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CERN Articles on Computer Security Written by the CERN Computer Security Team ( CERN Articles on Computer Security Written by the CERN Computer Security Team (http://cern.ch/security). Version of August 2018 This publication is released under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License Table of Contents Computer Security .............................................................................................................................. 8 The rancid USB box of chocolate (2018) ......................................................................................... 8 Protect your Family (2018) ............................................................................................................. 9 An old scam in a new disguise (2018) ........................................................................................... 10 Stepping up in user education (2018) ........................................................................................... 11 Malware, ransomware, doxware and the like (2018) .................................................................. 11 Another way of making money with ads (2018) ........................................................................... 13 Enter the next level: Doxware (2017) ........................................................................................... 13 Why you got a new PDF reader (2017) ......................................................................................... 15 “WannaCry”? The importance of being patched (2017) .............................................................. 16 Drive-bye (2016) ........................................................................................................................... 17 Playing hardball? Unfortunately it’s necessary... (2016) .............................................................. 17 DNS to the rescue! (2016) ............................................................................................................ 18 A few Christmas goodies for your security (2016)........................................................................ 19 Open door, open screen, open life... (2016) ................................................................................. 20 Flash, as bad as bad can be (2016) ............................................................................................... 20 Ransomware — When it is too late... (2016) ................................................................................ 21 Mac security — Nothing for old versions (2016) .......................................................................... 21 USB sticks — The silent killers (2015) ........................................................................................... 22 Bye, bye, Windows XP security... Welcome infections! (2014) .................................................... 23 Agility for computers (2014) ......................................................................................................... 23 Don’t put your family at risk (2013) .............................................................................................. 25 Got a call from "Microsoft"? The social way infecting your PC (2012)......................................... 26 Infecting Windows, Linux & Mac in one go (2012) ....................................................................... 27 Gotcha! Macs lose their innocence (2012) ................................................................................... 28 Found a USB stick? Go and infect your PC! (2012) ....................................................................... 28 25 years — Happy Birthday! (2011) .............................................................................................. 29 Mobile and Cloud Security ................................................................................................................ 30 Trips and travel: Some recommendations (2017) ........................................................................ 30 Pokémon GO! Or not? (2016) ....................................................................................................... 31 I know where you have been… since forever! (2016) .................................................................. 31 Android’s Armageddon… Reloaded (2016) .................................................................................. 32 Update on your privacy – or lack of it (2015) ............................................................................... 33 Android’s armageddon (2015) ...................................................................................................... 34 2 | P a g e IT or not IT, that is the question (2015) ........................................................................................ 34 Enter the cloud, pay with your password (2014) ......................................................................... 35 Your iPhone as a key-logger (2014) .............................................................................................. 36 Backed up and gone... (2013) ....................................................................................................... 37 BYOD: Bring Your Own Disaster (2013) ........................................................................................ 38 Android is the new Windows (2013) ............................................................................................ 38 Prison or “Prism”? Your data in custody (2013) ........................................................................... 39 … And thank you for your mobile data! (2012) ............................................................................ 40 One photo to rule your phone (2012) .......................................................................................... 41 Smartphone lost — Privacy gone (2012) ...................................................................................... 42 When the “Lion” eats your data (2012) ........................................................................................ 42 Is your Android running a temperature? (2012) .......................................................................... 43 IPhones, Androids, and history repeating (2011) ......................................................................... 44 Send your data into the cloud and make it… vaporize (2011) ...................................................... 44 Network and Data Center Security ................................................................................................... 46 Spectre and Meltdown, just the beginning? (2018) ..................................................................... 46 Scaling out intrusion detection (2018) ......................................................................................... 47 Hardball for attackers (2017) ........................................................................................................ 48 CERN under friendly poking (2017) .............................................................................................. 49 An attack for more security (2017) ............................................................................................... 50 Transparent monitoring for your protection (2016) .................................................................... 51 DirtyCow BBQ — Well done, CERN! (2016) .................................................................................. 52 Hacking CERN — A win-win for all (2015) ..................................................................................... 53 “Heartbleed” — A disaster for privacy (2014) .............................................................................. 54 After Prism & Tempora: How much monitoring is OK for CERN? (2013) ..................................... 55 The lure of wireless encryption (2013) ......................................................................................... 56 Why I like power cuts... (2012) ..................................................................................................... 57 Account and Password Security ........................................................................................................ 58 A second factor to the rescue (2018) ........................................................................................... 58 The easy way to lose passwords (2018) ....................................................................................... 59 CERN secure password competition… NOT! (2018) ..................................................................... 60 Brain power vs. password managers (2018)................................................................................. 61 Pimp up your password (2016) ..................................................................................................... 62 The value of your password (2016) .............................................................................................. 63 What is your identity? (2016) ....................................................................................................... 64 3 | P a g e Your privacy at CERN matters (2015) ........................................................................................... 65 CERN secure password competition (2015) ................................................................................. 65 Oops, there it goes... (2015) ......................................................................................................... 66 Don’t copy/paste
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