Developmental States’ Social Cleavages on the Conservative Party Dominance: Why Did Developmental States’ Social and Political Cleavages Structure One Party Dominance in the Center-Right, Not the Centrist Position? Seokdong Kim/ Claremont Graduate University* ─ Abstract ─ This research explains why East Asian developmental states—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan— formed one party dominance in the center-right, not the centrist position, in the industrialization period despite differences in timing of democratization and economic development. The conservative party’s dominance in developmental states has been a component of conservative corporatism that makes a conservative welfare state with weak social safety nets and low social expenditures. The conservative party’s dominance was maintained for about forty years not only by Japan’s LDP and Taiwan’s KMT but also by Korea’s authoritarian, conservative party, which rebranded its party name but consisted of the same power blocs. Social cleavages in East Asia structured the right-oriented dominant party system. Meanwhile, social cleaves in Western Europe kept balance of power between left and right in general, and brought about the social democratic rule in the long term in some European corporatist states, such as Sweden, Austria, and West Germany. Not only the Cold War and the formation of developmental state, but also rapid industrialization and long-term low inequality, created social cleavages as East Asia’s origins of conservative party dominance. These transformations helped East Asian dominant parties win elections ideologically in the center-right position, although dominant parties generally gain advantages as centrist parties in terms of Anthony Downs’s median voter theorem. The mixed method between comparative historical case analysis and statistical analysis finds that propositions of the conservative party dominance—economic growth, export promotion, and near-full employment—are generalizable beyond East Asia. In comparison between East Asia and Western Europe, strong nationalism, land reform, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality have supported the conservative party’s long-term rule in developmental states’ conservative corporatism; whereas, moderate nationalism and institutionalized welfare regimes with high social 1 expenditures have promoted a broad consensus on social markets and a long-term victory of the Social Democratic party in social democratic corporatism in European corporatist states. Key Words: Dominant Party System, the Conservative Party Dominance, Social Cleavage, Developmental State * Paper prepared for the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD). UC Irvine. May, 2018; A previous draft was presented at the Graduate Student Symposium of USC Korean Studies Institute, 2015. I welcome any comments about my paper. Please contact author ([email protected]) for revisions before citing. ─ Contents ─ I. The Conservative Party’s Dominance Structured by East Asian Social Cleavages II. Social Cleavages in Conservative Corporatism: Theory and Research Strategies 1. An Analysis on Social Cleavage Theory from New Institutionalism 2. Application of Social Cleavage Theory to an Analysis on the Dominant Party System III. Origins of the Conservative Party Dominance: National and Industrial Revolutions 1. The International Structure: The Cold War and Nationalist Competitions 2. The Political Transformation: The Formation of Developmental State 3. The Economic Transformation: Rapid Industrialization and Long-term Low Inequality IV. The Conservative Party Dominance Structured by East Asian Social Cleavages 1. Single Country Analysis: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 1) Japan: Dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (1955-1993) 2) South Korea: Dominance of the Republican Party and its Successors (1963-1988/2004) 3) Taiwan: Dominance of the Kuomintang (1950-2001) 2. Comparison between Conservative Corporatism and Social Democratic Corporatism V. Statistical Tests of the Conservative Party Dominance 1. Operational Definitions and Variables 2. Mean Difference T-test and Interpretation VI. Summary and Evaluation 1. Summary 2. Evaluation: The Rise and Fall of the Conservative Party Dominance 2 I. The Conservative Party’s Dominance Structured by East Asian Social Cleavages This chapter explains why East Asian developmental states (henceforth, “developmental states”), such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, created the conservative party’s dominance during industrialization periods until the early 1990s despite differences in timing of democratization and economic development. Japan created the dominant party system under a democratic regime, South Korea formed the dominance through—at least institutionally—democratic elections even under authoritarian regimes; whereas, Taiwan monopolized political power since its state building. Regardless of the regime type and the degree of political monopoly, all three states’ commonality is the conservative party dominance. Developmental states have succeeded in socioeconomic performances on economic development and redistribution through conservative corporatism—what I define as the state’s asymmetric alliance with firms. The success of conservative corporatism in economic development and redistribution brought about the conservative party dominance as an institutional outcome. Of course, regarding ideology, conservative corporatism in developmental states differs with social democratic corporatism in European corporatist states, such as Sweden, Austria, and Germany. However, until the early 1990s, developmental states organized corporatism with the partnership with the ruling party, as European corporatist states did. In particular, this research elucidates the way that developmental states maintained conservative corporatism through the conservative party dominance, as European corporatist states sustained social democratic corporatism with the help of the social democratic party’s long-term rule. Developmental states’ party systems have been created under greater influences of nationalism and postwar state building than did those of European corporatist states. For this reason, conservative corporatism has been the fundamental foundation of the conservative party dominance in developmental states. Specifically, the Cold War, the formation of developmental state, rapid industrialization, and long-term low inequality created social cleavages as origins of developmental states’ party systems. As the international structure, the Cold War and nationalist competitions created 3 competitive nation states. As political transformations, the government has built a developmental state where the professionalized bureaucracy achieved sustainable economic development. As economic transformations, sustainable economic development has been led by rapid industrialization and long- term low inequality. These political and economic transformations provide favorable conditions for the conservative party dominance, and they are contrasted with the nineteenth century’s national revolution and the eighteenth century’s industrial revolution in Western Europe. Lipset and Rokkan (1967; 1990) emphasize that the European party system has been structured and persisted since the 1920s; in their word, this “freezing” of the party system of the 1920s system has been originated from the two revolutions in the relatively symmetric rivalry between capital and labor, between center and periphery. For example, the social democratic party increased its voting and political power in the rivalry between capital and labor. Power-sharing political institutions, such as the federal state, have been developed under the balance between the center and peripheral regions. Meanwhile, developmental states led political and economic transformations in state-led asymmetric coordination with social actors after World War II. Under strong nationalism and postwar state building, developmental states created power-centralizing structure; in particular, the central government and the wartime social mobilization system are main components of conservative corporatism. The main institutional mechanisms of conservative corporatism are conservative welfare states and the conservative party dominance. By using the prism of conservative corporatism, this research highlights several unexplained perspectives on developmental states’ party systems: the conservative party dominance. First of all, because of the different patterns of state building and democratization between Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, comparativists have not highlighted commonalities of the conservative party dominance between the three countries. Apparently, Japan’s democratic dominant party system, South Korea’s authoritarian ruling parties’ long-term rule, and Taiwan’s virtual political monopoly differ each other. But these party systems are similar in the conservative party’s long-term rule. Secondly, the conservative party dominance in developmental states’ can be compared with the social democratic 4 party’s long-term rule in European corporatist states. These two groups’ long-term rule has maintained corporatism despite their different ideologies. Lastly, this research translates comparative historical analysis on developmental states into quantitative analysis to generalize the logic of the conservative party dominance. This mixed methods approach evaluates Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967; 1990) social cleavage theory in the East Asian context. Eventually, this research finds how conservative corporatism