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Olson's Standard Poodles

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Olson's Standard Poodles Sun-Golden Kennels STANDARD POODLE PUPPY PURCHASE AGREEMENT LIMITED REGISTRATION BREEDER/Seller: Mike or Sharon Long 7812 N. Longview Ct. Edgerton, WI. 53534 608-884-4000 [email protected] www.sungoldenkennels.com Definitions used herein include: "BUYER" shall herein be define as: ___________________________ BREEDER" or “SELLER” Shall herein be defined as: Mike or Sharon Long "PUPPY" shall herein be defined as “A PUPPY”, registered with the American Kennel Club (AKC) with the registered name of: SHARMIK’S________________________________ AKC Litter registration # PRXXXXXX Sire: AKC #PRXXXXXX Reg Name ____________________________________ Dam: AKC# PRXXXXXX Reg Name ___________________________________ The Sun-Golden Standard Poodle described above is sold for the sum of $1000.00 Payment to be made in full with cash or visa/mc. A pet puppy is defined here to be a Standard Poodle puppy which is in good health at the time of sale, and embodies the characteristics of the Standard Poodle breed. This puppy is purebred and the litter has been (registered) with the American Kennel Club. The Parents of this Puppy have had OFA x-rays to establish that they are free of Hip Dysplasia, Elbow disease, Heart disease and Eye disease The puppy is registered with a limited registration, which will prohibit breeding and registering offspring. The BUYER agrees this PUPPY is to be spayed/neutered at the appropriate age of (9-12 months) allowing for some sexual maturity of the pup which is necessary for their development. Veterinarian confirmation of this procedure must be supplied to the BREEDER by the time the pup is 1year of age or the contract is null and void. If found that this Sharmik Standard Poodle PUPPY has been used for mixed breed production (Breeding), this contract will have been breached and will result in the return of the said PUPPY with Litter Registration # PR146512 to Mike & Sharon Long of Sun-Golden Kennels, at the buyer’s expense, with no refund, or legal action will be taken. The BREEDER guarantees the above described dog to be healthy at the time of the sale, and has received the appropriate shots and worming schedule for the PUPPY's age. The BREEDER will provide Buyer with a Health Record detailing the treatment the PUPPY has received under the BREEDER'S care. The BREEDER does not assume any liability for any injury to said PUPPY after delivery. The BUYER agrees to have this PUPPY examined by a veterinarian within three days of delivery (Unless otherwise agreed upon due to travel, etc.) If the PUPPY is found to be other than healthy by the BUYER's veterinarian, it shall be returned to the BREEDER immediately, and the purchase price will be refunded. Deadline for this refund is one week from the purchase date. The BUYER agrees to maintain the PUPPY's health in good condition, and to provide yearly examinations, vaccinations, worming and any other usual procedures necessary to assure good health. The BREEDER has done everything possible to produce healthy sound puppies. By raising the puppies in the best way possible in regards to diet, exercise, socialization and veterinary care. There are many factors that can influence growth and development, such as diet, exercise, weight gain, etc. The BUYER assumes the responsibility to carry on with the appropriate vaccinations, exercise and feeding schedule, as supplied by the BREEDER. Standard Poodle being a large breed dog, have a muscular and skeletal system that is growing until 18-24 months of age. Exercise must be limited until said time (18-24 months) due to the growth of their muscles, bones, bone plates, etc. Several mile hikes, walks, or repetitive jumping will break down their hips early if done prior to this age, causing hip dysplasia that is not related to genetics. In cases where this is participated in, this contract has been breached and the Health Guarantee is null and void. The BUYER hereby agrees that if at any time the BUYER cannot take proper care of the PUPPY, the BUYER must contact the BREEDER and the BREEDER will have the first choice to either: 1. Take the PUPPY back with no refund or 2. Assist the BUYER in finding a suitable home for the PUPPY. The BREEDER offers a Health Guarantee (see attached document) that this PUPPY to be free of any genetic diseases for a period of two (2) year from date of sale. Genetics diseases may or may not surface until later in a dog's life cycle. Some genetic issues can however, become identifiable with a one to two-year period. The BUYER agrees that the SELLER is not responsible for the actions or safety of this dog once it leaves the SELLER'S possession. The SELLER is not liable for any costs that result from such actions. All provisions of this contract are designed to safeguard the dog, the breed, in general and /or the community, and as such, violation of any provision will cause damage to the BREEDER'S reputation. Failure to comply with any provision will result in the return of the dog to the SELLER at the BUYERS expense. The BREEDER strongly recommends that the BUYER attend obedience classes with the PUPPY and provide proper socialization opportunities for the PUPPY. The BREEDER neither makes or implies any warranties or guarantees, express or implied, other than those written in the agreement including, without limitation, the warranties of merchantability and fitness. This document constitutes the entire agreement between the BREEDER and BUYER with respect to this sale. BUYER'S signature below indicates that he/she has read, agrees to and does understand all the conditions of this Sales Agreement and Contract of Sale. DATE: ____________, 20_____ BUYER/BUYERS:_________________________________________________________________ Signature:____________________________ Signature 2:_________________________ Address:____________________________________________________________ City:___________________________________State:______________ZIP:____________________ Phone:_________________________________CELL:_________________ E-mail:____________________________ BREEDER: Mike or Sharon Long Signature:___________________________ Date:_______________ TEMPERAMENT The BREEDER strongly recommends that the BUYER attend puppy class and obedience classes with PUPPY and provide proper socialization opportunities for the PUPPY. .
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