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2007 From Revolution to Realpolitik: Iran's Foreign Policy in and the South Caucasus since 1991 William Jerry Johnston Jr.

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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

FROM REVOLUTION TO REALPOLITIK: IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IN

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS SINCE 1991

By

WILLIAM JERRY JOHNSTON, JR.

A Thesis submitted to the Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2007

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of William Jerry Johnston, Jr.

defended on April 4, 2007.

______

Peter Garretson Professor Directing Thesis

______

Jonathan Grant Committee Member

______

Mark Souva Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My most sincere thanks go to Dr. Asbed Kotchikian for his tireless dedication, helpful insight, and kind direction. Without his help this paper would not have been written. Many thanks also to Mom, Dad, and Kendra for their support of whatever I choose to do and wherever I choose to go in life.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract …………..……………………………………………………………………. v

INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………. 1

1. IRAN’S SECURITY POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS …….…………………………………………………………………… 4 Iran’s Ideological Warfare …………………………………………………… 6 Soviet Disintegration and New Realities …………………………………….. 10 Armenia and Azerbaijan: Iran’s Experience in the South Caucasus …………. 12 Religion and Atheism Collide in Central Asia: the Iranian Response to ’s Civil War ……………………………………………………….. 14 The “Other” Neighbor to the North: ’s Impact on Iranian Security Policy …………………………………………………………………………. 16 Energy, Economy, and Security Converge in Iran …………………………… 19 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………. 21

2. IRAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE FORMER SOVIET SOUTH …………. 23 Iran, Iraq, and the Emergence of Economic Importance …………………….. 25 Economic Development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus …………... 27 Energy and Economy in Iran ………………………………………………… 30 The Politics of Energy ……………………………………………………….. 31 The Caspian Sea: Convergence or Conflict? ………………………………... 33 The ECO – an Iranian Pipe Dream? ………………………………………… 38 Russian Interests and Iranian Response ……………………………………... 40 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………….. 42

3. IRANIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS ………………………………………………………………………... 44 The Failures of the Islamic Revolution ……………………………………... 46 Cultural Cautiousness ……………………………………………………….. 48 The Soviet Cultural Legacy …………………………………………………. 49 Culture and Nationalism in the Former Soviet South ……………………….. 51 Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus ……………………………… 52 Why not Revolutionary Islam in the Former Soviet South? ………………… 54 If not Revolutionary Islam, then What? ……………………………………... 58 Regionalism and Iranian Culture ……………………………………………. 61 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………… 62

CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………… 64

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...…………………………………………………… 67

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ………………………………………………………… 71

iv ABSTRACT

Iran’s foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991 serves to show Tehran’s foreign policy shift from revolutionary Islam to realpolitik. The Islamic Republic’s failure to export the Islamic Revolution as well as economic troubles precipitated by the Iran- led Tehran to act with more pragmatism in its foreign policy endeavors after disintegration. The shift to realpolitik reflects Iran’s failure to support revolutionary Islam in Tajikistan as well as tacit support for Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This paper examines the strong role power politics now play in Iran’s foreign policy at the expense of revolutionary Islam, particularly with regards to its relationships with Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Russia.

v INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Republic of Iran and its foreign policy have been of significant interest to policymakers and political theorists alike worldwide since the tumultuous Islamic Revolution that took place in 1979. After the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent sectarian violence spreading throughout that nation, Iran has become the subject of demonization as well as inquiry from both the hardliners and the curious in Western media and governments. Many questions have been circulating around these Western circles. Is Iran advocating violence and instability in the region, or is it simply misunderstood? Does the Islamic Republic seek to establish an Islamic government in her neighbors and consolidate power through religious means? How will Iran’s nuclear energy endeavors affect the West, and is Tehran actively seeking nuclear armament? While this paper does not directly address all of these questions and issues, it does seek to find a particular example of the use of Iranian foreign policy in order to help characterize Tehran’s objectives in geopolitics and to provide a Western audience with an assessment of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in the former Soviet south.1 Foreign policy matters, particularly for a country as complex as the Islamic Republic of Iran, are certainly not written in any codified manual for with a Western audience in mind. Scholars are left with little choice but to observe historical actions taken (or not taken) by the Islamic Republic coupled with government statements with relation to other countries in order to evaluate and predict current Iranian foreign policy. The decision-making process in terms of domestic actors and individuals for foreign policy in Iran is highly confusing, and well outside the capabilities of this paper. Therefore, this paper does not attempt to approach Iran’s foreign policy from the pluralist international relations theory, which is highly dependent upon characterization of key leaders and decision-makers as well as the decision-making process. Instead, this paper approaches Iranian foreign policy from the realist international relations theory, surmising that Iran’s actions in its foreign policy are made by the state as a unified rational actor acting in its own Machiavellian self-interests.

1 The former Soviet south is comprised of the Central Asian and South Caucasian nations that were once part of the USSR and include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, , , Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and .

1 This paper therefore argues that in the particular context of Iranian foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991, Tehran’s decisions have shifted away from the revolutionary Islamic rhetoric2 that characterized its geopolitical stance immediately after the ousting of the Shah in 1979 and toward pragmaticism and decision- making based on realpolitik.3 Furthermore, regionalism4 has been the primary tool that Iran has used in its foreign policy relations with regard to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. To that end, this paper addresses Iranian foreign policy in the former Soviet south in its three most distinguishable facets: security policy, economic/energy policy, and cultural policy. These facets are far from being mutually exclusive; decisions made in one category can and do affect issues in another. While the paper’s approach to understanding Iranian foreign policy categorically separates these facets, every attempt has been made to explain the complex interdependence of the three categories. The first chapter of this paper addresses Iran’s security policy. It shows that the Islamic Republic’s primary concern in its foreign policy in the former Soviet south is its own security. This concern stems from Iran’s experience with its war with Iraq from 1980-1988, and the subsequent aftermath. Examples of Iran’s foreign policy pragmatism in the region are shown through its lack of support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict as well as its support for ex-communist leaders in Tajikistan. Tehran’s actions are further explained by its complex and seemingly subservient regional relations with Russia, as well as connections made between Iran’s security and pursuit of nuclear technology. The second chapter of this paper takes a look at Iranian energy and economic policy. Economic difficulties that occurred as a result of the Iran-Iraq War led to a government policy of , which opened more resources for the Islamic Republic to use in obtaining regional influence in Central Asia and the South

2 The term “revolutionary Islam” is based on the principles set forward by Ayatollah Khomeini in his book Islamic Government, available in English in Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Berkeley, California: Mizan Press, 1981), 27-166.

3 The use of the word “pragmatic” necessitates dependence on realist international theory, and that Iran is indeed acting in its own self-interests. Realpolitik is, of course, politics based on power rather than ideology. “Pragmatic” is the term used in contrast with the concept of “revolutionary Islam.”

4 I define regionalism as an attempt to garner and wield geopolitical power and influence in a particular part of the world (in the case of Iran, the former Soviet south).

2 Caucasus. However, much of the Iranian economy is still heavily vested in its energy production. As such, Tehran takes a realpolitik line on issues such as the delimitation of the Caspian Sea in order to maximize its hydrocarbon production and profits. Furthermore, Iran has attempted to use the regional organizations with which it is involved, particularly the Economic Cooperation Organization, to extend its attempts at regionalism in economic and political influence throughout the former Soviet south. The third and final chapter of this paper addresses the Islamic Republic’s cultural policy. It suggests that Tehran’s cultural objectives in the region (particularly the promotion of its brand of revolutionary Islam) take a significant backseat to its security and economic policies. This is due primarily to Iran’s failure to export the Islamic Revolution to its Persian Gulf neighbors immediately following the departure of the Shah in 1979. Furthermore, the Soviet legacy on the countries of the former Soviet south made them particularly suspicious of Islam used in a political sense, as Soviet cultural policy had a tremendous lasting effect particularly on the Central Asian countries. However, this paper argues that former Soviet republics are quite open to other cultural ties with Iran, especially in terms of promotion of linguistic, historical, and ethnic ties to the Islamic Republic. Iran’s reliance upon realpolitik in its cultural policy is again evidenced by its promotion of regionalism rather than radicalism to promote itself as a center of cultural significance in the region.

3 CHAPTER 1

IRAN’S SECURITY POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s security policy has been a balancing act. Iran was once content to have the United States as a security partner, but the Islamic Revolution led to a change in the security policy of Iran, its foreign relations, and Iranian perceptions of the US and the Soviet Union. Tehran eliminated its ties with the US due not only to the conflict of interest with fundamentalist Islam, but also because of the strong relationship the previous regime, under the strong-handed government of the Shah, had with the United States. This sentiment aroused the passions of students loyal to the Islamic ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, and they overran the US Embassy in Tehran. From November 4, 1979 until September 20, 1980, these students kept the American staff of the embassy as hostages.5 Likely due to extreme actions such as these, after the Islamic Revolution Iran’s list of allies became shorter and shorter as their list of potential enemies became longer and longer. The most immediate result of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the threat that Iran’s Gulf neighbors perceived. The rhetoric of the Islamic Revolution espoused an encompassing Islam that would unite the oppressed peoples of the world into one community of solidarity. The Iranians supported Islamic movements throughout the Middle East, and denounced what they interpreted as corruption in countries that supported Western policies in the region.6 In turn, the elite rulers of these pro-Western Middle Eastern countries were threatened by what they saw as radical Islamists explicitly calling for an overthrow of their respective regimes.7 This perceived threat was manifested as neighboring Iraq launched an attack against Iran in a war that lasted from 1980 until 1988.

5 Shireen Hunter, Iran After Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 110-111.

6 Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 8.

7 Behrouz Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War (Plainview, NY: Guinan, 1989), 40.

4 Byman et al point to two distinguishing motivations for Iran’s security policy: revolutionary Islam and nationalism.8 Revolutionary Islam provided an ideology for the defense of Islamic interests, while nationalistic pride provided a history of Persian/Iranian involvement in regional agenda setting in the Middle East. Both led to an inevitable clash with great powers and regional actors alike; revolutionary Islam created an irreparable rift with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq, while nationalism reinforced the need for Iranian superiority in the region and garnered national support for open hostilities with Iraq. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s security policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus today is a direct result of its experiences during and after its war with Iraq. Tehran’s policy immediately following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was to export the Revolution to surrounding nations. However, this caused regional instability as it failed to take root in the Gulf and turned Iran’s neighbors against the Islamic Republic. Tehran found itself increasingly isolated as its Islamic neighbors allied with Iraq. This in turn forced Iran to become more self-reliant and to attempt to expand ties with the Soviet Union. Iran’s wartime experience opened the door to pragmatic security policy decision making based on realpolitik rather than revolutionary Islamic ideology. Iran began to implement its new security policies after it concluded its war with Iraq, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union posed the first opportunity for the Islamic Republic to put them into action in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The challenges of both the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict as well as the Tajikistani civil war reinforced Tehran’s security decisions based on realpolitik. Despite the many opportunities to support revolutionary Islamic rhetoric during these conflicts, Iran instead elected to base its decisions on pragmatism. While this pragmatism developed as a result of Iran’s lengthy war with Iraq, it was reinforced by its understanding of its relationship with Russia and its related economic posturing. The Soviet Union developed a relationship with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and its importance to the Islamic Republic as a trading partner increased as time passed. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia established itself as the most significant military power in the region, and Iran was forced to make its own security

8 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 8-10.

5 decisions with Russia in mind. Iran’s relationship with Russia after 1991 as well as its economic and energy concerns reinforced the realpolitik of its security policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Iran’s Ideological Warfare

Post-Revolutionary Iran‘s greatest national security policy influences came from its involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Revolutionary Islamic rhetoric surmised that surrounding Islamic countries would naturally support Iran. However, instead of Middle Eastern countries showing Islamic solidarity and support for the Islamic Republic, the Gulf nations almost unanimously supported secular Iraq; Arab nationalism as well as the limited appeal of a Shi’ite Islamic Revolution for Sunni Muslims played a significant role in the Gulf nations’ support for Iraq.9 Iran was supported regionally only by Libya and Syria, with the latter supplying arms in an attempt to counter Iraq’s initiatives.10 This lack of support led the Islamic Republic to believe that its protection could be guaranteed only through its own self-sufficiency. Tehran’s security policy was highly influenced by this realization: “self-reliance and domestic arms production,” rather than support from other countries, were the means of which to protect Iran from invasion and attack.11 Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War, in which few outside powers came to the assistance of the Islamic Republic, showed Tehran that any security guarantees made for the country would have to be provided by the country itself. Tehran initially saw the Iran-Iraq War through the eyes of revolutionary Islam. The rhetoric propagated by the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini resonated with the idealism of the religious movements that put him into power. The conflict escalated as Khomeini and other religious leaders promoted the export of the Islamic Revolution to the surrounding Muslim countries, particularly the predominantly Shi’ite

9 Barry Rubin, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed. E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 121.

10 Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 47.

11 Edmund Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 5.

6 Iraq, where it was likely to be accepted.12 This rhetoric threatened the leadership of most predominantly Islamic countries in the region; this was certainly the case with Saddam Hussein. Hussein had obtained control of the country by means of the Ba'ath party: a party that was secular in nature and had members of varying religious organizations.13 Hussein feared that the religious rhetoric promoted by Khomeini could have a destabilizing effect not only on his regime, but on the region as a whole. However, he also saw the government of Iran as weak, though growing in strength. In 1980, when Hussein perceived that the revolutionary government of Iran to be incapable of defending itself sufficiently, he launched an attack against Iran to counter Iranian attempts at subversion of his rule via the Kurdish and Shi’a opposition.14 For its part, Iran supported the idea of war with Iraq at the onset of the conflict. Tehran believed that its revolutionary Islam was stronger than the atheism of Hussein's Ba'athist Party and thought that the war with Iraq would solidify that. It was the sincere belief amid the revolutionary fervor that God was granting Iran an opportunity to spread the Islamic Revolution to the world. A war with Iraq would topple the irreligious government of Hussein and allow a more religious government to come into power in the country. Iranian support for the war was based on this idealism; thousands of Iranians volunteered for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to bring the Islamic Revolution to Iraq.15 The Iran-Iraq War did not go entirely as the Islamic Republic’s leaders had planned. Iran’s failure in the war led to significant developments in its national security policy. One such development was an understanding of the importance of a professional standing military. Both Iran and Iraq lost hundreds of thousands of men in the violence. Some estimates put Iran’s losses at about 400,000 to 500,000 men, many of whom were idealistic volunteers with the IRGC. One of the reasons the losses were so high on the

12 Efraim Karsh, “The Islamic Republic and the Gulf,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed. E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 29.

13 Monte Palmer, The Politics of the Middle East (Belmont, California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 229- 230.

14 Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 36-37.

15 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 34.

7 Iranian side was due to a lack of an effective professional military.16 Many of the officers of the military (Artesh) under the Shah were forced to resign or were prosecuted under the Revolutionary Courts. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps became a de facto replacement for the Artesh, although the latter was not completely dismantled. The officers of the IRGC were oftentimes promoted to leadership positions not as a result of military prominence or ability, but rather because of their character or reputation as a good Muslim. In terms of military capabilities, this formula proved to have disastrous consequences for Iran. As Byman et al. point out, …the failure of Iran to translate its ideological fervor into military success undermined the idea that military power counted for little, that professional military forces were unnecessary, that revolutionary ardor mattered more than professionalism, and that military hardware was unimportant.17

Iran’s lack of military success through its promotion of revolutionary Islam during the Iran-Iraq War led Tehran to an understanding that military professionalism was more valuable in conflict than revolutionary rhetoric. The Islamic Republic came to determine that troops were more valuable defending Iran’s security interests than they were attempting to export the Islamic Revolution. Another security policy attitude developed as a result of the Iran-Iraq War was that of self-reliance. Iran believed that all devout Muslims would rally to their cause and support the spread of the Islamic Revolution. Indeed, Tehran thought that in the particular case of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s majority Shi’a population would rise up, take arms against Hussein’s government, and welcome the Iranian Islamists. However, Arab nationalism and the power that Hussein wielded in Iraq proved to be a more profound motivation for the Iraqi armed forces than the allure of revolutionary Islam.18 Furthermore, most leaders of other countries in the Arab world (excluding Syria and Libya) threw their logistical, military, and moral support behind Iraq; the fear of the spread of an Iranian-style theocracy was a significant factor for relatively irreligious

16 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities & Impact (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 17.

17 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 36.

18 Charles Tripp, “The Iran-Iraq War and Iraqi Politics,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed. E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 64, 67.

8 autocrats in the region to provide this support for Iraq. Additionally, the cooperation of Syria with Iran was based more on an anti-Iraq policy rather than ideology; Syria, like Iraq, was a secular Ba’athist dictatorship, while Iran was an Islamic Republic.19 Iran therefore was unable to count on ideological breakthroughs in the region to provide allies in its security policy agenda. This, coupled with the loss of the United States as an ally and weapons provider, meant that the best military option in the long run would be for Tehran to produce their own weapons and munitions. During the war with Iraq, however, Iran was wholly incapable of doing so; industry had been crippled by internal politics and continued Iraqi raids, and human resources were limited as men were needed on the front line. Although military self-reliance remained a desired goal for Iran, it had to wait until it was realistic to do so. In the meantime, Tehran pursued a more immediate solution to its armament and equipment problems. A softening of relations with the USSR was another security policy developed as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. This was a significant turn to pragmatism that was incorporated into Iran’s security policy after the war. Ideologically, the USSR was denounced as the “lesser satan”20 for its official policies regarding religion, as the atheism of the USSR was incompatible with Iran’s revolutionary Islam. However, Iran’s lengthy war with Iraq brought a tempering of this ideological stance to the forefront of security policy. Under the Shah, the United States had been the predominant supplier of all things military for Iran: weapons, ammunition, aircraft, naval vessels, and even some military training. When ties with the United States were severed, the Islamic Republic also lost its primary source of military goods. Conflict with Iraq lasted longer than Iran’s leaders expected, and equipment originally from the United States was constantly in need of repair. Tehran needed a new supplier of arms, parts, military vehicles, and technology since it cut ties with its old source, and was incapable of producing its own. Harsh realities in terms of military necessity caused a significant shift in Iranian security policy from ideological revolutionary Islam to cold realpolitik. Iran found a more willing supplier of arms and technology in the USSR, and could not afford (in terms of national security) to place the idealism and rhetoric of its revolutionary Islam before its security

19 Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 47-48.

20 The United States, of course, was classified as the “great satan.”

9 needs. The softening of relations between the USSR and Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, therefore, did not take place due to a Soviet embrace of Islamic ideals. Rather, it took place as a result of Tehran’s realpolitik security need for a new supplier of replacement parts, arms, vehicles, and ammunition in its war against Iraq. Regardless of the rhetoric spouted by Iran’s official state mouthpiece, Iran acted with pragmatism. The Islamic Republic’s conflict with Iraq showed the Iranians first-hand the consequences of its inability to secure itself. The internal instability perceived by Saddam Hussein coupled with revolutionary rhetoric coming from Tehran gave Hussein enough confidence to attack Iran in a war in which hundreds of thousands of lives were lost on both sides of the front. Instability cost Iran more than lives, though, as it also crippled the economic capabilities of Iran’s industry. The lack of an effective security policy also meant that Iran was no longer free to pursue its ideological pursuits, as realpolitik demanded that ideology be sacrificed to maintain national security. Iran’s national security policy today owes much to the lessons learned from its war with Iraq; understanding the need for professionalism in all branches of the military,21 abandoning idealistic revolutionary Islam for realpolitik necessities, and the need for self-reliance in military production are all security policy lessons learned and retained from Iran’s war with Iraq. The security policy changes made as a result of the Iran-Iraq War essentially came to light after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Disintegration and New Realities

While tensions were running high in the Soviet Union (particularly in the Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia) from 1988 until Soviet disintegration in 1991, Iran took the initiative to show support for the Soviet Union. This was a direct result of Iran’s eight-year-long conflict with Iraq, which ended on July 18, 1988 as Iran officially announced it would abide by the UN Security Council Resolution 598 passed in 1987, which called for the cessation of hostilities.22 Iran desperately needed to repair its economy, reduce unemployment, and improve the living conditions for its population to

21 Particularly, the IRGC was in most need of professionalism in order to increase its effectiveness against the enemy and to reduce casualties.

22 Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 77.

10 quell potential or real discontent toward the Revolutionary regime. Iran’s President Rafsanjani was given unprecedented access to Baku, where he spoke in a local mosque urging restraint for ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. Experiences of the war with Iraq taught Iranian security policymakers that instability in areas surrounding Iran were a threat to Iran’s national security.23 The 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union brought new security policy realities to Iran. With the experience of the Iran-Iraq War behind them, Iran’s security policy largely abandoned the revolutionary Islamic ideology in favor of realpolitik decisions; this is due not only to Iran’s experiences in the war, but also to the death of Ayatollah Komeini who, as Shireen Hunter notes, “though capable of pragmatism and realism, was perhaps the only true revolutionary within the Iranian leadership.”24 Disintegration of the Soviet Union, in terms of geographic change, gave Iran a shared border with three countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) where there once was only the Soviet Union. The lack of Soviet domination of the region of the former Soviet south (Central Asia and the South Caucasus) created a new power vacuum in the area. As in the past, Tehran saw the inevitability that this power vacuum would be filled by a great power which would impose their model on the area.25 Iran’s security policy was such that it sought to fill that power vacuum in order to limit destabilization on its borders that had the potential to spill over into the Islamic Republic. The new perception of a power vacuum meant that destabilization in the region was a very strong likelihood; this new reality with which to be concerned demanded Iran’s attention. In fact, Iran’s primary concern for its security policy was the ethnic and political violence that took place in the former Soviet Union in years following its disintegration, as Iran itself consists of many minority populations in nearby potential breakaway regions. In particular, Iran was concerned with ethnic violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the civil war in Tajikistan. Iran’s security policy for these countries focused on the need for stability in the region for a number of reasons, including economic markets, ethnic factors within its own borders, regional stability, and

23 Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy, 3-5.

24 Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 108.

25 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 11.

11 national pride. Iran’s national security policy in these conflicts shows that the Islamic Republic acted in terms of realpolitik rather than revolutionary Islam.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Iran’s Experience in the South Caucasus

Armenia and Azerbaijan both share a border with Iran’s northwest, and began fighting each other even before the Soviet Union disintegrated. The area of contention between the two countries was an enclave known as “Nagorno-Karabakh,” a mountainous region of Azerbaijan that had a predominantly ethnic Armenian population. Iran originally viewed the conflict as an intrastate problem for the Soviet Union to solve, but after Soviet disintegration it developed into an international regional issue that included Iran.26 The destabilized region caused significant alarm for Iranian leaders, specifically in terms of “the burgeoning of the Azerbaijani nationalist movement, with its direct appeals to Iran’s Azerbaijanis and, in January 1990, publicized violation of the Irano-Soviet border.”27 Even before the onset of independence for the former Soviet nations, Iran had serious concerns regarding its territorial integrity and minorities within its borders. The bulk of the threat that Iran perceived in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan came from its co-religionists in Azerbaijan. Azeris constitute a substantial minority in Iran, with ten to twenty million Azeris living in the country.28 With the advent of Azerbaijani independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, some ethnic Azeris living on the north side of the border with Iran began to call for an integration with Azeris living in Iran; this was certainly the rhetoric of the Azerbaijani Popular Front leader, Abulfaz Elchibey.29 Furthermore, the successes of the Armenians in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict led to a large flow of Azeri refugees to the more stable northern Iran

26 The full scale of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is beyond the capabilities of this paper. For a more detailed account of the causes and results of the conflict, see M. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998).

27 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 16.

28 Ibid, 26.

29 Ibid, 27.

12 where co-ethnic minority Azeris reside.30 As the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 effectively destroyed the Iranian economy, Iran was certainly in no position to accommodate a sudden influx of refugees that could further destabilize an already disgruntled local population. While it is clear that Iran wanted a cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, its underlying motives may not have been limited to a “spillover” effect of the conflict. Rather, Iran viewed with suspicion any movement that sought to destabilize its own minority populations through a nationalist movement.31 As Byman et al note, “Tehran fears that the disintegration of neighboring states and the assertiveness of their ethnic groups could create models for Iran’s own potentially restive communities.”32 While Iran certainly wanted to keep refugees out of its borders, it was more inclined to fear an uprising of (traditionally mistreated) ethnic minorities than population shifts. As such, Iranian security policy dictated a certain amount of pragmatism when dealing with the Shi’ite Islamic country and her Christian neighbor. Though the idealism of Iran’s revolutionary Islam called for the unity of Muslims worldwide under the banner of Islam, Iran’s dealings in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict reflected a more practical line in terms of security policy. Instead of unconditional support for their fellow Shi’a Muslims in Azerbaijan, Iran largely attempted to remain unbiased in their endeavors to create a peace between the parties in order to avoid any potential destabilization of its own borders. As more Azerbaijani refugees flooded Iran’s border areas, Iran issued threats against Armenia that it would physically intervene if necessary; when the flow of Azerbaijani refugees slowed, Iran acted to circumvent the Azerbaijani-Turkish embargo against Armenia.33

30 Mohammad Atai, “Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia,” in Iran and Eurasia, eds. A. Mohammadi and A. Ehteshami, (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 2000), 116.

31 Azeris are not the only ethnic minority in Iran. Other minorities include Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds, Baluch Mazandarani, Jews, and Christians. See Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 13. Any attempt by one minority population to gain autonomy or independence may, the Iranians fear, lead to a cascading effect among all its minorities.

32 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 78.

33 See ibid, 79 and S. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 20 no.4 (1997): 15.

13 Iran’s security policy did not immediately classify Christian Armenia as a threat to their national security as their revolutionary Islamic rhetoric might have dictated; instead, the more pragmatic realpolitik line was taken with regard to the Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict. When Iran perceived a threat to its security by an influx of Azerbaijani refugees, it acted not with its revolutionary Islam in mind when it threatened Armenia. Instead, Tehran acted but with a realist international policy to prevent destabilization of the region. Contrary to what might be expected in terms of Iran’s revolutionary Islamic rhetoric, Iran acted against the wishes of Azerbaijan as it circumvented the embargo against Armenia for realpolitik purposes.

Religion and Atheism Collide in Central Asia: the Iranian Response to Tajikistan’s Civil War

As mentioned above, Iran’s centrality in Central Eurasia means that it in security terms, it is quite vulnerable to regional conflicts. Like the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, the civil war in Tajikistan was considered a threat by Iran to the stability of its regime. Also like the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, the Tajikistani Civil War had one side that was predominantly Islamic. Unlike the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, though, the conflict was limited to a single state and was political rather than ethnic. Iran reacted to the threat posed by the Tajikistani Civil War not with increased revolutionary Islamic rhetoric, but with the calculated pragmatism characterized by Iran’s security policy after the Iran-Iraq War. Iran announced, in fact, that it had “no desire to export revolution to Tajikistan or to interfere in its internal affairs.”34 The two major parties to the Tajikistani Civil War were the former Communist Party leaders that sought power after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Islamic Coalition that had gained control of the nation. Tajikistan did not have the natural resources or wealth of Azerbaijan; its importance to Iran was very much along cultural

34 Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 32.

14 lines.35 Tajik as a language is very similar to Farsi spoken in Iran, and there are many Persian cultural ties between Iran and Tajikistan. Although the Muslims in Tajikistan are predominantly Sunni and the Muslims in Iran are predominantly Shi’a, language and cultural ties between the two countries were sufficient to make Tajikistan a “responsibility” for Iran.36 The civil conflict that erupted in Tajikistan, therefore, expected to see large scale support of Iran for Tajikistan’s Islamists against the ex- communists. While vocal and moral support was given from Iran to the Islamists in Tajikistan, there was no show of force by Iran’s military apparatus against the ex- communists, nor was there any tacit transfer of arms or logistical support from Iran to the Islamists. Tajikistan’s ex-communists were quick to demonize the Tajikistani Islamists as fundamentalist in nature although all indications tend to point to the contrary: the Islamists were largely moderates. Furthermore, they were a conglomeration of both Islamic leaders as well as secular intellectuals, and they simply desired a more religious and ethical government. Nevertheless, the fear of a fundamentalist Islamic government in Tajikistan roused suspicion among surrounding Central Asian nations that disruptions could arise from their own Muslim populations, and that this would threaten their respective authoritarian regimes. Additionally, “the excesses carried out by that regime alienated a great number of …”37 Simply put, the existence of a religious regime in power in Tajikistan, regardless of the level of religiosity/fundamentalism, posed a perceived threat to the stability of the region. The attacks launched by the ex-communist forces, therefore, were not viewed with wide contempt throughout the Central Asian region. Russia, the major power player in the former Soviet sphere, voiced its support for the ex-communist opposition to the democratic rule of the Islamists; Uzbekistan did likewise. Initially, Iran voiced some criticism towards Russia’s support of the ex-communists, but quickly backed down.38 As

35 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 119.

36 Ibid, 119.

37 Atai, “Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia,” 117.

15 Mesbahi notes, “in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, the fight against Islamic fundamentalism was the critical factor that brought together a variety of domestic, regional, and international actors.”39 The Islamists, though democratically elected in Tajikistan, were becoming increasingly unpopular within their own country, and the opposition ex-communists were instrumental in uniting large portions of the population of that nation against the Islamists. Although Iran’s first reaction was to support the ideological revolutionary Islam, it acted so as to protect its realpolitik interests instead. Ideology spoke to Tehran’s revolutionary dedication to a worldwide community governed by Islam; pragmatism spoke against fanning the flames of an already unstable situation. Any tacit support for the Islamists would run quite contrary to Iran’s security policy. Regional stability would decrease as Central Asian countries, and more importantly, Russia, would oppose any moves made by Iran to support the Islamists in Tajikistan. Russia, as a regional power, poses a more significant existential threat to the Islamic Republic if it opposes Russian policy than any secular regime in Tajikistan. As more weight was assigned to realpolitik necessity than religious rhetoric, Iran certainly acted with pragmatism in its attempt to bring peace and reconciliation to Tajikistan, at the expense of a lack of support for its Muslim counterparts in the country.

The “Other” Neighbor to the North: Russia’s Impact on Iranian Security Policy

Iran’s security decisions and actions in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and the Tajikistani civil war were greatly influenced by Russia. The geographic proximity of Russia to Iran, its great size, its nuclear power, and its past history of involvement with Iran points to an inevitable impact of the Russians on Iran's Security Policy. As Herzig points out, “for the past two centuries the greatest threat to the security and territorial integrity of Iran has been posed by the and its successor the Soviet Union.”40 Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was clear that the

38 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 31.

39 Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 123-124.

40 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 1.

16 USSR was the single great power in the region. It was checked in power only by the United States, and both nations held their spheres of influence across the world. Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran was a proxy of the United States; it received weaponry, military advise, and technology from the United States to counter Soviet influence in the region. After the Islamic Revolution, however, Iran stepped away from the influence of the United States. The USSR was unable to sway a suspicious Iran toward its camp after the Islamic Revolution: Iran's leaders were adamantly against the atheism that the Soviet Union officially sponsored.41 Ayatollah Khomeini announced that Iran would be “neither East nor West,” but would follow its own ideology of an Islamic Republic.42 The eight year long war with Iraq changed the relationship between the USSR and Iran. As mentioned above, Iran was in desperate need of a supplier of arms, technology, and replacement parts for their vehicles. The United States cut ties with the Islamic Republic following the US Embassy hostage crisis, so Iran had little choice but to turn to communist countries like North Korea, and eventually the USSR itself to obtain these supplies. Although the USSR posed a great threat to Iran's security, Tehran’s most pressing existential threat at the time was the war with Iraq; therefore, the USSR became involved in supplying the Islamic Republic with weaponry, and posed less of a perceived threat to Iran as it essentially supported Tehran's efforts against Iraq. For its part, Iran was not perceived as much of a threat to the Soviet Union because it systematically rejected the influence of the United States and was kept weak by the war with Iraq. The USSR's regional power remained uncontested, and it seemed content to profit by providing weapons to the Iranians. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained an important regional player, and Iran's security policy remained contingent on the actions of the great power to the north. Although nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan initially posed a threat to the Islamic Republic, President Nazarbayev opted to have these weapons removed from his country to storage in the United States and Russia.43 As Russia maintained its stock of nuclear

41 Yahya Noori, Islamic Government and the Revolution in Iran (Glasgow, Scotland: Royston Limited, 1985), 37.

42 David Menashri, “Iran: Doctrine and Reality,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed. E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 54-55.

17 weapons, it remained a global power and the strongest authority in the region. Russia also remained an important source of technology and weapons for Iran. Despite American efforts to politically and economically isolate Iran from the rest of the world, Russia has retained open trade and generally good relations with Iran. Iran's security policy, therefore, tends to act in favor of Russia when it is presented with a conflict of interests. For example, Russia's war with Chechnya in the presented an ideological conflict of interests for the Iranians. The model of revolutionary Islam calls for the support of oppressed Islamic peoples throughout the world; however, the realpolitik necessities of the Iranian state recognize the military superiority of Russia. Russia is also a major trading partner with Iran, and Iran must keep this relationship in tact; any criticism of its handling of the Chechen rebellion must be kept diluted, and open support for the Chechens avoided. Russia also has a hand in Iran's security policy through the use of stationing its troops throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus to maintain border integrity of the former Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional organization that consists of members of the Former Soviet Union and maintains a peacekeeping force. This force is largely made up of Russian troops, and its use is predominantly for Russian foreign policy purposes.44 As all of Central Asia and Azerbaijan have Muslim majority populations, Russia initially feared that Iranian involvement in the region would attempt to bring fundamentalist Islam to the former Soviet republics. As such, Russia positioned itself as the dominant force in the region, and used CIS troops to posture a containment of any threat posed by Iran. For its part, Iran identifies the need for stability above all in the region, and recognizes the ability of Russia to maintain that stability. The reality is that both Russia and Iran benefit from the relationship they have with each other.

43 Atai, “Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia,” 112-113. Although Kazakhstan would have been a nuclear power, Atai notes that possible sanctions against Kazakhstan could have taken place as a result of its proliferation. Given that Kazakhstan was in need of economic assistance following the collapse of the communist apparatus in the country, it was within Nazarbayev's best interests to rid his country of nuclear arms.

44 For background on the role Russian peace keepers play in the CIS and promoting their own foreign policy, see Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan (Houndmills, England: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

18 Geographically and geopolitically, Iran enjoys a unique position in both the CIS and the Persian Gulf and can utilise this for a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia by a long-term realistic policy geared to the improvement of security in the region...45

As Iran benefits from Russian border security guarantees, Russia benefits from cultural influence and stability provided by Iran to Central Asia.46 Russia's dominance in the region serves to reinforce the practical nature of Iran's security policy since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Realpolitik dictates for Iran that overt opposition to Russia's dominance in a military sense would not be beneficial to the Islamic Republic. Having fought a brutal war for eight years based on idealism rather than realpolitik, Iran understands the dangers of upsetting the great power to its north. Furthermore, Iran receives benefits from its relationship with Russia; isolation from the world is avoided, new technology is received, and its borders with the Former Soviet Union are guaranteed. Iran is far from the early days of the Islamic Revolution when the Soviet Union was denounced as the 'lesser satan;' instead, Russia is today seen as an important impact player in Iran's security policy.

Energy, Economy, and Security Converge in Iran

Iran’s realpolitik decision making with regard to its involvement in regional conflicts as well as its deference to Russia in security decisions stem from Tehran’s economic posturing. Realpolitik in Iran's security policy can be attributed to its energy and economic situation, which are inevitably intertwined, as the Islamic Republic's economy is heavily dependent upon its vast sums of oil reserves and refineries. During its war with Iraq in the late 1980s, the price of oil dipped, and Iran found itself strapped for cash. This experience led Iran to the realization that a diversification of its economy was necessary for the longevity of the regime.47 Tehran's need for the diversification of

45 Gholam-Reza Sabri-Tabrizi, “Chechnya and the Impact of the Chechen Conflict on Russia, the CIS and Iran,” in Iran and Eurasia, eds. A. Mohammadi and A. Ehteshami (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 2000), 178.

45 Ibid, 177.

47 Though beyond the scope of this paper, longevity of a democratic-style government is often tied to economic performance. See Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of : Economic

19 its economy has led to a desire for a more sustainable and renewable form of energy: nuclear energy. Iran has found a willing partner for its nuclear endeavors in Russia. Russia's export of technology has made it possible for Iran to pursue development of its nuclear power plants and uranium enrichment. The benefit to Russia is simply monetary; Iran sees the arrangement as investment into its own infrastructure as well as a means by which to switch to a more sustainable energy source. The move toward nuclear energy is not without consequence, though, and these consequences have implications for Iran's security policy. Iran's current president, Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, as well as its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, have voiced their determination to bring nuclear energy and its benefits to Iran. The former has also launched severe criticism of Israel, calling for the disintegration of the state. As such, the West in general, and the United States in particular, fears that Iran's move to acquire nuclear energy also means that the nation will pursue nuclear armament. They believe that such a move might indeed be beneficial for Iran's security, as it would allow for the Islamic Republic to position itself against Israel and be on the short list of nuclear powers in the world; it would also feed into Iran's nationalistic pride, which asserts the historic power of the Persian Empire. In a regional context, however, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons would not serve its realist security policy interests. While gaining nuclear weapons would immediately serve to counter the influence of Russia in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, a new dynamic of instability would be introduced into the relationship between Russia and Iran. After nearly two decades of pragmatism, it seems unlikely that a return to revolutionary ideology would take place. This is not to say that Iran would not seek a nuclear weapon once its nuclear energy prospects were in place; rather, nuclear energy is the primary nuclear objective that Iran actively and openly seeks. If Tehran later develops nuclear weaponry as a result, that is simply a bonus. In the context of its most recent decision making process, Tehran’s security policy would be characterized as lacking pragmatism if it attempted nuclear armament; it would

Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 no.1 (1959): 69-105, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49 no.2 (1997): 155-183, and Bernhard et al, “Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival,” Journal of Politics 63 no.3 (2001): 775-803.

20 be in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran ratified, and the Islamic Republic would certainly be subject to economic sanctions that would not be in its best interests. Iran is in desperate need of economic vitalization after its long conflict with Iraq, and is unlikely to follow the course of North Korea and invest in nuclear bomb making that could cause ten to fifteen years of economic regression, instead of pursuing economic investment.48 Furthermore, overt pursuit of nuclear armament would likely isolate rather than gather Iran's former Soviet south neighbors around it. As shown by the example of Kazakhstan's president Nazarbayev, these countries are willing to do away with the prospects of nuclear weapons in order to maintain regional stability. Iran needs more economic partners rather than rivals, more friends than enemies, and more stability than revolution. Although the assumption that the pursuit of nuclear energy can lead to a pursuit of nuclear armament is a valid assumption, it is unlikely that Iran would seek such a destabilization of the region, given its adherence to realpolitik pragmatism in lieu of idealism in its security policy.

Conclusion

Iran's security policy began in 1979 heavily influenced by revolutionary Islam and nationalism. At the onset of the Islamic Republic, these two influences led to a great deal of idealism in its security policy, as a unified Muslim community was to be supported against totalitarian regimes and exploitation by the West. This rhetoric served to isolate Iran in the geopolitical realm: the West, the USSR, and the Gulf states all felt threatened by the notion of Iran's exportation of the Islamic Revolution, and the impact that would have on their respective spheres of influence. This idealism and sense of adventurism49 drew Iran into a long conflict with its secular neighbor, Iraq. When revolutionary fervor failed to translate into military success for the Islamic Republic, a new security policy had to be envisioned. The Iran-Iraq War

48 Heidar Ali Balouji, “The process of national security decision making in Iran: the signing of the Additional Protocol,” in Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-Proliferation, ed Shannon Kile, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 77-78.

49 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era.

21 led to the development of a more professional military, a need for economic recovery, and most significantly, regional stability to accommodate these goals. Realpolitik pragmatism over revolutionary idealism is the most significant characteristic of Iran's security policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991. Pragmatism led to Iran's support of the ex-communist regime in Tajikistan, and its lack of unconditional support for Azerbaijan's Shi'ite Muslims. The need for stability in these neighboring states far outweighs any pan-Islamic pursuits that may be desired by the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, realpolitik necessities are what drive Iran's security policy with regard to Russia. It accepts CIS protection of former Soviet Union borders, and avoids involvement in Russia's internal actions against some of its Muslim population. Tehran realizes that Russia poses a more significant existential threat to its security than a lack of promotion of revolutionary Islam in neighboring countries; it therefore acts in its security policy accordingly as it defers its revolutionary Islam to Russian foreign policy interests. This trend of pragmatism should be noted when evaluating Iran's current row with the West regarding its nuclear program. Although idealistic revolutionary Islam has an important part in the history of Iran's security policy, Tehran has since the war with Iraq systematically embraced realpolitik decision making at the expense of its revolutionary Islam. Pragmatism rather than revolutionary Islam will likely continue to define Iranian security policy in the near future as it has in its recent past.

22 CHAPTER 2

IRAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE FORMER SOVIET SOUTH

Iran’s economic policy is a subset of its foreign policy that is almost inseparable from its security and social policies. The economic policy leftover from the Shah’s reign had a great deal of impact on the Islamic Republic’s economic policy, especially in terms of foreign investment and multinational corporation domination. One particular aspect of Iran’s economic policy since the Revolution has been that of defiance to the United States. It became institutionalized under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Komeini, as defiance to the United States was one of the trademark policies that brought the Islamists to power. Trade ties with the United States have since been severed, and Iran continues to view American multinational corporations as damaging and exploitative of the Iranian people. However, after the death of Khomeini and the disintegration of the USSR, foreign investment on the part of other countries into Iran has been deregulated to an extent, and the capabilities of Iranian foreign investment abroad have increased. As such, Iran’s economy is increasing in terms of its capabilities to have an affect on foreign policy. Economic policies have become the backbone of Iranian foreign policy since 1991 that supports engagement rather than isolation on a global scale, promotes regional cooperation and economic integration, and seeks to limit Western (particularly American) involvement in the region. Iran’s economic policy since 1991 in Central Asia and the South Caucasus has its roots in Iranian involvement in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and its immediate aftermath. The realities of war and the severe economic strain placed on the country led to an increased emphasis on the part of the government toward developing a more liberalized economic policy. This liberalization allowed for foreign investment and increased the capabilities of the Iranian economy to put forth efforts and resources into obtaining regional influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus after the break up of the Soviet Union.

23 Although some diversification of industry has taken place since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, most of Iran’s economy is heavily dependent upon its oil revenues.50 At the same time, some of the former Soviet states are also beginning to develop their economies based on energy resources as well. Most of the economic contact made between the Islamic Republic and the former Soviet south, therefore, is based on energy trade and development of energy infrastructure. Much of the politics that develop in terms of economic agreements occur in the oil-rich Caspian Sea region, but also set Iran on a collision course at times with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The influence of Russia in Tehran’s economic policy is evident as well. Russia remains the most powerful country in what it can offer the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus as well as regional hegemony. In its current economic state, the Islamic Republic is incapable of supplanting Russia’s influence in the region, and must play second-fiddle to its giant neighbor to the north. Iran must be careful not to upset the Russian domination of the former Soviet south, for fear of the great economic consequences it would have on the Islamic republic. Tehran stands a great deal to lose, in terms of its security policy as much of its arms and technologies are received from Russia. Any economic policy, trade concerns, infrastructure development or investment on the part of Iran, therefore, must take Russian interests into consideration. Despite this, Iran does have regional aspirations of its own, and Tehran has begun to offer an alternative to Russian power via the Economic Cooperation Organization: a regional organization that has the potential to develop into a more inclusive organization that can challenge the Russian CIS.51

50 Nasser Karimi, “Iran refuses to budge under pressure, announcing missile tests as Ahmadinejad dismisses economy criticism,” Associated Press Worldstream, (2007) [on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, (accessed 22 January 2007).

51 Shireen Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 148-149.

24 Iran, Iraq, and the Emergence of Economic Importance

At the onset of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, economic issues were not of utmost importance to the incoming regime. Ayatollah Khomeini, Hunter notes, found economics to be unimportant in the grand scheme of things.52 Khomeini thought that implementation of a Revolutionary Islamic regime would eventually lead to a classless society where greater importance would be placed on piety rather than salary. Khomeini was unaware at the time of the Revolution of how much Iran’s devastating eight-year long war with neighboring Iraq would take its toll on the Iranian economy and how much it would have an affect on the surrounding political and social landscape. The war with Iraq shifted industry and caused attention to be drawn to the effects of economic performance on society and foreign relations. The locations of initial attacks made by Iraq in 1980 were significant targets of economic importance; the province of Khuzestan in the south of the country was home to “port facilities, steel factories, oil refineries, and petrochemical complexes”53 which were repeatedly attacked by Iraqi forces. Infrastructure, such as roads and fixed assets such as industrial machinery and buildings, were destroyed and caused significant setbacks to the Iranian economy. Potential growth in the economy was also prevented by the destruction of Iranian industry, compounded by the opportunity cost of pumping potential profit-making industrial resources into the war machine and shifting labor from the economic to the security sphere. Additionally, Hunter notes that the Iran-Iraq War marked a significant increase of Iranian government involvement with the nation’s economy; she notes that this led to an unwillingness of domestic investment into “productive activities” that could have stimulated economic growth during the war.54 Reconstruction of Iranian industry also became a point of contention, as limited resources had to be allocated to the reconstruction of certain industries at the expense of others. Should funds be first devoted toward the security apparatus to prevent another

52 Shireen Hunter, Iran After Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 59.

53 Hooshang Amirahmadi, “Economic Costs of the War and the Reconstruction in Iran,” in Modern Capitalism and Islamic Ideology in Iran, eds. C. Bina and H. Zangeneh, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 258.

54 Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 65.

25 attack akin to the likes of Saddam’s approach, or should funds be distributed to repair the crippled oil industry? The post-war economic approach taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran would reflect as well as have an influence on its foreign policy concerns. The path chosen for reconstruction has been stimulation of the national economy in order to produce more jobs and to stabilize prices.55 The ramifications for poor economic performance for almost a decade during the Iran-Iraq War are felt through the pulse of the Islamic Republic’s youth. Almost two- thirds of Iran’s 70 million people are under the age of 30 due largely to the estimated 300,000 casualties of the war; 56 unemployment, though listed officially at around 10%, is believed by many to be as high as 30%57. Iran’s population, therefore, can be characterized as young and unemployed. The economy is about 80% controlled by the government, and many of the young educated professionals without jobs place blame on the government for their lack of economic opportunities.58 As Byman et al point out, the lack of economic success in the Islamic Republic has led the youth of the country to feel more and more alienated and abandoned by its government; “the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is now based in large part on what it can deliver economically.”59 The Iranian government is experiencing an increasing demand on behalf of its young population to perform economically; religious rhetoric is not able to supplant the need for jobs for a growingly disenfranchised population. Iran's domestic problems regarding disenfranchisement and alienation of its youth push over into foreign relations as well. As Hunter rightly notes, “the many unemployed youth could become a very serious liability for the regime because they could be

55 Amirahmadi, “Economic Costs,” 263.

56 Simon Tisdall, “Weekly review: Power and the people: Iran says it wants nuclear energy to fuel its economy. The US says it wants to make an 'Islamic bomb'. But what do Iranians think? Simon Tisdall asks both the men in charge and people on the streets,” The Guardian Weekly (1 September 2006) [on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, (accessed 23 January 2007).

57 See Karimi, “Iran refuses to Budge.”

58 See Tisdall, “Power and the People.”

59 Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 16.

26 manipulated by its internal and external opponents.”60 This is particularly true of Iran’s volatile border areas, where large numbers of ethnic minorities reside across national borders from their ethnic kinsmen. Were the disenfranchised youth, particularly the ethnic minorities, to join with a separatist movement, it would cause a domestic headache for Iran from which it would be unlikely to recover. Furthermore, there have already been outward signs of the discontent of the youth regarding their financial situation. The largest demonstration since the advent of the Islamic Republic took place in 1999 as around 20,000 youth took to the streets to the nation’s poor economy.61 In order to solve these domestic problems, Tehran has pursued a foreign policy that would allow the country to grow economically. Iran’s economic stance with regard to relations with Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991, therefore, has been to seek a role in which Iran benefits economically, even if the trade-off means ridding itself of revolutionary ideals.62

Economic Development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus

Since the independence of the Central Asian and South Caucasian nations of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the Islamic Republic has seen the potential to garner influence in the region via economic influence. However, Tehran entered the economic scene with a great deal of cards stacked against it. As mentioned above, Iran in 1991 had only recently begun reconstruction and restructuring efforts after the eight-year long war with Iraq. Iran certainly had its hands full with regard to need for economic development within its own borders. Furthermore, there was a great deal of infrastructure in place between the former Soviet republics and Russia, but very little as far as road and rail infrastructure (much less oil and gas pipelines) in place between the former Soviet republics and Iran. In addition, soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian Foreign Minister steered Russian foreign policy toward

60 Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 76.

61 Babak Rahimi, “Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 7 no.3 (2003): 107.

62 Byman, et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 16.

27 multilateralism in geopolitics, with a heavy emphasis of strengthening ties and influence with the former Soviet states.63 The “Primakov Doctrine” dictated that the former Soviet Republics would be of the utmost importance to Russian foreign policy, especially since these countries were in Russia’s “backyard.” Under Minister Primakov, Russia intensified its involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet Republics. Economic liberalization in Iran in the late 1980s and early led to change in the way the Islamic Republic did business, as well as the way it saw its relations with other countries (particularly those that were in close geographic proximity). Other countries began to see post-war Iran as a country worthwhile of investment as the government’s grip on industry lessened, and it “abandon[ed] its cardinal revolutionary principle of rejecting foreign capital.”64 As the country opened its doors to investment, economic isolation in Iran became a thing of the past. Iran became more dependent upon imports,65 and it began to see a source of imports of raw materials from its newly independent neighbors. Iran today is a lucrative destination for foreign investment. Non- energy investment in industries like “aluminum, agriculture industries, public services and the stock market” are at an all time high in Iran, estimated to reach $7 billion by the end of March 2007.66 As the amount of investments in the Islamic Republic rises, Iran has also expanded its own investment into its neighbors to the north. As previously noted, Iran’s investment opportunity is limited. Herzig finds that “Iran is hardly better able to provide this investment for the FSS [Former Soviet South] states than they are to help Iran with its own investment needs.”67 As such, Herzig suggests that Central Asian and South Caucasian interests for attracting investment would thus largely be oriented towards Western or East Asian countries, such as the United

63 Robert Freedman, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4 no.2 (2000): 69-70.

64 Sohrab Behadad, “From Populism to Economic : The Iranian Predicament,” in The Economy of Iran: Dilemmas of an Islamic State, ed. P. Alizadeh, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 113.

65 Ibid, 114.

66 “Foreign Investment in Iran to reach US$7 BLN this Year,” Asia Pulse (24 October 2006) [on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, (accessed 23 January 2007).

67 Edmund Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 33.

28 States and China. Times as well as oil prices have changed since the time of Herzig’s writing: oil is now valued at over $60 a barrel and is not expected to fall significantly in the near future. This is almost triple the price from the time when the former Soviet republics gained their independence.68 Oil is certainly not the cure-all for Iran’s economic desires; it is, however, a step in the right direction for Iran to be able to pursue a more aggressive economic policy, especially in the region. Despite the economic setbacks, Iran is finding the means, motive, and opportunity to invest in their Central Asian and South Caucasian neighbors. Free trade zones have been set up in some border areas of Iran to increase the volume of trade in the region.69 Iran has been ardently attempting to build ties with former Soviet republics, including bitter enemies Armenia and Azerbaijan. Trade with these two countries in the South Caucasus is particularly indicative of Iranian interests with regard to both economics and foreign policy. As tension were heightened between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and blockades on both sides were imposed, Iran became more important to both countries; Iran supplied much-needed energy to the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan, and trade between Armenia and Iran increased “fifteen-fold” between 1991 and 1995.70 Iran came to be, for both Azerbaijan and Armenia, not only an important trading partner, but also a neutral party whose reputation was enhanced by their willingness to provide markets and services to both countries during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Tehran has been isolated in the region by the United States, however, not only in its attempts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also in its attempts to benefit from the Azerbaijani oil market.71

68 Behdad, “From Populism to Economic Liberalism,” 114.

69 Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no.3 (2004), 509.

70 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 34.

71 Gareth Winrow, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 108.

29 Energy and Economy in Iran

Prior to the Islamic Revolution, the Shah’s economic plan largely consisted of dependence upon oil. Some estimates put the 1978 oil income of Iran accounting for “more than 90 percent of its foreign exchange receipts,”72 and this lack of economic diversity made the nation’s economy prey to the price of oil on the global market. Thus, those thinkers in opposition to the Shah thought that in particular, Iran should move away from Western multinational corporations (such as the oil conglomerates), and diversify economically in order to remove the dependence of the Iranian economy away from the West and towards a sense of self-sufficiency.73 A move towards economic diversification during the advent of the Islamic Revolution, however, was not reached. The war with Iraq proved to be a very destabilizing force for the Iranian economy, especially as it relates to Iran’s hydrocarbon production. As noted above, Iran’s economy during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 was largely dependent upon its oil revenues. When the price of oil dropped significantly in 1986, Iran’s economic performance was further damaged.74 Quite simply, Iran’s war with Iraq greatly diminished the capabilities of the Iranian economy. The dependence of the Iranian economy on the oil market was largely responsible for the poor economic performance in the years following the Iran-Iraq War. Because of the vast dependence of Iran’s economy upon its energy reserves, it is impossible to separate Iran’s economic policy from its energy policy. Dependence upon energy resources to drive economic growth has diminished since the time of the Shah. However, some estimates suggest that “roughly 80% of Iran’s revenues come from oil,”75 and as such, Iran must ensure that its energy policy acts in a way that will be most beneficial to its economic needs. Although diversification in industry is on the rise (Iran

72 Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 56.

73 Ibid, 59.

74 Cyrus Bina, “Global Oil and the Oil Policies of the Islamic Republic,” in Modern Capitalism and Islamic Ideology in Iran, eds. C. Bina and H. Zangeneh, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 128.

75 See Karami, “Iran Refuses to Budge.”

30 has automobile production as well as a soft drink alternative to American products), energy is still the primary agent in its economy. Iran’s economic policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is thus largely tied to its regional energy policy. This policy focuses on the trade and development of hydrocarbon resources, as well as the geopolitics that result from energy concerns. Understandably so, as Iran serves as a strategic position between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.76 Iran sees energy trade as a means with which to avoid political isolation in the region and avoid marginalization in the world, a way in which to stimulate economic growth and fund industrial diversification, and a medium of promoting political and social stability at home and abroad by satisfying the economic needs of its own people and the needs of its neighbors. Furthermore, it seeks to promote a “collective self-reliance”77 in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in order to limit Western (particularly American) dominance in the region. After all, for Iranians “large numbers of hungry Muslims with their hands outstretched to foreigners are not going to serve the interests of the Islamic world.”78

The Politics of Energy

One important aspect of Iran’s energy policy is that it seeks to prevent Iran’s isolation in the international spectrum. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the US Embassy hostage crisis that followed found an end to economic cooperation between the United States and Iran. Indeed, the United States sought to impose punitive restrictions on Iran in order to attempt to marginalize Iran’s Islamic government. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, new nation-states were formed on Iran’s border, and Iran saw another potential avenue to avoid economic and political isolation. The sanctions levied by the United States in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 thus attempted to further isolate Iran and limit the Islamic Republic’s influence and power in the region by

76 Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, 128.

77 Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 60.

78 Ibid, 75.

31 removing its abilities to export or import high valued goods and services, as well as punishing companies involved in developing Iran’s oil market. Iran, however, has a commodity that has a significant ability to reduce the effects of sanctions: large reserves of hydrocarbon energy sources. As the demand for oil and natural gas are high, Iran’s neighbors and others who value receiving oil exports from Iran were not as quick as the United States to end their trade with Iran. Despite the call on the part of the United States for sanctions against Iran, only limited action on the part of US allies has taken place. Furthermore, since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has chosen a path of regional integration through various economic organization initiatives in order to secure its energy concerns in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It has established the Caspian Sea Littoral Organization as well as the Economic Cooperation Organization to serve the purposes of regional integration of its energy policies. The most important economic concern on the part of Iran is to avoid isolation; by remaining party to these organizations and reinforcing their effectiveness, Iran’s active engagement “solidifies its role as an integral part of the regional community. It makes isolation or containment unlikely or unworkable.”79 Iranian energy relations with Turkmenistan are emblematic of how the country would like to extend its strategic role in the region. Iran’s longest border with a former Soviet republic is Turkmenistan, and its attempts to solidify its influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus are exemplified in its economic and energy relations with Ashgabat. Turkmenistan has large supplies of natural gas, which is one of its primary exports. As is the case with most of the former Soviet republics, infrastructure for this natural resource was oriented toward and the other former Soviet republics. With the collapse of and the opening of free markets, Iran saw an opportunity to expand ties and increase trade. In 1997, Iran began a project to link Turkmenistan’s gas fields with Iranian infrastructure, which could offer Turkmenistan’s product to a new market.80 Turkey in particular was keen to purchase Turkmen gas, and

79 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 118.

32 soon began to do so via pipeline shipments through Iran. The Turkmenistan venture is important in that it is Iran’s attempt to prove to the other energy producing nations surrounding it that it can provide economic benefits for these countries by expanding the market for their product, as well as increasing political influence via bilateral economic agreements between itself and the former Soviet republics. Iran’s energy policy in the former Soviet republics seeks to establish Iran as a legitimate partner in economic development and expansion of global markets. Iranian relations with Russia, additionally, cannot be ignored in the context of economic and energy policies. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia was and remains the largest regional power with regard to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In terms of economic power and confrontation, Iran is incapable of replacing Russian influence in the Central Asian/South Caucasian region. As such, Iranian economic and energy policy with regard to these areas of Russian influence and interest will keep Russian relations in mind.

The Caspian Sea: Convergence or Conflict?

The Caspian Sea is the place where Iranian, Central Asian, Russian, and South Caucasian interests converge, and for good reason: estimated energy reserves in the Caspian Sea are vast, and the sea itself has long been used for its other natural resources. Oil in the Baku area has been known of for centuries, and in the 18th and 19th centuries the Caspian Sea, with its maritime advantages and natural resources, was an asset that both Russia and Persia desired.81 Conflict between the two nations largely came to a halt with the emergence of the Soviet Union and the implementation of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of Friendship in 1921, which “established freedom of navigation for all Soviet and Persian ships on the Caspian,” and the follow up Treaty on Trade and Navigation

80 Nader Entessar, “Iran: Geopolitical Challenges and the Caspian Region” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 172.

81 Bülent Gökay, “History of Oil Development in the Caspian Basin,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 4-6.

33 between the USSR and Iran in 1940, which established a standard fishing zone. 82 The Soviet Union comprised the majority of the Caspian Sea’s shoreline, and as such developed offshore oil drilling in areas that it could claim under the two treaties between itself and Iran. For its part, Iran concentrated on its land-based oil fields and did not pursue hydrocarbon initiatives in the Caspian Sea. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, in addition to Iran’s own economic problems, created new realities and possibilities for the Islamic Republic. Instead of dealing solely with the USSR, Iran had to contend with Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. The latter three did not pose as significant an existential threat to Iran in terms of security as the USSR had. Additionally, these countries were opening up to capitalism and foreign investment, and oil and energy companies were all too willing to invest in the expanding and lucrative oil and gas industries in the Caspian region. Iran’s issues with the Caspian Region became: • How to best delimit the Caspian Sea to obtain the maximum amount of economic benefit for Iran. • How to marginalize foreign influence in Central Asian and South Caucasian energy sectors while maximizing its own influence. • How to use energy markets in Central Asia and the South Caucasus to expand its own power and influence in geopolitics.

These issues tie directly to Iran’s foreign policy insomuch as they allow Iran to flex its geopolitical muscle. Iran has long realized that control of or influence in energy sectors and other economically important resources is a good way to prevent geopolitical isolation, and allow for engagement with the regime.83 The breakup of the Soviet Union afforded Iran an opportunity to expand its reach into Central Asia and the South Caucasus geopolitically via the Caspian Sea. The delimitation of the Caspian Sea remains a key issue in Iranian-Former Soviet South relations. To date, no agreement regarding demarcation of the Caspian Sea has taken place between Iran and the other countries surrounding the Caspian Sea. The disagreement centers on two different considerations of the Caspian Sea: whether it is a

82 Cynthia Croissant and Michael Croissant, “The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Conflict and Compromise,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 23.

83 Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 117.

34 lake or a sea.84 Technically speaking, the Caspian Sea is a lake, as it has no access to any other body of water and is surrounded on all sides by land. However, the size of the Caspian is vast (roughly the size of Japan)85 and natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, abound in the basin. The importance of the argument of whether or not the Caspian should be delimited as a lake or a sea is relevant in terms of how the seabed and the surface of the Caspian should be divided amongst the countries that border it.86 Those countries that believe that the oil and gas contained in the Caspian are a community resource and should be developed as the community sees fit tend to argue that the Caspian Sea is a lake.87 The countries that believe that the Caspian should be delimited according to maritime principles established for open seas (and the resources contained therein) tend to argue that the Caspian Sea is a sea. Under the “sea argument” of demarcation, the majority of proven offshore oil and gas reserves (as well as larger percentages of the Caspian itself)88 would be within the territory of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, while Russia and Iran would be left with smaller portions of the Caspian that are not proven to have, nor are likely to contain, hydrocarbon resources in large enough quantities for development. As such, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan stand the most to gain economically by supporting delimitation of the Caspian Sea according to the “sea argument,” while Russia and Iran stand the most to gain economically by supporting the demarcation of the Caspian according to the “lake argument.” The delimitation issue of the Caspian is indicative of deeper Iranian economic and energy concerns. In particular, Iran is concerned with the large portion of Caspian oil allotted to Azerbaijan through proposed demarcation, and the political and economic ramifications that Iran believes is certain to follow. For its part, Iran certainly considers Azerbaijani plans to involve Western companies in the development of its offshore oil

84 For an excellent discussion about this and other Caspian Sea issues, see , M.P. Croissant and B. Aras, eds., Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999).

85 Croissant, “Legal Status,” 23.

86 Maureen Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 44.

87 Croissant, “Legal Status,” 29.

88 Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region, 44-45.

35 fields to be against their foreign policy interests.89 In other words, Iranian interests in the Caspian Sea region are not simply to secure additional economic resources for use at its disposal; rather, Iran seeks to capture additional economic resources in the Caspian region to limit the capabilities of its weaker neighbors to obtain the ability to either limit Iran’s activities in the region, or to involve outside powers to counter Iranian interests. It is important to note that Iran sees the “sea” demarcation of the Caspian Sea as Western interference in the region.90 Western investment in Caspian oil markets in countries like Azerbaijan has been welcomed by the former Soviet nations. Iran is wary of the United States’ growing interest in the South Caucasian/Central Asian energy sector as a site of investment and industrial development, as it does not want American political influence to grow in an area that Iran already relies upon for trade in energy and other sectors. Iran’s attempt to block Azerbaijan’s development of offshore oil fields by claiming to avoid a future ecological catastrophe91 is really an attempt to give Iran a bigger share of the Caspian and to “impede the growth of Western—especially American—influence in the Caspian region.”92 Blocking Western access to the Azerbaijani oil market is not the only motivation for the Iranians to seek “sea demarcation” of the Caspian. Iran also has a vested interest in marginalizing Azerbaijan’s ability to maximize its hydrocarbon revenues. Iran is particularly sensitive of its minority populations in border areas, one of which is, of course, the Azeris. An economically successful Azerbaijan on the other side of a border with an economically floundering Iran does little to allay Iran’s sensitivities. Iran fears that if Azerbaijan were to reap a great deal of economic success from its Caspian Sea oil fields, the separatist tendencies of its Azeri population in northwestern Iran would surface and tear apart the multicultural Islamic Republic. It thus serves Iran’s domestic and foreign policy interests to demarcate the Caspian Sea in such a way that it limits Azerbaijani access to economic assets.

89 Nasib Nassibli, “Azerbaijan: Oil and Politics in the Country’s Future,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 115.

90 Croissant, “Legal Status,” 29.

91 Ibid, 38.

92 Ibid, 29.

36 Thus far, Iran has been unsuccessful in its bid to claim hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea. Iran has been forced to seek an alternative means, therefore, to increase its role in the Caspian energy sector, and thereby increase its influence in geopolitics. With development of oil fields out of the picture, the field that Iran believes will bring it the highest degree of success in the Caspian energy sector is with transportation. As DeLay notes, Iran’s infrastructure is well-suited for handling Caspian oil, it is geographically at the center of the action, and would easily be able to ship oil to world markets.93 However, the United States has been rather influential in preventing a pipeline from Azerbaijan to Iran from being built. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was designed to prevent further economic development of Iran’s energy sector, and was successful in abrogating a pipeline supported by oil executives to move oil from Baku’s oil fields to the Persian Gulf.94 Instead, the primary pipeline developed by Western oil companies currently runs through Georgia and Turkey. Despite being overlooked as a pipeline destination for Caspian Sea oil, Iran has still been able to gain a solid foothold in the Caspian energy market through innovative use of oil “swaps.” These swaps take oil from participating Caspian energy producers for domestic use in Iran, and then allow the same amount of oil to be distributed from Iran’s domestic production facilities to the international market in the name of the Caspian energy provider. This arrangement is lucrative not only for Iran, who reduce transportation costs of moving oil from its southern oil fields to northern refineries, but also for Caspian energy providers, who are able to reduce the cost of moving their product to Asian markets.95 Swaps are particularly useful in terms of Iranian foreign policy. They allow Iran to raise its local influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, to expand its own energy markets to increasing markets in Asia, and to more cost effectively provide energy resources to its northern urban population. Swaps cause the Central Asian and South Caucasian countries that use them to become dependent upon Iran’s access to distribution

93 Jennifer DeLay, “The Caspian Oil Pipeline Tangle: A Steel Web of Confusion,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M .P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 64.

94 Ibid, 64.

95 Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region, 113.

37 markets for their product.96 If these countries are dependent upon Iran’s access to distribution markets, it is unlikely that they will support any type of punitive action recommended by the United States designed to isolate Iran from the global economy. Indeed, it stands to reason that countries involved with swaps with Iran would be more likely to support the Islamic Republic’s endeavors to avoid isolation. As such, swaps enable Iran to be more influential in regional affairs by the “power of the purse.” Moreover, swaps are a modest means by which Iran can pursue its overall economic objective in terms of maximizing profits from Caspian energy reserves since it lowers the price of oil products for its citizens in the northern urban areas of the country where the vast majority of energy consumption takes place.

The ECO – an Iranian Pipe Dream?

As mentioned above, Iran seeks a legitimate place in the global economic system. One of the best ways to establish itself in the global economy is via regional integration. The states created by the collapse of the Soviet Union brought new life to the dead organization known as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which was formed in 1964 by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. The organization was resurrected in 1985 as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), whose purpose is “promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the Member States.”97 The ECO has been, since its resurrection, the primary means of contact and cooperation between Iran and the former Soviet south. It is also the only regional organization of which Iran is a part whose goal is largely economic in nature. Indeed, part of the Treaty of Izmir documents the need to pursue “removal of trade barriers” and “integration of the economies of the Member States with the World Economy to ensure their fuller participation in the globalization process,” which ultimately would benefit Iran in its search for regional power.98 Economic cooperation is a “priority in Iranian foreign

96 DeLay, “The Caspian Oil Pipeline Tangle,” 65.

97 See the ECO secretariat website: http://www.ecosecretariat.org/Detail_info/About_ECO_D.htm

98 The Treaty of Izmir (1996), page 3, retrieved Feb. 3, 2007 from http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ftproot/Documents/Basics/Treaty_of_Izmir.doc

38 relations with regard to Central Asia and the Caucasus”99 precisely because it is the most effective means by which Iran can exercise regional influence. Perhaps more importantly, the ECO as an economic organization is seen as a politically stabilizing agent for Iran.100 Free trade amongst the member nations of the ECO brings a greater amount of income to the member nations; greater income means a more content population and less instability in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In its pursuit of effective trade agreements and elimination of barriers to trade, Iran has sought to “combat the drugs trade and organized crime,”101 two very destabilizing factors in the former Soviet south as well as . Iran sees the economic viability of Central Asia and the South Caucasus as vital to its own interests, as it promotes stability in the region. However, Iran has other designs for the ECO which may not directly be associated with economics. Iran sees the ECO as a regional organization not only for economic cooperation across the region, but as a potential free market inclusive of all predominantly Muslim countries.102 The ECO may be seen by Iran in light of the humble beginnings of the European Union: it began as a regional economic cooperation between three Western European countries, but became an organization with decidedly more ecumenical political agenda-setting powers. Iran’s wishes for the ECO, while currently espousing the benefits of economics, certainly take into consideration the potential for a larger international political body capable of wielding more geopolitical power. Furthermore, the ECO may be an attempt by Iran to offer Central Asian and South Caucasian nations an alternative to its grouping with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a Russian-dominated organization.103 Iran, however, faces hurdles in its attempt to use the ECO for any sort of platform other than economic cooperation at its most basic level. One of the largest hurdles it

99 Tchangiz Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” in Post-, eds. T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1999), 83.

100 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 32.

101 Ibid, 37.

102 Ibid.

103 Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, 148-149.

39 must contend with is a lack of common vision for the organization on the part of another co-founder of the ECO, Turkey. Turkey, for the purposes of the Iranian government, represents a proxy of the West, especially as it has its sights set on becoming integrated into the European Union. Turkey is hesitant, if not opposed, to Iran’s attempts to use the ECO for purposes other than economic cooperation. Herzig notes that other countries in the ECO, such as Uzbekistan, are also wary of Iran’s use of the ECO as a “geopolitical soapbox” speaking against American involvement in the region, and are not keen on extending the organization to include cultural or religious matters.104 Moreover, Iran must overcome obstacles of an economic nature if it wishes to use the ECO as a vehicle for other geopolitical means; ECO members “have vulnerable economies characterized by poor performance.”105 Poor economic performance of member nations is counterintuitive to the organization’s purpose, and must be addressed if Iran wishes to expand the organization to include matters of deeper social, religious, and political conviction. It also seems unlikely that Russian interests in the former Soviet south would accommodate Iran’s designs for a regional organization that would rival Russia’s CIS.

Russian Interests and Iranian Response

Russia has a vested interest in the economic affairs that take place between Iran and the former Soviet south. Russia, like the countries in Central Asia, also takes part in oil swaps. It is much cheaper for Russia to engage in swaps than it is for them to transport oil all the way from Siberia to Western markets via pipeline. Furthermore, Russia is also a rather important trading partner with Iran. Although Iran’s grand schemes with regard to the ECO may pose somewhat of a threat to Russia’s regional organization (CIS), Russia does not fear the organization, nor has it challenged Iran’s attempts to open greater trade liberalization in the region. Russia largely views the ECO as baring little teeth, and has been described by the Russian media as an organization that is “more dead than alive.”106

104 Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 37.

105 Entessar, “Iran: Geopolitical Challenges and the Caspian Region,” 157.

40 The Caspian delimitation issue is an interesting caveat on the part of the Russians. In 1994 when the issue of delimitation came to a head, Russia initially sided with the Iranians; they thought that the Caspian should be divided as if it were a lake, and that all the resources of the Caspian should be shared and regulated by all countries bordering the it. This is largely due to the fact that like the Iranians, the Russian portion of the Caspian is devoid of any great potential for oil reserves and stood the most to gain economically by having a “lake” demarcated Caspian. However, as the geostrategic positioning of Russia became more oriented towards increasing their influence over the former Soviet states, their position regarding the demarcation of the Caspian also changed. By 1996 Russia took the position that “it can not stop the division of the sea”107 and began to seek a way in which to demarcate the sea while assuring Iran that it would not renege on its 1921 and 1940 agreements regarding the Caspian. A likely explanation for the change of heart on the part of the Russians involves Russian investment in the exploration and development of oil fields in the former Soviet republics’ portions of the Caspian. The Russian companies LUKoil and Gazprom have featured quite prominently on the Caspian energy scene, and are keen to retain their profitability in the region.108 With the withdrawal of support for a “lake” demarcation on the part of the Russians, it seems unlikely that Iran will be able to gain a share of the Caspian energy wealth; it does not seek to incur the wrath of Russia by direct conflict with Russian interests, and must therefore seek alternative methods of profiting from the Caspian (such as pipelines or swaps). Iranian interests in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, while expanding, are still no real threat to Russian power and influence in the region. As the price of oil increases and Caspian-area dependence on swaps increase, so too could Iranian influence in the region increase. Any conflict of interest on the part of the Russians would likely take place at the UN Security Council, where Russia could support American attempts to disrupt and isolate Iran economically so as to diminish its regional power capabilities.

106 Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia,” 514.

107 Croissant, “Legal Status,” 34.

108 For an excellent analysis of the involvement of Russian companies in the energy sector of the Caspian Sea in the former Soviet Republics, see Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region.

41 Conclusion

Iran’s limited emphasis on economic performance directly following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 changed significantly as a result of its experience in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The poor economic performance and steady decline of standards of living combined with public discontent during this period led to a slow but steady liberalization of their own economy. Increased capital enabled Iran to use economics as a tool of their foreign policy, particularly after 1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The energy market in particular is tied to Iran’s economy. The economy is necessary to provide for the Iranian people and limit discontent and potential calls for secession on the part of ethnic minorities. Therefore, Iran acts in its own economic interests in the region in order to provide for its people, even at the expense of Revolutionary ideology. Economic liberalization and foreign investment are no longer tools of the West’s control over Iran, but rather tools that Iran uses in a broader pursuit of regional integration and influence in the former Soviet south. The conflict of interests that has yet to be resolved in the demarcation of the Caspian is indicative of Iran’s economic policy in the region. Iran sought the greatest potential economic benefit for itself through development of Caspian oil fields, but barring their ability to lay claim to the oil fields in the possession of countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Iran has had to be creative in its approach. Iran’s greatest economic asset in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is its geostrategic position as the crossroads between the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. Although attempts to use Iran as a hub for oil transport have been thwarted by the United States, Iran is still influential in the swaps market, and is still a source of natural gas transport between Turkmenistan and Turkey. Iran’s attempt to increase its profile through the ECO has been limited, at best. The organization has made certain gains so far as economic integration of the region is concerned; conversely, it is far from the Islamic common market stretching from North Africa to the Indian Ocean that Iran ultimately wishes to see. Furthermore, Iran’s attempts to use the ECO for purposes other than trade and economic integration has been severely limited, as member states have resisted attempts by Iran to expand the

42 organization to deal with matters of cultural identity and religion in the region. Russian dismissal of the organization as being more “dead than alive” reflects the limited ability of the ECO to garner regional support for Iran or to limit the influence of Russia. The economic future bodes well for Iran and its foreign policy endeavors. The price of oil continues to rise, and US efforts for a full embargo of the nation have been resisted by Russia and China on the UN Security Council. So long as Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not change the mind of Western investors or spark American retaliation, Iran’s economy will likely continue to grow, and the nation will continue to expand its influence in the former Soviet republics to the north. If this expansion of economic power continues, though, Iran may have to check its endeavors to avoid a potential confrontation with Russia. Iran will have to determine whether it finds its good relations with Russia or an expansion of regional influence is more important to its foreign policy concerns.

43 CHAPTER 3

IRANIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Although many foreign policy strategists put Iran’s cultural policy on the forefront of its foreign policy agenda, in Central Asia and the South Caucasus the Islamic Republic’s emphasis on culture is diminished when compared with its security and economic foreign policies.109 Iran’s foreign policy today is shaped more by pragmatism and realpolitik than it is by revolutionary Islam and a desire to export the revolution. Tehran’s reasons for pursuing a foreign policy that relies more on pragmatism than ideology are many. The Islamic Republic’s current foreign policy objectives were molded significantly by its experiences with incorporating radical ideology into its foreign policy soon after the Islamic Revolution. A strong and coherent culturally-emphasized foreign policy based on Revolutionary Islam as a prime motivator for geopolitical decision making was emphasized by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran clearly had a profound impact on Iran’s foreign policy objectives. As such, in its early days the Islamic Republic of Iran attempted to spread the Islamic Revolution beyond its borders into the Muslim countries of the Persian Gulf.110 However, the Islamic Revolution was not accepted by Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors, and instead felt an existential threat on their security made by Tehran’s brand of radical Islam. This threat was part of Saddam Hussein’s reasoning for attacking the Islamic Republic in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The war had a significant impact on Iran’s domestic capabilities to provide both a sense of security as well as economic stability for its citizens. The impact of the conflict shifted Iranian thinking away from Islamic ideology and towards a foreign policy that was focused on realpolitik and pragmatism. As Iran was isolated geopolitically and devoid of any influence outside the circles that supported Revolutionary Islam, the Islamic Republic was forced to reorient its foreign

109 Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 7.

110 Ibid, 8.

44 policy to meet its security and economic needs. Thus, when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, a cultural foreign policy was not at the top of Iran’s agenda in the new former Soviet south. Nor was the environment ripe for an export of the Islamic Revolution in the former Soviet republics. Islam had developed quite differently under the tutelage of the Soviet Union than it had developed in Iran. Soviet leaders emphasized nationalism and an overarching Soviet culture that naturally included use of the Russian language and state-sponsored atheism. Religion was allowed to exist in the Central Asian and South Caucasian Soviet Republics, but it remained in place as a tool of nationalism rather than as a means of expression of piety. The cultural impact of the Soviet Union on these countries was not limited to Islam, and the need for cultural influence came soon after independence. For the countries of Central Asia as well as Azerbaijan, nationalism was only wrought under the watchful eye of the in Moscow, while it flourished in Georgia and Armenia centuries prior to Soviet occupation. It was the Central Asian countries, therefore, that subscribed the most to the Soviet-influenced nationalism; independence brought the overarching Soviet nationalism in these countries to an end, and opened the door to increase cultural influence from countries like Iran. Iran’s lack of use of revolutionary Islam as a cultural policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus thus stems from these two historical precedents: the lack of success in exporting the Islamic Revolution to Persian Gulf countries, and the legacy of the development of Islam under the Soviet Union. Iran’s non-pursuit of the export of the Revolution is realpolitik at its finest. Tehran now views promotion of revolutionary Islam outside its borders as potentially destabilizing for the Islamic Republic in terms of both security and economy. Furthermore, the former Soviet republics are wary of Revolutionary Islam due to the nature of the development of Islam under the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Iran must check its own foreign policy desires in the context of Russia’s foreign policy needs. Iran’s restraint in exporting the Islamic Revolution is best characterized in the example of Tajikistan, where the political atmosphere was the most likely to accept an export of radical Islam. Iran could have supported the Islamist

45 Coalition that was in power in Tajikistan, but instead chose to support the Russian- backed ex-communists. Tehran’s tools for cultural foreign policy are not limited to revolutionary Islam and ideology, but rather incorporate language, ethnicity, and moderate religious advances. These tools are all used in Iran’s attempts to spread its influence through the concept of regionalism. Rather than support the US-dominated unipolar world, Iran has sought a multi-polar world with itself as a point of power. Its use of cultural influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, therefore, is to open the doors for potential regional cooperation and to spread its geopolitical authority.

The Failures of the Islamic Revolution

One of the most interesting aspects of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is that it developed not only as a political movement, nor solely as a cultural one. The Islamic Revolution existed as a response to political concerns of the Shah’s dictatorship, as well as a signaling of the desire to return to a less corrupt government based on religious principles as well as social issues. Interestingly, the revolutionaries in Iran saw the movement not simply as a domestic issue, but as a movement that Muslims worldwide would join. The Islamic Republic promoted the export of the Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as it “supported Islamist revolutionary groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.”111 One of the intended aims of the Iranian government was to bring about an end to the perceived corrupt rule of Muslim countries who allowed Western and secular interests to supersede the religious interests of its Muslim population. The leaders of Muslim countries, Iranian thinking supposed, had allowed corruption of government to take place; the people of these countries would support Islam rather than corruption for governance and guidance. Characterizing the global nature of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Noori, a professor of theology at the University of Tehran wrote in 1985,

111 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 8.

46 It [the Islamic Revolution] has sprung forth from the very souls of those Muslim masses who were crushed by imperialism for centuries and whose Islamic character was severely repressed.112

The export of the Islamic revolution was a grassroots movement supported by the intelligentsia of Iran as a movement that would bring Muslim countries in the Persian Gulf region into alignment with Iran against Western and Communist interests in the region. Surrounding Persian Gulf countries, however, did not welcome the Islamic Revolution with open arms as Iran assumed they would. Conversely, many of these countries actually felt threatened by the Shi’ite dominated Iranian brand of Islam, and more importantly felt threatened by what they saw as a potentially violent overthrow of their respective governments.113 Rather than open direct lines of communication and extend Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf region, the rhetoric to export the Islamic Revolution instead isolated Iran in the Persian Gulf and precipitated a conflict with its secular neighbor Iraq. The war with Iraq and the isolation on the part of Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors had a significant effect on Iran’s foreign policy as it relates to matters of cultural and religious policy. Iran was no longer afforded the luxury of dealing with her neighbors strictly in Revolutionary terms, but had to use a more realistic political approach. Issues of economic and security concerns took precedence over religious and Revolutionary concerns, particularly as the immediacy of the Islamic Revolution drew to a close.114 When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, the war with Iraq that had only just ended in 1988 was a far more recent memory for Iranians than the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Tehran had two choices of what to do in the former Soviet south: they could either continue to follow a policy centered on exporting revolutionary Islam as they had attempted in the Persian Gulf, or they could institute a policy based on pragmatism. The nation chose to approach relations with the former Soviet republics far more cautiously

112 Ayatollah Allama Yahya Noori, Islamic Government and the Revolution in Iran (Glasgow, Scotland: Royston Limited, 1985), 36.

113 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Rubeinstein and O. Smolansky, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 115.

114 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era , 9.

47 than its radical approach to Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors immediately following the Islamic Revolution. Cultural Cautiousness

Cultural aspects of Iran’s foreign policy, particularly religion, had dominated the international political scene under the guidance of Khomeini. Aggressive and unabashed use of religion in developing Iran’s foreign policy had been the norm during the leadership of Khomeini. Hunter describes the change of Iran’s foreign policy orientation under the Ayatollah Khomeini as enhancing “the ideological and universalist – as opposed to statist and nationalist – dimensions of its foreign policy” as Iran’s primary foreign policy objective was “the spread of revolutionary Islam.”115 Iran’s foreign policy changed significantly after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, as is exemplified in Iran’s dealings with the former Soviet states on its northern frontier. With the advent of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iran approached its relations with its new neighbors to the north with relative caution that it did not exhibit towards its Persian Gulf neighbors in the decade following the Islamic Revolution. There are a few reasons for this cautiousness, the most important of which is the need for geopolitical stability. The Iran-Iraq War, which began only a year after the Islamic Revolution, was in part the result of the threat perceived by Saddam Hussein of the call by Iran for the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. The war lasted eight years and wreaked havoc upon Iran’s economy and its ability to provide for its own security. The absence of economic and physical security as a result of exporting the Islamic Revolution led to the belief that rather than establishing a multinational, multiethnic Islamic safe haven, the exportation of the Revolution was in fact a catalyst for conflict between Iran and the countries it sought to embrace through Islamic solidarity.116 The revolutionary leadership of Iran, including Ayatollah Khomeini, realized that Iran would have to change aspects of this revolutionary ideology in order to maintain its own economic and security guarantees; in the mid-1980s diplomatic relations

115 Shireen Hunter, Iran after Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 106.

116 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy, 8-9.

48 were opened with all countries except the United States, Israel, and South Africa at the behest of Khomeini.117 Current Iranian foreign policy follows the transition made from the early stages of the Islamic Revolution to be more aware of the need for geopolitical stability. It is most interesting to note, therefore, that Iran’s dealings with the independent former Soviet republics have not emphasized religion to the extent that one might expect from a revolutionary Islamic state. It is exceedingly more interesting as the majority of at least 6 former Soviet republics are predominantly Muslim,118 one of which (Azerbaijan) adheres to the same particular branch of Shi’ite Islam as Iran: Twelver Shi’ism. The restraint shown by Iran in its cultural dealings with the former Soviet republics reflects the shift of importance of revolutionary ideology in the Islamic Republic. The relations between Iran and the former Soviet republics are complex and necessarily involve the relations between Iran and Russia as well as the relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics. Iranian foreign policy with regard to culture has by and large shifted from a religiously dominated orientation to a secular policy that emphasizes ethnic and linguistic ties while, to a large degree, it deemphasizes radical Islam as a focal point of relations.

The Soviet Cultural Legacy

Iran’s positioning insomuch as cultural policy in the former Soviet south is concerned must be taken into consideration along with an understanding of cultural experiments that took place in these republics under Soviet rule. When the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, they quickly absorbed the territories of the Russian Empire, created borders on maps, and named them Soviet Socialist Republics. During its long rule over the Central Asian and South Caucasian nations, the Soviet Union exerted a significant amount of influence and sought to change the landscape of the cultural conditioning of these Soviet Socialist Republics. Josef Stalin’s Nationalist Policy was most instrumental in changing the socio-political identity of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Stalin’s idea was that of “divide and rule.” He created arbitrary borders that

117 Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 115.

118 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan

49 were not indicative of ethnic populations, and then he attempted to create an ethnic identity in that country if one did not exist prior to the Soviet absorption of Russian Empirical territories.119 Countries like Armenia and Georgia, however, had a well- established national identity that was created centuries prior to Russian and Soviet rule, and thus had no need of arbitrary nation creation by the Soviets. The attempt was to create a sense of nationalism in the new Soviet republics, and then supplant that nationalism with the idea of a superior all-encompassing Soviet identity. Stalin and Lenin strategically developed a system in which nationalism, they believed, could not grow unless it was the supra-nationalism of the Soviet state. This then, could consolidate Soviet (Russian) authority, power, and influence in the region to serve its own self- interests.120 Russian was promoted as the national Soviet language, and many Russians immigrated to these new Soviet republics to provide good socialist leadership for the indigenous peoples. The Russian culture was promoted significantly, and the process of Russification began in the early years of the Soviet Union. Another effect of the Soviet control over the Central Asian and South Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republics was that it changed the history of these countries. A great deal of Persian influence had been wielded in Central Asia and the South Caucasus from pre- history until the Russian conquest in the 19th century. At one point in time or another, the Persian Empire extended from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea to Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula to the borders of China. The Soviet conquest erased this long chapter of cultural connections between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Iran. In order to attempt to create separate national identities, the Soviets chose different aspects of the common cultural identity of the peoples of the region, and attributed them to different countries they had created. Hunter mentions that “the heritage of the Iranian Sammanids was attributed to the Uzbeks, while Iranian cultural heritage was attributed to the Tajiks,” a process which did not reconcile the connection of both groups to a common Iranian culture.121 This historical revisionism was rather useful for the Soviets in creating a

119 The Uzbeks, for example, were a creation of the Soviet State but became a separate cultural identity under Moscow’s designs.

120 Shireen Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 9.

121 Ibid, 10.

50 national identity for the Central Asian countries that did not have a solid foundation of a sense of “nationhood.” However, what was a convenient tool for the Soviets in the creation of a Soviet identity ultimately became the undoing of the Soviet Union, as nationalism reached a fever pitch that reached its apex in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. The Soviets left another cultural legacy for Central Asia and the South Caucasus in terms of the pursuit of religion. As the Soviets were ardent atheists, the cultural policy they instituted succeeded Christianity and Islam with atheism. Although atheism did not really take strong root in the Central Asian and South Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republics, they did to a large extent limit the ability of believers to worship freely. Religious movements were taken underground, and the influence of religious institutions paled in contrast to the influence of the Soviet apparatus.

Culture and Nationalism in the Former Soviet South

Independence can be characterized differently for the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The countries in the South Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Armenia, had a very solidified and institutionalized cultural self-identification. The conflict over administration rights between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the province of Nagorno- Karabakh during the waning moments of the Soviet Union had blossomed into a full- scale war that further nationalized the two states. Georgia, for its part, was busy fighting a civil war to assert Georgian nationalist control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For these countries, independence from the Soviet Union meant the opportunity to extend regional autonomy and authority over culturally and historically significant areas. For Central Asia, however, independence came largely as a shock. As Atabaki mentions, the Central Asian Soviet Republics “were founded as territorial states and not as nation- states” and largely continued to be so after independence.122 The nationalistic tendencies of the Central Asian states were not as defined as they were in the South Caucasus, and the notion of a civil society was not strongly developed in Central Asia. The Soviet

122 Touraj Atabaki, “The Impediments to the Development of Civil Societies in Central Asia,” in Post- Soviet Central Asia, eds. T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1999), 38.

51 nationality thus appealed to those in Central Asia as a means of identification, and this identity was stripped after the advent of independence. The ramifications for the notion of cultural identification are two-fold. Firstly, the newly independent nations that already have a strong sense of identity and culture are unlikely to seek new means of identification after independence. Instead, they will look to nationalistic figures from their well-established history as a means to further nationalistic agenda and to solidify their cultural identification. Secondly, the newly independent nations that do not have a strong sense of national identity, namely the Central Asian nations, will be forced to find a source for nationalism. Some would find nationalism in the revised history presented to the nation via the Soviet Union (ie Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), while others would be more apt to cultural identification from a point in time further in the past. For Iran’s cultural policy, then, those countries without a significant civil society or cultural identity that was firmly established prior to the conquest by the Soviet Union would be more open to establish cultural ties with Iran in a search for national identity.

Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus123

Although Communism had taken root in the Soviet Union as a whole, it was not able to replace religious ideology completely. In the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, for example, the Orthodox Church was not stamped out completely; the Communist Party did, however, put a great deal of pressure on the adherents of Orthodoxy and did not make it easy for them to practice their religion freely. Similarly, in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Socialist Republics, the Communist Regime was unable to replace Islam completely with its ideology in a cultural context.124

123 As Armenians and Georgians would identify themselves primarily as Christians, discussions of Islam in the South Caucasus for the purposes of this paper are limited to Azerbaijan, as Iranian cultural inroads to Armenia and Georgia would not involve Islam.

124 Tchangiz Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” in Post-Soviet Central Asia, eds. T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), 81-82.

52 The brand of Islam that was brought to the Central Asian countries was Sunni Sufism, which embraced a mystical understanding of one’s relation to God.125 As such, there was not a need to attend a mosque or to even have traditional infrastructure in place for the cultural Islamic character to remain within Central Asia. Islam as a system of beliefs that governed every day life and how the individual acted in society was not supplanted by Communism. The impact of Communism on Islam in Central Asia was more on the infrastructure of Islamic organizations, as religious organizations operated under the supervision of the Communist Party.126 Official religion was therefore largely a source of nationalism rather than spirituality,127 and was seen by the Communist Party as a tool of control rather than a threat to Party authority. By contrast, Azerbaijan was influenced most by Twelver Shi’ite Islam, as it was heavily influenced by the Persian Empire until Russian and later Soviet occupation. This sect of Islam is the same type of Islam that is predominant in Iran, and its history is full of existence within the regimes of detractors. From the early days of the Shi’at ‘Ali, or “Partisans of Ali,” the Shi’a have been more or less opposed by the widespread and dominant Sunni Islam sect. Shi’ism accounts for this opposition, and “taqiyya,” the act of concealing true faith for the purposes of prolonging the lives of family or self, is a long-standing tradition that is highly acceptable for adherents to the religion.128 Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, therefore, was not removed by Communism although it was shaped and influenced by it. Communism did not provide a true alternative to Islam as a cultural means of self-identification and action within society. Conversely, it affected the structure of Islam and the ability of Muslims to practice Islam as they saw fit within the Soviet Union. The Islam that emerged out of the ashes of the Soviet Union in the newly independent republics of Central Asia and

125 Edward Walker, “Islam, , and Political Order in Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs 56 no.2 (2003): 23.

126 Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” 82.

127 Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan: reform, reaction, and civil war,” in New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, eds. I. Bremmer and R. Taras, (Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge Press, 1997), 618.

128 For an excellent discourse of this and other Shi’a development issues, see S.H.M. Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shi’a Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

53 Azerbaijan was not the same type of Islam that developed in countries with regimes that supported Islam. It developed more as a means of which to promote nationalism (ie “all Turkmen are Muslims”) and a cultural tool that gave the community a certain notion of ethos rather than regulating every aspect of life. In other words, that it emerged from Azerbaijan and Central Asia at all speaks of Islam’s abilities in self-preservation; that it emerged in the form shaped by the Communist Party speaks of its practical and secular applications as a means of which to solidify Communist rule by promoting nationalism.

Why not Revolutionary Islam in the Former Soviet South?

With the advent of independence in the former Soviet republics, many political scientists theorized that the influence of Iran in the region would largely stem from its export of Revolutionary Islam to Central Asia and Azerbaijan. However, Iran has shied away from using its brand of Revolutionary Islam as a means of which to bring cultural ties closer with these nations. Although religion does play a role in Iran’s foreign policy, it has developed a more “secular” foreign policy in its dealings with Central Asia and the South Caucasus.129 When Turkmenistan’s president was asked about the threat posed by the potential Iranian export of the Islamic Revolution, he responded that he “could see neither an exporter nor anybody who can use such exports.”130 Tehran’s emphasis for cultural ties in the region have been more focused on historical ties with Iran than any push to start an Islamic Revolution in these predominantly Muslim countries. There are a few key reasons that leadership in Iran has decided not to pursue an aggressive policy of radical revolutionary Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. One of the biggest obstacles for an Iranian export of the Islamic Revolution to the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is Iran’s need for political and economic stability in the region.131 Political stability is necessary because of the large numbers of minorities within Iran that have the potential ability to cause problems for the

129 Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 32.

130 Shireen Hunter, “Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy,” Journal of International Affairs 56 (2), 140.

131 Peimani, Regional Security, 32.

54 leadership of Tehran.132 The Islamic Republic had a profoundly negative experience in its conflict with Iraq, and sees the potential for other conflicts just on the other side of the border or within its own borders. As Byman et al poignantly remind us, in Iran “ethnic minority groups are concentrated mainly in border areas and have ties with ethnic groups or states across the border.”133 The Islamic Republic is multi-ethnic, and Iran fears that some of its citizens will identify more with their ethnic identity than with their national identity. Iran is most fearful of its Azeri minority in the northwest of the country, and the potential for that population to be disengaged and dissatisfied with Tehran’s governance in lieu of its independent northern neighbor.134 If Iran were to pursue a policy of export of the Islamic Revolution, they will likely run into opposition from leadership in these countries. Furthermore, there is a great probability that these countries would attempt to marginalize Iran’s ability to export revolutionary Islam by attempting to mobilize ethnic minorities against Tehran. For its own security and to maintain stability in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, it is within Iran’s best interests not to pursue a cultural foreign policy designed around the export of the Islamic revolution as its keystone. Regional stability is desired by Iran mostly, however, because of the economic repercussions of its war with Iraq. The Islamic Republic lost a great deal in terms of infrastructure, industry, and manpower during the Iran-Iraq War. Its economy was in shambles, and its economic relations with other countries proved to be rather weak and incapable of obtaining resources and money to repair the country’s damage. Iran’s efforts with regard to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, therefore, are “to improve bilateral relations with Iran’s trading partners and neighbors in particular, and to avoid or minimize tension.”135 Revolutionary Islam is certainly a point of tension, and is capable of closing potential economic partners off from Iran. In terms of cultural policy, Iran places a greater emphasis on stability and ease of obtaining economic cooperation than on the export of the Islamic Revolution.

132 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy, 78-79.

133 Ibid, 13.

134 Gareth Winrow, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Rubinstein and O. Smolansky, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 102-103.

135 Peimani, Regional Security, 32.

55 Iran has declined to pursue an aggressive promotion of revolutionary Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus also because of the wariness and fear on the part of the newly independent republics of Islamic radicalism.136 One of the results of the Soviet occupation and the Soviet control of religious groups and promotion of atheism was in some Central Asian countries a resurgence of religious political parties and movements. Many of these movements have been particularly Islamic in character, and some have been violent in their attempts to obtain their political goals. This is the case of the Russian North Caucasus just across the border from Georgia, particularly in the area of Chechnya. Radical Islam in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 led to a civil war that only ended when the took full control of the country in 2000. Radical Islam borders both the South Caucasus as well as Central Asia, and the result of such a form of Islam has resulted in conflict in both cases; opposition in the region to radical Islam runs high. After the fall of the , Iran was seen largely as the bastion of Islamic involvement in political struggles in the region because of its past Islamic Revolution. However, as Byman et al remind us, Iran’s war with Iraq caused Tehran to be rather cautious, as it failed time and time again to spread the Islamic Revolution to its Persian Gulf neighbors.137 Iran had to work hard, therefore, if it was to convince its neighbors, particularly those countries with Islamic opposition parties138 that the sights it had set on those countries did not involve an export of the Islamic Revolution. As Iran’s motivation for involvement in the region is largely economic, as mentioned above, export of the Revolution would be contrary to Tehran’s realpolitik needs. Although revolutionary Islamic rhetoric in terms of both a cultural policy and a security policy would demand that Iran support Islamic parties in the former Soviet Union, Iran has instead actively pursued non-involvement with Islamic movements in the region. Another reason for the restraint in seeking an export of the Islamic Revolution in the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus has to do with Iran’s relations with Russia. The Russian Federation is the most important partner that

136 Ibid.

137 Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy, 8.

138 Namely, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

56 the Islamic Republic has in the region: in addition to their cooperation on trade issues, Russia is also Iran’s primary source of arms and technology. Moscow is also the most powerful country in the region, and it would not bode well for Iran’s security interests to intentionally provoke its neighbor to the north. What this means for Iran’s cultural policy is that it must check its interests in promoting Iranian cultural ties with Central Asia and the South Caucasus to ensure that its interests do not clash with those of Russia. 139 Russian troops acting in the interest of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are stationed throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus, in order to protect the territorial integrity of the CIS members as well as to act swiftly against any perceived threat to Russia or the CIS. One of the perceived threats Russia is prepared to act against is the Islamic “threat from the south.”140 If Iran was to export the Islamic Revolution to its new northern neighbors in an attempt to garner cultural influence, it would likely instead find itself faced, at the very least, with increased tension with Russia. The export of the Revolution in Central Asia and the South Caucasus would cause Iran to lose its most important trading partner and source of arms and technology, as well as turn that partner into an enemy.141 Realpolitik interests in its relations with Russia mean that the export of the Islamic Revolution to the former Soviet south is simply not an option for the Islamic Republic in terms of its cultural policy. The case of Tajikistan clearly characterizes both the former Soviet republics’ opposition to radical Islam as well as Iran’s restraint in supporting revolutionary Islam in the region. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a political power struggle emerged in Tajikistan between the former Communist leadership of the country and an alliance of various Islamic-oriented parties. The Islamic party coalition was far from the revolutionary Islam characterized by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and it promoted democratic reform coupled with an Islamic sense of morality.142 This, however, did not stop the characterization of the coalition by the former Communists as being “radical

139 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions Capabilities & Impact (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 7.

140 Winrow, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” 106.

141 Peimani, Regional Security, 57.

142 Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 121.

57 Islamists” that would employ tactics and rule similar to the Iranians in their Islamic Revolution.143 The relatively moderate and modest aims of the Islamic-democratic coalition were seen regionally in light of the Islamists in neighboring Afghanistan or Chechnya on the other side of the Caspian Sea. This characterization was further solidified as the political conflict between the ex-Communists and the Islamists turned into a full-scale civil war that devastated the country. Iran operated in the Tajikistani civil war with a great deal of restraint in terms of its potential to export the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic republic officially declared that it would remain uninvolved in the civil war, and that it had no desire to export the Islamic Revolution to Tajikistan.144 Furthermore, Iran went so far as to show support for the secular ex-Communist Tajikistani leaders when they took over the Tajikistani capital of , and to deliver humanitarian aid to the civil war-ravaged country.145 This restraint in Iran’s actions was coupled with Iran’s desires and attempts to broker a peace deal between the warring parties in Tajikistan. Tehran was attempting to send a clear signal to the rest of the former Soviet south in terms of how it would deal with the question of where Islam belonged in former Soviet politics. The signal sent by Iran seems to be that Islam is less important than the normalization of relations between the Islamic Republic and the former Soviet republics, a stable and productive former Soviet south, and strong economic relations between Iran and the former Soviet south.

If not Revolutionary Islam, then What?

Although Revolutionary Islam is the most visible aspect of Iranian culture, it is far from being the only viable cultural connection between Iran and the republics of the former Soviet Union. Linguistic and ethnic issues are at the forefront of Iran’s cultural foreign policy as Tehran seeks to build bridges of understanding and inroads of influence into its neighbors to the north. Persian language and culture has a history and had an impact in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states, Iranian logic surmises, and time

143 Ibid.

144 Peimani, Regional Security, 32.

145 Ibid.

58 spent under the domination of the Soviet Union severed those ties. Iran’s realpolitik interests hold that in order to garner influence in geopolitics, it must first start with re- establishing the cultural ties that were severed by the Soviet Union with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Furthermore, religion does play a part in Iran’s foreign cultural policy, albeit a much more diminished role when compared to the aims of revolutionary Islam. Religion is used in Iran’s foreign policy only in terms of its cultural connection with the countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and not in any sense of the export of revolutionary Islam characterized by the Islamic Republic’s early days of foreign policymaking. Languages are a key form of self-identity in a cultural context, and also can be used as a component of nationalism. In the case of Central Asia and the South Caucasus after 1991, linguistic ties help to establish a line of communication as well as orientation between the former Soviet republics and their more powerful neighbors. Prior to the establishment of the Soviet Union, the people of Central Asia and Azerbaijan used Arabic script for writing, and Persian was the “administrative and cultural language” of the area.146 Eventually, however, the Soviet Union introduced Cyrillic script for use in Central Asia as a means by which to solidify the created nationalism (Peimani notes that the republics each had a unique set of Cyrillic letters to differentiate nationalities)147 as well as to pave the way for Russian to be used as the de facto administrative and supranational Soviet official language. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, therefore, one of Iran’s policy objectives is to reunite Central Asia with its Iranian cultural roots, and language is the keystone with which Iran can make this connection. The only country in the region that speaks Farsi, the most widespread language used in Iran, is Tajikistan.148 Therefore, although Tajikistan does not share a border with Iran, it is a country that is of utmost importance for Iran insofar as culture is concerned. Tehran actively supported the decision to replace Cyrillic script with the Arabic script in Tajikistan in order to make the

146 Peimani, Regional Security, 45.

147 Ibid.

148 Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 119.

59 written language mutually intelligible in both countries.149 The result of this change increased education opportunity and cooperation between the two countries, as Iran provided school textbooks and other media to Tajikistan.150 The Islamic Republic also provided scholarships for Tajik students to study in Iranian universities. Furthermore, this cleared a path for an increased cultural exchange of literary work, both Iranian and Tajik, as well as television broadcasts from Iran into Tajikistan. All of these efforts to increase the language compatibility between Iran and Tajikistan should really be viewed as an Iranian attempt to gain influence in Tajikistan through cultural means. By promoting the use of Farsi and Arabic script, Iran was then able to promote prominent Iranian literary works. Additionally, the promotion of the use of Arabic script undeniably sought to attach the Tajik people historically to the Persian through the use of their common language. Most importantly, the promotion of the use of Arabic script was a harmless and non-intrusive means by which Iran could shift identification on the part of the Tajikistanis away from the Cyrillic script-using Russians toward the camp of the Arabic script-using Iranians. Iran could simply use the argument that the language is more easily expressed in written form through use of the Persian script without eliciting much argument from the Russians. Religion has also been used in Iran’s foreign policy, although it has not been in the form of Revolutionary Islam that many expected. Although Rubinstein characterizes the Russians as unconcerned about Iran’s spread of the “Iranian revolution” in Central Asia and the South Caucasus,151 the reality is that the religious factors promoted in the region bear hardly any semblance of the Islamic Revolution that ousted the Shah in 1979. It is more accurate to characterize the Iranian spread of missionaries, teachers, and assistance in building mosques not as a spread of Revolutionary Islam, but rather as a counter to the strong Sunni presence in the region supported by countries like Saudi

149 Ibid, 123.

150 Edmund Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 51.

151 Alvin Rubinstein, “Moscow and Tehran,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 52.

60 Arabia and Egypt.152 The Iranian use of religion is not an attempt to overthrow governments and spread the Islamic Revolution; it is simply an attempt to gain regional credibility and spread regional influence.

Regionalism and Iranian Culture

The cultural issues put forth by Iran’s foreign policy seek to reinforce a strong sense of regionalism in Central Asia and the South Caucasus with Iran at the core. Regionalism is the tool that Iran can use to reorient the former Soviet nations away from dependency on Russia, and towards a more solidified relationship with the Islamic Republic. Iran’s endeavors in regionalism are important not only to keep the country from being isolated geopolitically, but rather to reinforce the potential for Iranian influence and build the nation up in terms of geopolitical authority. Herzig recognizes the importance of culture in developing a regional policy, as “Iranian conceptions of regionalism generally attach importance to culture both as a defining feature and as a basis for cooperation.”153 In regional organizations promoted by Iran, then, the influence of culture is inseparable from both the means in which cooperation is promoted as well as the reasons for cooperation to begin with. Promotion of a clear cultural policy is for Iran a means by which it can promote its desire for regionalism. It is not globalism that Iran fears; rather, it is the American dominance in geopolitics and unipolarity that the Iranians wish to marginalize.154 In this context, the nature of the Islamic Republic’s cultural policy with regard to Central Asia and the South Caucasus becomes clearer. By promoting cultural understanding and linking Central Asian and South Caucasian cultural identity to Iran, Tehran is attempting to garner support for its regional capabilities and limit American unipolar influence in the region as a whole.

152 Peimani, Regional Security, 57-58.

153 Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia” International Affairs 80 no.3 (2004): 510.

154 Ibid.

61 For example, within Iran’s primary regional organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Islamic Republic strongly touts shared cultural values between members of the organization. Although some critics, such as Pahlevan, see the ECO as ineffective as an economic organization and “only a framework for a minimum possible cooperation at the regional level,”155 Iran sees the organization in terms of not only its economic effectiveness. Iran views the successes of the ECO with regard to its ability to connect member states culturally as well as economically, with the former eventually contributing to the success of the latter.156 It has been the Islamic Republic of Iran that has emphasized the Islamic nature of the ECO, and that has attempted to use the organization to expand cooperation between the member nations beyond economics to include issues of language, culture, and religion.157 Iran has used the ECO as a tool to promote regionalism and as a means of which to expand its regional power to the detriment of the United States and Russia; it has used cultural issues, such as religion, in order to attempt to forge strong relations between the member states of the ECO and Iran.

Conclusion

Iran’s cultural foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus was strongly influenced by its experiences in attempting to export the Islamic Revolution as well as the legacy left by Soviet occupation of the region. Its failures in its attempts to export the Islamic Revolution to countries of the Persian Gulf immediately after the ousting of the Shah in 1979 signaled Iran’s shift toward more pragmatic and realpolitik orientation of its foreign policy in lieu of a culturally dominated policy. The impact of Soviet structure left Central Asian countries in particular in need of cultural influence, but the development of Islam within the region left it suspicious of any kind of radical Islam, particularly of the Shi’ite variety.

155 Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” 87.

156 Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South, 37.

157 Ibid.

62 The Iranian choice to pursue an aggressive export of radical Islam in the region is notably absent from the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy agenda. Iran chose not to pursue an export of Revolutionary Islam to Central Asia and the South Caucasus because it was not a pragmatic policy to follow. Revolutionary Islam could be a destabilizing factor in the region, as Iran’s own experience in the war with Iraq showed. Tehran needs stability in the region in order to protect its own security and economic interests. Furthermore, the Soviet legacy left the countries of the former Soviet south convinced that radical Islam would supplant its unique national independence with domination by a foreign regime. Finally, Iran’s relations with Russia are tenuous enough that Iran must defer its own foreign policy desires to Russia’s. Russia is too important a trading partner and too great a power in the region for Iran to upset Russia in its attempts to gain influence. Iran’s cultural policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus has promoted linguistic, ethnic, and religious ties to Iran with the attempt at solidifying its position as a regional power. Its use of cultural policy as a tool of regionalism signals Tehran’s pragmatic approach to a geopolitical response to American unipolarity. In contrast to its foreign policy approach immediately after the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy today does not rely heavily on cultural issues. When it does use cultural issues, however, it is as a tool to promote regionalism and a return on the part of Central Asian and South Caucasian countries to the Iranian .

63 CONCLUSION

Iran’s foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991 provides a telling example of its foreign policy objectives after the death of its primary ideologue, Ayatollah Khomeini. Rather than continuing the line of Khomeini’s revolutionary Islamic objectives, Tehran has instead shifted its foreign policy to reflect a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy based on realpolitik. The necessity to shift to a policy based on realpolitik is based on Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War where its vital security, economic, and cultural needs were threatened and compromised by an outside power. Therefore, Tehran’s experiences with the former Soviet south in terms of foreign policy objectives were based on realpolitik rather than tenants of the Islamic Revolution. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iran’s primary foreign policy objective was to guarantee its own security. Accordingly, Tehran advocated a resolution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and did not support the Azerbaijani side in the conflict as revolutionary Islam might have dictated. Iranian fears of the empowerment of its Azeri minority and the strong possibility of an Azeri separatist movement were the pragmatic motivation for Tehran to establish strong ties with “Christian” Armenia in opposition to “Muslim” Azerbaijan. Tehran’s security concerns of the instability surrounding the Tajikistani civil war also led it to oppose the Islamists in that country. The other former Soviet Central Asian countries saw political Islam as a destabilizing factor for the country with the potential to spillover into their respective countries. As such, the Islamic Republic could not support the Islamists in Tajikistan without arousing suspicion among the other Central Asian nations. Therefore, it tacitly voiced its support for the ex-communists in opposition to the Islamists. Whereas Khomeini’s teachings overtly reflect the need for Muslims to support other Muslims in opposition to “tyrannical” secularism, Iran instead opted to follow realpolitik and support the ex-communists. Iran’s realizations that Russia is the true source of regional authority and power in the region, as well as its importance in supplying arms and technology (particularly nuclear technology) to the Islamic Republic play an integral role in Iranian foreign policy

64 in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Due largely to Russia’s development of the Primakov Doctrine, Iran must play a secondary role in matters involving the former Soviet south. In terms of Iran’s security policy, it must recognize the role of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces in former Soviet space acting as the guardian of Russian regional interests. Furthermore, this prevents Iran from actively supporting any type of Islamic-related government in the region. The Islamic Republic’s economic and energy foreign policies have likewise followed realpolitik rather than revolutionary ideology. Although revolutionary Islam emphatically rejects the notion of Western involvement in the economy of the Islamic Republic, pragmaticism led to the liberalization of Iran’s economy and the advent of foreign investment. In terms of Tehran’s foreign policy, most of its contact with the former Soviet south has been in the economic and energy sphere. Iran has significant interests in the oil-rich Caspian region, where its interests converge with those of the other former Soviet nations bordering the sea. Realpolitik in Iran’s economic foreign policy supposes that those with resources have more power; thus in the demarcation of the Caspian, Iran seeks a share for itself that will maximize its profits and ergo, regional power. Furthermore, Iran seeks to marginalize foreign influence in the Caspian, and therefore it particularly sees Western involvement in Caspian pipeline development as a threat to its regional authority. Barring a resolution of the demarcation of the Caspian that is beneficial to Tehran, the Islamic Republic’s most effective means of maximizing its economic capabilities in the Caspian will likely result from its use of oil swaps to encourage regional dependence on Iran. The Economic Cooperation Organization remains another regionalist tool at Iran’s disposal that seeks to reiterate and reinforce its geopolitical power. Although established as a means of which to open economic ties, the ECO is becoming a platform for Iran’s political agenda. It is quite possible, though only theorized, that Iran sees the ECO as an organization that is similar to the European Economic Community, which was the forerunner to the European Union. This would certainly seem probable, as economic integration with the former Soviet Union (among other states) would be a beneficial, effective, and bloodless way for Iran to end its reliance upon Russia and Russia’s domination in the region.

65 In terms of Iran’s cultural policy, it is not nearly as important to its foreign policy as it was in the period directly following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. As is the case with its security and economic policies, Tehran’s cultural policy also follows realpolitik rather than revolutionary ideology. The Islamic Republic’s failure to export the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent invasion by Iraq set the tone for Iran’s cultural policiy following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had a great impact on the culture of the former Soviet republics. Although the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan were predominantly Muslim in name, in practice they were far more influenced by Soviet nationalism than they were by Islam. Additionally, Islam was used in these countries as a means of which to reinforce nationalism under Stalin’s nationalist policy, and thus religions political movements in these countries were viewed through the lens of their experience with the Soviet Union. As revolutionary Islam had a very limited appeal in the former Soviet south, the Islamic Republic sought different means with which to increase its regional appeal. Therefore, it has sought to develop ties with Central Asia and the South Caucasus through linguistic (especially in Tajikistan) and historical ties. At the very least, Tehran wishes to subvert Russian cultural dominance in the region by promoting the use of Arabic script instead of Cyrillic script, and has had limited success in these efforts. The example of Iran’s foreign policy realpolitik in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991 can be very helpful (though not all-encompassing) to predict future Iranian action in other regions of the world. This is particularly true of the current situation in Iraq. If relations with the former Soviet south are any indication, it seems clear that Iran’s pursuits in Iraq will also be based on realpolitik rather than revolutionary Islam. Iran will no doubt seek stability in the area in order to reinforce its own security guarantees, though it no doubt sees American military presence as a threat rather than a stabilizing factor. It is likely that if and when sectarian violence ends in Iraq, Tehran will attempt to solidify economic ties with Iraq and extend regional influence through security and economic measures rather than purely cultural ones. Unless diplomatic ties between the Islamic Republic and the United States are resolved, however, it remains a guessing game as to what Iran has planned for its foreign policy future.

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70 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

William Jerry Johnston, Jr. was born February 24, 1983 in Wichita, Kansas. Raised in the Cocoa Beach, Florida area, Johnston attended the Florida State University where he received his BA in Media Production and Religion in 2004, and his MA in International Affairs in 2007. His research interests include Russia and the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, and Iran. In his spare time he enjoys studying religion and theology, as well as American foreign policy.

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