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TOWSON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE OSLO YEARS By Neil Rubin A thesis presented to the faculty of Towson University In partial fulfillment Of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Judaic Studies May 2010 Towson University Towson, Maryland 21252 ii © By Neil Rubin All Rights Reserved iii Abstract American Jewry and the Oslo Years Neil Rubin By the early 1990s the themes binding American Jewish life were experiencing irrevocable change. Formal emigration and religious barriers for Jews in the former Soviet Union had ended. The task of commemorating the Holocaust was entrenched. Finally, the 1993 Israeli- PLO signing of the Olso Accords seriously challenged American Jewry‘s unity in politically defending an embattled Israel. Meanwhile, mounting internal American Jewish communal concerns included confronting intermarriage, declining Jewish identity measurements, and rising tensions between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews over Israeli government attempts to redefine the ―Who is a Jew?‖ issue. At the same time, membership groups declined, the influence of ―mega-donors‖ rose, and the sense being in a collective community weakened. By the end of the Oslo period and the start of the Second Intifada, American Jewish groups quickly again rushed to defend Israel, but they found an overall smaller, less interested and more divided community than in the past. iv Table of Contents Chapter I. Introduction to the Study I.1 Rise and Fall of the Oslo Accords 1 I.2 How Oslo Changed American Jewry 6 I.3 American Jewry‘s Pre-Oslo Triumphs and Challenges 12 I.4 Oslo‘s Opportunities and Crises 20 I.5 Rationale For This Research Project 26 I.6 Research Materials and Resources 31 Chapter II. U.S. Jewry on the Eve of Oslo II.1 The Importance of American Jewry in the U.S. Political Landscape 35 II.2 A Disproportionate Influence on the Electorate 40 II.3 Israel on the Agenda 42 II.4 The 1967 Revolution 46 II.5 Fighting for Political Loyalties 50 II.6 Loan Guarantee Battles 52 II.7 American Jewry‘s Awkward Position 57 II.8 George H.W. Bush‘s Strategic Error 60 II.9 Baker Outrages American Jews 62 II.10 Rabin Becomes Prime Minister 64 II.11 Intermarriage and a ‗Continuity‘ Agenda 66 II.12 Distancing and Dissent on Israel 70 II.13 Rising Religious Politics 74 II.14 A Holocaust Agenda Achieved 75 Chapter III. The Rabin-Peres Years III.1 How Washington Became Israel‘s Top Ally 79 III.2 The Rabin-Clinton Bond 85 III.3 Rabin‘s Rocky Relationship With American Jews 88 III.4 Washington and the Oslo Accords 93 III.5 American Jewry‘s Response to the Oslo Accords 95 III.6 A Post-Oslo American Jewish Agenda 97 III.7 Tensions Within Organized Jewish Life 103 III.8 Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Divide 106 III.9 Washington‘s Response to Rabin Assassination 108 v III.10 Rabin Assassination and American Jews 111 Chapter IV. The Netanyahu Years IV.1 Post-Rabin Assassination to Wye 116 IV.2 The Syrian Track 125 IV.3 Netanyahu, American Jews, and the Conversion Crisis 128 IV.4 Netanyahu‘s Addresses to the G.A. 135 IV.5 American Jewish, American Catholic Ties Grow 139 IV.6 Strains With Mainstream Protestants 141 IV.7 An Evangelical Alliance 144 IV.8 Shifts in American Jewry‘s Attachment to Israel 149 IV.9 Changes in American Jewish Identity 153 IV.10 Israel At 50: American Jews Take Stock 156 IV.11 Netanyahu Loses Power 159 Chapter V. The Barak Years V.1 From Camp David II to Intifada II 162 V.2 Negotiations Jumpstarted 166 V.3 Camp David to Intifada 168 V.4 The Al-Aksa Intifada 172 V.5 Barak and American Jews 176 V.6 Pluralism and Peace 180 V.7 Confronting an Israel At Peace 185 V.8 Population Surveys and Jewish Interests 188 V.9 Spirituality and Religious Shifts 194 V.10 The Impact of the Camp David Failure 199 V.11 American Jews and the Al-Aksa Intifada 202 V.12 Media Monitoring 207 V.13 Breakdown of Ties With American Arab Groups 211 V.14 A Changed American Jewry 214 Chapter VI. Conclusions VI.1 Lessons for American Jews 220 VI.2 Lessons for Israeli Governments 224 VI.3 An Era of Broad Shifts 227 VI.4 How it All Happened 229 VI.5 Shifting Priorities 230 VI.6 Jewish Political Power 235 vi VI.7 Why the Pro-Israel Agenda Matters 237 VI.8 The Shock of Oslo 240 VI.9 A Move Inward 246 VI.10 New Efforts at American Jewish-Israeli Ties 248 VI.11 Response to Rabin Assassination 249 VI.12 Netanyahu‘s Tenure 251 VI.13 Lessons From the Conversion Crisis 252 VI.14 Camp David II Talks and Renewed Violence 254 VI.15 Final Thoughts 258 Selected Bibliography and Sources 260 Curriculum Vita 281 vii 1 Chapter I. Introduction to the Study I.1 Rise And Fall Of The Oslo Accords The general sense of optimism surging through the Jewish and diplomatic world on September 13, 1993 clearly rivaled that of other key moments in modern Jewish history, included heralded events such as David Ben-Gurion‘s much-anticipated proclamation of Israeli statehood on March 14, 1948, and the seemingly miraculous success of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War (June 5-10, 1967). Yet, the first event was tempered by the belief even amongst top Israeli military officials that the fledgling Jewish state‘s survival was uncertain, which meant the pending battles could result in a newly acute refugee crisis, not to mention tens of thousands of dead Jews, including Holocaust survivors who had recently arrived from Europe‘s emptying Displaced Persons (DP) camps.1 The joyous relief greeting the second event was preceded by weeks of fear of imminent attack by a numerically overwhelming multi- national Arab force that might launch a ―second Holocaust.‖2 In addition, within months after the Six-Day War, a few veteran Israeli political leaders as well as Diaspora activists 1 On May 12, 1948, Yigal Yadin, head of military operations during Israel‘s War of Independence, told Ben-Gurion and other pre-state leaders in a lengthy briefing that, among other things: the situation in Jerusalem remained extremely critical; the Jordanian Legion had overwhelmed the Etzion bloc of settlements; and the Arab forces‘ numbers of weapons were superior as were their numbers of troops. He personally preferred a truce because even if manpower and weapons could come in quickly after May 15, when the British would formally no longer control the country, the chances of a successful defense were even. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007 ) pp. 310-311. 2 Before the war, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin instructed schools and public buildings to be readied as hospitals and 10 rabbis from the chief rabbinate went through public parks, sanctifying them as cemeteries. Rabin told cabinet minister Zerah Warhaftig that the IDF could suffer ―tens of thousands‖ of soldiers killed in combat. As the author and journalist Tom Segev has since written, ―Only a society drenched in the memory of the Holocaust could have prepared so meticulously for the next one.‖ Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. Trans. Jessica Cohen (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005) p. 286. 2 began wondering what burden the newly acquired territories would place on the state, given the fact that the Arab world refused to recognize, negotiate or make peace with Israel.3 And while both the 1948 and 1967 events were one-sided celebrations for the Jewish world and its friends, they were mourned as both physically and morally devastating episodes by the Arab states and their allies.4 By comparison, the Washington-hosted 1993 event – the signing of the first Oslo Accords -- was a moment of globally poignant and highly choreographed peacemaking. It captivated the hearts and minds of most Jews, Arabs, Muslims and governments across the globe. Indeed, the now familiar photograph of a reluctant Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reaching for the hand of an eager Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat – a beaming U.S. President Bill Clinton urging them onward – could be modern diplomacy‘s most indelible snapshot.5 The initiation alone of the Oslo Accords resulted in a joint 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for its three principal actors -- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Arafat, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. The reward came simply for the act of 3 On September 1, 1967, leaders of 13 Arab countries gathered in Khartoum, Sudan to pledge to continue a non-military struggle with Israel. The resulting Khartoum Declaration declared there would be ―no peace, no negotiations and no recognition‖ of Israel. As Howard M. Sachar has written, ―[It] was the first serious warning to the Israelis that their expectation of an imminent ―phone call‘ from the Arab world [for permanent peace talks] might be a pipe dream.‖ Sachar, p. 676. Also, the late Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg relates how at the end of June 1967, he was in Israel when he attended a meeting with former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The ―father of the State‖ surprised his audience when he ―asserted that if Israel did not now give back, immediately, all the territory that it had captured in recent days – with the exception of East Jerusalem – it would be heading for historic disaster.‖ Arthur Hertzberg, The Fate of Zionism: A Secular Future for Israel & Palestine.