Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1

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Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle

DANIEL WASHBURN London School of Economics, London, UK

The model of enculturation I propose operates with a claim that individuals are intrinsically idiosyncratic. Support for individual idiosyncrasy begins at the level of neurons and goes on to encompass inter-individual phenomena. I draw on cognitive and social theory to support my position. In particular I consider the work of neurologist Gerald Edelman (2004) and his “theory of neuronal group selection” (TNGS) and Sahlins (2000) and his theory of culture. The model of culture presented here is designed to account for the phenomenon of individual idiosyncrasy. For this reason, culture is necessarily presented as a process -- and I am calling the process “enculturation.” The cognitive phenomena that allow language and signs to be shared between people are, within each individual, constantly changing via idiosyncratic neuronal firing patterns and via the incorporation of new experience and altered memory. The concept of memory is discussed in relation the model of enculturation. The durkheimian position, that social scientists should focus on collective representations and avoid making social claims based on the operation of individual minds (Durkheim, 1915:15-16; 1952:213) is given consideration. Cognitive research is introduced to suggest links between experience and memory (such as Edelman’s concept of the “remembered present”) and to establish the function of “the degenerative principle”. The work of Libet (2004) is utilized to suggest that conscious awarenesses are preceded by unconscious processes (i.e., processes outside reflective consciousness), and as such we are forced to conclude that unconscious processes initiate our conscious experiences. This raises questions of agency and free will. It is suggested that the process of cognitive association leads to novelty as a result of the instability of recurrent memory and the intrinsic idiosyncrasy of neurons. Enculturation then, can be seen as the activity of association as augmented by intrinsically idiosyncratic phenomena. Parallels are drawn between Bakhtin’s dialogic principle and the enculturation model. The concluding section suggests avenues for the future.

Key words: enculturation, memory process, human brain, individual

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 49 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1

1. Introduction: The Problem of Culture and tion” where cultural structures operate in social the Individual interaction and “exist as ‘models’ or ‘symbolic resources’ external to actors” and on which ac- When social-cultural anthropologists are tors may draw during social activity. On the far faced with theory that homogenizes human be- end one finds the “hard/internal position,” al a havioural motives they may challenge the issue Bourdieu (1979), “whereby actors acquire a kind by pointing to the diversity of behavioural mo- of internal programming, which in turn gener- tives found in ethnographic studies. Mary Doug- ates their behaviour, or at least the parameters las calls this “the effects of Bongo-Bongoism.” of their behaviour” (Ortner, 1990: 84). Between She points out that “when a generalization is the extremes we encounter the middle position, tentatively advanced, it is rejected out of court the position supported by Ortner: “actors may in- by any fieldworkers who can say “this is all very ternalise a schema under certain conditions and well, but it doesn’t apply to the Bongo-Bongo” thus be constrained by its forms, but under other (1970; cited from the 3rd edition, 1996:xxxvii). conditions may re-establish a distance between Whilst this immediately raises questions about themselves and the schema” (1990: 84). how two different anthropologists interpret two Likewise Claude Lévi-Strauss, who different social environments, it also provides a is most well known for his particular brand of potentially powerful check on claims of behav- structural anthropology (in which he asserts the ioural principles developed with limited sets of universality of certain modes of human thought) data. Harvey Whitehouse, with his on-going in- paradoxically also concludes that all the mem- terest in cognition, has identified a trend, similar bers of the species Homo sapiens are so unique to Douglas, whereby ethnographers reject claims that they are logically comparable only as mem- of universal dispositions or cognitions given the bers of different animal or plant species. Social diversity and complexity they often encounter life, he writes: during fieldwork. As Whitehouse puts it: ...effects a strange transformation in the Such microscopic studies [he speaks system, for it encourages each biological individ- here of ethnographic and qualitative research] of ual to develop a personality; and this is a notion human sociality reveal the extreme complexity of no longer recalling specimens within a variety the processes by which behaviour and meaning but rather types of varieties or of species…and are generated and transmitted. To most ethnog- which could be termed “mono-individual”. What raphers, it seems absurd to account for a par- disappears with the death of a personality is a ticular religious belief in terms of universal cogni- synthesis of ideas and modes of behaviour as tive dispositions or susceptibilities since it is ob- exclusive and irreplaceable as the one a floral vious that the expression of a particular belief is species develops out of the simple chemical caused much more directly and substantially by substances common to all species (Lévi-Strauss, other prevalent beliefs, ideas, and cultural 'maps', 1966: 214). by complex personal motives, emotions, and in- tentions (both conscious and unconscious), by Thus some questions come to the fore: political and economic forces and constraints, can we speak of culture as a supra-individual by discursive conventions and embodied hab- phenomenon? If so, then how cognitively en- its, and by a host of other distinctive contextual compassing is culture? Likewise, what sort of factors…Thus the anthropological 'instinct' is to control do individuals exert over their behaviour? mistrust probabilistic notions of partial causality I shall approach these questions by presenting a and to seek instead more encompassing, quali- model I call the process of enculturation. tative accounts of social/cultural phenomena, in which what appears to be general turns out to be particular (locally distinctive) after all (White- 2. The Process of Enculturation house, 2001: 207). The term enculturation has been defined Given such dispositions toward particu- as “the process where the culture that is current- larism, anthropologists have developed theories ly established teaches an individual the accept- of culture which support varying levels of indivi­ ed norms and values of the culture or society in dual idiosyncrasy. Sherry Ortner (1990) provides which the individual lives…Enculturation helps a rough typology of these theories. On one end mould a person into an acceptable member of of her typology we have the “soft/external posi- society” (Kottak, 2007). Unlike prior definitions

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 50 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 of enculturation, including the definition above, ideas, language, and communicate with one I am defining the term as a process which modi- another despite the seemingly constant novelty fies the significance of cognitive associations. In of each and every brain state. my definition of enculturation we are concerned In neurological terms this ability to share with 1) describing the phenomena that valuate is a result of the principle of degeneracy -- a con- and signify categorical associations and 2) with cept which simply says that different structures understanding how such phenomena may pro- can yield the same outcome (a core concept of duce different outcomes for every individual. the theory of neuronal group selection). Peo- Culture and enculturation are examined as the ple born without certain parts of their brain can processes and practices of individuals. Like- go their entire lives without anyone -- including wise, it would not be appropriate to confuse my themselves -- the slightest bit aware that seem- definition of enculturation with prior definitions of ingly important structures are missing (Edelman acculturation or innculturation -- many of which and Gally, 2001). Such people can appear vir- invoke a supra-individual phenomenon called “a tually a-symptomatic. Likewise, it is possible to culture.” suggest that if two different structures within one The model of enculturation I propose brain can arrive at the same outcome then the operates with a claim that individuals are intrinsi- potential exists for different structures in different cally idiosyncratic. Support for individual idiosyn- brains to produce similar outcomes -- accepting crasy begins at the level of neurons and goes that two different individuals will have led differ- on to encompass inter-individual phenomena. I ent lives (Edelman, 2004). In social anthropology draw on cognitive and social theory to support Marshall Sahlins (2000) arrives at a similar con- my position. The work of neurologist Gerald clusion when he distinguishes “culture-as-consti- Edelman, in particular his “theory of neuronal tuted” from “culture-as-lived” and parallels these group selection” (TNGS), supports my claim of formulations with “sign-in-structure” and “sign-in- intrinsic idiosyncrasy. action.” Sahlins writes, “in structure the sign is Edelman’s theory is of interest to my fixed by differential relationships to other signs; definition of enculturation because it provides in action it is variously combined with other signs support for individual idiosyncrasy from the cel- in implicational relationships” (2000: 287). For lular level outward. For example, if one were to Sahlins this divide constitutes what I am calling observe neurons in the brain of another human individual idiosyncrasy. Sahlins says “as every one would find that no two are exactly the same such context by which the sign is substantially -- they are all morphologically different (Edelman defined is unique, so then is every individual’s and Gally, 2001). Comparison of “equivalent” expression of the culture-as-constituted” (2000: neurons from two different individuals reveals 287). Accordingly, Sahlins states “the individual that each has a somewhat different morphology. is a social being, but we must never forget that Even among genetically identical people we he is an individual social being, with a biogra- find differentiated morphology across so-called phy not the same as that of any one else” (2000: “equivalent” neurons (Edelman and Gally, 2001). 284). In other words, we may very well learn or According to Edelman, when these neurons are accept the dictionary definition of a particular used, that is when they “fire” and electric im- word only to find that our brain, with every recall, pulses travel between them and jump across sy­ reiteration, or utterance of the word is altering it napses, idiosyncrasy remains. For example, if a or associating it with other signs, memories, and research subject is repeating the same action, or concepts in idiosyncratic ways -- this assertion is trying to recall the same memory, the patterns by in fact the point of my drawing upon neurology. which his or her neurons fire (to allow such repe­ Imagine a new religious convert -- a tition or recall) are never quite the same (Edel- former atheist -- who now recalls vividly having man, 2004). Nevertheless, we quite easily share felt the presence of the Holy Spirit even during  Unlike other cognitive theories which are perhaps more his most steadfast atheist moments. In this case familiar to a social-science readership, such as the work the recalled is also the re-worked and the re-as- of Jerry Fodor (1983) or Dan Sperber (2001), Edel- sociated. The concepts of degeneracy and intrin- man’s TNGS does not rely on arguments of innateness sic individual idiosyncrasy constitute my primary nor does it make claims for “hardwired” modules. Rather Edelman provides a model of experiential development use of Edelman’s work. which can account for the apparent presence of module- The model of culture presented here is like phenomena alongside individual idiosyncrasy. Thus Edelman’s theory parallels important social-cultural the-  Originally published in Kruskal, W. (ed.) (1982): The So- ory, such as Sahlins (2000), whilst providing additional cial Sciences: Their Nature and Uses. Chicago: Univer- tools with which to conceptualise individual experience. sity of Chicago Press.

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 51 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 designed to account for the phenomenon of in- analyst to ask “by whom, in what context, and dividual idiosyncrasy. For this reason, culture is for or against whom” is memory invoked. Thus necessarily presented as a process -- and I am the social sciences have developed tools to ex- calling the process “enculturation.” The degene­ amine memory (or resurrect silenced memory) rative phenomena that allow language and signs among smaller and more discreetly defined so- to be shared between people are, within each cial groups. Psychology too has met this chal- individual, constantly changing via idiosyncratic lenge, but proceeded from the individual outward neuronal firing patterns and via the incorporation -- from Freud to social psychology. of new experience and altered memory. My mod- As such tools have developed, Cole el of enculturation posits a cognitive associative (2005: 109) reminds us that there has been a network within which Sahlins’s “implicational re- constant interplay between the role of the so- lationships” are continuously transformed and cial and the role of the individual. Kerwin Klein thus ultimately influence our moment to moment (2000: 136) points out that when “freed of the valuations and significations. Memory, as the ba- constraints of individual psychic states, memory sis that will allow for the establishment of any im- becomes a subject in its own right, free to range plicational relationship, is thus also transformed back and forth across time, even the most rigo­ with each recall. rous scholar can speak of the memory of events that happened hundreds of years distant, or to speak of the memory of an ethnic, religious, or 3. Memory racial group.” Yet, once the individual is back in, so to speak, we should not ignore the historical Although I shall be developing a particu- work of the social sciences that suggests various lar definition of memory as informed by neuro­ ways in which memory is constantly contextua­ logy, I do so with reference to the historical and lized. We could in fact suggest that biological contemporary understanding of memory em- models of memory ought to be able to sustain ployed in the social sciences. the findings present in anthropology and psy- Jennifer Cole (2005), whose work I shall chology. Drawing on the work of Webb Keane in draw from liberally, suggests that some social anthropology and Gerald Edelman in neurology, scientists (namely sociologists and anthropolo- is it possible to establish such a model. gists) have historically followed Durkheim’s sug- To begin, I suggest that in so far as our gestion when it comes to the study of memory. In neurology may be said to potentially transform particular, Durkheim suggested that social scien- memory (perhaps not always radically) it is pos- tists should focus on collective representations sible for my model to parallel Keane’s use of Witt- and avoid making social claims based on the ope­ genstein. Keane (2001) draws on Wittgenstein’s ration of individual minds (Durkheim, 1915: 15- concept of private language to ask how we might 16; 1952: 213). Maurice Halbwach’s 1950 publi- be able to tell that “the next time I have an ex- cation The Collective Memory (Halbwach, 1980 perience that it’s the same as before?” (2001: [1950]) takes up Durkheim’s position and argues 603). Keane goes on to suggest that similitude that memories only exist as long as the groups can occur as long as persistent form is present: that sustain them exist (see Cole, 2005: 106). In “something must be identifiable as ‘the same’ the 1980’s, according to Cole, Halbwach’s work about it, and that something must have a form” was “rediscovered” and social scientists began (2001: 603). For example, he points out, “any re- to write of “popular” memory that challenged offi-  Salvatore Cucchiari (1988) for example has observed cial and state narrative. Milan Kundera (1980: 1; changing memorial narratives as religious converts re- cited in Cole, 2005: 106) for instance, observed establish/re-tell their pre-conversion pasts with religious that “the battle of man against power is the bat- reference and memory. Likewise, the classic anthropo- logical controversy between Margaret Mead and Derek tle of memory against forgetting.” This trend of Freeman can be seen to hinge on the recontextualization research suggests that national memory, so- of memory: Mead’s claims about female sexuality in Sa- cially and historically, constituted, could leave moa were later challenged by Freeman (1983) who re- certain memories silenced or excluded -- per- turned to Samoa and interviewed Mead’s original inform- ants (who were then several decades older), many had haps a core perspective for the study of identity converted to Christianity and some claimed that they had politics that was developing in parallel. Thus as lied to Mead about their sexual activity. Cucchiari’s work anthropologists recognized the “hidden circuits however, suggests that a convert’s retrospective narra- of movement” (Stoler and Strassler, 2000: 8) in tive about their own life may constantly change and take on, for example, more Christian elements/observations. which some memories were silenced, it became,  I am quoting Keane as he briefly responds in a scholarly as Cole (2005: 106) suggests, the task of the journal to a theoretical article.

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 52 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 ligion that can be shared or persist over even Likewise, any inter-individual representation will a momentary interlude requires concrete forms, occur by virtue of the principle of degeneracy. In such as texts, clothing, architectural styles, of- these cases the sameness question put forth by ferings, gestures, credos, and pedagogic strate- Wittgenstein remains one of individual memorial gies” (Keane, 2001: 603). Edelman might point experience -- a phenomenon in which sameness out, in contrast to Keane, that even having an is not stable but, at best, degenerate. experience -- at least a subjective experience (by The potential for idiosyncratic and novel which I mean an experience present in reflec- developments in memory raises the question of tive consciousness), is already a phenomenon belief, as an analytical concept. Keane suggests of memory. It is what Edelman (2004) terms the that “belief ontologically follows on practice” “remembered present,” and suggests that any (2008: 117) and in most cases the development scene constructed in primary consciousness is of beliefs “depend on the prior existence of the a process of memory -- not only because there practices” -- though this is not to say that beliefs will be a delay in subjective reaction to the world are determined by practices. I can agree with this (a phenomenon Benjamin Libet (2004) calls premise once I subject the concept of belief, as subjective antedating back in time), but also be- an analytical concept, to a closer examination. cause according to Edelman each individual’s Belief entails memory (or at the very least some past experience is engaged in forming their inte- evidence of a relation to practice), yet different grated awareness of every single moment (Edel- kinds of memory may arise in different contexts man, 2004: 8). Thus concrete forms, in so far as and thus influence the stability of belief. they are remembered forms, may not be all that Turning to a religious context, for a mo- concrete. In fact it may be possible to argue that ment, we can review the work of Whitehouse the appearance of concreteness, in terms of its (2001) and Edelman (1997, 2004), and point out memorial invocation, is necessarily a function that memory may make a difference to future oc- of neurological degeneracy -- the subjective ex- currence of a belief. For example, the so-called perience of “sameness” (even when supported flashbulb formation of an episodic memory (say by concrete forms) must also be mutable to the following a traumatic and one-off initiation ritual) extent that we can account for, say, instances may behave differently from a neurological point of religious conversion. Intrinsic idiosyncrasy, of view than would so-called procedural memory present even behind seemingly degenerate oc- (an Orthodox priest performing the divine service currences as a function of our neurology, allows for the 2167th time may recall the procedure with for the persistent illusion of concreteness as es- ease but probably could not recall the 539th time tablished by the remembered present. any more easily than he could the 1323rd). The Certainly, as Keane suggests, “signs extent to which these two forms of memory will must be identifiable when repeated -- a truly influence future decisions may differ and so too unique event, whether stellar explosion or birth may the stability of the associated beliefs. of a saviour, remains opaque without some form that allows it even to be recognizable in the first place” (2001: 603). Of course, we should also 4. Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Human keep in mind that the identifiability of signs is not Freedom and the Process of Enculturation stable. Rather, identifiability is subject to change with each reiteration -- a phenomenon that paral­ In so far as enculturation is a process lels Sahlins’s model, in which the mutability of which modifies the significance of cognitive as- structure is possible with each new event. Keane sociations and makes some of these modifica- also allows for this potential by pointing out that tions outside of the individual’s reflective con- there is “no guarantee…that [signs] will remain sciousness, we have to address the problem of bound to a certain experience or frame” (2001: human freedom. By human freedom I mean the 603). Nevertheless, Keane proposes the con- nature and extent of an agent’s agency. cepts of “local ideologies” and “representational Benjamin Libet’s experimentation (2004) economies” as super-individual phenomena. To suggests that the brain begins to initiate and pre- my mind, raising either as an analytical concept pare for a voluntary act about 400 milliseconds ought to be accompanied by questions of stabil- before the person becomes consciously aware of ity, for local ideologies may be best seen as the his or her intention or wish to act (2004). To the summation of the moment to moment reitera- extent that it can be suggested that conscious tions of the ideologies of individuals -- and each awarenesses are preceded by unconscious reiteration is without guarantee of boundedness. processes (i.e., processes outside reflective

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 53 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 consciousness), we are forced to conclude that lows for the process of decisions made outside unconscious processes initiate our conscious of reflective consciousness. In other words, re- experiences. “Freely voluntary acts are found to gardless of the cause (which we may in fact not be initiated unconsciously before an awareness have conscious awareness of) we may indeed of wanting to act…” In other words, “conscious possess a feeling of absolute spontaneity in our free will does not initiate the volitional process; own behavioural and linguistic decisions. I can the brain initiates the process unconsciously” certainly ask you to do something spontane- (Libet, 2004: 197). Libet suggests that there is a ous and you can shout (or enact) the first thing mechanism within reflective consciousness that that comes to mind -- though crucially it may not can act like a “veto” on the progress of an uncon- “come to mind” in the sense that you will have scious decision (though he suggests that such a had conscious awareness of it before executing veto may only be available in those instances in the behaviour. This is a process similar to most which a person feels as though they have made of the conversations you will have had during a conscious decision). This is not to say that hu- your life. Chances are good that you did not stop mans are not free to veto the unconscious activi- and consciously choose each word before it was ties of the brain, but rather, as Libet claims, this uttered (to consciously choose is of course a veto power is posterior to the decision, and may doable task, but one that results in halting and itself, to a degree, be the feeling of deciding that hesitant speech). we occasionally experience on a small percent- In this light, whereby the use of lan- age of decisions taken. guage is also dependant on the process of en- This paper will not solve the problem of culturation, we can develop Sahlins’s position. human freedom (which is the question of how The distinction between “culture-as-constituted” humans come to make decisions -- whether by and “culture-as-lived,” can be read to parallel the free choice or other phenomena). It will however concepts of “sign-in-structure” and “sign-in-ac- provide examples in which the process of en- tion” -- where the former is fixed by differential culturation influences decision making. In so far relationships the latter consists of implicational as it is claimed that the enculturation process is relationships. Heidegger (2002) considers a a universal phenomenon this paper would sup- similar discrepancy when he suggests that “in port the Kantian argument that in nature nothing understanding the being of beings, we always is the cause of itself (i.e., every causation of a already understand being as divided” (2002: 30). cause follows on from a prior cause). Yet, as he points out, we are not aware of such However, where Kant then goes on to an understanding; or, more accurately, we have explore the notion of transcendental freedom, forgotten about it: we can only respond to the evidence at hand in this paper. Namely, we have to consider the ...at every moment we comport our- idea that any brain state will be based upon selves to the kind of beings which we as humans prior states. The question is to what extent this are, as well as to the kind of beings which we limits, say, imagination (or as Kant might put it, are not. We constantly hold ourselves in such absolute spontaneity). We seemingly can com- an understanding of being. Our comportment is bine our experiential memories and concepts to carried and governed by this understanding of have original thought -- but how intrinsically free being. Yet the fact does not occur to us as such. is this thought for any individual? To be fair, Kant We do not attend to it at all, so that we must suggests in The Critique of Pure Reason that as first be reminded of this self-evidency. We have long as he maintains casual determinism in re- forgotten it to such an extent that we have never gards to the natural world he accepts that he will actually thought about it. We begin our existence not be able to establish theoretically, with any with this forgetfulness of our understanding of evidence, a position of transcendental freedom. being, and the more we open ourselves up to Rather, he suggests that it is our conception of being free that can entail such a sense. In this  In flowing speech, according to Libet, the process and way, freedom -- in Kant’s transcendental defini- content have both been prepared outside of reflective tion as meaning absolute spontaneity -- if limited consciousness beforehand (Libet, 2004:108). To con- sciously realize each word and decide to speak it before to an experiential concept (the feeling of abso- it was spoken would result in hesitant and halting speech. lute spontaneity) is supportable by my process Most speech is flowing, and even the speaker learns of of enculturation model in so far as the model al- the outcome after he or she has spoken, “when a spoken word is something different from what the speaker would  This is Heidegger’s formulation of Kant’s position consciously like to have said, he usually corrects that af- (Heidegger, 2002). ter hearing himself speak” (Libet, 2004:108).

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 54 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 beings, the deeper becomes our forgetting of ence nor idiosyncrasy can be independently di- this one thing, that in all openness to beings we vested from the process of caused brain-states. understand being (Heidegger, 2002: 30). Creativity, as such, may operate in the same manner. To link this to Sahlins I would suggest that it is in the analysis of our use of language, or what Heidegger would call a reminder of self- 5. Functional Properties of the Intrinsically evidency, that we establish the principle of divi- Idiosyncratic Process of Enculturation sion, i.e, the differential relationships that con- stitute sign-in-structure. In our use of language, A model akin to Edelman’s Theory of when considered from the vantage point of Li- Neuronal Group Selection is what informs, from bet’s work on unconscious processes, we may a biological point of view, my model of encultura- indeed have forgotten about differentiation. The tion. According to Edelman (2004) the TNGS degenerative phenomena responsible for trans- has three tenets. The first is “developmental forming our divergent brain states into a sense of selection.” It is concerned with epigenetic vari- unified consciousness could be considered as- ations in the patterns of connections among sociative instances: As I start thinking of green growing neurons that create “millions of variant grass fields in spring time I begin to think of circuits of neuronal groups” (2004: 39). Edelman the smells of sweet pollens and the bleating of suggests that variations at the synaptic level oc- young sheep. It may be possible to suggest that cur as a result of the fact that “neurons that fire the associative content of, in this case, imagina- together wire together” as early as the embry- tion, is due to experiential influence on memory onic and foetal stage of development. He points and thus an outcome of enculturation (I happen out that, in the earliest development stages, to live in a village with many green fields and families of genes control organization, but this a fair number of sheep). To answer Kant, and soon gives way to organization on the basis of provide for transcendental freedom, I suspect I patterns of neural activity which leads to “highly would have to consider my ability to spontane- individualized networks in each animal” (2004: ously imagine a completely new being -- never 29). The second tenet is known as “experiential before conceived -- in the centre of the field. In selection.” According to Edelman, during and af- this sense we are approaching an absolute dif- ter developmental selection “large variations in ferentiation. However, in practice (and this, one synaptic strengths, positive and negative, result could argue, is why Kant establishes his concept from variations in environmental input during of practical freedom to replace the problem of behaviour” and these modifications are “subject transcendental freedom) my entirely-new-being to the constraints of value systems” (2004: 39). is an associative being: I immediately imagined The third tenet, “re-entry,” is a result of a process a dragon and then became alarmed that that during development in which various reciprocal was hardly original. In subsequent reiterations connections are established locally and between the beast received body parts from a plethora distant areas -- thus allowing for signalling be- of other animals, finally ending up as a cloud of tween areas (2004: 39-40). Taken together, light blue gas hovering a few feet above the field. Edelman claims that the three tenets form a It may simply be that we approach freedom by a selectional system, and so, in a similar fashion process of association. The suggestion here is as other selectional systems (such as evolution that association leads to novelty as a result of or the immune system), the first principle/tenet the instability of recurrent memory and the intrin- is seen as a way to generate diversity among sic idiosyncrasy of neurons. In other words, it is a population, the second is a way for extensive a process that allows for (as Sahlins might say) encounters to occur between elements of the every individual’s unique expression of the cul- population, and the third is a means to differen- ture-as-constituted. Enculturation then, can be tially amplify the “number, survival, or influence seen as the activity of association as augmented of those elements in the diverse repertoire that by intrinsically idiosyncratic phenomena. happen to meet selective criteria” (2004: 42). For My position raises questions related to neuronal groups the third principle -- which works causation and creativity. The model I present to enhance the synapses of selected groups - would tend to suggest that causation (i.e., the re- - is a response to a given group, or pattern’s, lationship between the cause of an action and its engagement with the value system, where the effect) is a product of both prior experience and value system is defined as “the constraining ele- idiosyncratic process, and thus neither experi- ments in a selectional system consisting in the

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 55 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 brain of diffuse ascending systems such as the ing development in part by a process involving dopaminergic system, the cholinergic system, excess neuron production, exuberant extension and the noradrenergic system…” (2004: 180) of neuronal processes that compete for targets and leading to the formation of categories in so in an activity-dependent fashion, variant cell far as it influences synaptic strength (a process migration, and massive cell death. Despite the Edelman calls “value-category memory”). Ac- very large number of neurons within any verte- cording to Edelman, this experience of the world brate nervous system, it is almost certain that no works quickly -- over the course of milliseconds- two neural cells within an animal are identical - and has been working even from the days of in overall shape. Similarly, no two “equivalent” the individual as foetus, to establish modifiable neurons taken from two different vertebrate indi- neuronal groups. This model potentially dispens- viduals have exactly the same morphology, even es with the need for innate or hardwired mod- if the animals are genetically identical. Typically, ules, although certainly module-like phenomena neurons in the brain receive synaptic input from (successful neuronal groups and the maps and many thousands of other neurons so that in hu- patterns that form these groups) will be present mans, for example, there are approximately one from birth -- but present as a result of selection billion synapses in each cubic millimetre of brain rather than innate. gray matter. The pattern of connectivity created In Edelman’s selectional model, and the by so many synapses within such a tiny volume principle of degeneracy, we encounter scope of tissue in one animal could not be genetically for Lévi-Strauss’s proposed mono-individual, pre-specified and, thus, must be unique to each who, whilst reflective of the world around and individual. hypothesized within some anthropological mod- els of the person to be part of a supra-individual Thus, the hypothesized associative net- phenomenon (see Linger, 2007, for a description work shall require further investigation. One in- of variation across models of the person within vestigative avenue that may prove fruitful is the anthropology), has the potential to remain idio­ study of language. As with my distinction of our centric. Degeneracy can be identified in inter- use of language from our analysis of language, it individual communication where equivalent but is possible to contrast my argument to that of the non-identical structures convey meaning, such deconstructionists. According to Sewell (2005) as in metaphor, anaphor, and polysemy (Edel- deconstructionists argue that most definitions of man and Gally, 2001) -- requiring, I would sug- culture are unable account for the instability of gest, maintenance and adaptation of something linguistic meaning. For Sewell, deconstruction- like an associative network. Ultimately, as Edel- ists “locate this instability in the signifying mecha- man and Gally (2001) suggest, and as will neces­ nism of language itself -- claiming that because sarily affect the behaviour of an individual and the meaning of a linguistic sign always depends the probability of a particular decision occurring on a contrast with what the sign is opposed to inside or outside of reflective consciousness: or different from, language is inevitably haunted by the traces of the very terms is excludes. Con- …the functional properties of the nerv- sequently, the meaning of a text or an utterance ous system of an animal depend largely on the can never be fixed; attempts to secure meaning patterns of structural and functional connectiv- can only defer, never exclude, a plethora of al- ity among the neurons in the system. But, with ternative or opposed interpretations” (2005: 167). the possible exception of animals having excep- However, there is also the possibility that whilst tionally simple body plans, the exact pattern of opposites (or other forms of difference) can cer- connectivity is not genetically pre-specified with tainly be used to define symbols -- and often are, great precision. Instead, the pattern arises dur- within, for example, deconstructivist analyses or the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, i.e., cases in  Thus the idea that an infant has some sort of “innate which the symbol is pondered for a time within re- physics” (Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman, 1985; flective consciousness -- the cognitive process- Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1991) might be better ex- ing of symbols during the decision formulations pressed under the TNGS as experiential physics. that occur outside of reflective consciousness  The principle of degeneracy, if applied to the individu- al level thus accounts for observation of not only cultur- may be concerned with the linkage of similarity al change across individuals and group, but also the po- via the refinement of cognitive associative net- tential for religious conversion, intragroup memory, and works. The search for the potential answers that any other occasions in which a self-defined member of a the brain requires to direct functions of mind, like group dissents from other member’s characterizations of the group. what words to place next in a stream of speech

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 56 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 may be influenced by the speed at which neu- veto power is posterior to the decision, and may ronal networks operate. There may be an upper itself, to a degree, be the feeling of deciding that limit to the speed at which neuronal networks can we occasionally experience during a small per- operate and, when they have to work quickly, the centage of decisions taken. potential inclusion of opposites may not be some- thing that the brain concerns itself over when engaged in certain functions that, nevertheless, 6. Parallels with other Studies: Dialogue, affect the individual’s use of symbol. Thus it is Re-entry and the Degenerate possible to argue, in a slightly different tone than that which is normally attributed to the project of Consider Bakhtin’s dialogical principle. deconstructionism, that it is because of associa- Bakhtin describes what he sees as a principle of tion that meaning is “not fixed” rather than be- difference between the human and natural sci- cause of difference/opposition. Also, note that ences: evidence for the presence of response plasticity in the brain may mean that “a particular region Mathematical and natural sciences do in isolation may not act as a reliable index for a not acknowledge discourse as an object of in- particular cognitive function. Instead, the neural quiry. …The entire methodological apparatus of context in which an area is active may define the the mathematical and natural sciences is direct- cognitive function” (McIntosh, 2000: 861). Unli­ ed toward mastery over reified objects that do mited plasticity would destabilize a neural net- not reveal themselves in discourse and commu- work (Nitsche et al, 2007) and to this end it is nicate nothing of themselves. In their practice, necessary to hypothesize a function/mechanism knowledge is not bound to the reception and in- that limits plasticity (suggestions might include: terpretation of discourses of signs coming from signal strength in particular neurons, such as the very object to be known. the originating cluster, which would potentially In the human sciences, as distinct limit the length of the associative path; function from the natural and mathematical sciences, of time to response, that is to say, how quickly there arise the specific problems of establish- an answer is required; the presence of symbolic ing, transmitting, and interpreting the discourse opposites which allow the network to define the of others (for example, the problem of sources range of potential meaning). In any case, the in the methodology of the historical disciplines). constraining of such a process, when momentar- And, of course in the philological disciplines, the ily happens, is thus potentially what allows for the speaker and his or her discourses are the funda- arrival of meaning and semantics in the course mental objects of inquiry (cited in Todorov, 1984: of thought. According to the models of cognitive 15). scientists (cited in Lang, Davies, Ohman, 2000), an individual’s associative network of information Whilst I will raise the point momentarily comprises knowledge structures that subsist in of the extent to which a degenerate process memory and “may be activated by input that con- could be considered a reified object as would be tracts representational units within the structure” required to sustain Bakhtin’s position, it is just (Lang, Davies, Ohman, 2000: 137). The words or as important to give credit to the more general image, for example, of Jesus Christ, may prompt, purpose of his argument, for on the issue of dis- within the individual, memory retrieval of a se- course he observes that: ries of declarative associations such as bearded male, worship, love, and other history dependant In poetics, history of literature (and in the associations, including images, and episodic history of ideology in general), or to a considera- memories. These associations may limit or im- ble extent even in the philosophy of language, no pinge upon the decision making process that, other approach is in fact possible; even the most for one example, governs the flow of speech – a arid and earthbound positivism cannot treat dis- phenomenon that generally happens too rapidly course neutrally as if it were a thing but is forced to be a function of free-will (Libet, 2004), that is to to engage in talk not only about discourse but say, too rapidly to be a function present within re- with discourse in order to penetrate its ideologi- flective consciousness, and whose content may cal meaning, which is attainable only by a form thus be limited by the existent of such associative of dialogical understanding that includes evalua- networks. This is not to say that humans are not tion and response (cited in Todorov, 1984: 16). free to veto the unconscious cultural activities of the brain, but rather, as Libet has suggested, this

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In my definition of culture I have sug- and can thus support text creation, say as a gested mechanisms of assessment and valu- process of thought, that has virtually unlimited ation in the generation of significance. Bakhtin uniqueness. For Bakhtin, uniqueness, like truth, provides for the presence of such mechanisms is the whole that does not repeat itself anywhere. in so far as dialogue is the product, at least in To this end Bakhtin (or his current supporters) part, of evaluation and response. By recourse ought to consider the scope for his definition of to a set of evidence on the phenomenon of de- truth as supported by the TNGS and its rendering cision making outside of reflective conscious- of the individual as “necessarily idiosyncratic.” ness, however, we can also raise the question In so far as individual idiosyncrasy can of whether ideological meaning, and the pene­ be supported, and this is the basis for my pro­ tration of which is considered by Bakhtin only cess of enculturation model, the reification, or possible with the production of further discourse, perhaps thingification of the subject, remains il- may actually remain unique to the so-call “human lusive and to this end Bakhtin’s claim that “there sciences.” In other words, it is possible to argue is no knowledge of the subject but dialogical” is that the penetration of ideological meaning is a supportable both with natural science and human process that can take place outside of reflective science models. Thus the limitation of my study consciousness and thus might become a “reified is the phenomena of dialogical context. I cannot object” of study in so far as, for example, the se- anticipate accurately how an ethnographic in- lectional process proposed by the TNGS can be formant, for example, will think, speak, or repre- considered reified. I will of course, suggest that sent themselves, consciously or otherwise, in the this is not the case, for the closer we come, in an absence of a dialogical process. I can suggest observable sense to reification, the more we see however, that their own process of enculturation a probabilistic and degenerate phenomenon with will influence the significance or meaning of any re-entrant pathways at its core. Yet, this does not dialogue in so far as their associative network appear to me a reason to support an argument is an ongoing process of valuation and assess- of difference in object between natural and hu- ment. Crucially, it is a process that I am unable man science (in the TNGS at least, intentionality to observe at all points (though the suggestion is and will are both dependant on local contexts in that it might proceed along lines similar to those the environment, the body, and the brain, and supported by the TNGS and my model of indi- “arise selectively only through such interactions” vidual enculturation). In this fashion, accuracy is (Edelman, 2004: 111)). For Bakhtin: limited, for as Bakhtin says, “in the human sci- ences, accuracy consists in overcoming the oth- er’s strangeness without assimilating it wholly to …man in his human specificity, is al- oneself” (cited in Todorov, 1984: 24). ways expressing himself (speaking) this is, al- We can expand on Bakhtin’s idea of limi­ ways creating a text (though it may remain in po- ted accuracy by reviewing his critique of Freud tentia). Where human being is studied outside of and suggesting an examination of the phenom- the text and independently of it, we are no longer ena that make dialogue possible. Bakhtin points dealing with the human sciences (but with hu- out that Freud should be re-assessed given the man anatomy, or physiology, etc. …)” (cited in dialogical principle, for despite Freud’s penchant Todorov, 1984: 17). to place human life on a biological basis and to highlight individual motivation as part of this evi- Surely the disconnection, if it actually dence, it is more appropriate, according to Ba- can be said to exist, is not so straightforward. khtin, to look to the interaction of the analytical By the unfortunate occurrence of cerebral infarc- situation between patient and psycho-analyst tions in some members of our population and as the producer of Freud’s evidence. As Bakhtin our subsequent observation of these members puts it, “what is reflected in these verbal -utter as well as by direct tests, we can establish some ances is not the dynamics of the individual soul, claims regarding human anatomy as the limiter but the social dynamics of the interrelations of and supporter of so-called text creation. There is doctor and patients (cited in Todorov, 1984). To- no point, as far as investigation has suggested, dorov (1984: 32) suggests that Bakhtin, by the where text creation would be free of physiology.  Emerson (1986: 26) points out that Bakhtin’s reading Rather, the case, at least when utilizing a model of Freud is “very selective.” “Nowhere does he engage akin to the TNGS, is that the natural sciences Freud’s most provocative works, the great socio-psycho- can define functions of anatomy that have infini- logical essays of the war years and the 1920s. In those works Bakhtin would have found a more complex oppo- tesimally small chances of repeating themselves nent and, at times, an uncomfortable ally.”

centar za politološka istraživanja the political science research centre 58 www.cpi.hr Daniel Washburn: Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle suvremene TEME, (2008.) God. 1, Br. 1 CONTEMPORARY issues, (2008) Vol. 1, No. 1 same reasoning, might declare that memories difference between their associative networks. are interpreted in the light of the structure of the Thus the so called “present relations” of the doc- present situation. Bakhtin, in discussing doctor tor and patient are dialogical once we account and patient, writes: “would it not be more cor- for each individual’s entrance into the relation in rect to say that the physician and the patient, terms of the ongoing process of individual en- having joined forces, are doing nothing but pro- culturation. Neither, as Bakhtin says, will wholly jecting into the unconscious complex (paternal overcome the strangeness (individual idiosyn- or maternal) their present relations, inherent to crasy and uniqueness) of the other; nor will a so- the treatment (more precisely, some aspects of cial scientist when representing his or her inform- them, or their general schema, since these rela- ants. Far be it to consider Bakhtin’s observation tions are very complex)” (Todorov, 1984: 32). I a limitation, for it is perhaps in learning that we would argue that if we op for the first clause of are all un-acquirable others that we strive even his more precise reformulation (“some aspect of more so to discover or share that which bridges them”) then we can reject the first statement that the realm of intrinsic strangeness. the patient and doctor are doing “nothing more but projecting into the unconscious complex (pa- ternal or maternal) their present relations, inher- 7. Considerations for the Future ent to the treatment.” The closest we might come to producing evidence for Bakhtin’s initial claim The theoretical model developed in this is by suggesting that where something akin to paper might benefit from exposure to a breadth neuronal group selection may be said to oper- of interdisciplinary approaches. Where I have ate in the brain, we can plausibly submit that argued, following Libet, for the influence of un- the patient and doctor are constant assessors conscious processes on behaviour -- including of their present relations only by virtue of prior language, and thus as part of the enculturation assessment of other contexts that now weight process, one may wish to explore the relationship upon their current relationship.10 The patient and between the so called unconscious and what I doctor can be said to be doing much more than have termed reflective consciousness. Are we “projecting their present relations.” Each, having speaking, for example, of some sort of thresh- undergone a unique process of enculturation, old of scale in terms of neuronal firings, or are arrives in their relationship with recourse to the we speaking, as Glimcher (2003) has suggest- meaning provided by their own idiosyncratic his- ed, of conscious thought as that which occurs tories, any meaning shared is only to the extent when the modes of inference (whether Bayesian that inter-individual signification might be called or otherwise) require valuations not currently degenerate. This is to say, the unique neuronal provided by our associative networks? Where I firing patterns of doctor and patient, may (or may have suggested, following, Edelman (2004), that not) produce significations that are mutually un- modules -- as defined by Fodor (1983) and dis- derstood; a phenomenon perhaps guided by the cussed by Sperber (2001) -- are not necessarily innate, one may need to gather evidence much 10 Libet (2004) has suggested that 1) conscious aware- earlier during the process of development and nesses are preceded by unconscious processes, that 2) unconscious processes initiate our conscious experi- be able to test for, or isolate, those phenomena ences, that 3) “freely voluntary acts” are initiated uncon- considered innate. Where I have claimed that sciously “before an awareness of wanting to act…” and individual idiosyncrasy limits meaning and thus 4) that conscious free will does not initiate the volition- disturbs claims of supra-individual phenomenon, al process; the brain initiates the process unconsciously. These claims can add to Bakhtin’s notion of the uncon- save for degenerate occurrences, it is necessary scious. Emerson (1986: 27) summarizes Bakhtin’s posi- to examine the production and sharing of know­ tion as follows: “the ‘unconscious,’ this is, the part of our- ledge between individuals -- if indeed knowledge selves that is outside our control and awareness, is best can be said to be shared given the process of en- comprehended as merely that portion of the conscious not yet articulate -- an ‘unofficial conscious,’ if you will, culturation or given something akin to Bakhtin’s or perhaps a struggle among various motives and voices dialogical principal. The social researcher, to this within the conscious.” Libet might argue that the uncon- end, might engage in self-reflexivity when inves- scious is the absence of so called struggle, whilst Edel- tigating the individual’s enculturation in regards man may point to the process of re-entry as construc- tive of neuronal patterns that, once consciously learned to new knowledge and experience; not only by (for example, the process Vygotsky describes when find- the process of researcher entering into dialogue ing that a child talks to itself more when learning to over- with the informant, but also by consideration of come obstacles (1934)), arise again only through inter- the researcher’s enculturation. action between the environment, the body, and the brain -- a form, perhaps, of the dialogical principle.

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References:

Baillargeon, R. (1987): Young infants’ reasoning about the physical and spatial properties of a hidden object, Cognitive Development, 2(3): 179-200 Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., Wasserman, S. (1985): Object Permanence in Five-month-old Infants, Cognition, 20(3) 191-208 Bourdieu, P. (1977): Outline of a theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Cole, J. (2005): Memory and Modernity, in Casey, C., Edgerton, R. (eds.): A Companion to Psychologi- cal Anthropology, Oxford: Blackwell Cucchiari, S. (1988): Adapted for Heaven: Conversion and culture in western Sicily, American Ethnolo- gist, 15(3): 417-442 Douglas, M. (1970): Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmologies, London: Cresset Press Douglas, M. (1996): Natural Symbols (2nd ed.), London: Routledge Durkheim, É. (1915): The elementary forms of the religious life, London: Allen & Unwin Durkheim, É. (1952): Suicide: a study in sociology, London: Free Press Edelman, G. M. (1987): Neural Darwinism: the theory of neuronal group selection, New York: Basic Books Edelman, G. M. (2004): Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness, New Haven: Yale University Press Edelman, G. M., Gally, J. A. (2001): Degeneracy and complexity in biological systems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98(24): 13763-13768 Emerson, C., Holquist, M. (1986): Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, Austin: University of Texas Press Fodor, J. (1983): The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Freeman, D. (1983): Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth, Canberra: Australian National University Press Glimcher, P. (2003): Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics, Cam- bridge: The MIT Press Halbwachs, M. (1980 [1950]): The Collective Memory, New York: Harper and Row Heidegger, M. (2002): The Essence of Human Freedom (T. Sadler, Trans.), London and New York: Continuum Keane, W. (2001): Comments [reply to Robbins, same issue], Current Anthropology, 24(5): 603-604 Keane, W. (2008): The evidence of the senses and the materiality of religion, Journal of the Royal An- thropological Institute, 14(s1): 110-127 Kottak, C. P. (2007): Window on Humanity: A Concise Introduction to Anthropology, Boston: McGraw- Hill Higher Education Lang, P. J., Davis, M., Öhman, A. (2000): Fear and anxiety: animal models and human cognitive psycho- physiology, Journal of Affective Disorders, 61: 137-159 Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966): The Savage Mind, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Libet, B. (2004): Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, Cambridge: Harvard University Press Linger, D. T. (2007): Identity, in Casey, C., Edgerton, R. (eds.): A Companion to Psychological Anthropol- ogy, Oxford: Blackwell McIntosh, A. R. (2000): Towards a network theory of cognition, Neural Networks, 13(8-9): 861-870 Mead, M. (1973): Coming of age in Samoa: a psychological study of primitive youth for Western civilisa- tion, New York: Morrow Nitsche, M. A., Roth, A., Kuo, M.-F., Fischer, A. K., Liebetanz, D., Lang, N., et al. (2007): Timing-Depend- ent Modulation of Associative Plasticity by General Network Excitability in the Human Motor Cortex, Journal of Neuroscience, 27(14): 3807-3812 Ortner, S. B. (1990): Patterns of History: Cultural Schemas in the Founding of Sherpa Religious Institu- tions, in Ohnuki-Tierney, E. (ed.): Culture through Time: Anthropological Approaches, Stanford: Stanford University Press Sahlins, M. D. (2000): Culture in Practice: selected essays, NY: Zone Books Sewell, W. H. (2005): Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

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Enkulturacija i degenerativni princip

DANIEL WASHBURN London School of Economics, London, UK

Sažetak

Model enkulturacije koji predlažem operira s tezom kako su pojedinci intrinzično idiosinkrazijski. Potpora idiosinkraziji pojedinaca počinje na razini neurona te na kraju zahvaća i interindividualne fenomene. Kako bih potkrijepio svoj stav, oslan- jam se na kognitivnu i društvenu teoriju, pogotovo rad neurologa Geralda Edelmana (2004.) i njegovu „teoriju selekcije neuronskih grupa” (TNGS) te Sahlinsa (2000.) i njegove teorije kulture. Ovdje predstavljeni model kulture predviđen je za prikazivanje fenomena individualne idiosinkrazije. Stoga se kulturu nužno predstavlja kao proces koji nazivam „enkulturacija”. Kognitivni fenomeni koji omogućuju jezik i znakove koje ljudi razmijenjuju stalno se mijenjaju unutar svakoga pojedinca putem idiosinkrazijskih neuronskih obrazaca paljenja te putem inkorporacije novog iskustva i promijenjenog pamćenja. O konceptu pamćenja raspravlja se u odnosu spram modela enkulturacije. Pridaje se pozornost dirkemovskom stavu kako bi se društveni znanstvenici trebali usredotočiti na kolektivna predstavljanja te izbjegavati izvođenje stavova o društvu na temelju djelovanja umova pojedinaca (Durkheim, 1915:15-16; 1952:213). Uključena su i kognitivna istraživanja kako bi se ukazalo na poveznice između iskustva i pamćenja (poput Edelmanovog koncepta „zapamćene sadašnjosti”) te kako bi se uspostavilo funkciju „degenerativnog principa”. Libetov (2004.) rad se koristi kako bi se ukazalo na to da svijesnoj percepciji prethode nesvijesni procesi (tj. procesi onkraj reflektivne svijesti) te smo stoga prisiljeni zaključiti kako nesvijesni procesi iniciraju naša svije- sna iskustva. To budi pitanja o djelovanju i slobodnoj volji. Pokazuje se kako proces kognitivnih asocijacija vodi prema novinama kao posljedica nestabilnosti povratnog pamćenja i intrinzične idiosinkrazije neurona. Stoga se enkulturaciju može smatrati aktivnošću asocijacija pojačanom intrinzično idiosinkrazijskim fenomenima. Povučene su paralele između Bakhtinovog dijaloškog principa i modela enkulturacije. Završni dio donosi prijedloge za budućnost.

Ključne riječi: enkulturacija, proces pamćenja, ljudski mozak, pojedinac

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