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Science, Religion, and Virtue: Toward Excellence in Dialogue Daniel Richard Deen

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Science, Religion, and Virtue: Toward Excellence in Dialogue Daniel Richard Deen Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2015 Science, Religion, and Virtue: Toward Excellence in Dialogue Daniel Richard Deen Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND VIRTUE: TOWARD EXCELLENCE IN DIALOGUE By DANIEL RICHARD DEEN A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2015 Daniel Richard Deen defended this dissertation on July 15, 2015. The members of the supervisory committee were: Michael Ruse Professor Directing Dissertation John Kelsay University Representative Russell Dancy Committee Member Piers Rawling Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii Dedicated to Paul C.L. Tang iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would first like to thank my committee members Russell Dancy, Piers Rawling, and John Kelsay for quickly coming together and making the completion of this project possible. I would also like to thank the department of philosophy at FSU for giving me the opportunity to enhance my philosophical training in such a congenial environment. I have fond memories of the graduate seminars and reading groups of Michael Ruse, Michael Bishop, Russ Dancy, Al Mele, David McNaughton, Piers Rawling, and Jack Justus. All have left their intellectual fingerprints upon my work in one way or another. Perhaps more importantly, I offer a special thank you to the office staff for making sure I had all necessary administrative paperwork adequately accounted for; I owe Karen Foulke many flowers and Ben Miller and Jeff Hinzmann much bourbon! I would be remiss not to mention the wonderful cast of characters of philosophy graduate students that became friends during my time at FSU. Lastly, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my advisor Michael Ruse. Without his intellectual latitude and constant encouragement, this project would not have come to completion. I am proud to have been intellectually formed through his mentorship. Apart from the people at FSU, I must give a heartfelt thank you to Dr. Jim Bachman and Dr. Jeff Mallinson at Concordia University Irvine for coming together on short notice to read through and comment on the entire manuscript. I also thank Dr. Scott Keith for being ever available, pipe in hand, to decompress after a day of writing. I extend my heartfelt thanks to Dr. Rod Rosenbladt for steering me toward an academic career early in my undergraduate life and for his continual mentoring throughout my long academic journey. Likewise, I thank Dr. Paul C. L. Tang for whom this dissertation is dedicated. While he is not present to see its completion, I would not be here without his friendship. Finally, I thank my family. To my mom and stepfather for always being ready to help. To my children, whose constant smiles and pure joy at my homecomings after long days in the office empowered me to persevere. Lastly, my indefatigable wife who consciously created a domestic environment filled with constant encouragement, love, and forgiveness. Without such support I would not have made it, I love you. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Socratic Insight .................................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Chapter Contents ................................................................................................................. 3 2. CONFLICT AS INQUIRY: ALVIN PLANTINGA .................................................................. 7 2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Philosophy of Religion ........................................................................................................ 8 2.2.1 Aquinas/Calvin Model .............................................................................................. 8 2.2.2 Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model ........................................................................... 10 2.2.3 Fideism ................................................................................................................... 12 2.2.4 Taming Diversity: The Problem of Religious Pluralism ........................................ 14 2.3 Plantinga and Science ........................................................................................................ 17 2.3.1 Methodological Naturalism .................................................................................... 17 2.3.2 Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism .......................................................... 20 2.3.3 Problems with the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism ............................ 24 2.4 Conflict as Inquiry: Invasive Fideism ............................................................................... 27 2.5 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................................... 29 3. CONFLICT AS INQUIRY: PHILIP KITCHER ...................................................................... 30 3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 30 3.2 Philosophy of Science ....................................................................................................... 31 3.2.1 Well-Ordered Science ............................................................................................ 31 3.2.2 Ideal Conversation .................................................................................................. 32 3.2.3 Scientism ................................................................................................................ 35 3.2.4 Taming Diversity: The Problem of Value Pluralism .............................................. 36 3.3 Kitcher and Religion ......................................................................................................... 39 3.3.1 Against Supernaturalism ........................................................................................ 39 3.3.2 Orientation Model .................................................................................................. 40 3.3.3 Enlightenment Argument Against Religion ........................................................... 44 3.4 Conflict as Inquiry: Invasive Scientism ............................................................................ 47 3.5 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................................... 48 4. VIRTUE AND INQUIRY ........................................................................................................ 50 4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 50 4.2 Virtue Epistemology ......................................................................................................... 51 v 4.2.1 Virtue-Reliabilism and Virtue-Responsibilism ...................................................... 51 4.2.2 Form of Inquiry ...................................................................................................... 52 4.2.3 Plantinga, Kitcher, and Virtue Epistemology ......................................................... 54 4.3 Two Forms of Inquiry ....................................................................................................... 54 4.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 54 4.3.2 Nature of Inquiry ................................................................................................... 55 4.3.2.1 Epistemic Goals: Truth vs. Understanding ............................................... 56 4.3.2.2 Successful Inquiry ..................................................................................... 57 4.3.3 Virtuous Inquiry: Disciplinary Inquiry ................................................................... 58 4.3.3.1 Plantinga and Kitcher: In Disciplinary Context ........................................ 61 4.3.4 Virtuous Inquiry: Interdisciplinary Inquiry ............................................................ 63 4.3.5 Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................. 66 4.4 Plantinga, Kitcher, and Intellectual Vice ......................................................................... 67 4.4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 67 4.4.2 Plantinga's Intellectual Vices .................................................................................. 68 4.4.3 Kitcher's Intellectual Vices ..................................................................................... 71 4.4.4 Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................
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