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Sir Frederick Stanley Maude

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Sir Frederick Stanley Maude Andrew Syk, ed.. The Military Papers of Lieutenant-General Frederick Stanley Maude, 1914-1917. Stroud: Army Records Society, 2012. xv +312 pp. Maps, illustrations. ISBN 978-0-7524-8619-2. Reviewed by Jason Engle Published on H-War (April, 2014) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University) This edited collection of Sir Frederick Stanley ficial communications, Syk’s commentary is well Maude’s official correspondences, war diaries, supported by archival materials from British Na‐ and private letters to his family provides an in‐ tional Archives, the British Library’s Indian Office valuable lens through which to nuance several Collections, private papers housed predominantly important elements of the Great War historiogra‐ at the Imperial War Museum and the Liddell Hart phy. Since posterity has most readily recognized Centre for Military Archives at King’s College Lon‐ Maude for his role in turning around the fortunes don, and an extensive bibliography of published of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (MEF), memoirs and secondary literature. this volume offers readers unprecedented insight This volume is broken out into fve chronolog‐ into the direction of one of Britain’s relatively un‐ ical chapters, separated in accordance with explored fronts in the First World War. Maude’s Maude’s assignments. Though Syk includes early papers, as Syk notes, enhance “our understanding entries while Maude was the training directorate of the experience of command during the First in the War Office at the time of Britain’s mobiliza‐ World War,” since he commanded forces in tion, he is more interested in Maude the comman‐ France, Belgium, and Gallipoli, before becoming der. Thus, the frst chapter documents his time on the commander in chief of the MEF (p. 4). Syk the western front as commander of the 14th In‐ does an admirable job of placing Maude in con‐ fantry Brigade/5th Division/II Corps. It is clear text with his peers in the senior ranks of the that Maude was a hands-on commander, visiting British army and, in doing so, utilizes Maude’s pa‐ the trenches regularly, with a keen eye on their pers to further refine our perceptions of “com‐ condition and, thus, the protection and comfort of mand” in World War I. his soldiers. Syk notes that his subordinates often Syk rediscovered Maude’s papers while con‐ became irritated with Maude’s close supervision. ducting research for his doctoral thesis and is To that end, he was repeatedly ordered to move clearly comfortable with the source base.[1] As his headquarters further from the front, since at the author notes, Maude’s papers had been in the times it had come under German artillery fire. custody of his family, having seemingly disap‐ Maude also frequently gave voice to his frus‐ peared after excerpts appeared in Major General trations with Britain and its government, particu‐ C. E. Callwell’s 1920 biography of Sir Frederick larly over shortages in ammunition, trained offi‐ Stanley.[2] Beyond Maude’s diaries, letters, and of‐ cers, and manpower. In a particularly bitter entry, H-Net Reviews Maude complains that “we simply sit down day pinned the directives of MEF strategy. As Syk after day and do nothing. Lack of fghting materi‐ notes, “The Tigris provided the most reliable line al is, of course, the cause but what a terrible of communication, and thus the principal opera‐ record of bungling and maladministration and tions after mid-1915 were concentrated in the what needless loss of life has and will come of it. vicinity of this river” (p. 120). Such a limited ca‐ No doubt the guilty parties will be whitewashed pacity for transportation prevented newly arriv‐ in due course, as usually happens” (p. 81). At the ing troops from reinforcing the Tigris Corps’ relief same time, Maude regularly comments on his sat‐ efforts of Major-General Charles Townshend’s isfaction with the command and his love for the forces besieged at Kut-al-Amara. Maude’s diary re‐ brigade. This dedication was recognized through peatedly emphasizes the crippling effects of high his elevation to division commanding officer. casualty rates and having too few men and In June 1915, Sir Frederick Stanley took com‐ trained officers to replace them--both of which mand of the 33rd Division on the western front, contributed significantly to operational failures of but was quickly reassigned to the 13th Division in the MEF all the way up to the summer of 1916. In Near East. Chapter 2 documents Maude’s time on July 1916, Sir Frederick Stanley was appointed the Gallipoli front and the shambles in which he commander of the Tigris Corps over two division found British circumstances on the peninsula. He commanders who were senior to him--a reflection consistently reiterates the poor organization of of his competence as a commander and an indict‐ the staff work, and the sloppy, dilapidated state of ment of the rather poor quality of the comman‐ British defenses. Maude regularly complains that ders assigned to the Mesopotamian theatre of op‐ the lack of ammunition, equipment, and supplies, erations.[3] However, his time as corps comman‐ as well as means of transporting provisions limit‐ der was brief; a month later, Maude was promot‐ ed the offensive capabilities of Mediterranean Ex‐ ed once more, this time as commander of all peditionary Force. At the same time, the political forces in Mesopotamia. vacillation over whether Britain should abandon Chapter 4, through family and official corre‐ the Gallipoli campaign altogether left the forma‐ spondences, picks up where Maude’s war diaries tions there languishing in extreme weather and end, and provides the reader an equally penetrat‐ under the duress of Turkish artillery and sniper ing view of Maude as commander in chief of fire. “We are truly a nation of muddlers. But sure‐ Mesopotamia. One of his frst orders of business ly the procrastination of the last 4 months and the was the reorganization of the Tigris Corps, break‐ scandal which must necessarily result therefrom ing it out into two corps with two divisions each, must wake the Government up.... It is all too lam‐ allowing for greater operational fexibility. As Syk entable and has cost many valuable lives that and others have emphasized, the projection of might have been saved,” Maude complained on British imperial power in the Middle East had be‐ December 2, 1915 (p. 101). Days later, the British come a fundamental tenet shaping British strate‐ War Cabinet passed down its fnal decision to gy in Mesopotamia by the autumn of 1916. Senior evacuate the peninsula; Maude’s forces would be British commanders, including Maude, feared amongst the last to leave. that if British military power continued to appear January 1916 found the 13th Division reas‐ weak--especially after the disastrous Gallipoli signed to the MEF. Chapter 3 follows Maude and campaign and Townshend’s loss at Kut-al-Amara-- the 13th to Mesopotamia, where the protection of it would harm Arab alliances and encourage a the British assets in the Middle East--the Anglo- Turkish invasion of Persia. Persian Oil Company, India, and Egypt--under‐ 2 H-Net Reviews In order to revive British military prestige in abilities as a commander, having an innate ability the region, Maude focused his attention on im‐ to quickly assess the crux of a matter. As an excel‐ proving lines of communication; the development lent organizer with meticulous attention to detail, of viable land transportation was particularly crit‐ Maude effectively managed his forces in all facets ical. Maude oversaw the construction of several of his assignments. Contrary to traditional inter‐ interconnecting railways that would help allevi‐ pretations that portray World War I commanders ate the dependence on waterways.[4]. Additional‐ as caring little for the lives of their soldiers, Sir ly, as Maude notes, a steady stream of steamers Frederick Stanley frequently expressed concern and barges entered service almost weekly, accel‐ for the well-being of his men in the trenches, fully erating the movement of provisions and replace‐ appreciating their hardships. Maude’s consistent ments to the front lines. As a result, the MEF was criticism of the staff work of peers and subordi‐ finally able to effectively transport and distribute nates reflects the high standards of professional‐ the men, materials, and supplies the force had ism he maintained and expected from his subor‐ needed. At the same time, Turkish forces were be‐ dinates. Often frustrated by politically motivated coming weaker as replacements dried up. All of directives from the Imperial War Cabinet, Maude these elements combined enabled the British cap‐ was an aggressive commander who believed mili‐ ture of Kut in February 1917. “The Turkish Army tary imperatives on the ground should supersede that was recently before us has ceased to exist as political maneuvering. Indeed, as Lord Curzon a fghting force owing to its casualties, prisoners, said of Maude in 1918, “War … is a great discover‐ demoralization and the loss of a large proportion er of merit; and it is not too much to say that Gen‐ of its artillery and stores,” Maude wrote in his eral Maude was one of the discoveries … of the telegram to the chief of the Imperial General Staff, present war. At the beginning of the war he was Field Marshal Sir William Robertson (p. 216). only a Lieutenant-Colonel” (quoted, p. 8). With the Turkish 6th Army all but destroyed, Notes the MEF seized Baghdad. The defeat of the Turk‐ [1]. Andrew Syk, “Command and the ish 6th Army meant the end of large-scale military Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1915-18,” operations in the Baghdad region As Syk outlines (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2009). in chapter 5, the remainder of Maude’s command [2].
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