Yemen Recent Significant Events Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): AQAP Formed in January 2009 As a Merger Between the Yemeni and Saudi Al Qaeda Branches

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Yemen Recent Significant Events Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): AQAP Formed in January 2009 As a Merger Between the Yemeni and Saudi Al Qaeda Branches Yemen Recent Significant Events Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): AQAP formed in January 2009 as a merger between the Yemeni and Saudi al Qaeda branches. Operatives work in cells throughout the country and rely on tribal support for shelter. The group seeks to establish an Islamic state and has executed attacks on Western interests. Click image to enlarge See here for more information. Click image to enlarge Current Situation Al Houthi Rebellion: The al Houthi rebels, drawn from Yemen’s Yemen is increasingly unstable as an anti-government movement Zaydi Shiite population, are primarily active in Yemen’s northern seeks to force President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power. The Sa’ada and Amran provinces and have engaged in paramilitary country’s population faces high levels of poverty and activity against government forces and pro-government tribes. unemployment coupled with low levels of education. Oil, the See here for more information. primary source of public revenue, will run out between 2017 and 2021 and Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, will be without water in 2015. Southern Movement: The Southern Movement is an umbrella Corruption and resource constraints limit the government’s group for southern-based secessionists who regularly demonstrate capacity to properly address desperate socio-economic conditions. against the Yemeni government, protesting their perceived The government also faces multiple security threats: the northern marginalization in the unified state. Parts of the movement engage al Houthi rebellion, the southern secessionist movement, and al in militant activities. See here for more information. Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen Protests There is currently a ceasefire in place with the al Houthi rebels; Political unrest spread to however, the al Houthi rebels are backing the anti-government Yemen, where protests have protestors. In the south, the Southern Movement has also voiced been held across the country support for the protestors. The Yemeni military is now divided and calling for Saleh to resign. He major tribes renounced support for the government. has lost key tribal support AQAP remains a threat. The current instability increases the and influential figures within group’s operating space and it continues to attack government the military announced their targets in Yemen and seeks to strike Western targets. Recent support for the protestors. statements from the group have threatened Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the West. Click image to enlarge See here for more information. Gulf of Aden Security Review: A daily briefing on the situation in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Please click here. Click to return to first slide. Selected Recent Significant Events 1 Over 50 people were killed when snipers opened fire on demonstrators in Sana’a on March 18. Clashes between al Houthis, supported 2 by defected army units, and army loyalists have killed over 40 people. 2 Army defectors clashed with Republican 3 1 Guard units on March 22 and March 24, killing at least four people. 3 A roadside improvised explosive device 5 4 killed a policeman and injured seven 4 others in Aden on March 24. Yemeni security forces killed 12 AQAP 5 militants in Lawder on March 23. Yemen Protests Click to return to first slide. Protest Timeline Overview Participants 15 JAN: Youth activists and opposition Student and civil society activists, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP): Composed members initiated protests in Sana’a. “youth,” have called for President Ali of five opposition parties: Islah, Yemeni 11 FEB: Thousands of Yemenis protested Abdullah Saleh to resign since the Socialist Party, al Haq, Unionist party, and spontaneously throughout the country. Tunisian president stepped down. Popular Force Union party. The JMP 20 FEB: JMP rejected dialogue with the Protests have been occurring regularly original sought sweeping political reform, government and al Houthis join protests. since January in squares in the major but now calls for Saleh’s resignation. It 25 FEB: Massive protests occurred; cities, especially Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden, presented a five-point plan to Saleh. participants included the al Houthis, and eventually spread to areas that have Youth Movement: It rejects JMP Southern Movement, and general public traditionally been strong support bases involvement in negotiations and has independent of formal political parties. for the regime. formed an umbrella organization to 01 MAR: JMP sponsored a political rally. A violent crackdown on March 18 in present unified demands. 06 MAR: After Saleh rejected JMP’s Sana’a killed over fifty protestors. Saleh Islamists: Abdul Majid al Zindani, proposal, the JMP called for widespread declared a state of emergency that same designated a terrorist by the U.S., has led protests and a peaceful transition. day and dismissed his cabinet on March a group of clerics in the protests and 08 MAR: Demonstrations occurred in 20. On March 21, spurred by the events called for an Islamist state in Yemen. He areas traditionally loyal to Saleh. on March 18, mass defections from the submitted an eight-point transition plan. 10 MAR: Saleh ordered security forces to regime occurred, including key military Tribes: Two of the most influential tribes, protect the protestors from violence. commanders, such as General Ali the Hashid and the Bakil, have 13 MAR: Violence broke out at Sana’a, Mohsen al Ahmar, and tribal leaders, withdrawn their support for the regime. Aden, and Taiz protests. such as Sheikh Sadiq al Ahmar (Hashid) Tribes in al Jawf have aligned with the al 15 MAR: Yemen deported four foreign and Sheikh Sinan Abu Lohoum (Bakil). Houthi rebels against loyalist army units. journalists from the capital. Military: Key commanders within the 18 MAR: Over 50 protestors killed in Saleh offered to resign within the year, military , including General Ali Mohsen al Sana’a by rooftop snipers. but the protestors demand he step down Ahmar, have defected and declared they 20 MAR: Saleh dismissed cabinet. immediately. The youth movement has will protect the protestors. Defected 21 MAR: Mass defections occurred from formed an umbrella organization and has units have clashed with loyalist troops. government and military. laid out its demands. Southern Movement and the al Houthis: 22 MAR: Emergency law passed. Leaders called for solidarity with the 25 MAR: Rival rallies occurred in Sana’a. For more, please see: “youth” movement. Click for more 26 MAR: Negotiations for transition of “Yemen Protests: U.S. Policy in Crisis.” information on the Southern Movement power collapsed. Yemen Protest Briefing Slides and the al Houthi rebellion. Gulf of Aden Security Review: A daily briefing on the situation in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Please click here. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Click to return to first slide. Recent Significant Events History Leadership 22 MAR: AQAP militants attacked Ma’rib Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula checkpoint. Three militants were killed. (AQAP) officially formed in January 2009 Three soldiers died and two were injured with the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi in the attack. Some militants escaped. al Qaeda branches and operates out of 22 MAR: AQAP militants ambushed army Yemen. Saudi Arabia has effectively unit in Lawder in Abyan governorate. denied al Qaeda a haven in the country Twelve militants were killed and at least since 2004. AQAP receives shelter from five soldiers injured. some of the Yemeni tribes and portrays 17 MAR: Yemen’s Defense Ministry itself as a protector of the people. reported two AQAP militants captured AQAP’s primary goals are to establish an en route to Taiz, Ahmed Omar Abdul Jalil Islamic Caliphate within the Arabian Click image to enlarge al Khadmi and Khalid Saeed Batarfi. Peninsula and to attack the West. The Batarfi reportedly works with AQAP’s group is the most active operational Important Considerations media arm and was in charge of AQAP’s franchise of the al Qaeda network and is Capabilities: AQAP has historically Abyan and al Bayda military wing. responsible for the 2009 Christmas day targeted western interests in Yemen; 13 MAR: Suspected AQAP militants attack and the October 2010 parcel plot. however, the Christmas Day attack and attacked a security patrol in Zinjibar, The group actively recruits in the English- October 2010 parcel plot showed that killing on soldier and injuring three language and publishes two regular the group has international capabilities. others. magazine, Sada al Malahem (Echo of the English-language outreach: AQAP is the Epics) in Arabic, and Inspire in English. first al Qaeda franchise to publish in Americans Anwar al Awlaki and Samir English. Anwar al Awlaki, an American- Khan are operational within AQAP and born cleric, is hiding in Yemen with AQAP are credited with much of its Western militants and advocates for the Muslim outreach. community to wage violent jihad. Estimates of AQAP’s strength range from Guantanamo Detainees: Yemen the low hundreds to several thousand continues to be a destination for former operatives. Foreign fighters are believed Guantanamo detainees, some of whom to train for international operations, are part of the AQAP leadership. while Yemenis execute many of the U.S. Policy: Saleh is a partner in the war attacks against Yemeni government on terror and the U.S. has provided Click image to enlarge targets. various forms of assistance to Yemen. Gulf of Aden Security Review: A daily briefing on the situation in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Please click here. Click to return to first slide. AQAP ORGANIZATION CHART 2011: - This is a provisional organization chart OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP and subject to change as new data emerges. All information included is based off of open-source reporting. - All individuals except Abab were either imprisoned in Yemen or Guantanamo. Nasser al Wahayshi Sheikh Ibrahim - Dotted lines indicate individual may no Suleiman al Rubaish longer be operational within the Senior Leader Spiritual Leader organization.
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