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By
Parker 0. Roe
Senior Project
Jepson School of Leadership Studies
University of Richmond
Richmond, Virginia
May,1998 ENABLING HITLER: AN ABLE BODY FOR A DANGEROUS MIND
I. INTRODUCTION
Thereis no doubt today in theminds of theworld's populationthat Adolf
Hitler, theleader, the Fiihrerof NaziGennany was responsible forhorrendous acts and possessed of insane intentions. However, what was is that enabled him to see his goals throughto theextent thathe was able? Intruth, there exist hundreds of insane and sadistic people in today's world, however a "Fourth Reich" has not yet emerged. In other words, how was it thatAdolf Hitlerwas able to be thedemi-god of a country and movement which branded the continent of Europe forall eternity and not just anotherangry German looking for an end to post-World War I and
Versailles injustice and inflation? The answeris this: Hitler's success was linked to thosepowerful men who followedhim. These devotees becamethe combined incarnatedbody-vessel forthe derangedand dangerousyet intoxicating mind of
Adolf Hitler. Three such "architects" of thisinfamous dictator were Hermann
Goring, Heinrich Himmler, andJoseph Goebbels. Powerful, skilled, and fanatic, these men had a direct impactupon the success of Hitler's riseto power, maintenance of control, and implementation of his leadership. The intense and somewhat dysfunctional relationshipsthese men had withtheir Fiihrer suggests a deeperconcept at work as well. That concept is a broadened formof codependency andits subset topic of enabling. Therefore, it is my argument, that withoutmen such as theseand the codependent relationships they experienced,
Hitler would simply have been one more embittered Germanic madman. II. GORING: MONEY AND GOVERNMENT
Knownas Hitler's "firstpaladin," 1 HennannGoring firstmet his future
Fuhrerin Munich in 1922.2 Afterinterviewing him for a possibleparty position,
Hitler offeredthe fonnerWWI ace theleadership of the SA, theinfamous brown shirtedterror troops of the early Nazi Party. Hitlerneeded a distinguished soldier in hisranks at the time, and, althoughGoring pledged his loyaltyto him, their relationship was only laterto become close. The failed revolutionof the Beer Hall
Putschin November of 1923 found Goringdrifting away from the Party and flounderingin the underworldof Weimar resistance. Aftera fewyears in exilein
Sweden and Italy, Goringreturned to Germanyin 1927 and spentthe yearsfrom then until Hitler's ascension to power reestablishingeconomic, political, andParty power in ways such as becoming one of Hitler's deputies in 1928, being elected to the Reich stag in the sameyear, and eventuallyrising to become President of that body in 1932. It was in thislast positionthat Goring began to aid Hitler politically in any greatmeasure andbecome indispensable to his maintenanceof power. As
Overy statesin hisbook:
It was from thisposition thathe [Goring] was able unscrupulouslyto conduct negotiationswith otherparties, ostensiblyfrom a disinterested desire to form a stable governmentthat could commanda parliamentarymajority: in
1 R. J. O,,ery, Goering: The 'Iron Man' (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1984), l50(g). Biographical information takenfrom Overy. 7•21. practiceto find an avenuewhereby Hitler mightcomplete the 'legal revolution and gain the chancellorship.3
Thus began Goring's enabling of Hitler.
As Hitler ascended to the power position of Chancellor, he was
4 "inordinately gratefulto Goring,'' because of the partGoring had played in the
'legal revolution'. Therefore, he wasrewarded with a post in Hitler's new cabinet and the importantposition as PrussianMinister of the Interior. Asmember a of
Hitler's "kitchen cabinet", Goringserved as one of a small group of top leaders with whom theFuhrer conferred when makingimportant d ecisions. Goring ( along with Goebbels) oftenhelped to dissuade dissenting argumentsto Hitler's plans from other cabinet members, stemmingfrom his intense loyalty.5 In this manner,
Goring servedas an immediate and unwaveringassistant in the daily decision making of the Third Reich,helping Hitlerto realize andimplement many of his heinous acts. However, lacking any real Partyposition, Goringdepended on
Hitler's favor tokeep him in power securedas it was by his overt loyalty to the
Nazi leader. Eventually, Hitler commissioned Goring as his economicoverlord in
6 193 8, on behalf of the "all-out war eff ort'' ( afterthe reclaiming of the Ruhrand the successfulAnschluss with Austria)which Hitler was insistentupon.
3 Overy, IO. A Overy. 11. ' 6 William Carr. !htlcr�_Stu
Anschlusswith Austria. However, Goring wasmore interestedin the practical reasons forannexation rather than the ideological reasons Hitler stressed and spoke of in Mein Kampf. As theno n-violent diplomatic and political solution to the Austrianproblem drew closer to feasibility,Hitler remained "full of doubt and hesitation."7 However, Goringhad his sights set upon the naturalresources and foreignexchange reserves of Austriawhich would greatlyboost the German economy and, subsequently, pressured Hitlerinto immediate action. 8 Therefore, even in conjunctionwith one of Hitler's main ideological goals, Goringproved to be theinfluence he needed to succeed.
The Rome-BerlinAxis treatywith Mussolini's fascistItaly was completed in November 1936. This new turn of events called for "are-orientation of foreign policy which did not correspondwith the Mein Kampf strategy which Hitler is commonly supposed to have adhered to."9 Therefore, Goring was able to step in andinfluence Hitlerin the redefining of this policy, thereby increasing Hitler's dependence upon him.
Once in power, Goring, at Hitler'sbehest, had almost successfully completed the transformationof the German economy into a state-controlled entity. This process included thefonnation of state-run industry such as "Mining
7 Carr, 55 8 Carr. 55. 9 Carr, 54. EnterprisesHermann Goring" and the slow takeoverof private industrialist empires. 10 Most of thiswas completedby 1939. It is in thismanner that Goring enabled Hitler to increase his power even furtherby securingthe financial means to do so. Goring's actions allowed Hitler, who alreadyhad the ultimate political authorityat the time, to gain access to the industrial and economic frameworkof his growingThird Reich. Thispower would eventually lead himto financehis greatwar machine and, intum, execute the calamitiesof World WarII and the atrocitiesof theHolocaust.
Hitler also leaned on Goring for his credibilityand trustworthiness. The nature of much of Hitler's earlyplanning and goal implementationafter his appointmentto Chancellorwas radical enoughto receive weightyopposition at times from othergovernment officials. Goringwas able to assist in the "greasing of theaxles" to help these ideas do through at thetime andthis areaof assistance forthe Fuhrermerely broadened as theReich grew in power. When explainingh is motives concerningeconomic and foreignpolicy to his commandinggenerals on
August22, 1939, Hitler cited Goringas beingable to confirmthe waning
economic strengthof the Reich withoutthe securing of more national resources from areas such as the Sudetenland and Poland. 11 Thisconfidence in Goring's
testimonyis important because of the general view the majority ofhigh Partyand governmentalleaders had of Goringand his lack of official Partystatus.
10 Kater. I 05 11 Carr. 58. Goring's experiencewith air force strategies also made hima leaning post forHitler in those areas. More oftenthan not, Hitler did not interferewith
Goring'smilitary plans forthe air force especially duringthe war, even if it meant defeatfor the Luftwaffe as inthe Battleof Britain. Hitler retained confidencein hispaladin even in darktimes such as that until the evidence of Goring's failure was clear. 12 Although Goringfell out of favorfor this unsuccessful attackon the
British, Hitler kept a close place forhim in Reich and war affairsexemplified by the acceptanceof Goring'sair liftplan to aid the failing Stalingrad campaignin the fall of 1942.
Goringis linked to anotherone of these"enabling men", Heinrich Himmler, in that he helped to foundthe Gestapo and the concentration camp system.13
These twoelements would later prove to be instrumental to thereign of terror which kept orderthroughout the Partyand theReich 14 thereby solidifying
Himmler's enabling of Hitler.
12 Carr, 91 13 Carbal J. Nolan, The Longman Guide to World Affairs (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers USA. 1995}. 142 Ill. HIMMLER: TERROR AND CONTROL
HeinrichHimmler joined the Nazi Partyin August of 1923. Although young and inexperienced at thet ime, he was to become one of the most fearedand influentialpeople inall of the ThirdReich. 15 An early devotee of ErnstRohm, the original commanderof the SA, Himmlerjoined the paramilitarygroup and became a participantin the November 1923 Beer Hall Putsch as he carriedthe imperial
German ensignbanner withRohm's unit towards the War Ministrybuildings atthe center of Munich. However, the failureof thisrevolution marked a pause inhis politicaland aspiringmilitary career . Duringthe years of Hitler's imprisonment,
Himmler continuedhis Partymembership and activities andeventually was appointedsecretary to GregorStrasser, theformer Nazi Party and SA leader for
Lower Bavariain June of 1924. In early 1925, the ban on Nazism was liftedin
Bavaria andHimmler restored hismembership, this time with an official post as
DeputyGauleiter (Gau leader) of Lower Bavaria. It was fromthi s positionthat
Himmler was spring�boardedinto the securitysector of Nazicontrol in 1926.
The Schutzstaffel, or SS, was a security forceresponsible forthe protection of Party staffand officialswhich emerged in I 925. Set up as an elite group of men in the various districts of Nazi control, theseblack-clad troopsbecame rivals of the brown-shirted SA. Himmler was soon made deputyleader of this elite force inLower Bavaria andhis efficiency and success here soon foundhim advanced to
15 Biographical informationtaken fromPeter Padfield, Himmler: Reichsfiihrer-SS (NewYork: Henry Holt and Co., 1990). 58-93. theposition of deputyReichsfiihrer in Septemberof 1927. Here Himmlerbegan to exerthis ideas and ideals of whathe thoughtthe SS should be: "a secret police anda warriorelite, an instrument of internal conformityand a breedingground for thepurification of the race."16 Finally, on January20, 1929, Himmler ascended to his most infamouspost as Reichsfiihrer-SS.
Himmler'spersonal ideologyof the acquisitionof Nordic racial superiority was overshadowed and tempered at firstby his dutyto guardthe Fuhrer and the
Partyfrom both external an internalthreats. As sue� he established a secret service agency to monitorthe actions of Partym embers and to keep him informed as to theintentions of possible dissenters. As Padfield states: "Himmler was
Hitler's man inside the Party." 17 As sue� Himmlerwas on theway to forgingone of the more effectivepolice states in history, almost guaranteeingthe success, safety, andsecurity of his Fuhrer.
As Himmler's power andinfluence grew, he eventuallybegan to dominate and controlthe variouspolice organizations of theGennan states, replacing top officialswith his own SS men, untilhe finallytook over the Bavarian Gestapoin
Aprilof 1934, much to Goring'sdis may and annoyance. Thislast acquisition allowed Himmlerto obtain complete internal control of thesecurity of the Third
Reich. His powerand position, then, would provide the stability and control
16 Padfield, 90. 17 Padfield. l05 hatredof lawyers andpublic officials, not to mention the Jews. 19 These like hatredsenabled Hitler to develop outlandish and heinousplans and ideas which were embraced by his paladins, especially Goebbels, who, in tum, processed them into socially acceptable messages and desires forthe masses. IV. GOEBBELS: IMAGE AND CONFIDENCE
Joseph Goebbels, theman who was to be one of Hitler's closest confidants, experienced anabnonnal childhood due to the malformityof his clubfoot.20
Restrictedfrom the playful li feof most children, Goebbels immersedhimself in books, studies, andplaying thepian o. This patternof earlyintellectualism would eventuallylead to hisachievement of a Ph.D. in 1921 at Heidelberg. Goebbels parentsraised him inthe Catholicfaith, however, earlydo ubts reinforced by a difficultdevelopmental life caused himto abandonhis faith and his God in favor of a faith hisin ownabilities. A man slightof frameand dark of features,
Goebbels endured theridicule of his peers throughouthis life. Therefore, his aim was to become successfulthrough his intellectual abilitiesrather than physical prowess or courage in battle. According to Frolich in Smelser and Zitelmann's
TheNazi Elite. "his [Goebbels'] paramount ambition... was above a11 else to make himself importantand have a successful career."21
Inthe summer of 1924, Goebbels attendeda NSDAP (NaziParty) conference and was so inspiredby the political agenda thathe fooneda local branch of the Partywhen he rerumed to his townof residence. It was at this time that '"he discovered his giftfor public speaking."22 Thisrhetorical abilitythen grew andrichened to thepoint that Goebbels quicklyrose to be one of the
20 Biographical informationtaken from Ronald Smelserand Ranier Zitelmann, eds., NaziThe Elite (New York: New York UniversityPress, 1989), 48-61. 21 Smelser and Zitelmann. 49. 22 Smelser and Zitelmann, 50. prominent Partymembers in his region. However, his infamy forhis shrewdness, arrogance, andschemin g nature was also soon known. From thisve ryearl y point inhis p olitical life, Goebbels beganthe patternof being at odds with rival Party notables befriending fewof them excepting those with similarj udgments about otherP artymembers. One of such comradeswas Gregor Strasser, thepowerful leader of theNorth GermanNSDAP. Falling in withthe radical leftwin g of the
Party, Goebbels soon becameits most outspoken member andtalented speaker.
However, this was all to change thed ayhe met his futureg od, Adolf Hitler.
In Februaryof 1926, Goebbels firstheard Hitler speakand was immediately dravvnto theintense charismaof the fieryAustrian. Although once contemptuous of the rising demagogue, Goebbels' firstmeetin g withHitler was powerful enough to swayhim away fromthe Strassercontin gent andto set his sights on getting close to the future"savior" ofthe Nazi Partyand the Germanp eople. Hitler recognized Goebbels' brilliance and flairfor p ublic speaking and realized thathe would be a good additionto thealread y numerous ranksof his supporters. Future courting andflatterin g of the"little doctor''23 spellbound Goebbels who wrotein his diaryat the time: "I bow to the greaterm an, the political genius.. . Adolf Hitler,
24 I love you because you areboth gr eat and simple." Hitler, in tum, rewarded
Goebbels' devotion by assigning him thep ost of Gau1eiter of Berlin thereby cementing the close relationship of savior and disciple untilthe end.
23 Smelserand Zitelmann1 51. 24 Smelser and Zitelmann. 51. However, the admirationbetween these two men was by no means one way. Hitlerfound in Goebbels a willingconfidant, "one who could listen for days to his long-windedspeeches," 25 and a strongally in the Party. "The manbums like a flame," Hitler said.26 Others could denounce Goebbels as "the Mephisto of the Party" or "the scheming dwarf,"but Hitler remainedsatisfied with Goebbels and trustedhim more and more as their relationship developed.2 7 Hitler also confided in Goebbels about his privatelife more thanany othermember of his entourage. For instance, Hitler often used him as a sounding board forideas in private conversations andconfessed to Goebbels his physical pain, thereby showing unadulterated sides of his humanity, a dangerousthing for anomnipotent god-head to do. 28 Goebbels reveled in this"fraternal 1ove" 29 shown to him by his
Fuhrerand maintained thisposture until the veryend.
Hitler's long road to theChancellorship was considerablysmoothed by the intense effortsof Joseph Goebbels. From huge andharried speech campaignsto large protestmarches and shows of NSDAP force to ingenioustricks of propaganda, Goebbels spread the good word of thepromise s of his Fuhrer to the
Germanpeople who were ripe fora strongleader. 30 These people, swayed by the
25 LouisL. Snyder, Hitler's Elite: Biographical Sketches of Naziswho Shaped theThird Reich (New York: HippocreneBooks, 1989), 103. 26 Snvder. 103. z, Snyder: 103. 28 Glassman and Swatos. 150. 2!l Glassman and SwatOS: 158. 30 Robert 0. Pa�1on, Eu�ope in the Twentieth Century (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1997), 348. retained a love forhis disciple. In the faceof bestowed nicknames such as
"Wotan'sMickey Mouse,'' "MahatmaPropaganda," and"the he-goat of
Babelsberg," Goebbels persevered in his dutiesand with his cold and calculated mind remained a decided asset to Hitler.37 Throughhis minisny, Goebbels became"the dictator over Gennancultural life" 38 andthereby gained the sufficient amountof influence over the minds of the Germanpeople to maintain theimage of
Hitler as their hero more or less until the Russianbombs quit fallingon the Reich
Chancelleiy in 1945.
37 Snvder, 99. 38 Snyder, 99. The Concept
Codependency is an issue and phenomenon which has gained greater significance in the past ten or so years. This concept has evolved over much of the twentieth century with Homey providing a description of dependency39 that comes veryclose to contemporaryformulations of codependency in 1950. The specific term "codependency'' was derived from such concepts as "co-alcoholic, nonalcoholic,40 [and] para-alcoholic" and appeared on the treatmentscene inthe late
1970s. Throughoutthis process, theterm has been most widely used in conjunction with alcoholism or other substance abuse. Addictions like these set up the original frameworkfor the idea of codependency which relates to the behavioral patterns41 of those persons closely or directly involved with an alcoholic or drug addict.
In the case of Hitler, Goring, Himmler, and Goebbels, theconcept of codependency has to be a bit more widely applied simply because of the addiction involved. Hitler was an ambitious, power-hungry individualwho exploited every
avenuethat he was able to riseto greatness in post-WWI Gennany. Coupling this
withhis bitterhatred for allthings not related to the German cause or, more
importantly, to his own ambitious desires, one sees thepattern formingof a man
39 James P. Morgan, Jr., What is codependency.?, Journalof Clinical Psychology, Sept 1991, v74, 721. 40 MelodyBeattie, Codependent No More (Center City. MN: Hazeldcn Foundation. 1987), 29. 41 Beattie. 2&-31. inseparably linked to these aspects of his person. According to Schaef, codependency is "a disease thathas manyforms andexpressions and thatgrows out of a disease process that is inherent in the system in which we live. "42 Here,
Schaef refersto this disease process as the "addictiveprocess" definingaddiction broadly as "'anysubstance or process we feelwe have to lie about."43 Therefore, inthe lightof hispublic statements to the contrary, I make the claim thatHitler was addicted to power andhate, two thingson which he thrivedand which provided thebulk of hismotivation throughouthis despo tic reign as Reich
Chancellorof the ThirdReich. 44 As Reimannstates: "Hitler alwayshad to have victory, be it over individuals, masses, parties, or peoples. He was insatiable for victories."45 The direct statement "hatred intoxicated Hitler"46 also lends credence to a type of hate addiction. This, then, is the basis of the framework formy study of therelationship of Hitlerand the threeof his immediate subordinates as codependent.
Several definitions for codependency have arisenas clinical studyof the phenomenon has increased because of the ever-changinganalysis of alcoholism and others ubstance abuse diseases. Robert Subby defines codependency as: "An emotional,psychological, andbehavioral condition that develops as a result of and
41
43 A. W. Schae[ Co-dependence: Misunderstood-mistreated(San Francisco: Harperand Row, 1986), 4421. 45 Schaef. 21. 46 Carr, 5-20; AlanBullock Hitler: A Studyin Tyranny (NewYork: Harper :md Row, 1962). 313 Reimann. 60. The HartwickHumanities in Management Institute, Classic LeadershipCases: AdolfHitler (Oneonta, NY, 1993). 8. individual'sprolonged exposure to, and practice of, a set of oppressive rules."47
Professionals in the fieldcontinued their study of codependency and foundthat more groupsof people appearedto posses the behavioral disorder: adult children of alcoholics, people in relationshipswith emotionally or mentallydisturbed people, people in relationships with chronicallyill people, parents of children with behavior problems, and people inrelationships with irresponsible people. 48 This broader understandingof theconcept leads to theapplication of the termto those who areinvolved withpeople withany sortof behavioral or personalitydisorder fromsubstance addiction to abusive behavior. This is important for, even if Hitler was not a power and hatredaddict as I have suggested, he was still a behaviorally disturbed individualcited as being"the ultimatecriminal psychopathic murdererof moderntimes. " 49 It is also important to note thatthe addict ordisturbed individual can be a codependent as well and, therefore, be involved in both sides of the process.50
Beattie's defmitionof codependency is much more succinct: "A codependent is one who has let anotherperson's behavioraffect him or her, and who is obsessed with controllingthat persons' behavior."51 This control of behaviortook manyforms in the innercircle of the Fuhrer. First andforemost,
47 Robert Subby, "Insidethe ChemicallyDependent Marriage: Denial and Manipulation," quoted in Co Dependency. An EmergingIssue (Hollywood FL, Health Communications, Inc., 1984). 26. 48 Beattie. 30. 49 James Hillman,. The Soul's Code: ofIn Search Characterand Calling (NewYork: RandomHouse, 1996), 214. 50 Beattie, 30. 51 Beattie, 31. Hitler was obsessed with controllingthe behaviorof those aroundhim. 52 His most
effectiveway of accomplishing thiswas the encouragementof rivalry and
competitionfor his favoramong the highleadership of the Nazi Party andthe Nazi
government.5 3 He was also concernedwith the private lives of his paladins often
inquiringinto them as with Goring54 or expressing an interest in Goebbels' wife,
Magda. 55 Hitler's followersalso attemptedto controltheir Fuhrer in manyways
as well, although these were not as successfulas hiscontrolling overtures over
them. Themost obviousof these were theirindividual effortsto please Hitler and,
in return, gain more power or influence the decision-making process of the
governingof the Reich. 56
It is suggested as well that"codependents wantand need sick people around
themto be happy in an unhealthy way."57 In thislight, Hitler is definitelynot an
exception. Just from reading the profiles of thesethree men (ando thers like them)
it is plain to see thatHitler did, indeed, surround himselfwith othersick people.
There is good evidenceto suggestthat Goringwas addicted to morphinefor many
yearsafter being wounded in the Putsch of 1923 58 in addition to his compulsive
appreciation forfine art. 59 Himmlerwas a quiet manwho, althoughhe could not
52
54 Walter C. Langer,The Mindof Adolf Hitler (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), 62 5355 Kater, 230; Carr. 25: Bullock. 312. 56 Overy, 231-232. 57 Reimann. 123-126. 58 Bullock, 312. Beattie. 32. LeonardMosley, The Reich Marshal (London: Weidenfcldand Nicolson. 1974), 98; Hillman, 220. 59 Mosley, 166, 181. stand the sight of blood, was a cold and60 calculated killer, orchestratingthe actions of histerror-squads of Gestapo and SS. He has been accused of being completely amoral on more thanone occasion. Finally, Hitler had gathered an assortment of "freaks" aroundhim in his personal circle. Accordingto Hillman,
'�Hitler's entourage ... was most unusual forits collection of freaksin high places, even as others61 physically like them were systematically expunged in the death camps." The most prominent of these was Goebbels who had a clubfootand was veryshort in stature. His darkcomplexion, hair, and eyes also gave rise to much suspicion as to hisAryan background amongother high Party officials. These personal "defects" caused Goebbels much discomfort and paranoiathereby increasinghis efforts to rise above therest and please his Fuhrerto dizzying heights (see aforementioned).
Beattie also proposes that codependents62 are reactionaries who overreact and underreact, "but rarely do theyact." Theyreact 63 to theproblems, pains, lives, and behaviors of others as well as thoseof their64 own. Hitler was notorious forhis rage which he unleashed readily and often. This would fall under the overreaction category. He was also knownfor periods of greatprocrastination, mm.65 listlessness, andindifference to affairs which did not directly concern For 60 BradleyF. Smith, HeinrichHimmler: A Nazi in the Making, 1900-1926 (Stanford: Hoover InstitutionPress, 1971). 170-171. Hillman. 22L 62 Beattie. 33. 63 Beattie, 33. 64 Carr. 13. 65 Carr, 13; Bullock, 35,536; Langer, 72-73, 127, 129-130. 201-202. example, Hitler's inactiondue to procrastination was "not so much a matter of lazinessas it [was] a fearof coming to gripswith a difficultproblem." 66 He would then postponeaction until thevery last moment when the situationhad become cruciallyurgent or dangerous. According to Beattie'smodel, then, Hitler would be exemplifyingcodependent behavior.
66 Langer. 20 l The Characteristics
In their works onthe subject, Beattieand Subby provide characteristicso f codependent individuals in addition to their definitions. Beattie'slist very long and extensive containingvarious actionsthat codependents tend to do or not to do or fee1ings that they feel or do not feel.67 Having surveyed the list, I have taken the pertinent characteristicswhich apply to Hitler directly. These are listed as such:
Codependents tend to:
• get angry, defensive, self-righteous, and indignantwhen othersblame and criticizethe m • look to their relationships toprovide all of their goodfeelings • don't see or deal with theirfear of loss of control • get frustratedand angry • get depressed or sick • look forhappiness outside themselves • latch onto whoever or whatever they thinkthey can provide happiness • feel teniblythreatened by the loss of any thingor person they think provides their happiness • threaten • coerce • not trust otherpeople • think about suicide
Simply working down the list, I willprovide examples of these behaviors in
Hitler's life. Hitler seldom took criticism well; more oftenthan nothe became violentlydefensive and attacked thosewho criticizedhim. 68 Hitler also had a very
67 Beattie, 37-45 68 Carr. 13. self-righteousnature inthat he was possessed of an intense Messianic complex. In his youngeryears afte r WWI, he oftenreferred to himselfas the Messiah and claimed that God spoke to him. Later on he cultivated this idea and even 69 propagated among the masses.70 Hitler looked outside of himselfat all timesfor positive reinforcement. As stated inHartwick: Hitler had a "constantneed of praise. His vanitywas inappeasable, andthe most fulsomeflattery was receivedas no more thanhis due."71 It is logical to saythat Hitler fearedhis loss of control because of his association and relianceupon suchmen as Heinrich Himmlerand histerror-tactics to keep the Fuhrer in power. Hitler also frequentlybecame angry andfru strated. One wayin whichhe alleviatedhis frustrationsthat he had experienced forthe six yearsprior to WWIIwas to beginthe conflict. The war itself became anescape forhim fromthe tension and dissatisfactionwith himself and hisactio ns. 72 Hitler was often depressed andsick with his sleeping patterns being the most illustrative factor. The worse offhe was themore he was prone to sleep all day and not ariseuntil the late afternoonor earlyevening. So faras his happiness was concerned, Hitler desperately looked to thewomen in hislife to bringhim joy. Onlytwo were ever verysuccessfu l: Geli Raubal, his niece, and
Eva Braun, his eventual wife. The intimate relationships he experienced with these women were perverse atbest ofteninvolving abnormal sexual conduct
69 Langer, 34-35 70 Langer, 54. 71 Hartwick, 8. 72 Bullock. 50. amongother things.73 WhenGeli Raubalmysteriously died (either by suicide or shot by Hitler), Hitler became incredibly depressed and even threatenedsuicide. 74
Threatsand coercion were the mainstay of Hitler's power maintenanceand even in his Nazi state policy. Such reliance upon thesewould suggest codependent tendencies. Hitler's "golden rule" in politics was: trustno one. This general mistrustor people also spilled into his privatelife agreat deal with veryfew exceptions (i.e. Goebbels).75 Hitler also had a long record of suicide threats stemmingfrom inabilityto deal withreality: afterthe failed Putsch of 1923, after thedeath of Geli in 1930, and in Aprilof 1945 when the loss of the war seemed imminent.76 Therefore, the sumof all thesecharacteristics adds supportto the claim of Hitler's codependency.
73 Hillman, 219-220; Langer, 133-134, 170-171 74 Langer, 90. 15 Bullock, 630, 76 Langer, 79-80, 90, 237-238; Carr, 109-111. VI. THE CONCEPT OF ENABLING
Enabling is a concept directly linked to codependency in that it is a partof the process. Inthe arenaof alcoholism and its treatment, enablingis definedas:
"thoseinfluences of an individual, family, organization, or institutionthat may
serveto facilitate or sustainthe alcohol use of one or more drinkers.''77 Applying
it to thesubject group at hand, thedefinition would be modifiedto replace
"alcohol use" withimmorality, disturbedbehavior patterns, andhate crimes and
the "drinkers" would be replaced by Hitler and his followers. Ager, Thomas, and
Yoshiokabreak enabling downinto two different classes: direct and indirect
enabling, with directapplying to some aspect of the abuser's drinkingbehavior
and indirect applyingto some aspect of the abuser's nondrinkingbehavior. 78 In
the case of Hitler and his followers, I will be dealingwith direct enabling which is
comprised of twotypes:
Type I enabling pertainsto those behaviors( or events) that serveto
accelerate potential increasersof the abuser's drinking, such as indicatingto
the drinker thatit is okayto drink, suggestingattending activities and social
events where alcoholic beverages are served, and offeringalcoholic
beverages to the drinker. TypeII enabling consists of those behaviors (or
events) that decelerate potential decreases of abuser drinking. Examplesof
71 RichardD. Ager, EdwinJ. Thomas, and MarianneYoshloka, "Spouseenabling of alcohol abuse: conception, assessment, andmodification," Journal ofSubstance Abuse. 1996, v8, 62. 78 Ager, Thomas, and Yoshioka, 63. is an example of a way in which they all, bothcollectively and individually enabled Hitler in his hatred addiction.
Goring's greatefforts in governmental and economic strides forhim provided Hitler with the right amount of legitimate powerto fulfill his desires and the meansto keep it In this sense, his effortswere like unto a person givingtheir alcoholic spouse a drinkor, more correctly, givingthem money for alcohol, directionsto the nearest liquor store, andthe keys to the familycar. This example covers bothtypes of direct enabling in that Goringdirectly influenced Hitler politically by backinghis campaigns andindirectly be persuading potential business supporters and concerned politicians awayfrom Hitler's true agenda.
Covering forthe alcoholic merely enables him/herto be able to drinkwithout facingas manyof the consequences. Therefore, Goring eliminated many of the obstacles in Hitler'spath to power.
Himmler, with his tightly-reinedpolice state, was the only person Hitler could rely upon to maintain control in the Hinterland (homeland). As Combs delineates: .. Hitler became dependent upon Himmler's Schutzstaffe] (SS). He had no other anned force with which to enforcehis rule83 and, as with every despotism, forceis both the measure andthe source of power." This control enabled
Hitler'shatred for the Jews and irrational behaviorsoar to new heights withoutthe
8 3 George Hamilton Combs, Jr.. Himmler... Nazi Spider-Man (Philadelphia: DaYid McKay Co., 1942). 29. 84 generalpopulace objecting to his increasingly errantbehavior. The willingness withwhich Himmler carried out his duties also enabled Hitler to groweven more perverse in his desires forgenetic cleansingand Atyan dominance as well as other atrocities. Himmleralso enabled Hitler by helping him to keep up some of the pretense thatthe Fuhrer mightjust be a virtuousman after all. For example,
Himmlernever protested at his exclusion in themajority of Hitler'ssocial affairs.
He also supported derogatory statements about himself when they came fromthe mouth of the Fuhrer. For example, Hitler is quoted once as saying: "I need such policemen [Himmler]... but I don't like them."85 Himmlerwas also quick to shield
Hitlerfrom less than desirable press and publicity, especiallythat associated with
"FinalSolution". As he gave detailed reportsabout the exterminations, Himmler declaredto political and militaryleaders that"the Fiihrer's name must never be linked with these deeds"86 andassumed personal responsible forthe massacres perpetratedby the SS.
Goebbels' ingeniouspropaganda efforts forever immortalized Hitler in the eyes of theGennan people, helping to grantthem the Messiah forwhich theyhad longed ever since Versailles. These effortsand Goebbels' undyingfaith in his
Fuhrerand devotionto theNazi nationalist causes enabled Hitler to become the omnipotentgod�head of Germanyhe had been strivingto be.
84 Langer,204. 85 Ronald M. Glassman and William H. Swatos. Jr., eds,. Charisma.History, and Social Structure (New 8York:6 Greenwood Press, 1986 ), 161. Glassman and Swatos. 161. VII. CONCLUSION
Therefore, in conclusion, Ibelieve the codependent natureof the relationshipbetween Adolf Hitler and his three chief subordinates, Hermann
Goring, Heinrich Himmler, andJoseph Goebbels to be extremely important inthe studyof the"how" and "why" questions surroundingthe leadership enigmaof
Hitler. Inthis extreme case study, thebehavioral problemsof the fourmen are veryeasy to see; fromdrug addictionto intense hatreds to emotional disorders, they are all characterizedby some of those factorswhich makethem prone to a codependent relationship. My critique of my study wouldhave to be the applicability of the concept of codependency to these non-familial, non-substance related interpersonal relationships. Onlyvery recently have professionalsbeen broadening the idea of codependency to cover a morediverse set of variablesin dysfunctionalrelationships. It is my hope that in my proving of my hypothesis, that Hitler's success inhis nightmarishreign as Chancellorof Nazi Germanywas directlydependent upon the codependent nature of him andhis followersand their enabling naturein regardsto supportinghis aberrant behavior. There areseveral benefitsof broadening the concept of codependency especially intenns of leadership. This is because of thelarge number of potential codependent people in this country. According to Goff andGoff, "by conservative figuresthere are 10 mi1lion alcoholics in this country, and if each [one] affects fourother people, then the illness is at epidemic proportions,"87 andthese figures are dealing only with the alcoholic .. version" of codependency. Therefore, as youngminds poised on theleadership roles of tomorrow, I feel it is importantto understandthe breakdown and dysfunctionof more or less regularpeople when dealing withthem in a leadershiprole or as a subordinate. The extreme case of Hitler and his three paladins illustratesa severe instance of such personalitydisorder andinterpersonal dysfunctionwhich can subsequently serve as a learningbackdrop forthe observationand applicationsuch aberrantbehaviors in one's peers, employees, family, orany other acquaintance.
87 J. LarryGoff and Patricia J. Goff. "Trappedin co-dependency," Personnel Journal. Dec. 1998.v67, 52.