(Aoev MrcruEulczUNn'snsrry) POZNAN STLDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHYOF THE SCIENCESAND THE HLMANITIES
IDEALIZNIONXI: HistoricalStudies on Abstractionand Ideal tzation
Editedby FrancescoConiglione, RobertoPoli andRobin Rollinger Poanaí Stu.lies in the Philosophl of the ScienL'esarul the Hunanities 2001. Vol.82, pp. 125 l1ó
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AGENT INTELLECT AND PHANTASMS. ON THE PRELIMINARIESOF PERIPATETICABSTRACTION
Abstract. This paper discussessome aspectsof the controversiesregarding the operationof the agentintellect on sensoryimages. I selectivelyconsider viervs developed between the l3th century and the beginning of the 17th century, focusing on positions which question the need for a (distinct)agent intellect or arguefor its essential"inactivity" rvith respectto phantasms.My aim is to reveal limitations of the Peripateticalframervork for analyzingand explainingthe mechanisms involved in conceptualabstraction. The first sectionsurveys developments of Aristoteliannoetics and abstractionin Ancient and Arabic philosophy. The secondsection presents a discussionof some"positive" accountson abstractionand the agentintellect, and some"nesative" accounrs.
In Peripatetic psychology intellectual knowledge arises from the interplay betweenthe mind and sensoryimages. The possibleintellect receives what has beenisolated or abstractedfrom sensoryrepresentations by the agentintellect. In contrastwith the direct grasp of cognitive contentin the phantasms!as Aristotle had suggestedin De anima, the majority of medieval and RenaissancePeripatetics posited a mediatedassimilation of the essenceof sensiblereality, interpretingthe Aristotelianpsychology of cognition in terms of a theory of abstraction.The agentintellect plays a crucial role in conceptual abstraction.It is viewed as the active faculty of human mind or else as a separatesubstance which groundsempiricai knowledgeby illuminating or processingsensory images. The operationof the agentintellect in intellection was intenselydiscussed by ancient,medieval and early modern Aristotelians. Thesedisputes regarded both the ontology of the agentintellect and its role in generatinghuman knowledge.In this paper,I will discusssome aspects of the controversiesregarding the operationof the agentintellect on sensoryimages.l
rThe following issueswill not be discussed.(1) The varioustypes ofabstraction rvhich some authorsdistinguish; cf. the list of six intellectualabstractions in Paul of Venice ( I 504), f. I 55rb: (i) "actuatio phantasmatis";(ii) "depuratio", that is, "productio specieiintelligibilis ex phanrasmate tamquam ex causa effectiva"; (iii) "separatio", leading to a more general concept; (iv) "specificatio", consisting in the production of "second order" species; (v) "compositio" of concepts;(vi) "deductio". See also Castaneus(1645),2. who distinguishedbetr.veen four types of t26 Lcen Spruit
What doesthe agentintellect exactly do rvith the phantasms?Does it merely reveal their intelligible core or does it processsensory images and (re) constructs mental content'l I lvill selectively consider viervs developed betr,veenthe l3th centuryrand the beginningof the lTth centuryr,focusrng on positionswhich questionthe needfor a (distinct)agent intellect or arguefor its essential"inactivity" with respectto phantasms.My aim is to reveal limitationsof the Peripateticalfrarnervork for analysingand explainingthe mechanismsinvolved in conceptualabstraction. The first section brief-ly surveysdevelopments of Aristoteliannoetics and abstractionin Ancient and Arabic philosophy.The second section presentsa discussionof some "positive" accountson abstractionand the agentintellect, and some"negative" accounts.
1.Aristotle. Alexander and theArabs
Aristotle'spsychology of cognitionis developedalong the linesof an integra- ted model of perceptualand noeticactivity. An objectof thought(noeton') is made presentto the mind in virtue of a thought(noema) and this. in turn, requiresan image (phantasma).Aristotle did not havea full-fledgedpsycho- logicalor epistemologicaltheory of abstraction.And his useof termssuch as choriston andaphairesls does not entitle us to assumethat he had such a abstraction,namely, "habitualis" (throughirrpressed and inherentspecies), "actualis'' (through the intellectual act). "cognitiva". and "factiva". (2) irbstractionas an act of the possible intellect (a position endorsedby. among others. Zabarella and Suarez).(3) The issue of rvhetherthe final outcomeof abstractionis an individual fbrm or species,or else a universal.Some iiuthors distinguishedbetrveen two momentsin the generationof intellectualknorvled,ge. In "first order" intellection.a concretenotion of a singuìaressencc is generated:then the intellecîis able to engenderuniversals. See Thomas Wilton (1964), I l9; Gregoryof Rimini (1979-198.1),Super t, dist.3. q. l,352: John Buridan (1518).f.3ra: Paul ofVenice (1503),90vb, and idem (1504). l37rb; Lefèvre cl'Étaples(1525), 221r'-Pornponazzi (1966). 204; Fracastoro(157,{), l29r-v: Castaneus(16.15), 101: Colle-qiumConimbricense (1616). 307b; Suarez (1856), 122a-28a: Collegium Complutense(1637). 300a and 307b. (4) The doctrineof sensìbleand intelligible specieslsome opponentsol the speciesalso rcjectedthe agent intellect: cf. the positionsof Olivi and Durandus(infro'). (5') Only marginally attentionrvill be paíd to ìnnatisticaccounts of the agent intcllect. r Early medieval authors,such as Abelard, John oî Salisbury nnd Hugh of Saint Victor. use the term "abstractio".resuming Boethius' translationoî aphairesis.but before the rediscoveryof Peripateticpsychology in the West there is no systematicreflection on the role of the agent intellectin psychologicalconceptualisation. t Late 17th-centuryScholastic rvorks on psychology show an extensive but often sterile confiontation with authoritativesources: they no longer succeededin devising fresh insights or new methodsand approachesfor tackling in a novel way the central qucstionshanded dorvn by tradìtion. Agr'nt Inteller'r and Phantasms 12'7 theory. In Aristotle, the term abstraction(aphairesís) is mostly usedin logical contexts, indicating a method of subtractionwhich isolates objects for scientificstudy.a In a mathematicalcontext. Aristotle usedthe ferm chorizein.5 A brief analysisof three passagesfrom De anima, rvhich are often cited as evidencethat Aristotle held a psychologicalor epistemologicaltheory of abstraction,confirms our claim. In the first of thesepassages the terminology has a definite ontologicalsense (429b18-23). In the second(43lb12-19), ir refers to a set of mathematicalentities that are logically isolatedand grasped conceptuallythrough the methodof substraction.In the third passage(432a3- 9), the terminologyof abstractionrefers to a realm of intelligible entities r.vhosemode of being is that of dependenceupon sensiblesubstances. According to Aristotle, knowledgeis the graspingof objectswith a noetic status.Sensible forms becomenoetic objects in virtue of the agent intellect. The light metaphorfor the latter's activity doesnot supportan abstractionistor acquisitionalaccount of knowledge. As efficient cause of thinking, the productive mind illuminates what is already there and makes possible the generationof mental representationsof the externalworid in human thought. No preliminary abstractionis required. The agent intellect actualizesnoeta, that is, it generatesor reveals (Aristotle was not clear on this point) the intelligible core contained in the sensoryinformation. Notice that Aristotle regarded the relation between phantasm and active mind to be quite unproblematic,even though there is an overt ontologicalgap betweenthe two elementsinvolved. The roots of the Peripatetictheory of psychologicalabstraction are in Alexander of Aphrodisias.In his De anima, Alexander describedintellectual apprehensionas separating(chorizein) (cf. Alexander1887, p. 90, 1I l) forms from any possible material circumstance(pp. 84, 87-8). In this rvork, Alexanderconcentrated on the capacitiesof the human (material)intellect. The latter is capable of abstractingand grasping both material and immaterial forms. He remainedrather vague about the role of the active mind, identified r.viththe supremeintelligible and first cause,and ensuring the possibility of intellectualknowledge at a metaphysicallevel (pp. 88-9). ln De intellectu6, Alexanderattributed a more precise(cognitive) role to the active mind. As an actually intelligible form the agent intellect enablesthe material intellect to
o SeeCleary ( I 9lì5), pp. I 3-zl5,in particularpp. 36-215where De anima. l29bl I -23 and llt.7,g areexamined. 5 Also here, however, he spoke of "subtraction", that is, of separationof certain aspectsof sensible bodies in such a way that they can serve as the primary subjects of mathemaîical attributes. o The authenticity of this work is challenged by Moraux (1942) and defencledby Bazén fl973). 128 Leen Spruit separateforms from matter. Once actualizedby the agentintellect the human intellectimitates this intellect by knowing, which basicallyconsists in making materialobjects intelligible (Alexander 1887, pp. 107-108,110). At a larer stage,the human intellect will also be able to capturepure intelligibles (pp. 110-1).Trvo Alexandrianvier,vs became crucial for further developmentsof Peripateticreflection on the agentintellect: (i) the latter's activity may invesr (also) the potential intellect, leading it to perform its proper activity, and (ii) abstractionis viewed as an activity of the intellectin habitu (seealso Moraux 1942,p.121f;Bazdn 1973, p. 480). Arabic accounts of abstractionwere developed in the context of a psychologyrvith cosmologicaldimensions. According to Alfarabi (870-950), conceptualabstraction is an act of the potential intellect, groundedupon the separateagent intellect's introducingforms in matter (Alfarabi 1930,pp. 117- 8; cf. Dieterici1892, pp. xxxi-ii; Hammui 1928,p. 79; Finnegan1957, p. 142). In Avicenna(980-1037), knowledge amounts to a progressiveassimilation of abstractedforms.T Sensory images are a starting point for the processof genuineknowledge acquisition, rather than a sourceof cognitive contents.The most perfect form of knor,vledgeis achievedby graspingthe (separate)form independentof the material lvorld. The initial degreesof abstractioncan be unproblematically attributed to the human soul and provide, as it rvere, an impulse neededfor achieving the ultimate degree of abstraction- rvhich is basicallyconceived of as the receptionof a form originatingfrom the separate agentintellect.E Averroes (1126-1198) rejected this view of an emanationof intelligible forms and defined the operationof the agent intellect as "facere universalitatemin rebus" (cf. Averroes l9-53,p. l2). More specifically,the agent intellect operateson phantasmsby suitably modifying and presenting them to the materialintellect. The actualizationof the imagination'sintentions by the separateagent intellect consists in transposingthem from one "level" to another("de ordine ad ordinem".1.o
t Avicenna ( I 968). pp. I I ,1-20.For Avicenna'sdoctrine of intellectualabstraction, see also G. Verbeke,"Introduction", in Avicenna(1968), p. 46f; Mouhamma(1968), p. 881Sharif (t963), p. 492f:Jabre (198.{), pp. 281-31l. 8 Avicenna (1972), V.5; on the active intellect in Avicenna, seeDaviclson (1972). Also in his logic, Avicenna presented the view that perceptual acts merely occasion the production of intelligibleforms; cf. Jabre(1984), in particularon pp. 302-6 'Avenoes (1953),pp. 401, 400-8.The transfer"de ordine ad orclinem"remains a centralissue in Peripateticpsychology, also for those rvho do not lollow Averroes; cf., for instance.Duns Scotus(1950), Ordinatio, liber I. dist.3,q. 1,pp.216-7. Agenr Intelled ond Phantasms r29
2. Later accounts of the operatíon oÍ the agent intellect
During the secondhalf of the 13thcentury, Aristotle's De anima becamethe framework for Scholasticdoctrines of perceptionand knowledge. From the very beginningsof the spreadof Aristotelianpsychology in the West, the concept of intellectual abstractioninvolved reflection on the agent intellect. Many psychologicaldisputes regarded the natureand (hierarchical)position of the agentintellect, namely, rvhether it was (i) a part or function of the soul, (ii) superiorwith respectto the possibleintellect or its form (cf. Alexanderde Hales 1928,II, q. 69, n. 3, a. 3), (iii) a receptoryof innatespecies or formsr0, (iv) whetherthere were two (a divine and a human) agent intellects(Johannes Peckham1918, q. 6,73; RogerMarston 1932,p.259), or else(v) r,vhetherit wasto be identifiedwirh God.rl The need for a distinct agent intellect was not generally accepted.Some authorsblurred the distinction betweenagent and possibleintellect, or limited the agent intellect's operationto a "pura praesentia"or else regardedit as an idle entity. Among thoservho regardedthe agentintellect as a faculty on its own, there was no consensusrvhatsoever on its precise functions. For example,the medievalmaster of,arts John of Jandun(1285/9-1328) acknorvledged his inability to pinpoint the exactrole of the agentintellectr2, while other medieval and later Scholasticauthors simply held that the agentintellect lays the basis for the entire range of cognitive activities.LrAn early 13th-centurypsycho-
"' During the first half of the I 3th century,the notion of an agentintellect, as incorporatingthe ideasol the things, was rvidely acceptedat the Faculty of Arts. Cf. Gauthier (1975), p. 83f. The background for thrs docrrine is the Neoplatonic theory of knorvledgeof Arab authors such as Alfarabi and Avicenna, rather than Augustine's psychology.In some authors only moral knorvledge is innate, but an extension to all intelligible forms or specieswas a quite natural deveÌopmentol this standpoint.The innatismof fbrms or speciesrvas rejected by Albert the Great ( I 890-9),vol. XXV. 459b: yet, in his De anima. he did not cxclude the presenceof innate species in the light of the agent intellect. Somc RenaissanceAristotelians, such as, Marcantonio Genua. advancedan innatisticrnterpretation of the agentintellect in the light of the r? an,ila commentary of Simplicius. ' For example,see the positionof RogerBacon. r: JohnofJandun (1587),359:"Omnibus ergo consideratis confiteor ad praesensme nescire aliquamnecessitatem huius conclusionis.quod intellectusagens eftìciat speciemintelligibilem mediante phantasmate:& vere non apparet mihi quod intellectus agens habet aliquem modum causalitatisagentis super huiusmodi speciem una cum phantasmate". 'r Sce the meticulous,though rather artificial, overvierv of the multifarious activities of the agent intellcctin Paul oîvenice (150:l), 137r:(l) the abstractionofthe "quidditas"from thc singularthing rvhich is thereby transformed,without separatìngthe quidditativeessence from its individual subject.into a possibleobject for the intellectr(2) the agentintellect lifts the phantasm Îrom its potential status. and turns it into an actually known content; then (3) it abstractsan intelligiblespecies from the phanrasm,and delivers it to rhe possibleintellect: (4) rhe agent i30 Lecn Spruit
logical treatiseattributed two operationsto the agent intellecî: the abstraction of species,and their orderingin the possibleintellect (cf. Anonymous1982. p. 5l). This ratherunusual characterization of the agent intellect'soperations persistedonly duringthe first decadesof that century(see Anonymous 1952, p. 157); later authorsgenerally assigned discursive activity to the possible intellect.and narrorvedthe function of the agentintellect to the illumination of phantasmsand the abstractionof intelligiblespecies (cf., for instance,Albert the Great 1968, p. 201f.). Some authorsendorsed the view thar the agenr intellectmay also be active respectto the possibleintellect. The latter r,vas "vith supposedto have a double potentiality: its act, in addition to being contingenr on actualizingspecies, is dependenton the agentintellect. Thus, one type of illumination is directedtor.vards the phantasmsin order to enablethem to generatethe intelligible species.rvhile the other one triggersthe operationsof the possibleintellect once the latter is actualisedby the species.raHere I concentrateon the operationof the (human)agenî intellect with respectto the sensoryrepresentations, which is usually describedas the illumination of phantasms,and more specificallyon the issuervhether this is an "actio positi- va" (possiblyincluding an "impression"of somesort), an "actioremotiva', or a "sequestratio",or elsewhether it is simply superfluous. Albert the Great and rhomas Aquinas rverethe first Scholasticsto develop a full-blorvnaccount of theagent intellect on thebasis of rheavailable ancient and Arabic sources.Their view of the agentintellect as causallyresponsible for the representationof cognitive content setsthe stagefor later cliscussions on mental processingof sensory images. This is discussedin the first subsection.The issueof the preciseactivity directedby the agent intellect tor'vardsthe phantasmswas addressedby most authorswho discussedthe problem of mental representationafter Thomas' death.The secondsubsection presentsa sketchyselection of contrastingpositions, ranging from attributions
intellect unifies this intelligible speciesrvith the "quidditas" and the phantasm.In virtue of rhe fourth operation- so Paul claimed. though \.vithoutproviding an argumentfor this remarkable conclusion the intellcctcomes to know the quidditativenature oî sensiblereality "per se er immediate".For later Scholasticism,see FortunioLicetì (1627),who at the outsetot'Book V (305b). individuated fbur operationsof the active mind: (l) the production of an image representingthe particular esscnceto the possrbleintellect: (2) the creation of a specres representìngthe incomplex universirlnature: (3) the generationof a speciesthat lays the basisfor the possiblemind's propositionalthought: (4) the causationof a speciesthat grounds syllogistic reasoning. ra AlexanderHales (1928), p. ,{5.{.Cf. Giles of Rome (l-500).66ra,75ra., idem (1504),il, q. 22. The idea of this secondtype of illumination might be due to Themistius,influencel 6. Themistius (1973).22$. in parricular,235 ancl2,14. See also Godfiey of Fountaines(191.+), pp. 251-2:Anonymous (1963), pp. 62-3.80,275;Capreotus (1589), 177b. Agent Intellect atuÌ PhanlcL.sms 131 of a more or lesssubstantive operation to the agentintellect, to theoriesof an essentially"inactive" or evennon-existinq agent intellect.
2.1.Abst nrtti()n and ill ttntitratiurt
AÌbert's and Thomas' viervs of the agent intellect bear the stamp of the cosmologicaland metaphysicalapproach adopted by the Arabs in matters psychological.Albert held that the agentintellect or,ves its abstractivepower to the fìrst celestialintelligence.lt Accordingly. the same superiorintellect is ultimately responsiblefor the (potential) intelligibility of sensibleforms (Albert 1890-99,vol. IX,506a). Thomasargued that by virtue of the "lumen intellectusagentis", our soul is connectedto the "rationes aeternae"(Thomas Aquinas1952-1963,I, q. 84. a. 5)., and this in turn meansthat the humansoul or.vesits "virtus intelligendi"to a higherintellect. namely. to God.rt-Theagent intellect is capableof reconstructingthe essentialstructure of material reality in virtueofthe first principlesit virtuallycontains.r' Albert described the role of the agent intellect as "generare esse intellectuale"or "facere universalitatem".In his vier'v,detaching potential intelligiblesfiom their particularsubstrate amounts to reproducingthem as mentalcontents. Also accordingto Thomas,the agentintellect "constructs" its orvn objects,that is. it representsthe essentialstructure of materialthings as cognitive objects. By interpreting abstractionas production, Albert and Thomascircumvented de làcto the problematicimplications of this activityas a mere"unveiling" of the intelligiblecore of sensiblereality.'n In Thomas,also the agentintellect's various operations,such as illumination of phantasmsand abstractionof species'',must be understoodin terms of the constructive capabilitiesof this intellect.20By illumination the agent intellect assignsa higher actualityto the contentsof phantasy,thus making availablethe essential
r5 See also l5th-centuryAlbertists. such as. John Hulshout ol MaÌinas anclHeymeric cle Campo. 'n ThomasAquinas (1952-1963),I, q. 79. a.4: Thomas(1961). I. c.68,570 and II. c.77, l-58.11Thomas (19641. 127 Quuestio de spiritLtalibuscrealuri.s, a. 10. in Thomas (1953): QuodlibetunX. q. 4. a. 7c. Seealso Mundhenk (1980), Anhang Il. r'' Thc suppositionthat iî containsthe actual determinationsof the intelligibles rvould make phantasmstotally superfluous.Thomas (1959), III, lectio X, 739, and lcctio XIII, 794. Cf. Thomas Aquinas( I 952-I 963),I, q. 84.a. 3-4. '" ThomasAquinas (1952-1963). t, q.79. a. 3. In the contextofan extremelyhierarchized noetics, Dietrich of Freiberg stressedthe agent intellect's productive role in the generationof knorvledged/rd its objects;cf. Dictrich ( I 957), I 85-93.and Dietrich (1971). 146-1. '' Initially. rn I)e veriîate,q. 10. a. 8. ad 10,Thomas did not speakof abstractionof intelligible species.but of the processo1'making species intelligible. r0 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (1952-1963).I, q. 79. a. 3: the agent intellect actualizesthe ìntelligiblcs"per abstractionemspecierum intelligibilium". l -12 Leen Spruit
structureof sensoryrepresentations. Abstraction is not aî unveiling;it is an actuqlisationor determinationof the intelligible potentialof sensiblecontents. Therefore,cognition is an "assimilatioactiva" (Thomas 1959,III, lectio X. 739). The agent intellect's productivity consistsin transformingsensory representationalstructures into cognitiverepresentations.2r
2.2. Theagent intellect and thephantasms
It is most likely that Thomas did not regard illumination and abstractionas (temporally) distinct stagesin the production of intellective cognition. How- ever, by characterisingthe former as a necessarycondition of the latter22, Thomas introduced a problem for the future generations,namely what the agentintellect really "does" with sensoryimages. Following bishop Tempier's condemnationrn 1277many theologiansunder Augustinianbanners sought to restrainthe naturalistencroachments of Aristotelianpsychology, regarding the abstractiondoctrine as heterodox.In general,the illumination of phantasms was supposedto take over the role of intellectual abstraction.2sThe agent intellectprocesses sensory images in sucha rvay that the possibleintellect may acquire mental contents.However, within this framework, the nature of the illuminationand the role of the agentintellect rvere highly controversial.
2.2.1 "Actio posítiyct"and Jormal conjunction
To the bestof my knowledge,only a very restrictednumber of authors,among whom Jeanof Goettingenand Paul of Venice (1369172-1429)24,claimed that the illuminaîion of phantasmsconsisted in the agent intellect ímpressing
" With a daring translationof Thomas' cognitivepsychology into a modernterminology, one might say that the agent intellect digitalizesthe rich. but analog ìnformationof senseperception. SeeDretske (1981). ?2 Thomas( I 952-I 963). I, q. 85, a. I , ad 4um. The notion of the agentintellect as engendering "universalitatemin rebus" is derived fiom Avenoes; cf. supra. See in this context also ceach (1960), 18 and l30f: the notion of abstractionin Thomas does not imply that our conceptsarise from a selectionof dataon the basisof direct sensibleexoerience. :r During the Renaissance,some authors euen heid that intellectual knorvledgeis possible without illuntination. For cxample,Zabarella claimed that the phantasmcan move the intellectby itself, too, that is, even before the illumination by the agent intellect. Unrlluminated sensory imagesare receivedby the possibleintellect as "confusaeconceptiones" of individual objects.See Zabarella(1607), col. 1013-14,l0zl5-1054, and 1058-61,where Zabarellaargued for direct knowledgeof particularbeings. Cf. alreadyAgostino Nifo ( I 55,+),1 6va: without illumination, the mind graspsonly singulars.See also Burgersdijk (1621), 1I 8, and Castaneus( I 645). 10l. ra For discussionof Jeanof Goettingen(active at the turn of the l3th and l4th centuries),see Kuksewicz(1968), p. 132:cf. PaulofVenice (1504).129va. Agent lntellect and Phantasnts 133 somethingunto the latter.More generally,the operationof the agentintellect is defendedas an "actio positiva". Henry of Ghent (1217-1293)was a key figure for the developmentsof Peripateticpsychology after Thomas. He argued that a consequenceof Thomas' theory of abstractionis an intolerabledetermination of the intellect by the senses.He addressedthe problem of intellectualknolvledge in terms of a new relation betweenagent intellect and phantasms.Henry postulatedthat the only ratio intelligendiis fhe intellect'sbare essence2s, and thus the problem of knowledgeacquisition assumes a new form: "How can this bare essence graspthe sensiblervorld?" A crucial precondition,in Henry's view, is that phantasmsmust be capableof moving the possibleintellect. And this, in turn, means that they must be transformedinto universal entities, since their singularity prevents them from becoming intelligible.26The universal phantasmis the sensoryimage divestedof its material and particularaspects. Once purified by the agent intellect,the universalphantasm is capableof actualisingthe possibleintellect (Henry of Ghent 1520,a. 58, q. 2, l30r: cf. HenryofGhent 1985, p.51). Also Giles of Rome (124311-1316)argued that the agentintellect enabled the sensoryrepresentational devices to producecognitive contentsin virtue of its light (seeGiles of Rome 1504,V, q.2l). The illuminarionof the agent intellectis seenby this AugustinianHermit as a positive action,that is to say,a substantiveelaboration of sensoryinformation. Therefore,the agent intellect can be said to produce mental representations,and to contain them virtually (seeGiles of Rome 1500,74va.).In effectGiles'view deprivesabstraction of its effective finction in the processof knowledge acquisition." The spirituai characterconfered to phantasmsenables the latter to provide the intellectwith an integratedrepresentation of sensoryinformation. Gilesattempted a rapprctchementof Aristotle'sand Augustine'scognitive psychologies.His mediating position is adoptedby other Augustinian Hermits.28It also recurreciin the work of John Capreolus(i 1444),in other
" Henry of Ghent (1613), q. 1:1.260va: "Primo modo diximus iam. quod intellectus quicunqueetiam creatusseipso est ratio intelligendiquaecunque intelligit, ìdest,quod essentiasua nuda est ratio intelligendi quaecunqueintelligit, qua procedit ab ipsa active actusintelligendi. ita quod plus non rcquiritur ex parte intellcctivi. inquantumintellectivum est in actu intelligens".Also in Olivi the "nuda essentia"is endoued rvith a similar function. to Hcnry of Ghent(1613). v. q. 14, 262rb.Thomas. by contrast.merely took their materral chiìracteras an obstacletowards actual intelligibility. r'- See indeed.capreolus (1589). I89a: "... ergo nullo moclo intelligimusabstrahendo a phantasmatibus". ri Agostino Trionfi (1270/3-1328).Thornas of Strasbourg(l4rh ccntury) and Alphonsus VargasToletanus (ca. 1300-1366).Notice that in 1287Giles' cloctrinalthought became canonical fbr the AugustinianHermits. 134 Leen Spluit
l5th-centuryThomists, and * duringthe l6th century- in Franciscussylvester of Ferrara(147.1-1528). Immediate developments of Giles' viervson the generationof knowledgeare fbund in authorsstressìng the dependenceof humanknor'vledge on sensoryrepresentations. such as HerveausNatalis (ca. l250l60-1323),the 14th-centuryAverroist John Jandun and his follorvers. Other authorsendorsed a thesisaiready present in Thomas,namely, the fbrmal conjunctionbetr'veen agent intellect and phantasm.reThe 14th-century Italian masterof arts Taddheusof Parmathought that the relationbetween agent intellect and phantasmsr'vas analogous to that betrveencelestial intelligencesand their respectivebodies: the agentintellect provides sensory images with "operari", rather than with being. Tacldheusdid not clarify, horvever,horv the agentintellect can come to constitutean "aggregatum"',vith the phantasm- that is, horv the agent intellectcan be joined qua form to anotheragent, and horv they can co-operate(Taddheus of parma 19-5l, pp. r68-9). Jacopo Zabarella ( l-533-1589) developedthe thesis of the formal conjunctionin cornbinationrvith the central viervsof the Aegidian school. Zabarellaremoved abstractionfrom the capacitiesof the agent intellect. the soletask of rvhichis illuminationof phantasms.and he deniedthat the agent intellect operatedin the sensoryimages. Rather. this intellectjoins the phantasmas its form, and this fbrrnalconjunction is rvhatthe illuminationof the phantasmconsists in. Thus enhanced.the phantasmis the object that movesthe possibleintellect (.Zabarella 1607, col. 1010-12).By virtue of its formal union the agentintellect. the phantasmcan impressan intelligible "vith species;the latîer, in turn, triggersintellectual abstraction, rvhich Zabarella consideredto be a discriminativejudgment. The formal conjunction."vas also endorsedby the lTth-centuryDaniel Sennert.rvho arguedthat this conjunction movesthe mind. generatingthe intelligiblespecies and, by consequence.the mentalact (Sennert 1633, pp. 659-660).
2.2.2Ptrre presence
Godfieyof Fontaines(ca. 1250-1306/1309)disavor,ved rhe view rhatrhe agent intellectcan operateon phantasms.He characterizedthe operationof the agent intellecton phantasmsin terms rvhich avoidedany "concrete"contact betrveen them. Godfrey rejectedany positiveillumination of phantasrnsby the agent intellect.Indeed. rather than elaboratinga sensoryrepresentation. the agent intellectoperates on the phantasmby removingor separatingits features- not
'De verituÍe.q.20. a.2. ad 5: "Quod enim intcllectusagens habitu non indigeatad suam operationemex hoc contingitcluod intellcctus a-sens nihil recìpit ab intelÌieibilibussed magrs suan fomam eistnbuit faciendoca intellicibiliaacru". AgentIntellect and Phanîusns 135 realiter to be sure- so as to renderits formal core capableof moving the possible intellect. To explain this point, Godfrey introduceda metaphor. Considermilk as possessingboth colour and taste.Without the influenceof light, milk cannotmake itself manifestas r.vhite,but it can still manifestitself as sweet.When iight is present,milk can be graspedas rvhitewithout being perceivedas sweet.In the samefashion. Godfrey argued,one may distinguish betweenthe quiddity of a materialthing as it is representedin a phantasm,and its designationby accidentaldispositions (Godfrey of Fontaines1914, p. 37). The interactionbetr.veen intellect and sensibleimages in the generationof mentalcontents is identifiedrvith a "contactusspiritualis" or "virtualis", by rvhichthe substantialquiddities contained in sensoryrepresentations manifèst themselves.roAnd this "sequestratio"of the intelligibleessence is the agent intellect's"facere universalitatem in rebus"(p. 39). FenandusHyspanus (ca. 1400)retained the traditionalabstractive termino- logy (1977.p. 201),but he deprivedthe agentintellect of any effèctiveopera- tion to perfbrm. The gist of intellectualcognition is a "recipereintentiones rei" (p. 203).This receptionrequires only the purepresence of the agentintellect, which enablesthe phantasmto move the possibleintellect.rr As Walter Burley's(127115-ca. 1346) De potentiisanimae (Rurley 1971, p. 109)seems to indicate,the same,doctrinalline was generallyaccepted at the beginningof the lzlth century:the agentintellect enables the form presentin the imagination to causethe "speciesintelligibilis" (sometimesidentified rvith the cognitive actr2)in the possibleintellect. The proper explanationof horv sensoryrepresentations are illuminated by the agent intellectremained a centralquestion in 16th-centuryAristotelian pychology.Caietanus (1468-1534) concluded that the illuminationof the
30 Godfi'ey of Fontiiines(19lzl). p. 38: "Hoc autem fit quodam contactu spirituali et virtuirli luminis intellectusagentis, nam supponendumest qì-lodhaec cst naturaintellcctus agentis quod sua applicationead objectum singularevel phantasmaquodammodo contingat illud sua virtute solum quiìntumad id quod pertinetdicto modo ad eius qr"ridditatemsubstantialem". rl FerrandusHyspanus (1911),p.216: "Et iclconon videturessc ncgandum ipsa phantasmata aliquam haberedispositionem vel habilitatcmad movere ìntellectumpossibilem in pracsentir intelÌectusagenîis, quam in eius absentianon haberent,supposito etiam quod inrellectuspossibilis essetsumme dispositus. Hanc autemhabjlitatem seu dispositioncm non intelÌigo
phantasmsis different from that of the diaphanum. He suggestedthat the appearanceof colour may be taken as a model for the illumination of sensory representations.Now, this illumination, rvhich is qualified as "objective", does not apply to the rvholecontent of the phantasm,but is exclusivelyaimed at releasingthe "quidditas"contained in it.3rTherefore, the illuminationmay ar the sametime be seenas abstraction.3aThe abstractingillumination is like the daylight that only makes visible the colours of an apple,not its flavour.35 Caietanusdoctrine of an "objective" illumination causeda long dispute concerningthe natureof the illuminationof phantasms,namely, r.vhether the latterrvas "objective", "radical" (Sylvesterof Ferrara)or ,.efTective".16 CrisostomoJavelli (1470 172-ca.1538) shared with Caietanusthe view rhat the agentintellect is unableto impressanything on phantasms.The illumina- tion of sensoryrepresentations consists simply in the intellect's"assistentia & ..verè praesentia".3TJavelli argued that the position of a agens,'does not necessarilyimply an "imprimere".rsThe agentintellect's pure presencemust
tt Henry oî Ghent's alternativcto the doctrine of speciesrvas basedon this idea: cr. supra. Holvevcr, also Paul of Venice presumeda similar mon.ìentin the cognitive processas preceding the productionofthe intelligiblespecies: see Paul of Venice (150.1),137rb. Also John Vcrsor (151'1),159v, emphasized that the illuminationby the agentintelìect regarded not the mediumbut the object to be knowr.r. tt Caietanus(1514). 36lr: "Unde in propositoimaginor quod cum in fantasmatesit narura jntellectus haec:adveniente lumine agentisfantasma illustratur non formaliter: ur draphanum:sed obiective ut color: qua illustrationesplendet atquc relucet in fantasmatenon totum quoclest in eo sedquidditas scu natura tamen & non singularitasiÌlius ei commista:ita quod istarlluminatio est abstractiva:quia lacit aparercunum scilicetquod quid est: non apparendoaliud scilicetplncìpium individuans:ac per hoc splendetin fanîasmateintelligibile in actu:natura scilicet abstrahcns ab hic & nunc & tale intelligibile in actu movct inteÌlcctumpossibilem". See also 392v-393r and Caietanus(l-509), K5ra: the agcnt intellect actuaÌizesthe,.praeexistens in fantasmatibus intelligibiìein potentia";and K5vir. ''5 Caictanus(1514).3ó1r. Cf. Caictanus(1509). K5va: the intelìcctualabstracrion ooes nor consistin an "expoÌiatio",but in a "relucentiaunius & non relucentiaalterius". For a similar meta- phor,see Godlrey ofFontaines (1914) (analyzed abovc) ancl Radulphus Briro (1973), pp. 236-7. 'ó collcgium Conimbricense(1616).291a: "... non quasi intellcctusagcns aliquid luminis phantasmatibusirnprimat: sed quia tanquam extenìa lux radij sui consortio active elcvat phantasmataad producendanrspeciem intelligibiÌem: in qua colnmuni\ rìaturarcpraesentatur exuta difTerentijsindividualibus. manetque solo intellectuperceptibilis". r'- Javelli(1580).6S8b and 690r-b. The origirrofthi. doctnneofthc impressionofa qualityon the phantasmsby the agentintellect can be tracedto shortly after Thomasl it rvasdefended alreaclv by Jeande Goettìngen.see above. 's Javelli(1580).688b: "Ad hoc tlico quoclnon omne verè agenshabet imprimere nlsr agar actionc media, qua aliquid perducitur sir.'eimprimitur. seclsulTicit quod ex sui praesentiaconfcrt id. cui frt praesensJ& ponit aliquid ex rali praesentiaquod cx se non posset'.. AgentIntellect and Phantasms t31 be understoodas an abstraction,not involving any real separation,but rather a "repraesentatiounius non repraesentandoaliud".re Also the AlexandristGiulio Castellani(1528-1585) held thatthe (separate) agent intellect did not do anything rvith or in the phantasm.Castellani observedthat the illumination by the agent intellect consistsin its "so1a praesentia".By this presencethe sensoryrepresentations are detachedfrom their material conditions, and they become different in nature, that is, they becomeimmaterial and intelligible.o"The illuminatedphantasm incites the humanintellect to graspthe intelligible object (Castellani 1558, 45r-v.). SimonePorzio (1496-1554)rejected the idea that the agentintellecr is a "real", i.e. a physicalmotor. In his analysisof the relation betweenagent intellect and phantasm,Porzio emphaticallystated that terms like "motor, motum, & materia" apply to the cognitive processonly "metaphorice".u' Indeed,in contrastto what the Latins thought,the agentintellect is not an "agensreale" like heat.for example,but rather an "agensilluminans". The agentintellect moves the phantasm"per similitudinem"(Pomponazzi 1970, 35vb.).
2.3. Theagent intellect questioned
William of Auvergne(ca. ll80-1249) is one of the first 13th-centuryauthors to criticise Aristotelian noetics.William challengedthe notion of an intellect that is at once "agens" and "recipiens"(William of Auvergne 1614, vol. I, 318).The indivisibilityof the humansoul is the basictenet of his arguments againstthe distinctionbetrveen possible and agentintellect, purporting to shor,v that the latter, -"vhenvierved as a faculty of the hurnansoul, is superfluous(cf. William of Auvergne \674, on l22a-b;205a-210a).Subsequently, many Franciscanauthors, including Bonaventura,tended to blur the distinction betrveenpossible and agent intellectin the context of Augustine'svrew on ratio. Bonaventureneither took the agent intellect as totally actual nor the possibleintellect as straightforwardlypassive. Indeed, the completeact of the agentintellect depends upon sensoryinfbrmation, while the possibleintellect
}Javelli (1580),689a.See also the conceptionofilluniination as proposedby Godfiey of Fontaincs,rvhich rvas to returnin RadulphusBrito and rvhichrvas also referred to by Caietanus. *'' Castellani(155t3),:15r: ''... eodem sanèmodo intellectusAlens universalcmfblmam in phantasrnateà singularium conditionibusadumbratam suo illustrans splendore.idque sola praesentiapraestans. eam minimegignit. sed solùm intelligibilem eftìcit, estque ut habirusquidam pìiantasmatis.qui non verè agit. sed est solùm agendiratio,...". See also 70r: "... quamquam intellectusAgens. qucm Deum asserimus,in nobis incst.suique praesentia phiìnîasnlata illuminat". "'Sec also Caietanustheory ofan "objectivc" illumination and his exhoftationto pay atteÌrtion to thc signifìcationof the "vocabula"used. 138 Leen Spruit
may be regardedas passive only in its connectionrvith the body.a2Its passivity,however, is not absolute:assisted by the agentintellect, the possible intellect processesthe phantasms,thus abstractingspecies and ultimately ,l885: graspingthe essenceof sensibleobjects (Bonaventura In 11Senr., dist. 24,l, a.2.,q. 4, 569). PeterOlivi (1248-1298)pointed our rhat Augustinedid not speakof an active mind, therebysuggesting the consistencyof a cognitive psychology dispensingwith any sharpdistinction betrveen active and receptivefaculties of the humanmind. Olivi arguedthat no suchdistinction is possible:any crisp relation betweena possibleand an agent intellect inducesan undesirable hierarchybetween them (Peter Olivi 1926.vol. II, p. a5S).Before reaching rhis conclusion,olivi stateda number of philosophicalobjections against the possibility of interactionsbetween agent intellect and phantasm.In the productionof intelligiblespecies, the agentintellect is generallysupposed to illuminatesensory images. When deliveredto sensoryrepresentations, so Olivi observed,this light musteither preserve or loseits spirituality.The lattercase is to be excluded,because the illuminationrvould be causallyinert; only trvo problematic interpretationsare possible of the former case. Either the illuminationis ontologicallydetached from the subjectit inheresin. or the agent intellect communicatesits intellectualbeing to the receivingsubject (PeterOlivi 1926,vol. II, pp.457-8). To ignorethese difficulties, simply acceptingthe illuminationof the phantasmsas unproblematic,is of no avail, for various thorny problems invest the causal aspectsof the interaction betrveenactive mind and sensoryimages. The phantasmcannot be the material causeof the intelligiblespecies, because a materialcause inheres in its effect. Nor can it be the effìcientcause, because the latteris to be identifiedrvith the agentintellect. and a simpleeffèct suchas the intelligibiespecies cannot be causedby trvo different causes.A similar argumentundermines the possibility of a synergybetrveen agent intellect and phantasmin termsof principaland instrumentalcause. Finally, one may supposethat the agentintellect introduces a dispositionin the phantasmso that it can causethe intelligiblespecies. This hypothesisdoes not solve the issue,for it implicitly assumesthat the agent intellectis capableof producingthe specieson irs or,vn(Peter Olivi 1926.vol. II. pp.459-60). Also Durandusof SaintPourEain (ca. 1210-1332)argued that thereis no needfor the agentintellect. The necessityof an agentintellect r,vas generally justified on the ground that it carriesout an indispensableoperation regarding either the phantasmsor the possibleintellect (Duranclusof Saint pourEain 151I,L dist.3, q.5,27ra). Durandusargues that in both casesthis operationis
'r lt is clearthat Bonaventureconsìderecl both intellectsas knorvinI faculties. Agcrttlnn'llccr artd Plrctrtustns 139
superfluous.The a-eentintellect cannot perform an operationon sensory imagesfbr variousreasons. (1) Being an immaterialentity, it cannotimpress on phantasmsrvhat supposedly enables them to move the possibieintellect, for this impressionr.vould inevitably become material upon receptionby the phantasm.(2) The agent inteilect cannot abstractspecies or forms from sensoryrepresentations. because an abstractionis eitherreal or logical.and a contradictionfollor'vs on either account. The former type of abstraction concernsactual entities,lvhich the intelligible speciesare not: in fact, accidentscannot be abstracted,"... quia forma non migrat de subiectoin subiectum".And an "abstractiosecundum rationem" can be carriedout only by knorvingentities rvith respectto known things,whereas phantasms are not knolvn, and the agentintellect is not a knolving faculty (Durandusof Saint Pourqain1571. I. dist.3, q.5,27ra-b). Moreover,there is no satisfactory expianationof horv the agentintellect isolates the "quidditas"fiom material conditions.(3) There is no sound analogybet'nveen, for example.the light enablingcolour to move thepor.ver of sightand the agentintellect enabling, by its mere presence,sensory representations to move the possibleintellect: colour hasin itself the capacityto move the porverof sight. During the Renaissance,Agostino Nifo (146911O-1-538) referred to Durandus.Rightly, accordingto Nifo. the lattcr playeddown the role of the agentintellect as indispensablecognitive facuity. because the agentintellect causesneither somethingin the phantasmsnor a speciesor a notion in the possibleintellect. The iigentintellect is a "virtus agens"only insofaras it is "medium dispositivumquo anima recipit speciesuniversaliter repraesen- tativas".or. more precisely,a "dispositio qua phantasmataagant in ipsum intellectumnostrum".tt Nifo discussedand rejected six opinionsof "iuniores", besidesthat of Johnof Jandun.on intellectualabstraction.* Then he described abstractionas an operationof the possibleintellect, regarding the task of the agentintellect as principally"eductio" or "translatio"(Nifb 1553,208ra). In accordancewith his approvalof Durandus,Nifo deniedthat the agentintellect is ableto do anythingin or rvith the phantasm(208rb-va). The aforementioned
" Nifo (l-553). l76rb: horvever'.in Nifb (1554).53rb. the spccìcsproduction n,as still ultrihutcJlo thc ilqrnt intcllceL. * s"ifb (1553).207vb 208ra:(l) enablingthe phantasmîo mÒvethe possìbleintellect by purityingit; (2) productionof thc intelligiblespecies from the plÌantasm:(3) thc generationof a more generalconcept in baseof lesseeneral ones; (.1) production of sccondintentions: (5) forming composedconcepts fbrnr simpleones: (6) knorvìcdgeof thc causein virtue of cognitionoî the effects.According to Nilo. Jandunpostulatcd a doublc abstraction:the actualisationof the intclligiblesby the agent inlellect.and the possibleintellect's operations regarcling previously acquiredintbrmation. 140 Leen Spruit
role of the agent intellectas "medium dispositivum"can nolv be specified more precisely:it preparesthe soul to the receptionof universalintentions.a5 There rvereother Renaissanceauthors who no longer acceptedthe traditio- nal, sharpdistinction betr'veen a passive,knowing intellecton the one hand, and an active,un-knorving intellect on the other.Charles Bovelles (1419-1553 or 1567)described the activeintellect as a knowing faculty,and the potential intellect as a storingfaculty. He thus reversedthe classicalPeripatetic cloctrine that drew a distinction betweenan agent,not-knolving, intellect and of a receptiveone that eflèctively knorvs.a'phitipp Melanchthon argued that abstractiveknowledge is groundedon the information stored in memory (Melanchthon 1846, p. la5). By consequence,he assignedintellectual abstractionnot to the agentbut to the possibleintellect.aT The former is seenas "poeta" or "inventor" (p. 1a8), i.e. as a creative principle that divides, composesand discovers,whereas the latter unfolds its abstractiveactivity on the basisof mnemoniccontents already present in the soul.a8Followers of the simplician interpretationof Peripateticpsychology, such as Marcanronio Genua(1491-1563) and Marc'AntonioMocenigo (fL. 1559), conceived of the agentand possibleintellect as two momentsof the self-sameentity, namely as "intellectusmanens" and "intellectus progressus", respectively. The intellectis agent when it actualizesintelligibles from its own potentiality and then apprehendsthem. The intellectis a possibleintellect whenever it is not capabie of representingits own contents.Julius CaesarScaliger blurred the distinction betrveenpossible and agent intellect. regarding the cognitive act as an operationof the knowing and acriveintellect (Scaliger 1576, 95 1). Hence,it became inevitable that mind should be detached from any process of actualizationconceived in terms of Aristotelian physics. Although he attributedthe generationof the cognitiveact to the agentmind, piccolomini (1523-1607)held that the possibleand the agent intellecr or mind are essentiallyone (Piccolomoni1597. 1235).He believed that it is the same intellectthat is touchedby the phantasmsand that actuallyjudges its affections
t5 Nifo (1553), 208va:"... intellcctusergo agensnon agit seclafTicit animam, ut recipratrerum universalesintentiones"; see also 208r,b:"ergo virtus dicitur intellectusagens: per quantoest dispositio-qua phantasmatain intcllectumnostrum agant',. '" Liber cleinrell((tu. in Bovelles(l-510).9r'; see also l3v and l7r. A similar posrtlonwas found in some medieval authors.otìen combineclrvith a hierarchìcal.NeoplatonicalÌy inspired. conceptionof thc relation beîrveenpossible and agent intellect.and ofîcn rvith a tbrm oî natrvrsm rvith regardto contentslcî. in particularAlbert ancll.ris follolvers. tr Already Alexanderof Aphrodisiasattr;buted the abstractionto the intellect"in habitu": cf. supra. +r Melanchthon(i8'16), p l4u: "Hunc ait abstraherea phantasmatibus.Id est.hic celeriter obiectacontèrt, signa qr.racrit,er signis causasaut effèctus.collationes, allusiones, et incleeligit quodest aptissimum". Agent Intellect and Phunîasrns t4ì
(Piccolomont1591,1226 and 1309).The Dutch FrancoBurgersdijk (1590- 1635) questionedthe need for an agent intellect, and concludedthat the intellectmay be called "agens" insofar as it generatesconcepts after being informedby the species(Burgersdijk 1621 . I l8- 1I 9). Also Suarezrelativized the distinctionbetrveen agent and possibleintellect, assigningto the latter the central role in the cognitive process,and regarding the former as a mere dispositionalpower.'n Suarez qualified the operationsof the agentand the possibleintellect as "transiens"and "immanens",respective- ly (Suarez1856, IV. c. 8, 741a.).The possibleintellect surpasses rhe agenr intellectin excellence:by producingthe species,the agentintellect realizes only the preliminaryconditions under which intellectivecognition can take place, rvhile this form of cognition as such dependson the possibleintellect alone.The active mind providesthe intelligible species:as naturalagent it must repair a "defect" in the primary object of cognition, namely its materiality.50The agent intellect serves an indispensableinstrumental functionsr,because in its "operari" the human intellect dependson the senses. Once it has been informed, the possible intellect may attend to the various aspectsof the informationconveyed by the species. A radical dismissalof the agent intellect is found in the lTth-century schoolmanIldephonsgs Peflafiel (fl. 1655),rvho arguedthat human cognition requiresdivine intervention.Pefrafiel proved this as follorvs: if the objectsare unableto produceintelligible speciesby themselves,then a partial causesuch as the agentintellect is of no avail.s2Only God can repair the "improportio" of materialobjects (Peflafiel 1655,591a-b; cf. 594aand 595a).
3. Conc:lusion
Peripateticpsychology of cognition was basedon the view that the properties of things that are relevant for conceptualabstraction are not pre-given. Aristotle and most of his follorversbelieved in the existenceof a mentalability for conceptualizationon the basis of sensory signals received from the
"'Suarez (1856),IV, c. 8. However,already Thomas regarded the possibleìntellect as the only knowing intellect. 5n Suarez(1856),74,+b. In this contextSuarez polemizcrt rvith Nifo, De intellectu,tr. IV, c. 2l (containingan expositionof Averroes' viervof the possibleand agentintellect). sr According to Suarez,the agentintellect is tìrst of all a "technician';for the agentintellect as "artifex",see Thomas Suuon (1977), p. 466,and Taddheus ofParma (1951), p. 145. 5: See Pefiafiel(1655),591b-59.1a, for the classicarguments against the possibilityof a cooperation between agent intellect and phantasm. The various proposals for a cooperation betweenagent intellect and phantasmall beg the question,presupposing as they do what shouldbe demonstrated,narnely, the needfor an agentintellect. t42 Leen Spruit environment.The intellectcan graspthe essentialstructures of the physical world from informationthat is includedin the phantasms.The essencesare to be isolatedin virtue of an interactionof the active aspectof mind l,vithsensory representations.In his De ttnimo, Aristotle did not unequivocally state. however,whether the agentintellect generated. reconstructed or else simply revealedthe intelligiblecore of naturalreality. The formidabledifficulties that the notion of intellectas efficient cause produced,might be describedas dilemmasresulting from the applicationof the Aristoteliantheory of changeand its causesto the processof intellection.In Aristotle's vierv, psychologyr,vas a chapterof naturalphilosophy, and rvas accordinglydeveloped rvith the conceptualtools of physics,such as, matter and form. potency and act. Aristotle's naturalist approachto matters psychological,however, allowed for the possibilitiesof non-physicalchanges, the existenceof matterlessforms. and an immaterial intellect. Yet. the Peripateticconceptual framework did not provide the appropriatetools for determiningthe precisestatus of mechanismsinvolved in the formal mediation of intellectualknor'vledge. Indeed. some problems resisteda satisfactory solution.One of them regardedthe interactionbetrveen agent intellectand phantasms.The hypothesisthat the mind processessensory representations in order to grasp their (intelligible) content seeinsto involve a leap over an unbridgeablegap. Hor.v can the immaterial mind relate to sensible representations?What "does" the agent intellect exactly do with the phantasms'lAnd ',vhatabout the problematicnotion of a "hidden" presenceof cognitiveobjects in sensoryrepresentations? Proponentsof the agent intellect stressedthat the role of mental agency in the acquisition of knorvledgecannot be ignored. Mental content is not intrinsic.The majority of the Peripateticsconceived of cognitionchiefly in terms of a protluctioiz of the human mind, rather than the result of a progressiveunveiling of physiologically embeddedcontents. The mind processessensory images, rather than extractingsomething from them. In general,horvever, they failed to give a detailedaccount of how the active mind operateson the phantasm,and did not go beyond the claim that the co- operative effort of these trvo agents must be explained in terms of an "aggregatum"of form and matter. Admitting the agentintellect did not entail that generalknowledge was gainedonly by abstraction.Aristotle did not endorsea psychologicaltheory of abstraction.Moreover. many of his followers thought that the illumination of phantasmsr.vas sufîcient for the possibleintellect to graspthe intelligible core of sensoryimages. In their view, the cognitiveact is no longercaused by an agentintellect and receivedby a knor,vingintellect. The agentintellect merely filfils the preconditionsfor mental acts.The authorsr,vho endorsed this vier.v did not agree,horvever, on the natureof the illumination. After îhe rediscovery Ag, ttt IntcIIc,t tnJ Phcttttttsm.t 1,13
of Aristotle in the west, a long seriesof controversiesdeveloped on the issue rvhetherthis illuminationwas more or less"substantive" or whetherit simolv consistedin the agentintellect's "pure presence". Authors defending a substantiveoperation emphasized that the agenr intellect exertsa positive action "torvards"the phantasm,rvhich is not merely "remotiva" or "sequestrativa".They supportedthis view (vith the follorving claims. A purely "removing" illuminationdoes not enablethe phantasmto move the possibleintellect. If the phantasmscannot receive anything from the agentintellect, then one is forced to assumethat they are capableon their oln, as sensoryimages, of moving the possibleintellect. Granted that the agent intellectis an "agensper se",then it must producea positiveeffect. The advocatesof the "pure presence"vier,v stressed the fact that in the processof illumination by the agent intellect, nothing can be impressedupon the phantasms.Indeed, it is a basicrenet of Aristotelianphysics that accidents cannot be shifted from one substrateto another.Moreover, a spiritual entity cannotbe receivedby a materialentity. But evengranting this possibility,the impressionreceived in the phantasmwould necessarilybecome material and singular,thereby dissipatingits efficacy. A spiritual agent can change a material subjectonly by a "motus localis", and the latter is not to be ascribed to the agentintellect. These difficulties, ruling out the possibilityof impressing a form in phantasms,led many authorsto the conclusionthat the agent intellect'saction consists merely in its presence. The attacksof PeterOlivi. Durandusof Saint Pourgain,and other authors againstthe agent intellectpurported to show that the idea of an organizing system and of something out there to be organized is indefensibleon philosophical grounds. Though not rejecting Aristotelian psychology of cognition tout court, they revealed limitations of its conceptualframework. They did not challengethe idea of an active mind as such; rather,they argued that knorvledgedid not presupposethe existenceof a distinct active mental faculty processingsensory information. Accordingly, they held that the intellect can grasp the universalnature immediately in the phantasmsor else developedan internalist(Augustinian) psychology of cognition.
Leen Spruit Universitvof Rome "La Sapienzo" Via Carb Fect2 I-00161Rome 144 Leen Spruit
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