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Information and Liaison Bulletin INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Information and liaison bulletin N°363 JUNE 2015 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) aqnd the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (The Fund for action and support of integration and the struggle against discrimination) This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 15 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 363 June 2015 • TURKEY: A HISTORICAL SUCCESS FOR THE PRO-KURDISH HDP PARTY • PARIS: A CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE PARIS KURDISH INSTITUTE • SYRIA: THE KURDISH FORCES ARE INFLICTING REVERSES ON ISIS • ERBIL: UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION TURKEY: A HISTORIICAL SUCCESS FOR THE PRO-KURDISH HDP PARTY or the first time since “Sultanic”. Indeed, in the course Ultranationalist, extreme Right the 10% threshold of of the election campaign, the MHP (80 seats) both of which F votes at national level charismatic leader of the AKP had are ideologically and regarding was imposed in 1983, a kept referring to the Ottoman past opposed to the HDP (pro- pro-Kurdish party will in bizarre and mythical terms. Kurdish, feminist, supportive of be able to have seats in the Turkish religious and ethic and sexual Parliament. The HDP won 13.12% Having only won 40.87% of the minorities) many the formation of the national vote, which allows votes, the AKP will only be able of a government coalition highly it to have 80 seats. In consequence, to remain in office by forming a unlikely. Especially as both the the ruling AKP Party loses the coalition or give way to a gov - first two are opposed tot the absolute majority it has enjoyed ernment formed by a coalition of peace process started by the since 200. This puts a serious the parties at present in the PKK chief, Abdullah Ocalan and brake on Erdogan’s ambitions to opposition. However, the the head of the Secret Services carry out constitutional changes extreme polarization within this (MIT) authorized by the AKP. that would enable him to set up a opposition, mainly consisting of Presidential regime with greater the People’s Republican Party An AKP-HDP coalition also personal powers — a project that (CHP — secular, nationalist, cen - seems hard to imagine, even his opponents described as tre-left) with 132 seats and the though their electoral pro - • 2 • Information and liaison bulletin n° 363 • June 2015 grammes on the Kurdish ques - personal political opinions, as worthy of note. It was led by the tion are not as far apart as those well as the double standards former Islamist Prime Minister, of the HDP and the nationalist applied by Ankara to ISIS and Erbakan, and won 4-5% of the parties. Indeed, though the HDP the PTD vote — probably at the expense supports the peace process, the of the AKP. election campaign was above all On 10 June, Prime Minister Ahmet a trial of strength between the Davutoğlu’s government handed In provinces with a Kurdish leaders these two parties, the its resignation to the President majority population were as fol - HDP accusing the AKP of hav - who accepted it while asking the lows: ing an Islamist agenda and the minister to stay put pending the Erdogan stigmatising Demirtas formation of a new government, Adana (14 seats) with a mixed, as of being ù “Zoroastrian” or a for the maximum period of 45 Kurdish, Turkish and Arab pop - “Marxist”, and though Figen days allowed by law after a gener - ulation, the AKP came first with Yüksekdağ, the BDP co- al election. At the end of this peri - 5 seats, then the CHP second (4 President, stated that her Party od, if no cabinet has been formed, seats), MHP (3) and the HDP last remained “open ” to a coalition, a new General Election would with 2 seats. she avoided saying with have to take place. whom… Adyaman (5 seats) also with a The composition on the mew mixed Turkish and Kurdish pop - Although a bomb attack in the Parliament is as follows: ulation: AKP 4, HDP 1. last weekend of the campaign The AKP remains dominant cast a pall over Diyarbekir, with with 258 seats, after losing 68 as Agri (4 seats) — all went to the 3 deaths (a 4 th died a week later) compared with 2011. This is, in HDP and over a hundred injured, any case, its worst result since over very seriously, the Kurdish taking office in 2001. (Ahmet Ankara (the national capital) (30 “man in the street” unhesitating - Davutoğlu had promised to seats) AKP 15, CHP 11, but HDP ly expressed joy at a “historic” resign if the AKP did not win still managed to win 1 seat victory in the Kurdish struggle 55% of the votes, that is 330 out for recognition of its identity. of 550). Batman (4 seats) HDP won 3 to AKP’s 1 Other Turkish left voices, espe - Next comes the People’s cially those from the Gezi park Republican Party (CHP) with Bingol (3 seats) AKP 2, HDP 1 movement, also celebrated the 132 seats (3 less than in 2011) a results, seeing them as being, drop in votes of 1%. Despite its Bursa (18 seats) was dominated above all, a slap in the face to avowed intention of winning by AKP (9) but HDP won 1. Erdogan’s authoritarian and 35% of the vote, it didn’t even “wheeler-dealer” policies. secure 25%. Diyarbekir (11 seats) HDP won Moreover, his connivance with 10, AKP 1 some Islamist trends his encour - The Nationalist Movement agement of very conservative (MHP) won 80 seats, as many as Elazig with (4 seats) MHP 1a policies regarding women and the HDP, with 16.29% of the mixed Turkish-Kurdish popula - family affairs had irritated a sec - votes). It also increased the num - tion, but traditionally very tion of Turkish public opinion. ber of its seats, not so spectacu - Turkish nationalist, AKP 3 seats. larly (+ 27 seats). Similarly, at Erzincan where It was, however, this very con - AKP and CHP won 2 each, and servative attitude that had, hith - The HDP , obviously, had the Erzurum AKP 4 MHP 1 erto, enabled the AKP to take most spectacular success since, root in part of the Kurdish elec - with 13.12% of the votes, it Gaziantepe AKP 6, CHP, MHP torate, many of who remain secured 80 seats. and HDP 2 each attached to traditional values in a provincial society very distant None of the 17 other little parties At Hakkari and Igdir the HDP from the urban movements of reached the 10% threshold won all the seat — 3 and 2 Istanbul. But the Syrian war, the (many indeed, won less than respectively siege of Kobani and the hostility 1%)and are not represented in to “Syrian Rojava” undoubtedly Parliament. The score of the Istanbul (88seats) the AKP won weighed heavily on the outraged Happiness Party (SP), a conser - 39, CHP 28. The HDP 11, beating Kurdish voter, what ever their vative religious movement, is the MHP with 10. n° 363 • June 2015 Information and liaison bulletin • 3• At Izmir (26 seats) CHP 12, AKP Mus (3 seats) HDP 2 AKP 1, Finally, at Van, HDP won 7 seats 8 but HDP nevertheless won 2. While at Siirt the result was against 1 for AKP inversed These elections were also marked by In Kars the HDP beat the AKP, a substantial participation by the winning 2 of the 3 seats, but won Urfa (12 seats) a province with a Turkish and Kurdish diaspora. The no seats at Malatya, whose 6 mixed Kurdish-Arab population results abroad saw HDP win in seats were shred between AKP and an AKP stronghold, the Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, (5) and CHP 1 AKP won 7 and HDP won 5. Macedonia, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine and In Mersin, the situation is similar Other provinces completely won the United Kingdom. In Greece it to Adana, with a substantial by HDP are: Sirnak, 4 seats out tied with the CHP. In the rest of the population of Kurdish refugees, of 4, and, significantly, Tunceli- world the AKP won in 23 countries, who shared their votes fairly Dersim, often shared with the including France. The only country equally Ø AKP. CHP and MHP 3 CHP but this time giving HDP where MHP won the majority of the each, HDP 2. both of its 2 seats. vote was Albania. PARIS: A CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE PARIS KURDISH INSTITUTE he Kurdish Institute in they could freely express its very For over thirty the Kurdish Paris, which has been ancient culture, its speech and its Institute of Paris was our pride. T in danger of being identity. An independent and secular closed down since organisation, open to all, it has February 2015 because This was an act of strong com - enjoyed the status of a its grants by the French State mitment towards the Kurdish Foundation of Public Use since have been cut off, is campaign - people that is the largest ethnic 1993. A refuge of humanity it is ing to survive. population in the world without an area of freedom, in all the a State.
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