Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language Author(s): Thomas C. Scott-Phillips Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 2015), pp. 56-80 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/679674 . Accessed: 21/10/2015 08:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press and Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Anthropology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:29:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 56 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 1, February 2015 Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language by Thomas C. Scott-Phillips Comparisons with the cognition and communication of other species have long informed discussions of the origins and evolution of human communication and language. This research has often focused on similarities and differences with the linguistic code, but more recently there has been an increased focus on the social-cognitive foundations of linguistic communication. However, exactly what these comparisons tell us is not clear because the theoretical concepts used in the animal communication literature are different from those used in the corresponding literature on human communication, specifically those used in linguistic pragmatics. In this article, I bridge the gap between these two areas and in doing so specify exactly what great ape communication tells us about the origins of human communication and language. I conclude that great ape communication probably does not share the same social- cognitive foundations as linguistic communication but that it probably does involve the use of metacognitive abilities that, once they evolved to a more sophisticated degree, were exapted for use in what is an evolutionarily novel form of communication: human ostensive communication. This in turn laid the foundations for the emergence of linguistic communication. More generally, I highlight the often-neglected importance of pragmatics for the study of language origins. The origin of human communication and language is a topic comparisons tell us. On the one hand, empirical research on that has exercised many generations of scholars (Stam 1976). great ape communication has placed considerable emphasis Since Darwin, an important source of data has been com- on the question of whether signals are used “intentionally” parisons between linguistic communication and the com- or not. On the other, the theoretical frameworks used by munication systems of other species (Fitch 2010). A great deal contemporary pragmatics to describe and study formally the of research has thus focused on the extent to which non- expressive flexibility of human communication and the social- human primates’ natural communication systems have the cognitive mechanisms that make it possible are much richer same or similar properties as human languages (e.g., Arnold than simply intentionality. In particular, the idea of ostension and Zuberbu¨hler 2006; Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980a). is central to pragmatic theory but is little considered in the More recently, it has been argued that despite these similar- comparative literature. (Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics. ities, many forms of great ape communication are probably It is often characterized as the study of meaning in context, based on different cognitive mechanisms from human lan- to be contrasted with semantics, which is the study of meaning guage, and hence that the evolutionary conclusions we can in an idealized, isolated sense. Another way to think of prag- draw from comparisons with the surface form of these systems matics is that it is the study of the communicative basis of (e.g., their “syntax,” “semantics,” etc.) are either unclear or language use.) I shall define it in detail later, but an informal limited (Deacon 1997; Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009; To- gloss of “ostensive communication” is to say that it is inten- masello 2008; Wheeler and Fischer 2012). Consequently, the tionally overt communication. As such, ostensive and inten- focus of much current research on great ape communication tional communication are related concepts, but they are not is the extent to which it is based on social-cognitive mech- the same thing. As a result of this disjoint, although there is anisms the same as or different from those that underpin a great deal of data that is potentially informative, exactly linguistic and other forms of human communication. what conclusions we should draw is at best unclear. However, even here it remains unclear exactly what these In this article I bridge the gap between theory and data in the comparative study of human and nonhuman primate communication. In the next section I briefly survey the lit- Thomas C. Scott-Phillips is Research Fellow in the Evolutionary Anthropology Research Group of the Department of Anthropology erature on whether or not nonhuman primate communica- at Durham University (Dawson Building, South Road, Durham DH1 tion can be classified as intentional. I then introduce a key 3LE, United Kingdom [[email protected]]). This paper distinction for contemporary pragmatic theory between the was submitted 23 VI 13, accepted 29 V 14, and electronically ostensive model of how communication works and the al- published 22 I 15. ternative code model. I discuss whether great ape commu- ᭧ 2015 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved. 0011-3204/2015/5601-0003$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/679674 This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Wed, 21 Oct 2015 08:29:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Scott-Phillips Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language 57 nication operates according to the code model or the ostensive (Fitch, Huber, and Bugnyar 2010; Tomasello 2008). One model and how it compares with human communication in prominent question in this literature is whether or not signals this respect. I conclude that unlike human communication, are used “intentionally”—a notion that contrasts with signals great ape communication is probably a form of coded com- that are produced in a more “reflexive” or “automatic” way. munication, albeit of a particularly sophisticated variety. I Intentionality is a notion with a long philosophical history, then use this analysis to argue that ostensive communication and its meaning is difficult to capture precisely (it is often is most likely an evolutionary novelty in the human lineage concisely glossed as “aboutness”). Its typical usage in the an- that evolved as an exaptation of increased social intelligence imal communication literature is perhaps best captured with (exaptations are adaptations that evolved as an offshoot of a summary of the criteria used in empirical research to identify some other adaptation; e.g., bird wings evolved as an offshoot intentionality. The following proxies are the most commonly of heat-regulation devices). Languages then emerged as tools used (Liebal et al. 2014): (1) social use (sensitivity to the that enhance the efficacy and utility of ostensive communi- presence and composition of an audience), (2) gaze alter- cation. A key general point to emerge from this analysis is nation (signaler looks back and forth between social partner the generally underappreciated importance of pragmatics and and some object), (3) sensitivity to attentional state (signal is social cognition for the study of language origins. adjusted depending on the attentional state of the audience), (4) use of attention-getters (behaviors used to gain the at- Comparative Research on Intentional tention of an audience), (5) persistence and elaboration (con- Communication tinued use of a behavior until its objectives have been met and the use of alternative or modified signals in case of Comparisons between linguistic and nonhuman primate failure), (6) flexible use (use of the same signal for multiple communication have a long history. The first playback ex- ends and/or multiple signals for the same ends; i.e., means/ periments were performed as far back as 1892, that is, more ends dissociation), and (7) response waiting (after signaling, or less as soon as technology made such research possible waiting for an appropriate response). (Radick 2007). In these experiments, the vocalizations of an- What is worth noting about this list is that all of these imals are recorded and then played back to other members criteria are about whether or not a signal is used in a goal- of the same species so that their effects can be systematically directed (“intentional”) way. This is, then, a question about studied and hence compared with linguistic communication. how signals are used and specifically about whether signals Probably the most well-known playback experiments are those are used in the pursuit of a cognitively represented goal or that were used to document the alarm calls of vervet monkeys not. Whether this is an appropriate use of the term “inten- (Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980a). Those studies made a tional” or whether the above criteria are appropriate ones are particular impression because the alarm calls were observed matters that could be disputed, but these are separate ques- to share some important properties with words; in particular, tions with which I am not concerned here. I will adopt these that they identify specific things in the world, and their form criteria in this paper.