DOCSLIB.ORG

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results = 5*7&9.43= 7&6.=7**)42a=97&9*,.*8`= 5574&(-*8`=*8:198`=&3)= 88:*8=+47=43,7*88= &9-*7.3*= &1*= 5*(.&1.89=.3= 39*73&9.43&1=*(:7.9>= 57.1=,`=,**3= 43,7*88.43&1= *8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 18/1**= <<<_(78_,4;= -.-21= =*5479=+47=43,7*88 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress 5*7&9.43= 7&6.= 7**)42a=97&9*,.*8`=5574&(-*8`=*8:198`=&3)= 88:*8=+47=43,7*88= = :22&7>= Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009, which confirmed the Iraqis’ responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in OIF and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the agreement a “watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down.” U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing “how the war in Iraq will end,” in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel. The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering strands of the insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111th Congress, include identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship. This report is intended to provide background and analysis of current developments and options, and will be updated as events warrant. 43,7*88.43&1=*8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 5*7&9.43= 7&6.= 7**)42a=97&9*,.*8`=5574&(-*8`=*8:198`=&3)= 88:*8=+47=43,7*88= = 439*398= Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ............................................................................................................................... 1 Revised U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Partnership................................................................................... 3 Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement................................................. 3 Security Agreement Provisions........................................................................................... 3 Drawdown and Transition.........................................................................................................4 Current Strategic and Operational Dynamics............................................................................ 8 Current Strategic Dynamics: Tests and “Spoilers” ............................................................ 8 Current Operational Dynamics: Transitions ....................................................................... 9 Diminishing U.S. Leverage................................................................................................11 Future Strategic Considerations ...............................................................................................11 Clarifying and Updating U.S. Interests and Strategic Objectives......................................11 Applying Strategic Leverage ............................................................................................ 12 Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Relationship with Iraq........................................................... 13 Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq................................................ 13 Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of the Force........................... 14 Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination ........................................................ 15 Future Operational Considerations.......................................................................................... 16 How Much Help Is Enough?............................................................................................. 16 Further Troop Drawdowns................................................................................................ 17 Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission....................................................... 18 Transition Teams......................................................................................................... 18 Unit Partnering ........................................................................................................... 19 Capacity-Building....................................................................................................... 19 ISF Training and Advising Under Transition.............................................................. 20 Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint .................................................................................. 20 Coordination on Operations under the Security Agreement ............................................. 21 Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities......................................................................... 24 Role of Contractors........................................................................................................... 25 Equipment......................................................................................................................... 26 Options Available to Congress ................................................................................................ 27 Structure and Aim of the Report ............................................................................................. 28 Decision to Go to War in Iraq........................................................................................................ 28 Antecedents in the 1990s ........................................................................................................29 Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations............................................... 29 Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein................................................................................................ 30 War Planning ................................................................................................................................. 31 Strategic Objectives................................................................................................................. 31 Military Objectives.................................................................................................................. 32 Planning for Major Combat .................................................................................................... 32 Post-War Planning................................................................................................................... 35 Inter-Agency Post-War Planning ...................................................................................... 36 Military Post-War Planning .............................................................................................. 38 Organizational Decisions.................................................................................................. 39 Major Combat Operations ............................................................................................................. 40 Early Infiltration...................................................................................................................... 40 43,7*88.43&1=*8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 5*7&9.43= 7&6.= 7**)42a=97&9*,.*8`=5574&(-*8`=*8:198`=&3)= 88:*8=+47=43,7*88= = The Launch.............................................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Downloads/Documents/Tvpn-VW Primer-V1Q308.Pdf
    City Research Online City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Piyathasanan, B., Mathies, C., Wetzels, M., Patterson, P. and de Ruyter, K. (2015). A Hierarchical Model of Virtual Experience and Its Influences on the Perceived Value and Loyalty of Customers. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 19(2), pp. 126-158. doi: 10.1080/10864415.2015.979484 This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/17773/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2015.979484 Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ [email protected] A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF VIRTUAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS INFLUENCES ON CUSTOMER PERCEIVED VALUE AND LOYALTY Abstract Many businesses use virtual experience (VE) to enhance the overall customer experience, though extant research offers little guidance for how to improve consumers’ VE. This study, anchored in activity theory, examines key drivers of VE and its influences on value perceptions and customer loyalty.
    [Show full text]
  • Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq
    Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS POLICY FOCUS 137 Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2015 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: A Kurdish fighter keeps guard while overlooking positions of Islamic State mili- tants near Mosul, northern Iraq, August 2014. (REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal) CONTENTS Acknowledgments | v Acronyms | vi Executive Summary | viii 1 Introduction | 1 2 Federal Government Security Forces in Iraq | 6 3 Security Forces in Iraqi Kurdistan | 26 4 Optimizing U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq | 39 5 Issues and Options for U.S. Policymakers | 48 About the Author | 74 TABLES 1 Effective Combat Manpower of Iraq Security Forces | 8 2 Assessment of ISF and Kurdish Forces as Security Cooperation Partners | 43 FIGURES 1 ISF Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 10 2 Kurdish Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 28 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to a range of colleagues for their encouragement and assistance in the writing of this study.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Service Journal, December 2007
    WRITE FOR US! USAID’S “MISSION IN EXILE” REMEMBERING DICK SCISSORS SEMIANNUAL SCHOOLS SUPPLEMENT $3.50 / DECEMBER 2007 OREIGN ERVICE FJ O U R N A L S THE MAGAZINE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS COUNTRY TEAMWORK Is State Still Running Embassies? OREIGN ERVICE FJ O U R N A L S CONTENTS December 2007 Volume 84, No. 12 F OCUS ON Country Team Management WHO’SINCHARGE HERE? / 20 The issue of who wields authority over American embassy personnel — notably those who don’t work for the State Department — continues to prompt interagency conflict, as it has for years. By Shawn Zeller CHIEF-OF-MISSION AUTHORITY: A POWERFUL BUT UNDERUSED TOOL / 29 The State Department should capitalize on the presidential mandate given to every COM to strengthen the country team mechanism. By Edward Peck ONE HAND CLAPPING: Cover and inside illustration THE SOUND OF STAFFING THE FOREIGN SERVICE / 33 by Jeff Moores The demands of Iraq and Afghanistan have aggravated an entrenched liability in the Foreign Service: namely, severe understaffing. By Mark Johnsen PRESIDENT’S VIEWS / 5 THE EMBASSY OF THE FUTURE / 38 Professionalism Here is a vision of the new American diplomacy, along with By John K. Naland practical steps to get there. Excerpts from a recent report. SPEAKING OUT / 15 Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic Dynamic FS FICTION By Gerald Loftus BURIED / 44 LETTER FROM A great old ceiba tree in the mountains of south-central Cuba holds THE EDITOR / 18 a revelation into the island’s history, humor and people. By Steven Alan Honley By Michael Kelly REFLECTIONS / 96 Buying Potatoes in Havana By Robert Blau F EATURES REMEMBERING USAID’S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN, 1985-1994 / 48 LETTERS / 7 During a critical decade, USAID successfully operated an interim Afghan “mission in exile.” CYBERNOTES / 12 By Thomas H.
    [Show full text]
  • Methodist University School of Graduate Studies
    catalogue_graduate_2013-2014.pdf METHODIST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES ACADEMIC CATALOGUE 2013-2014 School of Graduate Studies & Office of Academic Affairs Methodist University Fayetteville, North Carolina 28311 catalogue_graduate_2013-2014.pdf CONTACT INFORMATION Methodist University 5400 Ramsey Street Fayetteville, North Carolina 28311 www.methodist.edu General University Policy President—Dr. Ben E. Hancock, Jr. (630-7005) Academic Information Executive Vice President and Academic Dean of the University—Dr. Delmas Crisp, Jr. (630-7031) Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs—Jane Weeks Gardiner (630-7158) Dean, School of Graduate Studies—Dr. George Hendricks (630-7056) Director, Master of Education Program— Dr. E. Sue Godwin (630-7060) Director, Master of Justice Administration Program —Dr. Darl H. Champion (630-7050) Director, M.M.S. in Physician Assistant Studies — Christina Beard (630-7215) Director, The Professional M.B.A. at Methodist University—Dr. James Marcin (630-7624) Admissions Information Vice President for Enrollment Services—Rick Lowe (630-7027) Director of Financial Aid—Bonnie Adamson (630-7192) Assistant Director of International Programs—Olga Polyak (630-7432) Director of Admissions, Physician Assistant Program—Jennifer Mish (630-7615) Program Coordinator, Master of Justice Administration—Kristine Thomas (630-7268) Program Coordinator, Professional MBA at Methodist University—Anne Way (630-7493) Program Coordinator, The Master of Education Program—Janice Luce (630-7511) Athletic Information Director
    [Show full text]
  • XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS ASSOCIATION SKY DRAGONS Spring 2012 ------82ND DOMINATES XVIII ABN CORPS NCO and SOLDIER of YEAR COMPETITION
    XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS ASSOCIATION SKY DRAGONS Spring 2012 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82ND DOMINATES XVIII ABN CORPS NCO AND SOLDIER OF YEAR COMPETITION Left to Right – CSM (Ret) Ted Gaweda, Pfc. Jeremy Shivick, Sgt. Jason Thomas, Alan Yeater On 5 April in a ceremony conducted at Sports USA, a huge sports bar at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, two paratroopers of the XVIII Airborne Corps' 82nd Airborne Division were selected as the XVIII Airborne Corps' 2012 NCO and Soldier of the Year. They were Sgt. Jason T. Thomas, 26, and Pfc. Jeremy Shivick, 21. Both Soldiers are assigned to the 1st Platoon, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which is part of the division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT). This is 2 the first time that both winners were from the same unit. The competition was held from 2 to 4 April, and the winners were announced during the ceremony which was presided over by the Ft. Bragg Garrison Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Samuel Campbell and the command sergeant major of XVIII Abn Corps' NCO Academy, CSM Nicolino Parisi. These were four days of grueling, early morning and late night events which included basic Soldier skills, the Army physical fitness test, a written exam, urban map orienteering, M4 rifle qualification, a weapons event, and an interview board. The competition certainly challenged the confidence and motivation of the Soldiers. Twenty-one Soldiers competed, representing each subordinate unit of the XVIII Abn Corps. Spc. Michael C. Lauritzen, from Jackson, Michigan, assigned to the 716th MP Battalion, 16th MP Brigade, Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, was quoted saying, “I'm grateful for being here, glad that my leadership had the confidence in me to compete at this level.
    [Show full text]
  • Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: in Brief
    Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Amy Belasco Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget January 9, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43727 Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief Summary The FY2015 continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-164, H.J.Res. 124, FY2015 CR), enacted on September 19, 2014, authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 national defense authorization act (NDAA), to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. The FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113- 291, H.R. 3979) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, H.R. 83) provide further authority and funding for the program. Congress acted in response to President Obama’s request for authority to begin such a program as part of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war. The FY2015 measures authorize DOD to submit reprogramming requests to the four congressional defense committees to transfer available funds. DOD submitted the first such reprogramming request in November 2014 under authorities provided by P.L. 113-164, and, in December, Congress approved $220 million in requested funds to begin program activities. H.R. 83 states that up to $500 million of $1.3 billion made available by the act for a new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to support the Syria train and equip program.
    [Show full text]
  • 2020 Annual Report 2021 Objectives a Letter from the Adjutant General Maj
    This document is made available electronically by the Minnesota Legislative Reference Library as part of an ongoing digital archiving project. http://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/lrl.asp MINNESOTA NATIONAL GUARD 2020 Annual Report 2021 Objectives A Letter from the Adjutant General Maj. Gen. Shawn Manke The Adjutant General To the Citizens of Minnesota: As Minnesota’s 32nd adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Shawn Manke is the senior leader of On behalf of the more than 13,000 Soldiers and Airmen of the Minnesota National the Minnesota National Guard. The adjutant Guard, I am pleased to present our annual report for 2020. This report is designed to general is the administrative head of the state’s share an overview of our organization’s missions, activities and accomplishments over Department of Military Affairs whose duties the past year, as well as to articulate a direction for the near future. and responsibilities are defined in Minnesota State Statute 190.09. The adjutant general is a The last year certainly tested the resolve and resiliency of all Minnesotans. Together, we state employee appointed by the governor of faced an unprecedented 2020, and amid angst and uncertainty we were reminded that Minnesota for a seven-year term. people matter most. Learn more about the adjutant general: In 2020, we were also reminded of the National Guard’s value to our communities, https://MinnesotaNationalGuard.ng.mil/TAG state and nation. I’m extremely proud of and grateful for the Airmen and Soldiers from across Minnesota who continue to step up and serve when called upon.
    [Show full text]
  • Maiawolins Thesis, 1.5 Space
    UC Berkeley The Charles H. Percy Undergraduate Grant for Public Affairs Research Papers Title A SHARED STATE: IRAQI REFUGEES AND AMERICAN VETERANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8dm8k1db Author Wolins, Maia Publication Date 2013-01-17 Undergraduate eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California A SHARED STATE: IRAQI REFUGEES AND AMERICAN VETERANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR Maia Wolins Faculty Advisor: Emily Gottreich Graduate Student Advisor: Timoteo Rodriguez Senior Honors Thesis, Middle Eastern Studies University of California, Berkeley Published January 17, 2013 [email protected] All rights reserved. Copyright © 2013 by Maia Wolins, B.A. 2 A SHARED STATE: IRAQI REFUGEES AND AMERICAN VETERANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR ABSTRACT The American media devoted primetime coverage to the military offensive in Baghdad in March of 2003 but as time passed the ‘War on Terror’ became an uneasy norm in American consciousness. Although the Iraq war swept through the lives of millions of Iraqi civilians and hundreds of thousands of American military families, few ethnographic studies document that aftermath. Furthermore, while veterans and refugees are the two largest populations affected by the war, no previous studies have analyzed both groups in concert. To that end, this paper is an ethnographic analysis of the war’s aftermath through the lived experiences of Iraqi refugees and American veterans in California. The research on which the study is based derives from twelve months of participant observation, group discussions, and qualitative interviews with refugees formerly of the Iraqi professional class who relocated to northern California after 2003 and, separately, with American veterans of the war who pursued bachelor’s degrees in northern California after leaving Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Galbraith.Pdf
    NY Review of Books | http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17103 15 April 2004 Feature How to Get Out of Iraq Peter W. Galbraith . In the year since the United States Marines pulled down Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, things have gone very badly for the United States in Iraq and for its ambition of creating a model democracy that might transform the Middle East. As of today the United States military appears committed to an open-ended stay in a country where, with the exception of the Kurdish north, patience with the foreign oc- cupation is running out, and violent opposition is spreading. Civil war and the breakup of Iraq are more likely outcomes than a successful transition to a pluralistic Western-style democracy. Much of what went wrong was avoidable. Focused on winning the political battle to start a war, the Bush administration failed to anticipate the postwar chaos in Iraq. Admin- istration strategy seems to have been based on a hope that Iraq’s bureaucrats and police would simply transfer their loyalty to the new authorities, and the country’s administra- tion would continue to function. All experience in Iraq suggested that the collapse of civil authority was the most likely outcome, but there was no credible planning for this contingency. In fact, the effort to remake Iraq never recovered from its confused start when it failed to prevent the looting of Baghdad in the early days of the occupation. mericans like to think that every problem has a solution, but that may no longer Abe true in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Violence in Iraq: the Growing Risk of Serious Civil Conflict
    Burke Chair in Strategy Violence in Iraq: The Growing Risk of Serious Civil Conflict By Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai September 9, 2013 Request for comments: This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordsman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman: Violence in Iraq 9/6/13 1 INTRODUCTION Iraq is a nation with great potential and its political divisions and ongoing low-level violence do not mean it cannot succeed in establishing stability, security, and a better life for its people. Iraq cannot succeed, however, by denying its growing level of violence and the responsibility of Iraq’s current political leaders for its problems. There are gaps in the data on Iraq’s current level of violence, its causes, and the responsibility of given actors. The data are still good enough, however, to warn that Iraq may be moving back to a level of civil conflict that will amount to a serious civil war. There is also substantial reporting to show that Iraq’s violence is not simply the product of extremists and terrorist groups. Iraq’s growing violence is also the result of the fact that Iraq is the scene of an ongoing struggle to establish a new national identity: one that can bridge across the deep sectarian divisions between its Shi’ites and Sunnis as well as the ethnic divisions between its Arabs and its Kurds and other minorities.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
    Order Code RL31701 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated July 15, 2007 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for Al Qaeda terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB) weapons, and no CB or nuclear weapons stockpiles or production facilities have been found. The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement and training/retaining sufficient Iraqi security forces to assume responsibility for the nations domestic security. Though initially denying that there was an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is regional/local organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.” DOD initially believed the resistance to consist primarily of former regime supporters and foreign fighters; however, it has now acknowledged that growing resentment of coalition forces and an increase in sectarian conflicts, independent of connections with the earlier regime, are contributing to the insurgency.
    [Show full text]
  • 12/11 Shibboleth, the Fine Point in Pronunciation Around Which Many Lie Slain
    Eric Darton Born Witness 27th Installment , 5/16/08 1 12/11 Shibboleth, the fine point in pronunciation around which many lie slain. The unforgiving sieve of language. Something to think about the next time you’re in the lovely Nederlandish seaside town of Scheveningen. “For every image of the past that is not recognized in the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably. (The good tidings which the historian of the past brings with throbbing heart may be lost in a void the very moment he opens his mouth.)… “To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’ (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.…” Says Benjamin. Did you write a book about the Center both unconsciously and precisely to constitute yourself on the margins? What is not heard may sometimes be r(h)ead. And vice versa. Ben Bernanke and the FedRez Boyz whack down interest rates – again – but insufficiently, so the market responds by lying down in the street, holding its breath and drumming its sneakers on the asphalt. It doesn’t turn blue exactly, more like a bright red. When it does splutter something, it’s pure hysteria: it wants to be rewarded – again – for being bad. NO! I don’t care that I broke daddy’s pipe – I want a beebee gun! Now! Eric Darton Born Witness 27th Installment , 5/16/08 2 OK, OK, just get up and let me blow your nose.
    [Show full text]