“GITTIN STUFF” Equipping Confederate Armies at the Onset of The Civil War (1861 –1862)

BY FRED D. SETH. JR, CPPM, CF, HARBOUR LIGHTS CHAPTER

PREFACE States of America (CSA). He also introduced me to Josiah his is the first of three articles on the Civil War, a Gorgas, the Confederate Ordnance General, who support- topic normally tackled by The Civil War Times ed his units and troops for four years with remarkable skill, not The Property Professional. I owe debts of grati- creativity and dedication. The Confederates had extraordi- T tude to my wife, Barbara, who presented me with nary challenges so I decided to focus on their support a Father’s Day gift of a Smithsonian workshop on turning issues in these three articles. points in the Civil War; Dr. Gary W. Gallagher (University The Civil War stands arguably as the most significant of Virginia), the workshop professor who convinced me event of our nation’s history. The genesis of such issues as there were no such clear “turning points”; and Dr. Doug the civil rights movement, race relations, women’s issues, Goetz, who agreed to publish these articles. Thanks also states’ rights, and national taxation can be found in the go to Gerald Tomasovsky, who loaned me his Mississip- events leading up to, during and after the Civil War. pi National Guard Staff Ride materials (1987) that pro- Almost as many Americans lost their lives during the Civil vided valuable information on logistics support to the War than in all of America’s other wars combined, includ- Confederacy. ing the World Wars. Napoleonic War tactics met modern During his outstanding workshop, Dr. Gallagher pro- weapons with devastating results. More books have been vided insight on the resources of the two warring nations, written about it than any other war in history, with over the of America (USA) and Confederate 50,000 published.

Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress

Commissary clerks with Supplies at the Commissary Depot in Aquia Creek, April 1863.

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As with any organization, the management of equip- active campaign.”1 ment and supplies impact, and are impacted by, the goals This first article focuses on the South’s capability to and objectives of the whole organization, in this case the wage war in 1861 and preparation and support for early Confederate States of America (CSA). The South did not engagements through the , Lee’s first have to “win” the war against the Union: It had to stave off foray North in the fall of 1862. The second article will defeat until the Union lost its will to fight and allow the address how the South built up its resources to support Confederacy to exist as an independent nation. Fortunate- armies on the Eastern and Western fronts and even imple- ly for our nation, President ensured that mented full mobilization by 1864. Support to the Gettys- did not happen and a much stronger nation emerged. burg and Vicksburg campaigns will be covered. The final However, logistics, equipment and supply management article will document the collapse of the Confederacy’s kept the South in the war much longer than anyone could support structure under the weight of Union occupation, have imagined. the successful blockade of southern ports, destruction of For many years, southern historians have claimed the the railroad network, devastation of food sources and final- South lost because it did not have the resources to wage ly, total defeat of its armies. war against the Union. Post war southern writing empha- These articles will be presented in a modified lifecycle sized the “ragged rebel” or the “lost cause.” This may have context. Many representative examples of logistics and been true during some campaigns, especially near the end, property support issues exist. I have attempted to select but for the most part, the southern soldier was well interesting ones that demonstrate the efforts of equipment equipped, especially with arms and ammunition. Most of and supply managers. Through research, I have gained the veterans themselves never mentioned supply shortages. respect for the creativity and resourcefulness of these logis- In fact, the opposite was true as stated by W. W. Black, ticians and realize how much we can learn from them. who served with General J.E.B. Stuart. He wrote, “…In Each article includes in its title, “Gittin Stuff,” a term books written since the war, it seems to be the thing to attributed to controversial Confederate General Nathan represent the Confederate soldier as being in a chronic Bedford Forrest. He used it to describe logistics, the labori- state of starvation and nakedness. During the last year of ous process of procuring necessary items, storing them the war this was partially true, but previous to that time until ready for use and finally distributing supplies and was not any more than falls to the lot of all soldiers in an equipment among the soldiers or users.2

Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress

The Confederate Seige Guns at Yorktown, VA

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agreed to fight for the South and only 18% could be fitted PART ONE with shoes. On May 7, 1861, Ordnance Chief Colonel INTRODUCTION Gorgas learned that the Confederates had only 159,000 weapons of all types, most of which had been seized from uring the first half of the nineteenth century, the Unit- Federal arsenals in the south. By June 1861, English ware- Ded States had gone through a period of rapid industrial houses were filled with Confederate military supplies, but growth. By 1860, industrial production heavily favored the the tightening blockade caused southern lead- North. Of the 128,300 industrial establishments in the ers concern that they could not be delivered. Early in the United States, 110,000 were loyal to the Union. Produc- war several ships successfully tested the blockade and sup- tion value of Union factories was ten times greater than plies began to flow slowly into the South. those of the South. The production of critical war supplies Limitations were felt almost immediately. By January and equipment was even more lopsided. In the United 1862, because of not guaranteeing loans in Europe, the States of 1860, northern states manufactured 97 percent of CSA was ruined financially, armies suffered from lack of the firearms, 94 percent of the cloth, 93 percent of the pig arms and supplies, and the home front felt the pinch. Con- iron and more than 90 percent of boots and shoes. The federate logisticians would have to begin to develop inter- South was short of virtually all equipment required and the nal resources to enable their armies to survive during the capability to produce more. ensuing years of the war. In manpower, the South was also at a significant disad- vantage. The North mustered 1.5 million soldiers during the war, the South 800 thousand. However, the South did ORGANIZATION have nearly 4 million slaves who did practically all of the he primary support organizations for any military force farming during the war and also provided much of the Tare commissary, ordnance and quartermaster, in that labor for construction of fortifications at New Orleans, priority. Competition for limited funds was inevitable Vicksburg, Richmond and Charleston. among the organizations. Ordnance Chief Josiah Gorgas In April 1861, CSA Quartermaster Colonel Abraham wrote that President Davis said, “For the infantry, men C. Meyers realized that southern contractors and mills must first be fed, next armed, and even clothing must fol- were unable to clothe and outfit volunteers who had low these; for if they are fed and have arms and ammuni-

Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress

The Confederate Winter Quarters at Centreville, VA in March of 1862.

18 NPMA Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 tion they can fight.” The Medical Service had a general most of the war against superior numbers and capability. precedence since it was necessary “first of all to keep the He fell in love with, and subsequently married, the daugh- hospitals empty and the ranks full.”3 The Confederacy ter of the former governor of and became a life- formed these organizations early in the war. long southern sympathizer. An excellent administrator, he demonstrated strength of character, diligence, and judi- Commissary ciousness in overcoming obstacles. His accomplishments were truly spectacular. He picked President Davis appointed Lucius Bellinger Northrop to highly qualified subordinates, organized his department, be Acting Commissary General of Subsistence in March and for four years provided arms, ammunition and other 1862. A West Point graduate, Northrop had surveyed the accoutrements to Confederate forces. To augment initially southwest for the army to identify food-producing areas in severe shortages, he acquired arms from Europe; coordinat- the winter of 1842-43. He combined medical training ed blockade running efforts; created the Nitre and Mining with extensive experience with the army. His service in Bureau that provided the basic ingredients of gunpowder many different climates provided him knowledge of subsis- along with copper, brass, iron and other essential chemi- tence needs of the soldier. William Maynadier, a cals; and built a network of armories and arsenals through- northerner, was appointed as the permanent Commissary out the South. General. Maynadier remained loyal to the Union and refused the position, so Northrop was permanently Quartermaster appointed. A favorite of , Northrop was dis- liked for his hardheadedness, especially when it came to The Confederate Quartermaster Department was orga- Union prisoners. After the , when nized by Act of Congress 26 February 1861. A Quarter- asked about feeding prisoners in Richmond’s Libby prison, master General, with the rank of colonel, headed the he replied: “I know nothing of Yankee prisoners; throw Department. Even then, logisticians and property man- them all into the James river."4 He did everything possible agers were comparatively low graded. He was supported by to hinder the efforts of those attempting to provide them four Assistant Quartermasters graded as majors, and as humanitarian support. many assistants as required at the rank of captain. From its birth, the Confederacy suffered from a short- Colonel Abraham Charles Myers, for whom Ft. Myers, age of food. The antebellum South devoted much of its FL is named, was appointed as the first Quartermaster acreage to cotton, tobacco and other income-producing General. Myers was appointed Quartermaster after lobby- crops. The farms of the upper Valley provided ing for the position. President Jefferson Davis offered the most of its foodstuffs. Beef, pork, corn, flour, fruits, butter position to several others but none wanted the job. Myers and cheese were transported by either steamboat or rail had spent most of his twenty-five year career as a first lieu- from states that remained with the Union. tenant artillery officer, so he was inadequately prepared for Recognizing the problem, the Confederate Congress the task he had been selected to perform. adopted a resolution in 1862 urging farmers to plant food Myers originally asked for a budget of $128 million to crops in place of cotton and tobacco. The efforts of much support an army of 100,000 men. Unfortunately, the Con- of the South, principally the Shenandoah Valley “the federate government did not practice sound Requirements breadbasket of the Confederacy,” resulted in sufficient Determination in estimating its budgetary needs. By the food being raised to feed the army and the general popula- summer of 1861, his budget would be cut to $39 million tion during much of the War. and support requirements would double. He established Often food was plentiful but storage, transportation his headquarters in Richmond at an old warehouse and and distribution were lacking. As the war progressed and requisitioned more warehouse and administrative space, as much of the South was under Union control, it became the bureau increased in size. Due to the War being fought more and more difficult to move supplies. Soldiers and on many fronts, he appointed assistants in Charleston, civilians both suffered as food rotted on loading platforms Montgomery, New Orleans and San Antonio, and tasked and railroad sidings and in warehouses. Inflation and the them with purchasing military equipment and supplies. devaluation of Confederate currency complicated the He established regional depots to support armies operating problem. throughout the Confederacy. Since the Confederacy had limited supplies, he envisioned importing much of the Ordnance equipment and supplies needed, and placed emphasis on establishing receiving points at southern ports. By July Colonel Josiah Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance during the 1861, the army grew to 198 regiments and thirty-four entire war, was a quiet, devoted Pennsylvanian and a true battalions. logistics genius. As the head of the most successful bureau Although an experienced supply officer, Myers was of the Confederate government, he was personally respon- overwhelmed and Army resupply became hopelessly sible for arming the Confederate army in the field during encumbered. Davis relieved him in 1863.

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FINANCING THE WAR equipment was outdated, including three, six and eight pound howitzers captured from the British during the War rior to hostilities, Confederate states seized U. S. cur- of 1812. Before Lincoln even took office, all but four Fed- Prency amounting to $718,294.03 from Federal cus- eral sites in the seven cotton belt states had been captured toms houses and mints in Charlotte and New Orleans. and property seized. The State of even captured 53 Finding other sources for cash would prove to be difficult. camels initially acquired for logistics purposes by previous To deal with the problems, President Davis appointed Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis.6 Christopher Gustavus Memminger of Throughout the Civil War, the Confederates captured Confederate Secretary of the Treasury in 1861. He had numerous cannons, small arms, food and other supplies. gained recognition as a conservative financier who believed For example, during the bloody Seven Days campaign in in hard money and had extensive banking experience in late June and early July of 1862, Robert E. Lee’s forces cap- Charleston prior to the war. tured 52 cannons and more than 30,000 small arms. Both cash and credit were scarce commodities for the Unfortunately for the South, the cannons were lost back to new government. Secretary of War Benjamin, the “brains the Union in subsequent battles.7 General of the Confederacy,” proposed to buy at least 100 thou- captured eighty-one cannons during the battles for Ken- sand bales of cotton, in 1861, and ship it to England tucky and . In his journal, Josiah Gorgas docu- immediately. This action would have provided a basis for mented such captures. During the on credit, perhaps as much as $50 million dollars. Such a sum May 31, 1862, eight or ten pieces of artillery were cap- could have outfitted the new Confederate army with war tured; at a battle near Harrisonburg, VA in the Shenan- materials and supplies until internal production could sup- doah, General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson took a large port the war effort. However, Secretary Memminger amount of army stores and medicine; in his Peninsula thought it was uneconomic and unconstitutional. He campaign Union General George McClellan lost “40 to 50 rejected the plan, calling it “Souphouse Legislation.” This pieces of artillery, an immense amount of stores, wagons, plan could have secured English support for the war effort & camp equipage of all sort”; and in September 1862 at and maintained the value of Confederate currency.5 the Second Battle of Manassas, the Confederates captured Jefferson Davis suggested another approach: withhold- 30 or 40 pieces of artillery and a great many small arms.8 ing cotton from England and France to try to get their support through a policy of “starvation.” This foolish poli- cy allowed the Federal government to establish the block- Imports ade that would become effective by 1863. Although Until the blockade was firmly established, imports from records are sketchy, total issue of Treasury notes by the Europe could be obtained through southern ports. At Gor- Confederacy may have reached $1 billion. gas’ insistence, second Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin dispatched Captain Caleb Huse to England, gave him REQUIREMENTS AND ACQUISITION broad authority and pushed for maximum acquisition of foreign equipment and supplies. Small arms and powder y the spring of 1861, the heads of each of the logistics were the most critical items by the spring of 1862 and Bbureaus came to the same conclusion. The South was were given first priority. Gorgas gave Huse orders to, “pur- inadequately prepared to wage war against the better chase weapons, ammunition and machinery with which to equipped and supplied . Many Confederates make more.”9 Since transmitting currency to foreign coun- deluded themselves into believing that the Union invasion tries was difficult, the South did position small stores of would cease after several defeats by Rebel armies. In fact, cotton as remittance through Fraser, Trenholm and Com- the first of six Secretaries of War, Leroy Pope Walker, failed pany in London. Huse established relationships with two to act upon Colonel Myer’s recommendation to obtain major suppliers, the London Armoury Company (LAC) military uniforms quickly from Europe. As a result, Con- and S. Isaac, Campbell and Company. LAC was pro- federate forces wore a hodgepodge of outfits that were southern and produced at least 75,000 Enfield rifles for hardly uniform. the Confederacy. Three sources of supply existed in the following order Secretary Benjamin worked out a barter system using of immediate availability: seizure or capture of Federal cotton to pay for materials. Even with an additional ship- property, imports from Europe, and internal southern ment of Confederate bonds, Captain Huse managed to production. have the Confederacy $5 million in debt by the end of 1862. Then Huse became the subject of an investigation Seizure or Capture due to his admission of taking a commission and paying exorbitant prices. The investigation was not completed By the beginning of hostilities, what could be obtained until October 1864, when he was exonerated.10 from seizure had already occurred, most notably weapons Of particular interest to property managers is Secretary and ammunition from Federal armories. Much of the

20 NPMA Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 Photos courtesy of the Library of Congress

Top: Harper's Ferry Railroad Bridge across the Potomac. Above: Harper's Ferry Railroad Bridge Destroyed. The bridge was destroyed and rebuilt nine times during the war.

Benjamin’s textbook, Treatise on the Law of Sale of Person- can filled with powder. These torpedoes were placed in al Property, written in England in 1868. His text is manda- southern harbors and sunk many Union ships. When tory reading today at some law schools in England and the Admiral yelled, “Damn the torpedoes full United States.11 steam ahead” at the Battle of Mobile Bay, he was referring In conjunction with procurement from abroad was the to these tin cans. The cans were wired from the shore and necessity of securing transportation to the southern ports. detonated. The South had no electrical wire and limited Gorgas noticed that private companies were running the capability to produce any so Rains sent women spies north blockade and making huge profits. He recommended that to steal wire and dredged up abandoned cables from the the government purchase and operate its own blockade- Chesapeake Bay and separated them into wire. runners to reduce overhead. He bought the ships, acquired Due to the loss of most of Tennessee during 1862, the cotton to trade and hired private agents to man the ships. only copper mines in the South came under Union con- Blockade runners evaded capture effectively during much trol. Copper had been used in the manufacture of percus- of the war until the last port, Wilmington, NC, fell near sion caps and bronze Napoleon cannon. Due to the short- the end of the war. age, casting of bronze guns was suspended and the manu- facture of caps reduced significantly. Again, Josiah Gorgas Creative Internal Supply Sources came to the rescue. He dispatched an ordnance officer to the hills of eastern Tennessee to buy up or appropriate all Brigadier General Gabriel Rains was the father of Confed- of the copper from apple-brandy stills that could be locat- erate land and floating mines. The floating version was ed. The tubing was transported to Richmond, cut into known as a “torpedo”, which in reality was a floating tin strips and rolled and then provided to the cap manufactur-

Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 NPMA 21 ers. An estimated 300,000 caps were manufactured from realized that the city was in a position to provide most of this source alone. A light cast-iron gun replaced the the ordnance materials for Virginia in preparation for war. Napoleon and was equally effective. However, he ran into an obstacle, the commander of the One of the more out of the ordinary sources of supply Virginia Ordnance Department, Colonel Charles Dim- was the acquisition of niter used for making gunpowder. mock. Dimmock maintained that the state had rights to all Prior to the war, little gunpowder was produced in the of the factories around Richmond and also to the weapons South. Since urine could be used to produce niter or salt- and rifle and musket making machinery previously cap- peter, a key ingredient in gunpowder, an enterprising agent tured from the Federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry. On July 3, for the Nitre and Mining Bureau, John Harralson, request- 1861, Gorgas issued an order directing that all “shafting, ed that the ladies of Selma, AL save their chamber pots for vises, tools, &c, now in the Central depot from Harpers collection.12 Ferry be transferred for further shipment to the Confeder- As the blockade tightened its stranglehold on southern ate facility in Fayetteville, NC.”14 This incident is an excel- ports, many more creative ways of acquiring materials and lent example of special tooling right to title between the equipment had to be developed. In addition, internal pro- current owner (by possession), Virginia, and the prospec- duction of raw materials, arms, ammunition, and other nec- tive user, the Confederate government. After several letters essary commodities increased dramatically after 1862. These and a formal request from the Secretary of War to the developments will be discussed in subsequent articles. Governor of Virginia, the state agreed to support the Con- federacy and transfer title. Gorgas would encounter many OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY such problems. Colonel Myers ordered James Pace, of the Danville tex- wnership and accountability of the limited equipment tile factory, to tour the Upper South seeking warps for Oand supplies were a significant issue to southern states. woolen mills and shoe leather. Governor Zebulon Vance of One of the primary causes of the War was states rights, at North Carolina refused to relinquish control of clothing the expense of a strong Federal government. One of the his state troops to Confederate authorities. He kept thou- benefits of a strong central government is the ability to not sands of uniform items in reserve rather than releasing only raise an army, but to support it. them to other southern forces that may have needed them At the beginning of the War, individual states were more. This was just one example of the running battle concerned about protecting their borders and supplying between the Governor and President Davis during the war. their own troops to the detriment of the overall cause. No One notable exception was newly elected Virginia Gov- state entered the Confederacy without making arrange- ernor, John Gill Shorter, a far-sighted man who agreed to do ments for self-preservation, so Ordnance Chief Josiah Gor- all that was best for the cause. Unfortunately, as the war pro- gas and his fellow logisticians had to be tactful in dealing gressed the number of like-minded men would diminish. with the states. Each strongly guarded its rights, preroga- tives and property: Many viewed the War as a fight for PROPERTY CONTROL their individual state’s rights, rather than as a “Confederate States of America,” a designation used and accepted liber- RECORDS AND REPORTS ally but never universally adopted throughout the South. he destruction of much of the Confederate Quarter- In addition to being first in secession, South Carolina Tmaster and Ordnance records at the end of the war was also first in self-protection. The state’s chief ordnance makes it difficult to determine what records were main- officer collected and prepared weapons for war. Although tained. Confederate ordnance officers and quartermasters the Confederacy would soon take over the function, the at the regiment and corps levels submitted reports up the South Carolina Military Board continued to function chain of command that provided valuable information on throughout the war. Tennessee put its Nashville powder consumption and combat losses. These reports helped the making facilities into production and Texas established the Confederate ordnance, quartermaster and commissary Texas State Military Board. Some states even worked bureaus to allocate available assets. Additional information together developing plans for temporary loans of equip- is provided in letters, individual documents and histories ment. The governors of South Carolina and written by the participants. Most of the South’s property exchanged telegraph messages concerning the number of records were destroyed in the last months of the war, and weapons they could provide each other in an emergency.13 no accurate reports covering the manufacture and distribu- Gorgas learned that had enough raw materials tion of weaponry (and related accoutrements) exist for the to make 200 tons of powder but he was concerned about Confederacy.15 whether Governor Brown would release it. In fact, the gov- One account exists, a Confederate War Department ernor withheld support from the Confederate army during report prepared by Gorgas in November 1863. Transac- the entire war, claiming it was more important to protect tions in a single year involved 45 million small arms car- the people of Georgia. tridges, 318,000 field artillery rounds and 267,000 pairs of When Gorgas arrived in Richmond in June 1861, he horseshoes.16 In addition to ordnance materials, he was

22 NPMA Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 responsible for acquiring associated items such as horse- motives in service in the United States, only 19 were built shoes, leather pouches, etc. for ordnance units. in states of the new Confederacy. Thirty-five different At the request of the U. S. Government, Gorgas pre- major railroad lines crossed the South, each with local pared a report on Confederate arms and equipment, interests. At the time of the Confederacy the average rail- from memory after the war. Largely due to his efforts, road under control of one line was two hundred miles. Lit- the South did not lose a single battle due to lack of arms tle or no coordination between the lines existed and mate- or ammunition.17 rials had to be reloaded on several lines to be shipped any distance. Two major lines ran northeast to southwest east MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION of the Appalachians. Unfortunately, they were only con- nected in two places. ovement of men and materials was as difficult for the One key supply route was Richmond to Atlanta with Mearly Confederacy as the acquisition of supplies and only one gap of 48 miles between Danville, VA and equipment. The North had 22,000 miles of railroads, the Greensboro, NC. The Confederate Congress appropriated South less than 9,000. Since most of the war was fought in $1 million in 1862 to complete the line. However, North the South, the Confederacy could use the railroads when Carolina planters were reluctant to allow their slaves to under their control early in the war. In fact, at the Battle of work on the project, iron rails could not be secured until First Manassas, General Joseph E. Johnston used the Man- the summer of 1864 and the shortsighted Governor Vance assas Gap railroad to bring his army of eight thousand with refused to allow the same gauge of rail in North Carolina supporting equipment to the battlefield, turning defeat as in Virginia.18 into victory. Key rail lines crossed at railheads such as Corinth, MS, Unfortunately, much of the southern railroad network a fact recognized by the Union command. The Battle of went from cotton growing areas to coastal seaports not Shiloh, TN, in April 1862 near Corinth was a tactical vic- north and south, which would have more effectively sup- tory for the South, but a strategic disaster. Probably aided ported the war effort. Building additional railroads by an insider, a Federal force shortly after the battle invad- required iron and the South produced only 7% of the ed Corinth, captured all the yards, shops and offices as well Nation’s pig iron. Replacing railroad equipment would as 18 locomotives, 100 freight cars and six passenger cars. prove to be extremely difficult. In 1860, of the 470 loco- Due to the loss of that vital junction, no locomotive trans-

Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress

The Orange & Alexandria Railroad in Manassas,VA was destroyed by Confederate forces during retreat.

Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 NPMA 23 ported men or materials again from Chattanooga to Mem- pressed to fill military orders.23 phis and a major east-west line that went all the way to Production of some materials, such as lead, was more Charleston, SC, on the coast was cut.19 successful. The Confederate government told the Union When the Provisional Congress in January 1862 made Lead Mining Co. of Wythe, VA, to either work their mines extensive visits to various depots, installations and depart- at capacity or the Government would nationalize them. ments, members wrote that the transportation of materiel The company opted to operate the mines for the CSA. was the responsibility of the Quartermaster General. They That mine is still in operation today as part of the New recommended more and larger depots at secure places near Jersey Zinc Company.24 the fields of operation. Furthermore, they recommended One advantage Confederate armies had early in the war direct military control over railroad service from Rich- was maintenance of small arms. Confederate weapons gen- mond, Nashville, Memphis and Atlanta to major army erally required less maintenance than those of the Union. headquarters. This plan had merit; however, states rights Standard Union weapons were the .30-caliber, pump- advocates in the Congress let the report die quietly and it action Remington and Springfield repeating rifles. These was never implemented.20 For some time transportation of repeaters enabled Northern troops to fire while prone; men, food and munitions was left to luck and the capabili- however, the pump action forced dirt into the mechanism ties of military officers and railway officers at the local causing frequent cleaning and maintenance. level. Government rail transportation continued to be The Confederates had a variety of pump and lever dependent on the efforts of local quartermasters and local action repeaters. The lever action restricted firing while railway agents.21 prone, but they were less prone to jam and required less maintenance due to dirt-clogged mechanisms. Mainte- STORAGE nance of weapons in the field was difficult for both sides, parts scarce and often not interchangeable. Generally, it n May 1861, Quartermaster General Myers rented an was easier to ship new weapons, capture weapons from Iold warehouse at 15th and Cary Streets in Richmond, Union forces or reassign them from the dead rather than VA and established the Clothing Bureau. He also set up an repair unserviceable ones. administrative headquarters and acquired additional ware- house space throughout the city. He appointed a staff that DISPOSITION manned offices in nineteen cities including Baton Rouge, Charleston, Savannah and Columbus. By 1862, major Con- ince the Confederate army could use just about any federate Quartermaster depots were located in Richmond, Sequipment, regardless of condition, virtually all dispo- Staunton, Raleigh, Atlanta, Columbus, Huntsville, Mont- sition was due to either damage or destruction during gomery, Jackson, Little Rock, Alexandria and San Antonio. combat, or loss through capture by Union forces. After numerous losses in the Eastern and Western campaigns in MAINTENANCE AND MATERIALS the spring of 1862, a Confederate Senate committee requested a report on the extent of spring losses. Quarter- ailroads of the Confederacy had no stockpile of sup- master General Myers claimed to be unable to state the Rplies either to maintain equipment or sustain opera- losses “even with approximate accuracy” but he was certain tions. The management of the Virginia and Tennessee of the “impossibility of replacing this vast amount of sup- Railroad stated in the autumn of 1861, “In the whole ply which have been lost.” 25 Tr y using that answer to an Confederacy, there is no manufacture of steel, locomotive, auditor today. tire, or many other articles absolutely necessary.”22 By the fall of 1861, rails had become so valuable that the owners TRANSITION: ANTIETAM, of The Mexican Gulf Railroad considered tearing up their line and advertising the rails for sale rather than continu- THE SOUTH’S FIRST BATTLE ing operations. Only a court injunction stopped them. ON NORTHERN SOIL Superintendent John M. Robinson of the Seaboard & Roanoke Line had used whale oil from New Bedford, MA, fter notable successes at the Seven Days Campaign and as the sole gear lubricant. Employees of the company were ASecond Manassas in Virginia, Army of Northern Vir- fed with bacon from Cincinnati, OH. Sources for both ginia Commanding General Robert E. Lee decided that an were now unavailable. The company erected a large smoke attack on a northern state would take some pressure off of house, killed hogs and cured pork for food and used the Southern armies elsewhere and provide an opportunity to refuse to create a lubricant to replace the whale oil. Cre- influence northern public opinion of the war. Unfortu- ativity may have solved the lubricant problem but a lack of nately for Lee, his army at this moment had never been “so metallic spares and components such as cylinder castings, dirty, ragged, and ill-provided for.”26 An expedition into springs and wheels were more difficult to obtain. The Maryland would allow Lee’s army to forage off the land. South had minimal production capability that was hard Subsistence was becoming a huge problem due to defeats

24 NPMA Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 in Tennessee severely reducing the pork supply. Bacon was caliber, .58 caliber, .56 caliber and .67 caliber. William the meat staple of the Confederate soldier. Allen wrote, “little system or order existed in the manage- In addition, railroads had been captured and rail lines ment or distribution of supplies.”27 Considering these cut. Lee knew that his forces would be far from depots and handicaps, Confederate artillery and infantry performed southern rail routes so provisions would have to be carried admirably at Antietam. in lengthy wagon trains. Infantrymen marched into battle at Antietam poorly Even though Josiah Gorgas had done a superb job of clothed and shod due to major supply depots and produc- obtaining arms and ammunition, Confederate forces at tion facilities being seized earlier in the year in Nashville Antietam were armed with a conglomeration of smooth and New Orleans. Long marches had taken their toll on bore and rifled small arms, various types of cannon, and poor quality boots and up to one third of the soldiers actu- often poor quality shells and fuses. One invoice for ammu- ally fought barefooted. Baggage wagons were at a premium nition issued in Sharpsburg (Antietam) dated September and replacement clothing and shoes were generally not 19, 1862, included small arms rounds of .54 caliber, .57 available. Newspaper reporter, Felix G. De Fontaine noted

Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress

Lincoln met with McClellan during the Antietam campaign. After the Union victory, he signed the Emancipation Proclamation

Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 NPMA 25 with some exaggeration that some southern regiments of standard policies and procedures would improve sup- could “charge and strip every dead Yankee’s feet they pass port and allow Confederate armies to fight for over two without coming to a halt.”28 more years. To deal with shortages, Lee issued general orders to The Union victory at Antietam emboldened President quartermaster officers to purchase supplies from civilians. Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation, which If unable to pay, they were to provide “certificates of gave hope to millions of slaves in the South. It also was a indebtedness of the Confederate States for future adjust- blow to the Confederate government and armies. As future ment.”29 In fact, he closed off the town of Fredericksburg, articles will document, logistical support helped provide MD to all but those on army business for several days. several opportunities for victory during the next two years, Unfortunately, quartermasters were only able to secure a but the first battle on enemy soil did not bode well for the thousand pairs of shoes and some clothing, not nearly future for either General Robert E. Lee or his Army of enough. Union garrisons at Martinsburg and Harper’s Northern Virginia. ◆ Ferry were raided for additional equipment and supplies. Few of the items captured ended up on official inventories, NOTES 1. Leslie D. Jensen, “A Survey of Confederate Central Government especially those captured by the cavalry. Many property Quartermaster Issue Jackets,” The Military Collector and Historian, managers today encounter similar challenges. Fall and Winter 1989.* Despite logistical problems, Lee’s forces performed 2. Dr. Steven E. Anders, “For Want of a Nail, a Brief History of the Quartermaster Supply Mission, Quartermaster Corps Historian, heroically at Antietam in the bloodiest single day of the April 2003.* war. The day after the worst casualties, September 18th, 3. Frank E. Vandiver, Ploughshares Into Swords, Texas A&M University, Lee decided to maintain his position. However, the next College Station, TX, 1994, p. 74. 4. Virtual American Biographies at http://famousamericans.net day he ordered a withdrawal across the Potomac. Even 5. W. Power Clancy, “Confederate Finance and Supply,” The Cincin- with a high bank and strong current, ’s nati Civil War Round Table, 1998.* quartermaster, Major John A. Harman, “swore” the wag- 6. Webb Garrison, Lincoln’s Little War, Rutledge Hill Press, Nashville, TN, p. 26. ons across the river. Jackson praised him neglecting to 7. Mike Wright, What They Didn’t Teach You About the Civil War, Pre- mention his colorful language. The army went into camp sidio Press, Navado, CA, 1996, p.73. and was supplied from the supply depot at Staunton, VA. 8. Sarah Woolfolk Wiggins (editor), The Journals of Josiah Gorgas 1857 – 1878, The Press, Tuscaloosa, AL, Also, foodstuffs were procured from the Shenandoah Val- 1995, p. 52. ley, which helped to alleviate the commissary shortages. 9. Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861 – 1865, New Many of the men in the army blamed incompetent York, Harper and Row, 1979, p. 76. 10. Frank E. Vandiver, Ploughshares into Swords, op. cit., p. 97. logisticians for the problems. Major Franklin Gaillard of 11. Confederate War Department website, http://www.csawardpt.com South Carolina told his wife that the army’s problems with 12. Frank E. Vandiver, 1001 Things Everyone Should Know About the losing stragglers could only be avoided by putting the Civil War, Doubleday, New York, 1999, p. 132. 13. Frank E. Vandiver, Ploughshares into Swords, op. cit., p. 56. Quartermaster, Commissary and Medical Departments in 14. Ibid., p. 67. better condition.30 Note that Gorgas’ Ordnance Depart- 15. Margaret E. Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher, Paul Finkleman, editors, ment was not included in the blame. Southern newspapers The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference, Simon and Schuster, New York 2002, p. 490. were also critical of supplies to the troops. An article titled 16. Ibid., p. 490. “Gross Management” in the Mobile Tribune alleged that 17. Ibid., p. 491. Government officials had failed to forward donated cloth- 18. Clement Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy, The Free 31 Press, New York, NY, 1954, p. 149 ing to the soldiers. In fact, contracts had been let in sev- 19. Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confederacy, The Univer- eral cities to produce clothing and shoes but raw materials sity of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, p. 143 had just about run out. 20. Ibid., p. 96. 21. Ibid., p. 97. To respond to the logistical complaints, Quartermaster 22. Ibid., p. 85. General Myers identified problems that still plague pro- 23. Ibid., p. 91. curement and property managers today. On October 1, 24. W. Power Clancy, “Confederate Finance and Supply,” op. cit.* 25. Harold S. Wilson, Confederate Industry, Manufacturers and Quar- 1862, Myers wrote an angry letter to the secretary of war termasters in the Civil War, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, stating that unit quartermasters were not sending requisi- MS, p. 35. tions through proper channels. He also referred to the 26. Gary W. Gallagher (editor), The Antietam Campaign, The Universi- ty of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1999, p. 101. common practice of quartermasters personally going to 27. Ibid., p. 105. Richmond to obtain supplies, circumventing the supply 28. Ibid., p. 108. system. General Lee recognized the problem and sent 29. Ibid., p. 109. 30. Ibid., p. 121. orders for quartermasters to “remain with their trains” and 31. Ibid., p. 122. that “their accounts would be examined (and the) property 32. Ibid., p. 130. inspected.”32 Lee understood the benefit of internal audit *Note: Articles reprinted on the web do not have page references and review. By January 1863, an order required all requisi- from the original reference. tions to be sent through their army’s quartermaster to the Quartermaster General in Richmond. The implementation

26 NPMA Volume 16, Issue 3 – 2004 BIBLIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE BOOKS Black, Robert C. III, Railroads of the Confederacy, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1998. Carter, Alice E. and Jensen, Richard, The Civil War on the Web, Schol- arly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, DE, 2003. Davis, William C., Look Away, A History of the Confederate States of America, The Free Press, New York, NY, 2002. Eaton, Clement, A History of the Southern Confederacy, The Free Press, New York, NY, 1954. Gallagher, Gary W. (editor), The Antietam Campaign, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1999. Garrison, Webb, Lincoln’s Little War, Rutledge Hill Press, Nashville, TN, 1997. McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom, The Civil War Era, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1988. McPherson, James M., Drawn with the Sword, Reflections on the , Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1996. Mississippi National Guard Staff Ride training materials, Jackson, MS, 21 –23 August 1987. Moore, Jerrold Northrop, Confederate Commissary General, White Mane Publishing Co., Inc., Shippensburg, PA, 1996. Nofi, Albert A., A Civil War Treasury, Castle Books, Edison, NJ, 1992. Thomas, Emory M., The Confederate Nation: 1861 – 1865, New York, Harper and Row, 1979. Vandiver, Frank E., 1001 Things Everyone Should Know About the Civil War, Doubleday, New York, NY, 1999. Vandiver, Frank E., Ploughshares Into Swords, Josiah Gorgas and Con- federate Ordnance, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 1994. Wagner, Margaret E., Gallagher, Gary W., and Finkelman, Paul (edi- tors), The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference, Simon and Schuster, New York 2002. Wiggins, Sarah Woolfolk (editor), The Journals of Josiah Gorgas 1857 – 1878, The University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, AL, 1995. Wilson, Harold S., Confederate Industry, Manufacturers and Quarter- masters in the Civil War, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, 2002. Wright, Mike, What They Didn’t Teach You About the Civil War, Pre- sidio Press, Navado, CA, 1996.

ARTICLES/WEBSITES Anders, Dr. Steven E., “For Want of a Nail, a Brief History of the Quar- termaster Supply Mission,” Quartermaster Corps Historian, April 2003. Aronson, Alan, “Strategic Supply of Civil War Armies,” at http://world.std.com Boaz, Thomas, “Guns for Cotton: Arming the Confederacy from Eng- land,” originally published in the Camp Chase Gazette (Vol. XXI, No. 5), April 1994. Clancy, W. Power, “Confederate Finance and Supply,” The Cincinnati Civil War Round Table, 1998. Confederate War Department website, http://www.csawardpt.com. “The Effects of the War for Southron Independence on the Home- front” at www.angelfire.com. Gillespie, Major William T., Jr., “Logistics and Lee’s Antietam Cam- paign,” US Army Logistics Management College, Jan Feb 03 Jensen, Leslie D., “A Survey of Confederate Central Government Quartermaster Issue Jackets,” The Military Collector and Historian, Fall and Winter 1989. Virtual American Biographies at http://famousamericans.net

FRED D. SETH JR. CPPM, CF, served 25 years as a logistician/sup- ply officer in the U. S. Marine Corps, retiring in 1991 as a Lieutenant Colonel. While with Westinghouse Savannah River Company worked on a team that restructured property management at the site. Was property manager at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). For past five and half years, has been a Senior Consultant and Engagement Director with American Appraisal Associates, assisting clients in maximizing their property management programs. Fred acted as VP Certification for two terms and coordinated the publish- ing of The Standard Property Book.

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