Precipitating the Decline of Al-Shabaab: a Case Study in Leadership Decapitation
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-12 Precipitating the decline of Al-Shabaab: a case study in leadership decapitation Butler, Brett M. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47912 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS PRECIPITATING THE DECLINE OF AL-SHABAAB: A CASE STUDY IN LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION by Brett M. Butler December 2015 Thesis Advisor: Bradley Jay Strawser Second Reader: Anna Simons Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2015 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS PRECIPITATING THE DECLINE OF AL-SHABAAB: A CASE STUDY IN LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION 6. AUTHOR(S) Brett M. Butler 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The tactic of leadership decapitation, using military action to capture or kill terrorist leadership, is a key component of United States counterterrorism strategy. Policymakers argue that eliminating terrorist leadership is an effective way to disrupt, and, ultimately, destroy terrorist organizations. Since 2001, hundreds of terrorist leaders have been captured or killed by U.S. counterterrorism operations. In spite of this, the spread of violent, radical jihadist groups like Al-Shabaab has expanded and grown in strength. This thesis analyzes the United States’ approach of leadership targeting toward Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and asks the research question: Under what conditions are leadership decapitation effective in degrading the terrorist group Al-Shabaab? This thesis finds that leadership decapitation operations have a limited effect in disrupting and preventing future acts of terrorism. It argues for a more analytical approach to leadership decapitation in order to improve its effectiveness. This thesis argues for leadership targeting principles that are likely to be effective counterterrorism strategies and lead to the long-term decline of the group, including basing targeting decisions on understanding the group’s internal dynamics, integrating decapitation operations into comprehensive counterterrorism strategies, and capitalizing on existing leadership divisions, which can be as effective as lethal military action. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF leadership targeting, leadership decapitation, counterterrorism, Somalia, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab PAGES 89 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited PRECIPITATING THE DECLINE OF AL-SHABAAB: A CASE STUDY IN LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION Brett M. Butler Major, United States Army B.S., Texas Christian University, 2004 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION STRATEGY AND POLITICAL WARFARE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2015 Approved by: Bradley Jay Strawser Thesis Advisor Anna Simons Second Reader John Arquilla Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The tactic of leadership decapitation, using military action to capture or kill terrorist leadership, is a key component of United States counterterrorism strategy. Policymakers argue that eliminating terrorist leadership is an effective way to disrupt, and, ultimately, destroy terrorist organizations. Since 2001, hundreds of terrorist leaders have been captured or killed by U.S. counterterrorism operations. In spite of this, the spread of violent, radical jihadist groups like Al-Shabaab has expanded and grown in strength. This thesis analyzes the United States’ approach of leadership targeting toward Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and asks the research question: Under what conditions are leadership decapitation effective in degrading the terrorist group Al-Shabaab? This thesis finds that leadership decapitation operations have a limited effect in disrupting and preventing future acts of terrorism. It argues for a more analytical approach to leadership decapitation in order to improve its effectiveness. This thesis argues for leadership targeting principles that are likely to be effective counterterrorism strategies and lead to the long-term decline of the group, including basing targeting decisions on understanding the group’s internal dynamics, integrating decapitation operations into comprehensive counterterrorism strategies, and capitalizing on existing leadership divisions, which can be as effective as lethal military action. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 KILLING GODANE .................................................................................1 PURPOSE ...................................................................................................2 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................3 EXISTING LITERATURE.......................................................................4 1. The View That Leadership Decapitation Is Effective .................5 2. The View That Leadership Decapitation Is Ineffective..............7 3. Improving Leadership Decapitation ............................................8 II. ANATOMY OF U.S. LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION POLICY ................11 THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP TARGETING .......................12 LEADERSHIP TARGETING IN SOMALIA.......................................16 THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM AL-SHABAAB ........................19 1. Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda ..........................................................19 2. The Terror Threat from Al-Shabaab .........................................21 DEGRADE BUT NOT DESTROY ........................................................22 III. TARGETING AL-SHABAAB LEADERSHIP .................................................25 HISTORY OF U.S. LEADERSHIP TARGETING AGAINST AL-SHABAAB .........................................................................................25 SHADOW WARS: 2002–2006 ................................................................26 INSURGENCY: 2007–2010 ....................................................................29 GUERRILLA WARFARE: 2011–2015 .................................................34 LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION: THE CASE OF GODANE ..........39 1. Al-Shabaab’s Golden Age ...........................................................39 2. Discontent and Purge ...................................................................41 NARROW FOCUS ..................................................................................43 IV. RESILIENCE TO LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION .....................................45 IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP IN AL-SHABAAB .....................46 1. Value of Inspirational Leadership ..............................................46 2. Value of Operational Leadership ...............................................48 3. Value of Collective Leadership ...................................................50 4. The Amniyat and Its Role in Organizational Resilience ..........51 AL-SHABAAB’S ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE .....................53 1. How Decentralization Increases Group Resilience ...................54 2. How Bureaucratization Increases Group Resilience ................56 vii WHY LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION IS UNLIKELY TO WORK ......................................................................................................58 V. WHO SHOULD BE KILLED TO DEFEAT AL-SHABAAB? .......................59 TARGETING OPERATIONAL-LEVEL LEADERS .........................59 EMPHASIZING CAPTURE OVER KILL ...........................................60 INTEGRATING LEADERSHIP TARGETING WITH A BROADER MILITARY STRATEGY ...................................................61