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A Defense of Subjectivist-Internalism About Reasons City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2016 Actions, Reasons and Self-Expression: A Defense of Subjectivist- Internalism about Reasons Carolyn P. Plunkett Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1269 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] ACTIONS, REASONS AND SELF-EXPRESSION: A DEFENSE OF SUBJECTIVIST-INTERNALISM ABOUT REASONS by CAROLYN PLUNKETT A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York. 2016 © 2016 CAROLYN PLUNKETT All rights reserved. ii Actions, Reasons and Self-Expression: A Defense of Subjectivist-Internalism about Reasons by Carolyn Plunkett This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ____________________ _______________________________ Date John Greenwood, Ph.D. Chair of Examining Committee ____________________ ________________________________ Date Iakovos Vasiliou, Ph.D. Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Jesse Prinz, Ph.D. (Supervisor) S. Matthew Liao, Ph.D. Jennifer Morton, Ph.D. John Greenwood, Ph.D. Iakovos Vasiliou, Ph.D. THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Actions, Reasons and Self-Expression: A Defense of Subjectivist-Internalism about Reasons by Carolyn Plunkett Advisor: Jesse Prinz, Ph.D. The central question of my dissertation is: what makes it the case that certain considerations are reasons for acting? This is a question about the truth-makers of claims about reasons, that is, what makes it the case that one has a reason to Φ rather than Ψ. There are two leading camps in the philosophical debate devoted to answering this question: subjectivism and objectivism. Subjectivist theories hold that one has a reason to do something when one has a non-truth evaluable favoring attitude towards that thing, e.g. desiring it. Objectivist theories insist that one’s desires are irrelevant to establishing the existence of reasons; that some action or desire is morally good or valuable is equally and universally reason-providing, whatever else individual agents happen to desire. I argue that all reasons for action are subjective; that, conversely, there are no objective reasons. After rejecting objectivism and providing a general defense of subjectivist views, I defend a more nuanced subjectivist-internalist position called Expressive Reasons. Subjectivist-internalism is the view that reasons are not only rooted in agent’s desires, but also that it must be possible for a reason to serve as the basis for an individual’s action if it is to be a reason in the first place. Expressive Reasons is the particular view that R is a reason for A to ϕ when ϕ-ing is an expression of soundly deliberating A’s self; and A, under ordinary conditions, would act on the basis of R. I argue that Expressive Reasons has unique philosophical advantages over competing views of reasons, and that it has compelling practical advantages in how it directs us to respond to different others. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I owe the completion of this dissertation and any success to the people and institutions mentioned here, and then some. Always the cheerleader that I needed, Jesse Prinz was a wellspring of support. His suggestions and clear, constructive criticism were extremely helpful in the development of this dissertation. I am indebted to Matthew Liao for taking on a CUNY student and advising me not only on this paper, but also various other projects in bioethics. Matthew has been incredibly generous with his time, attention, and guidance. John Greenwood, Iakovos Vasiliou, and Jennifer Morton provided very useful comments as I prepared for defense, and made the whole process very pleasant. I would not have made it this far without Katie Tullmann. From the pro-seminar our first semester to dissertation writing retreats in my last year, Katie coached me through graduate school. Her philosophical acumen is matched only by her kindness. Laura Kane has provided much-needed comic relief and commiseration, not to mention cafeteria cookies. Colleagues at the New York Society of Women in Philosophy showed me that philosophy is done best in groups, around a table. I am forever grateful to Gina Campelia and Rachel McKinney for introducing me to SWIPshop and to the women of NYSWIP for creating a forum for doing philosophy that is not intimidating, where one can present ideas and expect serious feedback without being made to feel small. Thank you to friends in the Emotions Reading Group and various Writing Accountability Groups for providing similar spaces. Parts of this project were presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting in March 2016 and in the Philosophy Department’s Dissertation Seminar. I thank audiences and colleagues for their attention and feedback. The City University of New v York provided research support through the Enhanced Chancellor’s Fellowship (2010-2015) and the Dissertation Year Fellowship (2015-2016). The Bioethics Program at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai provided support through their Ethics Fellowship, plus an active intellectual community. I owe many thanks to Arthur Caplan and colleagues in the Division of Medical Ethics at NYU Langone Medical Center for giving me the best incentive to finish this dissertation. I am thrilled and grateful to have the opportunity to do work that I love with such smart, supportive colleagues. My parents’ loving support has never wavered. I admire so much their commitment to education and to their family. Thank you for the freedom, confidence, and security to pursue my dreams and ideas in graduate school and beyond. Finally, I thank Sean for generously giving me the time and space I needed to work on this project. Thank you for not asking too many questions about philosophy. I love our tiny home and our life together. Motivation for this project came from a desire to vindicate individuals who have the do the seemingly wrong thing just to support their families and to survive. This dissertation is dedicated to them. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Overview of the Debate 1 1.1 The Conceptual Space 1.1.1 “Humean” Theories of Reasons 1.1.2 Varieties of Internalism 1.1.3 Subjectivism vs. Internalism 1.1.4 Clarifying Objectivist-Internalism 1.1.5 Hybrid Accounts of Reasons 1.2 Structure and Methodology 2. Objectivist Reasons & Objections 20 2.1 Objectivist-Externalism 2.2 Objections to Objectivist-Externalism 2.2.1 Contra-Argument from Intuition 2.2.2 Contra-Analogy Between Epistemic and Practical Reasons 2.2.3 Contra-Avoid a Regress 2.2.4 Contra-Argument from Metaphysics 2.3 Onto Internalism 2.4 Objections to Objectivist-Internalism 2.5 Final Thoughts 3. Why Subjectivism? 52 3.1 Disanalogy to Reasons for Belief 3.2 Argument from the Constitutive Aim of Action 3.3 Evidence of Reasons 3.4 Avoiding Presumptuousness 3.5 Avoiding Alienation 3.6 The Pillars of Subjectivism 4. Ideal Advisor Accounts of Reasons 79 4.1 Ideal Advisor Accounts of Well-Being and Reasons 4.2 An Externalist Account 4.3 Objections in the Literature 4.3.1 Ideal Advisor as Nomologically Impossible 4.3.2 Ideal Advisor is Unrecognizable 4.4 Alien Recommendations 4.5 Motivating Subjectivist-Internalism vii 5. Subjectivist-Internalisms 103 5.1 Generic Internalism 5.2 The Conditional Fallacy 5.3 Can Internalists Avoid the Conditional Fallacy? 5.3.1 Full vs. Practically Rational Selves 5.3.2 Action Descriptions and Explanations 5.3.3 A Somewhat Less Idealized Account 5.3.4 Do We Really Need to Worry about the Conditional Fallacy? 5.4 Reasons as “Normativized” Explanations 5.4.1 Reasons as Explanations 5.4.2 “Normativized Explanations” 5.4.3 Sound Deliberation 5.4.3.1 Improved Information 5.4.3.2 Imagination 5.5 Manne’s Modifications 5.6 Limitations: The Need for a Stronger Defense of the Explanation Constraint 6. Expressive Reasons 137 6.1 Self-Expression & Action: An Argument for the Explanation Constraint on Reasons 6.1.1 Self-Expression 6.1.1.1 Self-Expression Shows Cares 6.1.1.2 Self-Expression Shows One’s Cares 6.1.1.3 Self-Expression Can be Overt or Non-Overt 6.1.1.4 Self-Expression Does Not Require an Audience 6.1.1.5 Self-Expression Can be Successful or Unsuccessful 6.1.2 Actions Self-Express 6.1.3 Actions, Reasons and Self-Expression 6.1.4 The Advantages of the Argument for S-I from Self-Expression 6.2 Expressive Reasons 6.2.1 Sound Deliberation 6.2.2 Ordinary Conditions 6.3 Some Objections and Replies 6.3.1 A+ is Not Idealized Enough 6.3.2 The Problem of Self-Knowledge 6.3.3 ER is Incoherent 6.3.4 Certain Selves Shouldn’t be Expressed 6.4 Not Anything Goes 6.5 Conclusion Bibliography 175 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Taxonomy of Views about Reasons 5 ix Chapter 1: Overview of the Debate It’s a common occurrence. Teddy and George are arguing about what restaurant to go to on Saturday night. In defense of his choice, Teddy says, “I just read a great review of the oysters at John Dory Oyster Bar in the New York Times; let’s go there.” George responds politely, “I don’t like oysters. I know a great Peruvian place, let’s do that.” Teddy reminds George, “But I don’t like Peruvian.” The debate continues.
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