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Beating the Islamic State: Selecting a New Strategy for Iraq and Syria

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Beating the Islamic State: Selecting a New Strategy for Iraq and Syria NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Beating the Islamic State Selecting a New Strategy for Iraq and Syria Ben Connable, Natasha Lander, Kimberly Jackson Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1562 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report presents findings and recommendations intended to help the U.S. government revise its strategy to defeat the Islamic State, a hybrid insurgent-terrorist group that, as of mid- 2016, controls considerable territory in Iraq and Syria and that claims over 30 global affiliates. This report presents research derived from a series of workshops and subject-matter expert elicitations on how to defeat the Islamic State in the heart of its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Research for this report was undertaken for the Office of the Secretary of Defense under RAND’s Center for International Security and Defense Policy. The research began in January 2016 and was completed in August 2016. RAND conducted this research in accordance with all applicable Department of Defense protocols for human subject protection, including Department of Defense Instruction 3216.02, Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research. The anonymized opinions and information provided by individuals for this research do not necessarily reflect official policies or positions of the RAND Corporation, the U.S. govern- ment, the Department of Defense, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is pro- vided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures and Tables .............................................................................................vii Summary ........................................................................................................ ix Acknowledgments .............................................................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Near–Clean Slate Strategic Analysis for a New U.S. Administration ..................................... 1 Focus on Iraq and Syria ......................................................................................... 2 Names Matter: ISIL, ISIS, DAISH, Daesh, or Simply Islamic State? ..................................... 2 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 3 Organization of This Report .................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER TWO The Rise of IS and Root Causes .............................................................................. 7 Mid-2016 Situation: The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria .................................................... 7 What Are the Root Causes That Allowed IS to Emerge and Thrive? .....................................17 CHAPTER THREE Assessing the Current Strategy to Defeat and Destroy IS ..............................................19 Counter-IS Organization and Planning as of Mid-2016 ...................................................19 U.S. Government Strategies for Countering IS as of Mid-2016 ...........................................21 The 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: A Reasonable Template ................................25 Summarizing the Modified Approach to Counter IS ...................................................... 27 CHAPTER FOUR Analyzing Options for Defeating IS in Iraq and Syria .................................................29 Selecting a Strategic Approach and Appropriate Counter-IS Strategic Design ..........................29 Analyzing Each of the Three Strategic Options .............................................................31 Summary ........................................................................................................ 40 CHAPTER FIVE A Comprehensive Strategy to Defeat IS in Iraq and Syria .............................................41 Preliminaries .....................................................................................................41 Proposed Strategy: Defeating IS in Iraq ..................................................................... 46 Defeating IS in Syria ............................................................................................53 Summary .........................................................................................................61 v vi Beating the Islamic State: Selecting a New Strategy for Iraq and Syria CHAPTER SIX Conclusion ......................................................................................................63 An Argument for a Long-Term Strategy to Address Root Causes ........................................ 64 Actions Above the Options: What Can Be Done Within Any Strategic Design ........................65 Abbreviations ...................................................................................................67 Bibliography ....................................................................................................69 Figures and Tables Figures 1.1. Methodology and Analytic Approach ............................................................ 5 2.1. Islamic State Estimated Zones of Control in Iraq and Syria .................................. 9 3.1. CJTF-OIR Command Relationships .......................................................... 20 3.2. Various Official Articulations of the Counter-IS Strategy as of Mid-2016 ................ 24 Tables 4.1. Selecting a Grand Strategy....................................................................... 30 4.2. Continuous CT Approach ........................................................................32 4.3. Assessment of Continuous CT Option .........................................................33 4.4. Practical Stability Approach ..................................................................... 34 4.5. Assessment of Practical Stability Option ....................................................... 36 4.6. Legitimated Stability Approach ................................................................. 38 4.7. Assessment of Legitimated Stability Option ....................................................39 vii Summary As of late 2016, the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi Army was seeing progress in the fight to push the Islamic State (IS) out of Iraq, but at the same time, the group continued to plan and conduct international terror attacks. While losing ground in such places as Sirte, Libya, IS retains control of the core terrain of its so-called caliphate in Syria. IS continues to inspire young men and women around the world to conduct spontaneous acts of violence, unsettling Western democracies and threatening American national security. New options are needed to defeat IS, stabilize the Middle East, and reestablish a sense of domestic security in the United States and Europe. To that end, this report presents findings from research on the strategy to counter IS. It offers three options for a new strategic design and recommends a long-term approach that seeks to defeat IS by establishing legitimate governance in Iraq and Syria. Suc- cess against IS can best be achieved by removing the political, social, and physical space that it needs to survive. There is little hope for immediate resolution of this complex problem or for the rapid emergence of good governance in Iraq or Syria; this strategy will necessarily entail a long-term commitment to both countries. IS is a hybrid insurgent and terrorist group that,
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