Airpower in the Land Battle German Air Forces?
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418 Part Four: Airpower in the Land Battle German Air Forces? This notion we found laughable, for ours was the morale that suffered. Then did we find more fights or shoot down more Huns ...? On the contrary, combats were fewer, for the really intensive fighting was always near the Lines, within reach of the artillery-spotting and other patrolling two-seaters. Unfortunately High Command held to the illusion that o.o.P.s not only produced bigger and better combats but were an important instrument of offensive policy, which was a meaningless slogan, for an offensive spirit in the air meant attacking the enemy with resolu tion, not showing the Oag over Tournai. The consequence was that fighter pilots built up a deep resentment ... These insubordinate notions did not all come unbidden in the air but later on the ground, when there was time and mood to reOect.66 Despite being frequently outnumbered things did not always go so badly for the fighter pilots of the RFC. McKeever in 11 Squadron started his remarkable record of success by claiming his first victim on 26 June. He and his observers - 'gunners' might have been a more appropriate term - were credited with their eighth victory only eighteen days later.• On 21 July Raymond Collishaw and four other Cana dians from Naval Ten - Right Commander J.E. Sharman of Oak Lake, Man., Flight Lieutenant W.M. Alexander of Toronto and Flight Sub-Lieutenants E.V. Reid of Toronto and G.L. Trapp of New Westminster, BC - dived on about twenty enemy scouts over Passchendaele. Collishaw claimed three out of control in the course of a long general combat.67 This struggle for air superiority imposed a con siderable physical strain on the pilots, as ' Mel' Alexander recalled in tranquillity many years later. At nineteen years of age he was an experienced pilot in perhaps the most successful of all British air formations, the famed 'Black Flight' of Naval Ten.t 'Butterflies in your stomach is what you call it-nervous tension. You're almost panicky ... ' he remembered, and after most patrols his jaws ached from the prolonged muscular tension. On 24 July the staff of v Brigade could confidently report that 'the number of decisive combats had considerably decreased during the last few days which is a sure sign that the German morale is breaking down,' but the truth of the matter • Before 1917 was out McKeever was awarded tbe M C and Bar and promoted captain. No 11 Squadron had many other Canadians on itS rolls during July and August 1917. They included D.O. Davidson of Westmount, Que. (KIA 23 Aug. 1917), F.J. Foster of Clinton, Ont (KI A 23 Aug. 1917) , H.G. Kent of Toronto, J.A. LeRoyer of Quebec City (w1A 5 July 1917), W.B. MacKay of Ingersoll. Ont. (pow 27 July 1917), P.O. Mcintosh of Toronto (w1A 17 July 1917), H.C. McKinney ofShannonville, Ont .. T.W. Morse of Toronto (pow 20 Nov. 1917), E.D. Perney of Ham ilton (KI A 23 Nov. 1917), J.A. Revill of Edmonton (KI A 11 Nov. 1917), C.E. Robertson of Walkerton. Ont. (KIA 12 July 1917), N.J. Taylor of Regina (pow 19 Sept 1917). W.H. Walker of Saskatchewan Landing, Sask. (KI A 18 Aug. 1917), and J.L. Williamson of Toronto. t The commander of this all-Canadian flight, Raymond Colllshaw, with twenty-seven victories to his credit by 5 July, added ten more to his score and was shot down himself twice in three days before going on two months well-earned leave in early August. 'PilotS soon wear out as such,' recorded General Trenchard on 30 August 1917 when offering GHQ some PointS oonceming the formation of a separate air service. 'There are not enough ground billets for all wom out pilots. ArrangementS should be made for them to be received into the Army or the Navy if they desire such employment.' Air 1/521/16/12/3 Stalemate on the Western Front, 1917 419 was that the enemy, subject to similar strains, was holding up about equally well. This brief lull in the air battle had more to do with re-deployments in the air arm of the Fourth German Army and the difficulties of finding sufficient airfields on the watery Flanders plain than it had with German morale. In an air battle over Poly gon Wood two days later a German force of about fifty fighters engaged almost as many British scouts, while down below four German two-sealers successfully reconnoitred the British line in front of Ypres. That neither side was able to shoot down a single opponent in such a large dogfight suggests that they were very well-matched, rather than that the German morale was breaking down. Through out this period, too, enemy reconnaissance machines were able to keep a satisfac tory watch on the two-and-a-half mile wide main zone of traffic which ran parallel to the front some three miles behind. A single reconnaissance machine, flying at high speed, could cover the whole.corridor of the British front in less than an hour. The observed volume and regularity of ground traffic contributed greatly to the enemy's understanding of the British build-up.68 On the other hand, the German scouts were even less able to prevent the RFC's reconnaissance and artillery observation aircraft from fulfilling tbeir functions. The weekly intelligence summary of the Fourth German Army recorded on 18 July that 'the number of [enemy] reconnaissance formations has doubled,' although 'these mainly confined themselves to close reconnaissance; the line Courtrai Tourcoing was reached only once.' Reconnaissance on this scale meant that the Germans could keep few secrets, and it could only have been a slight consolation to them that forty-five British machines were claimed to have been shot down in the week under review, twenty-two of them falling within the German lines. By the end of the month 9 Squadron,• attached to the Fifth Army's XIV Corps in the tip of the salient, was flying fifteen counter-battery and twenty or more trench shoots a day despite au attempts to stop them.69 After several postponements the ground attack was finally scheduled for the morning of 31 July. As had happened earlier at Vi my, however, the most effective air operations had been conducted prior to the ground assault. The weather deteri orated so badly on the 29th that the air war virtually ceased until dawn on the 31st. In late afternoon the weather again closed in and flying had to be postponed. In the interval overcast skies and drizzling rain severely limited air operations. The artillery machines were unable to conduct a single shoot, contact patrolling was ineffective, and neither bombing nor close ground support missions could claim much success. For their marginal efforts the RFC paid dearly; thirty machines were rendered unserviceable (mostly by ground fire) during the day. 70 It continued to rain intermittently for ninety-six hours while the poor British infantry carried the line forward to a maximum depth of 3000 yards at the cost of some 31,000 casualties. Every small British advance was met by a determined German counter-attack, in which the German Schlachtstaffeln, unlike their British • Canadians with 9 Squadron during the period of the offensive included J.P. Cunninghame of Red Deer, Alta, F.W. Curtis of Toronto (KaA 14 Aug. 1917), F.B. Doran of Iroquois, Ont. (KI A 14 Aug. 1917), G.D. Gillie of Cornwall, Ont., C. Knowles (w1 A 24 July 1917), A.G. Peace, and H.S. Quigley, all of Toronto. G.S.B. Fuller of Sherbrooke, Que, joined the squadron in September 1917. 420 Part Four: Airpower in the Land Battle opponents, used large formations of close support aircraft to aid their ground forces in tactical arrangements which had been carefully worked out and rehearsed beforehand. 71 With only half of the planned territorial gains actually in British hands, Haig temporarily called off the ground attack, explaining to the British government that 'The low-lying, clayey soil, tom by shells and sodden with rain, turned to a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog ... In these conditions operations ofany magnitude became impossible, and the resump tion of our offensive was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather should allow the ground to recover. •n The aerial battle could not so easily be stopped and restarted. Airpower's battlefield mobility, born of its speed and ability to manoeuvre in a third dimen sion, means that it cannot be turned on or off as simply as ground power. Armies can fight hard for days or weeks or months, and then relapse into a semi-comatose state operationally, without losing the ability to hold their ground - indeed, that was the essence of trench warfare on the Western Front. But, as Trenchard clearly saw, airpower is offensive by definition. It must hold at least a local superiority or it holds nothing: superiority cannot be maintained by 'holding ground.' Air forces, like navies, can ensure superiority only by an offensive strategy. It was therefore impossible for the RFC to adopt a static, defensive posture. But even after the rain stopped, on the 5th, the development of the British air offensive was seriously impeded by heavy cloud cover. ArtiJJery co-operation was particularly hampered, being made 'most difficult, if not impracticable.' When the skies did clear a little the corps pilots might have to contend alone with German fighters.