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General Assembly Security Council Sixty-Eighth Session Sixty-Eighth Year Agenda Item 110 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

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General Assembly Security Council Sixty-Eighth Session Sixty-Eighth Year Agenda Item 110 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism United Nations A/68/651–S/2013/727 General Assembly Distr.: General 17 December 2013 Security Council English Original: Arabic General Assembly Security Council Sixty-eighth session Sixty-eighth year Agenda item 110 Measures to eliminate international terrorism Identical letters dated 9 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit the following information: On 6 September 2013, our Permanent Mission wrote you a letter, issued as document S/2013/533, concerning the open interference of the Saudi regime in the internal affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic and its support for armed terrorist groups. We pointed out that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Saud al-Faysal, said in Cairo on 1 September 2013 that his country had sent weapons to what he called the Syrian opposition, and that that was no secret. The Syrian Government now wishes to bring it to your attention that Saudi Arabia has continued to play a disruptive role. It has not limited itself to sending weapons to armed terrorist groups in Syria; from the very outset of the crisis, it has also offered them financial and logistical support. Saudi Arabian intelligence has recruited extremist terrorists among detainees from various nationalities in Saudi Arabian jails, some of them criminals and others Al-Qaida elements. The detainees are released and sent to murder the Syrian people. Exploiting the fact that the Islamic holy sites are located on its territory, the Saudi regime has attempted to legitimize terrorism in Syria by disseminating takfirist ideology on satellite television and encouraging the publication of distorted fatwas on the Internet. Those fatwas are poles apart from tolerant Islam. By calling for jihad against the Syrian State, they facilitate the recruitment of thousands of takfirists from various countries and rally them to fight the Syrian State and shed the blood of the Syrian people. In so doing, they clearly violate the principles of the Islamic faith and humanitarian and ethical values. They are a blatant infringement of the authoritative international resolutions, including the Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, which set forth an obligation to combat terrorist financing, recruitment and incitement. Represented by Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabian intelligence has recently revived the armed terrorist groups connected with Al-Qaida, groups that it had 13-62455 (E) 181213 201213 *1362455* A/68/651 S/2013/727 established and supported many years ago, and to which it has now granted increased logistical support in the form of weapons and recruits. Saudi Arabian intelligence is cooperating with its counterparts in neighbouring States. As a result, the borders with certain neighbouring States have recently been opened in order to allow fighters to cross into those States and train for combat in Syria. In the recent confrontations in the eastern Ghutah region, in Rif Dimashq governorate, numerous attempts were made to transport weapons and fighters through border crossings with Jordan to terrorist groups on Syrian territory, particularly the so-called Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam), a terrorist organization supported and funded by Saudi Arabia. It is no secret that thousands of Saudi Arabian nationals are fighting in Syria in the so-called Nusrah Front, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Army of Islam, as well as certain other units and groups, such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigade. Intelligence shows that the proportion of Saudi Arabian terrorists among active fighters in Syria has recently risen from 10 to 15 per cent. Most of them belong to the Al-Qaida organization. The competent Syrian authorities have recently killed some 300 Saudi Arabian terrorists including Mutlaq al-Mutlaq, a leader of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, who was killed in the Aleppo countryside a few days ago. Annexed hereto is a list of the names of some Saudi Arabian terrorists who have been killed in Syria. It should be borne in mind that in many cases, the bodies of dead terrorists are burned by their comrades in order to conceal their identity. In other cases, there is insufficient evidence to identify the bodies. The Saudi regime, its intelligence services and their terrorist proxy groups in Syria bear the largest responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria (see annex). They have taken part in terrorist crimes against civilians, infrastructure, Government buildings, hospitals, public and private facilities and property, schools and Islamic and Christian places of worship. Most recently, on 30 November 2013, they shelled the Umayyad Mosque in the old city of Damascus, killing four civilians, including a child and a woman, and injuring 26 others. On 2 December 2013, terrorists struck in the historic town of Ma‘lula, raiding the convent of Saint Thecla. They detained, abducted and held for ransom the abbess, Mother Pelagia Sayyaf, and a number of nuns who worked in the convent. They also targeted an orphanage attached to the convent, which is home to numerous orphaned children. The fact that Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs has boasted of sending weapons and terrorists to join the armed groups in Syria is ominous and requires a response. The Security Council must take immediate action, particularly as most of the groups are linked to terrorist organizations, foremost among which are Al-Qaida and the Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which are included on the Security Council sanctions list of individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida. Moreover, the current situation infringes a number of Security Council resolutions. For instance, paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 1373 (2001) provides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists. In bringing this significant information to your attention, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls on the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council immediately to take appropriate action to hold the Saudi regime accountable for propagating extremist takfirist ideology and supporting terrorism in Syria, which endangers not only Syria but the region and the world. The Syrian Government hopes that the Security Council counter-terrorism committees will give 2/13 13-62455 A/68/651 S/2013/727 genuine attention to this information and take the appropriate measures to bring an end to the unprecedented support provided by the Saudi regime to takfirist terrorism in Syria, which has organizational and ideological links to Al-Qaida. The State and citizens of Syria are being subjected to the worst form of extremist takfirist terrorism, whose random crimes claim dozens of innocent victims every day. I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be issued as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 110, Measures to combat international terrorism, and of the Security Council. (Signed) Bashar Ja’afari Ambassador Permanent Representative 13-62455 3/13 A/68/651 S/2013/727 Annex Non-exhaustive list of Saudi Arabian terrorists killed while committing terrorist acts on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic Name of terrorist Available information 1 Ibrahim Bakhtiyan Ar‘ar Killed on 25 July 2012 with several Arab terrorists in the Busra al-Sham area. 2 Fahd Muhammad al-‘Umayr Killed on 17 September 2012 in Jabal al-Zawiyah 3 Ibrahim Muhammad Abdulna‘im, Killed on 14 June 2013 a.k.a. Abu Khalid al-Dawsari 4 Ahmad Hamad al-Sa‘ur Killed on 11 November 2012 in al-Warshah 5 Ahmad Khalid al-Husayn Killed on 19 January 2013 in Tall Daww al-‘Utaybi 6 Ahmad Sa‘id Dayfullah Killed on 28 April 2013 in Idlib al-Buhayri al-Qarani 7 Ahmad Salim al-Sumayri Killed on 13 June 2013 8 Ayyub Abdul‘aziz al-Mu‘ti, Killed on 3 November 2012 in the aged 38, Al-Qaida member countryside west of Aleppo with several Syrian terrorists 9 Badr Abdulmuhsin al-Mulayhi Killed on 20 December 2012 in Kafr Laha 10 Bandar Muhammad Sulayman Killed on 20 December 2012 in Kafr Laha al-Mani‘ 11 Turki Nasir Abdullah Born in 1987. Came from Jordan after being released in return for going to fight in Syria, where he was killed 12 Tawfiq Sa‘id al-‘Ali Killed on 29 May 2013 13 Husayn bin Ahmad al-Tuwayjiri Killed on 20 December 2012 in Kafr Laha 14 Husayn Fudayl al-Jasim Killed in Bab Bila on 18 April 2013 15 Hamad Ahmad al-Sani‘ Killed in the Ladhiqiyah countryside 16 Hamad Abdulrahman Nasir Killed on 14 April 2013 in Wadi al-Dayf al-Ghufays 17 Hamad Yusuf al-‘Abbud Killed on 17 November 2012 in the Warshah area of Homs 18 Hamid Dakhil al-‘Anzi Killed in Idlib on 11 October 2012 4/13 13-62455 A/68/651 S/2013/727 Name of terrorist Available information 19 Khalid bin Husayn al-‘Utaybi Aged 40, killed on 19 January 2013 20 Khalid Husayn al-Harbi Killed on 18 February 2013 21 Khalid Hamad al-Nasir Killed on 11 October 2012 during a terrorist attack on the oil facility in Saraqib 22 Khalid Hamid al-Nasir Killed while attacking the Army checkpoint at the oil facility 23 Khalid Abdulrahim al-Hammad Killed on 9 January 2013 in Tall Daww 24 Khalid Abdullah al-Rashid Killed on 20 December 2012 in Kafr Laha 25 Khalid ‘Anash al-Bakkar Killed on 17 November 2012 in the Warshah area of Homs 26 Khalaf al-Salwan bin Sayfuldin, Killed on 9 October 2012 with several aged 37, fired a rocket-propelled Syrian, Arab and foreign terrorists during grenade launcher an attack on terrorist positions in the western Sam‘an countryside 27 Khalaf Jasim al-Ruwayli, a.k.a.
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