DOCSLIB.ORG

Belief in the Singularity Is Fideistic

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Belief in the Singularity Is Fideistic Belief in The Singularity is Fideistic Selmer Bringsjord1 • Alexander Bringsjord2 • Paul Bello3 1Department of Computer Science Department of Cognitive Science Lally School of Management & Technology Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) Troy NY 12180 USA [email protected] 2Motalen Inc. Troy NY 12180 USA 3Human and Bioengineered Systems, Code 341 Office of Naval Research 875 N Randolph St Arlington VA 22203 USA [email protected] Contact: [email protected] January 25B 2012 Abstract We deploy a framework for classifying the bases for belief in a category of events marked by being at once weighty, unseen, and temporally removed (wutr, for short). While the primary source of wutr events in Occidental philosophy is the list of miracle claims of credal Christianity, we apply the framework to belief in The Singularity, surely — whether or not religious in nature — a wutr event. We conclude from this application, and the failure of fit with both rationalist and empiricist argument schemas in support of this belief, not that The Singularity won’t come to pass, but rather that regardless of what the future holds, believers in the “machine intelligence explosion” are simply fideists. While it’s true that fideists have been taken seriously in the realm of religion (e.g., Kierkegaard in the case of some quarters of Christendom), even in that domain the likes of orthodox believers like Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and Paley find fideism to be little more than wishful, irrational thinking — and at any rate it’s rather doubtful that fideists should be taken seriously in the realm of science and engineering. 1 Introduction; Plan We deploy a framework for classifying the bases for belief in a category of events marked by being at once weighty, unseen, and temporally removed (= wutr). While the primary source in Occidental philosophy of such events is credal (= orthodox) Christianity,1 we follow Dennett (2007) in viewing philosophizing as equally applicable to religion and science, and apply this framework to the dominant basis (A) for belief in The Singularity, surely — whether or not itself religious in nature — a wutr event. We conclude from this application not that The Singularity won’t come to pass, but rather that regardless of what the future holds, the failure of a fit between A and either rationalist or empiricist argument schemas in support of this belief im- plies that believers in the “machine intelligence explosion” are simply fideists. While it’s true that fideists have been taken seriously in the realm of reli- gion (e.g., Kierkegaard 1986 in the case of some quarters of Christendom), even in that domain the likes of believers like Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and Paley,2 in line as they are with Christian orthodoxy and hence rationalism, find fideism to be little more than wishful, irrational thinking — and at any rate it’s rather doubtful that fideists should be taken seriously in the realm of science and engineering. 1.1 Preliminaries To make the situation a bit more tidy before we begin in earnest, we take a series of preliminary steps. First, we acknowledge the initial oddness of speaking of belief in an event. Traditionally, of course, the targets of belief (and knowledge) are propositions — though we certainly do say such things as that “Knox believes in General Washington,” in which case we are pointing to belief in a person. The situation before us is easily and quickly made cleaner: When we say that some believe in The Singularity, where this is an event, we simply mean 1Which shouldn’t be confused with the denomination known as ‘Greek Orthodox’ — a denomination that does though happen to itself be orthodox/credal in our sense. An elegant characterization of orthodox Christianity is provided by Chesterton (2009). Along the same lines, and no doubt paying homage to his intellectual and spiritual hero, is Lewis’s (1960) Mere Christianity. A more mechanical and modern characterization is obtained by simply following Swinburne (1981) in identifying orthodox Christianity with the union of the propositional claims in its ancient creeds (e.g., Apostle’s, Nicene, Athanasian), which then declaratively speaking within this limited scope harmonizes Catholicism and Protestantism. 2And — see note 1 — Chesterton, Lewis, and Swinburne. 2 that some believe that The Singularity will occur. In a parallel that will form a persistent theme in the inquiry herein, when someone says that they believe in The Resurrection, they are reporting their belief that the event in question (Jesus rising from the dead) happened. Note that belief in an event is thus paired with belief that a certain proposition is true. The same kind of association is in play in the case of belief in a person, since Knox clearly believes such things as that Washington is competent.3 In a second preliminary step, note that the properties being weighty, being unseen, and being temporally removed are here applied to events; and we invoke the already-seen abbreviation of this three-part adjective: wutr. We assume that the property of being temporally removed is clear enough to obviate any sustained analysis. This property applies to an event if it’s purported occurrence is either beyond the recent past or immediate future. Hence, the aforementioned Resurrection is temporally removed. So is WWI, the American Revolutionary War, the death of Adolf Hitler, the falling of a vast part of California into the Pacific Ocean due to a major earthquake, the Second Coming, and the arrival in 2020 of aliens superior in intelligence to most currently alive Norwegians. Clearly, The Singularity is temporally removed. We devote section 2 to characterizing the first two properties in ‘wutr.’ In a third preliminary move, we denote by S the event associated with The Singularity (the arrival on Earth of computing machines more intelligent, indeed vastly more intelligent, than human persons,4) and denote by S the corresponding proposition that this event will in the near future come to pass. By ‘near future’ we mean to encompass any length of time short of a century; hence we charitably adopt a temporally latitudinarian stance with respect to those confident that S will occur. On this stance, we are of course allowing much more time than any reasonable interpretation of ‘foreseeable future,’ and this is a phrase often used to frame predictions that advanced computing-machine intelligence will or will not arrive. For instance, Turing (1950) famously declared that he could foresee a time when humans not only routinely ascribed intelligence and other mental attributes to computers, 3We are happy to agree that believing in a person includes more than mere propositional belief, but this topic isn’t germane to our objectives herein. 4We recognize that The Singularity has now come to be associated with a group of events (e.g., the group often is taken to include the ability of human persons to exist in forms that are not bio-embodied), but to maintain a reasonable scope in the present paper we identify S with only the “smart-machine” prediction, which is quite in line with e.g. the sub-title of the highly influential (Kurzweil 2000): “When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence.” There is also in alignment with the locus classicus: (Good 1965). 3 but also when his test (the so-called ‘Turing Test’) would be passed; indeed he specifically predicted that by 2000 a level of such intelligence on par, linguistically speaking, with that possessed by humans would arrive.5 This prediction turned out to fall completely flat, as we all know by now.6 In a second example, this one falling on the side of pessimism, Floridi (2005) has argued that a certain ingenious test of self-consciousness cannot in the foreseeable future be passed by a computing machine.7 Finally, note that Chalmers (2010) recounts a number of the time-indexed predictions about when S will supposedly occur; our allowing a full century is in this context hyper-charitable. As confirmation of this, consider: Good (1965): S by 2000; Vinge (1993): the explosion between 2005–2030; Yudkowsky (1996): 2021; and Kurzweil (2000): 2030. On the other hand, Chalmers himself appears to believe that S will occur within centuries (note the plural). Since we wish to retain the concept of a foreseeable future, this is too large a range for us to use herein. 1.2 Plan for the Remainder With these preliminary matters settled, we announce our planned sequence for the remainder: In the next section (§2), our exposition aided by considera- tion of the claims of credal Christianity,8 we briefly characterize the category of the weighty and unseen, into which, as will be seen, surely The Singular- ity falls. Then (§3) we briefly summarize the three main epistemic positions of empiricism, rationalism, and fideism. These positions are sketched with help from the basic but eminently sensible and non-partisan epistemological framework erected by Chisholm (1977). Next (§4), we present our proof-by- cases argument for the claim that belief in S is fideistic — an argument that 5We recognize that Turing’s optimism was constrained by certain conditions regarding how long a computing machine’s prowess on his test would last, but such niceties can be safely left aside. 6As a matter of fact, Turing, like — as we shall see — those predicting the coming S, would seem to be guilty of the same fatal sin: failing to give a rationalist (or even an empiricist) argument for the prediction in question. One of us rather long ago happily conceded that the Turing Test will be passed (Bringsjord 1992), but this concession was not accompanied by any timeline whatsoever — and if there had been a timeline, it would have been an exceedingly conservative one.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Developments in Neuroscience and Human Freedom: Some Theological and Philosophical Questions
    S & CB (2003), 16, 123–137 0954–4194 ALAN TORRANCE Developments in Neuroscience and Human Freedom: Some Theological and Philosophical Questions Christianity suggests that human beings are free and responsible agents. Developments in neuroscience challenge this when wedded with two ‘fideisms’: ‘naturalism’ and ‘nomological monism’ (causality applies exclusively to basic particles). The wedding of Galen Strawson’s denial that anything can be a cause of itself with a physicalist account of brain states highlights the problem neuroscience poses for human freedom. If physicalism is inherently reductionistic (Kim) and dualism struggles to make sense of developments in neuroscience, Cartwright’s pluralist account of causality may offer a way forward. It integrates with thinking about the person from a Christian epistemic base and facilitates response to Strawson. Key Words: God, person, neuroscience, freedom, naturalism, nomological monism, physicalism, dualism, causality. Five years ago, the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, hosted a conference on ‘Neuroscience and the Human Spirit’. In his opening address, the organiser, Dr Frederick Goodwin, asked whether developments in the field do not pose a challenge to the ‘very foundation upon which our civilization rests’, namely, ‘free will and the capacity to make moral choices?’ The question I am seeking to address here raises the same issue with respect to the grounds of the Christian understanding of its message and, indeed, of what it is to be a person. In the light of recent advances in understanding the physical workings of our neural substrate, the electrochemical nature of cerebral processing and so on, does it still make sense to conceive of our minds as the free cause of our actions and the conscious centre of human life? So much suggests that the workings of our minds require to be construed in radically physical and, apparently, imper- sonal terms – as a complex causal series of synaptic firings and the like.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Doctrine of Religion As Political Philosophy
    Kant's Doctrine of Religion as Political Philosophy Author: Phillip David Wodzinski Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/987 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2009 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Political Science KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RELIGION AS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY a dissertation by PHILLIP WODZINSKI submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2009 © copyright by PHILLIP DAVID WODZINSKI 2009 ABSTRACT Kant’s Doctrine of Religion as Political Philosophy Phillip Wodzinski Advisor: Susan Shell, Ph.D. Through a close reading of Immanuel Kant’s late book, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the dissertation clarifies the political element in Kant’s doctrine of religion and so contributes to a wider conception of his political philosophy. Kant’s political philosophy of religion, in addition to extending and further animating his moral doctrine, interprets religion in such a way as to give the Christian faith a moral grounding that will make possible, and even be an agent of, the improvement of social and political life. The dissertation emphasizes the wholeness and structure of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as a book, for the teaching of the book is not exhausted by the articulation of its doctrine but also includes both the fact and the manner of its expression: the reader learns most fully from Kant by giving attention to the structure and tone of the book as well as to its stated content and argumentation.
    [Show full text]
  • David Hume, "The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," and Religious Tolerance
    University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Supervised Undergraduate Student Research Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects and Creative Work 5-2020 David Hume, "The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," and Religious Tolerance Jarrett Delozier [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, History of Religion Commons, Intellectual History Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Delozier, Jarrett, "David Hume, "The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," and Religious Tolerance" (2020). Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/2382 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DeLozier 1 Introduction In the history of philosophy of religion and natural theology, David Hume is an immensely influential contributor. One of his most important works in the field is his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which contains his greatest treatment of natural theology, specifically the design argument. However, there’s a big problem which the Dialogues present to understanding Hume. Eleven of the twelve parts of the Dialogues contain Hume’s sharp criticisms and attacks on the Design argument. But in the final part, in what is often called “Philo’s Reversal,” he seems to completely reverse course by renouncing his skepticism and endorsing the Design argument.
    [Show full text]
  • Douglas Hedley, COLERIDGE, PHILOSOPHY and RELIGION: AIDS to REFLECTION and the MIRROR of the SPIRIT
    Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 18 Issue 3 Article 9 7-1-2001 Douglas Hedley, COLERIDGE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: AIDS TO REFLECTION AND THE MIRROR OF THE SPIRIT Ken Casey Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Casey, Ken (2001) "Douglas Hedley, COLERIDGE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: AIDS TO REFLECTION AND THE MIRROR OF THE SPIRIT," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 18 : Iss. 3 , Article 9. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200118330 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss3/9 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. BOOK REVIEWS Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the Spirit by Douglas Hedley Cambridge University Press, 2000, 330pp. KEN CASEY, Kentucky Wesleyan College Emerson, in his panegyric on Plato, notes that "every brisk young man who says in succession fine things to each reluctant generation ... is some reader of Plato, translating into the vernacular, wittily, his good things." He lists a series of eminent thinkers, Boethius, Rabelais, Erasmus, among others, and ends with Coleridge. Modern histories of Platonism tend to relegate Coleridge to a minor role, at best a minor com­ mentator; however, if Douglas Hedley is corr<c'Ct, the view of Coleridge as a minor commentator and patchwork thinker is historically inaccurate and philosophically impoverishing.
    [Show full text]
  • Mystical Experience, Religious Doctrine and Philosophical Analysis
    2 [3 181- MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE, RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE ,AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS P. C. Almond, M. A. (Lancast.er), B.D. (Hons) (London), Th. L. A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Phi tosophy The Department of Philosophy The University of Adelaide De cember, 1978. ''i,\"6-¡'(,,r-í.¡r',,' ii t ti/'i I;t . i rt ¡t(¡ ' { TABLE OF CONTENTS P age III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.. ..... Vi INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF UNITY AND DIVER- SITY IN RELIGIONS I CHAPTER ONE : R. C. ZAEHNER: THE VARIITIES OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 30 CHAPTER TWO : N. SMART: THE MYSTICAL, THE NUMINOUS AND RELIGIOUS TRADI- TIONS... 64 CHAPTER THREE: W. T. STACE: EXTROVERTIVE AND INTROVERTIVE MYSTICISM tlt CHAPTER FOUR: R. OTTO: THE MYSTICAL, THE NUMINOUS AND METAPHYS I CS 156 CHAPTER FIVE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 204 CHAPTER SIX : MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS IN- TERPRETATION: AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE MODELS. 213 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE VARIETIES OF MYSTICAL EX- PERIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PROLEGOMENON 254 STLECT BIBLI OGRAPHY 295 SUMMA R Y The spiritual vacuum generated by the decline of t.he Christian world-view in the West has creaLed for Western man the opportunity of taking up any one of a variety of modes of spirituality. Religious diversity has become a fact in Western religious Iife. This increasj-ng pluralism has led to a real-isation of the philosophical problem in- herent in it, a probl-em crystallised in the so-called 'con- flicting truth cl-aimsr problem:- The different religions appear to make different and incompatible cl-aims about the nature of ultimate re afity, of divinity, ofl human nature , and cosmi c destiny .
    [Show full text]
  • Faith and Reason: from Vatican I to John Paul I1
    FAITH AND REASON: FROM VATICAN I TO JOHN PAUL I1 AVERY CARDlNAL DULLES, S.), John Paul 11's encyclical of September 14, 1998, on "Faith and Reason" takes up a theme that has been a staple of Western theology since at least the time of Augustine in the*fourth century. St. Anselm in the twelfth century and St. Thomas iquinas, in the thirteenth, argued brilliantly for the harmony between faith and reason. The medieval synthesis, already wounded by the inroads of fourteenth- century Nominalism, was sharply contested fiom two sides in the sev- enteenth and eighteenth centuries. At one extreme were self-assured rationalists, who belittled the role of faith, and at the other, skeptical fideists, who distrusted the powers of reason. Since some Catholic thinkers of the early nineteenth century were tainted by these two errors, the Roman Magisterium issued condemnations of both ration- alism and fideism. The official Catholic position was most authorita- tively summarized in 1870 by the First Vatican Council in its Dog- matic Constitution on Catholic Faith, which contained a chapter dedicated to the theme of faith and reason. e Without actually mentioning Thomas Aquinas, Vatican I endorsed 4. 194 AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, S.J. Fronl Vatican I to John Paul I1 195 his position. A decade later, in 1879, Pope Leo XI11 published his might have been expected simply to enlarge upon the positions of encyclical Aetmi Pdtris, proposing St. Thomas as the thinker whose Vatican I, very much as Leo XI11 had done in his encyclical on synthesis of faith and reason should be accepted as a solid founda- Thomistic philosophy in 1879.
    [Show full text]
  • Augustine's Three Discoveries: Faith, Will and History
    Augustine’s Three Discoveries: Faith, Will and History Augustine and the City of God Augustine (354-430) is usually treated, and quite justifiably so, as the first medieval philosopher in European intellectual history. However, we all know that he was neither medieval, nor a philosopher, nor, for that matter, a European. He was born and raised a Roman citizen in North Africa, where he was educated to be a public speaker, to become a professor of rhetoric first in Carthage and then in Rome, who, after a brief stint in the imperial court in Milan, having converted to Christianity, returned to Africa, where he became the bishop of Hippo and spent the rest of his life there, tending to his flock, writing theological treatises, while getting involved in sometimes rather bitter theological debates. But this brief summary of apparently conflicting, yet equally justified characterizations merely emphasizes Augustine’s significance as a transitional figure in intellectual history, straddling fundamentally different periods, indeed leading humanity from one into another within the time-span of a single human life. Looking at Augustine from this perspective, as one should especially in the context of a large-scale survey of intellectual history, approaching his monumental City of God, I believe we should focus precisely on those aspects of this work that point in the direction of the “new era”. Therefore, aside from the practical consideration of the impossibility of covering every aspect of this huge and enormously rich work in one sitting, I suggest we focus on those three main aspects of it that express what proved to be the “lasting novelties” of Augustine’s thought: his discoveries of faith, will and history as appropriate subjects of philosophical reflection.
    [Show full text]
  • Fideism and Presuppositionalism
    Grace Theological JournalS.1 ( 1987) 89- 99 FIDEISM AND PRESUPPOSITIONALISM STEPHEN R. SPENCER The oft-asserted view that a presuppositional apologetic is in­ herently fideistic raises the question of whether Cornelius Van Til was, indeed, afideist. When Van Til's writings are examined in light of fide ism defined as an advocacy of faith as the sole source of reliance in the ascertaining of truth, fide ism is seen as incompatible with Van Til's position. His presuppositional approach manifests a concern for truth, for rationality, and for a faith that has both content andfoundaiion. * * * INTRODUCTION ERTAINLY one of the most frequent characterizations of the pre­ C suppositional apologetic of Cornelius Van Til is that it is "fideistic." Lewis, for example, is concerned that Van Til, despite serving forty-five years as a professor of apologetics, has constructed a system of theology, not a system of apologetics. l In Lewis's estima­ tion, Van Til has not supplied a means of disputing with unbelievers concerning the truthfulness of Christianity. "In the name of defending the faith he has left the faith defenseless. ,,2 Montgomery likewise warns against Van Til's tendency to treat the unbeliever as a believer, working out systematic theology and its implications rather than verifying Christianity by "focusing upon their needs" and using as a "starting point" the "common rationality.,,3 Montgomery fears that Van Til has given the unbeliever "the impres­ sion that our gospel is as aprioristically, fideistically irrational as the presuppositional claims of its competitors.'" 'G. R. Lewis, "Van Til and Carnell-Part I," in Jerusalem and Athens (ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Hume and Pascal Terence Penelhum
    Document generated on 09/24/2021 7:46 p.m. Lumen Selected Proceedings from the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies Travaux choisis de la Société canadienne d'étude du dix-huitième siècle Human Nature and Truth: Hume and Pascal Terence Penelhum Volume 12, 1993 URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1012578ar DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1012578ar See table of contents Publisher(s) Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies / Société canadienne d'étude du dix-huitième siècle ISSN 1209-3696 (print) 1927-8284 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Penelhum, T. (1993). Human Nature and Truth: Hume and Pascal. Lumen, 12, 45–64. https://doi.org/10.7202/1012578ar Copyright © Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies / Société This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit canadienne d'étude du dix-huitième siècle, 1993 (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ 5. Human Nature and Truth: Hume and Pascal It may seem strange to combine the names of two such radically opposite thinkers as Blaise Pascal and David Hume. But I shall suggest that when we juxtapose some of the fundamental aspects of their thought, the result is instructive in several ways. First, though least in real impor• tance, I think it becomes possible to make some conjectures about direct influence from Pascal in the seventeenth century to Hume in the eight• eenth.
    [Show full text]
  • Theodicy and Reason Logic, Metaphysics
    THEODICY AND REASONTHEODICY Philosophica 2 — Theodicy and Reason Logic, Metaphysics, GERETTO, PERISSINOTTO CAMPOSAMPIERO, FAVARETTI and Theology in Leibniz’s Essais de Théodicée (1710) edited by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mattia Geretto, and Luigi Perissinotto Edizioni Ca’Foscari Theodicy and Reason Philosophica Collana diretta da Luigi Perissinotto Cecilia Rofena 2 Edizioni Ca’Foscari Philosophica Direttori Luigi Perissinotto (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Cecilia Rofena (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Comitato scientifico Silvana Borutti (Università degli studi di Pavia, Italia) Jean-Pierre Cometti (Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I, France) Arnold Davidson (University of Chicago, USA) Roberta Dreon (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Giuseppe Goisis (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Daniele Goldoni (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Mauro Nobile (Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Italia) Gian Luigi Paltrinieri (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia) Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte (Universitat de València-Estudi General, España) Direzione e redazione Univerisità Ca’ Foscari Venezia Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali Palazzo Malcanton Marcorà Dorsoduro 3484/D, 30123 Venezia http://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/col/dbc/10/Philosophica Theodicy and Reason Logic, Metaphysics, and Theology in Leibniz’s Essais de Théodicée (1710) edited by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mattia Geretto, and Luigi Perissinotto Venezia Edizioni Ca’ Foscari - Digital Publishing 2016 Theodicy and Reason:
    [Show full text]
  • The Continuity of John Hick's Thought
    EVOLUTIONARY MONISM: THE CONTINUITY OF JOHN HICK'S THOUGHT A THESIS SUBMITTED IN CANDIDACY for THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS Stephen Shaw Institute for Christian Studies August 1985 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION................................................... 4 CHAPTER 1 - THE HUMAN KNOWER................................... 9 FAITH AS PROPOSITIONAL BELIEF.................................. 9 FAITH AS MEDIATED AWARENESS................................... 15 SIGNIFICANCE AND INTERPRETATION...........................16 SIGNIFICANCE AND ACTION.................................. 18 INTERPENETRATION AND MEDIATION............................19 THREE ORDERS OF OOGNITION................................ 19 Natural.... .............................. .......... 19 Moral.......... ...................... .............. 20 Religious........................................... 21 THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS..................24 VARIATIONS IN INTERPRETIVE FREEDOM........................26 Natural.... .........................................26 Moral......... ......................................26 Religious............. .............................. 27 CHAPTER 2 - THE HUMAN IN THE MAKING........................... 29 THE TWO THEODICIES............................................ 29 THE FIRST STAGE OF CREATION, MORAL EVIL AND PAIN...............33 MORAL EVIL............................................... 33 PAIN..................................................... 36 THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS................................. 39
    [Show full text]
  • Faith and Reason
    Phil 2301 Intro to Philosophy FAITH AND REASON "More consequences for thought and action follow from the affirmation or denial of God than from answering any other basic question. They follow for those who regard the question as answerable only by faith or only by reason, and even for those who insist upon suspending judgment entirely." —Great Books of the Western World, volume 2, p. 543. Introduction: Why do you believe in God? I. The Relationship Between Faith and Reason A. Introductory questions on the relationship between faith and reason • Is religious belief and Christian faith rational? • Is Christian faith an essentially irrational activity? • Is Christian faith an arational activity? • If the claims of religious belief cannot be proven, is it still reasonable to prove these claims? • How many things are there in life that we cannot prove, and yet we believe them any way? • In this sense, could belief in God, and other religious beliefs be properly basic? • Is it sometimes morally permissible purposefully to get one self to believe what the evidence alone does not warrant, and this for pragmatic or existential reasons? • Is faith a separate form of life wherein external judgments are precluded and objective reason plays a very limited role? “For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavor to convince one another in matters of religion.” —John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), II, 415. B. The precise issue What role should reason play in the validation or invalidation of religious belief systems and practices? I.
    [Show full text]