"STRANGER THAN FICTION": ANGLO-AMERICAN-GERMAN

RELATIONS AND RIVALRIES THROUGH INVASION

LITERATURE: 1890-1914

A THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF HISTORY

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE

TEXAS WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

BY

MICHAEL D. STEWART, B.A.A.S., M.A.

DENTON, TEXAS

DECEMBER 2012

l'KXAS WO.MAN'S UNIVERSITYU�RARY TEXAS WOMAN'S UNIVERSITY DENTON)' TEXAS

July 12, 2012

To the Dean of the Graduate School:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Michael D. Stewart entitled "Stranger than Fiction: Anglo-American-German Relations and Rivalries through Invasion Literature: 1890-1914." I have examined this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts with a major in American History. '

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Department Chair Copyright© Michael D. Stewart, 2013 all rights reserved.

111 DEDICATION

To Elizabeth, who helped me to see a better future.

lV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No work ofliterature happens in a vacuum, and this work is certainly no exception. First I'd like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Paul Travis for his critiques, suggestions, and general shepherding of this paper to its proper conclusions. From one

(almost) scholar of German history to another, I give my gratitude. Thanks must also go to the staff of the library of the University of North Texas for their assistance in obtaining some of the more obscure texts referenced herein. Their patience and diligence cannot be thanked enough. Next, I must thank Dr. Laura Stem for her assistance in navigating the treacherous seas of overall graduate work and research. Its safe to say that without her intervention this work would never have seen publication. Also, the pioneering work of

I.F. Clarke must also be mentioned. If this work is considered of any scholarly benefit, it is because I stand on the shoulders of this research giant.

Additional thanks must be presented to the staff and volunteers of the Internet

Archive (www.archive.org) for their efforts to provide public domain books (no matter how arcane) to the public as free downloads on their web pages. Thanks to your effort, there are now more books available to more people than perhaps ever in history. Perhaps the result of providing electronic access for scholars was not intentional, but I appreciate the results nonetheless.

V Furthermore I must thank my family whose support and faith have kept me going when things seemed most bleak. My father and in-laws in particular have never stopped believing that something worthwhile might come out of my odd fascination with wars that never were.

Finally, I must thank my wife Elizabeth for her unwavering solidarity, criticism, and general poking to move me towards this emphasis and scholarship. It's trite, but I truly believe that without her love and support I would never have even begun this journey of study and research. Thanks, hon.

Vl ABSTRACT

MIKE STEWART

"STRANGER THAN FICTION": ANGLO-AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS AND RIVALRIES THROUGH INVASION LITERATURE: 1890-1914

DECEMBER 2012

The speculative literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are usually considered escapist fiction and not germane to historical study. This paper proposes that by studying the sub-genre of literature called "Invasion Literature. This paper postulates that one can understand the mindset of a nation's people during the time period the story is written in. Such stories not only influenced public mood but in turn were influenced by this mood, as their popularity during this time period reveals. This paper considers the Invasion Literature of three nations; the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. All three nations were under increasing pressure to either maintain their world power (in the case of Great Britain) or in the case of the United States and

Germany, to increase their national power. This competition would result first in a naval arms race and eventually the First World War.

Vll TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COPYRIGHT ...... iii

DEDICATION ...... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... V

ABSTRACT ...... vii

LIST OF TABLES ...... ix

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

II. VOXPOPULI AND SETTING THE STAGE ...... 14

III. GREAT BRITAIN, "RULE BRITTANIA" AND PERFIDIOUS ALBION ...... 38

IV. "DEUTSCHLAND UBERALLES" (GERMANY OVER ALL) ...... 55

V. THE UNITED STATES, AMERICAN COUSINS, AND MANIFEST DESTINY ...... 66

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FACTS OF FICTION ...... 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 99

ENDNOTES ...... 105

vm LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Output of Iron Ore ...... 6

2. Merchant Shipping ...... 6

lX CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The story of history is a tableau of change. Nationalities rise to preeminence and decline into obscurity. Empires rise and fall, and renowned leaders have their moments of greatness only to be replaced by others in the tapestry of human events. So it is little wonder that the nineteenth century saw the page of history being turned once again and a new world order being forged. Added to this turbulent but expected changing of the guard was the Industrial Revolution; an event unmatched in human experience since the dawning of the Iron Age. This seminal event brought nations to the fore and into conflict with each other faster and with potentially more danger than in any prior century. i

International rivalries are hardly new, but the nineteenth century was unique in that it held a significant population in industrial nations that were literate. Not only educated, but interested in international events and relations and their homeland's place within them. These interests were both driven by and drove leaders into policies that set the criteria for relations to the present day. This paper will investigate the novels of three nations; the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the German Empire of

Kaiser Wilhelm II. These novels, written for mass public consumption, created a genre of writing called alternately "Invasion Literature" and "Future War" stories. What these stories portray in their pages is tangible evidence of how public perceptions shaped the foreign policy of their respective nations until the onset of the First World War of 1914. 1 The closing decades of this century of change were expressed in rapid advancement in scientific theory, technology and culture. New theories, new devices and original ways of viewing the world and man's unique role within it were being exchanged among populations in ever greater and greater numbers. The old concepts of theology, monarchy, and mercantilism were giving way to new beliefs and methods of governance.

The world in general, but the European and North American nations in particular, were at the crux of most of these changes. ii As often with such events, the older nation-states that were viewed as "Great Powers" were being supplanted by new ones; the latter demanding their share of the world's riches while the former strove to retain their preferred positions.

The traditional 'Great Powers' of Europe had been France and Russia as land powers, Austria as the pivotal state within Central Europe, and Britain as a wealthy but predominantly maritime nation, iii but the nineteenth century found France's Bonapartist

Empire overthrown in 1815, and Paris's authority veering from republic to empire to republic yet again. The French army's poor showing in the Franco-Prussian War of

1870-1871 was a shock to many military analysts of the time and it was said to presage

French military decline. After the 1870s, French arms could only claim victories against

African and Oriental potentates; not against a European foe. iv

The old empire of Austria, the remnants of the Medieval Holy Roman Empire, found itself defeated repeatedly by Napoleon's Grand Armee. Only the naval battle of

Lyssa against the Kingdom of Italy in 1866 broke an otherwise long string of defeats suffered by Austrian forces throughout the century.v The Emperor in Vienna found 2 troubles within the boundaries of the empire as well. After 1867 the Hapsburg monarch was forced to create a dual state to assuage the nationalistic demands of the Magyars of

Hungary. This new state, called the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the Dual Monarchy, spent the balance of the nineteenth century in a desperate search for unity in the face of rising nationalism. The Balkans held the majority of the Hapsburg lands, and the peninsula was a nest of various peoples and cultures. Since Hungarians had been given a privileged status in the Empire equal to the ruling Germans, the empire's other minorities dreamed of repeating Hungary's good fortune for themselves. After all, why couldn't a

Dual Monarchy become a Triple one?vi

The Czar of all the Russias did not sit his throne with confidence either. The

Russian Empire was defeated in the Crimean War of 1854-6 by Britain and France.vii

However, these battles had more in common with the limited campaigns of the eighteenth century than the wars of nationality that would comprise the latter half of the nineteenth and the entirety of the twentieth century. In spite of this defeat, Russia was still considered a monolithic land power with designs in Europe and Asia.viii Unlike most of the Czar's European neighbors, Russia had no colonial holdings per se; merely large tracts of steppeland in Northern and Central Asia. Czarist troops played power games in the Central Asian states (including Afghanistan) with the British Raj. This 'Great Game' was played for influence throughout South Asia, and there were many who feared

Russian expansion in all parts of the region. ix But new powers were on the horizon. The

British Empire began to coalesce in the eighteenth century, but reached its zenith in the 3 nineteenth. Great Britain was instrumental in the defeat of Napoleon, though this was more to do with English gold subsidizing continental armies and the Royal Navy strangling French trade than the puissance of English troops. Nonetheless, Great Britain found itself emerging from the Napoleonic Wars stronger, richer and more confident than ever before. Added to this was England's role as the birthplace of the Industrial

Revolution and one can certainly see that by the last years of the nineteenth century the

British Empire felt itself in a unique position as a world power, what historians would call in the latter half of the twentieth century a 'Superpower. ,x

Yet other nations were beginning to march their way to greatness. The United

States of America began its existence as a predominantly agricultural nation with a weak and decentralized government until after the Civil War (1861-1865).xi The Republic found itself emerging from that internecine struggle ironically stronger and more industrialized than ever before. This trend continued through the rest of the nineteenth century, with the USA becoming progressively more populous, developing more resources, and perhaps most importantly of all becoming a burgeoning seat of innovation and industrial expansion. Though most of the United States' development was internal to the contiguous states and Alaska, the USA was nonetheless a nation with a sense of destiny and its own greatness. Despite formal government policy, American citizens and ministers alike took their own measures to try to expand the reach of the United States; men such as Ministers Stevens and Sanford Dole in Hawaiixiiand Commander Meade in

Samoaxiii did their best to force Washington's hands, but not until the Spanish-American 4 War of 1898 did the US government and people alike decide on their nation becoming a player on the world stage.

The last of the 'Great Powers' on the scene, the German Empire was formed from a collection of small German states united in 1871 under the leadership of the Kingdom of Prussia. This empire, a latecomer to both political unity and the Industrial Revolution, was by the tum of the century overtaking its erstwhile ally Britain in industrial output. xiv

Having the most effective army on the continent, the Reich began to worry the English when Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Tirpitz cast covetous eyes toward naval power and its exercise in world affairs. To this end, the German's pseudo-Parliament the Reichstag passed the first of the Naval Laws (1898) that gave as its goal to build Germany a first class navy _xv Geography dictated that this fleet would best serve German interests in the

North Sea. It could be based in the Baltic, but such would be easily trapped by a hostile

Denmark (still smarting from the loss to Germany of the duchies of Schleswig and

Holstein in 1864.xvi) or any other fleet that took station in the narrow opening into the

North Sea. This goal, as Wilhelm II put it, for Germany to 'Seize the Trident' put Britons ill at ease.xvii

Adding to this Germany's growing economy and the inescapable statistics of

British industrial decline as shown below:

5 Table I.Output of Iron Ore

Year I Germany lu.K. 1890 8,047 14,002

1895 8,437 12,817

1900 12,793 14,253

1905 16,848 14,825

1910 22,446 15,470

1914 20,505 15,107

Note: in thousands of metric tonsxviii

Table 2.Merchant Shipping

Year Germany U.K.

1890 593 5043

1895 796 6122

1900 1319 7208

1905 1883 9065

1910 2383 10,443

1913 2832 11,273

Note: in thousands of metric tonsxix

6 Such statistics created a feeling of assertiveness in the German government and public as well as a growing sense of friendlessness to the formerly isolationist Great

Britain.xx In short, Britain needed friends and allies. She eventually would obtain one in the United States, an alliance that would grow despite rough patches into the 'Special

Relationship' known to political observers to the current date. The USA and the British

Empire would ally against the German Reich, at first politically and maintain this alliance against the Soviet Union afterwards. Despite the fall of the Iron Curtain and a changing global stage, the alliance of the United States and Great Britain is a major factor in the world today.

But was such a result inevitable? Kaiser Wilhelm II seemed to think so. He often complained of the "Conspiracy of the Anglo-Saxon Powers" against Germany and that the Reich could never breach that link of blood between the USA and the UK.xxiBut was this true? Was the politico-economic alignment of the English-speaking nations inevitable due to similarity of culture and shared values as often claimed by many

Anglo-American politicians of the day?xxii Or was the Kaiser simply voicing sour grapes at being outmaneuvered by the British for American friendship?xxiii

Perhaps the single greatest force that influenced the final resulting alignments was that of public opinion. One would certainly expect public opinion to hold great sway in the democracies of the United States and Great Britain, but the public and its wishes were a force even in autocratic Germany. Often the Wilhelmstrass found itself being dragged into policies by public clamor instead of creating them from whole cloth.xxiv To be sure 7 individuals played their part, and Kaiser Wilhelm's missteps played a significant role in

Anglo-German hostility but all too often his bungling merely reinforced the view among

Anglo-Americans of Germany as an overbearing bully on the world stage.xxv

Where did the public get their perceptions of other nations? Politicians and public

leaders influenced opinions to varying degrees but the press must stand as the

predominant factor in both shaping and reflecting public views. Literature of the day

provided escapism to their readership to be sure, but such novels and serials were written

in a manner to both interest readers and increase sales. In this regard, giving readers a

view of foreign lands that meets their own expectations was an obvious way to increase

revenue. Books that portrayed other nations in manners not meeting with the public

viewpoint would have small sales regardless of the veracity of the works. This shaping of

their work to maximize profit then in turn reinforced preconceived notions among the

public. These expectations, even among escapist literature, had examples in all literate

societies of the day but especially in the industrialized nations of Europe and North

America.

It is the thesis of this paper to expose the reader to samples of this shaping of public perceptions of the 'Foreign Nation' and how these compare among the three with the Anglo-American-German literature of the time. These works cover a variety of

speculative topics and many began as serials in popular newspapers and magazines only to be compiled later as novels. Certain of these novels created an entirely new genre; the

'Scientific Romance', or what we would call today Science Fiction. While some of these 8 tales spoke of far off lands and creatures, most, nevertheless, tended to emphasize conflicts among the nations of Europe in the near future. These tales would be categorized today variously as either 'Invasion Literature' or 'Future War' stories.25

Perhaps the most well known to the contemporary reader would be The Riddle ofthe

Sands by Erskine Childers, but there were hundreds published before and after this work.

Though none made as great a success as Riddle ofthe Sands, they nonetheless both shaped and were shaped by the respective audiences of the day in America, Britain and

Germany. xxvi

While a clear division of the field and its types is uncertain, the genre of Invasion

Literature can be divided into two broad types, which in tum mirror their intended effect.

The first type is that of the "Cautionary Tale" story. This type ofliterature warns that the reader's nation is falling to invasion and humiliation by their great enemy (this nation changed depending on international circumstances) because the writer's native government was too stupid or parsimonious to pay for the 'proper' precautions to defend the homeland. The specific precautions that were proper would of course depend on the agenda of the writer and the point of view of the national audience of the readership. For the British Empire, this was usually either not spending enough on the navy, not buying modem ships but maintaining antiquated hulks, or so depending on the navy that the

British Army was considered useless. Otto von Bismarck once stated that if the British army landed on the German coast he would simply "send the Berlin police to arrest them."xxvii It might have been a jocular statement from the Iron Chancellor, but it could have just as easily been said by Britons who feared the army was a non-entity as most·

9 funding went to the navy. In Germany, the precautionary tale was usually based on the army being "wasted" by incompetent civilian leaders (including the Kaiser) and/or being overwhelmed by enemies with the German foreign office having paid insufficient attention to gaining allies. The USA's authors usually belabored the great republic's history of keeping a tiny army and navy active during peacetime and only struggling to build both when a war was actually invoked. All too often the great wealth of the USA in these stories avails them naught; it is usually shorn away as war reparations to the ruthless victors who humbled the soft and greedy United States capitalists.

The second type of story is best described as "Jingoistic Thinking". These could start as the first type; usually a sneak attack or bolt from the blue from the perfidious and untrustworthy foreign enemy but the natural abilities of the individual citizen of the nation shines through and by dint of his (always a "him") pluck/ingenuity/discipline/etc. the foul invaders are thrown back and the country saved for the 'decent people' of the nation. So it starts as a cautionary tale, the leaders responsible for the shoddy state of affairs are quickly disposed of, and the great and good of the people save the day. This is still an attempt at the cautionary tale, but the writer's own chauvinism dictates that the

"good guys" must win in the end. A perfect example of this type was What Happened after Dorking? This was written by an anonymous author, which was published in 1871; shortly after the original Dor king. The author reprints the Dorking story entirely, but adds to the story with the British fleet and troops having counter-attacked and saved the day.

The Unparalleled Invasion, published in 1910 and written by the lauded American author

10 Jack London, has the W estem World saved from the evil Orientals of China by the use of biological weapons to 'clean' China of all Chinese and leave the area open to

Euro-American colonization. Germany's authors were no less involved in the Jingoistic

Thinking type of tale, as the 1914 workFrankreichsEnde in Jahr 19??_by Adolf

Sommerfeld reveals. In this story Perfidious Gaul tries to attack Germany via secret schemes but is found out and permanently trounced by German might. xxviii

These Literary Invasions were often subsidized by special interests in the nation in order to promote their own peculiar programs. For instance, the short story mentioned earlier Battle ofDarking (1871) written by General Sir George Tompkins Chesney and was self-admitted by the author to influence the British parliament to increase funding for the army.xxix To the shock of Europe, the Prusso-German army decimated the French

Empire in short order, with only local insurgencies dragging the war out for another year.

With the idea of the vaunted French army being a paper tiger, Chesney apparently felt that such a story as the Battle ofDarking would rouse public attention to the threat posed by their former ally.

Though the furor over the new German Empire died down for a while, the Battle ofDarking was a huge financial success. Blackwood's Magazine, where it first appeared, went through six reprints in just over a month. This dark tale had captured the public imagination as nothing had for decades. By June, John Blackwood decided to publish the

Battle ofDor king as a six-penny pamphlet and it sold at the rate of 20,000 copies a week; peaking at over 110,000 by July.xxx 11 What did this success mean? In short, it appears that war ceased to be the concern of the aristocracy and the educated classes and instead became a topic to be considered by all literate folk. A short story that had originally been submitted anonymously had captured the public imagination across the world. Dorking was reprinted in Danish,

Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Swedish; with reprints in the British

Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Even the United States found the story irresistible, and at the close of 1871, 18 different versions of the story were on sale in Great Britain alone; and a new literary genre was born. xxxi

This phenomenon, again, and its perceptions, will be considered in this paper as its thesis. The success of the genre was due in large part to how they captured the public mood of the day and the unique nationality's fears on the world stage. In this they represent inherent prejudices and reinforced notions of the 'ENEMY' and the dire fate that could befall the unwary. As such, the usual foreign villain of the piece is inevitably the nation that at the time of the story's writing was considered one of the major threats to the author's homeland. Of course, this can change with conditions. Henry Gratton Donnelly's

The Stricken Nation reflected a treacherous Britain defeating and humiliating a wealthy but helpless United States--which was a real concern in 1890, with the first Venezuelan

Crisis looming. The Bering Sea and the Alaskan boundary were points of contention between the USA and the British Empire that would take years to allay. In addition, The

Captain ofthe Mary Rose appeared in Britain in 1894 with France as the evil antagonist;

12 this was a place France would hold in British Invasion Literature until the tum of the century. xxxii

In sum, public opinions change and this author postulates that the shift of such public opinion is measurable by the successful and popular tales of "Wars to Come."

Rather than a league of Anglo-Saxon Powers against Germany, the Reich instead had great latitude to ally either with Britain or America to obtain Chancellor von Bulow's oft quoted 'Place in the Sun.' But public perceptions were as inhibiting on freedom of action on all three governments and such was shaped by and in turn shaped the mass media and

Invasion Literature.

13 CHAPTER II

VOXPOPULI AND SETTING THE STAGE

The cultural biases and preconceived notions of a people do not emerge

spontaneously as Athena from Zeus's brow. Such viewpoints are as much influenced by

their past relations with nations as much as any current events. What were the relations

of Great Britain, Germany and the United States prior to 1890?

The march of history often contains odd occurrences among peoples, leaders and

societies. Those events resulted in the nineteenth century with the British Empire and the

German States (especially Austria and Prussia) as firm allies against Revolutionary

France. The French state, from Louis XIV' s Kingdom to the First Republic and

Napoleon's empire dominated the European continent and commanded respect from all of

its neighboring polities. By the early nineteenth century Hapsburg authority in the

Empire, on the wane since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) was irreparably damaged after

Napoleon's defeat of the Austrian forces and the formation of the Confederation of the

Rhine. While the monarchs of Europe tried to undo Napoleon's works in Germany, it was

a lost cause. The defeat of the French tyrant had opened the floodgate of German

nationalism. The only question was what form the new Germany would take and what its

borders would be. xxxiii

Another issue would be French interests, since Paris had maneuvered since the

Thirty Years War (1618-1648) to keep 'The Germanies' weak and disunited. The French

14 nation (Kingdom or Republic) had consistently been the preeminent military power of

Europe. xxxiv France could be courted, feared, or battled against; but never ignored.

Emperor Napoleon I eventually replaced the Enlightenment-inspired French Republic with an empire complete with a new aristocracy but this did not calm jittery European crowns. After all, if a petty country squire from Corsica could overthrow a monarch and declare himself an emperor, what did that say of the divine right of kings? After the

French Revolution the danger ceased to be simply a military threat but morphed into a threat that resulted in danger to all Monarchial Europe. Added to this was the Pandora's box of nationalism sweeping across the continent. xxxv

The French revolution was inspired by a multiplicity of factors, not least their own Enlightenment philosophers. Another influence, though its degree is debatable, was that of French exposure to the American Revolution against Great Britain. French soldiers, though sent by the King of France to battle the British foe more than to support any stripling republic, nonetheless were exposed to the idea of self-determination for the common man. xxxvi

After the battle that ended Napoleon Bonaparte's reign over France, Waterloo in

1815, and the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, the threat of France (and the French

Revolution) seemed tamed. The War of 1812 between England and America was concluded the same year, though hostility remained in the United States against the old

British foe. However, the returned Bourbon monarchy was overthrown in 1830 only to be replaced by a branch of the royal Bourbons from Orleans. This 'Citizen King' was

15 soon replaced by another experiment in democracy; the Second Republic in 1848. Like the First Republic before it, it was in turn deposed by a Napoleon; the nephew of the scourge of Europe in 1851; first as dictator and then as Emperor one year later.

However, Louis Napoleon (or Emperor Napoleon III as he styled himself in 1852) seemed far less interested in exporting radical ideals to Europe and instead played the diplomatic game as the Bourbon kings did before him. Unlike his famous uncle, this

Bonaparte preferred negotiation over the battlefield. xxxvii All in all, Europe appeared to be returning to the diplomatic sparring and 'Cabinet Wars' of the prior century.

This fa9ade of calm was changed when Otto von Bismarck became

Minister-President of Prussia in 1862. Bismarck, like the Frankfurt revolutionaries of

1848 was also a German nationalist; but of a different stripe altogether. He wanted to see a united Germany; the lost dream of the Medieval Holy Roman Emperors. But instead of a revitalized Austria again controlling the Imperial fate of Germany, the unscrupulous scion of the landed aristocratic class called Junkers wanted the Prussian kingdom to be t h e axis• o f any 1uture~ German state. xxxviii

His first military action in this goal, the war with Denmark over

Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, was the first strain on the firm friendship of Great Britain and Prussia. Though Queen Victoria's opinions were more sympathetic to Prussia than

Denmark, the Prince of Wales and his bride Alexandra (a Danish Princess) were resolutely against "That madman in Berlin."xxxix Prince Edward, however, remained good friends with his sister's husband Frederick the Crown Prince of Prussia. For the rest of

16 her life, Alexandra hated Germans and the Empire Bismarck forged. Years later, when

Kaiser William II made her second son, Prince George, an honorary Colonel in a Prussian regiment, Alexandra spluttered: "So, my Georgie boy has become a real life, filthy, blue-coated, Picklehaube German soldier!!! Well, I never thought to have lived to see that!"xl

However, even Victoria's Germanophile tendencies began to be strained after the

Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and finally broke after France's defeat in the

Franco-Prussian War.xii After the humbling of the Second French Empire and the declaration of Imperial Germany under the Prussian King at Versailles, Britain began to suspect their old friend of even greater ambitions. xiii This uncertainty and suspicion was the groundwork that led to one of the first of the 'Invasion Literature' works in England, the Battle ofDorking.xliii

The relations between the United States and Great Britain also underwent a change in the mid-late nineteenth century. While Bismarck was uniting Germany with

'Blood and Iron', The USA found itself fighting a vicious Civil War from 1861-65. The rebelling southern states originally counted on British support for their new nation, but the Confederate States of America's adherence to slavery (which had been outlawed in the British Empire in 1834) kept British public opinion divided on the war. Historians commonly argued that the Queen and the middle and lower classes were abolitionist and supported the Union while the aristocracy supported the South. However, Duncan

Andrew Campbell recently advanced a much more nuanced view of British opinions on

17 the war in his monograph, English Public Opinion and the American Civil War . Put simply, the United Kingdom was almost as divided as their erstwhile colonials on the subject of secession and slavery.xliv

Campbell provides several examples of pro-South mill workers and working newspapers as well as aristocrats who favored the Union. Though the exact feelings of the English public is complex and cannot be neatly parsed into classes, there was certainly differing opinions in all classes. Greater detail on this complex situation will be provided in Chapter 5.

One of the results of this ambivalence was the demands the American government made against England in the Alabama Claims of 1872. The Alabama was a rebel commerce raider built in British shipyards but manned by Confederates. Before being

1 sunk by the Kiersarge on June 16, 1864,X v she claimed many Union cargos and sent many merchant ships to the bottom. Britain defended the actions of her shipyards by insisting that the ships were built for foreign concerns that were fronts for the rebel

Southerners. Furthermore, British loyalty to Free Trade mandated ( according to

Whitehall) that they should not interfere in the business affairs of their shipwright industries.

One of the more radical suggestions to resolve the Alabama issue was purported by Senator Sumner. Essentially, he proposed that Great Britain by building raiders for the Confederacy owed the United States for not only vessels that were sunk by the rebels, but for the total cost of the war for the last two years of the struggle; since Sumner

18 insisted that the war was prolonged by British assistance to the rebels in Richmond. This amount was astronomically high, but Sumner was gracious enough to suggest that Britain could give the United States all of Canada and that would resolve the issue.xlvi

Fortunately cooler heads prevailed and the issue was given to arbitration. Each of five governments appointed a representative-the United States, Great Britain, Italy,

Switzerland, and Brazil. The arbitration panel met in Geneva and in 1872 found in favor for the United States. England was ordered to pay the US government $15,500,000 in damages. xlvii

As one might imagine from two commercial powers such as England and the

United States, trade rivalries played a major factor in antagonizing further relations between the two English-speaking nations. The Civil War in the United States, while assisting industrial growth at home, caused a loss of overseas trade for US companies and commercial transport. By the end of the US Civil War, British ships dominated trade with Latin America and British railroads held a commanding lead in developing the interior of the continent over rivals.xlviii It is true that Great Britain had a certain historical advantage in regards to the South American markets. British trade in the region began even when the Spanish still nominally controlled the area. Taking full advantage of the Napoleonic wars to intrude into the previously restricted trade areas of the Spanish possessions, this exclusive state of affairs was not even fazed by Latin American independence in the early-mid 1800s.xlix Brazil especially was grateful to England for assisting their independence from Lisbon and Madrid.1

19 Curiously, this opening of the Latin American markets not only aided British firms but the English dedication to Free Trade policies allowed other rising industrial states to compete in the markets of Hispania. Predominant among these latecomers were the United States and later in the century Imperial Germany. The USA felt that by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine they had a unique interest in the region and as such their interests

1 should be preponderant. i In this regard, the North American Republic frequently acted as a 'Big Brother' to the new republics to its south; usually to the resentment of said nations. Iii So as the last years of the century came upon them, British trade began to lose ground to the newcomer industrial powers of Europe and North America.

British commerce of the day tended to blame their loss of market share on the trust systems used in America and Germany, but it was as much a result of untenable

1 British control of market share as anything else. iii English industry was aging and had taken for granted their inherent advantage of being both the hub of the industrial revolution and their comparative wealth and power after the wars against Napoleon. But it caused much grievance prior to the tum of the century, and save for the Free Trade movement, England might have very well used government power to insure commercial control among the Latin American states.

Diplomatic and commercial friction between the three countries were not limited to South America, of course. The Samoan islands were an especially volatile point between America, England and Germany as all three had strategic and trade interests in the small group of South Pacific islands. Various schemes by the powers to work with

20 the natives seemed unsatisfactory, and in 1885 Germany took advantage of a rebellion to the Samoan monarch and began laying the groundwork to prepare the area for direct

1 annexation. iv Claiming to be responding to the request of the Samoan king, the American consul Greenebaum countered this apparent German move by raising the American flag

1 and declared the group of islands an American protectorate. v This was not authorized by

Washington, but they were concerned enough to support the move by sending naval vessels to Pago-Pago on the main island of the chain to support their consul and the

Samoan King. Great Britain was ostensibly an onlooker but leaned towards supporting the United States against Germany. A summit was arranged to try to resolve the issue diplomatically, but during a recess the rebels overthrew the Samoan king and Germany formally declared that the new government wanted their intervention and protection. !vi

German marines landed and the Anglo-Americans dispatched reinforcements to the region to protect their own interests. War seemed inevitable, but a sudden hurricane on

March 16, 1889 sent the three squadrons to destruction, with only the HMS Calliope

1 escaping intact. vii This disaster gave a chance for diplomacy to work and a preliminary agreement was reached to create a tribunal of representatives from all three powers to administer the islands. !viii

Another diplomatic issue that the United States handled with success was the first

Venezuelan Crisis of 1884-1895. In 1876 there emerged a boundary dispute between

Venezuela and British Guyana. The British claim was based on Dutch claims (the prior owners of Guyana) dating from 1603. Venezuela disputed it, but by 1884 negotiations

21 were at a deadlock. The dispute was further compromised when gold was found in the disputed area and many British prospectors moved in to stake claims.

The United States had supported the Venezuelans for international arbitration, but

London refused to budge. When Grover Cleveland returned to the White House for his second term, he was determined to do something about it. In 1895 he demanded that the

British submit the issue to arbitration and asked Congress to appoint an American commission to perform the arbitration. Great Britain, then under Lord Salisbury's ministry rejected American claims of jurisdiction and relations seemed at a breaking point.Iix

Great Britain, however, backed down and agreed to the American arbitration.

Many Americans and Britons, including the Prince of Wales and Lord Roseberry, threw their influence on the side of conciliation. A.J. Balfour declared that war with America would be tantamount to the "horror of civil war ... " and looked forward to the time when the country would "feel that they and we have a common duty to perform, a common office to fulfill among the nations of the world."1x

Despite the success of the Alabama arbitration, the Samoan standoff, and the

Venezuelan issue in the 1890s, international arbitration did not always go the way of the

United States. In 1890 the dispute between the United States and other nations led by

Great Britain brought a disagreement regarding the Bering Sea seal hunting industry to an arbitration panel, with the USA as the defendant. This panel found against the USA; but this occurred despite the fact that Alaska and the islands were owned by the Americans.

22 The USA insisted that it was trying to protect the seals' breeding grounds, but English and Scandinavian seal fisheries insisted that once the seals left the three mile limit the animals were in international waters and the United States had no right to seize their fishing boats_ Ixi As a result, the USA was required to pay the British and associated states a total of $437,000 for losses incurred as a result of the impounding of vessels. Needless to say, this upset the Americans and gave increasing complexity to resolving the

Yukon-Alaskan border issues in the 1890s. From territorial rivalries to commercial competition to disputes over appointment of British ministers in Washington, relations between Great Britain and the United States veered from chill to cordial, but neither war nor friendship seemed on the horizon. •xii

Despite the various and sundry rivalries and trading issues above, the governments and public perceptions were not yet set into firm convictions even at this late date. The closing years of the 'Long nineteenth Century' would find old assumptions and old antagonisms giving way to new realities.

Of all the scientific and technological advances of the era, perhaps the greatest changes were in human thought. The Christian and later Enlightenment views of human equality and each being gifted by God with free will and the spark of heaven was instead supplanted by the evolutionary views of Charles Darwin. Ironically, Darwin would have probably found the concept of his biological theories applied to society as rather disturbing_ Ixiii

23 The controversy engendered by evolution was not simply a revision of mankind's preconceived creation and existence on earth. It was a fundamental change in the way

Europeans thought about themselves. Christianity had taught for nearly two thousand years that all were equal in the eyes of a benign God. The Enlightenment reinforced this belief, though less from religion than from a belief in each man containing that 'divine spark' of reason and intellect. Darwin's view of nature being predominant in a world of fang and claw seemed to invalidate all this. Though some ecclesiastical figures tried to bring the concept of Christian religion into line with Evolution, lxiv the theory brought uncomfortable possibilities to the forefront of debate. If taken to its radical limit, as many claimed was the logical conclusion of Darwinist Evolution, there was no sin. No deity passing judgment, no morality, no karma; in short no obligation to fellow man or

1 creation. xv Survival was the only goal and reward, and Nature helped those who helped themselves, to paraphrase the old proverb.

This concept, so utterly revolutionary in paradigms, was controversial enough applied to human evolution. It was even more radical in application to human society _ixvi

In an era that saw Euro-American civilization astride the globe like a proverbial colossus, supreme in science, culture and military power it seemed to merely verify the resulting

1 state of the world in the later 1800s. xvii 'Survival of the Fittest' indeed; obviously Natural

Selection was in evidence and therefore one should not give such inferior cultures undue concern or pity.

24 A further progression of this rationale was that certain European nations were

'superior' to others. These superior nations were more fit to survive than other lesser countries. Nations were themselves like a single living creature. They had to grow and expand or they would wither and die; leaving those nations stronger than they to thrive and dominate. International relations were a matter of survival of the fittest, and devil take the hindmost. If a nation could only expand through war, if a people could only rise at the expense of its neighbors; such was nature and inevitable. 'xviii Nature demanded races of man to rise or decline; there was no standing still.

The modem reader must realize that the term 'race' was used in a different context in the late Victorian era than it is used today. Most persons, even those of nominal scientific education, believed that there was an actual French 'race' or German

'race' or even an Anglo-Saxon 'race." A curious affectation, since these distinctions

(created by Westerners) did not divide Oriental, Semitic or African "races"; only

Euro-American Caucasians. 'xix Japan was somewhat exempted from other Orientals after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 but only in certain limited ways. The Japanese were considered better than their brethren in the Orient, but still not quite the equal of

Europeans. Such ideology only increased an already tenuous set of relations between nations in Europe. !xx

In any event, the dictum of Social Darwinism insisted that the "race" (however defined) must advance in technology, population and especially that ephemeral condition of 'Civilization' or else their polity would go the way of the dodo and the Roman Empire.

25 A citizen of the British Empire and its Dominions might feel that their place as a world

power (perhaps the greatest world power) might very well seem to be a result of natural

superiority. They were the fittest nation, and so therefore (in their own opinion) they

deserved their place on top of the heap of nation-states. To a citizen of the United States

or the new German Empire, their homelands were nations on the rise in the international

arena. They were young, and therefore new entities to be tested in the jungle of

geopolitics. True there were other nations already preeminent in the world, but they were

1 old, corrupt and decadent. xxi As stated in this view of Darwinian thought, or 'Social

Darwinism' as it began to be called, nations should be willing to fight for their status or

1 give way for better nations and races; those more 'fit and deserving' of success. xxii

This nation-race 'Natural Selection', as defined by the Social Darwinists, could

not be assured by simple scientific knowledge and technology. History related many

cultures such as Ming China, the Roman Empire, or the Middle East under the Medieval

Caliphate who had superior technology and knowledge but who fell from their places as

world powers. What was needed in addition to science and technology was the

'Volkgeist' of a people, what English speakers of the time called 'Vigour'. ,Ixxiii

What could threaten a race's vigour? Strangely enough, a major factor was

considered to be the very civilization that gave the race their initial power and prestige.

Victorians of the late nineteenth century feared that advances in science and

1 industrialization resulted in 'emasculating' their men folk. xxiv What was worse, the women of the Euro-American civilization in these cultures were becoming more and

26 1 more self-sufficient and thus becoming more 'manly.' xxv Whereas men, by the ease from toil provided by the Industrial Revolution were becoming weaker specimens and losing

1 physical prowess. xxvi City dwellers tended to be smaller than their countryside brethren

1 due to lack of exercise and manly activities; or so the conventional wisdom stated. xxvii

Therefore the place of Euro-Americans in the preeminent place of civilization and power was becoming more and more in doubt. HG Wells' work The Time Machine was more than just a Scientific Romance story but a criticism of the class system endemic in the period. The Eleoi were a reflection of the emasculated city person, losing their drive and

1 initiative and becoming easy prey to outside forces. xxviii

Various newspapers and texts of the time referred to the people of the east, especially the Chinese but all were painted with the same brush, as being 'effeminate' and sly. Treachery and lack of forthrightness were considered unmanly vices but endemic to the Oriental psychology. Of course they had to resort to such feminine traits

1 (so European men believed) because they were physically weak and licentious. xxix All of which is odd considering how Chinese imported to America were given the worst and hardest labor intensive jobs on the Pacific coast (especially after the Civil War and the end of slavery), but prejudice need not adhere to logic.

While Darwin was a citizen of Great Britain, adherents to Social Darwinism spanned the breadth of the globe. Such ruthless theories certainly appealed to the militaristic Prussian-German culture as well as its young Kaiser. Yet even states that emphasized personal liberty such as Great Britain or the United States had many

27 adherents to this philosophy. The writer and editor of the English periodical The

Economist Walter Bagehot expressed a pervasive view in England in prose as a comparison of the 'Civilized' and 'Uncivilized' as follows:

"Consider the Australian bushman confronted by the English immigrant. Obviously, the colonist was superior in the art of killing. More than that, he was superior in his ability to control nature, not only because he could make better machines, but because he was himself a better machine. Finally, he was better 1 equipped to use the forces of nature for his own comfort and pleasure." xxx

The German military officer and outspoken Pan-Germanist General Friedrich von

Bernhardi spoke to the German people in his book Germany and the Next War on Social

Darwinism in even more stark terms. He writes, "No one need passively submit to the pressure of circumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at the parting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or to decadence. ,,Jxxxi

Bernhardi continues in this line of thought and writes his views on the 'Duty of

War'; a view of warfare as the natural filter with which to weed out the inferior and allow the superior to thrive in a mirror of evolutionary terms. He adds:

"Those who favour this view [War should be delayed as long as possible]take up approximately the same attitude as the supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively as a curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizing importance ... Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notion that the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least the chief duty, of any policy. To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definite answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not only the right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bring about a war_ Ixxxii

Bagehott in England, Bernhardi in Germany, and Mahan in America

28 were hardly the only proponents of this new, deadlier form of national competition but each is a good example of such view of Social Darwinism. Bagehott, as one might expect from the citizen of a nation whose rise was due predominantly to maritime trade and industrial development, tended to see the conflict in economic terms. Bernhardi, a

German officer in a nation where the army was preeminent over all save the Kaiser, lxxxiii tended to see things more as a matter of brute force and no law save strength. The United

States had its share of Social Darwinists to be sure, though such ideals are a bit odd in a country founded on the equality of man.

Another subject that was a source of considerable interest was the idea of

Navalism. This concept was first collected by the American naval Captain Alfred Thayer

Mahan in his 1890 work The Influence ofSea Power upon History: 1688-1783. This work, ostensibly a history of the rise of British naval supremacy from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, purported to display several key principles that would allow a healthy nation to become a 'Great Power. ,txxxiv When considered in tandem with Social

Darwinism, the work seemed a roadmap to world supremacy. Readers in many nations, but especially Great Britain, Germany, and the United States saw the book as a checklist of required prerequisites to world power and prestige.

According to Mahan, the critical point of superiority was that of naval force.

With the oceans of the world being compared to highways, he believed the nation that controlled such highways controlled the world. Therefore, if a country wished to become

1 predominant in the world they could only do so through naval might. xxxv While Mahan

29 had written his magnum opus The Influence ofSea Power series predominantly for

American audiences, virtually every industrialized state's leaders read and absorbed its teachings. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany told a friend: "I am just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan's book and am trying to learn it by heart. It is a first-class work and classical in all points. It is on board all my ships and constantly quoted by my captains and officers. ,,txxxvi

Mahan's work was probably the most popular and well received by the British.

Why not? After all, it declared the majesty of the Royal Navy and in essence sang the praises of Nelson and the Nelsonian tradition.txxxvii It also seemed to inform British navalists that what they had done in the past were the correct actions and (in theory) to continue as the world's first 'Superpower' they need only continue doing what they had done in past ages.

To Germans and Americans, it was a blueprint to power and respect. In Mahan's opinion, such would only come by virtue of sea power. If the German Empire wanted true world power, then only by 'grasping the trident' of sea power could their place in history be secured. The United States was in a similar position, and in truth was the real target audience for the book. Mahan wanted the research to encourage the USA to not only build up their navy but their merchant marine as well. At this time most commercial cargos were transported in British bottoms, and it was Mahanian doctrine that a vibrant merchant navy was a necessary precursor to warships and naval power. A nation could build warships without a merchant marine to be sure, and Mahan described the France of

30 Louis XIV's attempts to wrest control of the sea lanes from Great Britain by doing just that. But its failure was declared by Mahan to have been foreordained because building a war fleet without a merchant service (and a subsequent source of trained naval personnel) was to "Build an edifice on a rotten foundation. ,,Jxxxviii

These two philosophies, usually quite interrelated, provided the nexus of national aspirations and necessary competitions and conflicts for the future. To the readers of

Social Darwinism and Mahaniannavalism, no nation could stand still. The nation and its society must either advance or degenerate into obscurity. Readers of the time believed that recent history was replete with apparent examples of nations that had become extinct or irrelevant because they would not advance. Phillip II's Spanish Empire, The Dutch

Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, Imperial China ... all seemed to bear out

Mahan-Darwinian theories. Competition was inevitable, natural, and to be encouraged.

Such would whittle away the weak in society and the people would advance without being hindered by such human driftwood.

Navalism provided a ready-made arena for a nation to not only show its fitness to survive and thrive but to gain tools with which to seize power and wealth; in essence to prove their superiority and assure their dominance in the upcoming twentieth century.

Great Britain, as the focus of Mahan's work and according to the navalist doctrine the current dominant power due to the Royal Navy, inevitably felt discomfort at these other

1 nations hurrying to build navies to challenge the fleets of the British Empire. xxxix Unlike most other countries save perhaps Japan, England depended for its very life on control of

31 the oceans and could not sit idly by and let the seas fall to another's grasp. Furthermore, it infuriated them to see other countries building fleets with little actual need for them-as Winston Churchill quipped about the German Navy as a 'Luxury Fleet.'xc So tensions rose as each country viewed its neighbors with increasing suspicion and fear.

Naturally enough, an adherent to the dual concepts of Social Darwinism and

N avalism had to have an interest in both international relations and economics. These were the two arenas in which the tenets of these theorems were to be tested. With no war since 1871 in Europe, economics played a substitutional role for measuring a nation's vigour.

The citizens of Great Britain and its Empire were quite happy with the way things had been in the world since the 1860s and wanted things to remain the same for as long as possible; with England on top. As such, British policy could be considered as a policy of maintaining the status quo. The sun never set on the British Empire as often lauded in the jingoistic editorials of the time, and the British wanted peace and stability in the world most of all. Wars were bad for business, and Britain was the economic engine that ran the world economy. The latter half of the nineteenth and the pre-World War I twentieth century was perhaps the first attempts by nations to create a global economy based on Free Trade. In prior centuries the emphasis had been on Mercantilism, which was a development of intra-national economic life. Trade with other nations, while certainly extant, was not the preeminent goal of Mercantilism.xci Free Trade on the other hand emphasized trading connections between nations; raw materials of less developed

32 countries flowing to the industrial centers (such as Great Britain) to manufacture finished goods. Those products of industry were then exported to various markets both within and without the industrial centers of Europe and America.

British Free Trade supporters believed that such interdependence and commercial exchanges would enrich all concerned and decrease the likelihood of warfare. In this view, great wars such as the Napoleonic conflicts were unlikely to occur between interdependent trading partners as such would injure both parties' economies. There would be small wars to be sure, but conflicts spanning years and decades seemed a thing of the past. The fact that English firms were generally the world leaders for most of the century certainly played a role in the free trade movement as well. The century had been good for Britain and they wanted to keep it that way.

Regarding European issues, the British pursued a policy of the 'Balance of

Power.' That is, it was impossible to keep France (the hereditary enemy) cowed forever, and so the next best thing was to ensure that no one nation dominated the continent. In fact, France should be offset by Austria, Prussia (then later Germany) and Czarist Russia.

All should be balanced against each other militarily, and the English preferred to keep them suspicious of each other as well. xcii France had always been the British boogeyman, and so British policy was that France must be kept from again dreaming of European hegemony.

The rise of the German Empire was a watershed mark in the Balance of Power policy. In a situation not seen since the High Middle Ages, Germany was more powerful

33 than France or Austria. In fact, as the century drew to a close France was declining vis a vis Germany in population ( 40 million to 60 million), economically, and militarily.xciii

Obviously, the idea of supporting the Germanic central powers against France might have to be reconsidered if the balance of power was to be maintained on the continent.

By the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the German Empire was created and stood unchallenged on the land in western Europe. In the view of Wilhelm I, first Kaiser of the German Empire and his Chancellor Bismarck, Germany was also a 'Sated Power.'

It was due to Germany's ostensible lack of interest in further territorial conquests in

Europe that Bismarck could claim to be the 'Honest Broker' during the Congress of

Berlin in 1879. In his view, so long as France was kept in check by the Triple Alliance of

Germany, Austria and Italy (founded in 1882), Russia kept a friend and England kept in

'Splendid Isolation' from the continent, Germany would be secure and all would be well.xciv

This state of affairs might have continued for decades had not Wilhelm II become

Kaiser in 1889. The headstrong young leader chafed at Bismarck's apparent lassitude and unwillingness to get involved in colonial or commercial rivalries with other nations.xcv For all his genius, Bismarck was a traditional agrarian Prussian Junker, with a dislike of merchants, trade and any wealth not based on land and agriculture. Wilhelm II was probably more in touch with the pride and appetites of the German people and their desire for, as the later Chancellor von Bulow said in 1897, for Germany's "Place in the

Sun".xcvi So Bismarck was removed from his position in 1890 and following him were

34 Chancellors who would be subordinate to the Kaiser and his dreams of W eldMacht

(World Power.)

The United States was still predominantly an isolationist country preoccupied with internal matters and less interested in world affairs than other nations. But this would change with the Hawaii and Samoa incidents of the 1890s that would culminate in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Like Britain, the American Republic was more interested in economics than military force. Yet Mahan convinced policy makers and captains of industry alike that in the final decade of the century if American industry was to prosper it would have to export, and exports were difficult without a modern fleet to back up American claims in the world; this was especially true in the Orient. xcvii As noted earlier, Mahan's books were aimed at an American audience and slowly the citizens of the United States began to take heed.

So the waning years of the nineteenth century found relations between Great

Britain and Germany cooling and relations between the USA and Great Britain as correct, if not cordial.xcviii This is of course referring only to relations between the respective governments. Economically all three were becoming more and more interdependent and at the same time rivals for international markets. England's support of the United States'

Monroe Doctrine, namely that no European nation should gain additional territories in the

W estem Hemisphere was as much about British commercial interest in the region as anything else. Nevertheless the doctrine was the crucial point of controversy and war scares between the German Reich and the Anglo-Americans prior to World War I.

35 Needless to say, these issues and theories would not have had quite the same hold

on the public of these countries were it not for the significant increase in literacy during

the nineteenth century. The Victorian era saw literacy rates rise in the major powers of

the day, a necessary byproduct of industrialization and the need for a skilled workforce.

Newspapers and printed books had been around for a few centuries but in the nineteenth

century public demand for information on the world and their nation's role within it

became markedly pronounced. Newspapers, magazines, opinion journals, and such mass

produced media fed the appetite of the masses and shaped their perceptions of their

world. Rather than a passive receptacle to the views of their leaders and publishing

houses, the increase of commercialism provided a market for tailoring news and events to

suit the tastes of the reading audience.xcix

The nineteenth century found a greater number of publications available to a

larger audience than ever before, and the public of the Euro-Atlantic public. Perhaps for

the first time in history there was a wide range of publications that catered to a large

variety of tastes. Books and journals on self improvement, history, philosophy, and all

manner of political theory abounded. The waning years of the nineteenth century saw the

rise of Socialism, Anarchism, Nilhism, and universal democracy. Other reactionary

forces emphasized the powers of the state, tradition, and the race as defined by the

authors in question. Concepts such as navalism, racial vigour and social Darwinistic theories created an ethos in all three countries under study towards competition and

conflict. Therefore, the Invasion Literature genre was influenced by these views and thus

36 prepared the groundwork towards rivalries that would culminate in World War I. These novels purported to have the ability to solve their country's problems in the world, and gave warnings and solutions alike to the public of their nations.c

37 CHAPTER III

GREAT BRITAIN, "RULE BRITANNIA'' AND "PERFIDIOUS ALBION"

The 1890s were for the British a time to fundamentally reexamine both their diplomatic arrangement and military postures. The 'Splendid Isolation' of most of the century was leaving the United Kingdom in an awkward position; friendless in Europe and with a naval mastery they could no longer assume was God given and sacrosanct.

Great Britain, being a Constitutional Monarchy with significant democratic institutions, had these issues debated amongst the public as well as in the halls of Westminster. In earlier decades English economic and naval might allowed them the luxury of avoiding entangling alliances; thus an isolation that was truly 'Splendid.' This capacity to keep the other powers of the earth at arm's length gave Britain unprecedented freedom of action in world affairs. After all, England's wealth and power allowed them to defeat Napoleon did it not? England was the world's workshop was it not? What need did Britons have for the alliances and machinations of 'foreigners?'

Times were changing, however. Germany's unification with blood and iron, and

America's unification with a Civil War and Reconstruction resulted in two mighty powers evolving into great rivals to the British hegemony. Germany's industry was new and thus more modem than British industry, and they were subsidized by their government while Whitehall still obsessed itself with Free Trade policies. The United

States' industrial output not only had protective tariffs for their own industry while taking

38 full advantage of British Free Trade but also had the resources of most of the North

American continent. Only by virtue of the Empire could Britain hope to compete, and with Free Trade many of the Imperial Dominions such as Canada and Australia were making direct economic agreements with the USA; with Britain having only marginal interference. The Empire of Japan was growing as well, taking to heart the lessons of prostrate China and quickly preparing its navy and military so as to increase its influence in the Far East. But Japan relied on British yards to build their navy, and British officers to train their maritime forces. Still, Japan would bear watching in the future.ci

So, in addition to the adversaries of old (France and Russia) might be added the

United States, the German Reich, and eventually the Japanese Empire. Any attempt to remain the single largest and most powerful nation on the planet would bankrupt the treasury and require intolerable taxation on the public and commercial interests alike.

These were hard truths for the British public, long accustomed to being the preeminent nation in world affairs. It went against their grain to think that a British nation needed allies; they most certainly didn't want them.

The average Briton of the 1890s found himself becoming uneasy in a manner not seen since Napoleon Bonaparte. Enemies abounded, and they all seemed to crave English possessions, English technology and English power. What would a good Briton do to deal with such a delicate international situation? Opinions varied, as they often do in society. Some desired maintaining British preeminence regardless of the cost. Others thought an alliance with powers not directly in conflict with Great Britain was the best

39 solution. Yet others thought that high moral ideals in international relations ( such as promoted by the Liberals under William E. Gladstone) would insure Britannia's 'Pax'; through upstanding morality in lieu of power.cii

In the midst's of these contentious debates began the rise of the Invasion

Literature serials. Novels for the common man ( called alternatively 'Penny Dreadfuls' or

'Shilling Shockers') had been in vogue for most of the century, but as Britons lost their assumptions of world dominance they began more and more to emphasize a view of the future; to prophesize what Britons were uncertain about; namely their nation's role in the years to come.

Despite the resolution of much of the Anglo-American rancor in mid-Century with the conclusion of the Alabama Claims in 1872, there were still strains on US-UK relations. The annexation of the Hawaiian islands by dint of the filibustering 'President'

Dole of the Dole fruit company especially made relations tense.ciii This began to change in the years leading up to the Spanish-American War of 1898. Much to Europe's disappointment, Great Britain not only refused to support a move by France, Germany and Russia to force the USA to relinquish its conquests in the Caribbean and Pacific, but actually informed the European states that if they attempted such an act Britain would actively support the USA against them. civ

This was a real change of prior British policy, and several issues led to it. First was the fact that much of the English public took the American side in the war; believing that someone needed to take Cuba in hand and stop the atrocities being perpetrated by the

40 Spanish Viceroy upon the Cuban people. Another was Lord Salisbury's concern that

Germany wished the islands to be returned to Spain only so they could purchase them from Madrid themselves; or annex them outright. Specifically in the Philippines both

Great Britain and Japan preferred them to remain under American occupation instead of seeing them fall to Germany. This support of the USA during the war; virtually the only

European nation to do so, struck a sympathetic chord with American public feeling. The

United States in tum was one of the few nations that did not seriously condemn the

United Kingdom during the Boer War of 1899-1902.cv

Why this change? True the USA was a nation of rising power, population and industry. A nation that shared values of individual freedom and liberty ( especially after the Gladstonian reforms), and similar outlooks on international relations. Though this should not be taken too far; as George Bernard Shaw put it the USA and the UK were

" ... two nations divided by a common language."cvi

However, the cultural idea and concepts of liberty weren't new for either country.

Was it simply that British policy made a conscious decision to do an about face? Most

Britons, polled by the Contemporary Review of June 1898 felt a strong affinity for

Americans; certainly over other nationalities.cvii Indeed, many English referred to the

United States as part of the 'English Speaking World,' as if America was part of the

Empire but not actually ruled by it. cviii

Of course, much of this affection was tinged with an air of friendly patronizing.

Similar they may be, but perhaps most Englishmen knew in their heart that while their

41 shared culture was great, it was-first, last, and always-a British culture. The

Americans were viewed as "country cousins". This tended to rub Americans badly, and like many people guilty of this vice it was difficult to make British politicians, British newspapers, or the British public see how insulting this could be to the former colonies.

What of the German Empire? Despite the Kaiser's occasional faux pas and

Bismarck's Realpolitik the man on the London street prior to 1895 still viewed Germany with a certain degree of affection. After all, that Bismarck chap was dodgy, but hadn't the two stood together at Waterloo? The Brits felt the Germans to be crude and a bit of the bully but a friend in need when the chips were down.

This changed categorically with the Kruger Telegram of 1895.cix When British citizens in South Africa attempted to depose the government of the Boer Republic of

Transvaal, Whitehall was quietly embarrassed as one of the ringleaders was Cecil

Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony as well as his lieutenant Dr. Jameson.ex It was one of those things that many English felt would just blow over. But the Boers, being descended from Dutch colonists, were felt to be kin of the Germans as much as Holland and so the Kaiser sent the President of the Transvaal Paul Kruger a telegram congratulating him on repelling the incursion without having to call upon the aid of

'Friendly Powers.'cxi

This was a moral wound to the British public that never would fully heal. From being the coarse but well meaning Teutonic cousins of Britain, Germany now began to look untrustworthy, even rapacious. As Kaiser Wilhelm II had removed Bismarck as

42 Chancellor in 1890, the British couldn't even rationalize that it was the Machiavellian

Iron Chancellor who did such a perfidious act. No, it was Kaiser Wilhelm II, the grandson of Queen Victoria, the nephew of the Prince of Wales ... apparently offering a small backward state of slaveholding farmers aid against the old friend of Germany

England if necessary. cxii

This was the beginning of a frigidity of Anglo-German relations that only magnified as the years progressed. Germany's subsequent enactment of the first Naval

Law of 1898 appeared as a direct challenge to Britain's control of the oceans of the world.

Furthermore, German naval designs of limited cruising range and cramped crew quarters belied the claim of the Wilhelmstrass that the fleet was to protect German commerce. No, the Kaiser's new navy gave all the appearance of a war fleet designed to control the

North Sea and British coastlines_cxiii This threat to Great Britain's security was the next nail in the coffin of Anglo-German amity but not the last. More would come, with frightful rapidity until the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914.

The change of relations between Britain and its erstwhile enemy the United States and its erstwhile friend Germany was certainly reflected in the works of Invasion

Literature. As noted in the earlier chapters of this work, these books were brought out as much to fulfill certain political agendas as much as to create good literature ( and was usually more successful in the former than the latter.) A noted comment from a

Marketing colleague was the concept that 'Fear Sells.' Essentially the public pays more attention to something that scares them instead of things that please them.cxiv If this pithy

43 bit of advice is sound, then the Invasion Literature was certainly as successful as it was for the fear it generated as much as literary value.

It is perhaps not surprising that England, having the highest literacy rates in

Europe in the 1890s,cxv would have the single largest number of Invasion Literature works published there. After Chesney's Battle ofDarking (1871) its success began a flood of such stories, but most tended to be about the French or Russians moving to invade England. As noted earlier, with Anglo-German relations cooling but still amiable this shouldn't be surprising. In addition, until the rise of the US Navy and the German

Reichsmarine only France had sufficient naval might to challenge the Royal Navy. The primary works of this period of Francophobia were William Laird Clowes' The Captain of the 'Mary Rose, in 1892; George Sydenham Clarke's The Last Great Naval War, written in 1892; and the publisher of Jane's Fighting Ships Fred T. Jane's book Blake of the Rattlesnake (1895.) These certainly had an audience, and were some of the first true financial successes of the genre. But as the German threat loomed large in the minds of the English public, the enemy of the genre changed for British readers.

One of the first of the post-Dor king works with Germany as the predominant force was Headon Hill's novel The Spies of Wight ( 1899.) This book, a sort of proto

Riddle ofthe Sands, centered on the schemes of a network of German spies in Great

Britain working to undermine British capabilities in the event of war with the Fatherland.

When that work of Erskine Childers' The Riddle ofthe Sands was published in

1903 it caught the imagination of the British public. It sold in great quantities, and is

44 arguably the most well known book of the Invasion Literature genre familiar to readers today. The irony is that the author, despite writing of two English yachtsmen spoiling the

German plan for an invasion of England (all without a declaration of war) the author

Childers in reality became a German agent during the war and attempted to create a rising in Ireland with German arms in 1916.cxvi Nonetheless, the yachtsmen are true-blue

English patriots who when they stumble across preparations for war .. . "multitudes of sea-going lighters, carrying full loads of soldiers ... should issue simultaneously in seven ordered fleets from seven shallow outlets and, under the escort of the Imperial navy, traverse the North Sea and throw themselves bodily upon English shores. ucxvii

Even when a military strike wasn't in the offing, another tactic of these literary

German foes was to infiltrate troops into England, who would then strike from the shadows and overwhelm the defenders. cxviii This not only played on a fear of other nations, but immigrants as well. A. J. Dawson's The Message (1907) gave a perfect example of this xenophobic view of foreigners. A German waiter living in London tells the English hero of the book that he and his fellows were " ... Vaire strung, sare, ze

Sherman Armay ! ,,cxix and their infiltrating of British life insured German conquest. He continues with:

"There are in this country [Britain] 290,000 young countrymen of yours and of mine who have served their time, and who can shoot ... Clerks, waiters and hairdressers ... each have their work assigned to them. The forts which guard this great city may be impregnable from without, but from within - that is another matter. ,,cxx

45 The military assault on Britain was perhaps best epitomized by William Le Queux in his popular bestseller The Invasion of 1910, first serialized in the Daily Mail in 1906.

This work shamelessly promoted the British general Lord Robert's contention that the

British army was insufficient to protect the island and the text is rife with such comments as 'If the leaders had only listened to Lord Roberts' or 'Lord Roberts warnings were ignored, to our sorrow' and so forth. cxxi As one can surmise, The Invasion of 1910 was a jingoistic tale as defined in Chapter 1, and so no doubt relieved the English reader by having Albion win the day at the end. cxxii

One of the more prophetic works was The Great War of 189-, published in 1891 in the illustrated weekly Black and White. This serial depicted war sparking from the assassination of a royal personage in the Balkans, with Austria-Hungary declaring war as a result on Serbia, and Russia coming to Serbia's aid. Like history 23 years later,

Germany fulfills her treaty obligations to Austria and declares war on Russia, and France in her tum comes to her alliance partner's aid. Unlike history, however the assassination was not upon a Hapsburg but was instead committed upon Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria.

Serbia's attack on Bulgaria to take advantage of the chaos was the draw for Vienna to declare war upon Belgrade. Like reality Germany invades Belgium in order to strike at

France but curiously, in this war Great Britain comes into the war on the side of the

Austro-Germans instead of the Dual Alliance of France-Russia.

Did this have an effect on British public policy? Besides the sales of many of these works making their authors rich (Le Queux made a small fortune on The Invasion of

46 1910 alone) can this necessarily translate to public support against Germany? Is there any evidence of United Kingdom policy reacting to such possibilities?

In 1903 a report submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence by Colonel

William Robertson (War Office's Intelligence Department) insisted that, in the event of a war against The British Empire

" ... -[Germany's] best, if not only, chance of bringing the contest to a favorable conclusion would be to strike a blow at the heart of the British Empire before the British Navy could exert its full strength and throw her upon the defensive, blockade her fleet, destroy her mercantile trade and render her huge army useless. "cxxiii

Even though he admitted that such an undertaking would be difficult he nevertheless insisted that the Germans were capable of throwing " ... a force of 150,000 to

300,000 men ... upon the British eastern coast. "cxxiv In an odd return to Napoleonic concepts, he further stated that he believed that the Germans once ashore could live off the land and continue operations for some time to come. Apparently he thought the

Germans believed that simply by invading Britain the English would (like many of the

Invasion Literatures claimed) sue for peace.cxxv

Not all officers believed this by any means, but such a fearful concept was hard for the British public to shake. Even King Edward VII feared that his nephew 'Willie' might "throw a corps d'armee or two into England, making proclamation that he has come, not as an enemy to the King, but as the grandson of Queen Victoria, to deliver him from the Socialistic gang which is ruining the country. "cxxvi The above was written in

1908, five years before Saki would write When William Came: A Tale ofLondon under 47 the Hohenzollerns; which would have a very similar theme. Even Sir Edward Grey, the

Liberal Foreign Secretary took it as gospel that the Germans had spies and planners preparing for a cross-channel invasion of Britain. cxxvii We know today that the German

General Staff had never considered such a risky endeavor; at least not for another decade or so when the Reichsmarine would theoretically have enough ships to successfully challenge the Royal navy. Where did so many policy leaders get such ideas of German invasion and duplicity? Invasion literature seems the obvious answer.

The Cautionary Tales in Great Britain were varied in both content and scenarios.

From the l 880s France was the nefarious villain determined to subjugate the English

Lion, often aided and abetted by autocratic Russia. The "Bolt from the Blue" ( a surprise attack on the unprepared Royal navy) scenario was the usual beginning these stories made; with defeat made inevitable as portrayed in Le Queux'sThe Poisoned Bullet of

1893. The Jingoistic version of course had English pluck winning the day despite such perfidy (as in The Captain ofthe Mary Rose.) After relations with Germany began their decline at the turn of the century, the Teuton became the new source of villainy to frighten all good British into calling home the warships of the Royal Navy to avoid an invasion. cxxviii

The most famous work of this period was Erskine Childers' The Riddle ofthe

Sands; which portrays two British yachtsmen enjoying sailing along the Dutch and

German coasts only to discover a massive invasion fleet being prepared in secret. This fleet, being led by the Kaiser himself, was preparing to strike suddenly at the British Isles

48 in a surprise attack that would ensure German troops would appear on British soil. Once there, it was considered a foregone conclusion that they would defeat British soldiery and control the homeland. But the propitious discovery of the plot by the two yachtsmen and their flight back to England to inform the proper authorities ends this threat before it is launched.

What if it had succeeded? One might consider Saki's When William Came: A Tale ofLondon under the Hohenzollerns to be a novel that investigates this possibility. Saki, the pen name of H. H. Munroe, was usually known at the time for his society novels and romantic dramas, but his one foray into Invasion Literature provides a well written story full of sardonic humor and is revealing of his thoughts on the matter.

The invasion itself has already occurred when the story begins, and is referred to by the British and Germans alike as the 'Fait Accompli'; a sudden strike by Germany to take advantage of a surprise victory over the Royal Navy in a Franco-German war with

Britain as a reluctant ally of France. The main character doesn't show up for several pages; we are instead introduced to his wife Cecelia Yeovil and her amoral Bohemian set and how easily they've acclimated to living under the German yoke. The main character,

Murrey Yeovil, was on a safari in Russia during the war and only returns after battling off chronic malaria to an England he doesn't recognize.

For the rest of the book Murrey travels across England, almost like a ghost of the man he was, seeing what has become of his country yet unable to muster any will to change things. On his travels he meets the artistic set of London who rush to cater to

49 Prussian whims and consider themselves worldly and realistic in doing so. King George

V and his court have retired to India, where he still rules the Empire from there; but most of the aristocracy either went with him or took to travel abroad. The few left who refuse to cater to the German rule hide in their country estates and try to ignore the world; a fate

Murrey Yeovil finds especially seductive.

As with many of Monroe's works he writes a biting satire of British society, painting most of them as spineless hedonists who would much rather accept the new order than make any hard choices. Kaiser Wilhelm II, as the grandson of Queen Victoria, uses this connection to legitimize his reign and most of the remaining upper and middle classes seem to accept this. The common folk are angry and want to resist but without their 'natural leaders' (the aristocracy) they apparently can't organize anything.cxxix

The most humiliating thing to the hero Murrey is the promulgated Law of

Military Service for the British Isles. For a nation that so tenaciously resisted conscription, Murrey believes it will drive them to revolt. But the German Chancellor is cannier than the Englishman realized; for beneath the courtly politeness and benignant phraseology of the document ran

" ... a trenchant searing irony. The British born subjects of the Germanic Crown ... had habituated themselves as a people to the disuse of arms ... Their new Overlord did not propose to do violence to their feelings and customs by requiring from them the personal military sacrifices and services which were rendered by his subjects German-born. The British subjects of the Crown were to remain a people consecrated to peaceful pursuits, to commerce and trade and husbandry. The defence of their coasts and shipping and the maintenance of order and general safety would be guaranteed by a garrison of German troops ... Necessarily a heavily differentiated scale of war taxation would fall on British taxpayers, to

50 provide for the upkeep of the garrison and to equalize the services and sacrifices rendered by the two branches of his Majesty's subjects. ,,cxxx

This announcement sends Murrey into a cycle of despair:

"This boon, which had removed, at one stroke, the bogey of compulsory military service from the troubled imaginings of the British people, and fastened on them the cruel distinction of being in actual fact what an enemy had called them in splenetic scorn long years ago-a nation of shopkeepers. Aye, something even below that level, a race of shopkeepers who were no longer a nation. ,,cxxxi

Yet such is not all. The taxation system is used to encourage Germans to immigrate to Britain. Britons are encouraged to marry their children to Germans for reduction of taxes and to cater to Germans. Because, as a club friend of our hero observes:

"Well, you see, they are the people who have got the money .. .I don't mean to say that the invading Germans are usually people of wealth, but while they live over here they escape the crushing taxation that falls on the British-born subject. They serve their country as soldiers, and we have to serve it in garrison money, ship money and so forth, besides the ordinary taxes of the State. The German shoulders the rifle, the Englishman has to shoulder everything else. That is what will help more than anything towards the gradual Germanising of our big towns; the comparatively lightly-taxed German workman over here will have a much bigger spending power and purchasing power than his heavily taxed English neighbour. ncxxxii

Murrey and his friends see this as the end of British identity and the beginning of

Germanization. Now the average Englishman, Scot or Welshman couldn't even get military training so as to plan a future revolt. Financial incentives will be for Germans to come and English to emigrate. As Murrey's club pal put it, the new Germans smother with a feather mattress where Bismarck would have used a sledgehammer.cxxxiii

51 The story ends with the Kaiser and his entourage waiting for the British Boy

Scouts to parade in front of him and to receive awards from his youngest son who is their honorary leader; he is only, however, to be left waiting in an embarrassed silence. Not one of the expected thousands of boy scouts participate and this result gives Murrey some hope that the future generations will not accept slavery as many have done ... including his wife and himself.

Saki's use of the Invasion Literature is more of a pro forma method of criticizing the decadence of British society. There are pages and pages of disdain heaped upon the sport-loving, artistic and worldly temperament of the current generations of English.cxxxiv

He further emphasizes how all it would take is another hand on the reins of power with a veneer of legitimacy and barring actual repression many English would prefer keeping their creature comforts to contesting the result. It is small wonder that Germans often despised the resilience of the British to any hardships a war would bring. After all, many

English themselves belabored the stereotype in much of their media.

So much for Anglo-German understanding; what of Britain and their erstwhile colonies of the United States? One of the first of these works that predicated the 'Natural

Alliance' of Great Britain and Americas was G. Danyer's Blood is Thicker than Water

(1895) where a British author promoted the idea that the two nations had so many shared ideals and interests that it was inevitable that both would ally to dominate the world. In this Grand Union of Anglo-Saxons " ... all will be equal in the brotherhood of their race, and over all will float, as against the rest of the world, a common flag, which, hoisted

52 when danger threatens, will be the signal for the rally for a common object of every force

that can be disposed of by the greatest union of which history makes mention. ,,cxxxv

Even H.G. Wells fell under the sway of the heady brew of British might allied

with American resources and population. In his Anticipations (1902) he waxed with

enthusiasm:

"... a great federation of white English-speaking peoples, a federation having America north of Mexico as its central mass (a federation that may conceivably include Scandinavia) and its federal government will sustain a common fleet, and protect or dominate or actually administer most or all of the non-white states of the present British Empire, and in addition much of the South and Middle Pacific, the East and West Indies, the rest of America, and the larger part of black Africa. ,,cxxxvi

All these works reflected the international anxieties of the British public of the

time. One can see the evolution from Darking to When William Came as English fears of

a new Prussia using troops to land and conquer England before the Royal Navy could

intervene to the French wresting control of the oceans from a declining Britain to

Germany doing the same despite English precautions. A recurring theme is that of the

'Bolt from the Blue;' the enemy striking suddenly and smashing the (usually inadequate)

British fleet in the Channel and quickly rushing troops to the island before Britain could muster their far-flung fleets to concentrate on home defense. In most of these stories, the army was a decrepit force; under armed, under trained and always too small to defend the island; Britain is either enslaved by the treacherous enemy or if saved at the last minute only by luck or pluck; never due to adequate preparations.

53 The increasing view of an alliance with the United States gains appeal by the tum

of the century, and was usually stronger in the British Isles than in the United States.

Britains seemed to see in the USA the great equalizer to their rivals throughout the world.

With the United States in a alliance (though usually America is the 'junior' partner) Great

Britain could tap Yankee wealth, the vast population of the continent and the resources that would insure another century of British predominance in the world. It could be argued that Britain got much of what they claimed to have wanted in the 20th century; but perhaps not quite the way they wanted it. Reality revealed a 'Special Relationship' to be sure, but with the United Kingdom as the junior partner and the eroding of most of the

British Empire into independent states.

54 CHAPTER IV

"DEUTSCHLAND UBERALLES" (GERMANY OVER ALL)

In the year 1889 Crown Prince Wilhelm became Wilhelm II, Emperor of

Germany, upon the death of his father Frederick William. This brash, young and driven

sovereign had other ideas that conflicted with the conservative statesmanship of Otto von

Bismarck. The new Kaiser saw the German Empire as a growing world power and thought that he should promote German aspirations on the world stage; a drive for

"Weldmacht." In latter nineteenth century terms, this meant commercial expansion, a powerful fleet in the navalist tradition and colonies. Bismarck disliked all three, but especially the latter two. To the Iron Chancellor, a fleet was unnecessary to protect

Germany from its enemies (France and later Russia) and would dangerously anger the

British. Colonies were a waste of money and were far more trouble than they were worth.

History would prove Bismarck correct on these points, but from the consideration of the average German's public opinion Wilhelm II was far more in touch with his subjects' own desires than his old mentor.cxxxvii The German public were enamored of their newfound wealth in industry and heady with their importance in affairs.cxxxviii For perhaps the first time in centuries, the opinions of Germans mattered. They liked this, and as one might expect they were very sensitive to their newfound status.

In a battle of wills between Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the old minister from Pomerania couldn't hope to succeed. Though a superior stateman, the German

55 Imperial system left Bismarck hoisted from his own political petard. Wilhelm dismissed him in 1890 and Bismarck retired to his estates. He remained a significant figure in the conservative party within the Reichstag and frequently tried to oppose some of the

Kaiser's schemes, but his creation of the German Constitution made any opposition to the

Kaiser difficult and relatively powerless. So long as the army supported the Kaiser, his word was law. When the Kaiser took over as pilot of the 'Ship of State', he had many plans. Like his people, he reveled in his newfound power and his ambitions were greater than either of his Imperial predecessors. His future attempts to play a role as one of the great statesmen of the world would comprise a series of missteps and overreactions that would culminate in the First World War in 1914.

The evolution of this feeling of growing confidence is reflected in the Invasion

Literature/Future War stories of German origin. Like the British, the German public was quite interested in stories that foretold their future wars and potential glory. Among these were such rather forthright titles like The Reckoning With England, written in 1900 by

Karl Eisenhart. This work was published just as the first Navy Law was moving its way to fruition from the Reichstag to the shipyards of the German Empire. If the government was unwilling to mention just whom their fleet was to be used against, Eisenhart had no such qualms.

In his story Great Britain has been expelled from South Africa by the Boers and the French decide that this is the perfect time to declare war on their old enemy. During the opening stages of this conflict, the Royal Navy blockades various French ports,

56 refusing to allow neutral shipping free egress. Germany, infuriated by this limitation to their merchant shipping declares war on England. German naval forces seem outmatched by the English fleet, but the Germans have a secret weapon; it is the Electric Battleship that sweeps the oceans clear of the foe. England is defeated by the Franco-German alliance and the Reich gets to assume various useful parts of the British Empire such as

Gibraltar.cxxxix One might wonder why Germany needed to ship goods to and from

France via ports when they share a border, but never mind that.

Another author, Max Hemrichka, postulates a war against England in Germany's

Future in 100 Years. This war is instigated by German annexation of Holland, but with a century of preparation the decadent English find that they are no match for German science and might.ex! Karl Bleibtreu's Die 'O.ffensoivlnvasion'gegen England, published in 1907, has a similar cause and effect along with the inevitable German victory.cxli

One of the last works popularized in Germany was Hindenburg's March on London, a dream of victory over the Entente published in 1915. The author, Paul G. Munche, wrote of the then victor of the Battle of Tannenburg leading his victorious forces once again in a campaign against the odds; the invasion of Britain. As one would expect, the old soldier leads his troops to victory and the works ends with Hindenburg addressing his victorious troops firom B uc kmg. h am p a lace. cxlii

The German authors of Invasion Literature/Future War stories tended more toward the jingoistic tale but there were a few that warned their people of excessive hubris. In Sink, Burn, Destroy: The Blow Against Germany, a tale published in 1905 took

57 the above sty le German invasion of England stories and turned them around. This was a

'Battle of Dorking' for the German people; the Reich is invaded by the British after the

Reichsmarine's ships were decimated and Hamburg must submit to the ruthless

invader. cxliii

This story, sort of an admonition to the new German Empire to not grow

overconfident with its new power differs markedly from the 1904 work Der Weltkrieg:

Deutsche Trdume (The World War: German Dreams) by August Niemann. This book,

released in 1904 in an English translation called The Coming Conquest ofEngland sees

an Anglo-German war ending quite differently. In the prologue to his work, Niemann

states:

"The map of the world unfolds itself before me. All seas are ploughed by the keels of English vessels, all coasts dotted with the coaling stations and fortresses of the British world-power. In England is vested the dominion of the globe, and England will retain it; she cannot permit the Russian monster to drink life and mobility from the sea."cxliv

The protagonist of the book is Hermann Heideck, a German officer impersonating

a German merchant traveling through India. He quickly meets up with a Russian

merchant who is also a military spy; apparently the British in India are rather blind to

such things. They travel together and are caught up when Russia invades British India.

Niemann has several interlude scenes where one can perceive the conversations and thoughts of the great leaders of the time. For example, Czar Nicholas II and Count

Witte decide that the only reason Japan attacked Russia (the Russo-Japanese war has just begun) was due to English machinations and so they attack India. We then see notes 58 exchanged between St. Petersburg and Paris, both countries determined to ally with

Germany against evil Britain.cxlv But what of Alsace-Lorraine?

Apparently France is no longer interested in regaining those lost lands. Or so

Niemann has Delcasse (the minister most anti-German in the 'real' government) say to the

Czar(!) They're given up just so they could destroy English power.

"Shall the three Powers who, after Japan's victory over China, joined hands in the treaty of Shimonoseki, in order to thwart England's aims, shall they-Germany, France, and Russia-still fold their hands, or shall they not rather mutually join them in a common cause? In my mind's eye I see the armies and the fleets of Germany, France, and Russia moving together a~~inst the common enemy, who with his polypus arms enfolds the globe."cx vi

Meanwhile Heideck has fallen for an English woman whose husband is a cruel spendthrift, about whom the other English will do nothing lest a 'scandal' (Niemann's portrayed greatest sin of the Englishman) ensue.cxtvii Niemann goes on for pages about the lack of discipline of the average Briton and other social failings of their island neighbors.

The spies and their British hosts travel to the front and the British army is destroyed thanks to being betrayed by the Indian Muslim troops deserting to the Russians.cxiviii

There are lurid descriptions of the animalistic behavior of the natives when they revenge themselves upon the former British masters. It is ironic that Niemann repeatedly talks about freeing the natives from British control only to portray them as subhuman creatures that are really better off with Russian overlordship.cxtix Basically, Heideck insists that the British did too much for the Indians and they were not suitably brutal to keep them in check. ct

59 Heideck travels via steamship to Germany, who has joined the war against

England and occupied Holland while France occupied Belgium. This takeover of a

neutral nation is rationalized by Heideck as reasonable because Dutch Merchants are too

greedy to be really patriotic. cii Therefore, they are better off as part of the German

Empire. Despite Heideck's insistence that he is needed as a German officer for the front

he is assigned as a spymaster in Amsterdam. In this capacity his lost love Edith Erwin has

returned to England, escaping India after her husband's death. Her love for him requires

her to steal English naval plans and smuggle them to Heideck in Holland. Our German

hero is thankful for the plans, but rejects the English woman because she betrayed her

country; even though the betrayal was for him. She drowns in despair in the English

channel and Heideck dies as part of the fleet action that destroys the British navy.ciii Truly

an ending of which Wagner would have been proud.

Franco-German troops land in Britain and since everyone knows the British

territorials are useless the war ends. Arthur Balfor has to sign the peace treaty, which

takes British colonies and divides them among the victors. This is only just, because as the King of England is told:

"For centuries Great Britain has misused her power to increase her own wealth at the cost of others. Unscrupulously she grabbed everything she could lay hands on, and, injuring at every step important and vital interests of other nations, she challenged that resistance which has now shattered her position as a power in the world. The happiness of the peoples can only be restored by a peace assured for years, and only a j.~st division of the dominion of the earth can guarantee the peace of the world. ,,c m

60 Europe is now one happy utopia and England quickly is reconciled with their loss of world dominion and becomes part of the European 'Community.'ciiv Niemann's work takes much for granted, as do most of the Invasion Literature/Future War stories. But

August Niemann's book takes Franco-German-Russian anger at Britain for the Boer War of 1899-1902 and the aforementioned alliance to take most of Japan's conquest from the

Sino-Japanese war in 1894-1895 and morphs it into an alliance that really beggars plausibility.

This sort of wishful thinking about the various national positions of European states continues in the story FrankreichsEnde in Jahr 19??, written by Adolf Sommerfeld in 1912. Sommerfeld was a fairly prolific writer of crime stories and after World War I became a film director as well. Like Niemann's dream above, Sommerfeld creates a tale where German is encircled by the Triple Entente, as in reality. However in this explanation the Entente is really a sham and Russia still has interests in taking British

India. As Sommerfeld puts it, since the Entente was only a defensive alliance and since

Germany had no intention of attacking anyone it was worthless. clv In fact, Britain was somewhat cordial to the German Empire:

"England alone had made a serious effort to maintain correct relations with Germany, at least in business matters. This had nothing to do with feelings of kinship. It was because, in all parts of the great British Empire, the very foundations were beginning to shake. Like the writing on the wall that Belshazzar had once seen, the coal strikes and their social consequences spelt out the fearful Mene, Tekel, Upharsinof war."clvi

61 Another change is that Archduke Franz Ferdinand becomes Emperor of

Austro-Hungary (this was written before Ferdinand's assassination in 1914) and reorganizes the Hapsburg empire into a model of efficiency and patriotism. Italy too becomes stronger after tourists seem to abandon Italy for Spain. Sommerfeld postulates that with tourism gone the Italians would buckle down and become an efficient state.clvii

Germany had even tried to appease France, but it seems they were rebuffed. As the author tells us,

"Ever since Germany had, as a friendly gesture, given France a free hand in Morocco, the French had become increasingly extravagant in their conduct of affairs. Today it is quite apparent that France is suffering from incurable political hysteria. Their chauvinism in matters of national defence is proof of that. Although the steady drop in their birth-rate points to the decline of France as a military power, the Gallic cock has gone on crowing."clviii

Of course, this is a Future War book so there will be war. This war is started by the destruction of a German ship, the Schwalbe, in a French North African port. Much like the American battleship U.S.S. Main whose destruction helped start the

Spanish-American War, the investigation provides proof that the French blew it up with a torpedo. clix In a rage, the German public storms and destroys the French embassy in

Berlin. Germany declares war on France, and both Austro-Hungary and Italy vote to uphold their obligations under the Triple Alliance; unlike in 1914 when Italy stayed neutral and a year later joined the Entente against their erstwhile allies. France is not too worried, because she has her Entente partners who were obligated to come to the aid of a signatory if attacked. But Paris was in for a rude shock, for: "Paris laboured in vain to

62 represent the German declaration of war as an act of imperialistic brutality and the

Schwalbe incident as a calculated pretext. It was, they said, for an international commission, not for a German court, to investigate any crime committed by the

French."clx Alas, the British and Russians declare that since the war was instigated by the

French destruction of the Schwalbe that France started hostilities and they were not obligated to come to her aid.clxi

This rather convenient tum of events allows the entire Triple Alliance to gang up on France. Even Spain mobilizes forces in the Pyrenees mountains but does not invade.

Nonetheless this deployment saps French troops from the German and Italian frontiers.clxii Germany invades France but as in 1871 they move on Metz and Central

France and do not violate the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands. Italy destroys the French Mediterranean fleet and occupies Tunis.

Italian troops, in an amazing display of martial prowess never equaled in reality, invade and take southern France as well. Austro-Hungarian forces take up a defensive position on their border with Russia and act as a ready reserve for need. The Imperial and Royal

Austro-Hungarian Navy remains in the Adriatic to protect Italian coasts and therefore allows the Italian navy to engage in combat operations.

In short order the French armies are defeated through a combination of German superiority and French citizenry rebelling against the government. As in 1871 Paris is ruled by the mob that refuses to agree to their President's surrender to the Allies. They

63 continue the war through a variety of means both fair and foul but eventually are defeated and Paris is occupied. clxiii

In a manner reminiscent of the 'Cabinet Wars' of the prior century a Congress is called in Zurich to divide up the spoils. Italy gets French Northwest Africa save for

Morocco and southern France. Germany gets Central France annexed directly to the

German Empire as well as the choicest picks of French colonies. Spain gets Morocco so long as trade is free in the region. Austro-Hungary gets the remainder of French colonies and starts their colonial career. England and Russia, though not in the war insist on getting some of the spoils. Britain receives Artois and Picardie in France as well as

French possessions in India. Russia gets Persia and Afghanistan. clxiv

The French race then either dies off in a couple of generations or is absorbed into the English and Italian races. Germans and Franks are apparently irreconcilable and so the latter die off. What of the map of Europe? "England then joined the Triple Alliance, which became the Quadruple Alliance. Thus, the Congress of Zurich had made the central powers into a powerful, unconquerable union of states which guaranteed lasting peace for all Europe and was strong enough to impose its will on every other nation in the world. ,,clxv

Again the German authors seem to believe that most nations could be negotiated into alliance or neutrality when it came to German aspirations. One will note that the

United States plays little role in the above works. Only Niemann's work even mentions the Americans at all, and only to say that they supplied England with all they needed

64 during the war because their colonies were lost. Therefore, the USA is only there to gain commercial advantage and are not interested in getting involved militarily_cixvi

The change in German opinion that these three works chronicle is an interesting combination of growing hubris along with a degree of wishful thinking; namely, that their apparent encirclement ( obvious by 1907) was a 'paper tiger' that wasn't as strong as it looked. Surely the centuries old enemies Britain and France could never honestly ally for any reason? Russia wanted British India too much to ally with them. Not really; this Entente was just diplomatic whitewash.

This is not saying that the German government and military weren't quite aware of the true state of matters. Admiral Tirpitz had sleepless nights worrying that the British navy would strike suddenly at Wilhelmshaven and destroy the German fleet at a stroke; much as they did to the Ddanes in the Napoleonic Wars. Moltke the Younger would have a nervous breakdown as the World War caused armies to march in 1914. Even the bombastic Kaiser Wilhelm II would attempt at the last minute to arrange things with

England so that the war would remain a German-Austro-Hungarian war versus Russia.

But in the end London would not abandon Paris, and the German Army's Schleiffen Plan insisted on a attack on France before Russia; regardless of the diplomatic realities. In the final analysis the German public just didn't seem to want to accept that by the 1900s they were the pariahs of Europe and the world.

65 CHAPTER V

THE UNITED ST ATES, AMERICAN COUSINS, AND MANIFEST DESTINY

Thanks to rapid industrial and population growth in the decades after the Civil

War of 1861-1865, the United States of America looked forward to the next century as an era bright with promise. Its industry was moving from strength to strength, its military and government costs low, and its international obligations virtually non-existent; this allowed the USA to invest heavily in its own infrastructure. Only the Monroe Doctrine was an international obligation of any import, and that concept was nearly a century old and its enforcement was not so much by American power as British naval might.

England's shared interest in the enforcement of the demand for European nations to keep their hands off the western hemisphere insured that the Americans need not back up their doctrine with actual force. With a small Federal government and a burgeoning industry, the American people looked forward to a future bright with economic opportunity.

There were storm clouds on this happy horizon. It is ironic that these issues were partially due to the weakening of the old enemy of the Republic, Great Britain. While the

British Empire was reaching its zenith of power, its control of the world's oceans was slipping as other nations took up the figurative trident. The German, Russian and

Japanese Empires were beginning to explore the concepts exemplified in the Navalism movement and as their fleets grew the preponderance of the Royal Navy began

66 to wane. Prophets of naval power in the United States such as Captain Alfred T. Mahan tried to encourage the United States to also enter the seas with a powerful fleet; both merchant and armed, to increase the wealth and prestige of the country. ctxvii This was difficult to do, since most Americans continued to cling to the dictums of avoiding entangling alliances with other countries. This admonition, first voiced by George

Washington in his farewell speech to the country as his presidency ended certainly applied in 1796. It is debatable whether the Father of His Country meant for the concept to be followed into perpetuity.

If Great Britain enjoyed a "Splendid Isolation" then the American Republic kept a

"Golden Isolation."ctxviii This was short lived, however. As the 19th century progressed, technology and industry made the United States' geographic isolation smaller and smaller. With liners able to travel across the Atlantic Ocean in only two to three weeks travel was faster and more frequent than ever before. Telegraph lines spread over the world as sort of a 'proto-Internet'; connecting people from continents across the world more closely than ever before. A telegraph message could travel from London to Sidney

Australia in a matter of four to six hours. ctxix Compared to the 18 th century, where speed of communication was limited to the 2-4 knots of a sailing vessel or the speed of a horse this made the world much closer than ever. It further meant that the United States could less and less afford to ignore events beyond their shores. clxx

Furthermore, the weakening of the British Royal Navy vis a vis its rivals held more import to Americans than simply an academic exercise. With the Royal Navy less

67 able to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, and the United States Navy a collection of Civil

War antiquities, nations such as Germany and Japan, looking to expand with colonies in a world already claimed, looked with covetous eyes toward Central and South America.

The German Empire viewed Latin America as a bountiful region ill-served by its native polities and obviously in need of Teutonic efficiency to properly develop its resources.clxxi If the Americans and the British didn't like it, well at this point the aforementioned Social Darwinism claimed the day. Strength would prove the superior nation, and as Bernhardi proclaimed (in Chapter 4) war was the best method of determining a nation's fitness.

So the end of the Spanish American War of 1898 found the United States standing to challenge older powers and new rivals. Admiral Dietrich's German ships attempting to overawe Dewey's squadron made relations as chill between the United States and

Germanllxxii much as the Kruger Telegram of 1895 did for Anglo-German relations. The new President Theodore Roosevelt and the Navy Department planned for a larger navy and a greater role for the United States in world affairs; and their sights were starting to focus on the German Empire.

According to A. S. Grenville in his piece Diplomacy and War Plans in the

United States the ideas of those advocating the 'Large' policy (Military and naval increases) such as Mahan, Teddy Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge expanded

American influence into Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. To these proponents of United States interventionism, this was vital not so much to create

68 an American Empire but instead to create advanced bases to protect the North

American continent. Cuba and Puerto Rico especially were vital to control of the

Caribbean and to protect the planned Isthmian canal in Panama.c1xxiii

Roosevelt's view was that America's primary threat was not England but

Germany. He viewed rising German economic and naval strength as a direct threat to

South America and consequently the Monroe Doctrine. This is why despite the war scares with Japan in the Pacific Washington decided to concentrate the US battle fleet in the Atlantic. clxxiv

The Philippines were a more complex issue. Truthfully, McKinley was considering giving the Philippines either back to Spain in their entirety or perhaps keeping one of the islands (perhaps Luzon) for an American base only. Ironically, it was the strong German interest in acquiring these islands that gave the US

President pause. Not only Americans, but the British and Japanese were not willing to see a German presence so close to China and the Sea of Japan.c1xxv It was a curious irony that both Britain and Japan preferred the USA to annex the

Philippines outright in lieu of returning them to Spain; for it was an open secret that Spain had been close to signing a deal with Germany to have the Reich purchase the islands outright before the war with the Americans broke out in

1898.clxxvi

Naturally one should not lose sight of the fact that American corporate interests played a factor in the decision to retain the Philippines. These islands in

69 US hands would provide a perfect trade point for US business while not actually occupying Chinese territory; thus allowing the united States to retain its aloofness and disdain for the European powers who were slicing up China. In a sense, the

USA would gain the advantage of a treaty port in China without the headaches and questionable morality of actually attaining one.

"Every naval officer had taken to heart Mahan's teaching that economic rivalries were the true cause of global conflict, and then, by a process of applying 'the precepts of history', it seemed a logical conclusion to regard Germany and England as the ultimate mortal foes of the United States. All naval war plans of the period were based on an application of Mahan's doctrines', however absurd the conclusion to which they led. uclxxvii

Still, US hostility to Germany did not necessarily presuppose Anglo-American amity. The last of the Venezuelan Crises of 1903clxxviii where Britain and Germany sent warships to force that nation's president to pay outstanding loans to their citizenry increased American ire at Great Britain. It might have been worse save for two factors.

First, the British quickly moved to ameliorate Washington by a request for President

Roosevelt to act as arbiter. Second, Americans who read the papers in Britain could easily see that the joint Anglo-German action was as unpopular with the British public as it was the American public.clxxix

Indeed it was concern for the fragility of his government that Prime Minister

Balfour did his best to appease the Americans and distance British policy from Germany.

This was timely, as Roosevelt sent Admiral Dewey (a well known Germanophobe) to command a squadron in the Caribbean to insure that the Germans didn't go too far. After the resolution of the crisis in America's favor in 1903, Roosevelt was quite pleased. 70 As one might assume, the Caribbean was especially of interest to the United States and its naval goals. Not only was a significant portion of the American coastline directly vulnerable to any actions in the Gulf, but the American plans for an Isthmian canal depended on US naval hegemony in the region. With the Spanish islands transferred to the United States as protectorates only Great Britain held significant territories in the gulf.

"Fortunately it so happened that Britain, hard pressed by Russia and France, was just at this time trying to concentrate her military and naval forces [in Europe.] By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of January 1902, Hay not only secured British assent to the exclusive American control over the projected isthmian canal but also in reality the British recognition of American predominance in the C an'bb ean. ,,clxxx

America's prestige and international relations were of great importance and the evolution of that thought can be seen in the Invasion Literature of the United States in this time. The genre took longer to start in America than it did in Europe and Britain, but it quickly published quite a few works for the mass audience of 'Dime Novel' aficionados. The first of the Invasion Literature/Future War novels published in the

United States seems to have been The Last Days ofthe Republic by Pierton Dooner in

1880. The foreign adversary in this and other works of the time were the 'Yellow Peril' of Chinese coolies immigrating to the west coast of the United States. This threat to

American liberty and racial purity unfortunately reflects the populist and racist opinions of the day, and the Yell ow Peril sub genre remains a powerful part of the Invasion

Literature/Future Novels in America until World War I.clxxxi

71 The interesting point of American novels of this genre that distinguish them from the British or German stories of the same period is the naive obsession with the sanctity of civilians and general laws of war; at least, when it involves white ( or occasionally

Japanese) foes. Mass genocide upon non-whites seems to be indulged in with gleeful abandon by the white protagonists of these books. clxxxii

For an enemy with a more organized military, The End ofNew York by Park

Benjamin is probably the first Invasion Literature story written by an American author.

Its debut in the October 31, 1881 issue of Fiction Magazine, though not particularly different than similar Invasion Literatures from Britain at the time nonetheless created a sensation in the USA. This resulted in its book publication and contributed toward the development of the genre in America. From 1884 on, the story was regularly reprinted in volume 5 of Scribners' popular Stories by American Authors.clxxxiii

The story is of the Cautionary Tale variety. The Spanish, weary of American criticism of their Cuban policies, sends a fleet to bombard New York and the United

States; Civil War-era weaponry is helpless to stop them. America is saved in the end by three ironclads from Chile rescuing the nation but the humiliation remains. clxxxiv The idea of England being the nation to shell the United States re-emerged in the 1890s with emerging concern over the Venezuelan Crisis.

" ... At this time the New York Times ran such ominous analyses as 'A Stranger at Our Gate' a two-thousand-word article by William Drysdale warning on July 27, 1890, that 'Great Britain is no longer a distant power across the seas, but a powerful nation with entrenchments thrown across our front yard, ready to mter1ere· c wit· h our mgress· and egress. ,,clxxxv

72 Other stories followed quickly, and the pre-1898 Invasion Literature emphasizes war with Britain again and again. An example of this is Samuel Barton's 1888 The Battle ofthe Swash and the Capture ofCanada, with Canada falling to the United States but the

Eastern Seaboard ruined by the Royal Navy. The next year saw Frank Stockton's The

Great War Syndicate published; and American technology proves supreme over the machinations of the English. The United States goes to war with Britain, but as all

Americans know that business is the supremely efficient mode of organization, the USA gives the conduct of the war to a syndicate of American industrialists to wage. They build many inventions, including a sort of iron crab that submerges and crushes English vessels with its claws from below the water. Another device is an automated missile called a

'motor bomb' that is oddly similar to a cruise missile mounting an atom bomb. This fearsome weapon is used on a remote location to show the terrible power the United

States could unleash, and Britain surrenders to avoid it being used on London. The end of the story finds the two powers uniting (under American dominance) to become "Dictators of the World!"c1xxxvi

Other works of the genre saw Great Britain conquering the USA, but ironically by virtue of this the Americans are 'saved' from the twin evils of Socialism and Feminism.

In the 1885 work The Fall ofthe Great Republic, by an anonymous author writing as a future historian, the United States government has become the hostage of minority fringe groups determined to push their socialist, Irish anti-British, and Feminist agendas regardless of the wishes of the majority. This coalition, called the 'Peoples Party',

73 declares war on Britain to invade Canada. Their policies create such anarchy and poverty that eventually a coalition of European states led by Britain invade to end these dangers once and for all. America is divided among the powers and their rule eliminates

Socialism and returns the proper classes to their place of leadership in North

America.clxxxvii Regarding the threat of Socialism, prior to the Spanish American War most Germans portrayed in American Invasion Literature/Future War stories are not soldiers or agents of the Kaiser, but are instead Socialists who fled Germany to take up their insurgency in the United States.clxxxviii

Henry Groton Donnelley's The Stricken Nation first appeared in 1889.clxxxix

Normally a playwright, Donnelley wrote this work as much as a radical Irish nationalist as an American. The evil force in the work is Great Britain, and much is made of British holdings in Canada, the Caribbean and the Pacific (this was before the annexation of

Hawaii) and the territories are compared to an anaconda poised to squeeze the life out of the republic.

America was wealthy but in her usual state of affairs had a tiny army and virtually no fleet. Coastal defenses were either relics from the Civil War or non-existent. In short order, Britain strikes without warning, burning and occupying America's coastal cities on all three oceans and the Great Lakes and denudes the republic of its wealth. Again and again this 'Cautionary Tale' work decries the unpreparedness of American forces and the treachery and greed of the British. The story ends badly, with America virtually another

British Dominion within the Empire; independent in name only.cxc This work, well

74 before the Spanish American War or the first of the Venezuelan Crises (1892) though rather purple in its prose describing English atrocities, probably reflected more

Americans' view of the old enemy. His prior work to this, which described President

Ulysses S. Grant crowning himself Ulysses I of the American Empire also had many anti-British overtones and both were successful in reprint.

The Spanish American War, as noted earlier, began to change American opinions regarding Britain; at least insofar that they did not automatically assume the worst in

English motives. The contemporary Review of July 1898 noted in an article by Andrew

Carnegie that general moods were changing and for the better between the two

English-Speaking nations. cxci

After the Spanish-American War, opinions on Great Britain changed as did the idea of an American empire. Suddenly it didn't seem so bad for many Americans to see their country garrison far distant lands; for their 'own good' of course. Rather than simply building an empire, many citizens viewed America as a nation that should share its great gifts to the world. As Bruce Franklin quips in War Stars:

"The seventeenth-century American Puritans had been fond of imagining their little colonies as a beacon on a hill, illuminating a path for the dark Old World of Europe. In these late-nineteenth-century American fantasies of future war waged by forces deemed progressive, we see this vision becoming truly messianic as the old beacon light begins to assume the proportions of a global conflagration. ,,cxcii

Books about an Anglo-American Union for world peace and justice become ever more popular. Benjamin Rush Davenport's 1898 work Anglo-Saxons, Onward! A

Romance ofthe Future portrays this equal union more as a superior racial group rathtr 75 than bearers of superior culture or technology. The Anglo-Saxon-ized civilized world

(including Western Europe, The British Empire, USA, India and Japan) stood against the evil forces of reaction personified by the Czar of Russia; who was also now the Pope and therefore the paragon of evil to protestant America.cxciii This alliance of English-Speakers is determined to eliminate class and privilege, and it is this that doubtlessly convinces

Germany to be manipulated to fight on the side of Russia. Scenes of superior

Anglo-Saxons charging Slav artillery with sabers and cutting down the 'lower race' are rife in this tale; a disturbing precursor to racial theory prior to World War II. After the predictable denouement with the dominance of the Anglo Saxons assured, Germany is kindly allowed to join the Anglo-Saxons in world domination; as a junior partner of course. cxciv

Much was made of this idea of Anglo-American Fellowship, and perhaps the greatest literary example of this work was The Coming Conflict ofNations: or The

Japanese American War by Ernest Hugh Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick, a writer of boy's adventures such as The Grammar School Boys and Uncle Sam's Boys in the Philippines wrote the Coming Conflict in 1909 and found a highly receptive audience in both the

United States and Great Britain.cxcv

This 'Jingoistic Tale' begins with a sudden attack on the United States by Japan.

However, unlike 1941 this attack was on the American West Coast and involved one million Japanese soldiers who apparently slipped into America disguised as coolies. cxcvi

This was probably a veiled reference to Japanese spies at Port Arthur who did the same

76 disguise during the Russo-Japanese War. The numbers bandied about by Fitzpatrick continue in this vein, with Japan apparently able to send millions and millions of troops to various fronts easily; with no transportation or supply difficulties. Great Britain, naturally supporting the United States, finds itself hamstrung by the (real)

Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance signed in 1902.

"Britain had constantly urged upon its people that Great Britain, being bound by treaty with Japan, it was imperative that no overt act on the part of the British people should take place. The hearts of the British people were never- the less with their kinsmen, and they longed for a just and proper excuse to join hands across the seas to help to expel the invaders from American soil. Were not the United States but an expansion of Great Britain? An expansion of Anglo-Saxon civilization. Loud and many were the murmurs and anathemas hurled by the British people at those responsible for having placed Great Britain in such an unenviable and compromising a position. ,,cxcvii

This certainly reflected the United States' concern with the Anglo-Japanese treaty.cxcviii But war comes to Old Blighty after all when:

" ... Germany embarked a hundred thousand men and immense stores and munitions of war, sufficient to last through a long and arduous campaign, for the purpose of invading Brazil ... England protested and demanded the recall of the expedition; to these demands Germany gave evasive and equivocal replies." cxcix

This diplomatic sidestepping does not impress Whitehall; general war breaks out between Britain, France and Russia against the Triple Alliance of Germany,

Austro-Hungary and Italy. While the German fleet is sunk in a great battle in the North

Sea, Germany defeats France and Russia on land; the inference here is that the British never sent an expeditionary force to the continent. The Japanese use a secret smoke weapon to obliterate the US Navy in the Pacific, and to send the newly volunteered US 77 army into flight across the Rockies and out of Mexico. But Japan apparently goes too far for her British ally when she occupies the Panama Canal.

"news of the Japanese seizure of Panama flew through the British Isles and the colonies beyond the seas, the people arose as one man and demanded that the government terminate the treaty with Japan, as Japan had wantonly outraged the feelings of England in seizing the canal. ,,cc

The British government, being a (somewhat) democratic nation naturally respected the wishes of their public. They send a note to Tokyo:

" ... and demanded the restoration of the canal to the United States and the recall of all the Japanese soldiers from the United States and Central America. This Japan emphatically declined to do. The British Government immediately severed all connection with Japan and formed an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States." cci

The people and government of the United States, rather than resenting Great

Britain's neutrality while America was invaded, met the announcement with joy and applause. A joy shared in the British Empire when:

"Never had there been evinced such joy by the people of Great Britain and the United States. Everywhere throughout England and America were the two proud immortal emblems of the great English-speaking nations intertwined. People were delirious with joy, which gave vent by the firing of guns and great pyrotechnical displays, immense parades headed always by the Union Jack of Great Britain and the Stars and Stripes of the United States, and great meetings at . which fervent and patriotic speeches were delivered. In one day a hundred and fifty years of misunderstanding was swept away forever. George Washington belonged equally to the two great sections of the Anglo-Saxon race."ccii

78 So now Britain joins the war on behalf of the USA against Japan. In an even more ironic twist of fate, the war in Europe grinds to a halt. Germany's fleet is gone, but everywhere her armies are supreme and have moved into Turkey and the Middle East, planning to threaten India. But when England enters the war against Japan, a deal is struck in Europe:

"The British Government immediately sought out a "modus vivendi" with Germany, France, Austria and Russia. These nations being greatly alarmed at the Japanese seizure of the Panama Canal, pledged themselves to desist for the time being from further aggressive warfare. Germany and Austria, it was agreed, should remain in control of all those territories overrun by their armies until the final settlement by an international congress. Germany especially being bound to a large extent, by the ties of consanguinity to the people of the United States, was loathe to see those people humiliated by the Japanese, so she gladly consented to a general armistice with France, Russia and England, thus giving England an opportunity and a free hand to act jointly with the United States against Japan."cciii

For nations armed to the teeth and battling for about a year at this point, they all behave with admirable calm. Fitzpatrick probably is assuming that since the source of the

'Yellow Peril' diatribes was Kaiser Wilhelm that he would be quite agreeable to stopping the Japanese. France and Russia were losing so it is debatable how much say they would have at any rate, and might be wishing for a period to recover. Even in this fiction Vienna is under the thumb of Berlin and so naturally agrees with the Kaiser's choice.

Suffice it to say that there are more battles on land and sea, and enough to appeal to any reader fond of war fiction. The British develop a counter to the Japanese smoke and the royal Navy and the (newly rebuilt) United States Navy defeat the Japanese Fleet in a second battle of the Pacific, with nary a Japanese ship surviving. This run of victories

79 continues on land and though Japanese troops still hold California, Oregon and

Washington State the Japanese seek terms. The war is successfully concluded by the

United States and the United Kingdom in an alliance that becomes rather more than a

wartime partnership. Fitzpatrick describes the affinity for both nations emerging into a new polity; The Confederation of the English Speaking Powers.

"The one great result that the war had brought about, so far as Great Britain and the United States were concerned, was that it had forever wiped away all memories of the rupture that had so greatly interfered with the amiable relationship of those two great kindred nations. The time and opportunity had arrived for a readjustment of the relationships existing between all the English-speaking countries. The United States of America had returned into the fold of the great Anglo-Saxon commonwealths, and it was necessary that that fold be made broad enough to welcome home the returning daughter." cciv

But what of the Japanese? In an eerie comparison with 1945, the united

Anglo-Saxon super state demands unconditional surrender from the Japanese. Like in the

Second World War, this does not sit well with Nippon. "In these dire straits the Japanese

Government made overtures for peace to London and Washington. The British and

American Governments demanded an unconditional surrender."ccv This was unacceptable to Japan, as Fitzpatrick put it:

"Against this the pride of the Japanese rebelled. The Japanese people were willing to be immolated on the altars of patriotism and loyalty. The Japanese soldiers in America begged to be allowed to sacrifice themselves, if such sacrifice could help the fatherland. ,,ccvi

But unlike reality with A-Bombs to force Japanese surrender, the Confederation of English Speaking Powers seem to change their minds.

80 "The people in Japan were as equally opposed to an unconditional surrender, and they urged the government to stand steadfast, and maintained that they were prepared to suffer any hardships that could be entailed upon the country by a British-American invasion. After a great number of exchanges had taken place between the Governments of Japan, Great Britain and United States, it was finally agreed on peace.' "ccvii

The terms were basically that Japan's forces would disarm but remain under the authority of their officers and be returned to Japan. Their weapons would be returned on

Confederation vessels at a later date. The government would remain in place though

Japan would be briefly occupied by Anglo-American forces. Japan would hereafter limit their armaments on land and sea and pay the United States and indemnity for losses suffered. ccviii

In return, Japan kept their Emperor and the Confederation governments guaranteed to support Japanese interests in the Pacific when the international arbitration of borders was convened. Unlike World War II and the bitter feeling engendered by the conflict among all combatants, Fitzpatrick's nations feel a bit differently.

"The English-speaking peoples entertained a genuine admiration for the heroic valor and the splendid fighting qualities of the Japanese soldiers, and they paid just tribute to the remarkable aptitude that the Japanese had shown for perfecting Organizations. They were therefore much gratified at the moderation and humanity shown by their governments in dictating terms of peace to Japan. ,,ccix

This is probably a combination of Fitzpatrick's genuine admiration of the

Japanese people, as his later writing on Japanese jujitsu and culture proclaimed. It also reiterates the conventional idea among Western nations of the day; namely of war being a

'sport' and winners could then give kudos to the losers for being 'good sports' and

81 'playing the game well. The Japanese, being good sports, return this Bonhomie. When the Anglo-American ships approach Japanese waters:

" ... they were met by a Japanese war squadron composed of those vessels that had escaped destruction by being in home waters or in other parts distant from the scene of the last great fight. This squadron welcomed the arrivals with the firing of salutes, and the manning of yards and other expressions of welcome, which were warmly returned by the visitors. The visiting vessels were escorted to safe anchorage by Japanese war vessels. The soldiers immediately disembarked and occupied temporary quarters prepared for them around Yokohama. The populace had gathered in hundreds and thousands along the shores, and enthusiastically welcomed the now friendly forces. As regiment after regiment was disembarked, and marched to the airs of popular music, the people gave vent to great shouts of welcome. ,,ccx

Alas, loose ends remain in the story's finale. What of this settlement of, as

Fitzpatrick put it, " ... this world-wide war"? What of the other victor Germany? Though not part of the Anglo-Saxon club they hold a considerable amount of territory. The rest of the world is divided as follows. The Confederation creates Central and South America into two large Federal Republics modeled on the United States and the Anglo-Americans put over them to insure that they behave; because ... "The Governments and people of

Great Britain and the United States and of all other civilized nations, for that matter, were wearied of seeing some of the fairest portions of the world constantly given over to

. d ,,ccxi anarc h y an d d1sor er.

Germany, despite being a foe of England and ignoring Washington's protest about the Monroe Doctrine by invading Brazil are rewarded as well.

"Germany and Austria were united under one head, the Emperor of Germany. To these were annexed all the Balkan States, those fire brands of Europe. Turkey and Asia Minor.. were made dependent on Germany, which was to . h ,,ccxn hold a suzeramty over t em. 82 Germany lost all her African and Pacific possessions, which in the real world were fiscal burdens to Berlin at any rate. Constantinople, the Holy Land and the

Dardanelle's were made free and international regions.

Furthermore, the remainder of the world is parceled out to the other powers, both friend and foe. Japan gets East Asia (including Siberia), France gets North-West Africa

( which she already had by 1909), Russia got to keep Vladivostok as well as territories in the Caucasus. The Czar would also be compensated by gaining Persia. The narrator seems to imply that the terms were not negotiated by anyone but the Confederation; they were simply a fait accompli and the other powers just agreed to it.ccxiii

Fitzpatrick ends the book with a design for a sort of proto-League of Nations modeled on the Confederation of English Speaking Powers. This body would be a forum for solving the world's problems and empowered to punish recalcitrant nations. How?

Not with military force; but economic sanctions_ccxiv

Sanctions would work because the nations of the Earth would embrace Free

Trade, as London had aspired for years to do. Free Trade was not only good for nations and a way to punish recalcitrant; but according to Fitzpatrick even Christian. For ...

"To produce, by artificial and arbitrary means, barriers against the free distribution of the gifts of the Creator, is but to interfere with His beneficent designs, and to create conditions that can only lead to the destruction of all civilization. Commerce, to be enduring and civilizing, must be absolutely free. Restrictions on commerce presuppose a restricted civilization."ccxv

83 This book, written in 1909 and a mere five years shy of the Guns ofAugust 1914

concludes with a reinvigorated Europe (unless you are French), the CESP and Japan

fixing the world's problems. End, draw curtain. One of the major differences between this book and British works speaking of a United States of English Powers such as

George Griffin's Angel ofthe Revolution or Lake of Gold, this one written by an

American dwells more on the virtues of Free Trade and Christianity. Free Trade, as quoted earlier, is not only the natural way of commerce but if one does not engage in Free

Trade one is being Unchristian. Additionally, the world is ostensibly reorganized not for hegemonies but for the furtherance of Christian civilization. This is a notable difference, as religion and idealism played a much higher place in American policies ( even imaginary ones). This is a viewpoint that Woodrow Wilson would pursue at the Paris

Peace Talks of 1919, with debatable results.

84 CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND THE FACTS OF FICTION

The scholars who have made extensive research into the history of these tales of

Invasion are not as varied as in many other subjects. Perhaps the most respected in the

field is Ignatius Frederick Clarke. This scholar uses all sorts of future stories to chronicle

intellectual and social history from as early as the 1ih century (with Francis Bacon's

writings) to the 2000s. His eight-volume collection of such works covers issues ranging

from predictions of disasters, science fiction adventure and discovery, women's rights

and warfare to come. ccxvi His most pertinent works regarding Invasion Literature are

Voices Prophesying War: 1763-1984 (1966), The Great War with Germany, 1890-1914

(1997), and the oft-referenced work in this paper Tales ofthe Next Great War: Fictions of

Future Warfare and ofBattles Still to Come (1995).

I. F. Clarke is more of a narrator of these stories of futures past and he provides a

fine variety in his various anthologies. He does promote the thesis that by studying the

view of the past towards the future one can understand social issues among nations. This

paper promotes the same concepts, though narrowing the focus considerably to three nations and how their interrelations both acted and reacted on the public opinion that fed the literary mill which published the Invasion Literature stories.

85 When other scholars mention the genre of Invasion Literature, they do so only briefly and to make a small point towards a different context. Niall Ferguson delves into the concept of Invasion Literature/Future War stories in the first chapter of his work The

Pity of War, published in 1999. Ferguson takes a contradictory view when compared to most historians in that he postulates that these stories were just that; escapism and not relevant to European attitudes. In particular, he uses statistics in Pity of War to promote the idea that Europeans were not militarists as often claimed but were actually turning their backs on Militarism. ccxvii His observations are that if there was a militaristic streak in

European culture (which he doubts) prior to 1900 it was certainly declining in the years proper to 1914. This is an interesting argument and is opposite to the thesis of this paper.

Instead of taking these works at face value, Ferguson seems to try to argue that the rise in

Pacifism and other international societies opposed to conflict are indicators of a lack of interest in war as a means of resolving international disputes. The commercial argument is used as well, for of course war is bad for business, at least the non-armament industries.ccxviii What Ferguson seems to ignore is that one could be a member of an anti-war organization or be an advocate of international arbitration but still rally to the flag to defend the homeland. This is especially the case when said homeland was under threat, which virtually every nation in Europe believed prior to 1914.

The German Empire was convinced of their diplomatic isolation and of a conspiracy to destroy them by the Entente powers Britain, France and Russia.

Austro-Hungary was convinced that the southern Slavs prodded by St. Petersburg posed a

86 dire threat to the very existence of their polyglot state. Russia was humiliated after the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the diplomatic defeat by Austria-Hungary in the

Bosnian annexation of 1911. Russia therefore believed that their credibility as a European

Great Power was dependent on their strong reaction to a perceived threat. France was dwindling in population, industry and influence compared to the German Empire; and was determined to not face another humiliating defeat as in the Franco-Prussian War of

1871 or to be bullied again as in the Morocco crisis of 1912.

Then there was Great Britain. As related in Chapter 3 they were certainly feeling threatened on all fronts, but especially by Germany. If they did not stand with France and

Russia, Whitehall was certain that Germany would become the dominant power in

Europe; leaving England isolated much as Napoleon did at the height of his power in

1812. Such would ruin Britain and force the English to live with a proverbial dagger pointed at their heart. The German Navy could no longer be blockaded in the North Sea if

France was a ally of Berlin (willing or otherwise) and German industry could eventually outstrip even Great Britain in shipbuilding. So, Ferguson seems interested in deflating popular myths such as European Militarism in his book The Pity of War. Such objective reevaluation of historical assumptions is a good thing, but should not be stretched too far.

Another scholar that has looked at Invasion Literature, albeit in an extremely narrow context, is H. Bruce Franklin in his 1988 book War Stars: The Super-weapon and the American Imagination. Franklin uses certain war fictions written in the 1880s forward to promote intellectual and social history as well. His thesis is that the American books of

87 the time emphasized the creation of the 'American Super-weapon' and this obsession was the fulcrum for the eventual development of the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb and the

'Star Wars' SDI defense program first given form by President Reagan in the 1980s.ccxix

This singular work of study has value to the student of Invasion Literature and Future

War stories, but he is obviously a strong critic of any missile defense system and his disdain for the 'Super-weapon' concept tinges the entire work. He also makes a few historical errors, notably in his assertions that such super-weapons pervaded American

Invasion Literature of the period. It was certainly a factor, more than other nations' literature but hardly omnipresent.ccxx In fact that many American Future War fictions of the day did not have such 'Super-weapons' in the plot. Stories such as the Fall ofthe

Republic, Davenport's Anglo-Saxons Onward!, The Stricken Nation by Donnley, and such post 1914 works as J. Bernard Walker's America Fall en ( 1915) and At the Defense ofPittsburgh by H. Irving Hancock (1916) certainly lacked any 'Super-weapons'. In addition, those that did use the theme on occasion had the weapons in the hands of foreign states. Hancock's The Coming Conflict ofNations certainly had super-weapons, but they were Japanese and British respectively. Regarding the nuclear weaponry of the mid 20th century he skips the fact that the a-bomb project was predominantly British in scope; at least in planning and early development. Despite the criticism, his work is a good foundation for Invasion Literature from the United States; many of which were not included in Clarke's anthologies.

88 The central focus of this work is the idea of public perceptions and how they are both affected and effect government policy. Public perceptions are notoriously difficult to qualify in today's age of phone polls, internet voting and market analysis. For benighted eras before all this technology, the researcher is limited to the medias of the day in question. This can be a sort of literary minefield, with care to be taken as to what is valid and what is hyperbole.

Novels and similar literature are an especially valuable way to see what appealed to the reading audiences of each country. Why is this? The Invasion Literature/Future

War novels (and the serialized magazine articles that began them) were unlike newspaper articles in that they were not limited to the reality of the day. Theorizing the future allowed the jingoist within free reign or perhaps the prejudices within for a 'Cautionary

Tale'. They certainly did use reality on occasion, but could rationalize the facts to make their point; and of course to make money. Rarely did an author of Invasion Literature or

Future War have the opportunity to publish simply out of patriotism or a determination to make a statement. George Griffin's Lake ofGold and H. G. Wells' War in the Air spring most to mind, but they were exceptions that proved the rule.

Since profit was the first and dominant motive, magazine editors and publishers wouldn't publish anything that they knew wouldn't sell well to the readership. The problem with newspapers is that they dealt more with facts than fictions; whereas the fiction genre allowed the imagination to run free; to give the audience what they wished to read about.

89 What makes Invasion Literature/Future War fiction different from other fiction

works of the day is that it attempted to predict the near future of their target country. To

predict what the next war would be like, and who would succeed or lose and why. It

reinforced preexisting prejudices, chauvinistic notions, and fears of the 'other.' It should

be noted that while the 'other' was inevitably the foreign enemy, British and American

novels took as much emphasis on the foreigners in their midst as beyond their borders.

This would especially be true in an immigrant nation such as the United States, but

British books of the period worried about the shifty French waiter or the apparently

innocent German hairdresser. They seemed inoffensive, but were portrayed as secretly

spies and infiltrators of their nation to undermine Britain or America from within.

These fears coincided with a significant influx of foreigners within Great Britain

and the United States in the later half of the 19th century. Many Europeans fleeing

persecution among the autocratic states due to democratic or anarchistic tendencies found

both England and America to be lands of relative toleration compared to their homelands.

In addition, many of the peoples who resided in British Imperial holdings would travel to

Britain for education and jobs. The United States, a land of immigrants, had a large influx of new immigrants during the Civil War until just before the First World War. This resulted in cultural friction and tension between the public, especially in large urban areas such as London and New York.

Unlike the Anglo-Americans, German novels and serials did not take the view of foreigners undermining the state. Instead, their concern seemed to be concentrated on

90 other Germans, namely those from states other than Brandenburg-Prussia. The

Hanoverians were viewed as sort of faux Englishmen, with cynical views and a lust for

business profit. The Bavarians were portrayed as generally pastoral and Catholic, not to

mention being the state most resentful of Prussian dominance of the German Empire; the

industrialists of the Ruhr and Saar, and so forth. This is probably not surprising in a

'nation' that was only 29 years old at the tum of the 20th century.

British and American novels also emphasize class warfare, more even than the

German stories. These predominantly emphasized a fear of Socialists and Anarchists

instead. In William Le Queux's work The Great War in England in 1897 more damage is

done to London by the Lower Classes' running amok. These commoners are led astray

from their natural leaders by anarchists and Socialists and instead are encouraged to

damage more of London than the Russo-French bombardment of the city near the end of the book. Again and again there is revealed a Middle Class fear of the lower orders and their brutish excesses that emerge once the police are weakened. As most immigrants were congregated in the East End of London (the poorer area) this applies to both groups.

American works such as Donnley' s The Stricken Nation portray the same scenario as the British in regards to the poorer classes. The moment the authorities are weakened the criminal classes and minorities rise to loot, riot, and engage in all sorts of 'Outrageous

Excesses'; a polite euphemism of the time for rape, murder, and other acts beyond the pale of Victorian society. Thus we see a British fear of foreigners and the lower classes;

91 an American worry of the same (though more foreigners than lower classes) and a

German fear of fellow Germans that resent Prussian dominance.

What of the hopes of the readership? The British who perused such monographs

wished to read about England maintaining their hegemony around the world. Oh, it could

be menaced but in the end Tommy Atkins and Jack Tar will insure the Pax Britannica. As

it became increasingly apparent that she could no longer afford to do so even with the

resources of her empire, there emerged an emphasis on the "English Speaking Peoples."

Great Britain the parent and their young daughter the United States would assure the

peace and prosperity of the world; not to mention continuing British relevance on the

world stage. The United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland was threatened by continental

enemies, but British pluck and resourcefulness as free men would muddle on through to victory. If not, the North Americans would realize blood was thicker than water and come

save the day; led by the more experienced British of course.

The Americans had different ideas. True, there were many who agreed with the concept of' Anglo-Saxon Unity' but they defined this rather differently than their English cousins. To the citizens of the Great Republic, The United States had an obligation to share democracy and freedom with the world and they were going to do it. Of course there was a contradiction of opinions on how best to do this. Many thought the USA should enlighten the world with democratic ideals by example and remain isolated from the quarrels of Europe and its old animosities. Others believed in a more aggressive and imperialist policy (though they would have never used those terms) for 'Regime Change'

92 to coin a modem phrase. If an Anglo-American alliance was in the offing, then the USA

would be the dominant partner and Britain would be the respected but junior partner. This

state of affairs did result after World War II, but was certainly not in the manner that any

British statesmen would have considered desirable. Germany, being an autocratic

monarchy, was inherently mistrusted by the United States despite general good feelings

for most of the 19th century. In the Invasion Literature/Future War novels if Germany is not an opponent of the United States they are a distant nation; tolerable enough but uninterested in American interests.

Germany's views were perhaps less benevolent and therefore perhaps the most honest of all. They did wish to share German (re: Prussian) discipline, scientific mastery and order with Europe and the world, but not any particular philosophy. Also, they would share this by becoming either benevolent rulers or dominant partners of their European neighbors. The German Empire's predominant goal was to be supreme in Europe. This desire was evident in such works as The Coming Conquest ofEngland and Frankreichs

End in Jahr 19??. True, the German Empire was not overly concerned with forcing new governments on their neighbors, only demanding obedience. In Niemann's work the

Kaiser places no special demands on their allies Russia or France save for Gaullist acceptance of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. They must only follow the German lead and they would be rewarded with British colonies to rule. Great Britain is alternatively envied and despised, a greedy nation unwilling to share the spoils of the world with their

German neighbor. Americans were a decent enough sort, but really should stay out of

93 international affairs. The Monroe Doctrine was a relic of the Napoleonic era and any

attempt to keep Germany out of South America was foolish and as greedy as perfidious

Albion.

One point that seems to be a recurring theme in the novels of all three countries is the idea of 'Modem Man' being inferior to the sturdy folk of the past; the forefathers that made their nation great. Much is made about physical and mental decadence and how

such might very well lead to the destruction of their nation. Curiously, their enemy never

suffers from this denigration as well. Even when one of the other nations are the prime antagonist in the story they are uniformly capable, cunning and ruthless. Never weak, never poor soldiers, and rarely losing a battle; at least not until the climax of the novel (if appropriate) to provide maximum tension.

Do the novels, as presented in the prior chapters, provide accurate reflections of the various national agendas; at least as viewed by the novel readership? Does such mean there was no possibility of national alliance other than what resulted in history? Germany under the ascension of Wilhelm II and especially after the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 had a large amount of goodwill with the British people and his grandmother Victoria.

Once the Iron Chancellor left the picture, Britain was certainly more trusting of Germanic motives on the diplomatic stage. In The Great War in England in 1897, it was Kaiser

Wilhelm who led Germany into a war with France and Russia to punish them for their sneak attack on the British isles.ccxxi But the Kaiser's own diplomatic fumbles, starting with the Kruger Telegram of 1895 and culminating with German development of their

94 navy, seriously damaged Anglo-German chances of a rapprochement. When Joseph

Chamberlain made his infamous Birmingham speech where he spoke of an alliance

between England and the Reich he was pilloried in the press and had to make hasty

amends for the comments. Conversely, when he mentioned an Anglo-American alliance, this played much better with the British public if not entirely with their American

Cousins.

In the first years of the 20th century, Americans as a whole were kindly disposed toward Britain; especially after the Venezuelan Crisis of 1903, but most US politicians suspected the British were attempting to involve them in European affairs that the United

States really had no vested interests in. Added to this were the large German immigrant minority with connections to their homeland and the sizeable Irish minority who from the

Fabian raids onward were determined to keep American at odds with Britain. Between these two groups and the old tendency of the United States to avoid foreign affairs it is little wonder that despite all the rhetoric of a unity of 'English Speaking Peoples'

Woodrow Wilson was elected in 1912 on a platform of strict neutrality.

Could there have been a United States-German Imperial alliance? Ironically, the best chances for this were during the days of Bismarck. The Pomeranian Junker was peripherally involved in colonialism to be sure. It was under his watch that Germany acquired Zanzibar, Southwest Africa, and an interest in Samoa; but they were less imperial territories to him than possible bargaining chips to be used for diplomacy. As he

95 said once to a Reichstag member "My map of Africa? Here is France, here is Russia.

That is my map of Africa!"ccxxii

If Kaiser Wilhelm's succession to the throne created a brief window of

Anglo-German possibilities it had the reverse effect on German-American relations.

From the Kaiser's attempts to create a European trading block specifically aimed against the United Statesccxxiii to his insistence that Cuba and Puerto Rico, being Spanish possessions for centuries were therefore part of Europe and thus America cannot claim them the Kaiser did little to engender good feelings in the American Republic.ccxxiv

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the apparent support that the Pan-German league had among the German government also did not sit well with American public opinion.

Chapter 2 noted German intrusion economically in South America, which was bad enough for relations. Active attempts by both the League and members of the Kaiser's government to create de facto colonies and client states in Brazil, Argentina and

Venezuela would certainly have chilled even the best relations. Dietrich's naval standoff with Dewey in the Philippines to forcing the Germans to back down in the Venezuelan imbroglio certainly put the nails to the coffin of relations; at least as far as the American public was concerned. The German public did look favorably on the United States as expressed in Chapters 4 and 10, due in no small part to German relatives who immigrated to North America. But as noted in Emil Witte's Revelations ofa German Attache

Germans in the Reich had a distorted view of American opinion and little interest in d1scovermg. . t h e truth .CCXXV

96 'What If?' is one of those entertaining if academic pastimes for historians, but on

occasion they can also engender thought about the foundations of fact. Far from a

foregone conclusion, the allegiance of each of these three nations could have been

different. Considering all the possibilities, the perceptions of each other engendered through Invasion Literature/Future War novels seems to imply that an Anglo-German alliance would have been the most likely in lieu of an American German one. While the

US and Germany had concurrent economic interests against a country with large worldwide market share such as the United Kingdom, there was too much friction in how those markets should be divided.ccxxvi Germany would not have settled for US exclusivity in Central and South America, and nothing less would have been possible for American politicians of the day. The greatest single impediment to an Anglo-German rapprochement was oddly enough the half-German half-English Kaiser Wilhelm II himself. His bombastic pronouncements and vacillation between Anglophobia and love of his mother's homeland created an unpredictable diplomatic environment inhospitable to real agreements.

The current scholarship provides ample evidence against the Kaiser's accusation of a conspiracy of the 'Anglo-Saxon Powers' against the German Reich; commercially or militarily.ccxxvii In fact, arguably there was little joint economic cooperation between the

United States and the United Kingdom; certainly prior to World War I.ccxxviii It is a curiosity of history that if Kaiser Wilhelm really believed such a Cabal was extant, his

97 actions through the 1890s to the Great War laid the foundations of just such a 'Special

Relationship' but only after his abdication to the Netherlands.

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104 ENDNOTES

iFor specifics on this change of industrial power see Grant, Susan-Mary. A Concise History ofthe United States ofAmerica.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 243, 248-50, 262-3. Also see Brands, H.W. American Stories. (New York: Pearsons, 2012) Chapter 18,444, Chapter 21, 524. For a British perspective see Morgan, Kenneth 0. The Oxford History ofBritain. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 561 iiA perfect example of these wares on display is covered in the World's Faire of I 876, held in Philadelphia. See Grant, 213-4 and Brands, 445-6. iiiWawro, Geoffrey. Warfare and Society in Europe: 1792-1914 (London, 2000) Chapter I.and Townshend, Charles ( ed). The Oxford History ofModern War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) 55-70. ivFrench colonial troops were organized under the naval department so much of the colonial military history of French arms can be found in naval records. See Theodore Ropp's treatise The Development of a Modem Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987. pgs.143, 154. For French and international opinions after the Franco-Prussian War see pages 26-7. vJames Toll and Gordon Martel, Origin of the First World War (London: Pearsons 2007) viLaurence Lafore, The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I (Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, 1997) 55-56, 61-62. viiWawro, Warfare, Chapter 3. viiiMacKensie, David. Russia and the USSR in the 20th Century . (Wadsworth, 2002) 21-25, 31-33. ix Amstein, Walter. Britain Yesterday and Today (Toronto, 2001) 148-149. xTownshend, Oxford, pgs. 560-1. xiFoote, Shelby. The Civil War vol.I (Vintage Civil War Library, New York, 1974) 124. xii"The 1897 Petition Against the Annexation of Hawaii." National Archives. http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/hawaii-petition/ (Accessed April 12, 2009). xiiiKennedy, Paul M. The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations (Harper & Row, New York, 1974) 9-10. xivKennedy, Paul. M. The Rise ofthe Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860-1914 (George Allen &Unwin, London, 1980)293. xv Steinberg, Jonathan. Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth ofthe German Battle Fleet (MacDonald & Co., London, 1965) 97-120 xviWawro, Warfare, 81 xviiKennedy, Antagonism, 408. xviiiMitchell, B.R. European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1975) 362-4, 388, 399. xixMitchell, B.R. European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1975) 362-4, 388, 399. xxwilliams, Rhodri. Defending the Empire: The Conservative Party and British Defense Policy 1899-1914 (Yale University Press, London, 1994) 7. xxiWilhelm II, The Kaiser's Memoirs (Harper & Bros., New York, 1922) 74. xxiiCampbell, Charles S. Anglo-American Understanding: 1898-1903 (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1957) 10-11. xxiiiWilhelm II, Memoirs, 72. xxivCampbell, Understanding, 15.

105 xxvThe origin of the term 'Invasion Literature' is unknown, but 'Future War Stories' was used by Clark in much of his writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. xxviClarke, I.F. Tales ofthe Next Great War: Fictions ofFuture Warfare and ofBattles Still to Come (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1995) 22. Following on the success of Erskine Childers's Riddle of th~. Sands ( 1903 ), the spy story became a popular sub-genre of the future war story and survives today. xxvu Clarke, Future War, 11-14. xxviiiClarke, Future War, 344-346. xxixlbid, 14-15. xxxThe last of the France-as-enemy books published in Britain was F. E. Grainger'sSeaward for the foe of 1903. Apparently the Anglo-French Entente made French enemy books less appealing. Referenced froml.F. Clarke Tale of the Future by Clarke: From the Beginning to the Present Day. London: Library Association, 1978, 29. xxxiClarke, Future War, 2-3. xxxiiThese examples were taken from Clarke's book Tales ofthe Next Great War, with The Unparalelled Invasion pgs. 257-270; and AdolfFrankreichsEnde pgs.321, 363. The British story was written anonymous, What Happened After Dorking? New York: , 1871. xxxiiiTownshend, Charles (ed.). Oxford History ofModern War (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) Chapter 3.The Nation in Arms I. 55-74. Palmer, Robert R. The Age ofthe Democratic Revolution: A Political History ofEurope and America, 1760-1800 Volume 11.(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964). Note especially Chapter I: Issues and the Adversaries of the work. xxxiv/bid. xxxvForrest. Oxford History, 74. xxxviDuer, William A. (ed.) Memoirs ofLafayette~ 48-49 subsections 6-7. 1837. House, E.G.(ed.), Memoirs ofGeneral Lafayette~ 46, 66-7, 1824. Another supporting source is Palmer, Robert R. The Age ofthe Democratic Revolution: A Political History ofEurope and America, 1760-1800 Volume II. (Princeton: Princeton University Pressl964). Note especially Chapter I: Issues and the Adversaries of the work. For a differing opinion see Fuller, J.C. Military History ofthe Western World, volume 2: From the Defeat ofthe Spanish Armada 1588 to the Battle of Waterloo, 1815. (New York: Minerva Press 1955). Pgs. 341-369. General Fuller insists that the French Revolution was started by the Middle Class of France for economic reasons and not Enlightenment ideals. xxxviiLowe, John. The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem: 1865-1925 (Routledge, New York, 1994) 27-31. xxxviiiWhitman, Sidney (ed.), Conversations with Prince Bismarck (Bernhard Tauchnetz, Leipzig, 1900) 206-208. xxxixTuchman, Barbara .The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the World War 1890-1914 (Macmillan, New York, 1965) Chapter X. x1Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (Random House, New York, 1991) 12. xliSontag, Raymond James. Germany and England: Background ofConflict 1848-1894 (Russell & Russell, New York, 1964) 82-83. xli\on Bulow, Bernard. Memoirs ofPrince von Bulow Volume I (Boston, 1931) 21. Sontag, Germany and England 83, 95-6. xtiiiChesney, George Tomkyns. The Battle ofDarking (G. Richards Ltd., London, 1871) 66. xtivFor greater detail on British division on the American Civil War see Campbell, Duncan A. English Public Opinion and the American Civil War (Boydell Press, London, 2003). American perspectives are available in Foner, Eric. The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 2010). xtvBennett, Frank M. The Monitor and the Navy Under Steam (W. W. Norton & Co., Boston, 1900) 193. xtviLingley, Charles Ramsdell. United States Since The Civil War (Dartmouth, New York, 1920) 39. 106 xlvii 15. Jbid. xlviiiKoebel, W. H. British Exploits in South America (Routledge, New York, 1917) 515-516. Herwig, Holger. Germany's Vision ofEmpire in Venezuela: 1871-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986) 15, 26-7, 33 British Foreign Office Consular Report on Trade and Finances, 1896. xlixKoebel, British Exploits, 519-520. 1Koebel, British Exploits, 258. liKoebel, W. H. South America: An Industrial and Commercial Field (Routledge, London 1917) 24. liiLingley, Since Civil War, 288. liiiKoebel, British Exploits, 535-538. Koebel, South America, 27-8. livLingley, Since Civil War, 283. Iv Ibid. lviKennedy, Paul M. The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878-1900 (Harper & Row, New York, 1974) 69-70. lviiKennedy, Samoan Tangle, 86-87. lviiiLingley, Since Civil War, 287. lixlbid. lxLingley, Since Civil War, 227. lxiPerkins, Bradford. The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York: Atheneum 1968). lxiiThomas, Evan. The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the Rush to Empire: 1898. (New York: Liddle, Brown & Co. 2010) 62-65. Barbara Tuchman provides the British view of the issue in The Proud Tower, 30-32. A very biased American version can be read in Grover Cleveland's The Venezuelan Boundry Controversy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1913). lxiiiNoel Annon, Julian, Huxly and others, Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians: An Historic Revaluation of the Victorian Age (Macmillan, New York, 1966) 36. lxivSchmidt, Rudolf. Die Darwin'schenTheorien und ihreStellungzurPhilosophie, Religion und The Moral-Theories of Darwin (Nieben, Stuttgart, 1880) 115-126. lxvschmidt, Darwin'schenTheorien, 36, 230-233. lxviFerri, Enrico. Socialism and Moderrn Science: Darwin, Spencer, Marx (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1900) 36-37. lxviiSontag, Germany and England, 104-106. lxviiiTuchman, Proud Tower, 249. lxixvarious newspapers and novels of the time reflect this; notably Jack London's Unparalleled Invasion, Dogherty'sThe Battle ofthe Pacific, and of course Kaiser Wilhelm II's infamous "Hun" speech to German troops moving to China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. lxxKowner, Rotem. "Becoming an Honorary Civilized Nation", The Historian, (2005) 19-38. lxxiFerri, Socialism, 50-51. IxxiiMarwick, Arthur. The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (Norton, London, 1965) 94. lxxiiiMarwick, Deluge, 95. lxxivSchmidt, Darwin'schenTheorien, 40-45. Also Tuchman, Proud Tower, 249-250. lxxvFerri, Socialism, 36, 66. lxxviMarwick, Deluge, 94. lxxviiH.G. Wells, "The Land Ironclads", The Strand, December 1903. lxxviiiH.G. Wells, The Time Machine (Atreia Books, London, 1898.) lxxix Asada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2006) 10. Jack London, "The Unparallelled Invasion", McClure's Magazine, July 1910, 313-64. lxxxsontag, Germany and England, 104-106. lxxxivon Bernhardi, Friedrich. Germany &The Next War (Unknown, New York, 1912) 14. 107 Ixxxiivon Bernhardi, Germany, 52. I ... xxxmvon Bemhardi, Germany, 14. IxxxivMahan, A.T. Influence ofSea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1890) 25-28. lxxxv/bid. IxxxviWimmel, Kenneth. Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Sea Power Comes of Age (Brasseys, New York, 1998) 58. IxxxviiMahan, A.T. The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1897) 454 lxxxviiiMahan, Influence, 21, 138. lxxxixKennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1976) 149-151. xcHerwig, Roiger. "Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (Ashfield Press, London, 1980) Introduction xciMitchell, B.R. European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1975) 20. xciiLowe, Great Powers, 1-25, 39-40. xciiiWhitman, Conversations, 225-226. xcivvon Holstein, Friedrich. The Holstein Papers: The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1957) 377 Curtius, Friedrich. Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst (Macmillan, London, 1906) 443-9, 451. xcvWilhelm II, The Kaiser's Memoirs (Harper & Bros, New York, 1922) 1-2, 12-13. xcvivon Bulow, Bernard. Memoirs ofPrince von Bulow Vol I (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1931) 224. xcviiMahan, Influence, 70. xcviiiGelber, Lionel. The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906 (Oxford University Press, London, 1938) 16. xcixMitchell, European Historical Statistics, 19-27; 104. cclarke, I. F. Tale of the Future: From the Beginning to the Present Day. (London: Library Association 1978). ciAsada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2006) 16. ciiMarder, Arthur J. Anatomy ofBritish Sea Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1940) 16-7, 202,209. ciiiCampbell, Charles S. Anglo-American Understanding (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1957) 42. civGelber, Lionel. The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics 1898-1906 (Oxford University Press, London, 1938) 44. cvLeventhal, Fred and Roland Quinalt. Anglo-American Attitudes (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 2000) 100-1. cvteventhal, Attitudes, 5. cviiBeer, G. L. The English-Speaking Peoples, Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations (Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1917) l 02 Allen, H. C. Great Britain and the United States, a History of Anglo-American Relations: 1783-1952 (Macmillan, New York, 1955) 557. cviiilbid. cixlbid. ex/bid. cxiTwo objective sources on the Kruger Telegram and its influence on Anglo-German relations are Amstein, Walter. Britain Yesterday and Today (Toronto, 2001) 181. 108 And Kennedy, Paul. M. The Rise ofthe Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860-1914 (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980) 220-1. A differing view is given in Wilhelm II, The Kaiser's Memoirs (Harper & Bros., New York, 1922) 82-6. Kaiser Wilhelm II gives his reasons in his memoirs, though this is suspect as they were written after World War I and he was influenced by those events. cxiiMarder, Anatomy, 465. cxiiiMiller Brooks, Interview 12-2-2005. cxivMitchell, B.R. European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1975) 21. cxvChilders, Erskine. The Riddle ofthe Sands (Dodd, Mead & Co, London, 1903, 1998) Forward to the 6th printing. cxviChilders, Riddle, p. 271. cxviiSeveral serials and novels shared this particular theme including Wood, Walter. The Enemy in Our Midst ( 1901 ), Y exley, Lionel. When the Eagle Flies Seaward ( 1907) and Cole, R. W. The Death Trap (1907.) cxviiiDawson, A.J. The Message (Horace, London, 1907) 210. cxixDawson, Message, 93. cxxLe Queux, William. The Invasion of 1910 (Dodd & Mead, London, 1906) 36. cxxi/bid cxxii Le Queux, Invasion 545-6. cxxiiilbid cxxivClarke, I. F. Tales of the Next Great War: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still to Come (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1995.) cxxvClarke, I. F. "Wars of the Industrial Age" Washington Post, D-3. cxxvilbid. cxxviiThe calls to reinforce the Home Fleet and reduce ships in other seas was constant among most of the Admiralty. Much data can be read regarding this effort in Admiral Percy Scott, 50 Years in the Royal Navy (London: Albemarle 1919) 202-3 cxxviiiMunro, H. H. /Saki, When William Came: A Tale ofLondon under the Hohenzollerns (Bodley Head, London, 1913) 180-181. cxxixSaki, William, 187-190. cxxxSaki, William, 191. cxxxiSaki, William, 256. cxxxiiSaki, William, 257. cxxxiiiSaki, William, various. cxxxivSaki, William, 272. cxxxvoanyer, G. Blood is Thicker than Water (Unknown, London, 1895) 158-59. cxxxviWells, H. G. Anticipations (Atreia Books, New York, 1902) cxxxvitambi, I. N. The Navy and German Power Politics (Allen &Unwin, London, 1984) 114-115. cxxxviiiChickering, Roger. We Men Who Feel Most Gennan: A Cultural Study of the Pan-Gennan League, 1886-1914 (Allen &Unwin, Boston, 1984) 8, 26-30, 81. cxxxixFerguson, Niall. The Pity of War (Perseus Books, London, 1998) 20. cx1Ferguson, Pity, 21. cxliClarke, I. F. Tales of the Next Great War: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still to Come (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1995) 21. cxliiFerguson, Pity, 21. cxliii/bid. cxlivNiemann, August. Der Weltkrieg: Deutsche Trdume (World War: Gennan Dreams-released in English as The Coming Conquest of England) (Unknown, Leipzig, 1904) 2. cxlvNiemann, Conquest, 4. 109 cxlviN•1emann, C onquest, 2 . cxlviiN•1emann, C onquest, 32 . cxlviiiNiemann, Conquest, 40-46. cxlixNiemann, Conquest, 52-53, 78. c1Niemann, Conquest, 90-91. cliN•1emann, C onquest, 114. cliiNiemann, Conquest, 116. cliiiNiemann, Conquest, 118. clivSommerfeld, Adolf.FrankreichsEnde in Jahr 19??(Vnknown, Leipzig, 1912) 322. civSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 32 l. clviSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 323. civiiSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 325. clviiiSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 327. clixSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 330. cixSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 33 l. clxisommerfeld, Frankreichs, 332. clxiiSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 334-340. cixiiiSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 358-360. clxivSommerfeld, Frankreichs, 359. clxvNiemann, Conquest, 93. clxvi/bid. cixviiMahan, A. T. Influence ofSea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1890) 138. cixviiiKennedy, Paul M. (ed.) The War Plans ofthe Great Powers, 1880-1914 (Allen and Unwin, London, 1979) 32. cixixMitchell, B.R. European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1975) 21-24. clxxKennedy, War Plans, 32. cixxiHerwig, Holger. Germany's Vision ofEmpire in Venezuela: 1871-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986) 15, 26-7, Chapter 2. cixxiiWimmel, Kenneth. Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Sea Power Comes of Age (Brasseys, New York, 1998) p. 33. cixxiiiGrenville, A. S. "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States" War Plans, 21. clxxivKennedy, War Plans, p. 33. clxxvKennedy, War Plans, 29. cixxviCampbell, Charles S. Anglo-American Understanding: 1898-1903 (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1957) 283. c1xxviiCampbell, Understanding, 235,258. clxxviiiHerwig, Venezuela, 71. clxxixfbid. clxxxKennedy, War Plans, p. 27. clxxxiFranklin, H. Bruce. War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988) 33. clxxxiiFranklin, War Stars, 20. clxxxiiiFranklin, War Stars, 22. c1xxxivFranklin, War Stars, 22-23. clxxxvFranklin, War Stars, 23. clxxxviStockton, Frank R. The Great War Syndicate (Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1889) p. 25. Franklin, War Stars, 26. 110 cixxxviiFall of the Great Republic (Roberts Brothers, Baltimore, 1885) p. 32. clxxxviiiFranklin, War Stars, 28. cixxxixClarke,. I. F. Tales of the Next Great War: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still to Come (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1995) 11-14. cxclbid. cxciCamegie, Andrew. "Do Americans hate the English?",North American Review, 611. cxciiFranklin, War Stars, 31. cxciiiDavenport, Benjamin Rush. Anglo-Saxons, Onward! A Romance of the Future, (Humpbell Publishing co., New York, 1898) 40. ~~ . Davenport, Anglo-Saxons, 240. Franklin, War Stars, 31. cxcvFranklin, War Stars, 31. cxcviFitzpatrick, Ernest Hugh The Coming Conflict ofNations: or The Japanese American War. (H. W. Rohrer & Co., Springfield, 1909) 164. cxcviiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 44. cxcviiiMarder, Arthur J. From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fischer Era-1904 1919 Vol. I (Oxford University Press, London, 1961) 127. cxcixFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 96. ccFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 164. cciFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 165. cciiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 165-166. cciiiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 166-167. ccivFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 291. ccvFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 282. ccviFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 282-283. ccviiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 282-283. ccviiiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 284-285. ccixFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 286-287. ccxFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 287-288. ccxiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 297. ccxiiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 297-298. ccxiiiFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 299. ccxivFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 303. ccxvFitzpatrick, Conflict ofNations, 305. ccxviClarke, I. F. Tales of the Next Great War: Fictions of Future Warfare and ofBattles Still to Come (Sy~~cuse University Press, Syracuse, 1995) 11-14. ccxv 11 Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War (Perseus Books, London, 1998) 30. ccxviiilbid. ccxixFranklin, H. Bruce. War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988) Chapter 1. ccxxFranklin, War Stars, 31-36. ccxxiLe Queux, William. Great War in England in 1897 (Tower Publishing, London, 1894). ccxxiiLowe, John. The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem: 1865-1925 (Routledge, New York, 1994) 100. ccxxiiiHerwig, Holger. Politics ofFrustration, (Little, Brown & Co, New York) 18-24, 27, 34, 60-61; Fischer, Fritz. War ofIllusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (Allen &Unwin, New York, 1975) 30. ccxxivH . D • erw1g, r rustratwn, 24 .

111 ccxxvWitte, Emil. Revelations of a German Attache: Ten Years ofGerman-American Diplomacy (Doubleday, Leipzig, 1907) 56, 61,178,211. ccxxviHerwig, Holger. Germany's Vision ofEmpire in Venezuela: 1871-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986) 18-19. ccxxviiH . D • erw1g, r rustratwn, 13 . ccxxviii . . Herwig, Frustratwn, 14.

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