F a S T Update Ethiopia Quarterly Risk Assessment August to October
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Early warning unit F A S T Update Ethiopia Quarterly Risk Assessment August to October 2003 T S A F © swisspeace | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation FAS T Update Ethiopia | August – October 2003 | Page 2 T Contents Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions 3 Relative Civil Direct and Civil Violent Actions 4 Relative Civil Direct and Relative Government Direct Actions 5 Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation 6 Appendix: Description of indicators used 7 The FAST Early Warning System 9 S A Contact FAST: Phone: +41 31 330 12 04 Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 [email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast F Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp © swisspeace | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation FAST Update Ethiopia | August – October 2003 | Page 3 Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions 1.1 ©FAST 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 T 0.4 0.3 0.2 Country Stability 0.1 Relative Forceful Actions 0.0 -0.1 11/02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 Average number of reported events per month: 144 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: · During the past two months the Country Stability index has been at a constant 0.9. The proportion of S Direct Actions involving use of physical force (Relative Forceful Actions) has also fallen considerably. This chart suggests that the situation in Ethiopia is less conflictual than has it has been for quite some time. · Yet this positive picture hides a tense stalemate resulting from the government’s continued refusal to accept the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruling which would lead to the cession of Badme and other disputed border areas to Eritrea. Bound up with this issue is the fate of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ruling coalition and the struggle for control by and within its dominant party – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). · This struggle has involved a continuation of moves by the regime of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to tighten its grip on power through a range of more or less repressive – though predominantly not ‘forceful’ – means. Opposition to these moves has been growing alongside continued dissent over loss of territories to Eritrea and the possibility of EEBC compliance. Though again, this has so far mostly been without the widespread use of force despite a peak in military operations by rebel groups in August. · The humanitarian situation remains dire, with ongoing impacts of this year’s severe drought which A threatened 13 million people with starvation, now overshadowed by a looming malaria epidemic which could affect as many as 15 million. The return of substantial rains between July and September, which greatly favoured the reproduction of malaria mosquitoes, has improved crop prospects but has done little to ameliorate the situation in pastoral zones: As in the recent past, intense competition for grazing resources by migrating herders is likely to lead to further violent clashes over the coming year unless pastoralist groups can be appropriately assisted. · Despite talk in some military circles of an impending resumption of war with Eritrea, and unless Eritrea agrees to UN suggestions that both countries enter into dialogue about local departures from the EEBC border delineation, the present status – arguably more costly to Eritrea than Ethiopia – seems set to persist as long as the present government remains in control. This may be the case until the general election, due in 2005, but the earlier removal of Meles by elements within or outside the TPLF remains a distinct possibility, especially if he tries to accept the EEBC ruling. In this event the pressure for war – and thus on Eritrea to show flexibility – may increase. F Philip White © swisspeace | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation FAST Update Ethiopia | August – October 2003 | Page 4 Relative Civil Direct and Civil Violent Actions 1.1 ©FAST 1.0 0.9 Relative Civil Violent Actions Relative Civil Direct Actions 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 T 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 11/02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 Average number of reported events per month: 144 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: · The amount of Civil Direct (or conflictive) actions has remained at a low level during this analyzed period, S yet the proportion of Direct Actions that were ‘violent’ or highly conflictive has fluctuated dramatically. These trends reflect the sporadic nature of inter-ethnic violence, rebel attacks and threats set against a varying number of direct but non-violent actions including anti-government demonstrations. · The troubled Moyale woreda, located on the Kenya border and marking the split between Borena zone in Oromia region and Liben zone in Somali region, saw a continuation of clashes between Borena and other pastoralist groups during August and further inter-ethnic fighting involved Gabbra and Gerri groups in Liben in October leading up to the Somali region elections. In Bench Maji zone in SNNPR Surma tribesmen reportedly killed 17 and displaced over 300 households among Dizzi and Minit groups in October. · The August peak owes more, however, to anti-government actions. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has sustained its level of military action, clashing with both government forces in Borena zone and Kenyan troops across the border in several operations, with over 30 deaths. However, it denied responsibility for a bomb explosion at Adigala on a train travelling from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, killing two civilians – this and an attack on a Save the Children (UK) vehicle in Haraghe zone in October may have been carried out by Al-Ittihad terror groups known to be targetting Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) A has also been active, with attacks on army units at Degeh Bur and Degeh Madow in Somali region and the blowing up of a bridge connecting Fik zone with Harer. The United Liberation Forces of Oromia (ULFO), a coalition of several Oromo rebel organizations, mounted two further armed operations in Moyale woreda. · In September, 19 TPLF Central Committee members wrote a petition to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in which they threaten a return to war if the EEBC decision on Badme, Irob and parts of Afar was accepted. Meanwhile the Union of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), an umbrella grouping of 15 opposition parties formed in August to contest the 2005 elections, declared that it too rejects the EEBC ruling. · There is no reason to suppose that inter-ethnic violence and rebel action will quieten significantly in the foreseeable future: while TPLF and border community threats to fight rather than comply with any government acceptance of the EECB ruling can be expected to continue. Philip White F © swisspeace | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation FAST Update Ethiopia | August – October 2003 | Page 5 Relative Civil Direct and Government Direct Actions 1.1 ©FAST 1.0 0.9 0.8 Relative Government Direct Actions Relative Civil Direct Actions 0.7 0.6 0.5 T 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 11/02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 Average number of reported events per month: 144 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: · As has been the case for most of the last year, government actions have been somewhat more conflictive in character than those of the civil sector, with little fluctuation during the reporting period in either case. S · According to OLF sources government operations against rebel forces included the planting of a landmine in Moyale woreda, which was to have been blamed on the OLF but detonated prematurely killing ten government agents, and a number of attacks on suspected OLF members in Oromia region in September. Other reported Direct Government Actions included the arrests of six members of the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Union (SEPDU) in Kefa, nine Oromo National Congress members in Ambo and 135 other Oromos in Bale zone, and several officials of the Somali regional government. There were also government raids on CAFPDE and EDUP offices and a ban on an EDUP meeting in Mekele on the border issue, the dismissal of the University of Addis Ababa Vice President, searches of Arab and Somali occupied houses in the capital by special forces on suspicion of terrorist links, and mass sackings of government employees in Addis Ababa on charges of incompetence and corruption. In ongoing trials of the Derg regime the former Minister of Public Security Colonel Tesfaye Wolde-Selassie and four others were sentenced to death in the Federal High Court. · The tide of civil and opposition party complaints over coercive and autocratic government policies, in particular the ‘voluntary’ resettlement programme and recent moves to consolidate power at the centre at A the expense of regional governments, the armed forces and the press, has continued to rise. In East Wellega zone, some 300 resettlers demonstrated over the lack of promised services and assaulted Oromia Chief Executive Junedi Sado. With international NGOs highlighting dozens of deaths among resettlers each week due to malaria and starvation, government appeals for donor support to the programme have been received negatively. · These issues compound concerted opposition to the EEBC ruling which is mounting both within the TPLF, in Amhara, and opposition circles, leaving Meles with little room for manoeuvre and lending weight to his own assessment that his political future hangs on Ethiopia’s claim to Badme.