140th Bergedorf Round Table The Future of NATO June, 13–15, 2008, Berlin Contents Picture Documentation 1 Participants 20 Summary 21 Introduction 23 Protocol Welcome 27 I. NATO’s identity 29 1. NATO’s historical uniqueness 29 2. Where is NATO today ? 35 3. Threats and challenges 39 4. Tasks 41 5. The significance of Article 5 43 6. Burden-sharing 45 7. Recommendations 47 II. Afghanistan 50 1. Present situation 50 2. Lessons learned 53 3. Communication to the public 57 4. How to define success ? 59 5. Recommendations 60 III. NATO in relation to other actors 65 1. US and EU approaches towards NATO 65 2. The institutional relationship between NATO and the EU 68 3. NATO and Russia 71 Annex 4. NATO enlargement 77 Participants 85 Closing remarks 81 Recommended Literature 92 Index 94 Previous Round Tables 99 The Körber Foundation 111 Imprint 112 INITIATOR MinDirig Eberhard Pohl Dr. Kurt A. Körber Deputy Political Director, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Alexander Rahr CHAIRMAN Program Director, Russia/Eurasia Center, German Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin Fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Alain Richard Berlin Fmr. Minister of Defence of the French Republic, Paris Volker Rühe Fmr. Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of MODERATOR Germany, Hamburg Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger Dr. Ulrich Schlie Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy, Director-General Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Munich Defence, Berlin Prof. Dr. Paul W. Schroeder Professor emeritus of History and Political Sciences, PARTICIPANTS University of Illinois, Urbana Prof. Egon Bahr Ambassador Dr. Hans-Ulrich Seidt Fmr. Minister for Economic Cooperation, Berlin Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ambassador Ulrich Brandenburg the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Kabul Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Prof. Dr. Duygu Bazuğlo Sezer Germany to the North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Professor of International Relations, Dogus University, Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels Istanbul VLR I Dirk Brengelmann Dr. Jamie Patrick Shea Head of Division, Defence and Security Policy, Federal Director, Policy Planning, Private Office of the Foreign Office, Berlin Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ambassador Gijs M. de Vries (NATO), Brussels Senior Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Prof. Dr. Angela Stent Relations, Clingendael, The Hague Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and Dr. Sergey Kulik East European Studies, Georgetown University, Director for International Development Programs, Washington, D. C. Institute of Contemporary Development, Moscow Dr. Klaus Wehmeier The Hon. John Manley Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, Fmr. Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa Körber Foundation, Hamburg Dr. Dominique Moïsi Ulrich Weisser Senior Advisor, Institut Français des Relations Vice Admiral (ret.), Bonn Internationales (IFRI), Paris Christian Wriedt MinDirig Rolf Nikel Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Deputy Director General, Foreign and Security Policy, Hamburg Global Issues, Federal Chancellery, Berlin Paweł Zalewski Omid Nouripour, MdB Member, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw Member, German Bundestag, Berlin Dr. Gottfried Zeitz Dr. Thomas Paulsen Office of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, Dr. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, MdB Körber Foundation, Berlin Member, German Bundestag, Berlin 20 Summary I. NATO’s identity The debate started with a statement on the history of alliances. NATO was as- sessed to be the most successful alliance in history due to three unique achieve- ments. This finding could influence the general thinking about the future strate- gic orientation of NATO (p. 29–35). Today, NATO was characterised as a unique integrated military structure and not a sovereign entity. It still needs to adapt to the international environment that has emerged after the end of the Cold War (p. 35-39) and lacks a common perception of threats and challenges (p. 39–41). Participants agreed that the Alliance had core tasks, e.g. to guarantee European security, that it should not overload its agenda (p. 41–43) and that Article 5 still constituted its essence. However, one participant doubted that countries like Po- land or Norway could count on Article 5 (p. 43–45). Burden-sharing within NATO was assessed to be unequal, with the US bearing the largest share, not only of the military costs, but also of development costs, especially in Afghanistan. Europe was asked to increase its military contribution in order to prevent NATO from becoming a two-tiered system. There was disagreement on whether Germany was sharing the same risks in Afghanistan as other NATO member states (p. 45–47). With regard to NATO’s future, participants claimed that the Alliance should try harder to convert its military stake into political influence and pursue a “compre- hensive approach” (p. 47–49). II. Afghanistan Participants agreed that the situation in Afghanistan was very critical and that the West had underestimated the challenge in many respects. Governance was identi- fied as one of the major problems (p. 50–53). One participant proposed six lessons that should be learned from the Afghanistan mission for future interventions (p. 53–57). It was pointed out that NATO member states had failed to be clear with their populations about what the mission entailed and what it cost. In Germany, some participants criticised that communication between the government and the public was lacking clarity (p. 57–59). Concerning the question of how to define suc- cess in Afghanistan, it was stressed that NATO went to Afghanistan not to establish democracy but to fight al-Qaeda. All agreed that the exit strategy was “Afghanisa- tion”, meaning an increasing transfer of responsibility to the Afghan government and security apparatus (p. 59–60). Participants also discussed concrete recommen- dations for NATO in Afghanistan, e. g. to enhance training of the Afghan police and to enlist the countries of the region in order to stabilise the country (p. 60–64). 21 III. NATO in relation to other actors Participants analysed US and European approaches towards NATO, which was not assessed to be the central forum for transatlantic dialogue—an ambition that never has been fully realised. A new US President should define his concept of multilateralism whereas Europe should articulate its vital interest towards a new US administration as soon as possible (p. 65–68). Concerning the institutional relationship between NATO and the EU, one participant stressed that neither re- gional specialisation nor functional specialisation between EU and NATO was going to work. Instead, the cooperation between the European Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force should be strengthened and NATO and the EU should concentrate on the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD (p. 68–71). With regard to Russia, there was consensus that security in Europe was only possible with Russia, not against it. However, over recent years a substantive NATO policy towards Russia was assessed to have become more and more difficult as Russia has pulled back from cooperation. NATO was asked to think about new ways of cooperation with Russia. Many participants demanded that even Russian NATO membership, at some point in time, should not be precluded (p. 71–77). With regard to NATO enlargement, one participant pleaded to declare a morato- rium on the enlargement but not to fix limits. There was disagreement on the accession of Georgia and Ukraine (p. 77–80). 22 Introduction Wolfgang Schäuble Since the end of the Cold War, the global security situation has changed fundamentally. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, conflicts developed in Africa and in Eastern Europe that are also referred to as the “New Wars”. What distinguishes them from the “Old Wars” are the players involved, the objectives they are pur- suing, the methods of violence used and the way they are being financed. In these conflicts, the boundaries between armed bat- tle, personal violence, organised crime and massive violation of human rights are being gradually erased. These conflicts are often described as “asymmetrical”. However, many things are not as new as they appear to be at first glance. This also applies to asymmetrical warfare and wars. There are many examples in his- tory of wars we would refer to today as “asymmetrical wars”: The tactics used by George Washington and the colonial militia during the War of Independence are a classic example of guerrilla war. The list can be continued right up to the 19th and 20th centuries from the Spanish War of Independence opposing French Em- peror Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal and Spain right up to Vietnam. During the Cold War, the US military coined the phrase “low-intensity conflicts” to describe partisan warfare. What is new about asymmetrical wars is that, unlike in the past centuries, they have become the main form of conflict resolution today, thus revealing the darker side of globalisation. Even if the rapid development of information and communication technologies and the process of global convergence have proven to be a considerable gain in freedom for our liberal societies, the increase in glo- bal integration — socially, economically and politically — has also led to a loss of state sovereignty. Today, global crises and conflicts have a much more rapid and immediate effect on the Euro-Atlantic area of stability than they would have