5Th Canadian Armoured Divisionâ•Žs Attack on Delfzijl, 23 April to 2 May
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Canadian Military History Volume 7 Issue 3 Article 4 1998 Operation “Canada”: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Attack on Delfzijl, 23 April to 2 May 1945 Daniel Byers Royal Military College of Canada Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Byers, Daniel "Operation “Canada”: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Attack on Delfzijl, 23 April to 2 May 1945." Canadian Military History 7, 3 (1998) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Byers: Operation “Canada”: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Attack on De Operation ''Canada'' 5th Canadian Ar111oured Division's Attack on Delfzijl, 23 April to 2 May 1945 Daniel Byers peration "Canada" was the last action fought elfzijl is located on the coast of the Ems Oby 5th Canadian Armoured Division in the D Estuary, facing the German port of Emden. Second World War. The battle to open the As one of Holland's largest secondary ports, it northern Dutch port of Delfzijllasted ten days, looked promising to military planners for use in and cost the Division a total of 62 dead and 180 relieving the starving Dutch population following wounded. Yet it has largely been forgotten. 1 The the "hunger winter" of 1944-1945.2 At first glance capture of Delfzijl is interesting enough to be it seemed easier to capture than ports in the west worth studying in its own right. As one of the of the country, where German occupiers had last Canadian actions in the war, it reveals the retreated behind prepared defences against the level of proficiency achieved by Canadian soldiers advancing Canadians. In addition, heavy guns by that time. The reduction of the pocket was at Delfzijl protected the approaches to Emden, carried out with a high degree of efficiency, and a potential base for last-ditch operations by£ saw excellent cooperation between all combat boats, midget submarines, and other naval arms. It is also a useful reminder that for many weapons should Germany continue to resist Canadians the costly fighting did not end in defeat, as it had so far. 3 Emden was a strategic North-West Europe until the very last days of the target for Allied planners, and more importantly war. for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, which was then advancing towards it. 5th Division's The battle for Delfzijl also raises two operations were designed to support that questions: why was it undertaken so close to advance by putting constant pressure on Delfzijl. the end of the war. and why did commanders to prevent the defenders from retreating to continue to advance in the face of strong reinforce Emden.~ Thus, the attack on Delfzijl opposition that was detected early in the was motivated at the strategic level by several operation? The aim of this article is to address factors, which combined to make its capture an these questions, as well as describing the battle important aim. itself in some detail. As it argues. the reduction of the pocket was authorized due to a Unfortunately, the closing of the pocket was combination of strategic and operational factors. complicated by orders designed to protect Dutch It was continued after the strength of the defences inhabitants. Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister, 5th became evident because once the troops were in Division's GOC (General Officer Commanding), range of the pocket's defences it was less costly was asked to mount the operation using nothing to press ahead and finish the task, at least in more powerful than his usual infantry support the eyes of Canadian commanders, than to weapons: tanks, 25-pounder artillery, and 3-inch conduct a longer holding operation or siege. mortars. 5 Against these were ranged four troops oflarge enemy guns from 256 Naval Anti-Aircraft * * * * * Battery, which were located near Delfzijl, and at the "Reider Spit" to the south and east. All were ©Canadian Military History, Volume 7, Number 3. Summer 1998, pp.35-46. 35 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 3, Art. 4 A gathering qf generals at 5th Canadian Armoured Division Headquarters. 20 March 1945. Left to right: Brigadier I.H. Cumberland. commander. 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade: Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister; GOC 5th Canadian Armoured Division: unknown: Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery. commander: 21st Army Group; unknown: Lieutenant-General C. Foullces. GOC I Canadian Corps: Brigadier l.S. Johnston. commander; 11 th Canadian lrlfantry Brigade. now turned inland to protect the pocket. Several Canadian Infantry Brigade. and the immediate concentrations of smaller calibre artillery were commander of the operation. Considering the identified between Delfzijl and the town of number of enemy troops. the long frontage that Farmsum, while heavy coastal guns were sighted would have to be manned, and the artillery to fire into the area from as far away as Emden superiority of his opponents, Johnston chose to and the North Sea island of Borkum.6 begin his attack on Delfzijl as soon as possible. As he later put it. Besides opposition guns, Intelligence Officers identified at least 1500 German defenders There was little cover, the weather was miserable around Delfzijl, mostly naval fortress troops and the enemy shelling was taking it's [sic] toll converted to infantry, located in small battle of casualties. It was accordingly decided to push forward to at least reduce the pocket immediately groups of 80-120 men at various strong points. with the reservation that as the picture developed Experience would prove the total to be more than a pause could be made later when more troops 4000, not including men killed or evacuated to could be rested. ' 0 Emden during the battle. 7 Intelligence reports compared the task of taking Delfzijl to that of Tactical considerations, then, reinforced the "Breskens Pocket" in the Scheidt Estuary at strategic ones in the decision to proceed with Antwerp, one of the Canadian Army's worst the reduction ofDelfzijl. Although 3rd Division's battles of the previous autumn.8 The terrain matching advance on Emden actually went more around Delfzijl was similar to the Scheidt. slowly than planned over the next few days, consisting of soft polderland crossed by Brigadier Johnston was forced by his local numerous drainage ditches and canals. All situation to proceed with his own attack. He had vehicles were limited to the weak. narrow roads no way to know how close the war was to ending, of the region, and there was little cover anywhere. or the true number of men that his own soldiers Much of the area west ofDelfzijl had been flooded faced, and he planned his battle accordingly. by the Germans, and the pocket was ringed by a prepared system of mines and trenches, linking The two commanders of the operation, strong points centred on local villages. 9 Hoffmeister and Johnston, were well-qualified to assess the dangers. Hoffmeister was one of A tactical problem faced Brigadier Ian S. three prewar militia officers who rose to the rank Johnston, the Commanding Officer of 11th of Major-General during the war. after going 36 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss3/4 2 Byers: Operation “Canada”: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Attack on De overseas as a company commander with the Propelled and 17th Field Regiments, and two Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver in 1939. He out of three armoured regiments in the Division, took over as Commanding Officer of the unit in the British Columbia Dragoons and the 8th October 1942, and by March 1944 rose to Hussars. For the first two days, the fighting was command 5th Division. Hoffmeister led the led by Brigadier I.H. Cumberland of 5th "Mighty Maroon Machine" through the rest of Canadian Armoured Brigade, who ordered the their battles in Italy, before they moved to North Westminsters and Irish to take over positions in West Europe in early 1945. A recent study of the villages of Siddeburen and Oostwolde to the Canada's Second World War generals calls south of Delfzijl, while the Perths dug in to the Hoffmeister "the best Canadian fighting general north. Johnston formally took command on the of the war. "11 Brigadier Johnston was also a morning of April 25, by which time all three veteran of many years in the prewar militia. He battalions were fully involved in combat. mobilized in 1939 with the 48th Highlanders of Toronto. going from Regimental Adjutant to * * * * * Commanding Officer by 1943. and taking command of 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade in he battle for Delfzijl began at 11:00 p.m. on June 1944. 12 Thus. both men were competent. T the evening of April 23. Two platoons of the battle-hardened commanders. who knew their Perth Regiment's "C" Company moved off from jobs, while remembering what combat was like Godlinze towards the east, capturing the villages for the average infantryman. Neither was likely of Groote Nes and Klein Nes before pressing on to attack Delfzijl unless convinced of the need, to their objectives on the coast. They arrived at and both did all they could to reduce the costs. dawn, just as German artillery zeroed in on their When asked to conduct operations without heavy position. Meanwhile, "B" Company advanced artillery. Hoffmeister reportedly consulted his south-east towards Holwierde, but soon ran into men down to the level of the other ranks enemy opposition outside the village. Road regarding their willingness to carry out the task.