IDEALIZNIONXI: Historicalstudies on Abstractionand Ideal Tzation
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
(Aoev MrcruEulczUNn'snsrry) POZNAN STLDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHYOF THE SCIENCESAND THE HLMANITIES IDEALIZNIONXI: HistoricalStudies on Abstractionand Ideal tzation Editedby FrancescoConiglione, RobertoPoli andRobin Rollinger Poanaí Stu.lies in the Philosophl of the ScienL'esarul the Hunanities 2001. Vol.82, pp. 125 l1ó LeenSpruit AGENT INTELLECT AND PHANTASMS. ON THE PRELIMINARIESOF PERIPATETICABSTRACTION Abstract. This paper discussessome aspectsof the controversiesregarding the operationof the agentintellect on sensoryimages. I selectivelyconsider viervs developed between the l3th century and the beginning of the 17th century, focusing on positions which question the need for a (distinct)agent intellect or arguefor its essential"inactivity" rvith respectto phantasms.My aim is to reveal limitations of the Peripateticalframervork for analyzingand explainingthe mechanisms involved in conceptualabstraction. The first sectionsurveys developments of Aristoteliannoetics and abstractionin Ancient and Arabic philosophy. The secondsection presents a discussionof some"positive" accountson abstractionand the agentintellect, and some"nesative" accounrs. In Peripatetic psychology intellectual knowledge arises from the interplay betweenthe mind and sensoryimages. The possibleintellect receives what has beenisolated or abstractedfrom sensoryrepresentations by the agentintellect. In contrastwith the direct grasp of cognitive contentin the phantasms!as Aristotle had suggestedin De anima, the majority of medieval and RenaissancePeripatetics posited a mediatedassimilation of the essenceof sensiblereality, interpretingthe Aristotelianpsychology of cognition in terms of a theory of abstraction.The agentintellect plays a crucial role in conceptual abstraction.It is viewed as the active faculty of human mind or else as a separatesubstance which groundsempiricai knowledgeby illuminating or processingsensory images. The operationof the agentintellect in intellection was intenselydiscussed by ancient,medieval and early modern Aristotelians. Thesedisputes regarded both the ontology of the agentintellect and its role in generatinghuman knowledge.In this paper,I will discusssome aspects of the controversiesregarding the operationof the agentintellect on sensoryimages.l rThe following issueswill not be discussed.(1) The varioustypes ofabstraction rvhich some authorsdistinguish; cf. the list of six intellectualabstractions in Paul of Venice ( I 504), f. I 55rb: (i) "actuatio phantasmatis";(ii) "depuratio", that is, "productio specieiintelligibilis ex phanrasmate tamquam ex causa effectiva"; (iii) "separatio", leading to a more general concept; (iv) "specificatio", consisting in the production of "second order" species; (v) "compositio" of concepts;(vi) "deductio". See also Castaneus(1645),2. who distinguishedbetr.veen four types of t26 Lcen Spruit What doesthe agentintellect exactly do rvith the phantasms?Does it merely reveal their intelligible core or does it processsensory images and (re) constructs mental content'l I lvill selectively consider viervs developed betr,veenthe l3th centuryrand the beginningof the lTth centuryr,focusrng on positionswhich questionthe needfor a (distinct)agent intellect or arguefor its essential"inactivity" with respectto phantasms.My aim is to reveal limitationsof the Peripateticalfrarnervork for analysingand explainingthe mechanismsinvolved in conceptualabstraction. The first section brief-ly surveysdevelopments of Aristoteliannoetics and abstractionin Ancient and Arabic philosophy.The second section presentsa discussionof some "positive" accountson abstractionand the agentintellect, and some"negative" accounts. 1.Aristotle. Alexander and theArabs Aristotle'spsychology of cognitionis developedalong the linesof an integra- ted model of perceptualand noeticactivity. An objectof thought(noeton') is made presentto the mind in virtue of a thought(noema) and this. in turn, requiresan image (phantasma).Aristotle did not havea full-fledgedpsycho- logicalor epistemologicaltheory of abstraction.And his useof termssuch as choriston andaphairesls does not entitle us to assumethat he had such a abstraction,namely, "habitualis" (throughirrpressed and inherentspecies), "actualis'' (through the intellectual act). "cognitiva". and "factiva". (2) irbstractionas an act of the possible intellect (a position endorsedby. among others. Zabarella and Suarez).(3) The issue of rvhetherthe final outcomeof abstractionis an individual fbrm or species,or else a universal.Some iiuthors distinguishedbetrveen two momentsin the generationof intellectualknorvled,ge. In "first order" intellection.a concretenotion of a singuìaressencc is generated:then the intellecîis able to engenderuniversals. See Thomas Wilton (1964), I l9; Gregoryof Rimini (1979-198.1),Super t, dist.3. q. l,352: John Buridan (1518).f.3ra: Paul ofVenice (1503),90vb, and idem (1504). l37rb; Lefèvre cl'Étaples(1525), 221r'-Pornponazzi (1966). 204; Fracastoro(157,{), l29r-v: Castaneus(16.15), 101: Colle-qiumConimbricense (1616). 307b; Suarez (1856), 122a-28a: Collegium Complutense(1637). 300a and 307b. (4) The doctrineof sensìbleand intelligible specieslsome opponentsol the speciesalso rcjectedthe agent intellect:cf. the positionsof Olivi and Durandus(infro'). (5') Only marginally attentionrvill be paíd to ìnnatisticaccounts of the agent intcllect. r Early medieval authors,such as Abelard, John oî Salisbury nnd Hugh of Saint Victor. use the term "abstractio".resuming Boethius' translationoî aphairesis.but before the rediscoveryof Peripateticpsychology in the West there is no systematicreflection on the role of the agent intellectin psychologicalconceptualisation. t Late 17th-centuryScholastic rvorks on psychology show an extensive but often sterile confiontation with authoritativesources: they no longer succeededin devising fresh insights or new methodsand approachesfor tackling in a novel way the central qucstionshanded dorvn by tradìtion. Agr'nt Inteller'r and Phantasms 12'7 theory. In Aristotle, the term abstraction(aphairesís) is mostly usedin logical contexts, indicating a method of subtractionwhich isolates objects for scientificstudy.a In a mathematicalcontext. Aristotle usedthe ferm chorizein.5 A brief analysisof three passagesfrom De anima, rvhich are often cited as evidencethat Aristotle held a psychologicalor epistemologicaltheory of abstraction,confirms our claim. In the first of thesepassages the terminology has a definite ontologicalsense (429b18-23). In the second(43lb12-19), ir refers to a set of mathematicalentities that are logically isolatedand grasped conceptuallythrough the methodof substraction.In the third passage(432a3- 9), the terminologyof abstractionrefers to a realm of intelligible entities r.vhosemode of being is that of dependenceupon sensiblesubstances. According to Aristotle, knowledgeis the graspingof objectswith a noetic status.Sensible forms becomenoetic objects in virtue of the agent intellect. The light metaphorfor the latter's activity doesnot supportan abstractionistor acquisitionalaccount of knowledge. As efficient cause of thinking, the productive mind illuminates what is already there and makes possible the generationof mental representationsof the externalworid in human thought. No preliminary abstractionis required. The agent intellect actualizesnoeta, that is, it generatesor reveals (Aristotle was not clear on this point) the intelligible core contained in the sensoryinformation. Notice that Aristotle regarded the relation between phantasm and active mind to be quite unproblematic,even though there is an overt ontologicalgap betweenthe two elementsinvolved. The roots of the Peripatetictheory of psychologicalabstraction are in Alexander of Aphrodisias.In his De anima, Alexander describedintellectual apprehensionas separating(chorizein) (cf. Alexander1887, p. 90, 1I l) forms from any possible material circumstance(pp. 84, 87-8). In this rvork, Alexanderconcentrated on the capacitiesof the human (material)intellect. The latter is capable of abstractingand grasping both material and immaterial forms. He remainedrather vague about the role of the active mind, identified r.viththe supremeintelligible and first cause,and ensuring the possibility of intellectualknowledge at a metaphysicallevel (pp. 88-9). ln De intellectu6, Alexanderattributed a more precise(cognitive) role to the active mind. As an actually intelligible form the agent intellect enablesthe material intellect to o SeeCleary ( I 9lì5), pp. I 3-zl5,in particularpp. 36-215where De anima. l29bl I -23 and llt.7,g areexamined. 5 Also here, however, he spoke of "subtraction", that is, of separationof certain aspectsof sensible bodies in such a way that they can serve as the primary subjects of mathemaîical attributes. o The authenticity of this work is challenged by Moraux (1942) and defencledby Bazén fl973). 128 Leen Spruit separateforms from matter. Once actualizedby the agentintellect the human intellectimitates this intellect by knowing, which basicallyconsists in making materialobjects intelligible (Alexander 1887, pp. 107-108,110). At a larer stage,the human intellect will also be able to capturepure intelligibles (pp. 110-1).Trvo Alexandrianvier,vs became crucial for further developmentsof Peripateticreflection on the agentintellect: (i) the latter's activity may invesr (also) the potential intellect, leading it to perform its proper activity, and (ii) abstractionis viewed as an activity of the intellectin habitu (seealso Moraux 1942,p.121f;Bazdn 1973, p. 480). Arabic accounts of abstractionwere