El Caso De La Política Pública De Seguridad Nacional En México

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El Caso De La Política Pública De Seguridad Nacional En México CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y DOCENCIA ECONÓMICAS, A. C. EL RETO DE LA COORDINACIÓN INTERORGANIZACIONAL: EL CASO DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL EN MÉXICO TESIS PARA OBTENER EL GRADO DE DOCTOR EN POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS PRESENTA BERNARDO JORGE ALMARAZ CALDERÓN DIRECTOR DE LA TESIS: DR. DAVID ARELLANO GAULT CIUDAD DE MÉXICO JULIO DE 2019 DEDICATORIA Dedico esta obra a la memoria de mi Padre, el Dr. Felipe Almaraz Navarrete. Tu ejemplo es el norte que me guía. Dedico también esta obra a la memoria de mi hermano, el Dr. Carlos Antonio Almaraz Calderón. Tu ejemplo de vida ha sido siempre la motivación a buscar nuevos horizontes. AGRADECIMIENTOS A mi madre, Carmen, por su entrega y ejemplo de nunca claudicar. A Felipe, por siempre estar ahí. A Jesús y Luz del Carmen, por todo su apoyo. Al CIDE, por haberme formado profesionalmente y aleccionarme sobre la importancia de hacer de las instituciones públicas mecanismos de cambio social. Al Dr. David Arellano Gault, por enseñarme sobre decisiones, irracionalidad y contingencia; pero, sobre todo, por nunca perder la fe en mí. A Amalia, por nunca soltarme, por ser mi motivo y por haberme elegido a mí. El reto de la Coordinación Interorganizacional: El caso de la Política Pública de Seguridad Nacional en México ÍNDICE 1. Introducción .................................................................................................................. 1 2. Revisión de la literatura ............................................................................................. 10 2.1 Coordinación. 2.2 Relaciones interorganizacionales. 2.3 Descoordinación como patología. 2.4 Cómo resolver la descoordinación. 2.5 Interdependencia e interacción como elementos fundamentales para la coordinación. 2.6 Certidumbre y coordinación. 3. Planteamiento teórico ................................................................................................. 26 3.1 Comportamiento organizacional. 3.2 Coordinación como instrumento organizacional. 3.3 Coordinación como resultado de interdependencia, interacción y certidumbre 3.4 Hipótesis. 3.4.1 La coordinación es resultado del comportamiento organizacional estratégico. 3.4.2 La variación en las condiciones organizacionales y político- administrativas genera distintas tipologías de coordinación. 4. Metodología ................................................................................................................. 43 4.1 Planteamiento. 4.2 Variables de análisis. 4.2.1 Interdependencia. 4.2.2 Interacción. 4.2.3 Certidumbre. 4.3 Operacionalización de las variables de análisis. 4.4 Recolección de información. 4.5 Selección temática. 5. Estudio de caso ............................................................................................................ 65 5.1 Justificación del estudio de caso. 5.2 La Seguridad Nacional como política pública. 5.3 La Seguridad Nacional en México. 5.3.1 El nuevo andamiaje institucional. 5.4 Coordinación como elemento fundamental de la política de Seguridad Nacional. 5.5 Transformaciones organizacionales en la política de Seguridad Nacional. 5.6 Transformaciones administrativas y presupuestales en el aparato de Seguridad Nacional. 5.6.1 Evolución presupuestal. 5.7 Coordinación para la atención de desastres naturales. 5.7.1 Antecedentes. 5.7.2 Contexto general. 5.7.3 Elementos de interdependencia. 5.7.3.1 Conflicto burocrático. 5.7.3.2 Mecanismos de toma de decisiones. 5.7.3.3 Recursos disponibles. 5.7.3.4 Grado de institucionalización. 5.7.4 Elementos de interacción. 5.7.4.1 Relevancia pública. 5.7.4.2 Actores externos. 5.7.4.3 Diseño de la estructura de coordinación. 5.7.4.4 Posibilidad de ajustes. 5.7.5 Elementos de certidumbre. 5.7.5.1 Rupturas institucionales 5.7.5.2 Desconfianza interorganizacional. 5.7.5.3 Supervisión y sanciones. 5.7.5.4 Rendición de cuentas. 5.8 Coordinación para atender incrementos atípicos de violencia. 5.8.1 Antecedentes. 5.8.2 Contexto general. 5.8.3 Elementos de interdependencia. 5.8.3.1 Conflicto burocrático. 5.8.3.2 Mecanismos de toma de decisiones. 5.8.3.3 Recursos disponibles. 5.8.3.4 Grado de institucionalización. 5.8.4 Elementos de interacción. 5.8.4.1 Relevancia pública. 5.8.4.2 Actores externos. 5.8.4.3 Diseño de la estructura de coordinación. 5.8.4.4 Posibilidad de ajustes. 5.8.5 Elementos de certidumbre. 5.8.5.1 Rupturas institucionales y Desconfianza interorganizacional. 5.8.5.2 Supervisión y sanciones. 5.8.5.3 Rendición de cuentas. 5.9 Coordinación para desarticulación de organizaciones delictivas. 5.9.1 Antecedentes. 5.9.2 Contexto general. 5.9.3 Elementos de interdependencia. 5.9.3.1 Conflicto burocrático. 5.9.3.2 Mecanismos de toma de decisiones. 5.9.3.3 Recursos disponibles. 5.9.3.4 Grado de institucionalización. 5.9.4 Elementos de interacción. 5.9.4.1 Relevancia pública. 5.9.4.2 Actores externos. 5.9.4.3 Diseño de la estructura de coordinación. 5.9.4.4 Posibilidad de ajustes. 5.9.5 Elementos de certidumbre. 5.9.5.1 Rupturas institucionales y Desconfianza interorganizacional. 5.9.5.2 Supervisión y sanciones. 5.9.5.3 Rendición de cuentas. 5.10 Coordinación para generación de inteligencia. 5.10.1 Antecedentes. 5.10.2 Contexto general. 5.11.3 Elementos de interdependencia. 5.10.3.1 Conflicto burocrático. 5.10.3.2 Mecanismos de toma de decisiones. 5.10.3.3 Recursos disponibles. 5.10.3.4 Grado de institucionalización. 5.10.4 Elementos de interacción. 5.10.4.1 Relevancia pública. 5.10.4.2 Actores externos. 5.10.4.3 Diseño de la estructura de coordinación. 5.10.4.4 Posibilidad de ajustes. 5.10.5 Elementos de certidumbre. 5.10.5.1 Rupturas institucionales. 5.10.5.2 Desconfianza Interorganizacional. 5.10.5.3 Supervisión y sanciones. 5.10.5.4 Rendición de cuentas. 6. Principales resultados ...................................................................................................... 210 6.1 Coordinación en la política pública de Seguridad Nacional. 6.2 Variables organizacionales y político-administrativas en la Coordinación 6.3 Coordinación como función de la interdependencia, la interacción y la certidumbre organizacional. 6.4 Coordinación como estrategia organizacional. 7. Consideraciones finales e implicaciones de política pública ......................................... 218 7.1 Consideraciones teóricas. 7.2 Consideraciones para la política pública de Seguridad Nacional. 7.3 Corolario: Coordinación o el traje nuevo del rey. 7.4 Apuntes para Investigaciones futuras. ANEXOS. Anexo 1 Solicitudes de información realizadas al Consejo de Seguridad Nacional .............. 223 Anexo 2 Marco normativo de la Seguridad Nacional ............................................................ 225 Anexo 3 Restricciones normativas de la Seguridad Nacional ................................................ 228 Anexo 4 Detenciones relevantes por organización delictiva.................................................. 229 Anexo 5 Liderazgos de las organizaciones delictivas en 2012 .............................................. 232 BIBLIOGRAFÍA .................................................................................................................. 234 ÍNDICE DE TABLAS, FIGURAS Y GRÁFICOS. Cuadros Cuadro 1. Aproximaciones teóricas de las relaciones interorganizacionales ........................... 17 Cuadro 2. Impactos de Desastres geológicos, hidrometeorológicos, químicos, sanitarios y socio-organizativos en México 2001-2014 ......................................................................... 104 Figuras Figura 1. Diferenciación Organizacional.................................................................................. 29 Figura 2. Diferenciación organizacional y problemas complejos ............................................ 31 Figura 3. Interdependencia organizacional ............................................................................... 33 Figura 4. Definición de Coordinación ...................................................................................... 35 Figura 5. Elementos para la Coordinación ............................................................................... 38 Figura 6. Categorías de Coordinación ...................................................................................... 39 Figura 7. Integración del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional ....................................................... 78 Tablas Tabla 1. Operacionalización de la variable Interdependencia .................................................. 49 Tabla 2. Operacionalización de la variable Interacción ........................................................... 50 Tabla 3. Operacionalización de la variable Certidumbre ......................................................... 51 Tabla 4. Asignación de valores ................................................................................................ 52 Tabla 5. Recolección de información ....................................................................................... 54 Tabla 6. Mapeo Temático 2001-2006.................................................................................... ..57 Tabla 7. Mapeo Temático – Ley de Seguridad Nacional ......................................................... 58 Tabla 8. Mapeo Temático – 2007-2012.................................................................................... 60 Tabla 9. Mapeo Temático 2013-2018....................................................................................... 61 Tabla 10. Titulares de las dependencias de Seguridad Nacional 2001-2014 ........................... 84 Tabla 11. Número de Sismos registrados en México 2001-2014
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