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Collaboration of Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the Second Indochina War, with Particular Focus on Laos, 1952-1975

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Collaboration of Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the Second Indochina War, with Particular Focus on Laos, 1952-1975 Collaboration of Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the Second Indochina War, with particular focus on Laos, 1952-1975 Roger William (Willy) Bach BA A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy at The University of Queensland in 2016 School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry 1 Abstract This thesis examines the collaboration of Anglosphere allies, Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the US-led Indochina War and in particular, the Secret War in Laos 1954-1975. Though called the Vietnam War, and the American War by the opposing side, it was a regional war that affected all neighbouring countries. The war affected these Anglosphere allies too, whilst undermining their democratic institutions. The history of this collaboration has been largely ignored or denied, as the hitherto scarce literature showed. Most of the literature about the war has been written by US authors, or focuses on what the US did in promulgating the war. The actions of SEATO allies, Britain, Australia and New Zealand have been largely overlooked. This gap in the historical record needs closer examination. Three aspects of this collaboration have been selected to demonstrate its extent and depth. The thesis examines the building of the Operation Crown airfield near Leong Nok Tha and the Post Crown Works road networks in Thailand over the 1962-68 period, and the rotation of many engineer units and support services from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. This infrastructure was part of the US-led SEATO military build-up in Thailand. Crown was also used for commando incursions into Laos across the Mekong River. Participation in the SEATO alliance included staffing of the SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok; planning of an invasion, occupation and partition of Laos; and planning and participating in major SEATO exercises designed to rehearse the intended invasion. The plans also involved Britain contributing nuclear weapons. The invasion was eventually abandoned due to the divergent views, limited commitment of SEATO allies, and the US failure to consult. The study also describes Britain and Australia’s provision of counterinsurgency warfare advisers and how these individuals worked with special forces, mercenaries, and ethnic minorities to carry out covert warfare. These Anglosphere advisers also provided the US with strategic advice based on Britain’s experience in Kenya and Malaya. These counterinsurgency activities included ‘Hearts and Minds’ projects, but also the coercive removal of civilians from their traditional ancestral farming land. They set up strategic hamlets and refugee camps, destroyed food, crops, domestic animals, homes and property, and carried out the interrogation of prisoners. Eventually, advisers from Britain and Australia joined the leadership of the Phoenix Program, which assassinated 20,000 to 30,000 suspected communist sympathisers in South Việt Nam. The third aspect of Anglosphere involvement in the war detailed here is the process of invention and development, and eventually manufacture of defoliants – including Agent Orange – that were of great importance to counterinsurgency warfare. The destruction of food crops was as central to the US Ranch Hand program as the removal of forest canopy to reveal the disposition of their i adversaries. Defoliants were used to coerce civilians to vacate their homes and farms, turning these areas into free-fire zones. The toxicity and teratogenic nature of these chemicals caused aborted foetuses and unviable deformed babies. Eventually, the US government was obliged to phase out defoliant use, beginning with the immediate ending of crop destruction in 1971. The British, Australian and New Zealand contributions to the war were a whole of government undertaking. There were connections between the ‘big’ conventional war that included massive bombing and invasion plans, as well as the ‘small’ covert unconventional guerrilla counterinsurgency wars in Laos and throughout Indochina that were part of the regional war of resistance to decolonisation. The war, predicated on the fears of the Domino Theory, ended with none of the predicted outcomes. The foreign forces withdrew and the local nationalist- communist victors in Laos, Cambodia, and Việt Nam set about reconstruction with varying degrees of success and largely without assistance from the Anglosphere countries which had invested so heavily in the war. US forces left Thailand in 1975-76 at the request of Thai authorities. SEATO was disbanded in 1977. Australia’s forward defence doctrine was quietly forgotten. ii Declaration by author This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis. I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award. I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, subject to the policy and procedures of The University of Queensland, the thesis be made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968 unless a period of embargo has been approved by the Dean of the Graduate School. I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis. iii Publications during candidature Article Willy Bach 100% “Britain, Australia, the United States and Agent Orange in the Indochina Wars: Re-defining Chemical-Biological Warfare” http://honesthistory.net.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/583-Britain-Australia-the-United-States- and-Agent-Orange-in-the-Indochina-Wars-1.pdf 6 March 2015 Article Willy Bach 100% “Decolonisation and the Rôle of Counterinsurgency Doctrine –”Hearts-and-Minds‟ or the evidence of their own eyes” http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/docs/Challenging-Politics-Papers/Willy-Bach-Decolonisation- and-the-Role-of-Counterinsurgency-Doctrine.pdf Article Willy Bach 100% “Fear is the Parent of Cruelty: Racism, the Military, Terrorism and War.” The Complexities of Racism: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on 'Racisms in the New World Order', 6 - 7 December 2007 http://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/person/Bach,_Willy.html Article published 2008 http://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/34549/1/2008%20Racisms%20Conference%20Proceedings.p df Article Willy Bach 100% The Complexities of Racism: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on “Racisms in the New World Order” University of the Sunshine Coast 8 - 9 December 2005”Australian Nationalism, Conflicted Identities, Militarism and Exclusion” http://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/17905/2/17905_Gopalkrishan_%26_Babacan_2006_front_pa ges.pdf iv Article Willy Bach 100% Publications included in this thesis No publications included Contributions by others to the thesis No contributions by others Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree None v Acknowledgements I wish to thank the people who helped me to make this thesis possible. These include my original Supervisor, Carl Trocki and my Associate Supervisor, Ross Daniels at Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia (whose enthusiasm for human rights inspired much of my work). Ross’ assistant, Ed Nixon, was first to urge me to study this topic for a higher degree. After the School of Humanities was abolished I searched for a new Supervisor and was accepted by A/Professor Chris Dixon at the School of History, University of Queensland. Supervision was transferred to Dr. Patrick Jory. I have much for which to thank Patrick, especially for his patience. I suffered a number of bouts of poor health and struggled at times when only just able to work. I have received valuable help from Martin Shaw, University of Sussex, UK, Stephen Dorril, Huddersfield University, UK Mark Phythian, University of Leicester, UK, Michael McKinley, Australian National University, Brian Martin, University of Wollongong, Australia, Richard Matthews, Brandon University, Canada, Jerry Lembcke, College of the Holy Cross, USA, Kate Cassandra McCulloch, Sutayut Osornprasop, Bangkok, Thailand, John Tirman, MIT, Boston, helpful archivists at the Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University and the generous help from librarians at George Washington National Security Archives. Thanks too to Libby Stewart at the Australian War Memorial, Chris Clark at the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre; to former diplomats, British and Australian (who I am unable to name for ethical reasons); and former intelligence and special forces people who cannot be named. A special thanks to the late Lt Col John Stevens, RE, who was first to tell me that Leong Nok Tha was intended as a launch pad for an invasion of Laos. Miss C.J. Sayer,
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