Stand To

This is going to be my last “Stand To” column in ARMOR soldiers out from under his thumb between exercises. Heck, Magazine before terminal leave and retirement bring a 20-year you could even feel a loosening of control when ENDEX was career to a close. As I reach the end of this phase in my life, I’m announced over the net. reminded of how it began, and how life in the Army has We worked very, very hard, but we played pretty hard, too. changed ever since. While we worked hard, it was a fun place to work. I think you I cannot resist the temptation to offer one piece of advice — have to let yourself and your soldiers and troopers have some surely you can’t begrudge me the opportunity to mount a pulpit fun in this business, or all of the well-balanced people will leave one time in the four years I have been this magazine’s editor-in- the Army in disgust. Those who remain will be a too high chief. The advice isn’t just to my juniors, but to my peers and concentration of anally retentive “Type As” who want to staff the my superiors alike. A wise old “Gray Wolf” once said words to staff papers to see if we need staffing papers and then brief the my platoon sergeant that a just reporting 2nd Lieutenant Blakely results at 1600 on a Saturday afternoon. Oh, and you better not took to heart. I can’t quote him exactly, now that decades have make any mistakes while you do it or you won’t be able to stay passed, but it was something to this effect: “Sergeant Patsfield, in the command hunt. we work hard here in this brigade, and we work until the While in the past it might have been a good bonding exercise mission is accomplished, but when it is done, we play hard too.” to hold a Friday “maintenance meeting” at the club, the Before you pooh-pooh those as the well-meaning but suspect repercussions today if someone makes an error in judgment words of a commander in the late 70’s Army, an army which are just too severe. So, as a result, we have become had so many problems, let me point out that the Soviet Union increasingly a force that just goes home after punching the didn’t accomplish many of its aims in that time period. The Army clock and takes off its Army clothes because the job is over. then was good enough in its milieu to handle the threat, so the Service used to be our way of life; now we are losing this aspect Gray Wolf’s words were good and were worthy of emulation. of service to the country. And that’s part of the reason it is not Work Hard — Play Hard. That maxim can mean different much fun anymore. things to a lot of people, I suppose. Some would interpret it to A lot of people in and out of uniform complain about the way mean better and expanded intramural programs, with more the Army is right now. On some days I even complain a little sports participation during garrison time for everyone. Others myself. But make no mistake about, while there are specific will say it necessarily means too much Mr. Booze, and we need aspects about the Army which I don’t like, in its aggregate I still to keep a cap on that. To others it suggests out of control love it, believe in it, and am proud of it. womanizing in red-light districts, a deadly habit in this day and Over a frosty mug, I have idly speculated on where I would age. And true, those negative behaviors do occur when we play have been now if I’d majored in business and gone that route too hard or have leaders who don’t set good examples. It is rare out of school. But it is only idle speculation, for the fact is, that if now to hear leaders say much about the playing hard part of the faced with a magic genie chance to serve or not to serve from equation except to warn their soldiers and troopers not to, the beginning again, I’d make the same choice. To serve. Being because they will be hammered if they are caught hammered. a soldier, especially a tanker, was a child’s dream come true for Today, any blemish looks bad in quarterly training briefings me, and I rarely ever looked back to second guess the choice. and command briefings, so it is better not to take chances. As I sit in my office looking at the bulletin board I’ve decorated Instead, the phrase now seems to be Work Hard — Now Work with militaria from various ages, I don’t look so much to the past Harder. No wonder that the life of a soldier seems to be ever but to a future Army I won’t be a part of. I have mixed emotions more difficult for our recruiters to sell. Johnny with no play is an when I think about the exciting things which are about to unhealthy boy and will quickly decide not to stay in. happen — that makes me sad. I am elated, however, that a One of my favorite leaders in the Army, a brigade commander, strong Army still exists — especially when compared to any carried a sledgehammer with him everywhere he went. His likely foe’s force — and that there are great guys in our turrets. intent was “to remind people what battlefield effect a heavy That said, I wish you all good luck and good hunting. I will brigade has when it is used on an enemy — it ain’t a surgical always remain loyally yours. instrument.” He and the unit were high performers in — TAB simulations AND in the dirt at the NTC, yet he routinely let his

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

DENNIS J. REIMER General, United States Army JOEL B. HUDSON Chief of Staff Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 05266 The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-99-1

Editor-in-Chief Features LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY 9 The Future Scout And Cavalry System - (FSCS) Managing Editor by Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon JON T. CLEMENS 18 Chariots of Fire: Building the Bradley Fighting Vehicle by Major General Stan R. Sheridan (Ret.) Commandant 21 Problems Persist, But Continuous Band Track MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER Shows Promise in Light Armor Applications by Paul Hornback ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi­ 22 Is the Bradley Heavy Enough to Replace the M113 In Combat Engineer Units? monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 by Simon Tan Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. Disclaimer: The information contained in AR­ 24 Through the Breach: A Tanker Searches for a Common Perspective by Captain Jeffrey Erdley MOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi­ 28 Team Blade and Survivability Management cial Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by Captain Pete Huie change or supersede any information presented 30 Incident at Safwan in other official Army publications. by Stephen A. Bourque Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 36 Cadet Leader Training cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by Office of the Chief of Armor headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head­ 37 Achieving Effective ACIRC Relations: An NTC Model for Success quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar­ by Lieutenant Colonel Aaron R. Kenneston ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the 42 The Digital Reference United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by Colonel Kart Gunzelman and Captain Sean Pritchard Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 44 BEAMHIT: This Marksmanship Training System staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di­ Uses Lasers and Can Go Anywhere rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations, by Captain Eric G. Dulin and the training of personnel for such organiza­ 47 M1A2 NET Team Combines Military and Civilians in a First for the Army tions may request two copies by sending a re­ by Tom Werth and Specialist Randy Hughes quest to the editor-in-chief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 51 Tactical Vignette 99-1: those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor "FORGING STEEL - Exploiting a Brigade'S Success" Center has proponency. That proponency in­ 52 Solutions to Tactical Vignette 98-5: "Zone Recon To LOA Steelers" cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 57 New Electronic Information Systems Open a Virtual Library On-Line carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; Back AGTS Deploys With "First Team" To Bosnlal any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar­ Cover by Trudy Ryan and Major J.B. Iddins mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex­ clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C Departments officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol­ diers; and information conceming the training, 2 Contacts 3 Letters logistics, history, and leadership of armor and ar­ 7 Commander's Hatch mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level 8 Driver's Seat and below, to include Threat units at those lev­ 58 Reviews els. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, .KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to where copyright is indicated. Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK·TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121·5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. January-February 1999, Vol. cvm No.1 USPS 467-970 Directory - Points of Contact

DSN - 464-XXXX Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX u.s. Army Armor Center

Commanding General (ATZK-CG) ARMOR Editorial Offices MG George Harmeyer 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] Editor-in-Chief LTC Terry A. Blakely 2249 Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) E-Mail: [email protected] BG R. Steven Whitcomb 7555 E-Mail: TBA Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens 2249 Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) E-Mail: [email protected] COL Frank J. Gehrki III 1101 Editorial Assistant E-Mail: [email protected] Vivian Oertle 2610 Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) E-mail: [email protected] CSM David L. Lady 4952 Production Assistant E-Mail: [email protected] Mary Hager 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL John F. Kalb 5050 Staff Illustrator E-Mail: [email protected] Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL William J. Blankmeyer 8247 u.s. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) COL Robert L. Westholm 4009 COL Richard P. Geier 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) LTC(P) James H. Nunn 7955 TBA 5405 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: Mounted Maneuver BaHlespace BaHle Lab (ATZK-MW) NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) COL Karl J. Gunzelman 7809 CSM Kevin P. Garvey 5150 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL Patrick F. Webb 1272 COL Michael D. Jones 7848 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Scott R. Feil 6843 LTC Randall Williams 1315 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

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2 ARMOR - January-February 1999

LETTERS

Helicopters and Tanks in 2020: gained in the 1930s and World War II be- heads out of the sand and start figuring out Not an Either-Or Proposition tween armor and mechanized infantry, exploit- how to best utilize the awesome capabilities of ing the mobility differential. these systems. While it’s nice to have a group working on the international FSCS program Dear Sir: MAJ Blumentritt’s claim that bad weather that may give some future generation of affects aviation’s ability to operate is an over- While I agree with MAJ Blumentritt, that Ar- scouts a new system, we had better expend simplification. In fact, weather affects all more energy on optimizing the new systems mor will continue to play a pivotal role in land members of the combined arms team. During warfare for the foreseeable future, I must take we are getting now. Armored, 24-hour-a-day, the AH-64D Longbow IOT&E, the weather on-the-ground reconnaissance and economy issue with much of his argument regarding precluded operations by the mechanized helicopters on the battlefield (see Sep-Oct 98 of force operations are essential to the suc- forces off of the road network, and the Long- cess of combined arms operations. Protesting issue). Although the capabilities of the (attack) bow was the only maneuver system able to helicopter are becoming more evident, they, we can’t get the job done without FSCS is conduct normal operations. MAJ Blumentritt ludicrous. like the tank, are only a part of the combined appears to have forgone talking with any arms team and not an end to a means by Army aviators about our ability to operate in Most do not even know that the new acquisi- themselves. However to, “…use helicopters marginal weather conditions. In fact, both the tion systems on these vehicles contain not as airpower assets…” would fundamentally AH-64 and UH-60 are capable of operating in only very high resolution second generation nullify the combined arms team, by putting the up to moderate icing conditions. With the FLIRs but also daylight CCD TVs. These division and corps aviation assets under the development of the fire control radar on the systems, coupled with the digital databus control of the air component commander. AH-64D, visibility requirements for attack architectures of the vehicles, give us unprece- If the joint force commander uses attack operations will be reduced. To be sure, dented reconnaissance capabilities. Abso- helicopters as “airpow er,” then by definition weather will still be a real factor in aviation lutely no effort has been expended by the they will be apportioned by the joint force air operations, but less so than with fixed wing combat development community at Ft. Knox component commander (JFACC) through the operations, not to mention UAVs. to influence the design or equipping of the M3A3 configuration vehicles beyond what air tasking order process. Commanders will Although “flying tanks” are still far from be- need to plan for and request their use 48-72 every mechanized infantry squad will have in coming a reality, I believe that MAJ Blumen- an M2A3 IFV. This is criminal. hours in advance. This is in no way respon- tritt’s comments may go down with those sive to the ground commander’s require- made in 1914, by British General Haig, as to No significant effort has been devoted to ments. The very reason that aviation is an the capabilities of the “aeroplane” and its utility study or influence the design of the internal element of the ground maneuver force is to on the battlefield, or those of Air Force gener- rear configuration of the Bradley M3A3. In the allow them to operate within the tempo of the als after World War II as to the capabilities of M2A3 Infantry configuration, there is a won- ground battle. Although Army Aviation oper- the helicopter. We must remember that many derful flat panel display where the dismount ates “aircraft,” they are operated in the ground prominent Cavalry and Infantry generals had squad can look through either the gunner’s scheme of maneuver. Missions are planned tremendous doubts about tanks, until the sight, the commander’s sight, the driver’s for and executed in the same manner as for Wehrmacht made their utility overwhelmingly thermal viewer, or see the digital command any other member of the combined arms obvious. and control data available to the commander. team. Think of what could be done if we had put In recent months, it has become popular to His assertion that aviation cannot seize multiple displays and additional receiver ra- compare attack helicopters and armor as dios in the M3A3 so that scouts in the back ground is correct, at face value. Attack heli- competitors for the same mission. They are copters are designed to attack the enemy, not could look at all of these sensor outputs and not. They are complementary systems on the the downlink data from Apache Longbow MTI hold ground. Attack and air cavalry assets combined arms battlefield. Helicopters are provide the commander the ability to see the radar and UAVs that may be operating in their not, nor will they be, the end of the combat area. battlefield, and in concert with artillery set the arm of decision. Together, Armor and Aviation conditions for decisive ground operations. In will take the fight to the enemy with the tempo We are putting a very expensive mast- fact, every heavy division commander in Op- that is the hallmark of maneuver warfare. As mounted LRAS system on a HMMWV that eration Desert Storm, at some point, used an element of airpower, apportioned by the has virtually no protection. It could have been attack aviation forward of the ground elements JFACC, this cannot happen. mounted in the right rear of the M3A3, elimi- of their divisions, to see the enemy and set nating a vehicle from the force and providing the conditions for ground maneuver. Although MAJ ALLEN L. HUBER for even more sensor fusion on board the not able to hold ground they can “dominate” S3, 2-4 Aviation Regiment M3A3. When moving, the stabilized gunner’s terrain for a period of time. The 24th Infantry 4th Infantry Division (Mech) IBAS and commander’s CIV would provide Division used Apache helicopters to deny the the primary target acquisition capabilities, and Republican Guard a route of retreat to the when stationary, the large aperture LRAS causeway after the 100 hours. In Bosnia, the At Least in the Near Future, Today’s mast-mounted sensors would provide the attack helicopter has been used to force com- Scouts Will Use Bradleys & HMMWVs extended range capabilities needed. What we pliance with the Dayton Peace Accord. Few have now is two half reconnaissance systems. Dear Sir: would argue that M1A1s would have played a There are no good acoustical sensors in ei- pivotal role in the rescue of the Rangers in On November 9, 1998, at the UDLP factory ther ground system, yet the Field Artillery is Mogadishu. However, I believe that if you ask in York, Pa., a significant milestone in the procuring the BAT munition that has an excel- those outstanding soldiers what kept the history of the Armor Force took place and not lent sensor array which could also have been crowds from overwhelming them during the mounted and integrated on the M3A3’s mast. a single official representative from Ft. Knox night, they would tell you the attack helicop- As a battalion commander, I bought Steiner or Armor Branch was present. The M2A3 ters of Task Force 160 played a critical role. 15x80 binoculars with internal compasses in Infantry Bradley first production vehicle was Likewise, the Pakistani and Malaysian armor them for my scouts. These binoculars and the delivered to the U.S. Army, and with it comes new lightweight laser designators and pointers force that fought its way to the Rangers was the M3A3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. need to be on the BII of the M3A3. supported by Cobra helicopters of the 10th Mountain Division, sometimes flying below Whether anyone wants to admit this or not at We also need to look at the integration of rooftop level and firing into second story win- Ft. Knox, the only new Future Scout and Cav- some of the Land Warrior and dismounted dows. Aviation is not the panacea of the bat- alry Systems (FSCS) that most of the 19Ds in LRAS technologies for our dismounted scouts tlefield, but [helicopters] are far more than a the Army today will ever see are the M3A3 so that they can stay electronically tethered to component of airpower. Armor and Aviation Bradley and the Long Range Acquisition Sys- the M3A3 yet work in areas where vehicle must harness the same synergy that was tem (LRAS) HMMWV. It’s time to take our exposure needs to be minimized. ARMOR — January-February 1999 3

From a purist standpoint, the M3A3 Bradley plan: mass, simplicity, focusing on targetable R-A-M-P is not a replacement for well- is a terrible scout vehicle. It’s big, at 133 high payoff targets (HPT), flexibility, and time- drafted ROE, which must be tailored for par- inches to the top of the CIV, and heavy, at liness. On numerous occasions during BCTP ticular missions and be consistent with direc- 33.5 tons, but it’s the best we’re going to have and BBS simulations, as well as NTC and tives from higher headquarters. Rather, by for a long time. Let’s make the best of it in- CMTC rotations, I have seen fire support ensuring soldiers understand fundamental stead of crying about what we could have in assets squandered by engaging too many rules governing the use of force, R-A-M-P 15 more years. We need to work on its visual, unimportant targets. It is better to attack one provides a predicate for specific ROE. More- acoustic, and thermal signatures, and we critical HPT with everything available than to over, R-A-M-P is easily incorporated into unit need to get more sensors, radio receivers, fritter away limited assets on unimportant STX training and classroom training at all and integration capability on board. These are targets. This requires close control of observ- levels. The Center for Army Lessons Learned all within the realm of the possible for product ers and maneuver commanders who clearly recently published several booklets containing improvements and the budgets of today. understand the commander’s intent. There ROE vignettes useful for both field and class- are not enough fire support assets to service room training. Judge Advocate instructors at For those who think it’s more important to every request. Someone is going to have to the Armor School presently use these vi- expend all of our resources trying to get a new go without. gnettes, R-A-M-P, and specific ROE from FSCS, I remind you that in the 1970s, the actual deployments in Law of War classes for Armor leadership chose to ignore the M3 CFV I also agree with his targeting criteria, that junior officers. Operational law Judge Advo- development and upgrades, thinking a new the target must be stationary. I have tried to cates are available to help TOE units organize scout was just around the corner. It’s twenty engage moving targets with artillery at NTC similar training. years and one war later. It’s time we faced and have never been successful with conven- reality and our responsibility to equip today’s tional munitions. There are just too many In 1999, the U.S. Army Armor Center will scouts with the best we can. Remember – variables, including target location error, to be open an innovative training site for Mounted better is the enemy of good enough. consistently successful. Moving targets should Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Training

be engaged with artillery only when precision scenarios at the site will prepare mounted CHRISTOPHER V. CARDINE guided munitions are available. warriors and combat support elements for both domestic and foreign contingency opera- COL (Ret.), Armor/Cavalry Fire supporters of all branches and services tions. Familiarity with ROE is critical for units are technicians by trade. Both the Field Artil- preparing for MOUT training and, ultimately, lery and Military Intelligence are highly techni- Thoughts on Battle Command Article real world contingency operations. R-A-M-P is cal. Successful integration of fire support de- From a Career Fire Supporter ideally suited for this purpose and CPT Froeh- pends on the tactical application of technical lich’s article underscores this important propo- means. Maneuver commanders must train fire sition. Dear Sir: supporters to be both tacticians and intelli- gence analysts in order to engage the truly JOHN E. BAKER The September-October 1998 issue of critical HPTs. COL, U.S. Army ARMOR contained the article “Battle Com- Staff Judge Advocate I would recommend that all maneuver and mand Insights,” by LTC James E. Zanol. This Ft. Knox, Ky. article included a section entitled “Lessons of fire support soldiers copy LTC Zanol’s article Fires,” which was breathtaking, absolutely and read it daily. It summarizes every impor- tant fire support principle in the FM 6-20 se- stunning. I have been a 13F (Fire Support Training at Platoon, Company Level Specialist) for 17 years and have never seen ries (Fire Support in the AirLand Battle) in just a clearer explanation of the application of fire a few pages. I really don’t think anyone could Must Be Real, and Realistic support at the brigade level. It should be improve upon it. memorized by every armor, infantry, combat SFC SCOTT E. ROGERS Dear Sir: aviation, and artillery officer. Squadron FSNCO During my time as a fire support sergeant, 1st Sqdn, 3d ACR I could not agree more with COL Guy the soldiers Ihave learned the most from Swan’s letter (ARMOR, Jul-Aug 98) reference about fire support have been a couple of ma- Working Rules of Engagement training in today’s Army. I concur with COL neuver commanders at the company team Into Future Training Scenarios Swan’s assessment that most units training at and battalion level. This wasn’t because they our CTC’s fail to execute at the icon level. In had special technical knowledge of any fire Dear Sir: fact, there may not even be a linkage between support means, but because they understood the division warfighter and the missions exe- the most important battle command lesson: cuted at the CTC. maneuver commanders are solely responsible CPT Dan Froehlich has made a significant for synchronizing their own combat power. contribution to the Armor community in his While I do not suggest another study, I do They were excellent tacticians (not techni- article “Training Rules of Engagement: Be- think it is time for all of us to re-look how we cians) who understood that they needed every yond the Briefings,” published in the Septem- are approaching training. I think this is espe- advantage, every shred of firepower to win. ber-October 1998 issue of ARMOR. Rules of cially true for those of us who are more senior engagement (ROE) are all too often viewed in rank. Personally, I think the training doctrine The really good maneuver commanders I as hindering mission accomplishment, and at is fine. I suggest that how we are executing that doctrine may be a problem. have served under expressed a clear and least part of the reason is our failure to easily understandable intent and did not leave achieve an appropriate comfort level with the planning or execution to their staffs with- While all training is important, we must en- ROE during training. R-A-M-P, as described in out close involvement (not micro-manage- sure that we are producing units at the platoon CPT Froehlich’s article, is an exceptional tool ment). Otherwise, separate plans would be and company level that are capable of win- to teach ROE to soldiers and their leaders developed, unrelated to the commander’s ning engagements. I think most of our battal- intent, which would usually result in a dis- now, before they get caught up in the heat of ion and brigade commanders can look at jointed, piecemeal, and unsynchronized exe- the moment. The alternative to effective train- platoons and companies and determine if that cution of the battle plan. I have witnessed ing is increased potential for allegations that training is meeting the requirements to win many such fiascoes at both NTC and CMTC. force was used in violation of ROE or, fully as those engagements. You get better the more important, that the mission was compromised times you repeat specific training events pro- LTC Zanol’s article focuses on the really im- because legitimate force wasn’t applied. vided you get good feedback on what went portant factors in a successful fire support right and what went wrong (the AAR process). 4 ARMOR — January-February 1999

COL Swan’s command got better with each going to get the platoon leader or command the 82d Abn Div, with partial success, when I execution of a training event and his platoons position and who is not. Under the present was assigned there as an S3. and companies have more training events per system, everyone gets their turn! What is best year than any unit in our Army. for the unit, is not best for the individual. The closest we came to institutionalizing a unit manning concept was General “Shy” It is time that we put as much effort and time COHORT works and creates extremely ef- Meyer’s recommendation that we adopt a into platoon and company training as we do fective units if it has good officer and NCO regimental system similar to the British sys- for the division and corps warfighters. We leadership that understands the unique chal- tem. What we have now is only a shadow of should protect the training time for these units lenges and stresses of this type of unit. (See what he really intended. His concept was that with the same zeal that we protect the division Dr. Kirkland's Walter Reed Army Institute of officers and NCOs would remain with the and corps training events. We should insist Research (WRAIR) Tech. Report No. 5, Unit same regiment for their entire careers and that battalion and brigade commanders be at Manning System Field Evaluation, dated 17 would not be forced to move up or out. platoon and company training events versus June 1987.) The report cites “the deleterious Rather, they could remain at their current meetings at division and corps headquarters. effects on cohesion of rotating key company grade so long as they remained competent. Senior leaders at all levels should encourage level leaders.” The current officer personnel The idea emphasized stability and cohesion, commanders to send their executive officers management system requires that company- something we currently lack. to meetings so they can observe training and level commanders change every 15-18 coach and mentor their subordinates in critical months (in many cases even sooner) in order The current officer personnel management warfighting skills. to give every captain his turn. I was a battalion system emphasizes the officer’s career devel- S3 in the 82d Abn Div Arty and saw battery opment through narrowly defined “wickets,” I hear a lot of complaints about lack of ma- commanders change frequently. I even had to rather than unit cohesion or effectiveness. neuver space. What post does not have change out after 12 months although I was Unfortunately, these personnel policies un- space to maneuver a platoon or a company? getting good at my job. If the unit is lucky, it dermine combat readiness. Kirkland’s 1987 Use the simulations to enhance our ability to gets a good commander for the next 18 Tech Report states, “the most destructive fight our larger formations but not at the ex- months. If not, they have to wait 18 months behavior occurred when an officer was viewed pense of where the real fighting is accom- as trying to further personal ambitions at the plished. until they can get rid of the guy. The NCOs (esp. in the 82d) tend to stay in the same unit expense of the soldiers ... Rapid turnover of Finally, I think most of our young leaders and for several years. That’s stability. The soldiers lieutenants as platoon leaders made both soldiers love soldiering in the field when they stay, as well. Officers are the wild card. That officers and their troops feel that the lieutenant are fully engaged and can see the actual does nothing to enhance unit stability and was not part of the platoon, but a transient.” benefits of their work. They appreciate the cohesion (or combat effectiveness). This unit replacement policy is reminiscent of personnel policies in place during the Vietnam commander and command sergeant major The first light infantry division “entailed sig- that knows his profession well enough to point War in which many officers were viewed in the nificant changes from traditional practices in same manner by their troops. Kirkland writes, out better, more effective ways for them to the U.S. Army.” Rather than relying on logisti- employ their unit to achieve success. These “the perception most damaging to vertical cal superiority and overwhelming an enemy cohesion was that officers’ careers mattered soldiers stay because this is what they joined through attrition, the light infantry division had to do, not puck some icon in the simcenter. more to them than did the welfare of the unit.” to be able to deploy to an austere contingency Haven’t we learned something since our ex- area and win through “soldier power,” the perience in Vietnam? We’re still managing JAMES E. SIMMONS military proficiency of small groups of lightly personnel piecemeal, rather than as units! COL, AV armed soldiers. The limitations on airlift wouldn’t support a massive buildup of logistics Kirkland’s Tech Report didn’t just focus on or combat power. This concept is not new; the what went wrong in the COHORT system but Officer Turnover Makes Leaders airborne fought through Normandy during found many examples of units that “got it Appear To Be “Transients” WWII like this. The report defines “soldier right.” He and his co-authors give many sug- To Men in Their Units power” as the “synergistic product of inten- gestions about what ingredients were com- sive, progressive training rigorously focused mon to high-performance units. These ingre- Dear Sir: on the combat mission, experienced leader- dients included technical and tactical know l- ship, and horizontal and vertical cohesion.” It edge, respect for subordinates, trust in subor- Yes, COHORT CAN work IF personnel goes on to say that, “the COHORT system dinates, a power-down style of leadership, management policies support it. But, if makes possible the development of interper- caring and a focus on the mission (setting COHORT exists in only one place, such as sonal cohesion essential to small forces oper- clear priorities and shielding soldiers from the 7th ID(L) or a unit preparing to go to Bos- ating independently in hostile environments.” higher HQ requirements that weren’t mission- nia, hiccups are bound to appear elsewhere Staying together as a unit for three years essential). “Constructive commanders used throughout the Army. Current personnel poli- makes this possible. their staffs to fight higher headquarters to get cies (individual replacements) and COHORT personnel and equipment, shortstop require- are antagonistic. They can’t co-exist very well, The CSA published a White Paper on Lead- ments, and alleviate their subordinates’ anxie- if at all. The problem is not too few officers ership in 1985 (following the White Paper on ties.” and NCOs but too many officers that have to Light Infantry Divisions in 1984) that proposed get their platoon or command time before relationships between leaders and subordi- Kirkland makes an indictment of the prevail- moving on to the next job. For COHORT to nates based on mutual trust, respect, affec- ing Army culture. “It was clear from the ex- truly work and create cohesive, highly effec- tion, and dedication to a common purpose. periences of these light infantrymen and ar- tive units, officers have to be stabilized within The principles call for open, complete, and tillerymen that the current Army culture does those units. We would have to fill units with truthful communication both up and down the not support vertical cohesion or the capability officers, NCOs, and soldiers, and then keep chain of command. The CSA recommends to operate autonomously. Rather, the Army them together for an entire life-cycle (3 yrs). that leaders empower their subordinates by culture teaches leaders that the appropriate That would mean that some officers won’t “get granting them discretion commensurate with reaction to pressure is to centralize control, their chance.” We would have professional their competence, involving them in decision- put on a good show, and sweat the troops staff officers who would never get into a pla- making, and relying on the ability to function (remember the quote “treat them like ani- toon leader or command billet unless they autonomously within the boundaries of their mals?”). This is not because leaders are weak eventually prove themselves worthy. That missions. I have experienced this type of or evil; it is because they have been raised in would require battalion and brigade com- environment only once in my career, while an Army culture in which the prime assump- manders to make the hard call about who is assigned to the 7th ID(L). I tried to bring it to tions are that no one will do his best unless he ARMOR — January-February 1999 5

is pressured and closely checked, that being dios; the R-163-U series are mostly in the personnel to take action. (Draft TM 9-1095- good is meaningless unless you look good, 30.000-79.990 MHz range, and the R-163- 254-14, Operator, Organizational, Direct Sup- and if you look good no one will check further, 50U is one of those. It replaced the R-171 and port, and General Support Maintenance Man- and that I won’t be here when the facade I R-111 series radios as a 50-watt command ual (Including Repair Parts and Special Tools have created crumbles.” The implications of set. The R-163-10U is the normal set, and the List) for Counter Ambush Barrage Weapon this statement, if true, are enormous for readi- R-163-UP is just a receiver, as the major System XM55, Frankford Arsenal, September ness and deployability issues. noted. 1970.) The Rhodesians also improvised a number of interesting counter-ambush de- The writer states that he has not read any STEPHEN “COOKIE” SEWELL vices (See Taming the Landmine, by Peter systematic study of the COHORT system on a CW2 (Ret.) Stiff, pages 79-83. A “Minimore” was com- service-wide basis. I encourage him to read mercially available as recently as 1987). the WRAIR studies on the light infantry divi- sion and the COHORT system. They con- Seeking 33rd Armor Members MAJOR WILLIAM SCHNECK ducted extensive observational research and For Historic Registry Assistant Division Engineer conducted numerous interviews over a multi- 29th ID year period to come to the conclusions I re- Dear Sir: [email protected] ferred to above. He might also read the two Could you mention our efforts to document CSA White Papers referenced in this essay. the history of the 33rd Armor Regiment and its These issues are critical to our Army. With members, from its inception in 1941 through Letters Reflect Real Concerns battalion command being the Holy Grail of its many changes in the mid-1980s and About Simulations Versus Reality career success, most officers are risk-averse 1990s? We ask anyone who served in any and want to avoid doing anything that would battalion of the 33rd Armor Regiment to con- Dear Sir: jeopardize their next rating. This type of cli- tact us so that we may add them to our regis- try. I was perturbed by your views in “Stand To” mate does nothing to encourage risk-taking, in the July-August issue of ARMOR. empowering subordinates, or building the We are also establishing a new website at most combat-effective units. The fruits of a http://www.readyfirst.com/2-33Armor/ Specifically, your belief that the present flow power-down leadership style take too long to of letters to the editor, “indicate that there is realize for most. They are not immediate, and BRYAN SMITHERS much more going on than worried, paralysis- when a single OER can make the difference HHC 2-33, 1st Bde., 3d AD inducing, woe-is-us hand-wringing...” “who are whether you will make the battalion command 1976-1979 sounding Chicken Little, sky-is-falling list or not, most officers simply won’t risk it. alarms...” and “that behavior is counter- Our Army culture punishes risk-takers. It Use Sandbags to Protect Vehicles productive and only spreads panic when panic doesn’t allow mistakes. (If you can’t make is in no way warranted.” mistakes, how can you learn?) It actually When Strapping On Claymore Mines works against creating the most combat- On the contrary, rather than a sense of effective units! Doesn’t this tell you that some- Dear Sir: panic, you might interpret the increased num- thing is wrong? ber of letters to the editor as a strong indica- As always, I thoroughly enjoy your maga- tion of the increasing concerns of both active zine. I have one comment about SFC Thomp- Another writer responded to my piece yes- and retired officers and NCOs to the danger- son’s excellent article in the July/August issue. terday by stating that the resiliency of the ous trends that they perceive in their U.S. On page 13, he says “Another similar tech- enlisted soldiers of our Army keeps it strong. Army and their Armor Branch, trends that if nique was strapping Claymore mines to the He’s right. But I think it is a shame that they continued could lead to an ineffective army outside armor of the tank with the clackers have to be resilient to negative internal pres- incapable of performing its national defense sures that we could eliminate by overhauling marked as to position inside the driver’s com- missions. our officer personnel management policies. partment.” This may damage the host vehicle, particu- Consider COL Swan’s recent letter (Jul-Aug I hope the Army’s bold experiment of the ’98) in which he states his concerns over “the 1980s, the light infantry division and the larly a thinner-skinned vehicle such as a Brad- ley, M113, or truck. In every case, the M18 funding and development priorities weighted COHORT unit manning system, are not left on heavily toward virtual and constructive simula- the dust pile of history. I fear we are returning should be placed against a filled sandbag and not directly against the hull. When Claymores tions and away from live, FTX-based training. to a system that was in place during Vietnam These computer-driven simulations will domi- and failed us then. were detonated against the sides of vehicles during the Vietnam War, it caused “excessive” nate the so-called “second training revolution.” damage to the host. To decrease the damage, WILLIAM F. ADAMS From my perspective, based on 31 years of LTC, FA a miniature Claymore (sometimes called a “dirk,” “mini-more,” or a “Claymorette”) was service, with command experience from pla- PMS, Duke University toon-company-battalion-brigade; wartime ex- developed by the Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Even with the perience in Korea and Vietnam; and training Further Comment Clarifies miniature Claymore, the host vehicle still suf- experience in the U.S., Europe, Asia, and the Soviet and Russian Radio Bands fered “significant” damage. (See Claymore Middle East, I strongly endorse COL Swan’s Mines, Their History and Development, by concerns. I believe the U.S. Army should give Dear Sir: Larry Grupp, page 123.) live, FTX-based training first priority in funding and allocate only small funding for research I saw the comments about Adam Geibel’s Another technology, developed by FMC De- and development for computer-driven training article in the new issue of ARMOR and noted fense Technology Laboratories, used a less simulations. that the major made a slight error in his com- destructive, slow -firing counter-ambush device ments on radio types. In Russian, they use the that could be placed in multiple units on the It should be recognized that live FTX-based abbreviations “KV” and “UKV” for military band sides of the vehicle. This device was made up training serves important requirements – the radios. KV is “Korotkiye Volny” or short wave, of many rows and columns of short, aluminum testing of tactical doctrine in the harsh realities which to them is what we term HF — usually barrels, each holding a .22-cal. Long Rifle of field operations, the testing of weapons and 1-11 MHz on their radios, like the old R-130 cartridge. The back surface was a propellant equipment, and finally the testing of leaders. sheet that burned and caused the cook-off of series. UKV is “Ul'trakorotkiye Volny” or “Ultra- short Wave” which corresponds to our VHF. the .22s over about a minute duration, sound- ing like popcorn. It was intended to keep en- DUQUESNE A. WOLF The radios here are either from 20-51.5 MHz emy heads down long enough to allow our COL, U.S. Army (Ret.) or 30-80. The R-163-xxK series are HF ra- 6 ARMOR — January-February 1999 Training forTomorrow

by MG George H. Harmeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

The challenges of training the U.S. competency is developing combat ready trained quarterly, either in the virtual or Army's mounted forces in the post-Cold soldiers, competent and well-skilled live environment at the platoon and com­ War strategic environment are tremen­ staffs, tactically proficient and confident pany level. 1be MTS will allow com­ dous. We must lrain and sustain readiness leaders. and fina1ly. "killer" platoons and manders to conduct multi-echelon train­ for full spectrum conflict and expect to companies that are able to dominate any ing so that platoons and companies train deploy anywhere in the world on short threat across the speclrum of conflict. as the battalion and brigade staffs and noeice. These deployments win feature Small unit excellence is the key compo­ leaders are trained in the constructive, tailored packages of forces. to include the nent of our strategy as they establish the virtual, and live environments by maxi­ Reserve Component, and will require us basis for success on future battlefields. mizing the training environment based on to employ Information Age technology With that as our focus. the Mounted available resources. The goal of this strat­ against multiple and asymmetric threats. Training Strategy must: egy is to develop soldiers, slaffs, leaders, The increased deployments of the and units proficient in the core tasks. This • focus on resourcing pre-deployment Army's mounted forces in an era of fixed is paramount to sustaining and maintain­ combat proficiency levels and conslI'ained resources means, at least ing training readiness in preparation for in the near lenn, a dramatic decrease in • include Training Support Packages receipt of a mission order. The strategy is available training dollars for non­ after receipt of mission and mission the same for the Active Component and deployed units. rehearsals the Army National Guard, with the re­ In recenr years, every Armor and Cav­ • plan for sustainment training while quired level of training readiness based on time available to execute the strategy. alry unit in the Anny has used virtual and deployed constructive training devices in concen By integrating core tasks, this strategy is • place renewed emphasis on the con­ able to apply new training technologies with li ve training exercises to offset this duct of annual unit EXEV ALs curtailment of available training dollars. and approaches. justify the resources required to maintain training readiness, However, the training unit has borne the • identify core tasks to be trained and and to support the development and ac­ burden, to some degree, of managing the the number of annual iterations to quisition of new materiel and infonnation installationlinstitution training plan. as prevent atrophy systems capabilities. The MTS enables us well as the unit's tactical proficiency • account for personnel, turbulence to describe how and where to use T ADSS plan, deri ved from its METL • maximize the training potential of all and the training required to maintain Managing decreasing and turbulent re­ training environments - live, virtual, readiness - both pre- and post­ sources is the central focus of an emerg­ and constructive mobilization. ing Mounted Training Strategy (MTS) • support AC and RC environments As our new training strategy emerges. that we have initiated here at the Annor several new training technologies cur­ Center. This training strategy will include • support Campaign Plan XXI - War­ rently being fielded will greatly assist our a workable model that will allow unit fighter, Warrior. and WarMOD training effons. These systems are the commanders to execute well resourced • justify training resources Close Combat Tactica1 Trainer (CCTI) training given today's constrained re­ and the Tank Weapons Gunnery Simu­ sources. Moreover. the different training • be tailored for each MACOM lator System and Precision Gunnery environments in CONUS, USAREUR, The Mounted Training Strategy will de­ System (lWGSSIPGS). The pro­ and Korea require that the Mounted ccrr fine a pre-deployment training readiness vides a virtual environment for our units Training Strategy be tailored to meet each level that is achievable within current to train, sustain, and rehearse, which MACOM's demands its mission. tcaJ.rung resources and incorporates greatly complements that training con- training environment, and training re­ Training Aids. Devices, Simulators. and sources. Simulations (T ADSS). The methodology The central tenet of the new training incorporated into the Mounted Training strategy is simply this: The Anny's core Strategy is based on core tasks that are Continued on Page 48 ARMOR - January-February 1999 7 Armor Force NCO Academy Update: New Facilities, Enhanced Courses, Larger Student Load by CSM David L. Lady, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Atmy Armor Center

Our Noncommissioned Officer Acad­ While we are adding digital TrPs, we are These NCOs will now be able to partici­ emy. ably led by CSM Kevin Garvey, has not necessarily replacing the analog pate in Quartering Party activities, as well been e:

The Future Scout And Cavalry System - (FSCS)

Technology Overview, Critical Program Issues, and Design Considerations by Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon

Editor’s Note: In past issues of ARMOR, the au- thors of this article have discussed and illustrated some fascinating combat vehicle concepts, including a future main battle tank design that won ARMOR’s 1993 tank de- sign contest.

Currently, Britain and the U.S. are collaborating on a joint design for a future scout and cavalry vehicle that would replace the HMMWV and Bradley in U.S. service.

Authors Sharoni and Bacon join the dialogue with this article, which – it must be stressed – is an inde- pendent, conceptual design, not to be confused with the U.S.-British Tracer/FSCS final concept. emy. Stringent operational requirements datory for the FSCS. The High Mobil- But I think you will find their dis- have been posted for a small and light ity Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, cussion of scout and cavalry re- vehicle featuring a low profile, increased HMMWV (XM1114) up-armored scout quirements as interesting as the agility, and improved mobility to enhance version, though with improved mobility, vehicle they have designed to meet its survivability. These requirements led lacks adequate armor protection. The these needs. to various vehicle configurations that HMMWV is equipped with light weap- were inadequately protected — if at all ons and has insufficient payload-carrying — thereby suffering a highly dispropor- capacity for the required wide array of A Short Overview of the Ground Sur- veillance and Reconnaissance Role tional casualty rate when exposed to hos- sensors and electronics. The latter are tile enemy fire. necessary to successfully meet the sur- veillance and reconnaissance needs of the Mechanized tactical surveillance and The last three decades or so have been reconnaissance scout and cavalry vehi- characterized by efforts of upgrading and future battlefield during the first quarter cles have been the traditional ‘eyes and of the next century. Neither the modernizing old and new main battle HMMWV nor the Bradley was designed ears,’ serving the tactical commander and tanks (e.g. M60A5/M1A2SEP) and me- front combatant units since WWI. In past dium/heavy armored personnel carriers or optimized to perform scout and cav- alry missions. days, mainly due to immature or virtually (e.g. M113A3/M3 Bradley). These vehi- nonexistent technologies, there was an cles have been improved to enhance their Arguably, scout and cavalry operations acute insufficiency of long range, multi- firepower, mobility, and in particular, have been viewed in the past as secon- ple-sensing capabilities. Consequently, their survivability. Current scout vehicles dary in importance to the combined these highly maneuverable and lightly in use by the U.S. Army that served well armed forces’ maneuvers. Existing infan- protected mounted units were oftentimes in their heyday were originally designed try carrying platforms, produced to sat- assigned the ungrateful but critical role of while maintaining their particular mission isfy other land warfare functions, were serving as human ‘bait.’ When a potential in mind. Nonetheless, they can no longer converted into scout and cavalry vehicles. enemy could not be detected, they had no be regarded as clandestine and effectively They were not customarily designed nor choice but to attract enemy fire by delib- operate in the electronically saturated, optimized to achieve their specific mis- erately exposing themselves at the front heavily ‘sensorized,’ future battlefield sion. Thus, inherently limiting compro- line. Once a well-concealed enemy force environment without being easily de- mises in firepower (primarily self- revealed its position, it lost the critical tected and consequently destroyed. defense), survivability (armor protection, element of surprise. Consequently, tacti- signature attenuation, detection sensing cal commanders were able to plan their According to Army sources, the M3 ability, etc.); mobility and agility had to tactics and respond with much higher version of the Bradley armored fighting be made. This situation has changed probabilities of success, ostensibly avoid- vehicle fundamentally lacks the rigorous dramatically with the proliferation of ing catastrophic encounters with the en- stealthy characteristics considered man- high-tech weapon systems offered for ARMOR — January-February 1999 9

sale today in the open market, and the with the U.K., and would cut production to cover the development and production availability of a wide array of matured costs for both nations by leveraging of an Advanced Technology Demonstra- ‘sensing’ technologies. economies of scale. tor (ATD). These competing ATDs will be completed at the close of 2001, 36 It is widely recognized that an army Consequentially, the U.S. and U.K. months after contract award. Thereafter, with superior tactical situation aware- zealously embarked upon a collaborative ness, real-time intelligence gathering, fast venture to develop and produce a com- only one consortium will be down- selected for the EMD phase. information dissemination capabilities, mon FSCS/TRACER. On July 7, 1998, and high potential firepower, will have they signed a Memorandum of Under- Much has been written about the politi- the decisive edge and thus dominate the standing (MOU) that covers the program cal nature and inherent mutual benefits of future battlefield. It will win the war in definition, production, and follow-on such unprecedented cooperation between the shortest time possible, with minimum support. The MOU states that the FSCS/ the U.S. and the U.K. governments. To casualties and with lesser damage to its TRACER will fill a need for both sides to keep records straight, the U.K. voluntar- own military installations and industrial correct existing shortfalls in the current ily brought its program to a temporary assets. The FSCS is designated by the ground reconnaissance/counterreconnais - halt, allowing the U.S. to organize and U.S. Army to be one of the principal sance capabilities on the battlefield and to subsequently join forces with the U.K. in means by which it will substantially im- fully implement new emerging military this ambitious program. Multinational prove its tactical situation awareness. It doctrines. Current long-range U.S. acqui- defense programs of this nature, orches- will gain the critical, decisive, and com- sition plans call for procurement of 1,700 trated between allied countries on politi- petitive edge deemed crucial for quickly FSCS systems, to begin fielding in the cal grounds, are known to be extremely winning a modern war. It will play an 2007-2008 time frame, while those of the intricate and fragile. They have their essential role in the digitized battlefield U.K. call for 400 TRACERs. This com- ‘enemies’ (opponents) from within and by analyzing, sending, and receiving vital bined production quantity is ostensibly outside of their respective defense or- information that will dramatically en- sufficient to ensure industry economical ganizations. They also require that the hance combat effectiveness and survival return on its investment. The US/FSCS is two governments (and armies — at all of front line combatant units. targeted for fielding to all Army scout working levels) be fully committed and platoons, including division and regimen- work very closely to solve any problem. tal cavalry squadron scout platoons that The participating governments must FSCS/TRACER — A Joint Program are equipped with HMMWV/M1114 and quickly abridge emerging differences and Between the U.S. and U.K. M3/Bradley. legal complications that may rise initially (e.g. signing the MOU), during the de- In order to facilitate the FSCS joint pro- The U.S. Army began thinking about a gram, the U.S. Army has approved, for velopmental and production phases. They new Future Scout and Cavalry System must ensure program stability and endur- (FSCS) just a few years ago. The Armor the first time, a Fast Track Acquisition ing support. Experience has shown that (FTA) strategy for its Advanced Tech- Center’s Directorate of Force Develop- nology Demonstration/Project Definition participants must share developmental ment at Fort Knox, Ky., has concluded costs on an equal basis (50/50%) and that an FSCS was unequivocally essential (ATD/PD) cooperative phase. Other per- thereafter, individually bear production tinent executive management guidelines for the ground forces to achieve superior- for immediate implementation are: Use of costs in accordance with the base con- ity on the battlefield. The FSCS will figuration and quantities each party plans achieve that with an unprecedented level the Army System Acquisition Review to procure, while enjoying the savings of Council (ASARC) for follow-on mile- of intelligence gathering, information stone I/II decisions; approval of ATD/PD a combined production order. dominance, real-time analysis, and effec- tive dissemination of information. criteria at 50% signature reduction and Complicated contractual issues had to 250% increase in target identification and be resolved before the memorandum of The main thrust was launched when the acquisition range; and the execution of an understanding was signed. These in- U.S. Army ascertained that its scout and affordability study to address unit manu- cluded intellectual property rights, in the cavalry vehicle program resembled the facturing costs (UMC) prior to establis h- event that either party decides to prema- one that had been launched by the British ing requirements and requesting propos- turely end its participation in the devel- Army in a program known as TRACER als for the subsequent Engineering and opment or prior to production; transfer of (Tactical Reconnaissance Armored Manufacturing Development (EMD) technology; cost sharing during the de- Combat Equipment Requirement), in- phase. According to Army officials, the velopment and production phases; and tended to replace the British Army’s ag- FTA strategy will shorten the develop- future international sales to a third party ing Scorpion family of light armored ment effort by roughly 4 years and save a by each participant. Another essential vehicles. The profound similarity of op- total of $890 million by combining ex- prerequisite is that both armies must be erational requirements between the FSCS ploration, project definition, risk mitiga- willing to exercise a philosophy of ‘give- and TRACER is the major rationale be- tion, and EMD phases. A unique U.S. and-take’ in order to establish the widest hind the U.S. Army initiative. On April feature of the FSCS program strategy is base possible for common operational 21, 1997, a joint requirement oversight the elimination altogether of the tradi- requirements. A major threat to the ra- council validated the service’s mission tional Demonstration/Validation (DEM/ tionale and stability of such a cooperative need statement for the FSCS. Coupled VAL) phase, thus allowing the program program could possibly arise if the U.S. with seemingly perfect timing (still), it office to move straight into the EMD versus U.K. unique requirements will has presented a unique window of oppor- phase following the completion of govern and dominate over the common, tunity for the U.S. and the U.K. armies to ATD/PD phase. A formal Request For rendering the developmental phase inef- join forces and effectively merge the two Proposal (RFP) was issued on July 7, fective and subsequent production non- individual programs. The agreement 1998, immediately following the signing economical. Following the removal of would substantially reduce overall Engi- of the MOU. Two competing interna- these obstacles, FSCS engineers must yet neering Development Manufacturing tional consortia were to each receive a encounter extraordinary technical chal- (EDM) costs to the U.S. by splitting them 42-month contract (scheduled for 12/98) lenges. They must achieve the optimum 10 ARMOR — January-February 1999

middle grounds between highly sophisti- tional effort of Germany, Italy and the strike force that will be more lethal and cated technology and escalating costs; U.K. to develop the SP70 howitzer failed mobile than current units. reliability and utilization of fully inte- in the mid-1980s. The Howitzer Im- grated, customized versus ‘off-the-shelf’ provement Program (HIP/M109) during The FSCS — A Leader at the Forefront of Current Advanced Technology Non-Development Items (NDI) modular the late 1980s, which evolved into a joint systems. venture between the U.S. Army and the The FSCS is expected to serve well into Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), exemplifies the 21st century (2030) and will inargua- Finally, the independent National De- the complexities of such endeavors. This bly be the most advanced scout and cav- fense Panel (NDP), though not specifi- cally recommending any program cancel- program commenced with an extensive alry customized armored vehicle ever base of common requirements that served produced. Most of the major operational lations, has recently challenged the valid- as a firm foundation and justification for requirements for such a vehicle seem to ity of the Army’s legacy systems, such as the Crusader field artillery system and such a joint venture. Unfortunately, as the be forcefully endorsed by both armies. program progressed, conflicting opera- Positioned at the current forefront of the Comanche scout/attack helicopter. tional requirements, cost and domestic technology, the FSCS will play a promi- This attempt further reemphasizes the vulnerability and fragility of new major industrial issues had emerged, leading to nent role by serving as an Advanced an ever-growing increase in individual Technology Demonstrator (ATD). An weapon systems developments in with- unique requirements while diminishing advanced electronic sensors ‘suite,’ standing the sharp teeth of military down- sizing and critical budget cuts. Senators the common. Consequently, the joint stealth, reduced crew, high-mobility, program was ultimately terminated, and medium caliber armament, light weight, have been known to continuously urge each country proceeded with its own and enhanced survivability, will all point Congress to look seriously at potential weapons cancellations to free funds for efforts, culminating with their particular the way — technology wise — for other designs (The U.S. with the M109A6/ potentially subsequent developments, like other high priority modernization pro- PALADIN). the Future Infantry Vehicle (FIV) and grams that will better position the U.S. Army against modern and future threats. further along, the Future Combat System This brief, grim history of similar un- (FCS). With the cancellation of the Cru- In this ‘hostile’ political amb ience, any successful international endeavors is not sader’s Regenerative Liquid Propellant major new developmental program could become an inopportune victim of cancel- intended to discourage, predict, or cast a (RLP) main weapon system option, and shadow on the current collaboration. It with ever-growing reliance on current lation due to DOD’s attempts to recover does emphasize the crucial importance of technology, the new field artillery system funds for investment in revolutionary technologies and other force-mu ltiplier true and full cooperation among political, is not largely an ATD. military-operational, industrial functions, modernization priorities. Recently, we and other DOD procurement and acquis i- The FSCS will attempt to leverage nu- have been advised of the U.S. Army Ar- merous next -generation technology pro- mor Center efforts to terminate the M1A2 tion entities deemed mandatory for pro- grams developed in the U.S., to include: gram success. upgrade in support of the FSCS funding. The hunter sensor suite ATD; the multi- This is a precarious situation, which may function staring suite ATD; the battle- lead to a severe conflict within the ser- In the authors’ opinion, if the above space command and control ATD; the critical lessons will be carefully analyzed vice’s elements themselves and industry, and correctly implemented, the FSCS electric vehicle demonstrator; the driver’s causing program instability. Furthermore, vision enhancer; the composite armor we have recently ascertained that the U.S. program is predestined for success. It vehicle ATD; the advanced light armor possesses a unique blend of essential Army is considering an increase in the ingredients and prerequisites. Its timing is technology; and the composite armored Crusader requirement from 824 to 1,378 vehicle (CAV) ATD. favorable; up-front funding for Project systems, extending production by 5 years. Definition and Advanced Technology Given overall finite and ever decreasing Demonstration (PD/ATD) is available Overview of the FSCS budgets for acquisition and procurement, and supposedly in place; operational re- Major Operational Requirements and this may lead to a shortage of funds Technology Feasibility Assessment quirements are recognized, well estab- available for FSCS future production. lished, and justified; sensor technology is The following are the major Combat maturing and available; and the FSCS Operational Requirements that have been Multinational Defense Joint Ventures could be successfully put to use in local presented to the FSCS developers. These — Critical Lessons for the FSCS or in large scale military conflicts. Last are fundamentally different than the re- In reviewing similar multinational joint but not least, the cooperation between the quirements posed to conventional con- ventures, the MBT-70, an ambitious U.S. and the U.K. governments could temporary surveillance and reconnais- U.S.-German collaborative tank program serve as a mutual ‘insurance policy’ for sance vehicles. The profound difference during the late 1970s, comes to mind. both armies, diminishing the likelihood of is the level of sophistication and maturity The tank was technically superior to its a premature political termination, avoid- of advanced sensing ‘suites’ and stealth contemporaries, but way ahead of its ing the destiny of similar ill-fated defense technologies that will ensure successful time. This collaborative program did not programs. The FSCS philosophy com- implementation in the FSCS. The FSCS come to fruition because the two gov- plies with the U.S. Army’s fresh line of is required to ‘push the envelope’ of a ernments failed to abridge and conciliate thought in accomplishing a “Full Spec- wide spectrum of currently developed their differing operational requirements trum Dominance” in the near future. It technologies. With its advanced sensor and other pertinent funding, intellectual, embodies seeking “Mental Agility” by package; target identification, acquisition developmental and production matters. In enhancing real-time information process- and designation capabilities; and long- Europe, multinational attempts to cooper- ing and situation awareness, in contrast to range optics, it will provide real-time ate on various defense programs suffered “Physical Agility,” which pertains to all intelligence and enhanced situation a similar ill fate. Germany developed the other progressive conventional improve- awareness. These will be provided at an PzH 2000 and Britain the AS90 self- ments and upgrades. The FSCS could unprecedented level of speed, resolution, propelled howitzers after the multina- successfully be deployed with a small detail, and accuracy. ARMOR — January-February 1999 11 Future Scout and Cavalry System – The Authors’ Concept

Telescoping Back-up Long Range FSCS UNMANNED Day/Night Sight TURRET Day-Night Long Range Telescoping Combat Periscope Protective System Weapon Pack Stealth Tube Peripheral Stealth Jacket Antenna Array shown in active mode Under Armor Radar Scanning Surveillance Antenna Telescoping Antenna

Phased Array Radar Electronically Scanned Array (ESA) XXI Anti-Air/Ground Fire &Forget Missiles (3 ea side)

SELF-PROTECTION WEAPON PACK (-5 Deg to +90 deg Elev.) Active Protection - 35 or 40mm Autocannon with Device (4 places) 200+ ready rounds Under Armor IR Grenade/ Smoke Launcher (3 corners) - M240 7.62mm Coaxial MG with 500 ready rounds Detector Suite (4 places) - Long Range Day/Night Sight Under Armor Day/Night Long Range Sight/Laser Designator/HEL -Weapon Pack Stealth Tube/Antenna Array Main Fuel Tank Integrated Display Helmet (3) Hull Vetronics Space Claim FSCS CHASSIS Life Support System Electro-Optical Mechanical Slip Ring Rear Service Door Personnel Equipment Stowage IR Suppressor and Muffler Auxiliary Power Unit

Suspension Control Commander’s emergency Electro-Hydraulic Unit “Hard Pipe” Day/Night Sight

Front Fuel Tank

Modular Reactive “Special” Armor Through-Armor Vision TV (2 each side) Under Armor IR Grenade/Smoke Launcher (2 each side) Tensioning Idler

Obstruction Reinforcement System

Peripheral Viewer Books Electric Drive Power Conditioning Low Profile Survivable 3 Man Crew Compartment March Fuel Tank Skirt Anti-Mine Microwave Grill “Special” Armor Side Skirts

Electric Driven “In-Arm Hydro-Pneumatic Unit (6 each side) Front Sprockets (2) Through-Armor Vision TV (2 ea Front & Rear)

12 ARMOR — January-February 1999

To ensure that the FSCS will survive to achieve its entire mission and ultimately return safely, it must be equipped with state-of-the-art defensive protection and weapon systems. These will dramatically enhance its survivability and provide independence from reliance on the forces it is designated to support, allowing it to independently operate close to enemy front lines. (Ed. Note: Program officials in both the U.S. and the U.K. emphasize that this cooperative program is firmly grounded on operational requirements that are nearly identical for both armies). · Situation Awareness Sensors ‘Suite’: Situation awareness is the para- mount role of the FSCS. It will possess multi-spectral band sensors at ground Silhouettes show relative sizes of the conceptual FSCS and the Bradley. level and elevated positions (stationary surveillance and on-the-move view- ing/monitoring) to detect and identify yield a complete ‘picture’ of the battle- ward so that handling and discarding field. spent cases is entirely eliminated. Longer enemy forces at 10+ km with “Over-The- dwelling after firing reduces gun gas Hill” (OTH) operational capability in all · Main Defensive Armament: Equipped weather conditions and during day/night. with a medium caliber, automatic gun buildup under armor. It is smaller and lighter, and is comprised of fewer parts Rapidly advancing sensor technologies system (30-40mm), sufficient to defeat than any other comparable 35mm gun currently offer a multitude of detection enemy APCs and lightly armored scout and monitoring options, such as electro- and cavalry vehicles. As connoted, the available today. Bushmaster III capital- izes on the use of externally powered optical, millimeter wave radar, acoustical, automatic gun will be used primarily in a operation to separate gun mechanism electromagnetic, and infrared. The FSCS passive self-defense role, and only as a will provide answers to the operational last resort, when discovered and directly motion from cartridge ballistics, allowing for a precisely timed and fully controlla- strategic level and lower echelon com- threatened by hostile enemy forces. The ble operating cycle. A key feature assur- manders who have ever-increasing in- main armament will be employed against formation requirements. fixed-wing ground support aircraft, attack ing outstanding reliability is 100 percent positive cartridge control from the time Multi-Spectral Target Acquisition: helicopters, tactical unmanned aerial ve- the ammunition enters the feeder until the · hicles (UAV), and a plethora of ground Day/night target acquisition, identifica- armored threats. The new Bushmaster III fired case is ejected from the weapon. tion, prioritization and designation en- hanced capabilities. The FSCS will be 35mm automatic gun is selected as a pos- It is readily adaptable to advanced, high sible candidate because of its inherent equipped with a new generation radar advantageous characteristics: It is de- performance, anti-armor and anti-air system, such as Northrop Grumman’s penetrating rounds currently being devel- Electronically Scanned Array (ESA) signed and made in the USA, near the oped for the popular 35mm ammunition end of development, and fires NATO XXI. This radar is deemed highly effec- standard 35mm ammunition. The Bush- series to defeat present and future threats. tive in supporting FSCS’s critical mis- The 35mm ammunition family is ext en- sions. The ESA XXI is based on the master III demonstrates high reliability, sively used all over the world (30 coun- superior durability, exceptional accuracy, Longbow radar mounted atop the main and safe operation under all firing condi- tries) in various anti-armor and anti-air rotor assembly of Boeing’s AH-64 im- applications, so continuous development proved Apache attack helicopter. This tions. This gun is an evolutionary up- and performance enhancement are ex- scaled design that incorporates all the radar combines the basic Longbow fire battle-proven features of the 25mm M242 pected for many years to come. NATO control system — which detects, classi- standard 35mm ammunition is character- fies, prioritizes, and presents ground tar- Bushmaster gun, with significant system ized by a very short time of flight, which commonality and low-risk, proven per- gets for the Apache crew — but in a formance. The M242 is a widely ac- ensures very flat trajectory and enhanced lightweight configuration adapted to accuracy, resulting in high hit probability ground applications. The ESA XXI claimed gun and serves as the primary and extreme on-target effects. It has ex- armament on the Army’s Bradley fight- ground version uses a smaller, lower cost, ing vehicle. The Bushmaster III will be cellent armor piercing performance by and lighter weight antenna that was de- use of a discarding sabot projectile and veloped for use by the U.S. Army’s next - able to defeat the armored reconnaissance superior terminal ballistics. Storage, threat out into the year 2020 and beyond. generation reconnaissance helicopter, the transportation, handling, and firing crite- Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche. The Bushmaster III combines the cost- ria are all in full compliance with the U.S. The direct ‘sensor-to-shooter’ linkage effectiveness and compactness of Chain Army and NATO specifications. If will be enhanced by combining external Gun technology, design simplicity, exter- Bushmaster III is ultimately selected, information and intelligence gathering nal operation, positive round control, ease 35mm NATO ammunition will be pro- from other mobile sources so that the of maintenance, and constant velocity duced under license in the U.S. The FSCS can integrate his own sensors with feed to enhance the reliability of the gun Bushmaster III could als o operate with external information and intelligence to feed system. Fired cases are ejected for- the newly developed Oerlikon Contraves ARMOR — January-February 1999 13

Conceptual vehicle is seen above in travel mode, and at right in- surveillance mode with sensor systems deployed. Main gun tube housing also contains antenna array and is raised to vertical when sensors are deployed.

Advanced Hit Efficiency And De- struction (AHEAD) anti-air/missile de- fense to keep abreast of the ever- escalating threat scenario. Last but not least, the Bushmaster III is capable of firing the 50mm Supershot ammunition, currently in development, which is sub- stantially more potent than the 35mm well established in outer space and air- without detrimental losses from beam borne applications. The FSCS laser gun spreading, divergence, dispersion, standard ammunition. This is a strong argument in favor of this gun, indicating application will probably be a near-term diffraction, and scattering. Additionally, growth potential beyond the 35mm am- ‘spin-off’ of these developmental efforts. it must maintain its ‘self-focus’ Incontestably, laser gun technology characteristics and high-energy density, munition capacity. represents a tremendous step towards which are mandatory for achieving an There are possibly other viable candi- independence from logistic support. effective target kill, severely damaging or dates for the main armament, but in the There is no need for frequent ammunition temp orarily disabling an enemy threat. interest of space, they will not be dis- resupply since it will be ‘firing’ variable, Battle Management System (BMS) cussed herein. Any selected gun must high-energy short pulses (bursts) of con- · exhibit similar characteristics to the verted electrical energy. During target The second generation Battle Manage- Bushmaster III, or better. (Ed. Note: for ment System (BMS) includes peripheral acquis ition, a low-energy laser beam will multisensor-aided Target and Fire control discussions pertaining to gun selection, be pointed at the target to verify ‘on- see ARMOR article “Forward Area Air- target’ position and the corresponding acquisition system, a day/night integrated Ground Defense,” Jul-Aug 96). system capable of automatically monitor- effective range. Subsequently, the low- ing and tracking up to 8-10 active or pas- Bushmaster III major Specifications: energy beam will be substituted with a short, high-energy pulse, ultimately yield- sive targets simultaneously and au- Caliber: 35mm; Feed: single/dual; Peak tonomously. Automatic air/ground ac- recoil: 14,000 lb/ft; Total weight: 535 lb; ing target destruction (see ARMOR arti- quisition would come through thermal Overall length: 158.1 inch; Rate of fire: cles about the Future Combat System – FCS, J-A 97, S-O 97, and J-F 98). imagery, millimeter-wave radar process- Semi-automatic, 200 rpm (250 max.); ing, and direct optical sights. The system Power required 3 Hp @ 28 Vdc; Clearing would include: target recognition, identi- method (cook-off safe): Open bolt; Though chemical laser technology is considered mature, a compact and trans- fication, prioritization, and automatic Safety: Absolute hangfire protection; tracking with fire controls for both main Case Ejection: forward. portable tactical laser weapon system, (medium automatic gun) and secondary well integrated into a smaller mobile ar- · Secondary Potential Armament mored vehicle such as the FSCS, remains (laser) armament incorporating full stabi- System: High Energy Direct Projection lization and automatic loading. It would to be demonstrated. Typical outstanding include fire-on-the-move capability while Laser Gun for Self-Defense and Target issues are integration of optics, energy Designation: The FSCS will be equipped pressurization system, radar, and com- engaging multiple targets in self-defense. with a high-power, extremely accurate, It would play a passive role within the mand and control. Recent developments tactical and regional digitized communi- fully stabilized laser gun. The FSCS is in high-power laser technology imply that envisioned as an almost ‘all-electric’ ve- future ‘spin-off’ Self Defense Initiative cation networks by providing critical hicle, which facilitates use of a laser gun battle awareness information and target (SDI) exertions, on a much smaller scale, data submission and acceptance. The that could be used defensively against a could be implemented in armored variety of close-in threats. Among them ground-to-ground and ground-to-air of- FSCS/BMS could be temporarily are helicopters, drones, ground ‘soft’ ‘slaved’ to other FSCSs, air defense sys- fensive weapons and active self-defense tems, or to higher echelon command and targets, infantry, and incoming enemy applications. A high-power, direct Line missiles. High-power laser technology for of Sight (LOS) laser beam must have the control centers. armament applications has successfully ability to travel through the atmosphere at · Signature Management: A Reduced advanced beyond its infancy and now tactical operational ranges (10-15 km) Signature Management System (RSMS - 14 ARMOR — January-February 1999

radar, acoustic, visual, infrared/thermal and consequently, the enlargement of its FSCS more independent and capable of and magnetic) would enhance survivabil- vis ible silhouette. operating over long periods without re- ity. Modular Armor Protection: The quiring periodic maintenance and logisti- · cal support. This requirement is difficult · Multi-Net Communications: Capa- FSCS will be equipped with an advanced to satisfy and necessitates a departure ble of simultaneous voice, data, and im- add-on modular armor kit (‘package’) agery communications on multiple nets, that will be installed as required. This from any conventional power source. As shown, the FSCS power pack is config- and of collecting, sending, receiving, and armor kit could be improved over time ured for a hybrid front-drive installation. integrating information from a variety of without requiring major changes to the land, air and sea sources, including higher hull and weapons/sensors station. It will Electro-mechanical propulsion for mobil- ity applications is currently recognized as echelons, other services, and friendly also allow easier transportation of the the wave of the future, let alone the fact forces. Intervehicular communications vehicle without the armor kit, which must be highly reliable and capable of could be transported separately. This that another major system is partially utilizing electrical energy for its opera- operating flawlessly and continuously system will protect against medium- tion. under all adverse conditions to facilitate caliber ammunition and rocket-propelled internal communications and dissemina- grenades. Hybrid Electro-Mechanical Power tion of information within the crew. · Two or Three Men Operational Crew - System For Automotive Applications · Mobility: Must be greater than the Is It Feasible? Defense Daily (12/11/96 p. 398) re- supported armored forces, with potential speed of 60 mph. An amphibious capabil- The vehicle would be manned by a crew ported that DARPA is embarking upon a of two, preferably three, to facilitate si- new venture to find a contractor team ity is desired. The FSCS will be powered multaneous mounted and dismounted able to inexpensively develop and dem- either by a conventional power pack, comprised of a highly efficient diesel surveillance operations. The option to onstrate the capabilities of a highly- carry a fourth crewman in the turret to effective, Hybrid Electro-Mechanical engine coupled with a hydro-kinetic extend the length of effective operational Power System (HEMPS) for generation transmission, or a hybrid electro- mechanical power system (discussed capability — though up front seems ad- and storage of electricity. HEMPS is in- vantageous — will substantially reduce tended for automotive applications as a separately). the electronic ‘payload,’ ultimately re- prime-mover in advanced combat vehi- · Survivability: Increased survivability sembling the undesirable image of yet cles. In essence, it is comprised of a die- against enemy scout vehicles via signa- another personnel carrier. The FSCS sel engine or gas turbine driving a genera- ture management reduction, enhanced must be smaller and lighter than the tor(s) to produce electrical energy for use agility and mobility, a “dynamic protec- Bradley. Its crew ought to be less than the and subsequent storage by the vehicle tion ‘suite,’ selective modular special conventional four or more crewmembers systems. DARPA intends to invest more armor, and NBC integrated protection. in order to reduce the vehicle’s protected than $40 M to develop and test the Deployability and Force Projection: and visible volume. Full automation, with HEMPS over the coming few years. · consolidation and centralization of major Competing teams will develop and dem- Transportable by C-5, C-17, C-130, and functions performed by a conventional onstrate an integrated HEMPS for a 15- C-141 aircraft. crew, will eventually lead to dramatic 20 ton vehicle (e.g., FSCS). · Endurance: Effective range of 400 crew reduction. The major functions of miles, 72 hours continuous operation commander, main armament operator, Granting industry the prerogative to de- velop its own designs without stringent without resupply. weapons/self-defense suite operator, data directive from DARPA is a fine idea that acquisition and processing operator, and · Hull/Turret Construction: Advanced driver/navigator, could be alternately has great merit and will pay handsome composites and metallic materials m-i dividends in shorter schedules and overall plemented as structural and ballistic ele- assumed by each one of only three reduced developmental costs. The crewmembers. The adaptation of a re- ments to facilitate weight reduction and duced crew requires a departure from the HEMPS is in full accordance with the reduce radar and thermal signatures. requirement for simplified and reduced Though not mandatory and a topic for a underlined philosophy of conventional logistics. Integrated HEMPS are more APC operation. The three-crew members separate discussion, it is most likely that could not and should not be expected to efficient and have improved performance the FSCS will be equipped with a weap- compared to contemporary diesels or ons/sensors station, which will resemble a perform all routine functions presently turbine-based power packs. They operate assigned to conventional APC crews. It rotating platform or superstructure. It will implies that logistics, maintenance opera- with less noise and with reduced thermal provide structural support for the main signature, thus improving survivability. and secondary armaments, as well as for tions, sentry duties and alike, should be It’s problematical whether integrated reduced by virtue of highly advanced the vast array of multi-directional sen- technologies and extended reliability. The HEMPS will be less costly to produce sors, other electronics, and communica- and deploy than contemporary diesel tions equipment. The conventional turret FSCS self-defense systems should oper- power packs. Attempting to capture the ate intelligently and independently; con- is not applicable here because that im- tinuously watching, monitoring, and pro- better of two worlds, HEMPS seems to plies at least one crewman will be posi- be applicable to the lighter FSCS and tioned there. In the authors’ personal tecting while the crew is asleep, recuper- alike as a near-term solution, and less for ating, or inoperable. opinions, the multitude of electronic sens- the longer-term, heavier FCS. HEMPS is ing and communications equipment, in still going to require diesel or turbine fuel addition to the main and secondary ar- Alternative Energy Propulsion for for its operation, and now we would have maments, will not leave any extra room Automotive Applications a piston engine or a gas turbine in addi- for an additional crewmember. If at- tion to a sophisticated electrical power tempted, it will result in an undesirable A predominant FSCS requirement is to generating system to worry about. This increase of the FSCS’s weight due to the significantly lessen the dependency on will be counterbalanced by higher reli- need for additional ballistic protection, conventional fossil fuels, thus making the ability and fuel economy. ARMOR — January-February 1999 15 FSCS Concept Vehicle Details 35 or 40mm AUTOCANNON M240 7.62mm (200+ RNDS) Self- Protection Weapon Pack COAXIAL MG (- 5 Deg to 90 DegElev ) Telescoping Antenna

Under Armor IR Grenade/Smoke Launcher (3 Corners)

Long Range Day/Night Sight Tube (3) Periscope Blast Relief Door Weapon Pack Stealth Tube/Antenna Array Electronically Scanned TOP VIEW Under Armor Weapon Array (ESA) XXI Back- Up Long Range Day/Night Sight Radar Scanning Pack Under Armor Day/Night LEFT SIDE MISSILE RACK Surveillance Sight Low Profile Long Range Sight/Laser Survivable 3 Antenna Designator/HEL Telescoping Combat Man Crew Protection System Compartment Anti- Air/Ground Fire & Commander Emergency Forget Missiles (3 ea side) “Hard Pipe” Day/Night Sight

FRONT VIEW LEFT SIDE VIEW REAR VIEW FCS Concept Vehicle (Overall View) (Sensing Devices Under Armor)

239.64

128.65

Anti-Air/Ground Fire & Forget Missiles (3 ea side) Through-Armor Vision Under Armor IR Grenade/ Peripheral Viewer Self-Protection TV (2 ea fwd & rear) Smoke Launcher (2 ea side) Blocks Weapon Pack Through-Armor Vision Commander Emergency TV (2 ea side) Rear Service Door “Hard Pipe” Day/Night Sight

82.77 70.21

59.46

Anti-Mine March Fuel Tank Microwave Grill

16 ARMOR — January-February 1999

· Circumferential Transparent “Vir- · Play an essential role as an active in- Logistics Are Crucial To the FSCS tual Reality” Under Armor Vision formation node, fully integrated into the digitized communication battlefield, tac- Like all contemporary modern APCs, All-around, ‘virtual reality’ day/night the Bradley requires a long, vulnerable 360o array of TV/Thermal cameras and tical, and regional networks: combat, ‘trail’ of logistic support, which severely surveillance and logistic. computer processed vision enable the limits its deployability and operability. In crew to “see” through the armored walls · Improved cross-country mobility, the power projection era, strong logistical of the crew compartment with their hel- speed, and agility, and greater range than dependency is not acceptable. The cur- met-integrated displays. It allows excel- the Bradley APC. rent goal is to reduce the logistic burden lent “buttoned-up” visibility and allevi- by at least 50%! A modern, maneuvering ates motion sickness. The weapons could · Autonomous day/night obstacle army must reduce its reliance on restric- avoidance, ‘Auto-Pilot’ (AP) naviga- be fully slaved to each of the three-crew tion/cruise and automatic formation ma- tive logistic support systems while con- members as tactical considerations and suming fewer, limited resources. On July battle conditions dictate. All critical battle neuvers. 17, 1996, Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, Dep- awareness, vehicle status, and intelli- uty Chief of Staff for Doctrine at the Enhanced Mobility gence information is accessible to the Army’s Training and Doctrine Com- crew on their helmet displays. The FCS will be equipped with a highly mand (TRADOC), expressed his concep-

efficient, electro-mechanical power train, tion that the Army’s operational revolu- Integrated Survivability which consumes substantially less energy tion relies upon effective utilization of than conventional prime movers to pro- better technologies and techniques to · Lightweight (15-20 ton) all-terrain, all weather, extended-operational capability, duce equivalent output. It could increase support ground forces. The key issue is the operating range by up to 20% and to “temporarily break from the logistics highly mobile vehicle. More versatile more when compared to the fuel guzzling umbilical cord...” restoring the rapid than the present Bradley APC series and capable of missions beyond those tradi- gas turbine engine. It has a much higher maneuvering of dispersed formations so power density (HP/ft3) and is much essential to full exploitation of armor’s tionally performed by contemporary sur- smaller in comparison to conventional firepower, shock, and mobility. Accord- veillance and reconnaissance scout and cavalry vehicles. diesel or gas turbine prime movers (up to ing to Gen. Scales, the Army will be able 50% increased volumetric efficiency). to create a dominant Force XXI by em- · Substantially reduced overall target Power electronics could be increased by ploying alternative sources of energy for signature (heat, acoustic, magnetic, and 100%, which ultimately implies a smaller mobility and propulsion while reducing visual) via ‘stealthy’ materials and a con- envelope of the FSCS. A composite the traditional restricting dependency on tour design. Equipped with an extensive ‘band’ track will reduce noise signature rations, ammunition, and spare parts. Signature Management System (SMS - (30-50%) and increase life such that no This same underlying philosophy has thermal, electromagnetic, acoustic), coun- maintenance is required during opera- played a paramount role in the derivation termeasures, and a False Target Genera- tional activity. of our FSCS concept. tion (FTG) active/passive decoy system · Unprecedented cross-country mobility Tracked Versus Wheeled Suspension which could project and emulate an imaginary FCS signature to divert incom- and enhanced agility will be provided by Tracked suspension is by far the best a Hybrid Electro-Mechanical Power Sys- ing homing missiles. tem producing variable 600-700 Hp system ever devis ed for ground automo- tive applications in terms of mobility, · Equipped with a self-defense dynamic (@20 ton, 30-35 hp/ton). Computerized reliability, and durability. There is no ‘Hit-Avoidance Suite’ (HAS) which hydropneumatic ‘dynamic’ suspension automatically detects, prioritizes, count- will provide a smooth and comfortable evidence of any current or near future system that could match or outperform it. ers, and intercepts enemy cruise missiles, adjustable ride over all kinds of rough There are some voices arguing to equip helicopters, unmanned vehicles, high terrain. Maximum cross-country speed performance fixed wing ground support will be 100 kph (63 mph). This is high the FSCS with a conventional wheeled system. No wheeled vehicle could catch aircraft, top attack anti-tank munitions, and practically unattainable with limited up with armored formations when they artillery munitions (SADARM - Search performance, conventional torsion bar or and Destroy - Armor type), and other coil-spring suspensions. Nonetheless, it is move quickly to surprise and defeat the enemy. Tracked suspension will remain anti-tank threats. attainable with a hydropneumatic suspen- the best and only choice for armored ve- sion. Maximum flat-road cruising speed · Automatic detection, alert, avoidance, will exceed 120 kph (75 mph) at maxi- hicles on the Earth’s random surface tex- and protection in areas contaminated by ture. Future improvements will include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), mum power output. extended durability, maintenance-free and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) operation, and substantial weight reduc- protection capability. Sustainability — Reduced Mainte- tion. The FSCS will be equipped with a nance and Logistics Hydropneumatic Active Suspension · Integrated passive/active mine detec- tion, avoidance while stationary or, pref- Powered by a new, highly efficient (HAS). HAS is a hydropneumatic tracked · system that provides a high degree of erably, on the move. type of prime mover. An engine/power tactical mobility through variable suspen- source that facilitates the implementation sion height, which is dynamically com- Force-Projection Deployability of electricity as a source of energy. puter controlled, and allows operation · Improved air, land, and sea transport- · Significantly reduced reliance on con- over all terrain types and in all weather ability and deployability by way of re- ventional maintenance, resupply of ra- duced overall weight/volume and a tions, ammunition, fuel, and spare parts to smaller silhouette. achieve extended operational capability. Continued on Page 49 ARMOR — January-February 1999 17

An early Bradley maneuvers at the National Training Center.

Chariots of Fire: Building the Bradley Fighting Vehicle

by Major General Stan R. Sheridan (Ret.)

Chariots of Fire may be the title of a turret, the two TOW antitank missile in the hull behind the driver where he 1981 Oscar-winning Hollywood movie, launcher, the highly effective 25mm can- could not see to command or fight the but it is also a fitting description of the non system, the very reliable power train vehicle; the crew/squad compartment was “soldier-carrying” vehicles that went into with its outstanding cross-country mobil- a crowded “arms room” and an inade- production in 1981 and today carry the ity, and the overall fightability of the sys- quate fighting platform; and the main Bradley Systems name. In fact, chariots tem — this was not always so. In the armament, a 20mm cannon, had no ar- of one kind or another have carried sol- beginning, in the late 1960s and early mor-killing capability. diers into battle, and on and around the 1970s, the Army was struggling to de- battlefield, throughout the recorded his- termine and define just what it wanted as In 1975, the MICV program was reori- tory of warfare, dating as far back as the the replacement for the M113 armored ented and combined with the Army’s early Egyptians and the Romans. Even personnel carrier (APC). The M113 had SCOUT and Bushmaster (25mm cannon) today, the Israeli indigenous tank carries been a workhorse during the Vietnam programs into a single vehicle program, the name chariot in Hebrew — Merkava. War and was the backbone of the Army’s the Infantry and Cavalry Fighting Vehicle So, some 20 years after departing the mechanized infantry. Was the replace- System, renamed in 1981 for General of program as the U.S. Army’s first Pro- ment to be another APC that brought the Army Omar N. Bradley. With that gram Manager for what has become fighting men to the battle in a protected reorientation came a reaffirmation of the known to the world as the Bradley Fight- “battlefield taxi” and then placed them in Army’s requirement and a redesign that ing Vehicle System, and some 6,724 harm’s way to fight on foot; or was it to resulted in today’s Bradley Fighting Ve- Bradleys built and in the hands of U.S. be a true fighting vehicle, giving the sol- hicle. Its two-man turret placed the vehi- Army soldiers, it seems appropriate for dier a protected place from which to as- cle commander up high where he could me to tell the story of how the Bradley sault, fight, and kill the enemy? The re- see, command, and fight the vehicle. The evolved into the finest fighting Chariot of sult, in the early 1970s, was the latter, a addition of a two TOW antitank missile Fire of its type in the world today. fighting vehicle concept called the launcher gave the mechanized infantry Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, or battalion a long-range, front-line, tank The history of the Bradley was long and MICV, which, when translated to an all- killing capability without increasing the tortured. While today we take the design up prototype in the mid-1970s, proved to Army’s force structure. The vehicle’s and the vehicle’s outstanding warfighting be unfightable. The gunner was in a one- crew compartment stowage was revised performance for granted — its two-man man turret; the vehicle commander was and redesigned into a fighting compart- 18 ARMOR — January-February 1999

ment from which mounted infantrymen Maintainability requirements during in- and Don Whalen) as a composite evil could fight. And the less-than-capable dependent government acceptance test- incarnate. Certainly, in all honesty, the 20mm cannon was replaced with the ing. program did have its problems along the battlefield-worthy 25mm Bushmaster, But there is more to the Bradley story. way, both fiscal and technical, but no with its armor piercing and high explo- more so than are to be expected in any sive multipurpose ammunition. With this The real questions facing the fielded combat vehicle development program, Bradley system were: What do soldiers redesign and reorientation, the technical think of the vehicle? Is it really fightable? and certainly less than some of its prede- design challenge for the developer of the cessor programs. These are examples of new vehicle was on a par with that of Does it meet the Army’s needs? And how some of the problems that we really did does it do in combat? The proof of any designing a tank, but with the added hu- piece of equipment issued to soldiers is encounter: man factors of carrying an infantry squad, allowing the vehicle to swim, and ulti- its performance and soldier acceptance in · From a fiscal standpoint, we all — combat, and the Bradley was no excep- government and contractors alike — mately making it an acceptable fighting tion. The Bradley’s combat test and proof grossly underestimated the impact of platform for mounted infantrymen and cavalrymen. was Desert Storm, where it received not inflation and the cost of doing business in only its baptism of fire, but complete the 1970s and early 1980s, which drove With these changes, the mechanized in- soldier acceptance. The experience of the up the system’s final unit production cost. fantry found itself in much the same posi- lead brigade of the 24th Mechanized In- Technically, the early transmission tion, from a doctrine standpoint, as the fantry Division’s “Left Hook” operation · horse-mounted cavalry did when the ma- was typical of the Bradley’s superb com- was a show stopper. The problems caused me to stop government testing in chine gun first appeared on the battle- bat performance in the 100 hours of De- late 1975 and introduce into the program field. The design of the new mobile sert Storm. The brigade’s 120 Bradleys weapons system, when translated into traveled 360 miles, fighting all of the way a full transmission competition between two different technical approaches. The fightable hardware, required changes in with no vehicle drop-outs or losses. current fielded transmission is the result mounted infantry doctrine and the devel- While the 25mm armor-piercing round opment of new operational concepts and did kill some T-72 tanks with shots to the of that competition, and I might add is the “fixed” and winning version of the origi- tactics in order to take full advantage of side and rear, it proved to be an overkill nal MICV show stopper. the new vehicle’s battlefield capabilities. against the Iraqi BMP infantry carriers, Firing on moving targets with the 25mm often passing right through the BMP and · The gun, too, had its development cannon, for example, now required the calling for use of the more appropriate problems. One evening, I received a call infantry gunner to use tank gunnery tech- HEAT-MP (High Explosive Antitank- from one of the two competing 25mm niques, which were totally foreign to the Multi Purpose) round. The Bradley sol- cannon developers asking which news I infantrymen of the late 1970s and early diers of Desert Storm, and those using the wanted first, the good or the bad? The 1980s, whose largest automatic weapon vehicle in places like Somalia and Bos- good news answer I asked for first was until then had been a .50 caliber machine nia, have resoundingly endorsed the sys- that the explosion had put out the fire; the gun. As a result of this and other opera- tem and put to bed the naysayers, the bad news was that the cannon had blown tional capabilities and requirements of the questioners, and the critics by affirming up in a test stand. Again, this develop- new system, mounted Bradley infantry- that the Bradley is a highly mobile and ment problem was fixed prior to weapon men required totally new training pack- effective battlefield killing machine. It is selection and acceptance by the Army. ages. not an APC nor a battlefield taxi, but it does take soldiers to the battle and lets · As I said earlier, the Bradley is not a To the Army’s credit, it bridged the doc- boat, but it does swim today. While try- trine, training, and tactics gaps, and has them fight while mounted and protected. ing to make it work, we sank some It is not a boat, but it does have a swim- produced the world’s most capable and ming capability. It is not a tank, nor is it (without casualties) during the develop- finest mounted warriors. ment of the final swim kit. heavily armored, but it does have a long- The Bradley development program pro- range tank killing capability; and it ex- · Long after I had left the program, and ceeded successfully through the late ceeds the tank’s cross-country mobility the Army and OSD had given the produc- 1970s and early 1980s, sucessfully fight- and effectively complements the tank on tion go-ahead, there was a “tempest in a ing off the “Too Big, Too Bulky, Too the battlefield. Today, with over 6,700 teapot” over the ballistic protection of High” naysayers, a presidential program infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles in the vehicle’s aluminum armor, the lack of cancellation, and three U.S. Army gen- the hands of U.S. Army soldiers around Army live-fire verification tests of the eral officer reviews, in 1976, ’77, and the world, the Bradley is justly touted and Bradley’s armor in a complete, all-up ’78. With the program re-started after the soldier accepted as the finest fighting vehicle, and a claim by some at the Of- presidential cancellation in 1977, and the vehicle of its kind in the world. fice of the Secretary of Defense that alu- reaffirmation of the requirement, the con- minum armor would burn catastrophi- cept, and the design by the three general Having said all of this, and having cally when hit. All of this was empha- officer reviews, the program proceeded to painted the fielded Bradley infantry and sized in the HBO movie. Protection lev- meet its congressionally mandated first cavalry system in justifiable glowing els for the vehicle are still classified to- production delivery date of May 1981 praise, I do not want this article to look day, but in general, standards called for without further delays. In fact, the Brad- like a “whitewash” of the program, which protection at various ranges against direct ley was the first, and I believe the only, at this point, some readers might say it is. fire weapons up to 14.5mm, small anti- tracked vehicle to be approved for pro- I say this in view of the recent HBO tank shaped charge missiles, various size duction by the Army and the Office of movie about the Bradley, which said just mines, and overhead artillery bursts the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on the the opposite, described the vehicle and nearby. Although the movie doesn’t give first request. This was due primarily to the program as a flaming disaster, and this impression, we also knew from the the vehicle exceeding its overall de- depicted me and my two successor gen- beginning that, if the vehicle was hit by signed-in system Reliability-Availability- eral officer program managers (Phil Bolté large mines, large antitank missiles, or ARMOR — January-February 1999 19

tank rounds of any size, there would be “One has to wonder, was the result ity with the chassis of its sister fighting major penetrations and serious damage. that cost the Army a company of Brad- vehicle. The differences between the two These risks, as a trade-off between mobil- leys worth the time and expense? I are in the physical, rather than mechani- ity, protection, and weight, were accepted don’t know the answer, but I can say cal, aspects of the chassis. Again, the by the Army from program inception and that the Army did not learn very much proof of this derivative was its complete were reconfirmed by the three general from this testing which it did not al- success and soldier acceptance in the officer reviews of the late 1970s. As a ready know.” combat of Desert Storm. At the same result, ballistic testing was limited to fir- time, the Army got its “pick-up truck.” ings on representative armor arrays and struction ballistic testing did reveal some Today the derivative carrier’s time has technical calculations based on previous things about the Bradley vehicle that re- come. Among other uses, it is being ballistic test results, and not on an all-up, strongly considered by the Army as the sulted in refinements to its protection very expensive vehicle, testing it to de- prior to Desert Storm. These included the basis for a command and control vehicle, struction. Initially, the Army and OSD addition of Kevlar spall liners inside the an ambulance, and a communications were satisfied with these results, but later, vehicle. vehicle (which had been recommended due to the persistence of testers in OSD, earlier, but not approved due to cost); the Looking back, and forgetting the pain the Army conducted full vehicle live-fire restowing of some ammunition from testing to destruction. Seventeen produc- along the way, one can say that the Brad- inside to outside of the vehicle; some ley was a success story. This was primar- tion Bradleys, a mech infantry company’s restowing and rearrangement of the fight- ily due to the Army’s belief in, and sup- worth, were taken from the Army and ing compartment to better protect the used in these tests, which OSD directed port for, a fighting vehicle and its MLRS crew; some fuel storage tank relocation; derivative, along with the dedicated hand- and paid for. Of those 17, four were and the addition of external, bolt-on ar- in-hand team effort by all those directly tested to destruction, and the remaining mor to enhance protection over critical 13 were used for various other live-fire involved in its development, production, areas. As a result, the A2 Bradley of De- and fielding — the U.S. Army Program tests, but all were lost to the Army’s in- sert Storm and later is a better protected Manager’s Office, the infantry, cavalry, ventory. When it was all said and done, vehicle than the early production vehi- the testing reconfirmed what we already and artillery users, and all of the many cles, which are now all being upgraded to dedicated civilian contractors who went knew to be the protection levels of the the A2 configuration or better. the extra mile for the program. The de- vehicle, what would happen to the vehi- cle if hit by large missiles, tank rounds, or Finally, a question that begs answering velopment buzzword today is PART- is, “Why didn’t the Army, on its own, NERING, or the joining together of all large mines, as well as the fact that alu- those involved in a development program minum armor does not burn catastrophi- plan for and conduct vehicle live-fire cally as claimed by the OSD testers. testing?” The answer is simple: it toward a common goal. Without knowing couldn’t afford the cost, nor did it deem it, that is what was done with the Bradley An interesting aside to the live-fire story in the 1970s and early 1980s, long before such testing necessary. In the final analy- was the use of a MICV prototype (the sis, the accomplishment of the testing the word or the thought was in vogue in vehicle is now displayed as a monument required specific direction and extra fund- the Defense Department. in front of Infantry Hall at Fort Benning) ing from OSD. One has to wonder, was While the birthing process may have for early mine testing. Initially our pro- the result that cost the Army a company been difficult and lengthy, the Bradley gram master plan called for 12 prototype of Bradleys worth the time and expense? vehicles; but due to funding limitations, systems turned out to be worthy members I don’t know the answer, but I can say of the U.S. Army’s force of mounted we bought only eight — hardly enough to that the Army did not learn very much warriors, joining and complementing the meet all the demands for prototypes, let from this testing which it did not already alone ballistic testing. But the program Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter, know. But the protection afforded Amer- forming a combined arms team to be made do with the eight and received a ica’s soldiers by today’s A2 Bradley is reckoned with on any battlefield, any- production go-ahead based on the testing superior to that of early production vehi- of that number. When a requirement for where in the world. cles and may be responsible for saving live-fire vehicle testing against large soldiers’ lives. mines came along, my successor, Briga- dier General Phil Bolté, looked long and And what of the Bradley derivatives, or Major General Stan R. Sheridan, a hard for ways to meet the requirement support vehicles, during this process? In 1951 graduate of the U.S. Military without destroying one or more of his 1975, the U.S. Army had a need for a Academy, commanded armor units limited number of prototypes. Hence the tracked vehicle platform for the Artil- from platoon to brigade in a career use of the MICV monument vehicle from lery’s Multiple Launch Rocket System that spanned more than 30 years. Fort Benning as a cost-, time-, and proto- (MLRS), and the Bradley vehicle chassis Much of his later career was spent in type-saving measure. The MICV could was chosen as the candidate platform. In be used because its chassis, from a ballis- development of major weapon sys- reality, what the Army really wanted was tems, including serving as program tic protection standpoint, was identical to a highly mobile, tracked “pick-up truck” that of the Bradley. The MICV “monu- manager for the M60 tank program whose truck bed could be used for many and first PM of the Bradley program. ment vehicle” was shipped to Aberdeen battlefield missions, but at the time the Proving Ground, exposed to mines of only money available was for the devel- At his retirement, he was the Assis- various sizes, and finally, partially de- opment of the MLRS carrier. Adopting tant Deputy Chief of Staff for Re- stroyed by a large mine. It was externally the very successful and reliable automo- search, Development, and Acquisi- refurbished and then returned to Fort tive and suspension components of the tion and Deputy Chief of Staff-RDA Benning, where it stands today. original MICV chassis, the MLRS carrier for International Programs at DA HQ. While expensive and probably unneces- was developed, tested, accepted, and He is now retired in Naples, Florida. sary, the OSD-directed live-fire to de- fielded with almost complete commonal- 20 ARMOR — January-February 1999 Problems Persist, But Continuous Band Track Shows Promise in Light Armor Applications by Paul Hornback

The U.S. Army continuously seeks to the Canadian Department of National track on a Combat Vehicle Reconnais- reduce operating and support (O&S) Defence for the Hägglunds BV206 vehi- sance (Tracked) (CVR(T)) platform. U.S. costs for fielded combat systems while cle, with test results indicating three times and U.K. test reports noted the following developing future combat systems that the life of the original Swedish-supplied significant results: exh ibit ultra high reliability with lower track. · M113A3 paved surface rolling resis- maintenance requirements. As the Army tance for the band track was 67% less evolves from Army of Excellence (AOE) Manufacturers, like Soucy International, to Force XXI and beyond, we must claim continuous band tracks provide than the current T130 track. No signifi- cant difference was noted for operations achieve increases in force sustainability enhanced on/off road mobility through in sand.6 without sacrificing critical mobility, le- reduced ground pressure, better traction thality, and survivability attributes. This and lateral stability; reduced platform · A 1,600-pound weight reduction was remains a formidable task for legacy vibration, noise, radar/acoustic signa- realized on the M113A3 equipped with tracked combat systems, and will be a tures, weight, and rolling resistance; im- band track as compared to the T130 challenge for future systems unless we adopt changes in track design and materi- als. It has long been an accepted fact that tracked vehicles provide a stable weapons platform with excellent all-weather mo- bility over a wide range of terrain.1 How- ever, the superior mobility of tracked platforms has traditionally incurred a substantial cost penalty. Historically, steel-tracked vehicles have higher O&S costs than wheeled combat platforms.2 The higher O&S costs are directly attrib- uted to the rougher terrain profile charac- teristic of tracked vehicle employment (tracked vehicles endure a greater per- centage of cross-country mileage than wheeled vehicles)3 as well as the mainte- nance burden imposed by their track and suspension systems. Furthermore, steel Detail view of the continuous band track installed on an M113 APC during recent tests. tracks inherently produce vibrations that adversely impact the reliability of on- proved track life; corrosion and mainte- track.7 On the CVR(T), the weight saving board electronic components, contribut- nance-free operations; and lower life was 30%. ing to even higher O&S costs. 5 cycle costs. · M113A3 internal and external noise Continuous band track technology is not The U.S. Department of Defense and levels were 6 dB lower for the band track new and currently exists on Caterpillar U.K. Ministry of Defense (MOD) have than for the T130 track.8 30/30 tractors, agriculture tractors (where recently experimented with continuous soft soil mobility is critical), Small Unit · The CVR(T) with band track achieved band track on lightweight armor plat- a 50% reduction in platform vibration. Support Vehicles (like the Finnish SISU forms. The continuous band track (com- NA-140 all-terrain articulated vehicle) monly referred to as rubber track) is an · M113A3 band track durability (the and Light Weight Trailers. The U.S. endless, synthetic rubber molded track point at which track separation occurs) Army Tank-automotive and Armaments with internal drive system. The molded was approximately 4,700 kms when Command (TACOM) has awarded Cat- track is reinforced with Kevlar, nylon, tested over 20% primary (paved) roads, erpillar a contract option for producing polyester and/or glass fiber to provide 40% secondary (gravel) roads and 40% the Deployable Universal Combat rigidity and increased track life. Both the cross-country at a 12 tons GVW.9 Earthmover (DEUCE) equipped with a U.S. and U.K. are interested in determin- continuous rubber track. Rubber track · Maintenance events for the M113A3 ing the feasibility and military perform- band track system included two drive was selected to reduce Gross Vehicle ance enhancements resulting from con- Weight (GVW), thereby enhancing tinuous band track on armored combat sprocket replacements, two track throws (the same track was reinstalled), one idler DEUCE deployability. The DEUCE can platforms. be parachuted into a combat zone and, wheel replacement, and three incidents thanks to its rubber tracks, can travel at To verify the purported benefits of con- where multiple wheel studs required speeds of up to 30 mph, permitting self- tinuous band track, the U.S. Army evalu- tightening.10 ated an experimental band track on the transport rather than truck/trailer trans- port.4 A rubber track system has also M113A3 armored personnel carrier while been developed, tested, and approved by the U.K. experimented with a similar Continued on Page 50 ARMOR — January-February 1999 21

Is the Bradley Heavy Enough to Replace The M113 in Combat Engineer Units? Author’s Proposal Calls for Modifying the M1 Chassis by Simon Tan

Although it is usually uneconomic to build small numbers of specialized ar- mored vehicles, we thought the author’s reasoning and discussion worth including in this issue. – Ed. Consideration is now being given to mounting combat engineer squads in Bradleys, rather than M113s, but neither the M113 nor the Bradley is adequate for this purpose. A better idea would be to adapt a turretless M1 tank chassis as the basis for a new engineer vehicle. First, let’s examine why the M113 is no longer adequate: - It is too slow to keep up with Bradleys and M1s. - It is too thinly armored, and improving that armor would add too much weight. turret and adding a new top deck, to cre- compartment. The M1 should be able to - It is poorly armed, with only a .50- ate the BTR-T, apparently a reaction to comfortably carry a six-man dismount caliber machine gun, and the operator is the way lightly armored BMPs were de- section. Ingress and egress to the troop exposed to enemy counterfire. stroyed so easily in the Chechnya fight- compartment will be via roof hatches and ing. a side clamshell door on either side of the - It is being phased out, creating logistic troop compartment. The latter would be problems. My proposal is derived from the Israeli used under fire as it avoids dismounting experience with the Puma Centurion In some ways, the Bradley would be an conversion in particular. This is a special- over the top. A rear-facing clamshell improvement. It has better firepower, arrangement, as on the Achzarit, is un- ist assault transporter for their combat necessarily complicated. more speed, and greater mobility, but it engineers. It provides the occupants with also has major drawbacks: MBT protection and mobility. Other - Stowage of bulky equipment would be - There is insufficient internal space to heavy APC/IFV developments, such as in external armored bins fitted along the carry a large engineer squad and the the Achzarit and BTR-T, have also side of the superstructure. This eliminates many specialized equipment kits they emerged. These vehicles can be described the need to handle the equipment in and will use. as assault transports intended to deliver out of the troop compartment. It also their occupants into a high threat situa- doubles as spaced armor. - To create more space, it would have to tion. jettison its TOW launcher and missile - Fitting a low-profile, one-man turret storage. I believe a similar vehicle would be a with an auto-cannon like the M242 significant addition to the combat engi- Bushmaster or equivalent to the front left - Considering the high-threat environ- neering capabilities of the Army. corner of this superstructure. A two-man ment in which engineer squads typically turret will simply take up more space work, there is insufficient armor protec- The Vehicle within the fighting compartment and in- tion on the Bradley, compared to a tank. crease weight. A turret such as the one We shall call this proposal the AEV or found on the Marder would be ideal as it The Soviets and the Israelis have re- Assault Engineer Vehicle. It will be cently developed specialized engineer based on the M1 Abrams and be con- reduces the exposure of the gunner. and infantry fighting vehicles fabricated verted from surplus stock. This reduces - The commander will be equipped with from tank chassis. The Israeli Achzarit is both the cost and gestation period of the independent panoramic sight with ther- a troop carrier developed from a T-55 project. The conversion would involve: mal channel. tank chassis. The Israeli Puma engineer vehicle is a converted, turretless Centu- - Cutting away the turret ring and build- A single tube TOW launcher would also rion tank. And the Russians have adopted ing up a low, heavily armored (MBT be fitted on the side of the turret. This is some of their T-55 chassis, removing the standard) superstructure for the crew intended to fire “DEMO-TOW,” a demo- 22 ARMOR — January-February 1999

lition/anti-materiel variant of the TOW family. Using surplus TOW and ITOW guidance and propulsion units, this weapon will have a 6-inch diameter war- head comprising a reinforced penetrator cap, a fuel-air explosive (FAE) warhead module, and a high-impulse rocket mo- tor. The weapon is intended to have two operating modes, impact and delayed. In the first mode, the missile explodes upon impact, this being used for attacking un- protected structures. In the second mode, the rocket motor will ignite before impact and propel the warhead into the target. Operation is not unlike a runway crater- ing weapon. Penetration should be at least 12 inches of reinforced concrete. The weapon would then explode inside - There should be provision for carrying port companies will be required to sup- the structure. fascines on the rear deck and sides. port deployments. These should include mechanics and resupply elements. Fi- The weapon should also be very effec- - Adding a towing pintle for an armored tive against a wide variety of targets. trailer would permit carring extra engi- nally, this vehicle would be an excellent adjunct to the Grizzly ACEV. Warhead weight can be quite high as the neering stores. It should be capable of weapon does not need to exploit the full remote jettison from the fighting com- 3,750m range of TOW. A 2,000m range Costs partment. should be quite sufficient. Conventional The basis of the unit would be 60 used HE payload can be substituted if FAE is M1 hulls, which are paid for. Equipment not considered politically feasible. Comparisons and conversion should cost no more than The AEV would carry 6 rounds for the Even with all the modifications, the ve- $1.5-2 million per unit by conservative launcher and would normally consist of hicle should still weigh less than a full estimate. M1 and be able to use Class 70 bridges five DEMO-TOW and one TOW 2A/B To create DEMO-TOW missiles, we for self-defense. Reloading would be and equipment. It would have better mo- could use TOW propulsion units avail- from under armor, using a roof hatch as bility than the Bradley, and much better armor protection. It should have surviv- able for remanufacturing, which should on a Bradley. reduce costs. The warheads would have ability equal to or better than the M1, and to be created. A rough estimate is that Roof-mounted, remotely operated ma- armament as good as or better than the chine guns, such as those on Israeli ar- Bradley. With its dozer blade, plows, these missiles would cost under $25,000 mored vehicles, could be fitted for extra per unit, and they would have a wide fascines, and explosive mine-clearing range of applications beyond AEV. firepower. The crew would consist of a capability, it would be versatile in breach- driver, gunner, and vehicle commander. ing situations. The vehicle would be ca- Some additional features that could be pable of integral mine marking. And Time Frame added include: there would be plenty of space for exter- nal armored stowage. Using fast track management and re- - A dozer blade at the front of the vehi- vised bidding, I would expect a working cle. This would be retractable and have prototype by 2001 and IOC by 2003-4 at full width extensions. Mine plows could Organization the latest. The project should be a re- be fitted. quirement, not contractor-driven. Ulti- The conversion of 60 vehicles would be mately, this would be a low-risk devel- - IRA/VRA armor arrays could be adequate to form a special Armored As- opment with short gestation to provide a added to improve survivability. ERA sault Engineer Battalion. It would be significant enhancement to combat engi- would be unsuitable as it poses a hazard composed of four Armored Assault En- neers at a reasonable price. to the dismounts. gineer Companies, each with three pla- - Additional smoke dischargers could be toons of four vehicles and two in the HQ attached at the hull rear as well as the section. Four would be held as reserve in turret. Obscuration during dismount will battalion. Regular armored engineers Simon Tan trained at the University be important and the number of discharg- would cross train in the use of this of Edinburgh from 1991-1997 as an ers should exceed 16. Additionally these equipment. Drivers, gunners and com- architect. He intends to pursue a fur- dischargers could be loaded with APERS manders would be organic to the battal- ther academic career in military sci- munitions for MOUT operations. ion but the dismounts would not be. ence in the future. He has always Companies could be attached to brigades had a keen interest in military sub- - There could be mounting points on the as required, rather than being organic to rear deck for line charge/FAE launchers jects, in particular armor. His major their structures. They should be consid- areas of focus are armored tactics to clear minefields. ered at least a corps asset. Companies - An automatic minefield marking sys- should be committed together. Piecemeal and doctrine from WWII to the pre- tem installed on hull rear edges could use should be discouraged. Units would sent, with particular interest in battal- perform like the system on the minefield- always work in cooperation with other ion/brigade operations and wider op- marking BRDMs. arms, not alone as assault infantry. Sup- erational issues. ARMOR — January-February 1999 23

Through the Breach:

A Tanker Searches for a Common Perspective

by Captain Jeffrey Erdley Fort Knox and Fort Leonard Wood. obstacles with little more than direct fire Through my experience, one fact has support. The disjointed manuals may be proven itself over and over — the ma- corrected with future versions of FM 71- “Operation Desert Storm neuver arms and engineers lack a com- 2, as the engineers don’t even use the showed that our World War II- mon understanding of breaching and only term “hasty,” and the new FM 90-13-1 vintage minefield breaching work together when forced upon each will eliminate each distinct operation other for a breach. FM 90-13-1, Com- (deliberate, in-stride, etc.) and designate and clearing capability, cou- bined Arms Breaching Operations, lays them all simply as “a breach.” Therefore, pled with the lack of demolition the framework for a common vision; in my experience, we often view each expertise, resulted in an inabil- however, in the field, the principles of other as adversaries getting in the way of ity to technically or tactically this manual are not always followed nor the mission. It is important to realize that breach the modern minefields understood. creating a lane through an obstacle is not

that we faced.” conducting a breach, but rather just one The Doctrine small part of the operation. A breach is a - Operation Desert Shield/Desert combined arms operation involving not Storm Engineer Observations Armor and engineer units in the field only engineers and tankers, but every often proclaim that their branch can “do it Quotes such as this may stir emotions of alone” as both types of units possess the BOS element. Somewhere in the middle of the engineer and armor high grounds is disbelief in some U.S. forces because all necessary equipment to create a lane the truth about the most effective way to of the breaches during Desert Storm were through an obstacle. While engineers are successful. It is important to note, how- experts at explosive and manual opera- work together in breaching an obstacle and continuing the attack. This is where ever, that the majority of our forces (ex- tions, the tanks control the plows and task force and brigade combat team re- cept the Marine divisions and a brigade rollers for mechanical reduction. Each of the 2AD) maneuvered far to the west branch also practices reducing smaller, hearsals and training become essential — before deploying to the field. It is impera- of the main defenses. In every case, the easily constructed obstacles on our own. tive to develop a cohesive plan for Iraqi resistance proved vastly weaker This is not necessarily a bad thing, since than predicted — a fact that thankfully the speed and momentum of maneuver breaching operations as early as possible and to bring all participating elements negated the 80 percent casualties pre- forces require that we breach quickly together to orchestrate this complex op- dicted for U.S. breaching forces. I served without waiting for engineer support to as an acting engineer platoon leader with come forward. FM 71-2, Tank/Mech In- eration. B/23d Engineers (1st Armored Division) fantry Battalion/Task Force, states, Through refinement, the breach plan can for a CMTC Hohenfels rotation, and “Combat engineers are located with the be developed and captured in the unit’s conducted well over 100 breaches as a breaching force of the battalion to per- SOP as an effective reference for both tank platoon leader, executive officer, and form hasty breaches. However, time and maneuver and support units. acting commander of armor-heavy teams. distance factors may require hasty I’ve been fortunate to have had both breach by maneuver units without direct Current doctrine provides little insight tanker and engineer viewpoints through engineer participation.” Likewise, engi- as to what this effective middle ground is. both field training in local training areas neers are often thrust forward of both Most of the armor manuals reserve a few and CTCs, and formal schooling both at light and mech units and told to reduce pages to roller and plow operations and 24 ARMOR — January-February 1999

simply state that for larger obstacles we will get support from the engineers. The engineer manuals are no less guilty as the obstacle reduction capability of tanks is viewed as an afterthought, mainly for proofing. Even the doctrinal bible on breaching operations, FM 90-13-1, barely mentions tank breaching, saying that tank plows and rollers may be used in the breach. FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, dedicates only a single page each to the plow and roller. We shouldn’t A successful AVLM launch and blast clears the path for a 3-67 Armor M1A1 forget that the introduction of British west of Drinkwater Lake at the NTC. tanks in World War I opened the wire and trenches in France to help end the the minefield in a breach. This technique essarily slow a tank during movement. stalemate. Since there is no effective may be effective if units cannot visually The main planning consideration for manual on the tactical employment of identify mines or locate them with the plow tanks is to keep them away from either the plow or the roller, tankers must tank’s thermal sights. It may also work in wadis, streambeds, non-MLC bridges, discover the tactics, techniques, and pro- finding enemy FASCAM, but it is impor- and other restricted terrain. The tank is cedures on our own for unit SOPs and tant to realize, with the density of both much longer with a plow attached and operations. To spur some ideas and raise conventional and situational minefields, cannot drive through steeper dips. If the awareness, I’ll offer some personal ob- that the roller tank may be well past the plow does dig in, crews must dig the mud servations on identifying obstacles, ways leading edge of the minefield before the and dirt off the plow immediately. The to maneuver to them, notes on the roller hits a mine. I’ve never observed added weight routinely causes seals to equipment, and techniques in the breach this technique to be effective, since the burst on the suspension in the front of the that proved successful in the field. roller tank is a massive, lumbering beast tank. As with any successful combat opera- ill-suited to lead a combat formation. Instead, the lead tanks must be killers on The Equipment tion, a successful breach begins with ac- point that clear the immediate area for the The equipment available for the breach curate reconnaissance. Through trial and error, we learned that the most effective formation and can fix enemy vehicles is not limited to the tankers’ and the en- with direct fire while the plows and roll- gineers’ AVLBs, AVLMs, MICLICs, method of locating obstacles, bypasses, ers move behind terrain or at a safe dis- Bangalores, and grappling hooks. A suc- and breach locations was to put engineers in scout vehicles overwatching NAIs to tance into their breach positions. cessful breach is a combined effort that includes the engineers; the indirect, gather obstacle intelligence. The armor Within the tank company, the MTOE counter-battery, and smoke missions of battalion’s scouts know the task force or distributes one plow to each platoon, with brigade combat team commander’s in- a roller on another tank in the company. the field artillery and mortars; aviation fires; infantry support; and sometimes tent, and have the “maneuver view” of Since the tank platoon rarely maneuvers even the smoke of the Chemical Corps. how to conduct the operation. But no one on its own, and never in the breach, this has more knowledge of obstacle comp o- serious violation of unity of command is All of these systems are excellent in their own way, but for the purpose of this arti- sition, dimension, and purpose than the usually corrected through task organiza- cle, I’ll concentrate on the M1 plows and engineer. With the two together in one tion in the field (much to the hand receipt vehicle, they formed an efficient team to holder’s resentment). The most effective rollers and methods of integrating them with the engineers. locate the obstacles, locate and mark the breach forces I have seen have had all of bypasses, create lanes, and determine the the reduction assets massed in one pla- Armor manuals are fairly weak on point of breach. Other reconnaissance toon. In a few missions, we attempted to breach missions. Three methods dis- assets, such as the Brigade Recon Troop, attach this platoon under an engineer cussed in FM 71-2 are a plow/roller UAVs, scout helicopters, and even company commander. However, this led combination, using the M88 with its COLTs may be available, depending on to disastrous results every time because blade down, and just driving through. FM the priority of the mission in the overall of the loss of guns in the battle. The tanks 17-15 still teaches the disastrous method scheme of operations. were treated as engineer vehicles only of staggering plow tanks to create wider and the company’s killing capability was lanes. This inevitably leads to a live mine Even as reconnaissance is being de- ployed, the commander and staff must reduced by 1/3. in the spoil exploding on the second tank. That manual also still instructs tank pla- immediately start planning for the breach To be successful, the maneuver chain of toon leaders to mark lanes with in every offensive course of action devel- command must remain intact. This fact is opment. It is safe to assume that our just as true for the engineer companies CLAMMS — fortunately, I believe most of these were turned in after proving use- forces will be under both indirect and and platoons fighting the mission. The less. Instead, the most effective method direct fire since the enemy uses obstacles maneuver commander commands the to channel and separate forces just as we breach force, but within that force, the of tank obstacle breaching is the mine plow. The plow digs below mines and do. With speed at the breach in mind, the engineer commander may control that then uses spoil to push them to the sides. TF or BCT breach force must maneuver reduction element. This allows the ma- toward the front of the formation. If a neuver commander to concentrate on the Any vehicle that stays within the track of the tank is safe from mines. breach is imminent, their best location is security element and the critical task of second in the order of march. Both FM controlling direct fire at the breach site. The tank roller may have been good in 17-15, The Tank Platoon, and FM 71-2 intent, but is generally loathed in the ar- state that the lead tank should be the Contrary to the beliefs of many soldiers mor community as more trouble than it is roller tank since it is designed to detect I’ve worked with, the plow does not nec- worth. Several tank manuals suggest ARMOR — January-February 1999 25

leading an attack with your roller tank to ties, poor MICLIC training at home sta- force has set the conditions for commit- find the leading edge of the minefield. tion, and the general lack of an effective ment of the breach force. Whatever the However, anyone who has maneuvered training device or training strategy.” method, the end state must always be the with them quickly understands that an “The MICLIC system suffered from sev- same. The maneuver force must get attack with a roller point man would have eral serious shortcomings. During test through the breach quickly to continue all the momentum of a lethargic snail. firings, the system suffered a 50% failure the assault and kill the enemy. The roller was designed to be carried to rate.” Even when the MICLIC success- After setting the conditions for the the battlefield on a lowboy trailer, and the fully fires, it can only clear a 100-meter receiving tank would already have the long path in the obstacle. This is excellent breach through SOSR, most engineers I’ve been around have preferred moving mounting kit secured to the front slope. for smaller obstacles, but in many breach- the plow tank into position 100 meters The crew only installs the rollers on the ing operations, the obstacle is very deep. tank in the attack position before crossing FM 90-13-1 also acknowledges that the before the obstacle with the MICLIC directly behind. This technique provides the LD, maneuvers toward the breach, MICLIC has a “skip zone” where mines some cover for the MICLIC crew or drives through as the proof tank, and are left untouched, and deeply buried drops them on the far side to be retrieved mines, non-pressure fuze mines, and AVLM while they sit exposed in front of the enemy for the minutes it takes to later. In this mission, and this mission overpressure-resistant mines prove very raise, lock, fire, and detonate the charge. only, the roller is effective, but prolonged resilient against the MICLIC. A major use of the roller can severely damage a advantage of the tank-mounted systems is A very well-trained tank crew may also be able to set the engineers up for success tank. During one field problem, my that they can keep going through the ob- on the MICLIC launch by halting at the wingman had to keep a roller on his tank stacle without the lengthy firing process. for the entire month because of lack of Knowing that engineers cannot accom- correct stand-off distance for launch and set perpendicular to the obstacle. Imme- support to transport them. It took about plish the breach alone, it is essential that diately after the explosion, the tank is nine months to replace or repair all the they work together with the tankers. shocks and seals of the suspension that then in position to start plowing from his Techniques position and go through the obstacle were destroyed by the extra weight. The while the enemy may still be disorgan- other division at that post never even used The methods of obstacle reduction I’ll their rollers; I never saw them moved discuss here are simply the combination ized after the large blast. During the time the MICLIC crew is getting set, the tank from the far corners of their motor pools. of a MICLIC and plow tank and then crew can drop the plow and verify that it In January 1996, I got a late Saturday briefly the plow tank and a roller tank night phone call to do some quick repairs breaching a wire and mine obstacle. The is locked down. Once the rocket is fired, the breach moves very quickly. on three of our four rollers and get them combination of reduction assets and on a plane at Robert Gray AAF Sunday methods to use them are only limited by From the tanker’s perspective, this tech- morning to go to Bosnia. Of course, I your imagination, but these are the two nique does work, but is filled with actions didn’t shed any tears when that plane left. methods I have used the most. Regardless that are setting up the breach force for of the method, all breaches must be the failure. It is obvious that the attacker must There is also a major Class IX problem task force or combat team’s main effort. place a huge volume of fire on the de- with both of these systems. Neither sys- tem is reportable, so we could order all The attack hinges on this mission, and fender during the entire mission. How- therefore every asset, including the most ever, with the plow tank directly in front the parts 02, non-deadline. Even with this ammunition, close air support, priority of of the breach, where our own obscuration priority, the average plow part expected ship date (ESD) was about nine months, fires, Firefinder radar, and smoke pla- smoke and, hopefully, burning enemy toons must be concentrated at this deci- vehicles may obscure his view, his main and about a year for the roller. Without sive point. With them, the commander gun is effectively taken out of the fight. being reportable, these systems lose the visibility they need to be fixed properly. must build the breach fundamentals of When the enemy does spot the tank and suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce MICLIC at the point of breach, they now Currently, crews cannot fix deadline sys- (SOSR). To accomplish this, the breach- have a much larger (two vehicles end to tems; therefore they can’t train on them. After only a short time, no one is familiar ing unit is organized into the support, end) target to aim at for the several min- breach, and assault forces. When forming utes that they sit in a known fire sack. with them, and then they are just ignored. these forces, it is critical to retain unit This is when everyone finds out if the Not even the item managers could help us get these parts faster because the lack integrity and the existing chain of com- suppressive fire was effective or not. In mand. Success hinges on keeping each this time, the enemy forces can destroy of emphasis on these vital tools. platoon or company intact under its own the attacker’s best tools for getting During most heavy task force opera- maneuver commander, with the engineer through the breach and deny the com- tions, engineers I’ve worked with have commander as a right-hand man. When mander his best place to put in the lane. believed that the Holy Grail of breaching the teams are set and putting fire on the Even if they are successful, and the plow is the MICLIC/AVLM. Although not an enemy, the support force leader must call tank crew survives the enemy fire, they armor system, it is a tool we, and our for the indirect fires and smoke missions. now have to face the fact that a 25-year- engineers, worked with quite a bit. The His mission requires a good view of the old vehicle is about to fire almost a ton of prevailing belief in armor when we saw battlefield, and he is usually the best to high explosives over their heads, using a the MICLIC or AVLM getting ready to have the overall view and control these system that has a misfire rate of about 50 go toward the point of breach was sim- fires. Both artillery and the armor battal- percent. As soon as this warm and fuzzy ply, “Get our plows ready, the MICLIC ion’s mortars must be used to the fullest time is over and the MICLIC successfully won’t work.” Even engineer AARs from for fires and smoke missions. But when explodes to start the breach lane, the plow Desert Storm contained the following these fail, the tanks can also fire volleys begins pushing through the blast area. conclusions: “Units place an overreli- of HEAT rounds in front of enemy posi- ance on the MICLICs as the answer to all tions to create obscuration from the dirt. Because the MICLIC was the reduction their breaching problems. This was due When the effects of all these systems is asset, the plow is the proofing system. to the ignorance of threat mine capabili- beginning to peak, then and only then, the Immediately after the blast, the tank plow 26 ARMOR — January-February 1999

begins moving through what is left of the the installation of the plow’s moldboards. simply and quickly (shock effect) drives wire and mines. The tank must go on a These force the spoil farther to the sides straight to it. This is another point where straight path because it cannot turn with- of the tank and create a wider lane while the doctrine falls apart. The blade drop out risking damage to the plow tines. The preventing mines from falling back into point and speed of the tank may seem turret should be traversed to the left so the lane. Once the tank commander is simple, but have drastic effects on the that any mine blast to the front does not sure that they have plowed beyond the far quality of the lane. damage the gun tube. If the turret is trav- edge of the obstacle, the tank must briefly ersed to the right, the tank commander is stop, back up, and raise the plow. This set further back and would have problems only takes a few seconds, and then the Synopsis seeing to the front and determining the far plow tank should always move off the edge of the obstacle. Some crews also lane and set in a suppressive fire position In the heavy force breach, the maneuver install a makeshift wire-cutting device in to the left of the breach lane. Because the commander has to synchronize every the center of the blades. This device al- plow control cables run through the available battlefield operating system to lows them to cut and then push away the driver’s right vision block, it is safest to set the conditions for a successful breach concertina, where it might otherwise get drive to the left so he can see where he is and continued attack. No one system, or dragged before breaking. This won’t stop going while the gunner is free to traverse even branch, is able to accomplish this the tank, but it could damage the plow by and look for targets. mission without direct involvement and cutting the nylon lifting straps, and may assistance by others. A major problem Although the breach is now well estab- get caught in the track. lished, it is not complete until it is facing the combined arms team today is a lack of understanding of the common Armor and engineer doctrine on plow marked. The MICLIC and path dug by doctrine in FM 90-13-1 on how to exe- employment represents the extremes of the plow are very distinctive, so the im- plow performance, while the best answer mediately concern is to mark the exact cute this mission. The primary soldiers in the breach are the tankers and engineers, lies somewhere in between. Many of the entrance and exit. VS-17 panels are ex- but even our schools teach different armor/joint publications state that the cellent markers at both ends. We used the crew can drop the plow as little as 10 red side on the right and orange on the methods of execution. Then, when we come together in the field to plan and meters in front of the obstacle and then left. The exit point is the most critical execute the mission, the officers haggle plow up to 10 mph (FM 71-2). The tank under fire, because many combat vehicles platoon ARTEP lists no standards. Engi- in training turn off too early and end up over exactly what to do. neer manuals bring the drop point back to running right into the minefield. At night, To alleviate this confusion, we need to 100 meters with a speed below 10 kph filling plastic water bottles with chemical develop more effective combined arms (FM 20-32). (Bear in mind that the M1 light fluid for markers can enhance the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and pro- speedometer is in kph.) Both specifica- VS-17s. We used to use “tippy toms” to cedures on the breach. If we start by lock- tions are right and both are wrong: the mark the left handrail of the lane because ing a bunch of tanker sergeants and cap- only way to be sure the depth setting and engineers can just throw them out as they tains in a room with their sapper counter- plow speed is effective is to conduct a move through, but they are usually not parts, they may be able to find some rehearsal. By plowing a practice lane in very useful when the path is dug. Any common ground before the balloon goes the area of operations similar to the soil initial method that clearly marks the en- up. With common doctrine, the tankers conditions at the obstacle, the com- trance, exit, and path of the breach is es- and engineers will complement each mander can quickly (after two or three sential and must be continually improved other very well in the combined arms practice lanes) determine the best depth (reducing the obstacle) for follow-on breach, with reinforcement by every and speed to dig out mines and produce units. (See FM 90-13-1, App E) available battlefield operating system. sufficient spoil to push them to the sides. Through combined TTP development, The blade drop point and speed can also When tank units conduct breaches with- refinement, implementation, and training, out a MICLIC or AVLM, we train to do be refined in a rehearsal. The best case is them with only a plow and roller. We still we can set the conditions for a coordi- to drop and then begin movement to nated effort between all BOS elements on avoid damage to the tines by dropping follow the basic tenets of breaching as the the battlefield. As individuals, or individ- MICLIC/plow combination, but with this while moving, although this is also de- method the plow does the breaching and ual units, we can do many great things. pendent on local soils. After the plow Acting together as a cohesive team with creates a lane, the mine roller simply the roller does the proofing. Without the common doctrine, we can accomplish roller, tank units are forced to use a “Hol- follows the exact path through the obsta- lywood” tank through the obstacle first to anything, even an operation as demand- cle to detonate any remaining mines. He ing as the breach. should travel at the same speed as the proof the lane. It is a grim job, but if the tank doesn’t hit a mine, then the lane is plow tank, with the gun tube again over proofed. Regardless of which reduc- to the left, and then exit the lane to the Captain Jeff Erdley is a 1994 right in a hasty defensive position. In tion/proofing combination the com- mander decides to use, the plowing por- Distinguished Military Graduate theory, the roller can withstand two mine tion is almost identical to the process hits per roller and continue to be effective of Lehigh University. He has as a proof. Regardless of the exact previously listed for the MICLIC/plow served as a tank platoon leader, combination. The only difference is how executive officer, BMO, and S1 method, several systems must work to- the plow tank begins its mission. When gether to breach, proof, and mark the at 3-67 Armor in the 2nd AD lane. terrain allows, the plow tank is most ef- and 4th ID(M). He is a graduate fective if it can remain behind an inter- The plow can dig down to 8, 10, or 12 visibility line while the conditions are set of airborne, air assault, AOB, inches, the depth to be set prior to the for the breach. The commander can talk and EOAC and is currently mission, based on the ground conditions to that TC to position him directly in working on an MS in engineer- (the softer the soil, the deeper the setting). front of his desired point of breach, so ing management. Not only is this depth critical, but so is that when he orders the plow forward it ARMOR — January-February 1999 27

Team Blade and Survivability Management by Captain Pete Huie

As the task force began to consolidate on the objective, LTC Stone surveyed the broad expanse of land in front of him. Thirty minutes earlier, remnants of an enemy mechanized infantry comp any had retreated across this terrain. The task force commander knew they would re- turn in the form of a brigade-sized coun- terattack, probably in less than 36 hours. To his right and left the land was void of any relief, with not even the slightest undulation. He’d need the support of the attached engineer company, or his task force would have no choice but to fight from above ground. The good news was that the three sur- viving M9 Armored Combat Earthmo v- ers (ACE) from his assault force were now beginning to scratch out fighting positions for his main effort. A fourth ACE had been damaged as it proofed a able to provide immediate organizational engineer and TF commander have estab- breach lane during the earlier attack. The and direct support to all blade assets. lished a survivability timeline based on remainder of the engineer company’s As LTC Stone and his company team the brigade’s timeline and guidance. The ACEs were racing up to the battle posi- brigade order may also establish a prior- commanders conducted a reconnaissance ity of missions and vehicle fighting posi- tion to begin digging in his company of the engagement area, Team Blade teams . These ACEs would help, but began to consolidate behind his battle tion standards. From this, the task force much of his task force would still be commander knows if blades can be used position. Consisting of the battalion’s 21 in his countermobility planning and the above ground when the enemy brigade M9 ACEs, 6 SEE tractors, attached counterattacked. The task force – and D7/D8 bulldozers from the corps Combat types of positions he has time to prepare. ultimately, the brigade’s defense – would In this case, the BCT commander has Support Equipment Company or Combat directed that Team Blade be used for depend upon the successful execution of Heavy engineer battalion, M88 recovery the engineer battalion’s Team Blade. vehicle, the battalion shop equipment survivability only, and task forces will be limited to hull-down positions or modi- During home station training and the truck and welding trailer, and command fied two-tier positions. The brigade engi- most recent National Training Center and control vehicles, Team Blade pro- vides the brigade combat team (BCT) a neer has determined that there is not suf- rotation, the brigade had successfully ficient time to prepare turret-down posi- adopted the Team Blade concept. How- means to rapidly and efficiently prepare tions. This guidance serves to prioritize ever, this would be its first use with a full its defense. Led by the engineer HHC commander, the team establishes its the survivability effort and efficiently use brigade and in combat. the blade hours allocated to the task UMCP Forward two to three kilometers force. LTC Stone has tasked his opera- Team Blade is a consolidation of all behind the task force battle position. The blade assets within the brigade, designed Assault and Obstacle Platoon Leader tions sergeant major with the mission of to rapidly construct both vehicle and dis- enforcing the timeline. Other task forces (PL) from the engineer company support- in the BCT use their CSM or master gun- mounted fighting positions. The concept ing the task force in sector, controls the was developed in response to decreasing blades on and between company posi- ner to accomplish this mission. The A&O maintenance assets within mechanized PL performs the same mission for his tions and serves as the point of contact battalion commander. The A&O PL engineer battalions and in an effort to for the company team commanders. streamline command and control of the While the UMCP Forward is being estab- moves his blades to the contact point brigade survivability mission. Team behind the first company battle position lished (Figure 1), the attached bulldozers and links up with the company executive Blade is formed during the defense from are brought forward, and the A&O PL organic and attached blade assets. The moves to contact points on the task force officer. Before the engineers’ arrival, the alternative was to use the ACEs in at- XO has ensured that the corners of all boundaries to link up the remainder of the proposed vehicle fighting positions have tached engineer companies to dig in their engineer battalion’s ACE and SEE fleet. supported task force. This was a slower The task force has tasked a section of been marked with long pickets and that process, especially as ACEs experienced vehicles are available to proof the posi- tanks to provide security for the lightly tions as they are completed. The tank mechanical problems and the company’s armed convoy. mechanics were unable to fix them with commander for each vehicle is also avail- their minimal assets. Through the use of a Using the UMCP Forward as a rally able to supervise the construction of the forward unit maintenance collection point point, the battalion’s blades are consoli- position he will fight from and to guide (UMCP) under control of Team Blade, dated and moved to the first company the incoming blade teams to the proposed the battalion’s engineer mechanics are team battle position. By this point, the TF position. 28 ARMOR — January-February 1999

14 3-15 FEBA 4-64 15 have been paired up to create blade teams. While one vehicle digs the fight- ing position, the other spreads the spoil across the battle position to prevent the 16 EA fighting position from being easily spot- 2 UMCP 4 RLY ted. FORWARD CHUCK As the blade teams dig, enemy artillery begins to impact less than three hundred meters to the front of the BP. Following a 17 rehearsed battle drill, the blades occupy positions that are deep enough to cover them, and the rest move to a rally point designated by the A&O PL. In this case, 18 he has chosen a point halfway between 19 4-64 the BP and the UMCP Forward. If an enemy attack is imminent, all blades will 1-64 withdraw to the rally point. Despite the massing of the brigade’s blade assets on FEBA one BP, there is not a significant risk of the team being destroyed in a single artil- Figure 1. TF 4-64, the center TF in the BCT defense, with Team Blade graphic control measures. lery attack. With vehicle fighting posi- tions spread across the BP, blade teams As the blades enter the company battle chanic, and maintenance team chief, the are never closer than a hundred meters position, the A&O PL releases the SEEs maintenance team uses one of the two from one another and in most cases they to the infantry platoon leader to construct M88 recovery vehicles in the battalion, are at least two hundred meters apart. his dismounted fighting positions. If the the only battalion shop equipment truck With the first company’s battle position company is armor pure and does not re- and welding trailer, and one or two quire individual fighting positions, the AVLB bridges as maintenance platforms. complete, the A&O PL moves his team SEEs are moved to the next company In some cases, the battalion will push to the next company contact point and the process begins again. Hours later, as the team that does. The infantry PL under- forward an ULLS computer and clerk stands the task force survivability time- and a larger PLL inventory to better sus- task force’s survivability window comes line and a linkup time is agreed upon tain the team. Even under the best of to a close, Team Blade moves to the con- tact point at the task force boundary. Un- before the SEEs are released. The blade conditions, one or more M9 ACEs will be teams are assigned to the marked posi- found in the UMCP forward. Designed as der the watchful eyes of the tank section tions and digging begins. The A&O PL a breaching vehicle capable of keeping providing security, the team is met by the CSM of the new task force and the As- remains on the battle position to super- pace with the M1 and M2, the ACE re- vise the dig effort. He is responsible for quires constant maintenance attention sault and Obstacle PL from the engineer the correct use of the blade assets, the when digging. As it was not designed to company in sector. conduct of hourly maintenance by his dig, this type of work places tremendous LTC Stone again surveys his battle posi- crews, survivability and maintenance pressure on the vehicle’s hydraulic and tion. With vehicles, dismounts, and am- status reporting, and adherence to the suspension system. ACE operators must munition caches dug in, he is able to fo- brigade and task force survivability time- actually stop digging and perform a series cus on the destruction of the coming lines. His platoon sergeant performs these of preventive checks on the vehicle once counterattack. In the engagement area to functions in his absence and is also re- an hour. Separate engineer company his front, sappers continue to emplace sponsible for feeding the crews on the maintenance teams are not capable of obstacles. His company team command- battle position and escorting damaged providing this attention with the limited ers rehearse the occupation of their newly vehicles back to the UMCP Forward. The assets they have available. Separate engi- constructed fighting positions. Team Team Blade commander will typically neer company dig efforts lead to higher Blade has been a success. escort a repaired vehicle from the UMCP deadline rates among the ACEs and thus Forward back to the dig site. The Team slower completion time for company Blade commander is also responsible for team defensive positions. A mechanized CPT Pete Huie served as a all logistical support to the team. This engineer battalion simply does not have Combat Engineer platoon leader includes feeding, fueling, fixing, and the organic maintenance personnel, re- with the 3rd Engineer Battalion moving the team. The task force may be covery assets, or specialized equipment to required to supplement this support, es- support three separate, simultaneous sur- and as an Assault and Obstacle pecially with fuel. The ACE requires fuel vivability missions. platoon leader and TAC Officer with the 10th Engineer Battalion in every five to six hours when digging, and As LTC Stone and his commanders re- this can stretch the capabilities of the Fort Stewart, Ga. He is a graduate engineer battalion’s support platoon. turn from their reconnaissance, his staff of the Armor Officer Advanced informs him that the survivability effort is Paramount to the success of the team is now 25 percent complete. With three Course and the Engineer Officer the maintenance section. Organized with ACEs deadlined at the UMCP Forward, Basic Course and is currently at- the battalion’s engineer mechanics, a Team Dig has 18 ACEs and four attached tending the Combined Arms and welder, at least one direct support me- D7 bulldozers operational. These vehicles Services Staff School. ARMOR — January-February 1999 29

Incident at Safwan by Stephen A. Bourque

The small Iraqi town and airfield of Safwan1 occu- pies a special place in the history of the 1991 Per- sian Gulf War. The site of the peace talks that ended this short conflict, it represents the public triumph of America’s Cold-War Army. At Safwan, the American military buried the ghost of Vietnam that had haunted the United States for over twenty years.

The village of Safwan also has a less denly, the town of Safwan had become well known meaning. The failure of extremely important. Over the next 18 ground forces to capture objectives in the hours, two commands from the 1st Infan- Safwan area during the war prompted a try Division would confront Saddam major dispute between GEN H. Norman Hussein’s Army on Iraqi soil in an inci- Schwarzkopf and his subordinate com- dent that threatened to reopen the just- manders, that went on to poison relations concluded conflict. 2 proposed meeting. LTG Yeosock now among senior leaders in the post-war era. had to call the CinC and tell him to What is often lost in describing the gen- On 28 February, GEN Powell had or- dered GEN Schwarzkopf to conduct a change his plans.8 erals’ verbal battle, however, is the story cease-fire ceremony with the Iraqi High of how American soldiers captured the Schwarzkopf had already sent a mes- airfield in preparation for the dramatic Command. Schwarzkopf wanted this site sage describing his concept for the nego- located deep in Iraq so it would be obvi- tiations to GEN Powell. Now he had to cease-fire negotiations. ous to all who was the victor and who call his message back and change the site was the vanquished. He also wanted it at “Safwan is not under our control.” of the talks. Looking at his map, he se- a location that the Iraqi delegation could lected the airfield at Safwan as the alter- In the early morning hours of 1 March reach by road.5 He directed his Chief of nate site and redrafted his message to the 1991, the 1st Infantry Division’s night Staff, MG Robert B. Johnston, to find the Joint Chiefs of Staff.9 The airfield at operations officer had just settled down to location. Around 2100 hours, Johnston Safwan was six kilometers west of the what he anticipated would be a routine called LTG Yeosock, who was at his intersection near Safwan. Schwarzkopf shift. The Big Red One’s headquarters command post on the other side of Ri- had never ordered anyone to seize the was on the Basra-Kuwait highway just yadh, for site suggestions. Without con- airfield. Now it became an objective that west of the burning fires of Kuwait’s Ar tacting either of his corps commanders, should have been taken. Neither Rawdatayn oil field. The night sky had a who were familiar with the conditions on Schwarzkopf nor Yeosock called Franks red glow overlain with a constant roaring the ground, he suggested three possible ahead of time to ask him for his assess- from the flaming wells. Troops did not locations: the village of Shaibah outside ment of the location. need flashlights as they moved around in of al Basra; Jalibah airfield, about 80 the night. MG Thomas G. Rhame, the miles west of al Basra; and a location division commander, and his principal across the Hawr al Hammar causeway.6 After the fact, later that night, BG Steve Arnold, the Third Army G3, asked COL staff officers had finally gone to bed after Since only one of these, Jalibah, was almost a week of operations that began Cherrie, the VII Corps G3, about using on 23 February. Danger Main’s3 night under American control, it was the only Safwan for the negotiations. Cherrie told realistic choice. shift began the routine task of general him that it was on the other side of the security, accounting for all soldiers and demarcation line in enemy territory. It equipment, and planning for subsequent After Yeosock passed on his sugges- was the first the Corps G3 had heard of tions, he ordered LTG Gary Luck and operations. the airfield at Safwan, and he couldn’t XVIII Corps to prepare the airfield for the understand why the CinC had chosen that Shortly before 0200 hours, the VII ceremony. Later that night, Luck told him location.10 Around 0130 hours, Yeosock Corps tactical operations center’s duty that Jalibah was not the site to use. It had called Franks himself and asked him officer called to ask if the 1st Division been the target of a violent attack by the about the status of the airfield near Saf- had the area around Safwan under control 24th Infantry Division on the morning of wan and told him about the upcoming or observation. Since he had just con- 27 February.7 Unexploded munitions and conference.11 A few minutes later, one of firmed the locations of all units in the damaged vehicles were everywhere, and Cherrie’s staff officers called the 1st In- division, the duty officer said no.4 Sud- it could not be cleaned up in time for the fantry Division’s main command post. 30 ARMOR — January-February 1999 For almost ten minutes the division’s mander, LTC Bob Wilson.16 Like other my order was violated and why this mis- duty officer confirmed to several corps units in the 1st Infantry Division, the cav- sion was reported carried out when it staff officers that no one in the 1st Infan- alry squadron had only a minimum num- wasn’t.”20 try Division was near Safwan and that ber of soldiers awake and on-duty. For Given the scope of all that Yeosock and unit locations had not changed since the almost a month it had been on a war foot- report he rendered at 1900 hours the pre- ing and few soldiers had been able to get Franks had accomplished in the last few 12 17 weeks, it was a demeaning exercise that vious evening. Finally, an agitated LTG any sleep over the previous four days. seriously soured morale at the end of the Franks had enough and grabbed the tele- Once Wilson was awake, Rhame told phone from his staff officer. “Do you him to move as soon as possible to recon war. Months after the conflict, Stan Cher- 18 rie remembered how irate he was as he know who this is?” He shouted at the the area near Safwan. read Franks’ personally typed reply to stunned divisional staff officer, “Get Rhame on the phone now!” Quickly, the Franks, meanwhile, had second thoughts Schwarzkopf. Here was a commander about this impromptu mission. At 0308 who had achieved all that had been duty officer raced out of the TOC and hours, he called Rhame back and ordered asked, and now he was being accused of across 50 yards of fire-illuminated sand 21 to wake his exhausted commander.13 the 1st Infantry Division to stop its dishonesty. Yeosock and Franks each movement. At first light, he wanted shifted blame to no one, and each ac- MG Rhame, awaking from his first de- Rhame to conduct an area reconnaissance cepted full responsibility for unintention- cent sleep in over a week, at first thought to determine if the CinC could use the ally ignoring the details of the order.22 Of it was some kind of a joke. Throwing on site as a meeting area. He was to find out course, the issue was not about seizing his trousers and boots, he raced back to if there were any enemy troops in the the road junction, but about an airfield. his command post that he had left only a area, but not to get into a serious fight Schwarzkopf had never told Yeosock to couple of hours earlier. There, Franks with Iraqi forces. Finally Franks, under seize the airfield. was on the phone wanting to know about pressure from Yeosock and Schwarzkopf, Safwan. In a few minutes, Rhame con- also asked him to run an “audit trail” on VII Corps now had one last combat firmed that Safwan was not under the the mission. In other words, had the 1st mission to perform. At 0350 hours, control of his division and had never been Infantry Division received the order to Franks called Rhame again, and laid out an assigned objective.14 By now, almost seize Safwan crossroads? If so, why was his mission for seizing Safwan. “Intent is 45 minutes had gone by since that first it not accomplished? If not, why not?19 to not take any casualties.” The corps’ log call from the corps. Rhame finally asked, read, “If you run into enemy forces, then “What were his orders?” LTG Franks Schwarzkopf, by his own admission, stop and report to CG VII Corps.”23 LTC then gave Rhame a mission to reconnoi- came “completely unglued” when he Wilson’s 1-4 Cavalry Squadron still had ter the area around Safwan but not to get found out that VII Corps had not taken the mission. It was to move to and seize decisively engaged.15 Safwan. He shouted at Yeosock: the airfield near Safwan and occupy it in preparation for the surrender ceremony. Off the phone with the corps com- “I ordered you (italics are Schwarz- Rhame, passing along Franks’ guidance, mander around 0240 hours, Rhame radi- kopf’s) to send VII Corps to that road told him to avoid combat (and re-starting oed his 1-4 Cavalry Squadron com- junction. I want to know in writing why the war) if possible, but to defend himself ARMOR — January-February 1999 31

XXX VII LTG Frederick M. Franks, JR as appropriate. These orders, from Wil- son’s perspective, were just what he needed: clear senior commander’s intent, xx xx xx X HQ VII maximum flexibility for the ground 1 1 1 11 XXX commander in an unclear situation, and no hint of the tension and politics taking xx III xx place between division, corps and army UK headquarters.24 Wilson had a fairly pow- 3 2 1 erful force at his disposal, two tank- reinforced ground troops, two air cavalry troops, and an Apache attack helicopter company.25 X II X X X 7 8-43 93 14 MP 207 MI Movement to Contact

Wilson moved out at 0615 hours with X III III XXX his two ground troops moving cross- 354 CA 7 7 AG 2 SPT country, north-north-east. The ground scouts moved quickly in standard travel- ing overwatch formation. With the Saf- wan Mountain (Jabal Sanam) as a guide, Fig. 1 A Troop moved in the eastern and B Troop moved on the western sides of the U.S. VII Corps Organization as of February 1991. zone.26 Forward of each ground troop was an aerial scout-weapons team (SWT) consisting of OH-58 scout helicopters XX and Cobra attack helicopters. The AH-64 1 MG Thomas G Rhame Apache company was kept on the ground at a holding area ready to respond if Wil- x x son’s troopers got into trouble.27 X X X HQ 1 2 SPT

Rhame could tell Wilson little about the x enemy situation. The 1st Infantry Divi- 3 sion’s Main Command Post had only II II Authorized Equipment recently reorganized after the ground 1-1 1-4 334 Tanks offensive, and its G-2 (Intelligence) sec- 224 Infantry/Cavalry Fighting Vehicles tion was unable to provide the squadron 72 Artillery Tubes 9 Multiple Rocket Launchers with any information on the Iraqi’s com- II 28 II II II 24 Attack Helicopters position or disposition. The aviation 17496 Soldiers scouts, however, were soon reporting MI dozens of abandoned Iraqi army vehicles on the way to the airfield. Rhame ordered Wilson not to slow-down and destroy any Fig. 2 of these vehicles so he could get to Saf- wan before the Iraqis could react.29 Organization of the 1st Infantry Div. (Mech), February 1991

As the ground troops approached the 31 mountain, around 0700 hours, A Troop pared positions. Wilson reminded his Cavalry Squadron had obviously arrived commanders not to fire, unless fired upon at the southern boundary of the Basra swung to the east and B Troop moved to or in danger,32 but to continue in a steady pocket. the west. The squadron had been expect- ing a large runway, but A Troop’s sol- advance on to the airfield. The troopers Around 0830 hours, LTC Wilson were nervous and some feared that they diers crossed the narrow asphalt strip would be the first casualties in a renewal moved forward to the airfield, dis- thinking they were on an unfinished four- mounted from his Bradley, and ap- lane highway. Initially it appeared de- of the fighting. Courageously, they drove proached several “well-dressed and well- their combat vehicles within the range of serted, but a few moments later, the air the Iraqi weapon systems and occupied fed” Iraqi soldiers whose uniforms indi- scouts discovered tanks and other vehi- 33 cated that they were from a Republican cles in revetted positions on the northern the airfield. Guard unit. Their equipment appeared in side of the airfield, oriented towards the With the cavalry squadron on the objec- very good shape and Wilson noticed south and west. Behind the dug-in armor, tive, Rhame ordered Wilson to move his trucks with fresh vegetables and other the Iraqis positioned many more tracked air-scouts to the important road junction, supplies. Wilson then spoke, through an and wheeled vehicles.30 What the 1-4 about five miles east of Safwan Moun- interpreter, with the senior officer at the Cavalry Squadron had found, defending tain. As the air cavalrymen continued to site. He told the Iraqi colonel that the about 1500 meters north of the airfield, investigate, they found the area full of airfield at Safwan was under U.S. control was an entire Iraqi armored brigade. other Iraqi tank and mechanized units. As and that he must move his men and Three battalions were on line and an ad- the squadron’s scouts watched, hundreds equipment immediately. Obviously dis- ditional battalion positioned in depth. All of Iraqi vehicles continued to move north turbed by Wilson’s words, the Iraqi offi- of the Iraqi combat vehicles were in pre- and away from the Americans.34 The 1-4 cer left to speak to his commander.35 32 ARMOR — January-February 1999

As the officer departed, four Iraqi tanks moved in front of Wilson’s command group and lowered their gun tubes at it. The young squad- ron commander realized this was no time for bravado, and calmly pulled his group south 100 yards. He then alerted his troop command- ers who were also negotiat- ing with Iraqis at other por- tions of the airfield, and di- rected the Apache company to fly over his location in a show of force. Arriving a few moments later, the sight of the greatly feared attack helicopters caused a change in the Iraqi attitude as, al- most immediately, the Iraqi tanks moved back. With the situation now clarified, Wil- son, along with his boss COL Jim Mowery (1st In- fantry Division’s Aviation Brigade Commander), again moved forward to confront the Iraqi officers. An Iraqi colonel told Wilson that his general said they were to remain on the airfield. Wil- son calmly replied that if they did not move out, the entire 1st Infantry Division would attack them within hours. Looking at the hover- ing Apache helicopters, the Iraqi officer said he needed to speak with his superior and departed.36 Fig. 3 Similar situations were tak- ing place in the two cavalry Situation, 2300 hours, 27 February 1991 troop sectors. Not all the Iraqi soldiers were in as told the Iraqi officer that they had to leave At 1020 hours, the Iraqi colonel re- good shape as the troops Wilson encoun- the area because of the upcoming peace turned to A Troop and told its com- tered. In many cases the cavalrymen pro- talks. The two leaders exchanged map mander that he was not going to leave the vided rations for obviously hungry Iraqi locations and the Iraqi colonel departed to airfield. Just at that moment, the now soldiers, many who came out of hiding confer with his superiors.38 So far, the- ubiquitous Apache attack helicopters and surrendered to the squadron’s troop- cavalrymen had accomplished their mis- flew overhead. Pope, knowing the terrify- ers. Just as they had done during the pre- sion with skill. Their command discipline ing reputation of these aircraft amongst vious week, American troopers disarmed prevented a tense situation from turning the Iraqis, told the Iraqi colonel that if he the Iraqis willing to surrender, gave them into a needless firefight. didn’t move, American forces would food, and sent them to the south towards attack him. This Iraqi colonel, also, went Rhame wasn’t waiting for this situation the VII Corps’ prisoner of war com- 40 to continue. Now that Wilson had ac- back to find his superiors. pounds.37 complished his reconnaissance mission, In CPT Mike Bills’ B Troop sector, a In the A Troop sector, about the same he directed COL Tony Moreno’s 2d Bri- similar scenario played itself out. He and time that LTC Wilson was having his gade, consisting of two tank battalions, a a detachment of combat vehicles moved first encounter, an Iraqi Republican mechanized infantry battalion, and a field towards the Iraqi defenses. Once close, Guard colonel approached the American artillery battalion, to move into the sector. the young captain dismounted and ap- troops. He was angry that they were feed- At 1009 hours the Dagger Brigade started proached some soldiers asking to see ing his soldiers on his land. As a re- to move toward Safwan. Rhame placed their commander. Soon a lieutenant colo- sponse, he directed his own men to brew Wilson’s cavalry squadron under the nel arrived who, in broken English asked up some tea for the troopers of A Troop. operational control of Moreno’s bri- “Why are you in Iraq? Are you lost?”41 CPT Ken Pope, the A Troop commander gade.39 Bills assured him that was not the case ARMOR — January-February 1999 33

and he was here to secure the site for the cease-fire negotiations. The Iraqi com- mander told his junior enlisted soldiers to leave and surrounded Bills with about 15 to 20 officers and senior soldiers. The Iraqi LTC then left to confer with his superiors. A short time later he returned with addi- tional soldiers, wearing the black leather jackets, cam- ouflage uniforms and berets of Iraqi commando units.42 To Bills, the situation looked as though it had ta- ken a turn for the worse. However, after a short, tense stand-off, this Iraqi unit and all of the others on the airfield received orders from their superiors to leave. By 1200, the entire airfield complex was clear of Iraqi troops. BG William Carter, the 1st Infantry Divi- sion’s Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), flew to Wilson’s location and told him that he was now under the approaching 2d Brigade’s operational control.43 The Roadblock

The stand-off wasn’t over Fig. 4 yet, however. While most of Situation, 0800 Hours, 28 February 1991 the 2d Brigade moved cross country, its supporting 4-5 Field Artillery Battalion moved directly (1) We must have the airfield. ground. From the perspective of VII Corps and 1st Infantry Division officers, up the Basra road. At the village of Saf- (2) CinC ordered us to take it. wan, an Iraqi infantry unit stopped it as it if something went wrong, Yeosock and tried to move through the town. This unit (3) Must show that we have wrecked the Schwarzkopf would have a subordinate was from Saddam Hussein’s home town country to humiliate them. Must show ready to sacrifice. knocked out buildings and equipment. of Tikrit and had no intention of mo v- 44 ing. Around 1100 hours, COL Moreno (4) Go into airfield at Safwan with Ending the Impasse arrived with armored reinforcements and overwhelming combat power. asked to see the senior Iraqi officer. Soon Ultimately it didn’t matter. Rhame, not a major arrived, but Moreno wanted a (5) Force Iraqi units out. known for being indecisive, had already more senior officer. Soon a command car decided to end the standoff. Ten minutes (6) Use PSYOPS to convince them to before Yeosock called, Rhame ordered arrived with two generals and a civilian leave. Invite them to surrender. government official. Moreno calmly told Moreno to tell the Iraqis to move or die the group that he was bringing his forces (7) If not, use combat power. If they by 1600 hours.48 fire, destroy them. to Safwan for the peace negotiations and Tony Moreno was tired. The infantry they had to stop blocking the road. The (8) Attempt to avoid contact. Request colonel had been commanding from the Iraqis didn’t understand, and actually permission from CinC before committing confined quarters of his Bradley fighting thought they had the Americans sur- to combat.46 vehicle for over a week. Both MG rounded. Moreno demanded to see a 45 Rhame and BG Carter were at his head- more senior official. Yeosock, under obvious pressure from quarters providing all the supervision he Meanwhile, LTG Yeosock was under Schwarzkopf, 47 was obfuscating the is- needed. Once he received Rhame’s in- increasing pressure from Schwarzkopf to sue. Did he want Rhame to force the structions, he jumped at the chance to end get the area secured. After 1500 hours he Iraqis out or not? These were garbled the standoff. He deployed his forces for called directly down to MG Rhame and instructions that left the disposition of the an overwhelming dis play of combat told him the following: problem to the commander on the power, moving the 1-4 Cavalry now un- 34 ARMOR — January-February 1999

Safwan and Vicinity To Basra 5 Miles der his operational control, and his other three battalions to surround the airfield ? and the town around 1500 hours. He Elements of several ? drove his M2 Bradley right up to the re- Iraqi Divisions (Basra Pocket) cently arrived Iraqi delegation. On his way out of the vehicle, Moreno hit his mouth on its hard metal, causing his lip to Airfield bleed. As the somewhat intimidated Iraqi delegation began reading a statement, Iraq Jabal Sanam Safwan Moreno cut them off. T o Umm Qasr Spitting a wad of blood at the feet of the Kuwait surprised Iraqis, the stocky Hawaiian pointed his finger and said “If you don’t 1/ 4 X leave by 1600 hours, we will kill you.”49 4 1 I D Just at that moment a tank battalion ar- rived to add emphasis to Moreno’s threat. X To Kuwait City Tanks moved right up to the enemy 2 1ID command vehicle as the Iraqi officers looked on, horrified. Moreno, again, told them to move. The Iraqi commander Fig. 5 requested some more time, and Moreno 1st Infantry Division units move to secure Safwan Airfield, 1 March 1991. consented, but emphasized that at 1630 hours, “I’m coming through.”50 The Safwan incident highlights the ef- fire by his own brutal account of his dispute with The Iraqi general left to get his soldiers fect of personalities on the conduct of Yeosock and Franks in his autobiography, written moving out of the area. A short while war. The tactical chain of command was with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New later he reappeared and thanked COL based on clear bonds of trust and mutual York: Bantam Books, 1992), 550-551. Rick Moreno for not killing his soldiers. Then admiration. Six years after the incident, Atkinson, Crusade (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, he asked if he could leave some of his Bob Wilson still had nothing but praise 1993) and Robert Scales, Certain Victory (Wash- tanks to help secure the negotiation area. ington, D.C.: GPO 1993) generally ignore the for Rhame’s clear general orders on seiz- entire controversy. Michael R. Gordon and LTG An amazed Moreno told him no and ing Safwan. In their interviews after the Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War (Boston: drew him a map of where he should war, Rhame and Cherrie often spoke of Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 438-443, move his soldiers to. “Anything within how they trusted and believed in Ge neral continued to stir up this controversy without any three kilometers of that box when the sun Franks’ leadership. serious analysis of its causes. The best account of rises we will kill.” The Iraqi general nod- the causes of the controversy is found in Richard ded in agreement and departed.51 The incident at Safwan, therefore, pre- M. Swain, “Lucky War” Third Army in Desert sents the victorious Gulf War Army in a Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Command Conclusions and General Staff College Press), 1994. General different light than seen by the public in The Iraqi units soon left and the 1st In- 1991. Safwan refutes the image of the Franks’ perspective on the Safwan controversy is perfectly executed, clean, “high-tech,” found in Tom Clancy and GEN Fred Franks, Jr., fantry Division began preparing the site Into the Storm: A Study in Command (New York: for the negotiations. Rhame, Moreno, and military operation most Americans be- lieve took place in the winter of 1991. It G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1996), 445-460. Wilson had pulled off a demanding mis- 3Nickname for the division’s main command sion without a loss. In his memoirs, was conclusive proof that the strength of the Army rested on the shoulders of its post. Schwarzkopf says his threat to use force 4Author’s notes, 28 February-1 March 1991. was “bluffing.”52 Yeosock is much more officers, noncommissioned officers, and individual soldiers. During this period the author was a member of candid, and was concerned that Safwan the 1st Infantry Division’s G3 Operations Staff. could have become a place the Iraqis 5Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 549. chose to stand and die, forcing the Notes 6Richard M. Swain, “Lucky War:” Third Army Americans to violate the cease-fire on in Desert Storm, 293; and Yeosock Interview, 29 53 Iraqi soil. June 1991. 1This article benefited from assistance and ad- 7 What does this minor incident about an vice from many people, both military and civil- Jason K. Kamiya, A History of the 24th obscure crossroads in the Iraqi desert say ian, who helped to make this story as accurate as Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team about the U.S. Army at the end of the possible. Of special note are LTC (Ret.) John During Operation Desert Storm (Fort Stewart, cold war? At the tactical level, the Saf- Burdan, BG Bob Wilson, COL Mike Kendall, Ga.: 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1992), wan incident shows the folly of relying COL(Ret.) Rick Swain, LTG Tom Rhame, BG 29. on only high-technological solutions. Stan Cherrie, COL Dave Gross, and Dr. Susan 8GEN John Yeosock and COL Richard M. Soldiers on the ground, backed by con- Canedy. Versions of this paper were presented Swain, “Interview with GEN John Yeosock,” 27 ventional firepower and attack helicopters before the Association of Georgia State Univer- June 1991. under the control of the ground com- sity Historians and the 1997 Ohio Valley History 9Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 549- mander, convinced the Iraqi soldiers to Conference. 550. leave without a fight. The result was no 10Cherrie Interview, 12 September 1991. 2Tom Donnelly was the first to publicly address 11 bloodshed on either side and an accept- the tensions between General Schwarzkopf and VII Corps Tactical Operations Center (TAC), able site for peace negotiations. No his subordinate commanders at Safwan in his Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, entry 3. amount of high-tech weaponry could article “The Generals’ War,” Army Times, 2 121st Infantry Division TAC, Staff Journal, 28 have attained that political objective. March, 1992, p. 8. Schwarzkopf added fuel to the February 1991, entry 83. ARMOR — January-February 1999 35

13Author’s notes, 28 February-1 March 1991. 271-4 Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders on the (G3 Operations), Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, 14Rhame Interview, 26 July 1991; and VII Storm,” 19. entry 46; and Swain, “Lucky War:” Third Army in Desert Storm, 297. Corps TAC, Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, entry 3. 28Burdan, 19 March 1997 and author’s notes. 45Jim Tice, “Coming Through: The Big Red 15VII Corps TAC, Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, 291st Infantry Division Main Command Post entry 3. (G3 Operations), 1 March 1991, entry 8; and, 1-4 One Raid,” Army Times (26 Aug. 1991), 18; and 1st Infantry Division Tactical Operations Center 16Author’s notes; and 1-4 Cavalry Operations Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders on the Storm,” 19. (TAC), Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, entries 29, Staff, “Riders on the Storm,” ARMOR (May 30. 1991), 19. This article is a published version of 30Burdan, 19 March 1997. 46VII Corps TAC, Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, the squadron’s formal after-action report. 31 1st Infantry Division Main Command Post entries 25, 33. 17Stephen A. Bourque, “Desert Saber: The VII (G3 Operations), Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, 47Colonel Mike Kendall, Note to author, 15 Corps in the Gulf War” (Ph.D. diss. Georgia entries 9-14, 46; and 1-4 Cavalry Operations July 1991. State University, 1996), 215-228. The 1-4 Cav- Staff, “Riders on the Storm,” 19; and Rhame 48 alry Squadron began screening the 1st Infantry Interview, 26 July 1991. Rhame Interview, 26 July 1991. Division’s attack sector on 3 February. It had 32BG Bob Wilson, Note to author, 10 Jul 97. 49Ibid. been on a war-footing, therefore, for over four 33Burdan, 19 March 1997. 50Tice, “Coming Through,” 18. weeks. 341st Infantry Division Main Command Post 51Ibid. 18LTC John Burdan to author, 19 March 1997. (G3 Operations), Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, 52Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 552- Burdan was the operations officer (S-3) during entries 15-30. 553. this period. 1-4 Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders 35 53 on the Storm,” 19. Wilson, 8 May 1997, 2-3. Yeosock Interview, 29 June 1991. 36 19VII Corps TAC, Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, Wilson, 8 May 1997, 3-4. 37Burdan, 19 March 1997. entry 3. Dr. Stephen Bourque received his 20 381st Infantry Division Main Command Post Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, 550- Ph.D in history from Georgia State 551. (G3 Operations), Staff Journal, 1 Mar 91, entries University in 1996. He holds an 21Cherrie Interview, 12 September 1991. 31, 36 and 40; and 1-4 Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders on the Storm,” 20; and Rhame Interview, 22Franks sent a letter to GEN Schwarzkopf MMAS from the U.S. Army Com- 26 Jul 91, and Burdan, 19 Mar 97. mand and General Staff College, an conveying this message: Cherrie interview, 12 39 September 1991; and Clancy and Franks, Into the 1st Infantry Division Main Command Post MA from Ball State University, and a Storm, 456. Yeosock, according to his assistant (G3 Operations), Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, BA from Florida State University. LTC Mike Kendall, did the same: Kendall, note entry 43; and Rhame Interview, 26 July 1991. 401-4 Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders on the From 1975-1991, he served in vari- to author, 18 September 1997. ous command and staff assignments 23VII Corps TAC, Staff Journal, 1 March 1991, Storm,” 20; and Swain, “Lucky War:” Third entry 6. Army in Desert Storm, 297. in cavalry and armor units in the U.S., 41 24BG Bob Wilson, “Some comments ref. Saf- 1-4 Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders on the Germany, Australia, Saudi Arabia, wan,” Memo to author, 8 May 1997, 1. Storm,” 20. Kuwait, and Iraq. He currently 42 251-4 Cavalry Operations Staff, “Riders on the Ibid. teaches history at California State Storm,” 19. 43Wilson, 8 May 1997, 4-5. University, Northridge. He has been 26Wilson, 8 May 1997, 2; Burdan, 19 Mar 97. 441st Infantry Division Main Command Post published by various military journals.

Cadet Troop Leader Training Cadets arrive at your units with basic military training on land navigation, first aid, basic by The Office of the Chief of Armor infantry weapons familiarization, basic individ- ual training, small unit training, squad tactics, survival, and drill and ceremony. Some cadets have had training on infantry platoon tactics, Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT) is one Most important is the need for the cadets to tank platoon tactics, patrolling, communica- of the most valuable tools the Military Acad- get as much time in the field as possible and tions, NBC, tactical intelligence, basic rifle emy and ROTC have to prepare future sec- as much independent interaction with soldiers marksmanship, and physical training. They ond lieutenants for life in the Army. Cadets as possible. This is the best way for a young have also received familiarization training in live with active TO&E units and learn what life cadet to spend his summer. Division G3s cavalry and armor, air defense, field artillery, is like in the environment they will soon be should try to get cadets into units that are and combat engineers. The cadets arrive fully joining, a perspective that cannot be dupli- going to gunnery or FTXs, but recovery after capable of teaching classes on a range of cated at the college campus, the academy, or they have returned from the field can be great military topics if they are given adequate at a relatively structured summer camp. training, too. We want cadets to go to units preparation time and reference materials. that are “busy,” in any capacity. Over the last two years, there has been a Brigade and battalion commanders, take ad- Cadets will not break. Cadets need a chance trend in the number of units that elect to host vantage of this resource. It benefits both the to operate without a safety net. Company cadets during the summer. With ROTC cadets unit and the cadets that, in the future, will be in commanders should give cadets a chance to being added to the summer Mounted Maneu- your units as second lieutenants. Individual succeed or fail at a mission. They are ready to ver Training that the West Point cadets get at G3s should coordinate with West Point and be thrown into a position where you have Fort Knox, there has been a rise in the num- ROTC to determine the number of cadets that given them a mission, your guidance, and a ber of cadets who want to go to Armor CTLT. units will host. Notify your G3 that you would suspense. While the cadet is there is a great like to host cadets this summer. At the same time, a lot of good units doing time to send platoon leaders to on-post good training have declined to host cadets for schools or allow them to work something Again, remember that cadets don’t break. the summer. This is a mistake; this is a great away from the platoon. The platoon sergeant This is a chance for them to learn, and it’s chance for the Armor Force to give those who is there. Cadets need time to work with sol- your opportunity to influence the branch will be platoon leaders in just over a year a diers and noncommissioned officers, to listen choice of the future leaders of the Armor unique introduction to the ways of the Army. and to learn from their experiences. Force. 36 ARMOR — January-February 1999

Achieving Effective AC/RC Relations: An NTC Model for Success

by Lieutenant Colonel Aaron R. Kenneston

One hundred years ago, the Spanish- patible equipment, and a common train- standing army, supplemented with inde- American War brought to light the need ing strategy. Of course, in an AC/RC pendent state-trained reserves, was not to reform active and reserve component relationship the support must also be mu- realistic in the 20th century. The Army’s relations in America’s Army. Although tual. To be highly successful, the partner- overall performance caused the Secretary our Army decisively defeated the Spanish ship must increase the proficiency of the of War to create a General Staff, reorgan- defenders in Cuba, there was a great dis- reservists, while materially enhancing the ize the War Department, and reform the parity in the ability of units to accomplish active unit’s warfighting ability. National Guard. Active and National their missions. This was especially evi- Guard units began routinely to conduct dent in active and reserve component Units participating in the Spanish- joint maneuvers, be issued the same type performance.1 Prior to this war, National American War clearly did not have the of equipment, as well as use common Guard training consisted mainly of close mutual trust and support necessary for training standards and methods. Thus, the order drill and marching. Each state had effective relations. Upon outbreak of the war marked the very beginnings of effec- its own training standards and, based hostilities, the Army Ordnance Depart- tive integration of the RC into America’s upon available funds, provided its own ment limited the issue of modern rifles to Army.4 2 the Regular Army. The Reserve units equipment. To compound this problem, participating in this conflict, with the In the hundred years since this water- Active and National Guard units seldom exception of the Rough Riders, were shed event, our Army has experienced trained together. armed with obsolete Springfield .45-70 both successes and failures while pursu- In sharp contrast is today’s highly suc- single-shot black powder rifles. When the ing the ideal of seamless AC/RC integra- cessful training relationship between the expeditionary force commander made the tion. As we near the end of this century, 11th Armored Cavalry (Blackhorse) unfortunate decision to place a National one unit stands out as a model of the Regiment and Nevada’s 1/221st Cavalry Guard unit in the lead as our Army ap- Army Chief of Staff’s “one team, one (Wildhorse) Squadron. The validity of proached the open meadow below San fight, one future.” This unit is the storied this partnership was demonstrated during Juan Hill, the unit’s weapons were not 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Tasked two active duty NTC rotations this year, only ineffectual, but their smoke revealed with providing a world class Opposing when the Wildhorse fought alongside the the exact location of the riflemen. This Force at the National Training Center, the Blackhorse in January during Rotation brought the concentrated fire of the en- 11th ACR has aggressively pursued the 98-04 (see ARMOR, May-June 1998) and emy directly to bear upon the approach- full integration of its three FORSCOM- again in August during Rotation 98-10. In ing column. The Spanish were armed authorized round-out units. Nevada’s 1st both rotations, the 1st Squadron, 221st with the then-state-of-the-art bolt action Squadron, 221st Cavalry, has recently Cavalry assumed its OPFOR identity as Mauser Model 1893, firing a smokeless, been joined by Arizona’s 1st Battalion, the 60th Guards Independent Tank Bat- modern 7mm cartridge. Their withering 180th Field Artillery (Thunderhorse), and talion, and fought under the control of the fire caused the green Guard soldiers to go will soon be joined by a recently re- 125th Guards Tank Regiment (the 11th to ground and obstructed the attack’s stationed cavalry troop in Montana. 3 ACR) to defend the fictitious nation of forward movement. The success of the unique Black- Krasnovia against a visiting active Army Of course, there were other factors be- horse/Wildhorse relationship is strength- brigade combat team. sides the reserve component’s poor train- ened by three lessons that our Army An effective AC/RC relationship, like ing, inferior equipment, and improper learned from its experiences in the Span- that of the 11th ACR and the 1/221st employment that affected our Army’s ish-American War. First, the Wildhorse Cavalry, is built on mutual trust and sup- performance. But, the war certainly high- conducts regular joint maneuvers with the port. Developing mutual trust requires lighted the inadequacy of AC/RC rela- Blackhorse. There is no peacetime equiv- both time and patience. It is created tions. Our country discovered that the alent to the realistic experience of the through frequent training exercises, com- Revolutionary-era ideal of a very small MILES battlefield at the NTC. Second, ARMOR — January-February 1999 37

the 1/221st Cavalry has equipment on a par with its active duty counterpart. The visually modified M113A3, HMMWV, and M1A1 (BMP, BRDM, and Krasno- vian Variant Tank) are reliable, modern combat vehicles. Third, the training in the 11th ACR and its round-out units uses a standardized training strategy. All train- ing follows the proven “8-step training 1/221 Armor’s “Krasnovian Variant” of the M1A1 tank on the move. model”5 as directed by the commander of the National Training Center. Here is how the 8-step model was used to attain squadron’s night fighting capabilities. A provides courses of action to the SCO for success in the six months between Rota- tank crew evaluator accompanies the tank 150-day training. The troop commanders tion 98-04 and Rotation 98-10: and rates the TC based on the standards then brief the SCO on their 120-day train- in the Motorized Rifle Company Hand- ing plans. Once approved, the SCO signs Step One. Immediately following the book. This exercise ensures that leaders their training schedules. The troop first after-action review (AAR) of January’s have the confidence and basic competen- sergeants then address issues by excep- Rotation 98-04, the staff began to de- cies necessary to lead their troops on the tion for the 90-day and 60-day training velop the plan for Rotation 98-10. While MILES battlefield. Additionally, Wild- events, while the squadron executive the squadron did not know the exact de- horse leaders participated in the regi- officer records issues for the staff to re- tails of the missions that it would perform ment’s officer professional development solve. They then conduct a final “sanity during its next NTC rotation, it could classes, which focused on how to defeat check” of the upcoming 30-day training. make certain assumptions, based upon BLUEFOR command, control, commu- From January’s 180-day guidance to the doctrinal employment of an inde- nications, computer, intelligence, surveil- July’s 30-day review, the training plans pendent tank battalion. After assessing lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capa- for NTC Rotation 98-10 were refined and the squadron’s past performance, the plan bilities. communicated to the Wildhorse troopers. was to focus on three major areas: the lethality of individual tank crews, the Step Three. Prior to NTC Rotation 98- Step Five. Next came rehearsal of the survivability of reconnaissance assets, 10, a detailed reconnaissance of the train- training plan at squadron, troop, and indi- and the synchronization of squadron ing site was conducted. Officers and key vidual vehicle-level. As has become combat power. The squadron scheduled NCOs spent a full drill weekend at the tradition in the Wildhorse, every vehicle and conducted planning sessions with the NTC participating in a tactical exercise commander, each with a map containing regiment and fellow active duty squad- without troops (TEWT) to gain a greater full operational graphics, participates in a rons. Wildhorse staff officers also par- terrain appreciation and discuss OPFOR squadron-level rehearsal on a giant sand- ticipated in a series of wargaming ses- battle drills on the ground where they table. These rehearsals culminate in a sions. Several potential scenarios were would be executed. The Wildhorse lead- full-up squadron-level meeting battle at ers maneuvered in HMMWVs through- the NTC utilizing MILES equipment. discussed based on probable enemy courses of action. Then, general concepts out the training area with the regiment Our unit, the 60th Guards ITB, sparred for employment of the 1/221st Cavalry providing a motorized rifle battalion with the free-thinking, uncooperative 4th were developed. commander to facilitate this process. He MRB of the 125th Guards Tank Regi- discussed detailed tactics, techniques, and ment in the Central Corridor one day Step Two. After initial planning, the procedures, covering topics that ranged prior to the regiment’s actual attack on a squadron began to train and certify lead- from potential enemy aerial battle posi- visiting BLUEFOR unit. This was a ers. The centerpiece of this training is tions to critical intervisibility lines. When “win-win” event for both the Blackhorse OPFOR tank commander certification. the Wildhorse was not actually in the and the Wildhorse. Every member of the This process is similar to BLUEFOR tank field, its soldiers were taking classes on squadron team, from supply sergeant to tactical tables. Conducted over a drill navigation techniques and reporting pro- mechanic to scout, was totally focused weekend, this training is designed to vali- cedures. and committed to performing tasks to date a tank crew’s ability to meet OPFOR standard. The 1/221st Cavalry gained standards on the battlefield. The certifica- The regiment also provided a compre- hensive intelligence summary of the invaluable experience, while elements of tion process consists of 11 tasks modeled the regiment were able to practice critical after the Blackhorse crew validation pro- BLUEFOR. The squadron leadership tasks prior to Training Day 01 of NTC gram.6 The process begins with struc- carefully studied the known capabilities of their opponents, the newly digitized Rotation 98-08. The 11th ACR provided tured PMCS, PCI, and MILES opera- “Blackhorse Brothers” to critique per- tional checks. Then, the tank commander 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, from Fort Hood, Texas. formance and provide troop/squadron maneuvers his tank along a prescribed after-action reviews. Lessons learned route and encounters an anti-armor team, Step Four. The next step was for the from the rehearsal were folded into final enemy tanks, FASCAM, and a wire/mine squadron to issue the training plan to preparations for the upcoming rotation. obstacle. The TC must navigate from subordinate troops at the monthly com- operational graphics, employ all tank mand and staff meeting. This meeting is Step Six. When the time arrived to de- weapons systems, conduct hasty conducted on a Tuesday night two weeks ploy for NTC Rotation 98-10, each breaches, report to a higher headquarters, prior to drill, and looks out 180 days. The trooper and the squadron had the confi- and call for fire. Limited visibility opera- squadron commander gives his vision for dence which comes with solid training tions are also included to enhance the the 180-day training plan. The S3 staff and thorough preparation. 38 ARMOR — January-February 1999

125 GTR

4th MRB w/ B Trp

60 ITB (-)

Fig. 1. MRR Meeting Battle (60th Guards ITB as Second Echelon)

The regiment provided a liaison officer ment, and helicopters, the 60th ITB was were able to overwhelm a sophisticated to facilitate communications with higher tasked with helping to overload their sen- BLUEFOR observation and listening headquarters. Nevada senior leadership sors. Combat Reconnaissance Patrols post. With this key terrain secured, the provided technical support, such as envi- (CRP) moved along a southern route 60th ITB’s Forward Security Element ronmentalists and DS-level mechanics, to creating smoke and dust, which created was able to bound to the southern wall of ensure that Wildhorse troopers could the illusion of a large southern force, the central corridor. The main body then focus entirely on the task at hand. Even while the 125th GTR attacked in the maneuvered into terrain known as Hid- Arizona’s 1-180th FA (Thunderhorse) north. Once the regimental commander den Valley. The FSE was able to breach a battalion contributed by providing about called for the commitment of the second tank ditch, two wire/mine obstacles, and a dozen qualified forward observers to echelon, the 60th ITB moved along the rout a cavalry troop in the defense. Con- assist in the fight. same southern route that the CRPs had currently, the main body engaged and During the first battle of the rotation cleared. By combining a known safe destroyed two Apaches and pushed three (see Figure 1), Bravo Troop was attached route with additional obscuration, the more out of the valley. With the helicop- to the 4th MRB as part of the Forward 60th ITB moved unimpeded into the fray. ter threat neutralized, the main body was Security Element in a regimental meeting An Apache helicopter, as well as a few able to overwhelm the remaining M1/M2 M1 tanks and Bradleys, were destroyed opposition and secure the east mouth of battle. When the FSE made contact with the BLUEFOR, B Troop set a firing line as the 60th Guards ITB exploited the Hidden Valley. The 60th ITB had now and was able to fix and destroy numerous regiment’s success. “set the L” on the remaining defenders of Bradleys and M1 tanks. The effect of The second battle proved to be a gradu- Hill 780. concentrated volley fire was stunning. ate-level tactical exercise for the citizen- While the main body provided suppres- The only radio transmission received at soldiers of the 60th Guards ITB (see Fig- sive fires on Hill 780, the FSE maneu- the 60th Guards ITB command post dur- ure 2). This time the regiment conducted vered and secured the hill. The 60th ITB ing this engagement was “Send more a penetration attack. Attacking with three then assumed a hasty defense on Hill 780 ammunition!” Next, the 60th ITB (-) battalions abreast, the 125th GTR again and along an IV line located near the east swung into action as the 125th GTR’s attempted to overload the BLUEFOR’s mouth of Hidden Valley. The Wildhorse second echelon, and was given a unique formidable intelligence assets. The 60th had accomplished its mission! Several deception mission. Because of the excep- ITB used speed and obscuration to move M1 tanks and Bradleys located on Hill tional ability of the 4th ID to see the bat- along the regiment’s southern flank. The 760 attempted to retake Hill 780, but their tlefield with their UAV, digitized equip- CRPs employed smoke and stealth, and counterattack failed. ARMOR — January-February 1999 39

125 GTR

60 ITB

Fig. 2. MRR Penetration (60th Guards ITB as Enveloping Detachment)

The squadron morale was high after par- ment. Troopers at all echelons discussed The citizens and soldiers of this great ticipating in these two battles. In a testi- lessons learned. Performance was exam- nation should be proud of our Army’s mony to the determination and persever- ined at the individual, collective, and progress since the Spanish-American ance of Krasnovia’s unsung heroes; the leader levels. They also updated troop War in 1898. Despite the challenges and truck drivers, medics, cooks, supply per- and squadron METLs. setbacks of this last century, our Army of sonnel, and mechanics had worked at an 1998 is committed to “one team, one amazing pace to ensure that all combat The squadron’s hard work had indeed fight, one future.” As we study the les- power crossed the line of departure for improved the lethality of its tank crews, sons of history, more effective AC/RC every battle. COL John D. Rosenberger, the survivability of its reconnaissance relationships are beginning to emerge. 58th Colonel of the Regiment, told the assets, and the synchronization of its The Blackhorse and its round-outs serve troopers of the 1/221st Cavalry: “I’m combat power. However, additional items as an excellent example of highly effec- proud to serve with you and count you as were identified that needed to be im- tive AC/RC relations. Their mutual trust members of this great fighting regiment, proved at the squadron level, including and support continues to be strengthened a team of teams. You should be proud of timeliness of information, both to subor- through almost daily interaction. Using yourselves. You came ready to fight; you dinates and higher headquarters, speed of standardized training strategies like the accomplished your missions with distinc- the approach march, use of indirect fires, “8-step model,” they are achieving new tion; you took good care of each other. and crosstalk among attacking elements. levels of training readiness. The Black- You upheld the heritage and traditional horse provides training support to its performance of the Blackhorse Regiment. Step Eight. While the experiences of round-outs, and in turn, receives addi- There are no finer compliments, and you NTC Rotation 98-10 are still fresh in the tional combat power to train visiting earned them all. Allons!” Wildhorse Squadron’s memory, future BLUEFOR units. As a model of the syn- plans are already being formulated. The ergy that our Army can achieve, the 11th Step Seven. The euphoria of the battles focus is now on positioning the squadron ACR, the 1/221st Cavalry, and the NTC soon faded as the squadron began to con- so that it can retrain to meet the standard, are committed to remaining full partners duct AARs. Under the critical eyes of the to win by even more decisive margins, in in providing world-class training to regimental S3 shop, the Wildhorse par- preparation for NTC Rotation 99-08 next America’s Army as we enter the 21st ticipated in brutally honest self-assess- June. century. Allons! Let’s Go! 40 ARMOR — January-February 1999

Notes

1Schwarz, Fredric D., American Heritage, July- August 1998, The Time Machine “The Out-of- Date Army,” p. 102. 2Lawson, Don, The United States in the Span- ish-American War, Abelard-Schuman, New York, 1976, p. 13. 3Regan, Geoffrey, Great Military Disasters, A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence, M. Evans & Company, Inc., New York, 1987, p. 221 4Cosmas, Graham A., America’s First Battles, 1776-1965, San Juan and El Caney 1-2 July 1898, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence Kan., 1986, p.147 5The “8-step training model” is a synthesis of key steps contained in FM 25-101, Battle Fo- cused Training, and TC 25-10, Lane Training. BG (P) Cash brought this training method to the Under its VISMOD skin, this BMP is a converted M113. NTC from his assignment at the CMTC in Europe. Admittedly, it is simply “a way” to man- age and conduct training, however, it is an effec- tive and successful technique. 611th Armored Cavalry Regiment TACSOP, 20 January 1995, Annex Q (Crew Validation).

LTC Aaron Kenneston commands the Nevada Army National Guard’s 1st Squadron, 221st Cavalry. He has previously served as a brigade assis- tant S3, battalion XO, cavalry troop commander, and tank platoon leader. He holds a masters degree from Cali- fornia State University, Dominguez Hills. He is a graduate of both the Army and Air Force CGSC, and the Army War College Defense Strategy Course. A HMMWV, with a few additions, becomes a Krasnovian BRDM wheeled APC.

At left, a crew rests and refits after the battle. Above, the XO briefs the command group.

ARMOR — January-February 1999 41

The Digital Reference by Colonel Karl Gunzelman and Captain Sean Pritchard, Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab

The year is 2015. You are the battle cap- tain in charge of current operations — a key member of the redesigned task force staff. The battalion commander’s face suddenly appears on your teleconference screen. He sends satellite imagery of the enemy positions to your whiteboard ter- minal along with instructions to prepare an electronic OPORD in an hour. The screen goes black. Around you, the crew of your Staff Operations Vehicle has already begun to assemble data. The Friendly Ops officer has logged on to the TOTAL RECALL site and has begun providing information to the intelligent search agent. Within seconds you will have files from the Center for Army Les- sons Learned showing what other units have done in similar situations, the results of their actions, and the lessons they learned. This information will prove criti- cal in your effort to prepare an OPORD so rapidly. But is this scenario nothing but science fiction? Last June, the Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab (MMBL) conducted Battle Command Reen- Figure 1. BCR on-line manual start page. gineering II (BCR 2) and examined just such a scenario. BCR is an on-going ex- ual — a precursor to TOTAL REI-CALL step in the MMBL and CALL coopera- perimental program examining advanced (Retrieve Information [REI] from Center tive effort to develop for the Army After digitization’s effects on battle command for Army Lessons Learned [CALL]) the Next (AAN) an on-line information re- at brigade and below. Among other sub- interactive system described in the above trieval tool to aid in situation analysis and jects, MMBL examined an on-line man- scenario. The on-line manual is another decision-making during training and op- erations. The on-line manual used in BCR 2 combines text and graphics into an intui- tive web-based user interface to provide soldiers quick reference to information. Because the manual was written in hyper- text markup language (HTML), it be- haves similarly to a web page and is viewed in a web browser. The manual combines three separate sections: a hard- ware/software user’s guide, an OPFOR order of battle, and an OPFOR vehi- cle/equipment reference. The site is or- ganized using HTML frames. The top frame provides top level navigation be- tween the three sections. The left frame shows the table of contents for the cur- rently selected section. This table is pro- vided in a combination of text and graph- ics to help the user quickly locate a sub- ject. The largest frame provides the se- lected content. This layout allows the user to immediately move to another section or any location with just a click of the mouse. 42 ARMOR — January-February 1999 Future improvements to the manual in­ as tactical and gunnery field manuals DRIVER'S SEAT clude linking the manual's subject matter (FMs) and technical manuals (TMs) may (Continued from Page 8) to real-world examples that illustrate become reality in the Army After Next. techniques and lessons learned, and to Virtual FM is an MMBUDirectorate of related material in the CALL database. Training and Doctrine Development For example, we can show how to maxi­ combined initiative to convert text-based tasks have been added to the course, en­ mize the BCR custom hardware and field manuals to on-line 3D visualization. suring that all graduates are introduced to software's utility in planning and con­ Another tool is the Digital Technical the Future Battle Command Brigade and ducting operations. Links can also pro­ Manual, which could be combined with Below (FBCB2) hardware and software. vide a user with AAR-style replay of on-board vehicle sensors to automatically Extensive training takes place in the previous BCR missions so that the user detect and diagnose mechanical faults. SIMNET facility, challenging every as­ can examine the effects of different tac­ After detecting a fault, the digital TM pect of leading, training, fighting, and tics, techniques, and procedures in rela­ could direct operators and mechanics to maintaining the platoon. A significant tion to the future vehicles and technolo­ the relevant section of the database, pro­ period each evening is now spent on the gies provided in BCR. A user interested viding procedures and parts information terrain board and with the manuals in in planning an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle needed to correct the fault. As digital order to prepare for the next day's train­ (UAV) reconnaissance route could select references mature, they may be integrated ing. Let no sergeant arrive expecting a from a list of clips showing previous into one database combining TOTAL "gentleman's" course; all must worl<: UAV recon missions. A user interested in REI-CALL, Digital FMs, and Digital hard to master all requirements for properly placing Unmanned Ground Ve­ TMs. This database could be tailored to graduation. Those NCOs with rusty study hicles (UGV) on a screen line to• .ensure the user's needs at each level, vehicle, habits, or not possessing the required sensor coverage in depth could select platoon, company, etc. The result would educational levels in math, reading, and from a list of clips showing scout platoon be a wealth of information available im­ comprehension, must visit their local screen line missions. Finally, a user faced mediately which would help the soldier educational centers - far enough in ad­ with planning a complex deliberate and leader maximize performance. vance - and have their educational abilities assessed. Those who score low breach could search the CALL database TOTAL REI-CALL involves a series of for similar missions. The use and contin­ in the diagnostic exams need to take re­ requirements and emerging technologies ued development of the on-line manual fresher courses in order to posture them­ to meet those requirements. Data must be will provide insights to guide the devel­ selves for success in NCOES. collected and indexed in CALL's data­ opment of TOTAL REI-CALL. base. Intelligent search agents and virtual The requirement to take the APFT upon The goal of the TOTAL REI-CALL modeling software must be designed. arrival is - and will remain - in effect. program is to provide commanders and And the information must be on line and If and when the Army changes its policy staff an on-line tactical information re­ readily accessible. Several technologies on the APFT as an entrance requirement trieval tool. The software will include an will support TOTAL REI-CALL. The in NCOES courses, there will still be a intelligent search agent, which prompts Training Feedback Module-Training requirement to pass the test for gradua­ the user for all relevant information about Center Version (TFM-TC), a Windows­ tion. Come prepared to pass the test, and the tactical scenario and then searches the based/user-friendly software package, save yourself a lot of trouble. database. The search agent will have the was recently implemented at the National No more ''welcome packets" are being ability to identify parallels between the Training Center. The TFM-TC captures mailed to any students. AARs showed current tactical scenario and the scenarios mission conditions and relates them to that less than 50% of the NCOs received of missions stored in the database. The task performanceltask standards. It also the correspondence. Instead, prospective search agent will provide the user with provides information on how units have students can access updated information relevant missions and lessons leamed. dealt with previously encountered situa­ through the NCO Academy's Home Additional software will allow the user to tions. The TFM-TC further provides an Page. What subjects will be taught, what adapt the information and lessons from automated means of executive summary to prepare for, what to bring, what are the past missions into the current situation report production, AAR preparation! standards, and who are the points of con­ allowing virtual wargaming and rapid presentation, and take-home package tact are all on the home page. course of action development and analy­ production. Once data has been captured, sis. The result will be that lessons leamed the MMBL will experiment to develop http://www.knox.anny.miVschooVncoalncoa.htm from past experience can be injected into optimal methods for presenting the data or the planning cycle, thus improving plan­ to the user. As these technologies mature ning efficiency and effectiveness. and are put into use, TOTAL REI-CALL http://147.238.100.101/schooVncoa/ncoa.htm will move towards implementation and, TOTAL REI-CALL is one of a number the futuristic scenarios examined in BCR The NCO Academy home page can also of digital on-line tools being examined by may become more reality than science be accessed through the U.S. Army home the Armor Center. Digital references such fiction. page, the USASMA home page, as well as the Fort Knox and Armor Center home page. Sergeants, access the course require­ For more information on Battle Command Reengineering or ments and prepare yourselves both men­ other ongoing experimentation at the MMBL,vlsit their web tally and physically, for weeks of chal­ lenging classroom, simulation, and hands­ site at: on training. Come ready to be challenged http://knox.;www.army.millmbbl and to excel. SERGEANT, TAKE THE LEAD

ARMOR - January-February 1999 43

BEAMHIT: This Marksmanship Training System Uses Lasers and Can Go Anywhere by Captain Eric G. Dulin

The BEAMHIT 330A and 110 Marks- armory, this can be a difficult manship Training Systems are indoor, problem for a beginning laser-activated target engagement sys- shooter to overcome, and tems that can accurately engage targets, does not assist in teaching using actual weapons, without the use of the proper basic marksman- live ammunition. These devices can be ship fundamentals. The used for both basic and advanced marks- photo at right illustrates manship instruction. The major comp o- pneumatic replicas of M4 nents of the systems include a laser carbines and M16A2 rifles transmitter, a laser transmitter rod, and a that BEAMHIT designed for target sensor. The laser transmitter is use in basic rifle marksman- adaptable to multiple weapons systems ship training. Both pneu- by the use of different laser transmitter matic rifles automatically fire rods. One end of the rod screws into the every time the trigger is laser, and the other end of the rod fits into pulled, and do not have to be the barrel of the weapon. Vibrations from SGT Frank Megow, an instructor at C 3-81 AR, en- recharged. Soldiers who train the weapon’s firing mechanism trigger gages a 330A target using a pneumatic M4 carbine. on the M9 using the BEAM- the laser when the weapon is dry fired. Below, a station of the BEAMHIT 110 M9 minirange. HIT system fire single action The systems require no ammunition of Targets are called off in a timed sequence providing with no adverse impact on any kind. 9mm rods are standard with challenging and realistic training. training, however, BEAM- both BEAMHIT systems and both the HIT has developed a pneu- M16A2 and M4 carbines can be used with an optional laser transmitter rod.

The differences between the two types of BEAMHIT systems are the size of the target, the feedback provided by the tar- get, and the components required for more detailed feedback. The 330A sys- tem consists of a ten-inch, circular bull’s- eye laser target with power supply, a laser transmitter, a 9mm-transmitter rod, a computer program, and electrical cables to connect the target to a 286 or higher computer. Once connected to the com- puter, the target’s eye face is displayed on the monitor. When a soldier fires at the target, the laser beam emitted from the soldier’s weapon strikes the face of the target, causing the target to emit a beep. The target instantaneously transmits the location of the laser strike to the com- puter, and displays it on the monitor. above illustrates the use of four BEA M- matic device to cock the M9 after Subsequent laser beam strike locations HIT 110 targets on the M9 mini-range. firing, and provide a simulated recoil. appear on the monitor, and the distance between each laser hit, (the shot group Both systems are compatible with C Company, 3-81AR, the basic rifle dispersion) is measured. M4, M16A2, and 9mm weapons. marksmanship company for the 1st Ar- When actual M4 carbines and mored Training Brigade, Fort Knox, The 110 system is a smaller eight-inch M16A2 rifles are used with these Kentucky, uses the 330A system to train target that consists of a circular bull’s-eye 19K and 19D One Station Unit Training systems, they must be recharged, by (OSUT) soldiers, and basic training target with power supply, and a laser pulling back on the charging handle transmitter with a 9mm-transmitter rod. after each shot. The recharging action (BCT) soldiers, on the fundamentals of This target system provides hit or miss marksmanship. 19K OSUT soldiers re- after each shot requires the soldier to ceive training using the M4 carbine feedback to the shooter. When the laser break the cheek to stock weld. Al- hits the target, the target emits a beep, and though this is not a problem for an pneumatic rifle, while the 19D OSUT displays the number of hits obtained on and BCT soldiers receive training using experienced shooter, such as a Na- the M16A2 pneumatic rifle. The BEA M- the right side of the target. The photo tional Guard soldier practicing at the 44 ARMOR — January-February 1999

the M4 carbine. This sys- gagement. Forty BEAMHIT 110 systems tem provides maximum have been linked together to create a benefit to the 19K soldier miniature, indoor 9mm pistol range. The because the Weaponeer targets are arrayed in ten four-target sta- shooting system that Ft. tions run as a complete firing order. Ten Knox uses for 19D OSUT soldiers simu ltaneously engage the four and BCT marksmanship targets at ranges of eight to ten meters as instruction is not compati- the target numbers are called off. The size ble with the M4 carbine. of the targets, the minimal amount of time between engagements, and several SFC David Parker, SSG The pneumatic weapon replicas. From top to bottom, left to simultaneous engagements, create chal- Michael Love, and SSG right, an M4 carbine, a laser transmitter and rod for the M4 / lenging, realistic training. M16A2, a pneumatic M4, an M9, a laser transmitter and rod Uwe Thon, instructors at C for an M9, a pneumatic attachment for a .45 cal pistol (now 3-81 AR, developed a The task, conditions, and standards for BEAMHIT 330A and 110 available for an M9), an M16A2, a laser transmitter and rod the BEAMHIT 110 system are: for the M4 / M16A2, and a pneumatic M16A2. training system that pro- vided enormous benefit for TASK: Engage BEAMHIT 110 targets at 19K 9mm instruction and eight meters using the M9 9mm pistol and HIT 330A system has been integrated into the was incorporated into the POI. The 330A laser transmitter. program of instruction (POI) for all three system is used to develop basic shooting : Day, from a standing posi- groups of soldiers for use during the first day skills by measuring the shot group disper- CONDITIONS of fundamentals training. Soldiers fire a three- sion of a 12-round shot group fired at the tion, at a given distance, using an M9 9mm shot group at a 25 meter zero target placed pistol with laser transmitter device, firing 330A target at a distance of 15 meters. A single action, while wearing LBE and Kevlar. over the 330A target 15 meters away, from soldier engages the target from the stand- both the foxhole supported and prone unsup- ing crouched position using the two- STANDARDS: The soldier must obtain ported firing position. Each soldier must handed grip. The soldier is monitored by eight registered target hits out of a possible achieve a three-round shot group with a shot a drill sergeant or marksmanship instruc- twelve targets, with a minimum of two hits on group dispersion of less then 40 millimeters, tor again for obvious shooting errors, each target to receive a GO. or four centimeters. The four-centimeter circle such as improper breathing or is the building block for follow-on 25-meter trigger jerk. Once the soldier shot grouping and zeroing training. The task, fires all 12 rounds, the soldier conditions and standards for the BEA MHIT and the coach observe the 330A are: computer screen and critique his performance by using the TASK: Demonstrate consistent aiming during the BEAMHIT exercise. round strikes displayed on the screen. CONDITIONS: Given an M16A2 rifle or M4 carbine, computer target, BEAM- The task, conditions, and HIT laser, and simulated foxhole, while standards for the BEAMHIT wearing helmet and LBE. 330A are: STANDARDS: Each soldier will fire TASK: Engage a 15-meter two three-round shot groups, one from BEAMHIT target using a M9 the foxhole supported, and one from the 9mm pistol and laser trans- prone unsupported, each three-round mitter with a shot group dis- shot group must fit within a four centime- persion of 120mm or less. ter circle. The BEAMHIT 330A system allows the CONDITIONS: Day, from soldier to observe the strike of each round a standing firing position, and monitor the dispersion. A drill ser- engage targets from a given geant or a marksmanship instructor cri- distance using the M9 9mm tiques the shooter during firing for obvi- pistol with laser transmitter ous fundamental errors. After the soldier device, firing single action, finishes firing, the soldier and the instruc- while wearing helmet and tor examine the computer screen. The LBE. pattern of the rounds on the screen can indicate fundamental shooting errors, STANDARDS: Soldiers such as improper breathing or trigger must obtain 9 out of 12 regis- jerking, as indicated in FM 23-9. The tered hits within 120mm to photo on the next page illustrates the receive a GO. feedback received from firing the The BEAMHIT 110 system BEAMHIT 330A system. SGT Megow engages the BEAMHIT 330A from the prone is used to develop more ad- unsupported position. The tank to his right supplies The 330A system is an integral part of vanced shooting skills such as energy for re-cocking and simulates the weapon’s the 19K OSUT program of instruction for target acquisition and en- “kick.” ARMOR — January-February 1999 45

The BEAMHIT systems were first used for 9mm marksmanship training. An initial study conducted after their imple- mentation into the POI showed an in- crease in the number of soldiers who qualified the first time, an increase in the number of soldiers who qualified expert, and a decrease in the average number of rounds needed to qualify each soldier. The BEAMHIT system was integrated into the 19K and 19D POI as a supple- ment to the target box exercise. The use of the BEAMHIT system provides each soldier an additional opportunity to fire simulated rounds and gain confidence in his shooting ability prior to firing live rounds for the first time. The pneumatic SSG Uwe Thon, one of the three soldiers who developed the M9 POI, engages the weapon, life-sized target, and four centi- BEAMHIT 110 systems during a M9 minirange exercise. meter standard provide a realistic training experience. The BEAMHIT system is a cost- effective training system. Although the primary purpose of the BEAMHIT is basic marksmanship training, both sys- tems are excellent tools for marksman- ship training prior to weapons qualifica- tion, and are frequently used by perma- nent party units on Fort Knox. The BEAMHIT is also useful to National Guard or ROTC units who need to con- duct marksmanship training, but can no longer use indoor ranges. During the TRADOC Commander’s Conference at Fort Knox in 1997, BEAMHIT unveiled the new BEAMHIT 2000, which is a “virtual reality” range. The BEAMHIT 2000 can use a picture to create a realis- tic, working, scaled, indoor reproduction of a weapons range, which operates with such simple tools as a computer, a bed CPT Eric G. Dulin sheet for a projection screen, and the laser was commissioned in transmitters and rods used with the Armor from the Lou- BEAMHIT 330A and 110 systems. The isiana State University device is very impressive, and could be ROTC program in extremely useful for forward-deployed units to conduct basic and advanced 1993. He served in 5- marksmanship training to include “virtual 17 Cavalry, Korea, as qualification.” a scout platoon lead- er, troop executive officer, and support POINTS OF CONTACT platoon leader. He For information contact: was assigned to Ft. Knox where he For BEAMHIT 9MM Training: SFC served as an execu- Ruise/SSG Thon, C 3-81 AR, DSN 464- tive officer for B 2-81 7911 AR, a 19K OSUT For BEAMHIT M16A2/M4 Training: training company, and SSG Stroud, C 3-81 AR, DSN 464-4867 as the commander for For information on BEAMHIT devices: The results of SGT Megow’s three-round shot group. The C 3-81 AR. He is cur- Mr. Steve Rosa, BEAMHIT Corporation, darker circle on the monitor indicates the center of mass of rently a student in the 1-800 BEAMHIT the three-round group. The results are within the 40mm dis- Armor Officer Ad- persal required. vanced Course.

46 ARMOR — January-February 1999

M1A2 NET Team Combines Military and Civilians In a First for the Army by Tom Werth and Specialist Randy Hughes Photo by Major Brian Raftery Tank moves from deprocessing site to unit’s motor pool.

Because of the reduction in military instructors from within that were M1A2 the DID. The CST will allow platoon, manpower within the Army’s Training qualified, and brought in additional company, and battalion exercises without and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the GDLS personnel from the M1A2 Saudi actually using the tank, saving OP- command had to withdraw its support of tank program, who were re-qualified on TEMPO costs and reducing training time. the Army Materiel Command’s New the U.S. M1A2 tank at Ft. Knox. All of After the classroom phase is complete, Equipment Training (NET) mission. Sol- the new combined NET instructors were students are taken to the motor pool diers previously assigned to NET have relocated to Ft. Hood in August 1996 for where they perform hands-on training. been reassigned to divisional units. In a final certification, and the first integrated It’s here that the students are tested on all “first” for the Army, this function will be NET team started in October 1996 with classroom instructions, including any assumed by private industry, which organizational maintenance training for new training learned in the motor pool. showed interest in conducting contractor the 2/12 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division. Every student must qualify on the Tank new equipment training through presenta- Crew Gunnery Skills Test before going tions made to the Department of the The 44 personnel of the current com- down range on any qualification table. bined NETT consists of 13 senior instruc- Army (DA) staff. tors and a NETT NCOIC from Ft. The course length is a total of 59 days for a battalion. TTI-VIII is also accomplished Due to the reduction in force and a hir- Knox’s 16th Cav, 29 instructors, and one at this time, with NETT assistance run- ing freeze, AMC could no longer support site manager from General Dynamics, adding DA civilians or increasing the plus augmentees from the unit receiving ning ranges, providing direction, and conducting after-action reviews for each military NET TDA strength at the Tank- the training. crew. This ensures the crew uses the automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) to sustain operator, crew, and The training consists of three parts — M1A2 tank to its maximum capacity. classroom, motor pool, and TTI-VIII. In unit maintenance training on the M1A2. the classroom, students are taught the A combined team of military and civil- Direct Support (DS) and General Support ian instructors train the hull (63E) and (GS) training for the M1A2 NET and difference between all the components on turret (45E) mechanics for three weeks. the M1A1 and the M1A2, with the help NET management continues to be ac- of Crew Station Trainers or CSTs. NET The students are trained and certified complished at TACOM with DA civil- prior to the unit taking delivery of their ians providing matrix support to the Pro- training starts during tank issue week. new tanks. The instructors then visit each The tanks have been previously deproc- gram Manager (PM). essed, inventoried, and repaired by TA- unit during the gunnery portion of NET to further train and assist mechanics if In order for the PM to meet fielding COM’s Materiel Fielding Team. During they have a vehicle breakdown during goals and continue hands-on training for issue week, each company/troop reports the M1A2 tank system, a new NET team to the fielding site and, with the help of gunnery. (NETT) was formed consisting of 14 an instructor, performs PMCS and inven- The joint military and civilian NETT military instructors and 30 contractors. tories BII. The instructor then drives the completed OP/CREW and UM/NET for Their mission is to provide M1A2 train- tank to the unit’s motor pool. In the week the 1CD in July 1997. Comments from ing for officers, warrant officers, and following issue week, units report for the the field on the combined military and enlisted soldiers in armor, cavalry, and classroom phase of training. contractor NETT were all positive, and support units. soldiers say that this new combined The decision to augment the NETT with The Crew Station Trainer is a valuable, NETT gives them the training they need flexible training tool, which allows a to operate and maintain the M1A2. contractor instructors was made by the large student-to-instructor ratio during Abrams PM in February 1996. The exis t- ing basic order agreement contract was NET. The CST provides a Driver’s Inte- According to the Abrams Tank NET grated Display (DID), Commander’s Manager, the evaluation of the combined used to speed up the contracting process. Integrated Display (CID), Gunner’s Con- NETT is excellent. The structure and A statement of work was completed by the PM, TACOM, and Ft. Knox’s NET trol Display Panel (GCDP) and all the expertis e of both the military and civilian screens and menus required to teach the team members is providing soldiers with personnel. student the M1A2 tank systems. It is also exceptional training and is ensuring that The contract was awarded to General valuable in training the unit mechanic, we have the “best tankers for the best Dynamics in May 1996. GDLS hired who can access valuable fault data from tank in the world.” Each company or ARMOR — January-February 1999 47

FSCS (Continued from Page 17) conditions. This greatly improves accu- ability, and improve deployability. In interface between the various functional racy while firing on the move. HAS can order to reach applicability, there are still modules, computer, and power resources. save over a ton of weight compared to many practical problems that must be conventional torsion bar suspension sys- resolved associated with ballistic and Concluding Remarks tems, which contributes to the paramount structural integrity, non-destructive test- In preparing this article, we have come overall goal reducing weight. Arguably, ing, signature reduction, producibility, to realize that there are many similar at- HAS is not as critical for the FSCS as it is and field reparability. The program is for a much heavier vehicle (FCS?), but it focused on developing a medium-size tributes in the underlying philosophies among the FSCS as we envision it, the will dramatically enhance the FSCS’ ride chassis (17-22 ton) for typical applica- Future Combat System (FCS), and the quality speed, and thus warrants serious tions such as the FSCS. It is expected that consideration. Critical for survivability, as much as a 50% weight savings could Air Ground Defense System (AGDS) that we described in previous articles the HAS equipped FSCS’s reduced sil- be achieved in the future compared to a published in ARMOR. We ask for the houette will give it an important battle- conventional steel structure. Composites field advantage when on silent watch or technology will bring substantial reduc- reader’s forbearance for the repetition of these similarities as outlined here. They during other missions requiring minimum tions in size and weight of the high per- were mentioned only where they helped visual signature. formance FSCS without sacrificing op- erational capabilities. Indisputably, light- in understanding the prevailing concept and the conceptual evolution of the Implementation of Composites in the er vehicles offer many advantages in the FSCS FSCS. Like our Future Combat System form of strategic deployability, tactical To allow rapid deployability and facili- mobility, and sustainability. (FCS) concept, the proposed particular configuration of the FSCS is not as im- tate transportability, weight reduction is portant as the core idea behind its concep- one of the dominant and mandatory pre- requisites imposed on the FSCS. To The FSCS Scenario - A Major Digitized tion. A revolutionary sensing and moni- Battlefield Contributor toring ‘suite,’ greater lethality, reduced achieve meaningful weight savings, the signature, extraordinary survivability, crew must be repositioned in the hull (see Operational requirements dictate that the FMBT/FCS) such that the overall pro- FSCS should operate as a ‘system’ while improved deployability, enhanced com- munications, mobility, endurance, and tected envelope could be dramatically functioning and communicating beyond substantial reduction in logistic reliance reduced. A possible way of complying the conventional, rather narrow, tactical with this requirement is to manufacture level. The FSCS will be an active node are key to FSCS. the hull and possibly the ‘turret’ out of on the battlefield-digitized network. This The FSCS is a very advanced mecha- composites with reinforcement of tita- is a dramatic departure from the conven- nized tactical surveillance and reconnais- nium or other light but strong metallic tional way mechanized tactical surveil- sance scout and cavalry vehicle. With its components to serve as a ‘skeleton’ for lance and reconnaissance scout and cav- extended information-gathering capabili- maintaining structure integrity. In es- alry vehicles have operated since their ties, it pushes the boundaries of technol- sence, the issue is to achieve large-scale inception. The FSCS will assist the local ogy currently available. It is almost an economical production while establishing commander and crews in obtaining real- all-electric platform that uses electricity the level of confidence in the ability of time digitized information on the close- as a dominant energy source. Electricity composites to be successfully applied in area battlefield. This information will be is used to power its laser gun, main armor structural applications. To gain used by the local forces, but also will be power train, and all other self-defense additional weight reduction, the tracks conveyed to Greater Area War Manage- suites, sensors, communications, fire and road wheels must be made of com- ment Centers. Vital information on en- control systems and various auxiliaries. It posites, although they may also contain emy targets obtained from the FSCS, will is designed to be highly reliable by virtue metallic components for reinforcement. be prioritized and fed back to tanks, artil- of advanced technologies requiring only Affordable composites technology could lery, infantry, and ground attack aircraft. low-level, and in some cases, virtually no be demonstrated as a cost-effective alter- The FSCS will be an integral part of the maintenance during operation. It will be native approach to manufacturing vehicle closer to the logistician’s ‘dream war components. Applications may include digitized (computerized) battlefield net- machine’ than any other armored vehicle work system and will serve as its “eyes road wheels, suspension components and and ears.” Much has been recently writ- ever produced. The FSCS will influence track shoes, leading to significant weight armored warfare because it will provide reductions and increased durability. ten about the essence of battlefield digiti- essential real-time information. It is quin- zation, so we will not elaborate any fur- Composite materials utilized in the pro- ther here. The FSCS will have a second- tessential in allowing the combatant duction of structural elements are lighter ground component to achieve informa- than steel and can improve a vehicle’s generation vetronics system that will fur- tion dominance on the 21st century bat- ther advance digitized data control and fuel consumption, cross-country speed, distribution, electrical power generation tlefield. operational range, and battlefield endur- ance. and management, computer resources, The FSCS is categorically not a direct and crew control and display processes. offensive weapon system and should not A four-year contract to develop a The vetronics system will accept a variety be envisioned, designed, or deployed as lighter, more transportable comp osite of inputs, while delivering outputs related such. Its primary “weapon” is its sensor armor vehicle was awarded to United to power system control, sensor control, suite. Once detected and identified, it will Defense L.P. in 1994. The program is communications, countermeasures, weap- be a prime target for enemy forces, par- aimed at exploring the use of composite ons control, artificial intelligence, train- ticularly tank hunters and attack helicop- materials in structural applications to ing, maintenance, diagnostics, and prog- ters. The FSCS’ main role, to the extent reduce weight, enhance vehicle surviv- nostics. This architecture will provide the possible, is to perform its surveillance ARMOR — January-February 1999 49

and reconnaissance missions while being all the necessary ingredients to succeed. dling, loading and storage systems. entirely transparent to the enemy. This will dramatically increase its survivability Note: All information contained in this Dr. Asher Sharoni, formerly the Di- and ability to fulfill its critical missions. rector of Engineering with WDH, is Its predominant underlying operational article was derived from open sources and the analysis of the authors. the president of Howden Fluid Sys- philosophy should always remain: ‘The tems. He holds a Sc.D. in Mechanical FSCS’s strength is in its stealth...’ Engineering from MIT and a M.Sc. The FSCS, as capable as it promises to Western Design HOWDEN (WDH) and B.Sc. in Mechanical and Indus- be, must compete for availability of funds is a small defense company in Irvine, trial Engineering from the Technion, for R&D like any other major develop- California, which specializes in the Israel Institute of Technology. He is a ment program. The fully justified re- former colonel in the Israeli Defense quirement to support the existing M1 design, development and production series tank fleet until a new tank becomes of ammunition and material handling Forces, in which he was involved in available, while preserving the industrial systems for the U.S. and International various major armored weapons de- base for armor design and production, military markets. WDH’s track record velopments. Dr. Sharoni has accu- will limit the allocation of funds set aside includes a variety of air, land and mulated more than 30 years of active for the FSCS. The FSCS’s ultimate des- seaborne weapon systems which experience in armor development, tiny, among other major development require automated feed, resupply and design, testing and production. programs, was determined in the recent optimized ammunition packaging. [Editorial Note: A. Sharoni and L. Ba- Army’s Quadrennial Defense Review WDH has been involved among oth- (QDR) that will dictate the Army’s shape con have co-authored the following other for the next 20-30 years. The proposed ers in the Tank Test Bed, AC-130U articles in ARMOR: The U.S. Future FSCS, with its powerful main arma- Gunship, AH-64 Apache and Tank Main Battle Tank (FMBT); Autoloaders ments, alternative unique energy source Compact Autoloader Programs. For Future Tanks; The Common Chassis to operate almost all systems, enhanced Revisited: Should the Next Howitzer Be self-defense capabilities, digitized com- Mr. Lawrence Bacon is the Director Built on the M1 Chassis?; Forward Area munications, computer networking abil- of Graphic Arts at WDH where, for Air-Ground Defense For The Armored ity, precision navigation and advanced the past 19 years, he has been re- Forces-Revisited; and The Future Com- aerial sensors, will be a paramount sponsible for creating numerous con- bat System (FCS).] member of Army XXI and beyond. It has cepts for automatic ammunition han-

Continuous Band Track (Continued from Page 21) · Installation procedures are cumber- future combat systems where band track Carrier,” Wayne Lucas and Kenneth D. Scott, some at best and require lifting one side technology can be engineered into the Yuma Proving Grounds, Yuma, Ariz., May 1997, of the vehicle off the ground (a logistics overall design scheme. Although further 2. problem for replacement in the field).11 evaluation is required, continuous band 7Ibid, 8. track has demonstrated the potential to 8Ibid, 10. Challenges that must be overcome in- meet future standards of increased force clude battlefield repairs (short tracking), 9Ibid, 6. sustainability while maintaining critical ease of installation, sprocket durability, 10 mobility characteristics for both legacy Ibid, 13-15. and heavier GVW applications. Addi- and future lightweight tracked combat 11Ibid, 6. tional testing has been conducted on the M113A3 uploaded to 15 tons with posi- systems. tive results. TACOM is also planning to evaluate band track on a 25-ton Bradley Mr. Paul Hornback is a general Fighting Vehicle during 1999. Soucy is in Notes engineer with the federal govern- the final design stage of a battlefield re- ment. He is presently assigned to pair kit and Alvis Vehicles Ltd. (the 1“Wheeled Versus Track Vehicle Study, Final the HQ TRADOC Combat Devel- CVR(T) manufacturer) is examining air Report,” Studies and Analysis Activity, Head- opment Engineering Division, Fort quarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- bags to lift the CVR(T) thereby enhanc- Knox Field Office, which provides ing installation/battlefield repair. mand, Fort Monroe, Va., March 1985, 1-68. 2Ibid, 1-86. reliability, maintainability, and sys- Conclusion. Continuous band track of- tems engineering support to the Di- 3 fers the potential to reduce platform vi- Ibid, 1-76 and 1-86. rectorate of Force Development, bration, internal and external noise emis- 4Army RD&A, “TACOM Awards DEUCE Fort Knox, Ky. He holds a Bachelor sions, track weight, and platform mainte- Production Contract,” November-December of Science in Mechanical Engineer- nance. These benefits directly translate to 1996. ing and a Master of Science in In- higher reliability and availability, stealth- 5 Soucy Web Page, Military Applications. On- dustrial Engineering, both from the ier platforms, increased payload capacity, line. Available @ http://www.soucy-group.com/ reduced GVW, greater mobility, and web/International/Emilitary.htm. 6 November University of Louisville. His military lower O&S costs. While the current focus 1998. experience stems from a six-year has been on retrofitting existing tracked 6“Summary Test Report of the Experimental tour as a UH-1N helicopter pilot in vehicles, the high payoff may occur on Band Track for the M113 Armored Personnel the U.S. Marine Corps. 50 ARMOR — January-February 1999

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 99-1 WHAT’S YOUR NEXT FORGING STEEL — MOVE?? Exploiting a Brigade’s Success

Situation: Enemy: Task Organization You are “Hammer 6,” the Task Division intelligence reports indicate Force commander of TF 1-40, (BDE there is a key bridge site along the Reserve), with two tank teams river Quasimodo that must be se- Tm A (M1A2) and one mech team. cured. The bridge site is currently un- The brigade just conducted a delib- defended and is the only way across Tm B the river. An enemy MIBN (6 T-80s erate attack against a stationary en- and 15 BMPs) is moving west toward emy mechanized infantry battalion Tm C (MIBN) on Objective Anvil. Objective the bridge with an ETA of 40 minutes. In the south, your scout #3 reports Anvil is located three kilometers to enemy vehicles, 2 T-80 tanks and 5 B En (-) 2 volcanos the west of PL Red. The brigade’s attack was a success. However, it BMPs, moving northeastward. These vehicles are suspected remnants encountered less resistance than from the MIBN defeated on Objective expected and the reserve, TF 1-40, heim. Before scout #1 could pass any was not committed. Anvil and are most likely moving to- further information, radio contact was wards the bridge site in an attempt to lost. The other two task forces of the bri- secure the bridge and defend it until

gade are currently consolidating and the MIBN from the east can reinforce reorganizing along PL Red. Your task them. In the north, scout #1 reported TF Mission: force is postured in Tactical Assem- 2 tanks vicinity grid 040205 and a The brigade commander wants to bly Area Pittsburg 2 km west of PL small dust cloud behind them moving capitalize on the success of his attack Red. southwest out of the town of Dirk- and he wants your TF to exploit that success! The commander issues a FRAGO to your TF. Your mission, Hammer 6, is to attack to secure the bridge site on Objective Steel. DIRKHEIM N

PL REDPL You have priority of FA fires (1 DS Bn with DPICM/HE/Smoke). You PLBLUE (LOA) 21 will also have 2 sorties of A-10s II Quasimodo Dust Trails loaded with Mavericks on station in 20 15 minutes. You must act now! Sct 1 What do you do! MIBN(-) Estimate 40 minutes to bridge 19 Requirement: AA Sct 2 Pittsburg 18 You have ten minutes to assess OBJ STEEL the situation and formulate a 1 40 FRAGO. Issue your FRAGO as if 17 talking on the radio to your com- pany commanders. Submit your solutions to the Bn/Bde Branch by Sct 3 16 e-mail at: BilaferJ@ftknox-dtdd- emh5.army.mil, or mail your solu- 15 tion to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK- II TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

ARMOR — January-February 1999 51 SOLUTIONS — TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-5

“Zone Recon To LOA Steelers” from the September-October 1998 issue of ARMOR

THE PROBLEM - Reported complex obstacle (triple- taches an engineer squad and an extra strand concertina with AT and AP FIST to your company team to assist you Situation: mines) running NE-SW with difficult in your mission, and he orders you to You are “Wolfpack 6,” the commander bypass at SW end vic 059568; dis- position both FIST-Vs in OPs where they of Delta Team, TF 3-37, with two tank mounted enemy activity vic 055591. will be able to observe preparatory fires on the objective. He reminds you that all platoons and a mech platoon. Sunrise is at - Last SITREP at 0445. 0600, sunset at 1800. friendly elements, including scouts, must · B section (VIPER 4 and 6). be at least 2 kilometers from any pre- Enemy: planned targets because the brigade - Reported point obstacle (wire and commander has given him MLRS sup- The 52d MRB has seized Bensonville to mines) with difficult bypass on north our north. It is set up in a deliberate de- side grid 119580. port for the attack. You have priority of fense on the south side of the town in artillery fires until 0600, and you are pri- OBJ GREEN (encompassing OBJ YEL- - Last reported grid 112606. Last mary shooter for AB0001 and AB0002 LOW and OBJ BLUE, which is east of transmission at 0300: “CONTACT prior to the attack. After completing your YELLOW) oriented south. In OBJ YEL- NORTH, OUT!” No further contact. reconnaissance mission and positioning your FIST-Vs in OPs, you will consoli- LOW, we expect an MRC(+). The TF S2 · C section (VIPER 1 and 5). templates that the enemy is established in date your remaining forces at CP 7 and a well-prepared defense out of contact, - Reported two BMPs stationary vic fall in as the trail company team of the TF with three MRPs in a horseshoe forma- 076556 oriented S-SE at 0030; diamond during the attack. You may tion tied into the terrain and a dismounted wire/mine obstacle oriented NE-SW leave FIST-Vs and dismounted OPs north infantry strongpoint on the west side of vic 074587 at 0200. of PL COWBOYS, but you must have the rest of your company team positioned his defensive position. This strongpoint is - VIPER 1 destroyed vic 078588 at templated to have an AT firing line com- 0230; all KIAs. at CP 7 prepared to attack when the TF posed of 2A45Ms and AT-5s. The enemy comes through. VIPER 5 conducted dismounted re- also has an extensive obstacle belt, three - The time is now 1700, and the sun will dismounted reconnaissance teams (DRT), connaissance and reported tracked set in an hour. Your assembly area is 3km and two CSOPs forward in the security vehicle activity vic 100600 at 0300; three T-80s (stationary in a hide posi- south of the LD, and the LD is 10km zone (see map board with original enemy south of PL COWBOYS. The attack is SITEMP and R&S graphics). tion) vic 079609 at 0400. planned to begin with preparatory fires at The most probable and most dangerous - Last reported grid 062608, relayed 0600. You must act now! What do you course of action is for the enemy to cou- through VIPER 2 at 0445. do? rageously hold his defensive positions Without a clearer pic- and die in place. He will attempt to ture of the enemy, the piecemeal friendly units with obstacles TF commander be- and indirect fire and destroy them in his lieves that tomo rrow’s kill sack as they move through the restric- attack will be unsuc- tive NTC-like terrain north toward Ben- cessful. He wants you sonville. to assume the mission Friendly: of the scout platoon. At 1630, just as your 1SG TF Mission: As the main effort of the arrives at your assem- brigade’s attack on OBJ GREEN, TF 3- bly area with the LOG- 37 attacks 310600AUG98 to seize OBJ PAC, the TF com- YELLOW, vic 085595, to facilitate pas- mander issues a sage of follow-on forces that will gain FRAGO directing you control of Bensonville vic 130700. to conduct a force- Last night the TF scout platoon, which oriented zone recon- had only six operational HMMWVs, naissance to LOA infiltrated through the zone to attempt to STEELERS to confirm reconnoiter enemy positions and obsta- or deny the S2’s tem- cles. As of first light this morning, the TF plate. He wants you to TOC has lost communications with the reconnoiter all NAIs; to scouts. Before the TOC lost communica- identify the composi- tions with the scouts (VIPERS), it had tion, disposition, and received the following information: array of enemy forces in OBJ YELLOW and · A section (VIPER 2 and 3). the obstacles in the - One vehicle requires recovery vic security zone; and to 044580; the other vehicle is FMC destroy CSOPs and any and a patrol is conducting dis- other reconnaissance mounted reconnaissance vic 045594. assets in zone. He at-

52 ARMOR — January-February 1999

THE SOLUTIONS

Author’s Solution 112606 without reporting any contact; MRP and obstacle in those NAIs. Do not this tends to deny the presence of the become decisively engaged with the en- templated CSOP in NAI C112 and an emy’s main defense and consolidate at (NOTE: This solution is in the form of a obstacle and MRP in NAIs C107 and CP 7 NLT 0600. FRAGO from WOLFPACK 6, the com- C106 respectively. Based on this infor- Concept of the operation: mander of Delta Team, TF 3-37. The mation, I think he is probably weaker in team comprises two tank platoons and a the east than in the west. We will move quickly in a company mech platoon.) wedge, assuming risk to PL COWBOYS. Friendly: We must make contact with VIPER Before contact was lost, scout locations ASAP and use him to assist us through- SITUATION were reported as follows: out the mission. We will set vic PL COWBOYS, BLUE will move quickly General: · A section (VIPER 2 and 3): one ve- hicle needs recovery vic 044580; and begin to locate and destroy the DRT Last night, the TF scout platoon (VI- the other vehicle is FMC and is col- teams in zone. RED will move forward PERS), with six operational HMMWVs, located with the bent vehicle; patrol and destroy the CSOP in NAI C109. infiltrated through the zone to conduct is conducting dismounted recon- WHITE will move up and clear NAI reconnaissance of enemy positions and naissance vic NAI C103 (grid C112. With the CSOP and DRTs de- obstacles. As of first light, the TF TOC 045594). stroyed, the enemy will not have eyes on has lost communications with the scouts. our reconnaissance efforts tonight or our The attack is planned for tomorrow · B section (VIPER 4 and 6): last re- attack tomorrow. Then we will continue morning at 0600. Without confirmation ported at grid 112606; assumed to our reconnaissance and set FIST-Vs in of his IPB, the TF commander has seri- be zapped. OPs to observe AB0001 and AB0002. ous reservations about the enemy situa- · C section (VIPER 1 and 5): VIPER On order the engineers will breach the tion and scheme of maneuver for tomo r- 1 zapped vic 078588 at 0230 (all obstacle vic CP 8. NLT 0600, we will row’s attack. To ensure the operation’s KIAs); VIPER 5 is conducting dis- consolidate at CP 7 and conduct rearm success, he has directed us to complete mounted reconnaissance, last re- and refuel operations. Then we will fall in the mission of the scout platoon. ported grid 062608 at 0445 (relayed as the trail element of the TF diamond by VIPER 2). when the TF passes our location at 0700 on the attack to seize OBJ YELLOW Enemy: Additional graphic control measures: tomorrow morning. Intel update follows. Before contact was Maneuver: lost, the TF scouts reported the following Add the following graphic control enemy situation: measures: BLUE: You are initially the main effort. Lead company wedge to PL COW- · Complex obstacle (triple-strand · Platoon boundary along N-S grid line 09. BOYS. Move quickly to CP 7, dismount, concertina with AT and AP mines) and conduct a hasty DRT sweep to clear running NE-SW with difficult by- · PL OILERS along E-W grid line NAI C110. Once this is complete, re- pass at SW end vic 059568. 53. mount, and send one section and a FIST- · Dismounted enemy activity vic · CP 8 at 121572. V to NAI C113 and send one section to 055591 at 0445. NAI C111. You must move quickly to take out the enemy’s eyes. RED and · Point obstacle (wire and mines) with MISSION WHITE will overwatch your mounted difficult bypass on north side vic movement. Dismount your squads 1km 119580. south of each NAI and clear NAI C113 · Two stationary BMPs oriented S-SE Wolfpack conducts a zone reconnais- and C111. Use your dismounts to guide vic 076556 at 0030. sance NLT 301730AUG98 to LOA the FIST-V into a position vic 054555 STEELERS to destroy enemy reconnais- oriented on NAI 109 to call fires on the · Wire/mine obstacle oriented NE- sance forces, confirm or deny the pres- CSOP. Once DRT sweeps are complete, SW vic 074587 at 0200. ence of other enemy forces and obstacles establish a dismounted OP (OP1) vic · Tracked vehicle activity vic 100600 in zone, and establish OPs to observe 053563 to observe NAIs C103 and C104 at 0300. enemy defensive positions. Consolidate and a dismounted OP (OP2) vic 122552 at CP 7 NLT 0600. to observe NAIs C107 and C108. Use · Three T-80s stationary in hide posi- your vehicles to overwatch your dis- tion vic 079609 at 0400. Intent: mounts as much as possible. Your vehi- An obstacle in the west, although not Our main reconnaissance effort will be cles are the company reserve. Keep them templated, has been confirmed by the in the east, because I believe that is where at REDCON 1 and be prepared to react scouts. The enemy’s countermobility the enemy is weakest. I want to destroy quickly to FRAGOs from me. Leaving capabilities are not unlimited. If, as the DRTs and confirmed CSOP, observe your OPs in place, start your move back scouts report, there is a large complex NAIs C103, C104, C105, C108 to con- to CP 7 NLT 0500. Consolidate at CP 7 obstacle in the west, the enemy must be firm or deny templated enemy MRPs and NLT 0600. weak somewhere else. Additionally, VI- obstacles. I want to clear NAIs C106 and THUNDER 14: Move with BLUE. Set PER’s B section was able to maneuver to C107 to confirm or deny a templated vic 054555 oriented on NAI C109. On

ARMOR — January-February 1999 53

order, adjust fires on the CSOP in C109. WOLFPACK 5: Move with RED and complete your IPB, inform the TF com- After destroying the CSOP, move to a supervise the effort in the west. Call the mander that you believe that the enemy is position vic 046567 to serve as primary TF main and get retrans for our net. weakest in the east and recommend that shooter for AB0001 and AB0002. he begins developing a COA to attack in WOLFPACK 9: Request that the TF the east, to be executed pending the re- RED: Move on the left of the company immediately attach to us an additional sults of your reconnaissance. The recon- wedge. Set COWBOYS. Follow and engineer squad, two additional medic naissance information you gather and overwatch BLUE’s move to NAI C113. PCs, a fueler, and an ammo truck for this your recommended COA should provide Set vic PL OILERS. Once the FIST is set mission. They must move with us when him with sufficient information to make in a position to observe fires on NAI we leave this location. Follow the com- his final decision. C109, move forward and destroy reported pany team’s move and set the trains at CP CSOP at NAI C109. Make contact with 7. Conduct CSS operations from there. Sacrifice security for speed and assume VIPER 2 on his net, and send a section to Conduct rearm and refuel operations at risk in your movement to PL COW- recover his vehicle. Have him guide you CP 7 NLT 0600. BOYS. Make contact with VIPER ASAP in, if necessary. If recovery is not possi- and use them to help you. If any scouts WOLFPACK MG: You are the com- are still alive, you should be in communi- ble, ensure that all friendly elements, pany team relay and battle captain. Move including VIPER 5 (last reported to be cations range with them by the time you near AB0002), are at least 2 km from in my HMMWV with the trains. Ensure reach PL COWBOYS. If any scouts are that you maintain communications with alive, they have presumably been con- targets. Send your other section with the me and with the TF main. Keep accurate XO to set PL RAIDERS and observe the ducting continuous reconnaissance and obstacle reported by VIPER vic 074587. track of the battle and move to high surveillance since they lost communica- ground as necessary. Determine if there is a bypass on the NE tions with the TF main. They should have end. If there is no bypass, determine the I will move with WHITE. I need clarifi- at least some new information that will point of penetration. Move as stealthily as cation on the enemy situation in the east. help you. It is implied in your mission possible, and do not become decisively Keep me informed. What are your ques- that you assume operational control of the engaged. Start your move back to CP 7 tions? scouts. Issue them a FRAGO to conduct NLT 0500. Consolidate your platoon at detailed area reconnaissance of any un-

CP 7 NLT 0600. confirmed NAIs in OBJ YELLOW and RATIONALE help you confirm your IPB. Ensure all scouts are at least 2km from preplanned WHITE: Move on the right of the company wedge. Set PL COWBOYS. The three keys to the success of this targets and abandon disabled vehicles if Follow and overwatch BLUE’s move to mission are: necessary. Extract wounded scouts as NAI C111. Set vic PL OILERS. Once necessary. BLUE reports NAI C111 clear, you be- 1. Recognize that you can’t do every- thing. You must clarify the TF Clear DRTs to prevent them from ob- come the main effort. Move forward and serving your every move. Only dis- clear NAI C112. Send one section and commander’s PIR. Time is of the es- sence, and your resources are lim- mounts will be able to clear the DRTs. SAPPER 2 (engineer squad) to reconnoi- Your mechanized infantry platoon is your ter the point obstacle vic CP 8. Do not ited. Seek guidance from higher and focus your reconnaissance efforts. primary means of dismounted reconnais- risk being compromised. Assess the traf- sance. Use it to conduct DRT sweeps to ficability of that avenue of approach for 2. Fight the enemy, not the plan. You quickly take out the enemy’s eyes. If the attack. Bypass the obstacle and clear must quickly conduct a thorough DRTs are not cleared, they will call fires NAIs C107 and C106. Attempt to make IPB. Use reports from the scouts to to impede and harass your reconnaissance contact with VIPER’s B section and find update your sitemp. Plan off of your efforts throughout the night. Once it out what happened to that element. updated sitemp, not the original from completes its DRT sweeps, BLUE sets in Evacuate WIAs if necessary. Return to the S2. Continue to update your run- two short-term OPs (VISITS) to observe CP 8. On order breach the obstacle. Be ning estimate of the enemy situation NAIs, provide redundancy for preplanned prepared to leave that tank section and throughout the night and think from targets, and provide “reconnaissance engineer vehicle on site to secure the area the enemy’s perspective. Recom- pull” for the TF during tomorrow’s at- and keep that lane open. Have your other mend a COA to the commander tack. Use BLUE’s vehicles to act as the section set RAIDERS and observe NAIs based on the information you gather. company team reserve or quick reaction C108 and C105 to confirm or deny pres- 3. Use all assets available. Continue to force. FRAGO them as necessary. Use ence of obstacles and vehicles. Position BLUEs dismounts to guide in and set one THUNDER 24 (FIST) in an OP vic use available scouts to conduct re- connaissance and provide you with of the FIST-Vs in a position to overwatch 090573 to be the alternate shooter for NAI C109 and adjust fires on the CSOP AB0001 and AB0002. Start your move information on the enemy in OBJ YELLOW. Evacuate wounded and other targets of opportunity to facili- back to CP 7 NLT 0500. Consolidate tate your reconnaissance. BLUE must your platoon at CP 7 NLT 0600. scouts as necessary. Share informa- tion with reconnaissance assets from move quickly because you must clear DRTs before moving any other elements SAPPER 2: Move with WHITE. On your adjacent units, brigade recon- naissance assets, etc. north of PL OILERS. Otherwise you risk order, breach the obstacle vic CP 8. Be compromising your entire unit. prepared to remain on site, secure the After LOGPAC activities are com- area, and direct traffic through the lane. pleted, start your movement ASAP. Re- Destroy the CSOP confirmed by the quest clearer focus from the TF com- scouts in NAI C109 with a tank platoon THUNDER 24: Move with WHITE. mander. You must request additional and indirect fire called by the FIST-V Set vic 090573 and orient on NAI C103 assets (engineer, medics, fueler, and emplaced by BLUE. Clear C112 to en- and C104. You will be the alternate ammo truck) in order to accomplish your sure that there is not a CSOP there. This shooter for AB0001 and AB0002. mission and sustain your team. Once you will leave the enemy completely blind

54 ARMOR — January-February 1999

and allow you to continue your zone re- Reader’s Solution the east to go into the MRP kill sack. The connaissance toward OBJ Yellow. CSOP in 109 is intended to give early warning and to attrit us. You must get eyes on the obstacle in the (Submitted by CPT Ray M. Ceralde, In the eastern AA, the scouts haven’t western corridor. This is where the TF Korea) commander currently plans to attack. If seen anything in 112 so we can assume you cannot convince him to attack in the that the two BMPs in 109 are the CSOP east, he will attack in the west as planned TASK ORGANIZATION: for the MRC defense. The scouts proba- and expect you to provide him with the bly haven’t cleared 108, where there is a grid to the point of penetration where the RED – 1st Platoon (Tank) templated obstacle, but their report of tracked vehicle activity vicinity of 105 obstacle is weakest. WHITE – 2d Platoon (Tank) indicates that there is an MRP defending Physically clear NAIs C106 and C107. BLUE – 3d Platoon (Mech) this AA. I’m pretty sure that 108 is the location of this MRP’s kill sack. Since If you can deny the presence of an MRP FRAGO: Delivered face to face with and obstacle there, you may convince the 1s, 4s, and attachments while CO/TM the MRC has put a great deal of effort TF commander to attack there. With into the turning obstacle in the west, I do conducts LOGPAC activities, and brief- not think that there is an extensive obsta- some further reduction by the engineers, ing off a 1:50,000 map and a dry erase the bypass on the north side of the point board. cle here. obstacle may be a viable avenue of ap- Situation. Scouts conducted zone re- The gap in the far east is blocked by a proach for the attack tomorrow. Use of point obstacle. The scouts found a diffi- this avenue, if successful, would also connaissance up to PL STEELERS last cult bypass around it but I’m sure that serve to isolate OBJ YELLOW and pre- night. The task force has lost commo with them. However, these are the reports somebody is overwatching this obstacle. vent the enemy from repositioning forces It may be an MRP (-) or a single vehicle from OBJ BLUE (east of OBJ YEL- they sent back before we lost contact. and they may have let the scouts through LOW) into OBJ YELLOW. The scouts reported the following en- to prevent their detection and/or deceive emy activities: us that this obstacle is not covered. This Reconnoiter the obstacle at CP 8. Be- MRP(-) may be defending this obstacle ware of enemy overwatching the obsta- - Two BMPs, stationary, oriented SSE at 076556, NAI C109. vicinity the 1257 grid square oriented cle. The enemy should have eyes on the west or defending in 106. obstacle. Be careful and do not risk com- Three T-80s, stationary, in a hide po- - The scouts haven’t found any DRT promising your forces and your plan. If sition vicinity 079609, NAI C104. possible, bypass the obstacle initially and teams, especially in NAIs 110, 111, and clear C106 and C107. If the NAIs are - Tracked vehicle activity vicinity 113. I still think that there is one DRT clear, prepare to breach the obstacle at CP 100600, NAI C105. team out there, however. 8. Do not breach too early, because you - Enemy dismount activity vicinity As far as the friendly situation goes, Vi- may compromise your intentions and 055591, templated strongpoint, NAI per 1 has been zapped and Vipers 4 and 6 allow him time to replace the obstacle. C103. made direct fire contact, and we haven’t heard from them since. As of the last The scouts confirmed tracked vehicle The scouts reported the following obsta- report, four scout vehicles are still alive cles: noises at NAI C105, but they neither with one requiring recovery at 044580. confirmed nor denied the presence of the - Wire and mine obstacle consisting of All of the scout vehicles are north of PL templated obstacle in NAI C108. Use a triple-strand concertina, AT and AP RAIDERS. tank section from WHITE and your vehi- mines. Oriented SW to NE starting Our attachments are an extra FIST-V cle to conduct mounted reconnaissance from a difficult bypass at 059568 go- along the eastern mobility corridor. Use ing NE for an unknown length. and an engineer squad. BLACK 1, take the standoff distance of your thermal one of your FIST-Vs to go with RED and sights to observe NAIs C108 and C105 to - Wire and mine obstacle 074587 ori- the other one to go with WHITE. BLUE confirm or deny presence of the tem- ented NE to SW. This obstacle most 1, take SAPPER 12 (engineer squad) plated obstacle and MRP. Then set the likely ties in with the previous obsta- with you. cle and both of them combined are second FIST-V in a position where it can Our mission is to conduct a force- observe the preplanned targets and pro- probably an extensive turning obsta- oriented zone reconnaissance to destroy cle. vide redundancy as the alternate shooter. enemy security forces and to recon point If you visually clear NAI C108 and deny - Point obstacle consisting of wire and obstacles from PL COWBOYS to PL the presence of an obstacle there, you will mines with difficult bypass on north RAIDERS starting at 1800 in order to have further support for recommending side at 119580. This obstacle is most support the task force’s reconnaissance that the TF attack in the east rather than probably blocking the gap at 120573. effort. the west. I think that the enemy is defending the My intent is that we are completing the Do not allow mounted movement north western avenue of approach (AA) as his scout’s zone recon, not redoing it. There of PL RAIDERS in the central mobility main effort. His AT weapons are cover- are plenty of tasks that we have to do, but corridors without your authorization, ing an extensive turning obstacle that will I have prioritized the most important because, based on your IPB, PL RAID- try to force us to go north and straight ones. If we can re-establish commo with ERS is most likely the southern edge of into the kill sack of an MRP or tank pla- the remaining scouts, our mission be- the enemy’s kill sack. Using this control toon vicinity 104. The AT fires will have comes much easier because the scouts measure will prevent friendly vehicles flank shots on us as we go north to avoid can continue their recon up to PL from driving into the enemy’s kill sack the obstacle. The strongpoint is there to STEELERS and provide us updated re- and becoming decisively engaged by his protect the AT firing line and force us to ports. The end state is that we have de- main defense. stay off the western ridge and keep us in stroyed the CSOP, reconned the point

ARMOR — January-February 1999 55

obstacle in the gap, identified the DRTs, commander decides to attack through perform all the tasks, but some are impor- cleared designated NAIs, and positioned here for tomorrow’s attack. BLUE, your tant enough to support the TF com- the FIST-Vs ready to observe AB0001 section will provide overwatch for SAP- mander’s purpose, which is to enable the and AB0002. Also, we are ready to fall in PER to protect them during their recon. S2 to determine the enemy template. as the trail CO/TM for the TF. Additionally, observe for any enemy forces guarding this obstacle. My plan is based on the assumption that At 1800, be at REDCON 1 ready to there are scouts still remaining and who move out of here. We’ll cross the LD in a WHITE 1, work and talk with BLUE’s can continue to perform reconnaissance. wedge formation using the traveling section and use bounding overwatch to If I can re-establish contact with the re- overwatch method, with BLUE leading cover their moves as they clear 111, 112 maining scouts, and they can continue and RED trailing in the west and WHITE and the obstacle at CP D8. When 112 is their zone recon to PL STEELERS, they trailing in the east. CO trains will trail in clear, go to CP D6 and send the FIST-V can execute the other half of the mission the center behind RED and WHITE. I’ll to position on the ridge about 1 km west that the TF commander wants me to ac- assume risk and sacrifice security for of CP D6 to observe fires on AB0001. complish. Additionally, they can provide speed while moving up to PL COW- Additionally, observe NAI 108 from CP additional reports since the past day about BOYS. After crossing PL COWBOYS, D6 to see if there are any enemy or ob- what they have discovered that we do not be deliberate and cautious in your move- stacles there. know yet. If I can’t contact the scouts or ment. BLUE and SAPPER, once you’ve re- if they are all destroyed, I will continue the mission only to recon the areas that I BLUE 1, set vicinity CP7 and send your conned the obstacle, move back to CP D3 don’t have a good read on, such as NAIs dismounts to clear NAI 110 in order to using a series of bounds to overwatch deny DRTs the use of this key terrain. each other. WHITE, work with BLUE to 106 and 108. Also, I want you to try to re-establish cover their moves back. When BLUE is Based on the scout’s reports and making commo with the scouts on their net. They set at CP D3, move back to CP D2. some deductions, such as about the turn- may be simply out of range, and we BLUE and WHITE, from your positions, ing obstacle in the west, the intel picture should be close enough to contact them continue to overwatch NAI 112 to report is over halfway complete. With that, I from here. any new enemy activity. prioritized which NAIs we need to clear, what enemy to destroy, and what obsta- When 110 is clear, BLUE 1, split one Here’s the coordinating instruction for section to go west with RED and one to everybody. The TF commander wants us cles to recon to enable the S2 to confirm or deny the enemy template. go east with WHITE. to consolidate at CP 7 once we’ve com- pleted our recon. I think it’s because he In order to gain a foothold, I need to BLUE section and RED 1, you will wants all available combat power in the clear NAI 110 first. From there, I have conduct a raid on the CSOP at 109 to destroy it in order to deny the enemy AA the TF attacks. On order, move to CP RED and BLUE conduct a raid to destroy 7 where we will consolidate. From there, the CSOP in the west. I have the BFVs from using his security elements. Here’s we will fall in as the trail CO/TM in the guide the tanks in because they can locate my guidance. BLUE, have your section move toward CP D4. I want you to fix TF attack. and fix the CSOP, making it easier for the tanks to locate and destroy it. I use a raid the CSOP from the support by fire posi- BLACK 7, move the CO trains to CP 7 for this operation because I do not intend tion vicinity CP D4 to allow RED to de- once 110 is clear. Request the FAS to stroy it. RED 1, talk to BLUE’s section move closer to CP 7 and request for an to hold that ground; the enemy probably has a pre-planned artillery target there. so they can guide you in to assault the additional M113 attached to us for Destroying the CSOP here will allow the CSOP. I will be with RED to control the casevac. Request an additional fueler and action here. ammo HEMMT to be attached to us for TF to attack unimpeded. RED 1, after you destroy all enemy in tomorrow’s attack, and be prepared to In the east, I sent BLUE’s other section conduct a hot refuel and rearm during to clear NAI 111 to ensure that there are 109, move back to CP D1 to overwatch tomorrow’s attack. no DRTs. I then have them recon the BLUE’s section. BLUE 1, at CP D4, send your dismounts to clear 113 to deny BLACK 5, go in the east with WHITE point obstacle because we need to deter- mine if a breach through here will sup- DRTs use of this terrain. Once 113 is to control the maneuver there. Keep at- port the TF’s attack. I did not send them clear, keep your dismounts there. Their tempting to make contact with the scouts. mission is to observe 103 and 104 to pro- I assume that they already know, but past PL RAIDERS to clear NAIs 105 and 108 because I believe that this would put vide early warning if the enemy situation remind them to be at least 2 km away them in a suspected MRP kill sack. changes. BLACK 1, send one of your from the pre-planned MLRS targets by FIST-Vs to position vicinity 113 to ob- 0600. For the scout vehicle requiring When RED, WHITE, and BLUE had serve AB0002. BLUE, keep your section recovery, order them to destroy it if it completed their missions, I positioned in the vicinity of CP D4 and continue to can’t move out before 0600. them just north of PL COWBOYS con- overwatch 109 to ensure that it remains ducting a screen mission to allow them to I’ll be in the west with RED. What are clear. your questions? continue observation but close enough to CP 7 to consolidate for tomorrow’s at- BLUE, send your eastern section to CP tack. D3 and send your dismounts to clear 111 in order to deny DRTs use of this terrain. RATIONALE: The instructions I gave to the platoons WHITE 1, overwatch BLUE’s section in Since the TF commander has issued were not extremely specific but I gave order to protect them. Once clear, take vague guidance, and assuming that I can- them enough guidance so they can exe- your dismounts back and move your sec- not contact him for clarification, I would cute using their own initiative. In situa- tion to CP D5 and clear 112. Next go to have to prioritize tasks and execute the tions where time is critical and there is CP D8. SAPPER 12, recon the point ob- most important ones. This is not disobey- minimal preparation time, initiative and stacle to determine if mechanized forces ing orders but maintaining a purpose clearly defined tasks and purposes are can move through a breach if the TF orientation. It is probably unrealistic to important to success.

56 ARMOR — January-February 1999 New Electronic Information Systems Open a Virtual Library On-Line

As the Army moves into the rapidly changing world of digital must regis ter on-line to receive a user ID and password to ac- technology, it can no longer afford to rely on paper-based train- cess publications with limited distributions. The Army Training ing materials. Unit commanders must be able to tailor generic Support Center manages the ADTDL. To learn more about the training materials to address their specific organizational struc- “Library Without Walls,” go to the ADTDL web site at ture, mission-essential task list (METL), training schedules, and http://155. 217.58.58/. resource constraints. Similarly, “schoolhouse” training and doc- trine developers must be able to revise materials rapidly so that TRAMOD Executive Management Information System training programs can be fielded concurrently with new systems (TEXMIS) and procedures. TEXMIS is an Army -wide database that serves two major To facilitate these requirements, the Army has developed sev- purposes: (1) It contains doctrinal and training information that eral systems that provide users the latest updates on the tasks can be downloaded and imported into ASAT or SATS; (2) It they train and the equipment they use. Each of these systems functions as a “warehouse” for proponent schools who want interfaces with the others, either directly or through another, to their doctrinal and training products to be available on the allow instant transfer of information between databases. ADTDL. There are several significant differences between

TEXMIS and the ADTDL. Refer to the table below to deter- Standard Army Training System (SATS) mine when to use which one. You must register on-line to re- ceive a user ID and password in order to use TEXMIS, which is SATS gives unit commanders and training managers a user- managed by the Army Training Support Center. To learn more friendly, computer-based, automated training system to enhance the planning, resourcing, and assessing of unit training. SATS about TEXMIS, go to its web site at http://155.217.35.201. automates the training management doctrine found in FM 25- 100, Training the Force, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, U.S. Army Publishing Agency (USAPA) and FM 100-5, Operations. It provides unit commanders with Some publications are not yet available in TEXMIS and the the tools to: (1) Develop training plans, METLs, calendars ADTDL. The only way to acquire those publications is by or- (three-dimensional), and schedules; (2) Tailor ARTEP Mission Training Plan training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) to fit dering them through the USAPA web site at http://www- usappc.hoffman.army.mil/. This site also contains an extract of the unit METL; (3) Design training exercises and calculate re- DA Pam 25-30, which lists the latest dates and change numbers source costs; and (4) Assess training and generate readiness reports. The Army Training Support Center at Fort Eustis, Va., for all doctrinal, training, and technical publications. fields SATS and provides training and technical support. To The Army continues to produce upgraded equipment, devices, learn more about SATS, go to its web site at http://www. and procedures during its move towards digitization. Training satsbbs.com. developers continue to update TSPs and MTPs faster than the

printed manuals reach the units in the field, but all changes are Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT) available through these present databases. By utilizing these systems, either independently or in conjunction with each other, ASAT is a training development database used by proponent schools to develop doctrine, ARTEP Mission Training Plans, the Army’s trainers can streamline their planning process, in- crease efficiency, update their training methods, and share Soldier’s Manuals, training support packages, and Combined breakthrough ideas. Combat units can take advantage of the Arms Training Strategies (CATS). Each proponent school maintains its own ASAT database where local training data technology provided to modernize their training, ensuring they afford their troops with the most current training available. (e.g., specific to resident courses) and proposed training prod- ucts are stored. When training products are approved for Army - To learn about how these automation tools are employed at the wide distribution, they are uploaded to another database called U.S. Army Center, go to the web site for the Analysis & Train- TEXMIS (see below). The Army Training Support Center pro- ing Development Automation Branch, Directorate of Training vides training and technical support for ASAT. For more infor- and Doctrine Development, at http://147.238.100.101/dtdd/ mation about ASAT, check out its web site at http://www. atda1/home.htm. atimp.army.mil/asat/. Action TEXMIS ADTDL Army Doctrinal and Training Digital Library (ADTDL) You want to look at the You cannot view the content of a Use the ADTDL; you can contents of an MTP, training product without download- view the contents directly on The ADTDL is an Internet web site contain- Soldier’s Manual, or ing it first. the Internet. ing hundreds of approved doctrinal and train- other training product. ing publications. It contains field manuals, You want to download Use TEXMIS because you can You could use the ADTDL, training circulars, ARTEP Mission Training an MTP into SATS so import the T&EOs directly into but you would have to cut- Plans, training support packages, and much you can tailor the SATS without any typing. and-paste the T&EO, piece more, although it does not contain technical T&EOs. by piece, into SATS. manuals. Users can view publications on the You want to find all You could use TEXMIS if you want Use the ADTDL if you want Internet or download and print them. The training products that to find a task and download into to search for a topic or do ADTDL offers searching capabilities, so that address a specific task SATS or ASAT. However, you not want to download task one could find all publications that address a or topic. cannot search TEXMIS for specific data into SATS or ASAT. topics. topic such as cavalry security operations. You ARMOR — January-February 1999 57 Author's Recipe for Fixing Personnel Problems Doesn't Attack Army's Core Weaknesses

The Downsized Warrior, America's personnel system and the laws that bind the XXI system, "If past history is any guide, how­ Army in Transition by David McCor­ "system." ever, we might expect to see a relatively con­ mick, New York University Press, New He quotes an unnamed captain as saying, servative set of recommendations that do little York, N.Y., 1998. 268 pages, $24.95 "At Fort Bragg, captains didn't cooperate at to challenge the status quo." (hardback). all. It's become so competitive ... I've seen He addresses the Army's fascination with captains do each other in. They would catch themes like a "vigorous and youthful officer In the realm of articles and books which ad­ someone doing something, not illegal, but a corps" and the "generalisf' reasoning that dress new doctrine, tactics, and organizations judgment call, and they'd say, 'Hey, I'm going results in moving officers through numerous on the digitized battlefields of tomorrow, this to slam him by telling the boss.' And they did." assignments for short periods of time. These book addresses the cultural foundation of the A major at Fort Hood, Texas, adds, "I see a lot traditions are based on the mobilization prob­ Army, its officer personnel system. Whether more competitiveness among majors and a lot lems experienced by the Army at the start of the Army's drawdown worked will not be less cooperation." To reach these painful World War II, when there was a small officer known until the next real war (but is being points, and support his thesis, McCormick has corps and no plan for expansion into a force seen currently at the National Training Cen­ conducted research where he analyzed hun­ structure that would support an army to fight a ter). But David McCormick's The Downsized dreds of primary and secondary sources that global conflict. Warrior reveals troubling signs among the deal with both the officer corps and society's McCormick also touches upon, but not in Army's 65,000 commissioned officers. Yes, impacts on how the Army conducts its per­ detail, the negative effects of another tradition the Army leamed from the last several draw­ sonnel business. He also interviewed hun­ bom in World War II, the Army's maintenance downs, which followed the Korean and Viet­ dreds of officers impacted by the drawdown, of a larger than necessary officer corps. nam Wars, and executed the "build-down" and hundreds of other personnel, including Again, only William Hauser and some aca­ more efficiently. But condensing a Cold War former Chiefs of Staff of the Army, who have demics have challenged the Army's rationale army without restructuring a personnel system been behind the scenes of personnel actions at undercutting readiness by keeping so many designed at the end of World War II left a or directly involved with the drawdown's plan­ officers in peacetime. McCormick points out in dispirited officer corps. As a result, an already ning and execution. detail that, over the last decade and through rigid Officer Personnel Management System He paints a thorough picture on how Army the next decade, officers are gaining less and (OPMS), designed to support the Defense senior leaders painstakingly and compassion­ less experience in jobs that will demand criti­ Officer Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980, ately approached the hard mission of cutting cal decisions in combat. A Significant example leaves officers, particularly commanders, the Army following our victory in the Gulf War. is the average time officers are serving in more concemed with surviving the bureauc­ But the Army leaders weren't fault-free. The battalion positions such as company com­ racy than surviving the battlefield. then-Chief of Staff at first reacted slowly to mander, operations officer, or executive offi­ For officers who enjoy reading only battle Congressional demands for a "peace divi­ cer, prior to becoming a battalion commander essays and dramatic acts of leadership under dend," and offered up few cuts or new force (the average is 54 months in a 16-year ca­ fire, this is a hard read. But, it must be read structures that would justify existing strength. reer). This comes at a time when the Army is and reread if officers are to understand how The Army, which has the reputation of being embracing information technology that calls the "system" works. McCormick opens the notoriously bad at legislative relations, again for experienced officers to assimilate and door on a process few of us have had the found itself under a barrage of floor speeches digest massive amounts of information, and privilege to view. The professional value of calling for deeper reductions. then make a decision on a 24-hour-a-day this book far outweighs its modest price of When the Army finally woke up, it found future battlefield. $24.95. I highly recommend it to everyone's Pentagon civilians under Defense Secretary McCormick also addresses the impacts of professional reading list in order to understand Dick Cheney already mapping the service's the Army's "rigid" management system on the impacts of military culture on military ef­ future force structure. At this point, the Army fectiveness. officer education. He discovered the draw­ became more a manager of the drawdown down fostered an "anti-intellectualism" (it's The author, a West Point graduate and for­ than its chief executive officer. With its cen­ actually been a tradition, stemming from offi­ mer Engineer officer who served with the tralized personnel system, it was very good at cer resistance toward the first proposal to use 82nd Airbome Division in the Gulf War, con­ this, with detrimental impacts to officer profes­ examinations in order for officers to enter the cludes: "Morale within the officer corps has sionalism. In sum, civilians set overall strategy School of Artillery and Cavalry (prelude to greatly declined as a result of downsizing, as and the Army sweated the details. Again, this C&GSC) at Ft. Leavenworth in 1888). It has have career expectations. The officer corps as was something the Army was good at; it has a been a tradition in the Army to place officers in long historical tradition of "pursuit of mean­ a whole is less committed to the Army~and the career-ending jobs in Army educational insti­ military profession than it was before ingless details." tutions, such as Fort Leavenworth and West downsizing began." He explains the complexi­ The climax of the book is McCormick's at­ Point. The Army forced military instructors and ties behind the latest problems with the officer tack on the Holy Grail of the Army, its officer professors to retire. Command and General corps as no one has since Colonel William personnel management system. The system Staff College became known as "SERBia" ­ Hauser (USA, Ret.) did in the late 1970s, was built, designed, and sustained by the a mocking reference to the Army's use of 1980s, and early 1990s. McCormick's book senior ranks to support the "up-or-ouf' promo­ selective early retirement boards, or SERBs, disputes the claims by many senior officers tion system, with traditions that stem from to cull the force of officers. McCormick reports that the drawdown has only highlighted ca­ World War II and George C. Marshall's view of that in 1992 alone, the Army forced 28 lieu­ reerism and that it will subside after the draw­ the officer corps in the future. Specifically, tenant colonels, a "substantial portion" of the down is over. McCormick counters this ex­ McCormick conducts an all-out attack on the faculty, to retire. The same occurred to ROTC cuse by using the drawdown as a catalyst that OPMS studies of 1971 and 1983, and says, exposes larger flaws in the Army's officer with a little insight into our current new OPMS Continued on Page 61 58 ARMOR - January-February 1999 USAREUR's Desert Storm Account Lacks Objectivity, Lessons Learned

From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Very little study is actually dedicated to the and synthesizing infonnation from that time Army, Europe, and the Gulf War by tactical operations during the ground war. A period. Many archives, unit histories, and Stephen P. Gehring, Center of Military scant six pages are all the attention that is official documents have been dissected to History, Washington, D.C., 1998. 377 given to this subject. Instead, the author provide data. The actual deployment order for moves on to postwar redeployment opera­ USAREUR is included in the book as an ap­ pages, maps, illustrations, tables, and tions. The complex issues of what equipment pendix. The author has done a good job appendixes. $17.00. would be returned to Europe, what would stay cataloging what actions must be accom­ in CENTCOM, and what would return to plished for a large scale deployment, and CONUS required extensive planning in order number crunching exactly what USAREUR While much has been written on the subject to meet another multitude of conflicting de­ did to make the deployment happen. of the Gulf War, very little study has been mands (treaty limitations in Europe, our allies' Unfortunately, because of the large bias and devoted exclusively to USAREUR's (U.S. reluctance to allow pennanent bases on their lack of self-criticism, I cannot recommend this Anny, Europe) involvement in the conflict. soil, and an overriding attempt to save Stephen P. Gehring, the staff his~rian for money). He concludes the book with the pro­ book. I feel that the author passed up a great opportunity to let the Anny leam from any USAREUR, attempts to provide this infonna­ grams intended to increase the morale of mistakes which happened during USAREUR's tion in his new book, which serves as an individual soldiers after their retum (such as deployment. Instead, the book ignores any echelon-above-corps look at USAREUR opening the Berchtesgaden resort). preparation, deployment, and redeployment failures and only highlights the successes of for the Gulf War. I would not recommend this book, for several the operation. This is not the way the Army reasons. First and foremost, the book lacks should write its own history. Gehring starts his history before the Iraqi any semblance of objectivity. The book com­ invasion on 2 August 1990, beginning with the pletely supports USAREUR decisions, and late 1980s anns reduction agreements and shows the righteousness of USAREUR poli­ CPT FRANK SOBCHAK the drawdown of forces in the European cies. At times, it almost sounded like propa­ Fayetteville, N.C. Theater. He catalogues both the planning and ganda. To make matters worse, there are execution used to cut back forces in order to almost no criticisms or discussions of mis­ meet treaty agreements, and later the so takes that were made. It is a shame that in Death Traps: The Survival of an called "peace dividend" from the collapse of such a large operation as USAREUR's par­ American Armored Division in World Communism. In the midst of this chaos, Ge­ ticipation in Desert Storm, we cannot criticize War II by Belton Y. Cooper, forward by hring argues that senior USAREUR leaders, ourselves to leam from our mistakes so that Stephen E. Ambrose; Presidio Press, namely General Crosby E. Saint (the we will not make them again. If you are look­ CINCUSAREUR), successfully restructured 1998; 324 pp., $28.95 ($26.05 via ing for an evenhanded or fair AAR, this is not Bames and Noble); ISBN 0-89141-670­ their forces to form more mobile, offensive it. Instead you will find what reads like a self­ units called "Capable Corps." This restructur­ congratulatory press release from USAREUR. 6. ing appears to be in line with the AirLand Most armor aficionados have seen the movie Battle concept espoused during the same Additionally, as previously noted, this book covers mostly subjects at echelons above "Kelly's Heroes," and the adventures of the time period. Gehring believes that this edict anachronistic Oddball and his crew. One of revolutionized USAREUR forces and made corps. Very little time is dedicated to where the rubber meets the road, at battalion level the more memorable scenes in the movie them able to execute their mission during the finds Clint Eastwood, as Kelly, running into a Gulf War. and below, where soldiers and junior leaders make operations happen. The book discusses relaxed Donald Sutherland who is "catching In the midst of this drawdown, Iraq invaded corps, divisions, and brigades, but rarely talks rays" while his crew feverishly works on the Kuwait. Gehring lists and discusses about individual battalions. The book is written tank. Eastwood asks if he is going to help USAREUR's participation in Desert Storm, at such a high level that, unless a reader is them. The answer? "No, man, I don't know focusing primarily on logistical support and serving on a division or corps staff, very few what makes 'em work, I just ride in 'em." deployment. He covers early involvement, relevant lessons can be gleaned from its The same cannot be said for Belton Cooper. such as piecemeal deployments (12th Avia­ pages. Fifty-four years ago, as a lieutenant, Mr. Coo­ tion Brigade), deployment of individuals in Although not necessarily a fault, the book is per served as an ordnance liaison officer with required/shortage MOSs, deployment of re­ Combat Command B of the 3rd Annored serve crews, supply shipments, and ship­ somewhat deceptive in its title. Topics dis­ cussed are primarily the preparation, deploy­ Division during its combat in northern Europe. ments of equipment (M1A1) drawn from war He got to see a good portion of France, Bel­ reserve to upgrade deploying CONUS units. ment, and redeployment. Actual combat in­ volvement is not studied closely. gium, and Gennany over the hood of a jeep Gehring then covers the political grand­ tearing along rutted roads as he sought out standing and discussions which led to the The book is not an easy read, as much of damaged or broken-down tanks in need of decision to give CENTCOM an offensive op­ the presentation is dry and lifeless. The book repair. Since 3AD had bypassed many pock­ tion by deployment of a USAREUR corps. The is statistic-heavy with many charts and ets of German troops, this was an incredibly decision-making process to detennine which graphs, and lacks first person accounts of hairy task, but one absolutely critical to the units would deploy is explored, but not criti­ events. Adding some primary source material ability of the "Spearhead" division to do its job. cally. Due to many conflicting requirements from actual soldiers and leaders who carried As an alumnus of the 3rd, I eagerly awaited (post-drawdown end state in Europe, main­ out the operation could have spiced up the this book coming out since I heard of its re­ taining base security, attempting to keep unit book, but they are notably absent. lease date last June, and the wait and the book have both been worth it. integrity), units that deployed were often On the other hand, the book is well re­ patched together and were not fortunate searched and prepared. It is obvious that The picture Mr. Cooper presents here is a enough to have habitual training and working extensive historical work went into gathering very personal but very preCise tale of the ef- relationships. ARMOR - January-February 1999 59 forts needed to keep an annored division personnel like WWIL This book lays this out The contents serve as a source of inspiration moving in heavy combat. There has never better than any other recent effort, and should for readers facing the need to put pen to pa­ been anything like it before or since, and the be part of the library of any contemporary per in their own personal struggles to under­ tale is of great worth to those who do not un­ warrior, be he "heavy" or "light." stand the past and it's meaning for the future derstand either the sacrifice of the past or the of their profession. The saying of "Amateurs talk tactics, profes­ effort required to pennit our predecessors to sionals talk logistics" is personified in this make that sacrifice. The tale which is told here ROY THOMAS book. is of one where it is not minutes of sheer ter­ MAJ (Retired) ror, but day after day of fear, drudgery, and 8th Canadian Hussars horror, overcome by detennined men to make STEPHEN "COOKIE" SEWELL (Princess Louise's) sure the tanks would roll forward. CW2 (Ret.) Mr. Cooper is a very polished writer, and the book is very readable. But there is a certain The Changing Face of War: Learning Fighting for the Soviet Motherland: quality of "you are there" many other memoirs from History edited by Allan D. English, Recollections from the Eastern Front do not seem to have. Part of it is the fact that McGill-Queen's University Press, Mont­ by Dmitriy Loza, edited and translated by there are a number of technical errors in it, but real & Kingston, London, Buffalo, 1998, James F. Gebhardt. University of Ne­ in the case of this book, they actually enhance 293 pages, $45.00 (Canadian), ISBN 0­ braska Press, 1998. 271 pages. Cloth the tale being told. These errors are not those price: $45.00. ISBN: 0-8032-2929-1 of a man who has not done his research, but 7735-1723. reflect the "rumor control" effect so many of us are familiar with, but in its 1944 version. "Leaming from history" is a challenge that Fighting for the Soviet Motherland: Recollec­ tions from the Eastern Front is a first-hand Case in point: the lack of a good, mobile, most ARMOR readers must face at some point in their development as military profes­ account of the Great Patriotic War as lived well-anned and well-armored tank. Mr. Coo­ and fought by a highly decorated Soviet per gives the field view of the stupidity and sionals. "The Changing Face of War is a collection of essays by Canadian army, air tanker, Colonel Dmitriy Loza. Colonel Loza is "branch blinder" mentality which held up a Hero of the Soviet Union, the USSR's high­ 9Omm-anned tanks, putting a sharp stick in force and navy officers, the product of a est designation for bravery, and a witness to the eye of the image of General Patton as he course in war studies considering the impact of strategic ideas on the conduct of warfare. some of the harshest fighting on the Eastern does so. But he writes that the M26's Front. Drawing upon both his own experi­ "Christie" suspension made it a much better With such a "joinf student body, it should be ences and those of comrades, Colonel Loza tank. Elsewhere, he correctly notes that the no surprise to find a range of results in their has fashioned a memoir that offers both value Pershing had a torsion bar suspension, not a reports. Six papers deal with the evolution of as an historical recollection as well as a digest Christie suspension. (J. Walter Christie, an strategy from the Napoleonic Wars to the of lessons applicable to today's annor sol­ eccentric if there ever was one, created a present. Five studies are about unconven­ diers. long-travel coil spring suspension laid out at tional warfare. Five additional pieces take the sharp angles inside a false hull. This did per­ lessons of history into the 21 st century. Loza's description of mounted warfare is mit the tanks to go very fast oller rough consistently gritty, hard-hitting, and absolutely ground, but copyrights and lack of a perceived The essay that perhaps is of most interest to convincing. He is clearly an expert at his craft, need caused the U.S. Anny to purchase only the ARMOR community is titled, ''The Myth of a professional officer who always notes with seven Christie tanks. Christie sold his designs Manoeuvre Warfare: Attrition in Military His­ particular carefulness matters of life and death to Britain and Russia, where they influenced tory." The author's thesis is that "manoeuvre­ on the battlefield. In particular, anyone inter­ the suspensions on the T-34s, SU-85s and based fighting ... or other stratagems to making ested in the performance of Sherman tanks SU-100s, and the British Covenanters, Cru­ fighting less costly is something to be pursued will enjoy Loza's commentary. He covers saders, and Cromwells. But Christie's design at the tactical and operational levels. At the everything from ammunition stowage, to was not involved in the success of the M26.) strategic level, he argues that attrition deter­ maintenance, to annor characteristics, to the mines the outcome between roughly evenly vagaries of fighting the tank under a wide Cooper does provide some very interesting matched opponents. range of conditions. insights as to one of the classic "Gotterdam­ merung" pictures of WWII, the one that shows In view of the recent ARMOR article on So­ Throughout, Loza writes with studied de­ a Gennan Panther burning in front of Cologne viet tank design and the ongoing series on tachment, yet with the conviction that the Red Cathedral. A 3AD M26 had picked it off with a U.S. Cold War MBT development, "An Exam­ Anny was engaged in a noble fight against the shot on the move right after the Gennan tank ple of Force Development: Tukhachevsky and Germans. Loza's tales of the imperatives of had just knocked out a Shennan. He includes the Soviet Art of Deep Battle" is probably of combat are thus boldly adopted and consider four photographs from his own collection of topical interest to readers. The author of this few subtleties regarding conduct by soldiers the tank being knocked out, and the bumed­ piece, when he wrote it, was a member of the and units in war. This is nuts-and-bolts history; out hull days later. He also provides the only Canadian Forces' Force Development staff. analysis is left to the reader. What conclusions known description of what he calls the Loza does draw are straightforward and For those involved in preparing for SFOR, "M26A 1E2" or Super Pershing, better known pragmatic. He is most interested on the one "Eliminating the Shadows: Applying Counter­ fonnally as the T26E4. This tank, the only hand in the comradeship and brutality that insurgency Doctrine to Peacekeeping" may guaranteed Tiger II killer to ever be shipped to transpired before his eyes, and on the other, stimulate useful ideas. As a veteran of seven Europe, did actually fight one engagement, the performance of men and equipment that different United Nations missions, in my view vaporizing an unknown Gennan vehicle at he encountered along the way. this essay only serves as a start point. 1500 meters (due to snipers, nobody wanted Of special interest is Loza's discussion of the to go find out what it killed!) While the title "Stealth Technology: A Revo­ entire range of tactical military activities, not lution in Air Warfare" appears to address Regardless of branch or interest, this book just combat scenarios. Loza fully covers nu­ strategy primarily of interest to the air forces of provides a very exciting, and in some cases merous logistical matters: food preparation the WOrld, in fact the role of technology in moving, description of the background effort it and delivery, maintenance procedures, the changing the conduct of war, raised in this took to pennit units like 3AD to become the practices surrounding burial of the dead, pro­ article, has to interest all those whose legendary formations of WWII. Nothing in motions, and even the delivery of field mail. branches are based on technology. recent times - ridge-running in Korea, fire­ This is the kind of detail that can only come bases in Vietnam, or even the 100 Hours of This book provides a broad range of Cana­ from a veteran who has experienced such Desert Stonn - pressed the ingenuity and dian examples of attempts to learn from the combat, and is the strong suit of the book. resolve of American troops and their support history of military ideas in the strategic sphere. Loza even discusses his experiences against 60 ARMOR - January-February 1999 the Japanese in 1945, an aspect of World tween the active and reserve components, rorism will be a major threat to our national War II almost entirely overlooked by most taming of the powerful military-industrial com­ security. While these are important topics, the accounts of the period. plex, and a reduced defense budget which author contributes no original thought to them, would allow the attainment of the promised and they distract the reader from the book's While the book is replete with such insights, "peace dividend." main point. the reader is forced to search for them to the extent that the overall value of the work is Drawing from his experiences as a former Despite serious shortcomings in historical diminished. The power of Loza's commentary member of the Senate Armed Services Com­ research and the author's failure to provide is hindered by a poorly organized format. The mittee, Hart claims that the current force the reader with a viable solution to identified book contains 31 separate sections, each structure is incapable of meeting America's problems, this extended essay is a worthwhile which describes a vignette and is presented security needs in the next century. It is too read. It will surely stimulate discussion con­ topically. There is no situational context pro­ dependent on expensive, high-tech weapons, ceming the future role of the reserve compo­ vided for any of the sections. Loza merely and is unable to deploy in a reasonable nents, but it does not significantly contribute begins with his reminiscences leaving the amount of time to hotspots around the globe. any new inSight into that role. Therefore, a reader striving to understand the setting. By organizing the active army into smaller, prospective reader should wait until next year While each section has a title, they are so highly mobile units capable of undertaking to purchase it when the book appears on the vague as to be impossible to decipher without deciSive action, the United States would be reduced-price table. tuming to that section and scanning the text. able to quickly achieve its military goals. Addi­ Any sense of chronological order is likewise tional forces, if needed, would be provided by absent. Back-to-back sections may discuss the reserve components. STEPHEN M. GRENIER events years apart in time, only to retum again CPT, Infantry By increasing the role of the reserves, Hart later to the earlier period. The text does not claims that the National Command Authority even specifically state the units in which Loza would be less likely to commit American sol­ served, although the reader can infer that diers to troubled areas if the operation re­ these included the 233rd Tank Brigade and Downsized Warrior quired the mobilization of the reserves. This, 46th Guards Tank Brigade. Furthermore, the however, would require a major change in (Continued from Page 58) maps that are included are not related in any how American troops are currently utilized. In way to the body of the text. While capably order to continue long-term commitments rendered, the reader almost encounters them instructors, who found themselves booted off such as Bosnia, and recurring operations, by accident midway through the work. Had the college campuses, as well as officers as­ such as Haiti and the MFO in the Sinai, re­ translator and editor, James F. Gebhardt, Signed at the War College and the Combined servists would have to be mobilized not only provided more in the way of context, the utility Armed Services School. The result is that the for the operation itself, but also for an intense of this book would have been greatly en­ officer corps has fallen back to more "tradi­ train-up period. Although hundreds of reserv­ hanced. As it is, the trauma and realism em­ tional muddy boots career patterns." This will ists are currently deployed to such areas, the bedded within Loza's account risks being lost have a long-lasting impact on the Army as proposed cuts of the active army made by as mere trivia. generations of officers avoid academic as­ Hart would require a drastic increase in both signments, opting instead for short-term ca­ Military historians and modem-day tankers the number of reservists activated for federal reer satisfaction. alike will appreciate the richly detailed ac­ service and the length of time they are mobi­ counts of ground combat included here, al­ lized. Hart fails to address the economic and "Morale, career expectations, and organiza­ though one wishes the valuable information political ramifications of increasing the reliance tional commitment within the officer corps within the text was more accessible. None­ on the reserve components for operations not have fallen, careerism has risen, and initiative theless, Colonel Loza's description of fighting directly relating to a national security threat. has declined in the post-Cold War Army," says on the Eastem Front ultimately constitutes a McCormick, as he offers proposals that go Hart only touches the surface in addressing riveting story that communicates war as a beyond those recommended under the label the historic animosity between the regular and desperate clash of machines and of men. In of OPMS XXI. However, they fall short of the reserve components. He too quickly dis­ one section he discusses combat awards and type of revolution that is necessary to create a misses Emory Upton's classic writings con­ offers what is a fitting summary to his memoir professional officer corps for the future. His ceming the importance of a full-time, profes­ as a whole: recommendations include ''flexible career sional army, describing the nineteenth-century pattems" and an end to anti-intellectualism by Every decoration of frontline soldier repre­ National Guard as a group of misunderstood, a allowing officers to attend more schooling. He sents a underutilized semi-professionals in search of battle, sleepless days and nights, mentions nothing about reducing the size of serious wounds or ones. guidance from their active counterparts. Not light These decora­ the officer corps in relation to the force, based only did Upton analyze national military policy, tions are reminders of those long-ago fiery on historical models, nor the necessity of years, was war. but he was also instrumental in developing of our youth that tempered by combining officer policies with a personnel infantry tactics that utilized the principle of system that promotes unit cohesion. maneuver. Additionally, Upton proposed a CPT BRADLEY T. GERICKE system of military schools based on the Ger­ What McCormick discovered may be insolv­ West Point, New York man model and wrote the first definitive mili­ able with the type of evolutionary reforms the tary history of the United States. Upton's writ­ Army has attempted to use to "cure" its officer ings, although skewed in areas, were not the problems. The Army, with its individual focus, The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of unsustained, vindictive slurs against the Na­ summed up in the "be all you can be" phrase, the People by Gary Hart, The Free tional Guard as Hart suggests. They were maintains that the only way it can attract suffi­ Press, New York, 1998. 188 pages, based on the performance of citizen-soldiers cient numbers of young men and women is to notes, index. $23.00, ISBN 0-684-83809­ during the Civil War. Furthermore, it was a promise them professionally satisfying lives, 5. "skeleton force" in true Uptonian fashion, not complete with rapid promotions, travel, a an army of citizen soldiers, which was able to subjective evaluation system that demands absorb the millions of new troops at the out­ less than competence, and more education. In The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of the break of the Second World War. When you recruit based on careerism, we People, former Senator Gary Hart makes a should not be surprised if more officers are controversial proposal to replace a large por­ Throughout the book, Hart illustrates several putting resume ahead of country. tion of the active force with a well-trained, critical, albeit obvious, shortcomings in today's civilian-based reserve. The benefits of estab­ military. He addresses the need for more lishing a "true militia," he argues, would in­ strategic air and sealift, warns us of the dan­ MAJ DONALD VANDERGRIFF clude greater coordination and solidarity be­ ger of "mission creep," and predicts that ter­ Duke University

ARMOR - January-February 1999 61 AGTS Deploys With “First Team” To Bosnia!

by Trudy Ryan and Major J.B. Iddins

The Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS), systems will be installed on a bed of railroad ties on the U.S. Army’s state-of-the-art gunnery trainer, con- level ground in lieu of concrete slabs. Contractor Lo- tinues to meet expanding training requirements. gistics Support (CLS) will be provided by AAI/ESI, the Normally stationed at CONUS locations, two of the same contractor for CONUS trainers. Qualified elec- M1A2 trainers were sent to Bosnia in late November tronics technicians with extensive AGTS hands-on in support of 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) troops during experience will be co-located with each trainer to pro- their deployment. The AGTS will sustain the gunnery vide high operational readiness. skills of M1A2 crews who man M1A1 tanks while de- At present, 1st Cavalry Division is the only division in ployed to the Balkans and reduce or eliminate reme- the Army fully equipped with the M1A2. According to dial training after completion of the mission. AGTS MSG Tim Dodge, Master Gunner for 1CD, “Given the has proven it can develop and sustain individual, fact that the division deployed two battalions of M1A2 crew, and platoon precision gunnery skills to a profi- tankers to an area of operations which is equipped ciency level that permits rapid transition to live fire only with M1A1 tanks, the logical conclusion was to training or combat gunnery. deploy the AGTS to sustain the exceptionally perish- AGTS can be configured to meet the user’s training able M1A2-specific skills. Additionally, the First Team needs, and can support institutional, unit, and de- is deploying other necessary Training Aids, Devices, ployed training situations. The AGTS configuration Simulators, and Simulations (TADDS) to keep the being deployed to Bosnia can be relocated easily. It soldiers well trained on a variety of weapon systems.” has a self-contained shelter and environmental condi- AGTS stands ready to support the armor soldier tioning unit, and is flexible enough to accept power wherever he may be deployed. from a variety of sources, in this case a military power generator. Currently there are three platoons of M1A2 AGTS: Trudy Ryan is the hardware engineer for the at Ft. Knox, Ft. Hood, and Ft. Carson, each with pre- AGTS program at STRICOM (PM Trade). She is brief and after-action review (PAAR) capability. The currently the co-chairman of the AGTS Crew Sta- AGTS was fielded early to each location, even before tion/Mobility System Integrated Product Devel- M1A2 tank fielding, so it could be effectively utilized opment Team. She has 13 years experience during New Equipment Training (NET). Seven M1A2 working on STRICOM simulation projects. Ms. AGTS systems now in production include SEP capa- Ryan holds two BS degrees in engineering from bility, and are scheduled for delivery to Ft. Hood, the University of Miami. Texas, beginning in March, 2000. The two AGTS systems bound for Bosnia were to fly Major J.B. Iddins is the project director for AGTS from Kelly AFB to Tuzla AFB, Bosnia, on a C-17 air- at STRICOM (PM Trade). Major Iddins is an Ar- craft. They will be stationed at Camp McGovern and mor officer and a member of the Acquisition Camp Bedrock for one year. Personnel from the Corps. He holds a BS degree in education and a Army’s Simulation, Training and Instrumentation masters in information systems management. He Command (STRICOM) have been in theater to con- is a 1998 graduate of the Army’s Command and duct site surveys and arrange logistics support. The General Staff College.

PIN: 075083-000