AFRICAN JOURNAL OF GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT • Volume 2 • Number December 2013 AFRICAN JOURNAL OF GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT AFRICAN JOURNAL OF GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT

Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 African Journal of Governance and Development Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013

Editors EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Vernon Damani Johnson Western Washington University (USA)

ASSISTANT-EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Thenjiwe Meyiwa Human Sciences Research Council (RSA)

MANAGING EDITOR Simão Nhambi University of St Thomas of Mozambique

REVIEW EDITORS Betty Mubangizi University of KwaZulu-Natal (RSA) Babafemi Akinrinade Western Washington University (USA)

LANGUAGE EDITORS Gaylene Jablonkay (English) Anastacio Chembeze and Odete Raposo (Portuguese)

Honorary Editor Joaquim Alberto Chissano Fundação Joaquim Chissano

Publishers Centro de Investigação Científica (CIC) University of St Thomas of Mozambique (USTM) Avenida Ahmed Sekou Toure, 610, Maputo, Mozambique Tel: +258 21 49 11 35 • Fax: +258 21 49 11 34 Email: [email protected] • www.ustm.ac.mz

Artworks Communications 30 Steel Road, Morningside, Durban 4001 (RSA) Tel: +27 31 303 6466 • Fax: +27 31 303 4493 Email: [email protected] • www.artworks.co.za

Número de Registo: 7152/RLIND/2011

ISSN: 2218-5615

Copyright © USTM, 2013.

The views outlined in individual contributions are not necessarily those of the University of St Thomas of Mozambique.

Disclaimer: While every care has been taken in the compilation of this publication, no liability can be accepted by the publishers or editor for any errors or omissions that may have occurred. Contents Introduction: Nurturing good governance in Africa...... 3 Betty mubangizi and simÄO NHAMBI

Good governance and economic development: The challenges of democratic sustainability in Nigeria...... 4 Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa

Rethinking deification, gerontocracy and clientelism in the Nigerian political space...... 18 Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode

African leaders and trust deficit culture: Power, politics, and the Nigerian polity under General Ibrahim B. Babangida (1985-1993)...... 33 Donald O. Omagu

Perception of public corruption in Kenya...... 55 DOUGLAS KIMEMIA

Health diplomacy and public policy in Nigeria: The impact of the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes...... 72 Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene

Contributor’s biographies...... 87

Guide for authors...... 88

Referencing...... 89 Editors Editor-in-Chief Vernon Damani Johnson, Western Washington University (USA) Assistant-Editor-in-Chief Thenjiwe Meyiwa, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Managing Editor Simão Nhambi, University of St Thomas of Mozambique Review Editors Betty Mubangizi, University of KwaZulu-Natal, RSA • Babafemi Akinrinade of Western Washington University Honorary Editor Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Fundação Joaquim Chissano Editorial board Ahmed Jazbhay University of South Africa David Moore University of Johannesburg, RSA Elisio Macamo Basel University, Switzerland Lawrence Hamilton University of Johannesburg, RSA Lisa Aubrey Arizona State University, USA Maleshoane Mathonsi-Rapeane National University of Lesotho Margaret Lee University of North Carolina, USA Mario Cumbe Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Mozambique Pearl Sithole University of KwaZulu-Natal, RSA Pierre Matungul University of St Thomas of Mozambique Regis Chireshe University of South Africa Romain Francis University of South Africa Sergio Inácio Chichava Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Mozambique Stephan Meyer Basel University, Switzerland Ushotanefe Useh North West University, RSA José Chichava Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Mozambique Nurturing good governance in Africa Betty Mubangizi and Simão Nhambi

We present this issue in the aftermath of the passing of Nelson Mandela – a leader whose commitment to the liberation and rennaissance of Africa and to equality and social justice remains unrivalled; a leader who many around the world associate with good governance and development on the continent. As we reflect on Mandela’s legacy, we think of him as a good leader whose charisma could inspire people to do more and better, and thus achieve desirable results towards development. It is common knowledge that the success or failure of our development policies occur through the lack of good leadership rather than lack of capacity, know-how or skills. Corruption, self-enrichment and nepotism are some of the undesirable acts that prevail when leadership and accountability are absent. During his presidency and post-presidency, amid technical and obviously human limitations, Nelson Mandela gave his best to shape policy and influence the world. As the world mourns this iconic leader, his words are echoed unchallenged by every continent: “I would like it to be said, here lies the man who has done his duty on Earth. That is all.” (Nelson Mandela) The African Journal of Governance and Development draws on Mandela’s commitment to governance and development on the African continent and seeks to unpack, interrogate and critique these values and concepts. This issue is no different and, drawing largely from West Africa, examines underlying factors impacting governance on the African continent. In the first article, Bolarinwa discusses the challenges of democratic sustainability in Nigeria with respect to good governance and economic development. Bolarinwa observes that promotion of good governance at all levels of authority remains the greatest antidote to the problem of democratic sustenance in Nigeria. Oyebode interrogates issues of culture as infused into deification, gerontology and clientelism and the extent to which they impact the relationship between the citizens and those in government, with dire consequences for societal well-being. Against this backdrop, Omagu submits that military coup d’états have become the institutionalised method for changing governments in many African countries. He then examines the heightened waves of military incursions, with particular emphasis on General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime in Nigeria. He concludes that African leaders fall short of their promise when they vie for public office to fight for the people and promote good governance. Kimemia discusses the perception of public corruption in Kenya. He contends that regardless of the resources spent on anti-corruption initiatives, Kenyans seem more pessimistic about the trend of corruption, hence the inflated public perception of corruption. Kimemia attributes this to the lack of prosecuting power and ‘big fish versus small fish syndrome’. The discussion concludes that government officials who have unjustly enriched themselves with public funds and assets should be charged in a court of law regardless of their position in government. As the target date to achieve the Millennium Development Goals approaches, policy makers in Africa are taking stock of what is, was and could have been. As corruption pervades administrative processes and threatens good governance and accountability, pressure is on public service to rid itself of this evil. This Issue of the African Journal of Governance and Development is thus timely and relevant in that it offers a glimpse into the thinking of scholars on the continent. It is clear from the discussions in this issue that scholars on the continent are concerned about a range of subjects relating to declining good governance. But there is hope for Africa. According to the Chair of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Africa’s economies have come a long way since the difficult and challenging 1980s and 1990s. At the time, most of Africa’s economies were saddled with high foreign debts and burdened by inflation. The overall GDP growth of Africa’s economies was very low, at about 2% per annum. Presently, the continent has turned the corner in that foreign debts are in decline, inflation is under control in most countries, and foreign direct investments are positively flowing back onto the continent. It is crucial that these gains be sustained through good governance processes of the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. It is not only to politicians that the continent will look to nurture these values, it is also to a functional public service that is alive to Africa’s challenges; committed to ethics, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector and alive to the needs of those living on the margins of society.

Introduction 3 Good governance and economic development: The challenges of democratic sustainability in Nigeria Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa Abstract Perhaps the greatest problem facing Nigeria’s post-colonial state is that of democratic sustainability. Having experienced transition from colonial autocracy to independence and civil rule in 1960, Nigeria was touted as one country in sub-Saharan Africa that would likely make steady progress towards democracy and good governance. But with military intervention in politics way back on 15 January 1966, truncating the progress of the First Republic, there has been both political and governmental instability. The country has experienced the woes of bad governance, massive corruption, human rights abuses and economic deprivation from greedy civilian political leaders and military dictators. Good governance deals with the manner in which a country is governed; the process of selecting the leaders articulating national objectives; formulating policies; and the extent to which the government is performing the primary duty of advancing the welfare of its citizens. This paper examines the concept of governance and identifies the cannons of good governance. It holds that poor governance manifests itself in corruption, political instability, civil strife and conflicts, and that these impact negatively on our development efforts. It thus argues that there can be no development without good governance and recommends certain steps to enthrone good governance and enhance the welfare of the citizens, which is the ultimate goal of economic development.

Keywords: democracy, good governance, economic development, corruption, democratic sustainability Sumário Talvez o maior problema que o estado Nigeriano pós-independência enfrentou é o de sustentação democrática. Tendo experimentado transição de autocracia colonial para independência e poder civil em 1960, Nigéria foi tido como um país na África Sub-Sahariana que vai provavelmente fazer progresso estável para democracia e boa governação. Entretanto, com a intervenção militar na política, no longínquo 15 de Janeiro de 1966, trancando o progresso da Primeira República, a história foi de tanta instabilidade política e governamental. O país experimentou as angústias de má governação, corrupção massiva, abusos dos direitos humanos e perdas pelos líderes políticos civis e ditadores militares. A Boa Governação lida com a maneira e a forma como o país é governado: o processo de selecção de líderes articulando objectivos nacionais; formulação de políticas e a dimensão pela qual o governo desempenha o seu papel primário de promover o bem-estar para os seus cidadãos. O presente estudo examina o conceito de governação e identifica os cânones de Boa Bovernação. O mesmo, assegura que a má governação manifesta-se em corrupção, instabilidade

4 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 política, contenda civil e conflitos, e estes têm um impacto negativo nos nossos esforços de desenvolvimento. Deste modo, o autor, argumenta que não poderá haver desenvolvimento sem Boa Governação recomenda certos passos para entronizar boa governação e melhorar o bem-estar dos cidadãos, que é o fim último do desenvolvimento económico.

Palavras chave: democracia, boa governação, desenvolvimento económico, corrupção, sustentabilidade democrática Introduction Democracy is arguably the most popular form of government in the world today. Within the last two decades, it has emerged as the most sought-after political system across the planet. Although it is indisputable that democracy cannot solve all of mankind’s problems, we must also admit that we cannot solve many of those problems without democracy thus necessitating its sustainability. Different scholars have conceptualised democracy in different forms; one of America’s founding fathers, Abraham Lincoln defined it as “the government of the people by the people and for the people”. This presupposes that democracy is hinged on the active involvement and participation of the people in governance. The word democracy itself is a derivative of two Greek words, ‘demos’ which means the ‘people’ and ‘kratein’ which means ‘rule of’ or ‘rule by’. This suggests that democracy means ‘rule by the people’, and it reinforces our conception of democracy as being anchored on popular participation (Babawale, 2007:7). In the public realm, governance refers to the extent to which the government is running the affairs of the nation in the best interest of its citizens. There is political governance (how political power is acquired and exercised) and economic governance (how economic policies and programmes are initiated and executed). Another aspect of governance concerns businesses and here we talk of corporate governance (how corporations are managed for the interest of all the stakeholders). Good governance has become an issue of global importance. As country after country shamefully slid into avoidable debt traps and indescribable poverty, multilateral institutions started paying attention to government machineries, institutions and processes, believing that the answers might be found therein. Towards the end of the last century for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) started paying more attention to governance issues like military spending, democracy, human rights, corruption, and crony-capitalism because it believed that addressing them would provide markets with better information, ensure greater transparency, and limit the irrational destructiveness of financial crises (Muo, 2007:420). Public governance has two dimensions – political (how power is acquired and utilised) and economic (how economic policies and programmes are conceptualised, executed and evaluated). The issue of governance arises primarily from the social contract between political leaders and the followers. Followers hand over their sovereignty and resources to the leaders on the implied condition that they govern in the best interest of the governed. This best interest is ascertained through the constitution of the country, the manifesto of the leading party and other democratic

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 5 means of finding out what the people prefer. Governance then is an examination of howthe government is fulfilling this all-important contract with the people. In specific terms, governance has been defined as ‘Policy making and policy execution regulated by systems of laws and guidelines which are segregated into specific operations to achieve specific national objectives, and it is achieved through good public policies with clear objectives. Good governance, which guides the country towards a desired goal, in this case development, which includes concepts of equity, social justice and effective exercise human rights (Muo, 2007:420),can also be a process that enables people to utilise collective power to manage their affairs in the most effective and efficient manner and in accordance with their collective needs and aspirations, cultures and traditions. It requires the development of skill and capability in utilising and managing the political power of government for maximisation of the welfare of the people. The state’s institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making processes and implementation capacities, and the relationship between government officials and the public (UNDP Nigeria, 2003:15). Todaro and Smith, (2003:712), argue that good governance goes beyond the absence of corruption to include the ability of the public sector to design and implement efficient and effective policies to realise development goals, government responsiveness and respect for citizens and institutions of society and mechanisms for peaceful transfer of power in accordance with popular will, including widespread participation. Ozigbo (2004:17) differentiates between mere governance (the capacities for exercising authority) and good governance which depends on the “extent to which a government is perceived and accepted as legitimate, committed to improving the public welfare and responsive to the needs of its citizens; competent to assure law and order and deliver public services; able to create an enabling policy environment for productive activities and equitable in its conduct, while Ovia (2005:14) emphasises its building blocks, which include public accountability, transparency, predictability of government behaviour, and adherence to the rule of law, equity and social justice. Development, on the other hand, has been traditionally seen as significant increases in the levels of GNP/GDP and the resultant per capita income. These figures were eventually discounted for inflation. It was seen as a country’s ability to expand its output faster than the population growth rate. These perspectives were mostly economic and quantitative; they provided average measures; there has never been an average citizen; and it did not reckon much with poverty, income distribution, employment and other social indicators of well-being. Measures of development have, however, gone beyond this level with more emphasis given to qualitative and human-interest issues including freedom and cultural liberalism (Muo, 2006b:6). Successive administrations have performed woefully in terms of good governance. With the pervasive culture of poverty, Nigeria is not the best example of democratic sustainability. Therefore, this paper critically examines the concept and practice of good governance and tries to show the interconnection between it and economic development as a necessity for democratic sustainability.

6 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Conceptualising governance and good governance Governance is perhaps not a new expression in the extant political science literature; it generally refers to the task of running a government or any other organised entity. However, the attempt to make conceptual use of the expression was made popular in the literature on African development by the World Bank publication Sub-Sahara Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, (1989), which saw the African political and economic problem as a crisis of governance. Scholars have so far made a series of attempts, even though inconclusive; to define governance, but the attempt is only subject to individual perception, especially as it relates to their private social, economic and political endeavours. Governance can be defined as “the fundamental process by which the lives and dreams of a people are jointly pursued through deliberate and systematic strategies and policies for the attainment of their maximum potential. It is the combination of responsible leadership and enlightened public participation” (Muo, 2006b:9). Governance, rather than being perceived in political terms as an institution, is construed as “the management of the lives of the people in a systematic, organized way for the best possible results, using the consensus of the people’s will, vision and wisdom” (Muo, 2006b:10). With this definition, one is not restricting governance to a political institution as would have been envisaged, but to include all human collectivity. According to Bello-Imam: Governance entails:

the mechanisms whereby an institution or organization (be it family, the nation-state or elements of it) incorporates the participation of relevant interest groups in defining the scope and content of its work – including the capacity to mediate among these interests when they enter into conflict – and the means whereby it demonstrates accountability to those who support it. (Bello-Immam, 1997:13).

Coming back to national issues, a United Nations report actually defined governance as the existence of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs. According to the United Nations report, “it is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences” (UN Report,1997:35). Governance has also been referred to as the functions undertaken by a government in maintaining a unified state, defending the territorial integrity and running its economy, i.e. an effective and efficient functioning of government towards securing the well-being of its citizens. In short, governance is the sum total of the many ways individuals (citizens) and institutions, both public and private, manage their common affairs, that is, a continuing process through which conflicting and diverse interests and needs may be accommodated and co-operative actions taken (Muo, 2007:5). If governance embraces all of the methods – good and bad – that societies use to distribute power and manage public resources and problems, good governance is therefore a sub-set of

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 7 governance wherein public resources and problems are managed effectively, efficiently and in response to critical needs of society. Effective democratic forms of governance ideally should rely on public participation, accountability and transparency. This implies a high level of organisational effectiveness in relation to policy formulation and the policies actually pursued, especially in the conduct of economic policy and its contribution to growth, stability and popular welfare. This good governance also includes openness and the rule of law. As a necessary condition for development, a system of good governance in a limited administrative sense would consist of a set of rules and institutions (that is, a legal framework for development) and a system of public administration, which is open, transparent, efficient and accountable. Such a system would provide clarity, stability, and predictability for the private sector, which would constitute the essential engine of economic development and in turn, democratic sustainability in a ‘market friendly’ development strategy. In recent years, people have been much more concerned about good governance than anything else, especially as an attempt to sustain and consolidate hard-won democracy, which continues to gain ground. Good governance in this context involves a normative judgement, which indicates a preferred condition that should ideally govern the relationship between state and society and between a government and a people. According to Biyi Adegoroye in a newspaper report New Nigeria (3 October 2000:8), “Good governance is the positive actions undertaken by a government to promote democracy and achieve social justice”. For governance to be considered good however, scholars like Muo, Babawale, Diamond and James, among others, have come out with the following attributes: accountability based on the notion of popular sovereignty and public choice; a legal framework that guarantees the rule of law and due process; popular participation in decision-making processes based on political and social pluralism and on freedom of association and expression; and bureaucratic accountability based on impersonality of office, uniform application of rules, and rationality of an organisational structure. Using the UNDP (2003:13) report, characteristics of good governance include: participatory activities; sustainability; legitimacy and acceptability to the people; transparency; promotion of equity and equality; the ability to develop the resources and methods of governance; promotion of gender balance; toleration and acceptance of diverse perspectives; the ability to mobilise resources for social purposes; the strengthening of indigenous mechanisms; the operation by rule of law; efficient and effective use of resources; the engendering and commanding of respect and trust; accountability; the ability to define and take ownership of national issues; being enabling and facilitative; regulatory rather than controlling; being able to deal with temporal issues; and being service-oriented. The nature and scope of economic development Alkali (1997:45) citing Seers (1971:56) holds that in discussing development, three questions are critical: What has been happening to poverty; what has been happening to unemployment and what has been happening inequality? He then goes on to argue that development could not have taken place unless these three variables were declining. Mabogunje (1980:45) sees it as a dynamic process that involves quantitative growth and qualitative change, and must ultimately

8 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 lead to improved material welfare of the people. Rodney (1972:9), who criticises capitalist intellectuals for concentrating on economic development, takes it from the individual level as implying increased skills and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being and agrees that this is tied to the state of the society as a whole. Arnold, (1985:23) sees development as also including intangible elements like the way the political system is operated, the manner in which the social or ethnic groups work together and fit into the state structure, the social, scientific and cultural assumption upon which the society as a whole rests. Emmanuel (2005:4) posits that in addition to the improvement in the standards of living that encompass material consumption, education, health and environmental protection, development involves equal opportunities, political freedom and civil liberties. New perspectives and measures of development have thus emerged over the years. Proponents of these new measures include A. Sen (1998 Nobel Laureate) who propounded the capabilities concept and the UNDP, which developed the Human Development Index (based on longevity, knowledge and standard of living). Concerns for poverty eradication, redistribution of income or elimination of inequality, the war against unemployment, levels of literacy, longevity, nutritional intake and cultural freedoms, are now critical issues in development. The World Bank articulated this new perspective when it stated in its 1990 report that “the challenge of economic development is to improve the quality of life. A better quality of life calls for higher incomes but it involves much more. It encompasses as ends in themselves, better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom and a richer cultural life”. It is important to stress that development goes beyond economics and economic issues. Nevertheless, the fact remains that other aspects of development cannot materialise without stable economic fundamentals and indeed, the economic aspects cannot fare well without these aspects. Sandstorm (2005:24) deepens and widens the concept of development to include an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives; an inner dimension which incorporates the moral and spiritual angles – people becoming better people; and cultural liberty. He holds that development is a people’s movement, not a government-funded affair since development issues relate to values and relationships that cannot be bought with government funding, and that the ultimate goal of development is freeing the human being to become as good a human being as humanly possible. Korten (1990:2) brings in the issue of foreign support for development and reminds foreign agencies, donors and governments that their contributions would be measured in terms of the enhanced capacity of the people to determine their own future. From this new thinking, the following are generally accepted as the core values of development. Sustenance is the ability to meet basic needs of the people – food, shelter, health, security. All economic policies should thus be geared at providing as many people as possible with the capability to overcome the misery and helplessness arising from the lack of these basics. Self- esteem (to be a person) involves enhancing the sense of worth and self-respect of individuals – a dignity, honour and a feeling of not being used as tools by others. Freedom from servitude

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 9 is to be able to choose. Freedom is defined as a sense of emancipation from alienating material conditions of life and from social servitude to nature, ignorance, other people, misery, institutions and dogmatic beliefs. In this case, it is important to note that while wealth does not increase happiness, it increases the range of human choice. Good governance, corruption and development Good governance, among other things, involves prioritising due process, constitutionalism, rule of law, transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs. The absence of good governance and its byproducts, automatically leads to two negative outcomes: massive corruption and political instability. None of these outcomes is conducive to development. Corruption is a multiplex and hydra-headed phenomenon that defies a simple definition. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 29 September 2000 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for instance, lists up to 18 corrupt practices. Two definitions underscore the complexity of corruption. Corruption means different things to different people: in ordinary parlance, corruption means any dishonest or illegal act, immoral behaviour, any conduct that smacks of cheating, indecency, and/or a violation of normative values of society like sexual abuse. From a jurisprudential angle, corruption has been defined as the abuse of public or entrusted power for personal gain or the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. Put differently, corruption means the use of public office or power or position for private benefit as when a public officer in the discharge of his official duties collects a bribe to enrich his own pocket, shows favour or even bends the operative rule to gratify him or confer an unfair advantage for a fee. Corruption manifests in various forms such as outright misappropriation of public resources for purely private or dishonest use, nepotism, or disregard for accountability in exercising discretion in a matter in which the officer is vested with monopolistic or entrusted power (Akanbi, 2004:13). Corruption is the illegal, unethical and unauthorised exploitation of one’s political or official position for personal gain or advantage; it is a means of influence. It includes payoffs, kickbacks, gifts and bribery, graft, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds. These things do not mean the same thing. For instance, bribery means giving something to somebody in order to influence; graft means taking wrong advantage of connections in politics; nepotism involves people in high places giving special and undeserved favour to their relatives; misappropriation means to take and use someone else’s money wrongly (Ujomu, 2004:32, Gyekye,1997:193 and Goldstein,1999:418). Corruption is a universal phenomenon but in Nigeria, it has reached alarming levels. As the economy continued with its downward plunge, corruption worsened in proportion. The paradox of the present scenario is that no president of Nigeria has spoken on the need to fight corruption as Obasanjo has done, or has even established institutions and structures for that purpose. Yet Nigeria has the dubious honour of being the sixth most corrupt country in the world and this is an improvement on its previous position! Despite the Independent and Corrupt Practices Tribunal, the Due Process Office, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and thousands of sanctimonious presidential declarations, Nigeria is still regularly beset by corrupt deals in the

10 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 public sector (especially petroleum, politicians and the police), and National Assembly, with the Presidency being fingered as the most corrupt office in Nigeria. Of course, there is corruption in the private sector but since, government dominates all aspects of the economy, and corruption by its agents has more devastating impacts (Muo, 2004:6). The tales of corruption coming out of Nigeria are so scandalously common that the nature, number and quantum of such reports no longer shock Nigerians. The most recent one includes the bribery-for-vote scandal in the Ekiti rerun election where the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officials were alleged to have taken money from a political party. Unfortunately, the government also appears not to be serious about fighting corruption as can be deduced from the duplication of responsibilities, the under-funding of the agencies, and perceived selectivity in the operations of the Independent Corrupt Practices and 0ther Related Offenses Commission (ICPC). This is generally due to the failure and virtual collapse of governance, the contamination of democratic values, the erosion of accountability and the prevalence of bad leadership. The erosion of public confidence in the country’s political and economic institutions promoted a culture of contempt for the rule of law and ultimately and unfortunately, a social tolerance for a myriad of practices previously considered abominable (Obasanjo, 2004:29). Democratic sustainability Sustainability as in consolidation is the process by which democracies become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves, according to Larry Diamond (1995:13), behavioural and institutional changes that normalise democratic politics and narrows its uncertainty. This normalisation requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training and other functions that civil society performs. However, most of all, and most urgently, it requires political institutionalisation. A democracy can best be sustained when the people have good reason to believe that it is capable of withstanding pressure or shocks (including dissent and opposition) without abandoning the electoral process or the political freedom on which it depends. Moreover, this will require a depth of institutionalisation reaching beyond the electoral process itself. From these, however, a variety of different criteria have been proposed in the literature in order to identify a sustained democracy. According to J. Linz (1990:143-164), one of these is the two-election test, or more accurately, the transfer of power test. Democracy is consolidated when a government that has itself been elected in a free and fair contest is defeated in a subsequent election and accepts the result. The point of this criterion is that it is not winning office that matters, but losing it and accepting the verdict, because this demonstrates that powerful players and their social backers are prepared to put respect for the rules of the game above the continuation of their power. The second criterion favours a simple longevity or generation test. Approximately twenty years of regular, competitive elections are sufficient to judge a consolidated democracy, even without a change of ruling party, since habituation of the electoral process would make any alternative method for appointing rulers unthinkable.

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 11 Apart from these two criteria, democracies emerge and become sustained, not out of any principled commitment to democratic norms, but when the major political players recognise sufficient common interest in establishing electoral procedures and subsequently see that keeping to the rules of the game outweighs the costs of them being undermined. The foregoing has demonstrated that the sustainability of democracy is a product of many factors or conditions operating together. No one condition on its own will be either necessary or sufficient but an accumulation of facilitating conditions can be expected to enhance prospects for the survival of electoral democracy. The project is clearly more difficult in some circumstances than others, and faces much more formidable obstacles in some countries than others. It is a task in the social sciences to identify these circumstances and subject them to comparative analysis. The concept of democratic sustainability has the problem of not being able to be classified correctly as its boundaries are fuzzy and fluid. For the purpose of this paper however, democratic sustainability means the capacity of the polity to nurture and consolidate democracy over a very long time with little or no threat to the abortion of democratic experiment in whatever form and pretence (Ibid, p. 166). Challenges of good governance in Nigeria Good governance has been an elusive challenge in Nigeria, as in most other African countries. The reasons are complex, but I have decided to classify them into legitimacy, leadership and popular participation. In Nigeria, the greatest threat to governmental legitimacy is the military, which has turned itself into a posse of political gladiators in the battle for the control of the state through incessant intervention in politics and government. For instance, on eleven different occasions, because of the military’s desire to control the state, Nigeria went through endured coup d’états, which failed, aborted or succeeded. Between 1960 and 1999, Nigeria has had seven military Heads of State and many coup victims. At last count, over 117 people, both military and civilian, have been executed over coup charges. Military governments are harbingers of instability as while a bad civilian government can be voted out at the next election (even though uncommon in the Nigerian context),a military coup is the only way to remove a bad military government (Azeez, 2002:343). Not only that, military rule is devoid of the legitimising role of popular participation in government and politics. Voting at elections, election campaigns, political rallies, public assemblies and procession on public issues and other forms of popular participation, are all part of the process for good governance; with all these banned under a military regime, the country reverts to being a colonial state. The people can therefore hardly be blamed if they continue to think of the government during military rule the same way as they did in colonial days. On leadership, it was discovered that governance is a complex responsibility where even an honest, decent leader may not understand the intricacies of his undertakings and what it means to govern, and may not have or know what it takes to govern properly. The political history of Nigeria is replete with failed attempts at good governance, epitomised principally by the inability of the

12 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 leadership to forge a cohesive coalition of the different nationalities comprising the nation-state. Nigeria’s segmented character is unique, with well over 250 ethnic-linguistic groups, some of which are bigger than many independent states of Africa. For instance, at the beginning of the 60s, there were 3 000 tribes or ethnic groups in the world. About 1000 were represented in the continent of Africa and over 30 of those are found in Nigeria today. This creates a problem unknown to the experience of other people in the world. No Western or Eastern civilization has ever evolved a political system that can cope with this gigantic problem of ‘hyper-ethnic instability syndrome’. This is problematic in the sense that plural and segmented societies consider themselves biologically, culturally, linguistically and socially distinct from each other, and most often view their relations in actual or potentially antagonistic terms, (Azeez, 2002:344). And because of mistrust and unhealthy rivalries among these different ethnic groups, the struggle for power, particularly at the federal level, has always been vicious and sometimes violent. Even when national political parties were formed, these always broke down along ethnic and regional lines (AC, APGA are good examples). Access to political power in terms of sharing political office, resource appropriation and revenue allocation at the federal level, is conceived as an advantage to appropriate federal resources in favour of the particular ethnic group(s) in power to the detriment of the ones that are left out, with every region claiming marginalisation. Consequently, ethnic, cultural and religious barriers were not harmonised through an equitable and impartial balance of interests. Disparities, rather than diminishing with independence, were deepened and widened. The results were lack of commitment to wards ensuring good governance, gross violations of human rights, and the repression of the energies of the people, which could have been constructively released for development and nation-building purposes. Another problem of the leadership is that of corruption at all levels of governance. Corruption has always been an obstacle to the effective realisation of enduring democracy, good governance and protection of human rights. In all practical terms, “corruption makes nonsense of all fiscal planning and budgeting. It wastefully depletes the nation’s inadequate resources. It also promotes inequality and renders it almost impossible for citizens to address the objectives of- equity and justice in their society,” (Azeez, 2002:344b). The magnitude of corruption and the absence of probity, equity, accountability and patriotism that characterised the leadership and institutions over which the state presides can be regarded as a greater threat to a sustainable democracy from which the state must be rescued. It needs be emphasised that the challenges of good governance have also been attributed to popular participation of the citizenry in the day-to-day running of government. Beyond the pervasive culture of poverty that renders African governments too weak to attain greater efficiency because of their limited resources, the available scarce resources are far from being judiciously used. Although corruption takes a large chunk of the scarce resources, wastages and palpable inefficiency makes alienates government from the citizenry. In an insightful piece, Femi Otubanjo, a political scientist, bemoaned the spate of civil uprisings against constituted authorities, which raised a fundamental question about the relationship between the Nigerian state and her citizenry.

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 13 The indication is that there was a simmering feeling of exasperation among many, which carried with it a readiness to renege on the obligation to obey the law or even take up arms against the state. This observation was made in 1989, but the deplorable living conditions of the average Nigerian of all strata of the society then is nothing when juxtaposed with the present state of poverty and squalour. Compounding the problems of the citizenry is the civil society in Nigeria, which unlike other African countries exhibits clear traits of weakness. The civil society suffers from some limitations in its capacity to serve as vanguard for democratic sustainability and the promotion of popular participation. It is beleaguered by an authoritarian state and has to contend with a very strong state either under military autocracy or one-party rule. The civil society is rather segmentary and non-inclusive because it contends also with regional and religious factionalism, with membership dominated by a particular ethnic group. This segmentation usually undermines national alliances around common demands. In some cases, the ruling elite skew issues to their own advantage and at the expense of the nascent democratic culture and its sustainability; they exacerbate the divisive tendencies of the civil society. Another problem of the Nigerian civil society is that it is non-combative in its struggle for democracy, whereas democracy is never handed down arbitrarily; it is always fought for. The embarrassing level of illiteracy and general mediocrity limits the mobilisation of the civil society in its perennial democratic struggle and consolidation. Lastly, there is a growing impatience with what democracy and constitutionalism have to offer to the nation, and the undue expectation on immediate material gains to the detriment of democratic and constitutional ideals maturing to a reasonable extent. The overbearing problems of ignorance have consequently resulted into frequent invitations to the military to intervene. The calls have practically proven to devastate attempts at good governance, which would guarantee a sustainable democratic polity (Azeez, 2002: 345-347). Suggestions on the improvement of good governance and sustainability of democracy Democracy can be sustained if the military (and other agents of violence) are made subordinate to elected civilian control. Obviously, the military need to renounce political activities to be restructured, professionalised and reoriented for it to be able to defend democracy. This is because civilian control of the armed services is an essential aspect of government of, by and for the people. In a democracy, the majority decides public policy, and citizens are subject to the rule of law instead of brute force. There is the need also to depoliticise the armed forces, redefine military priorities, programmes and commitments, reassert civilian supremacy, and institute strong and effective mechanisms for achieving democratic control. In fact, it was one of the first problems tackled by President Obasanjo’s government, given the sectional and tyrannical use to which the military was put under the Babangida and the Abacha administration. Military restructuring was part of the larger question of political restructuring and was aimed at ensuring a regionally balanced and ethnically representative force meant for an enduring democracy.

14 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Democratic stability presupposes that a people have, at a given time, the government that they prefer and that this government will be one that pursues their interest. This is a condition for stable government. An amoral milieu, as under military regimes, debilitates the effectiveness of the state as it renders it incapable of enforcing its policies, making it a rather soft state. Governance in Nigeria, although frustrating, demanding and only occasionally gratifying, obviously requires commitment for it to be effective. The call for military intervention as a solution to civilian negligence in governance is totally misplaced. Equally, for democracy to be sustained, people must continue to identify with the chosen unit of democratic decision-making. If democracy is understood to mean equality, there is little likelihood of continuing support for a regime that leaves the gross inequality of wealth unattended and continues to entrench impoverished daily living conditions or retards the economy through inefficiency and/or corruption. Thus, sustained economic development and equitable distribution of wealth are prerequisites for good governance and democratic sustainability. It is argued that peace promotes development, but only equitable development can promote peace. In an atmosphere of peace and promotion of social justice and economic development, democracy continues to thrive and is subsequently sustained. In the extant literature on democracy and good governance, with regards to sustainability generally, there seems to be a kind of consensus that without accountability, probity and transparency in the conduct of public affairs, democratic sustainability will be a mirage. By United Nation’s standards, accountability is: the ability to hold public officials and their representatives to a standard of conduct that is clearly in the public interest. This requires rules of conduct that are transparent, straight forward and broadly accepted in society, as well as administrative and legal processes to discipline or remove officials who do not respect such rules (UN Report, 2007:30). Weak accountability mechanisms tend to facilitate corruption and other abuses of office and thereby undermine governance. Therefore, for governance to be considered good, it must be open, which suggests that policies are generally subject to prior consultation and public discussion and that there is a legally enforceable right of public access to government records, the publishing of government functions and the right of the public to attend meetings of various government bodies. Through transparency, government procedures are to be widely understood and decisions concerning the use of public resources are to be subject to scrutiny. Moreover, another guarantee that a government will remain democratic is the existence of a strong opposition; no political system can be considered democratic in the absence of countervailing centres of power. A system of governance where there is a healthy competition between opposing political parties and where voters cast their votes for the candidates of their choice remains the best way of forestalling authoritarianism and ensuring good governance. The role of the civil society – various non-governmental organisations, human rights and pro-democracy organisations, the media, religious assemblages, cooperative unions and professional associations – as facilitators and defenders of democracy and good governance, is widely acknowledged to the extent that they are seen as important instruments that can force the country to be more

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 15 transparent and accountable. However, an opposition party or civil society that fails to live up to their democratic potential – those that are often fragmented into a many factions beset by personal and/or communal ambitions, poorly organised, shallowly rooted, personalistic vehicles engaged in clientelistic and/or communal appeals – will not inspire respect and can in no way sustain democracy. However, Nigeria does not yet possess a well-developed civil society. Existing groups played a major role in forcing the military out of power and enabling civilian rule. Certainly, vigilance will prove vital for defending the new democracy. This calls for a programme of empowerment that supports the emergence of a strong non-governmental component of civil society, able to participate in public debate on defence and security policy, with the sole aim of curtailing military incursion into politics. The putative role of the independent media in sustaining democracy is that of providing the public space for a wide range of societal opinion to be expressed, and supplying the population with objective information about government performance. The press needs to help create a feeling of nationhood among people traditionally divided by tribal loyalties to explain the objectives of a new society and to obtain co-operation in communal and national projects. It was the press, which, defying all odds held the torch to battle the military oligarchy and their attendant usurped disposition. An important challenge facing most democracies is enhancing the position of women in decision-making at all levels, because no country can afford to limit the potential and creativity of half of its population. History has shown that, although women have all the skills needed for development, these have unfortunately been confined too long to the home environment. Women’s experience in conflict resolution is very appropriate training for leadership. However, women who attain leadership positions are subject to much more scrutiny than men, as if they are expected to fail. More often than not, the failure of women is seen as evidence against women in general rather than the case of a particular individual. Conclusion In retrospect, it is clear that development challenges arise from bad governance and that promotion of good governance at all levels of authority remains the greatest antidote to the problem of democratic sustainability in Nigeria. Once good governance is established as a permanent system, it will be easier for to focus all energies and resources on meeting the challenges of development growth, security and a good, creative existence for all. The first few years of this new dispensation should be regarded as a period for politicians to re-engage in self-education, achieve some consensus about building relevant political and civil institutions that can ensure transparency and accountability, and foster democratic values and culture as discussed, to promote good governance. No doubt, the quest will be an ongoing learning process. While there are bound to be several ups and downs along the way, it is important that mistakes are learnt from and appropriate measures to forestall making further mistakes and put in place, rather than calling for military intervention.

16 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 References Akambi M. (2004, 19 August). Corruption and the Challenges of Good Governance in Nigeria. Faculty of Social Science Guest Lecture. University of Lagos. Alkali, R.A. (1997). The World Bank and Nigeria: Cornucopia or Pandora’s Box? Kaduna: Baraka Press & Publishers Ltd. Artwood, B. (1998). Corruption, A Persistent Development Challenge. Economic Perspectives: Corruption and Development. U.S. Information Agency. Asemota, O. (2004, 15 September). Africa and the Scourge of the Failed State. Business Day, p. 17. Azeez A. (2002). Good Governance and the Challenges of Democratic Sustainability in Nigeria. Nigeria Forum. Vol. 23, No. 11-12, pp. 344-347. Babawale, T. (2007). Good Governance, Democracy and Democratic Best Practices. CBAAC Occasional Monographs. Bello-Imam, I. (1997). In Governance in Nigeria: Politics, Economy and Society in the Adjustment Years, 1985- 1995. Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers. Boeninger, E. (1991). Governance & Development: Issues and Constraints. Proceedings of World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, August 19, New York. Emmanuel, A.O. (2005). Local Economic Development activities in Obigho LGA of Ondo State. Presented at the International Conference, September 9, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Goldstein, J. (l999). International Relations. New York: Longman Addison Wesley. Gyekye, K. (I997). Tradition and Modernity. New York: Oxford University Press. James, H. (1998). From Grandmotherliness to Governance: An Evolution of IMF Conditionality. Finance & Development. December. Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 9. Korten, D.C. (1990). Getting to the 21st Century – Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. Bloomfield: Context Institute. Diamond, L. (1995). Rethinking and Socially: Towards Democratic Consolidations. Cross Roads. USIS. Vol. 1, No. 3. Linz J. (1990). Transition to Democracy. The Washington Quarterly. Summer, pp. 143-164. Mabogunje, A. (l980). The Development Process: A Special Perspective. Hutchinson University Library Press, London. Muo, I.K. (2006). Leadership Values and Development. Paper presented at First College Conference on Values, Virtues and Development Crises in Nigeria. University Of Education, ljebu Ode, 25-28 April, 2006. Muo, I.K. (2007). Good Governance and Economic Development. Corruption and Challenge of Human Development (ed. ). Babcock University, Ilishan, Ogun State, Nigeria. Biyi Adegoroye (2003, 15 September). Africa and the Scourge of the Failed State. Business Day, p. 17. Obasanjo, O. (2004, 20 June). Speech at the 10th Anniversary of Transparency International. Ovia, Jim (2005). Good Governance, CBN Autonomy and Product Innovation. Zenith Economic Quarterly, Vol. l, No. 3. July, pp. l4-19. Ozigbo, N.C. (2004). The Role of Governance in National Development. Business Day, September 24. Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian-Publishing House. Sandstorm, H.M. (2005). The Place of Human Development in Development Theory. Paper presented at the International Conference on Human Development, Covenant University, Ottawa, 27 June. Seers, D. & Harmondsworth, L.J. (1971). Development in a Divided World. London: Penguin Books. Todaro, M.P. & Smith, S.C. (2003). Economic Development. Patparanji, Delhi, India: Pearson Education. Ujomu, P.O. (2004). Corruption & Mismanagement: The Bane of the Nigerian Society. Ibadan: The Sage. Biyi Adegoroye, United Nations Development Programme, Nigeria (2003, 15 January). What is Globalization? Business Day. Harsch, E. African Recovery (2005), United Nations Office of Communications and Public Information. United Nation’s Forum in Addis Ababa. Vol. 2, No. 4. World Bank publication on Sub-Sahara Africa (1989). From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa 17 Rethinking deification, gerontocracy and clientelism in the Nigerian political space

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode Abstract Up until now, blanket respect, loyalty and veneration have been given to ancestors, living elders and godfathers in all cultures in Nigeria and their celebration in politics has become worrisome. These practices derive from deification, gerontocracy and clientelism. Most of the existing works in African anthropological studies written by cultural apologists have romanticised these socio- religious practices and found them sacrilegious but only a few connect them to democratic milieu of the 20th and 21st centuries. Thus, more than historicising and romanticising these socio-religious beliefs, this paper employs critical discourse analysis to confirm, legitimate, reproduce and challenge their power relation with the Nigerian people. This paper argues that dogmatic acceptance of the unquestionable powers of these phenomena negatively impact on societal well-being. The paper consequently submits that only a few of these past celebrated personalities should be recognised and respected and that only the living and the dead who are not self-serving and whose interests as well as conduct are not diametrically opposed to societal good, deserve veneration. It is suggested that we must free ourselves from avoidable hegemonic control of seen and unseen powers.

Key words: ancestor, living elder, godfather, power relations, socio-religious practice Sumário Até ao presente momento, o respeito superficial, a lealdade e veneração são dados aos ancestrais, anciãos vivos e padrinhos em todas culturas na Nigéria e a sua celebração em política tornou-se preocupante. Essas práticas derivam da deificação, gerontocracia e clientelismo. A Maioria dos trabalhos existentes romantizaram essas práticas sócio-religiosas e encontraram nelas sacrilégios, mas alguns destes se conectam ao meio social democrático. Assim, mais do que historiar e democratizar estas crenças sócio-religiosas, este artigo faz uma análise crítica do discurso para confirmar, legitimar, reproduzir e desafiar sua relação de poder com o dominado. O estudo argumenta ainda que, a aceitação dogmática de poderes inquestionáveis desses fenómenos tệm impacto negativo no bem-estar social. O artigo, mostra também que apenas algumas personalidades celebradas cabem no espaço de reconhecimento e respeito que, somente, os viventes e os mortos que não são serventes de si próprios e cujos interesses assim como conduta não são diamentricamente opostos ao bem social bem venerado. É sugerido que nós nos devemos livrar do evitável controlo hegemónico dos poderes visíveis e invisíveis.

18 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Palavras chave: ancestral, ancião vivo, padrinho, relação de poder, prática sócio-religiosa Introduction Inokoba and Ebienfa (2013) affirm that West Africa is one of the poorest regions on earth and that ECOWAS countries have some of the lowest standards of living indexes in the world. They state further that thirteen of the fifteen countries in West Africa were among the thirty listed countries at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development index in 2009. It is quite clear from the UNDP ranking that as a West African state, Nigerian is also lagging behind in social, political and economic status more than half a century after independence. This is because Nigeria, which is claimed to be the giant of Africa, has yet to come out of its social, economic and political doldrums despite its abundant human and material resources. In every corner of the country, there is an acute shortage of drinkable water, electricity, good roads, industries and employment opportunities for the ever- increasing population of teeming school leavers. Most analysts and social commentators blame this situation on bad governance culture and corruption. Painting a gory picture of corruption in Nigeria, Transparency International in 2005 ranked Ghana 50, Senegal 66, Cote d’ Ivoire 71 and Nigeria 101 (the second most corrupt country in the world) (UNODC, 2006). A retrospective look at the situation would generally raise such questions as: • How did we get into this mess? • What have our forbearers done right or wrong to put us in this mess? • What is wrong with our cultural heritage? • What are the living elders doing to get us out of the present quagmire? • What are the plans of the young ones for the foreseeable future?

It is assumed that some of our worthy ancestors would be upset with the level of social decadence, political logjam and economic woes in Nigeria while the unworthy forebears would be complacent and muse at our plight. But even if the forebears were not happy, what are they capable of doing? This question would sound profane in a society where we generally believe that both dead and living elders have pervasive influence over the fortunes of the living. In the same vein, in cultures where old age and ascendancy have a touch of venerability, elders both dead and living are respected because they are our predecessors and have served as purveyors for our existence today. In most cases, veneration is accorded them. It is generally believed in Africa that the ancestors enter into a spiritual state of existence after death. This entry of the dead elders qualifies them to have a say in the affairs of the living. They are seen as intercessors between the Supreme Being and the living. They are perceived as “the font of life and well-being” (Sangree, 1974: 66). In the same light, Olaoba (2005:57) opines that ancestors worship and veneration presupposes the fact that “the living and the dead are in continual partnership and association in the day-to-day governance of the society.” He sees the living elders as the representatives of the ancestors whose opinions and verdicts on matters must be respected and taken as sacrosanct. Mendosa (1976: 57) extends the argument to social relations when he notes, “the ancestors among the

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode 19 Sisala of Northern Ghana are also perceived as a reflection of social relations quite often extended to symbolic expression”. Ray (1976: 147) sees ancestral rites in Africa as a process of ritualising rules and social relations. West Africans generally believe that the ancestors and heroes still live on and that their interventions in ordinary day-to-day affairs of man are incontrovertible. In the process of socialising young ones, this belief is passed from generation to generation through folktales, stories, anecdotes, taboos and ritual worships. Evidences abound in most Nigerian cultures of theatrical pettiness in the ritual worship and veneration of ancestors and living elders on grounds of their being progenitors only, warfare achievements and physical prowess without reference to the immediate and far-reaching effects of their actions and inactions. For example, Achebe (1958) tacitly refers to this misplaced focus when he reveals that in the Igbo society, man is celebrated for his physical prowess, not on the strength of his intellect and emotional stability. In Achebe’s ‘Things Fall Apart’, nobility is conferred on Okonkowo as a mark of his victory in a wrestling bout, war gallantry as well as food production capacity. Okonkwo’s violence and labour heroism has unfortunately permeated our democratic practices, which is now dependent on possession of both state and non-state forces and material wealth. Arguably, looking at the history of Nigeria, heroism is misplaced on some people (living and dead) whose beliefs, interests and behaviours have impeded Nigerian growth and development. One may ask the following questions: • How many of the hitherto celebrated heroes have not engaged in egocentric undertakings at the expense of the general masses? • How many were opportunists who were only favoured by the tide of their times or real achievements? • How much of good have they delivered to the social collectivity? Beneath their actions what could we fathom – hegemonic pursuit, dynastic rule or liberalism?

In answering these questions, historical revelations have been most perturbing. In the recent past, ‘godfatherism’ entered the vocabulary of African politics as an advanced form of clientelism. The term refers to an evolving institution of individuals in the political plane whose influences through force, money and manipulation, strategically but tragically placed them in a superior position to dictate the political practices of their times. Political godfathers are thus, individuals who possess both economic and political power to determine who are selected or voted into political office. This is an emerging trend in African politics with its debilitating effect on political development and democratic transitions. In most instances, states are held down by unnecessary veneration of ancestors, living elders and godfathers. For example, the boiling sectarian and ethnic cauldrons that Nigeria has represented in the last five decades are probably traceable to its historic past and emulation of virtues and behaviours of unworthy ancestors, living elders and godfathers who fan the ember of disunity. In the light of this awareness, Albert (2012:14) rightly notes that “modern African studies, rather than just romanticize history of great Mali, would simply interpret the opulence involved in Mansa Musa’s pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 – 1325 as evidence

20 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 of a pre-colonial example of wasteful foreign trips and financial recklessness that now inflict contemporary African leaders.” In order to get out of this problem of misplaced history, scholars argue that we need to have a more critical look at each of these ancestors, living elders and godfathers. For example, Raji-Oyelade (2013) opines that for Africans to forge ahead, they need to search their innermost self and sever relationships with those who hold them down. He opines that rebirth begins from within; it involves a revolutionary twist in the collective mind/consciousness. Above all, the desire to speak truthfully, even if this leads to self-sacrifice, has become paramount if they want to get out of spiritual bondage. This appears to be the only way to national rebirth and development. No doubt, individual nations as well as the African continent at large needs emancipation, not only from the clutches of imperialism, but also from the strangle hold of a past and present not worthy of celebration. Thus, this paper utilises critical discourse analysis in the pattern advocated by the behavioural school of thought to confirm or challenge power and dominance in relation to deification, living eldership complex and clientelism. As power relations are salient to society and culture, we focus on political development of Nigeria over the ages with reference to the above phenomena. The assumptions are that the problems in the personification of powers have mummified Nigerians and that they need to critically challenge these powers to find solutions to and ways out of their present social, political and religious predicaments. Conceptual and theoretical discourse Ancestors, living elders complex and godfatherism will be conceptualised as they are used in this paper. The paper will also benefit from power exchange relations theory. Ancestor worship is a belief system that is a result of the indelible impressions, conceptions and perceptions ingrained in African psyche by experience over time of an existing relationship between the living and the dead. Thus, it is a product of man’s mind and notions. Opoku (1973) opines that the ancestors are respected because they are our elders and our predecessors. Respect, power, fear, protection and imparting of wisdom to the living are central to the ancestral system (Mendosa, 1976). Patrimonial perception of human relations is also a key issue in the concept of the ancestor belief system and their deification. Fortes (1969:30) describe the ancestor cult as “the transportation to the religions planes [of] the relationships of parents and children in the ritualisation of filial piety.” He notes that others describe it as an extension of human relations to the supernatural sphere or, as a reflection of these relations, and as their ritual and symbolic expression. Ancestors are thus members of the society that we deify after death. Ancestors are perceived as having dominant powers and this belief creates fear of the unseen in the mind of adherents. Olaoba (2005: 141) is of the view that “the neglect of the ancestors who need recognition and propitiation can also bring about afflictions which can cause conflicts within the family, lineage, and society.” Sangree (1974) and Calhoun (1980) paint the authority of the ancestors as pervasive and absolute. The foregoing positions of ancestors suggest that there is a power asymmetry between the ancestors and the living. There seems an exaggerated perception

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode 21 of their infallibility even while on earth. It also amounts to arrogating too much power to them at the expense of living members of society who ordinarily should be architects of their own fortunes. However, there is no empirical evidence to validate this claim of superiority of the ancestors except that the claim remains in the psyche of men – a mostly unquestionable, whimsical and imaginative psychosocial belief. The ancestors have a lot of responsibility to their families and the divinities in the sociological realm (Clarke, 1930). The question is: how much of these have they dispensed? Recognition of living elders as custodians of wisdom and knowledge is widespread in Nigeria. Living elders are the ones to be heard in a society where gerontocracy as a style of government dominates the socio-political sphere. This belief system is tagged ‘eldership complex’ (Mendosa, 1976:60). A junior is expected to honour and obey anyone who is older than him. This practice is in conformity with West African culture in which old age has a touch of venerability (Opoku, 1973). The living elders link the present to the past. Thus, respect, power and fear are used to sustain the institution of living elders as representatives of ancestors on earth. Sangree (1974) avers that by stressing the structural and cultural continuity between elders and ancestors, African societies are held together. Mendosa (1976:57) differs on the belief that “there is no significant difference between the dead ancestors and living elders in the beliefs and actions of the living”. However, Sangree (1974:70) notes that “indigenous distinction between the living and the dead reflects and reinforces structuring and resolution of inter-generational conflicts.” Mendosa (1976:63) also asserts “there is a conceptual separation between the world of the living and the world of dead ancestors, as well as subtle comprehension of the similarities between the two spheres.” He notes further that both living elders and ancestors have authority and power over juniors as both are to be feared and respected. Kopytopp. (1971) describes ancestors as living elders as well as superior to living elders who hold authority on behalf of members because they are forebears. Calhoun (1980: 313) argues that “the fact that ancestors are dead makes it easier to idealise them, to have them represent lineage values as opposed to personal interests or idiosyncrasies of judgement”. In the same light, Oyebode (2012:36) notes that the mogaji (the lineage head in Yorubaland) as “office-holding elder represents the ancestors of his family and his verdict on conflict issue is sacrosanct.” Thus, he affirms that an elder who holds office functions as a traditional, religious, cultural, judicial and political controller of his people, and as a representative of the ancestors. Godfatherism is an advanced form of clientelism in African political vocabulary. Whereas, clientelism stands as the intervening linkage between the ruler and the ruled, it is over celebrated in godfatherism. Omobowale (2006) sees political clientelism as a kind of connective cord between politicians and the people. He further agrees with the description that recognises this belief as a process through which developmental expectations are met through loyalty to the patron and political elite. It is a phenomenon that is sustained through the patron-client relationship that is mutually beneficial to the parties involved. Usually, there is power asymmetry as godfatherism involves hero-worship and over adulation of the godfather by the godson who depends largely on the godfather’s authority for the achievement of his political pursuit.

22 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Although godfatherism is not new in Nigeria, it became more pronounced in Nigerian political history during the second republic (1979-1983). Party primaries were unethically manipulated by the rich political elites and influential civil servants who benefited from the oil boom of the early 1970s. These elites used financial and material inducements to win clients who became loyal to them. This trend has continued to date. Omobowale (2006:106-107) avers,“Godfathers gain honour and respect from the people through their (philanthropic) deeds.” They openly identify with the low-class as well as effectively court in political power. Through their interactions with the people, they identify their needs and strive to obtain them from the political class to be able to continue to enjoy respect and veneration. They also dispense favour in return for loyalty by making use of their personal wealth to provide for such needs. However, godfathers usually perceive the support they give either to their clients or the people as a form of investment that must bring dividends in the form of loyalty and material gains. Omobowale (2006) opines that political godfathers usually bring political godsons into politics but usually end up controlling them. Most African cultures allow clientelism as the foundation on which trust and accountability are predicated. Clientelism is perceived as a platform for check and balances in the political sphere and its provision of linkages between the ruled and the ruling class is incontrovertible. It also enhances social order within social structures through satisfaction of valued interests of both parties i.e. the patron and the client. Its reciprocal nature ensures the satisfaction of the expectation of both parties, thus resulting in inter-dependence, which is critical to political relationships. Power exchange relation theory is defined by Omobowale (2006) as a process involving social beings that interact with one another for the exchange of valued resources. Cook (2000) opines that behaviour in this social exchange is as a result of payoffs, which are reciprocal. Power exchange relation theory presupposes a state of equilibrium whereby the parties in relationship will have mutual benefits. Beyond the ordinary man and man’s affairs, relationship with the superhuman is also expected to be mutually rewarding. These rewards may be in the form of love, support and provision of needs for the person to continue to feel obliged to continue to service the relationship. God also expects loyalty and worship from man. However, in power exchange relations’ theoretical frame, power is shared as nobody, whether human or superhuman, enjoys a monopoly of power. Although there may be power asymmetry, Molm (1989) posits that the dominated too may exercise some level of power to make the dominator conform to their wish provided they have greater punishment power to exercise. Although the dominator has greater punishment power, he may feel some loss of power or relevance should the dominated withdraw from the relationship. This loss may be in the form of loyalty, respect, reverence and worship. Thus, the dominated in unbalanced power relations has a legitimate right to withdraw his loyalty. This withdrawal is much easier if the power of the dominators not really seen but only exists as a conjecture of the mind. For example, while the powers of the living elders and godfathers are real and physical, those of the ancestors are spiritual. Omobowale (2006:30) avers, “If the dominated are deprived and subjected to injustice, they may take recourse to opposition value to draw legitimacy for the exercise of power to contend

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode 23 against institutionalised powers (authorities) which have breached the norms of reciprocal and fair exchange.” Douglas (1999) cites other authorities to conclude that subordinate entities will usually perceive predominant influence or control, regardless of intentions, as a potential threat and seek to realign the power relationship. Thus, the possibility of freedom from entanglement of dominant powers is explored in this paper using a behavioural theoretical model. Dominant power and retrograde politics in Nigeria Behavioural school is “located in the skeptical philosophy of David Hume, the pragmatic worldview of William James and Charles S. Pierce, and the instrumentalist outlook of John Dewey” (Asirvatham and Mistra 2008:803). It is argued that all of them stressed empiricism, voluntarism, individual activity and a practical approach to truth based on observation of an objective, pluralistic world. They state further that behavioural theorists rejected the speculative, idealist mode of thinking and the rationalistic or logical deductive analysis of political thinkers belonging to the classical tradition. The behavioural point of view is a historical because it does not wholeheartedly accept stories passed from generation to generation. Thus, using this historical approach, the classification of every dead member of the family as ancestors seems general, abrasive and demeaning of the status of somebody who should presumably be the link between the creator (God) and the creatures (living beings). Marx describes unquestionable acceptance of myths as another instance of man allowing an alien power to rule him, which in reality is his own creation (Esirvatham and Misra). In an objective analysis, fundamentally, some dead and living members of the society may not be fit to perform the function of human-God relations’’ officer. The dead or living elders who erred, shirked their responsibilities and disrupted social order while on earth, would not qualify to fit into our class of revered ancestors as their transformation to the spirit realm would not be beneficial to humanity. This thinking contradicts Olaoba’s (2005:145) position that “their transformation to the ancestral community makes ancestors infallible.” It is hereby argued that bad dead members of the family who neither repented nor asked for forgiveness before death may continue to constitute a cog in the wheel of society’s progress while in the spirit world. This thinking is in line with the personification of Esu Elegbara as an unrepentant member of Nigerian society while alive, whose transfiguration further empowers him to unleash more terror on the society. Oyebode (2012:146) notes that Christians and Muslims see Esu Elegbara as a malevolent spirit. Esu Elegbara is seen as a trickster, prankster or shower of dissension who is feared by both worshippers and non-worshippers. Thus, Esu Elegbara, who incidentally belonged to the early progenitors of man, should not enjoy veneration. However, in some traditional cultures in Nigeria, Esu Elegbara occupies a respectable position in the spiritual consciousness of worshippers who deify and venerate him as a both a benevolent and malevolent spirit. Esu Elegbara is thus perceived as a harbinger of good and bad. However, critics of traditional belief opine that Esu Elegbara does well by accident. The present leadership in the country may be perceived to be symbols of Esu Elegbara character because they only do well by accident not by design. Unfortunately whatever they do badly, they blame Esu Elegbara for their failures.

24 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Olaoba (2005) ascertains that the supernatural realm to which the ancestors belong wields a great moral influence on the day-to-day progression of human affairs. This means that those whose deeds were immoral while on earth should not qualify to enjoy veneration, worship or ritualisation. As noted by Napoleon (2013), ancestors who were locked in perpetual warfare, incessant raiding of one another and land grab, and who made woman the cause of their warfare, would not fit into the social category of influential personalities. In his study of the Yanomanmo of Venezuela and Brazil, he tries to answer the question: what were our early ancestors really like as they accomplished the transition from a hunter-gatherer to a more complex, settled society? Thus, for the purpose of this paper the concept of ancestor, forefathers will at the end of the discourse be limited to only those deceased political and historic figures whose sojourn on earth was and is still globally relevant to the social, political and economic progress of their people. The classification will not be by ascendancy but by achievement. Power exchange relations in Nigeria are a concern for scholars. The dominator directly or indirectly controls the apparatus of the state and this control enables him to dole out whatever pleases him. However, Molm (1989) avers that though the “exchange relation may be unbalanced, its reciprocal nature ensures the satisfaction of the expectations of both parties and this creates inter-dependence.” Thus, the patron-client relationship is mutually reinforcing in politics in Nigeria. However, in order to sustain this relationship, the patron and the client enter into a kind of gang-up relationship at the expense of the masses. In Nigeria, for example, they both patron and client steal the resources of the state and concentrate power in the hands of a few who are ready to dispense favour in return for loyalty. They control the politics and resources of the state in ways that are similar to pre-colonial Nigeria, which abounded with examples of egocentric power pursuit at the expense of the state. These actions included inter-tribal warfare, marauding and other savage behaviours. In the past, while western cultures pursued technological advancement, agricultural development and economic revolution, most Nigerian progenitors were engaged in myopic and self-centred pursuits. Their actions and inactions accounted and is still accounting for the nation’s underdevelopment. In fact, when Europeans arrived, they tagged Africa as a ‘dark continent’. What did our ancestors do to match the global trend towards better living conditions? The sixteenth to nineteenth century marked the period when civilisation was reversed in Nigeria as a result of inter- tribal wars. Adesote and Ajisola (2012:36) note, “This was a period when flourishing towns were destroyed”. Awe (1964:140) cites other authorities “the interior tribes were continually warring with each other and that these civil wars and marauding continued intermittently until the definite occupation of the hinterland in 1897.” Although extensive military pacification was required to subdue the restive natives who opposed colonialism, many African political and religious leaders were fighting wars of supremacy or were engaged in expansionist wars within. They did not come together to resist colonialism; rather these leaders sought the support of white explorers, slave traders and strategists to engage their kinsmen in wars. They bought guns and ammunition from European traders in exchange for African slaves. Thus, it was possible to subdue Benin Kingdom in 1897, Sokoto Caliphate in 1903

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode 25 and Lagos in 1821. Although sovereignty of African states was tactically robbed by the colonial powers with great effort using the logic of predation, violence and oppression, it was made possible by the greed of past leaders who put self- interests above the corporate interests of their nations. This theory is evident in the complicity of traditional political leadership with European powers even to date. A critical review of events that led to colonisation of African nations would reveal bravery, cowardice and complicity with European colonisers. Personalities like King Jaja of Opobo and Ibadan chiefs gallantly resisted western hegemony and only “being brow beaten to submission” by stronger power (Awe 1964:327). However, other personalities like Oba Dosumu of Lagos and Oba of Dahomy and other slave traders condescended to western control with furtive resistance and collaboration in slave trading. Lack of bravery and wisdom on the part of those who colluded with slave traders to rid Nigerians of their freedom was queried by Duru (2013:12), thus:“What could make an umbrella worth 40 human lives and a medium-sized mirror worth 20 people? Why would 10 able-bodied men and women be worth not more than 10 coral beads? It is simply a language of slavery, oppression and dehumanisation”. Exploits of western powers led to competition, inequality, expansion and subjugation of African nations with the complicity of a few powerful natives who were engaged in inhuman trades prior to colonialism. Adesote and Ajisola (2013) rightly note that before the advent of European slave trade, there existed internal slave trade and a ‘pawnship’ (iwofa) system in Yorubaland. This was not peculiar to Yorubaland as all cultures in Nigeria also had ways of enslaving the less privileged members of the society. Alas! Are these traders in human beings the ones we venerate today? Is their inhumanity to man worthy of celebration? Promotion of African values and cultural practices dominated our struggle for independence, nationalism and post-independence ideologies. Pan Africanists introduced Afrocentric models of development in both our economic and political pursuits. These Afrocentric models were noticeable in Julius Nyerere’s Ujama, Nkruma’s African socialist movement, Muammar Gadaffi’s Jamahiriya, Senghor’s theory of African cultural superiority, as well as African communitarianism. Other African leaders who promoted wholesome African cultural renaissance were Patrick Lumunba of Congo, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Sekou Toure of Guinea (Alozie (2012). In the present dispensation, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is still locked into his struggle with western power over his promotion of land reforms in his country whereby blacks take over farmlands from whites. Unfortunately, most of these leaders disrupted their ideological pursuits with ‘sit-tight syndrome’, which later made them lose focus and become unpopular in their countries. For example, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana lost focus as a result of his embrace of occultism to retain power and perpetuate his regime. Thus, while Awolowo remains a hero and ancestor of repute, late General Sanni Abacha continues to attract wide condemnation for his record of human rights abuse. In the same vein, while Nelson Mandela would easily pass as a legend for promoting transitional democracy in South Africa, General Ibrahim Babangida could not enjoy the same veneration for scuttling democratic ideals in Nigeria for several years.

26 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Oracular consultation of ancestors, deities and gods remains a retrogressive cultural practice in Nigeria, especially during the selection of traditional leaders. In most instances, this consultation is skewed in favour of unpopular candidates who merely enjoy the patronage of the living elders. Thus, ancestor worship becomes a divisive power to cheat the majority. These are parochial and retrogressive power relations. Injustice is often obtained through monetisation of political and selection processes. The rich often promote themselves as ‘living elders’ at the expense of the aged who are poor, especially in the Igbo society where wealth is power. Traditional and political leadership is gradually losing its pride of place as a result of indiscipline. Although traditional chieftaincy institutions represented by the Sarkis, Emirs, Obis, Obongos, Obas and other traditional office holders typify the living elders complex in Nigeria, many actions and inactions of the custodians of great traditional institutions have brought their sacredness into disrepute. Two instances readily come to mind because of media publicity given them. One was the case of the deposed Deji of Akure, Oba Adesina, who fought in public with his estranged wife. Second was the case of Owa of Ilowa, who allegedly raped a youth service corps member and justified his action. Many of such incidents abound among the custodians of Nigerian culture. Albert (2012: 157) affirms “modern political leaders have seen traditional political leaders as rivals and as impediment to their aspirations or as instruments to be manipulated and co-opted to achieve their goals.” Because of material gains and zeal to remain relevant, most traditional leaders have become pawns in the hands of the political class. They are co-conspirators in the suppression of the wishes of the masses. It is a common practice in Nigeria to use big ancestors’ names to deceive the populace. While the Northerners use Uthman Dan Fodio and Ahmadu Bello, the Westerners bank on names like Oduduwa and Obafemi Awolowo and the Easterners use Nnamdi Azikwe and Odumegu Ojukwu to gain political relevance. They claim to be adherents of their philosophies during electioneering but on getting into political office, they pursue different agendas. Even once dead, some of these revered personalities remain kingpins whose names people throw about to gain political favour. In the present political dispensation, offspring of deceased politicians are compensated with plum political jobs irrespective of their progenitors’ contributions to Nigeria’s present state of want. Most of the time, nobody weighs the forefathers’ contributions to judge if their children deserve what is being given to them. Most of these children also turn out to be a disappointment like their parents because they lack enviable pedigrees. Marginalisation of the youth as a result of perpetuating living elders in the political space is widespread in Nigeria. These elders are either retired military officers or their collaborators who shortened democratic regimes for twenty-nine years and looted the country’s treasury in the past. Most other living elders are complacent except for a few activists like Wole Soyinka, Bala Usman, Abubakar Umar, Sheu Sanni, Femi Aborisade, Femi Falana and Ogbonaya Onu, who continue to resist dictatorship and imperialism. Misappropriation of oil subsidy funds in Nigeria in 2011 revealed complicity on the part of the living elders with their collaborators in government. Excessive adulation of an individual is foolish and unproductive. Idolisation, glorification,

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode 27 romanticisation and idealisation of living elders are detrimental to personal and societal growth because this only emphasises the status quo. Thus, when ‘ancestor cult’ and living elders complex roll into one in the psyche of body politics, they tendentiously mummify political actors, either as an electorate or contenders. The imposition of candidates by elders as a result of misplaced idolatry; respect and recognition can be blamed for Nigeria’s decline in democratic culture. Living elders should be assessed on and respected for the values of their intelligence, skill, courage, honour, thoughtfulness, loyalty and fairness in interpersonal relationships. When there is a conflict between what an elder wants for himself and what is best for the society, the resolution must be in favour of the society. Commenting on the historical descent and decadent political experience in Nigeria, Soyinka (2013) notes that:

Individually and collectively, we are at war, and the enemy is not hidden. Of its own relation it has given itself name, a profile and an agenda. Others have spr[u]ng up, geared to outdo their obsessed predecessors. Let each community look into its past, and see how both inertia and covert gleefulness have fuelled the raging inferno.

Some scholars see godfatherism or clientelism as a factor militating against entrenchment of democratic principles or good governance in Africa. They believe it sustains corruption, autocratic rule, mediocrity, patrimony and personalisation of power. The case of Anambra state in Nigeria is illustrative of the negative impact of godfatherism on good governance culture. Between 1999 and 2007, Anambra state was beset with godfatherism syndrome, a cankerworm that ate deep into the polity and economic situation of the state. It endangered the polity as it promoted a diversion of public funds by godfathers who insisted on taking a certain percentage of state revenue for personal use. Failure of godsons to heed their demands led to their unceremonious exit from government. Omobowale’s (2006:ii) findings on the client-patron relationship reveals that political “clientelism has hindered the direct access of clients to resources”, yet the patrons seem to be more interested in their individual survival than in that of their clients. Dependency syndrome no doubt entrenches underdevelopment of the polity. There is a kind of unbalanced power relationship between the godfather and godson, which usually creates mutual suspicion and threatens the political well-being of the state. In a bid to retain his position, the godfather sometimes becomes despotic, using non-state forces to secure his position. This was exactly the case in the Adedibu-Ladoja saga in Oyo state between 2005 and 2007 where the impeachment of the incumbent governor and the installation of a godson as a puppet governor occurred, who governed for almost five years. In Nigeria, deification, gerontocracy and clientelism has become an umbrella for the promotion of bad governance rather than promoting good political culture. They are all related to the cultural model under which spirituality, materialism and dominance cultures are used to perpetrate and perpetuate impunity and injustice. Many dead and living elders have promoted and are still promoting ethnic and sectional interests, which have hindered Nigeria’s journey towards nationhood.

28 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Charting a new course In a real-life situation, though ancestors, living elders and godfathers may possess overwhelming powers or control of resources because of ascendancy, yet the clients or adherents of such faith and belief may sometimes opt out of the relationship to improve their lot. This withdrawal could be illustrated by adherents of new faiths (Islam and Christianity), abandoning ancestor worship without any obvious proof of punishment or affliction from the dominating power. Also, godfather and godson relationships have witnessed contractual breakups as a result of the excesses of the dominating power. In Nigerian political history, Chris Uba versus Chris Ngige of Anambra State, Olusola Saraki versus Muhammed Lawal of Kwara State and Lamid Adedibu versus Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo State sagas, are clear failures of power exchange relations. It must be noted that sometimes revolt against the dominating power results in conflicts or acts of misdemeanour, which are usually temporary but necessary to achieve a turnaround in the polity. Historical evidences point to the triumph of the dominated. This thinking is in line with the concept of freedom as non-domination. Soyinka (2013) conceives of this position as theology of freedom that should not submit to the tyranny of the few. Obviously, what is needed in Nigeria today is the management of power relations existing in past and present socio-economic experience. As highlighted in the review of Dewey’s book, An Exegesis of Democratic Vision (Rogers: 2009) sees a method of managing power relations in Dewey’s proposition. According to him, Dewey’s point is that there is a transactional relationship among self, others and the world resulting from the movement and disruption in life that he called ‘problems’. To him, Dewey insists that faith is an imaginative projection of belief in still-to-be- realised potentialities, not just in the existence of divine objects. People must not allow this belief to hold them back from the pursuit of greater enterprise. Rogers (2002) opines that since the care of self is dependent both prospectively and retrospectively on the seen and unseen of nature, man must act to liberate self. Thus, Dewey’s idea of religious experience returns the objects of faith to the natural world and its inherent possibilities, rather than sequester those objects to some supernatural realm. It is in the perception of these phenomena as natural that people can liberate their minds and seek justice in their power relations with the dead, living elders and godfathers. The modern conception of liberal society is that the most urgent part of the human task is to supply a critique of religion and tradition. This critique is intended to liberate political life from the influence of religious or traditional myths or superstition. Thus, the belief that angry ancestors may be responsible for enormous human sufferings in the form of spiritual torment and physical misery, are largely superstitious and must be discarded. Hume (1948) sees this capacity in man to assert himself when he states that whatsoever he conceives as existent, he can also conceive as not existent. In light of the foregoing, he asserts that it is only experience that teaches us the nature and boundary of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Knowledge is, after all, the source of all human actions and behaviours. In order to liberate our minds from cultural practices that will hold us down, Ekeanyanwu (2012: 44) recommends, “We should not mistake this liberation from the past as cultural

Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode 29 imperialism.” He explains that cultural development is the syncronisation of indigenous cultural values and norms with that of the global community for the benefit of the society. In the same vein, the discourse in this paper should not be mistaken as cultural imperialism or total rejection of deification, gerontocracy and clientelism, but a recommendation of a cautious selection of those that qualify to enjoy such status. Soyinka (2013) opines that now is the time to close ranks among the different ethnic groups in Nigeria and make up for past dereliction in order to protect it shard- earned freedom against any threat. The marginalised, who have been deceived through ancestor worship, living elders’ complex and godfatherism, need to shed the toga of inferiority. Gramsci’s (1971) entreaty is relevant in assuming balance of power. He notes that:

Power is seldom absolute; groups may more or less control other groups, or only control them in specific situations on social domains. Dominated group[s] may more or less resist, accept, condone, comply with or legitimate such power and even find it natural. Power may become hegemonic if allowed to thrive through laws, consensus or norms.

What Nigerians have done so far is to condone, comply with and legitimate such powers of the ancestors, living elders and godfathers. Now is the time to challenge such powers and ask fundamental questions as to the worthiness of individual living or dead in classification and veneration. These questions border on historical, ideological, interpretative and explanatory discourse of their relevance to societal well-being and promotion of good governance cultures. These questions may include among others: • In what ways did their pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial conducts enhance Nigerian development? • What roles did individuals play: dead or living elders that have put us in the present situation, good or bad? • What is the doctrinal relevance of these practices to liberal democracy? Conclusion This paper notes that the powers conferred on these venerated personalities have mummified Nigerians and have ingloriously permeated political thinking. The paper also avers that we all share the guilt in the present predicament of Nigeria as a retrogressive nation. Nigerians are guilty either through their allegiance to a faulty past or their selection of living mentors whose contributions to nation-building have been retrogressive. Raji-Oyelade (2012: 11) notes that: We all try to react to the sense of a nation, either through denial, appropriation or reversion of the existing or developing national culture. I think we contribute in our own ways to the rebirth, death or stillbirth of our nation, depending on our imaginative response to the concept of nationality. The above quote suggests that our greatest undoing is our attachment to the inglorious past and present, which we celebrate and venerate. Our failure is in our inability to decipher, separate and distinguish achievements and foibles. We tend to lump greatness with ascendancy

30 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 and we respect mediocrity at the expense of meritocracy. For Nigeria to progress as a nation, it needs to remove fear, affliction and delusion arising from misplaced judgment of who qualifies to be reference points in the trajectory towards democratic excellence. Nigerians need to create free minds that have the capacity to select or reject elders, ancestors, heroes and godfathers, depending on their individual worth. Traits like physical prowess, wealth, possession of force and arrogant displays of profligacy should not be part of our criteria for recommending veneration and celebration. Those who developed political estates, which later crumbled as a result of greed, selfishness and expansionist ideology, should not enjoy a pat in the back. This paper is not a recital of human negligence or foibles to stir-up negative memories and feelings of the violation of humanity; it celebrates excellence and social relations using an ethical framework. The burden of guilt is on the complacent while the martyrdom of the gallant ones remains indelible in the foregoing discourse. Ancestors, living elders and godfathers who resisted oppression, suppression, colonialism, slavery and dominance of the elites in Nigeria all fit into our memory of the glorious past, enviable present and bright future. Consequently, this paper advocates a revolution of mindset, a walk away from the retrogressive and allegiance to integrity, good conscience, self-esteem and service to humanity. Thus, in stirring this debate, this paper argues that merely describing deification, gerontocracy and clientelism as discourse issues in religion and politics is not enough. We must continue to explain these terms as properties of social interactions that constitute mundane and spiritual problems as well as solutions to our political experience as a nation. We must be concerned with the way social and spiritual powers’ dominate and how inequality is enacted, reproduced and resisted to enhance values in the Nigerian society. Thus, the social and political contexts of the existence of ancestors, living elders and godfathers in our psyche calls for constant review in order to purge ourselves of fear arising from our entanglement to seen and unseen dominant powers.

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32 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 African leaders and trust deficit culture: Power, politics, and the Nigerian polity under General Ibrahim B. Babangida (1985-1993) Donald O. Omagu Abstract The phenomenon of military coup d’états, a feature especially of Nigeria and African countries, became the institutionalised method for changing governments after independence in 1960. This cycle of military régimes supplanting civilian governments tagged itself as a ‘corrective’ form of governance aimed at bringing to an end the misrule, ineptitude and corruption of the preceding government. Paradoxically, military rule has proven to be an aberration, dysfunctional to political development and the epitome of corruption and human rights violations. This paper traces the heightened waves of military incursions, with particular emphasis on General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime, and the failures and successes of his administration so as to establish the appropriateness of the phrase “African leaders and the trust deficit culture within the context of Nigeria polity during the period under review”.

Keywords: African leaders, Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, military regime, and deficit culture Sumário O fenómeno de golpes de estado militares, uma peculiaridade especial da Nigéria e países africanos, tornou-se o método institucionalizado de mudança de governos, depois da independência, em 1960. Este ciclo de regime militar suplantou governos civis, etiquetou como forma ‘correctiva’ de governação com objectivo de trazer um fim de desgoverno ou má administração, inaptidão e corrupção para o governo seguinte. Paradoxalmente, o poder militar tornou-se uma aberração e disfunção para o desenvolvimento político, assim como epítome de corrupção e violação de direitos humanos. Este artigo traça a elevação das ondas das incursões militares com particular ênfase sobre o regime do General Ibrahim Babangida, desaires de liderança e sucessos da sua administração, de modo a estabelecer o uso apropriado da frase “Líderes Africanos e Cultura Deficitária de Confiança” dentro do contexto de organização de governo da Nigéria durante o período em revista.

Palavras chave: líderes Africanos, Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, Regime Militar e Defice Cultural

Donald O. Omagu 33 Introduction “Good leaders”, according to Rotberg (2004), produce results, whether in terms of improved standards of living, basic development indicators, abundant new sources of personal opportunity, enriched educational opportunities, skilled medical care, freedom from crime, or strengthened infrastructure. Rotberg (2004), however, opined that “bad and despicable leaders tear down the social and economic fabric of their lands; they impoverish their increasingly downtrodden inhabitants. Bad rulers oppress their peoples, depriving them of liberty, prosperity and happiness.” (Rotberg, 2004:9) It is against this backdrop that this paper examines President Ibrahim B. Babangida (IBB) who, in 1985 when he assumed office, outlined a number of actions and policy positions that would be responsive to the yearnings and aspirations of Nigerians. Prominent among these were his resolve to eliminate corruption, solve the country’s serious economic problems, and hand over power to a democratically elected government by the end of 1992 (Omoigui, 1985). Paradoxically, President Babangida soon established a reputation as a deceitful politician who, despite his lofty rhetoric, did not meet the standards he set for himself between 1985 and 1993. During this period, human rights abuses, including ethnically based attacks, became widespread. The press was also silenced. There were also grim reports of assassinations, phantom coups, and the disappearance of opposition figures (Joseph, 1996, 601:193-200; Joseph, 1999, 359-76) all in an attempt to silence critics. Indeed, Babangida’s style of leadership not only earned him nicknames like ‘Maradona’, ‘Machiavelli’, ‘Master of the Game’, and ‘Evil Genius’, but it provides useful insight into the trust deficit culture of African leaders. To put this discussion in its proper historical perspective, this paper examines the policies of the Babangida administration in light of the phrase ‘African leaders and the trust deficit culture’ to establish its appropriateness within the context of Nigeria polity during the period under review. In doing so, the paper makes a critical analysis of the following: a brief survey of the emergence of the administration and the legitimacy problems it initially faced; the administration’s human rights posture; its economic policy, particularly the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); and the implementation of the transition to civilian rule. The origin of the administration In the early hours of August 27, 1985, the voice of Major General Joshua Dogonyaro of the Nigerian Army, heralded by martial music, told a weary and bewildered nation that power had been seized in a palace coup from General Mohammadu Buhari and Major General Tunde Idiagbon by Major General Ibrahim Babangida, who thereafter declared himself ‘Military President’, becoming the first military president in Africa and probably the world (Folarin, 2010). A combination of reasons given to justify the coup d’état ranged from massive corruption

1 Although it was purportedly reported that Gloria Okon ‘died’ in detention, another report made available by Nigerian journalists suggest that she was smuggled out of the country by her highly placed military sponsors.

34 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 to general economic hardship as a result of the austerity measures in the country due to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stalemate initiated by the Shehu Shagari regime (Olagunju & Oyovbaire, 1991). Other allegations included Buhari-Idiagbon’s high-handedness culminating in the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree Number 2 of 1984, which gave Major General Tunde Idiagbon’s Chief of Staff the power to detain anyone labelled a security risk for up to six months without trial (Omoigui, 1985). Also criticised was Decree Number 4 of 1984 by which two journalists of The Guardian – Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor – were jailed by the Buhari regime. This decree was promulgated to prevent journalists from reporting news embarrassing to government officials. These decrees, among others, were considered to have almost turned the country into a “virtual military garrison” (Fawole, 2003: 150). These local crises and the mismanagement of certain external affairs such as the ‘Dikko crate affair’ leading to a Nigeria-Britain diplomatic face-off, the xenophobia leading to the expulsion of West African aliens during the Shagari era, and the IMF stalemate, were a huge embarrassment to a nation regarded as a regional leader. These, according to Babangida, had compromised Nigeria’s international standing and made the country a laughing stock abroad. In addition, the new administration lashed out at Buhari-Idiagbon’s foreign policy:

Nigeria’s foreign policy was characterized by inconsistency and incoherence. It lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood in matters of international concern to enable other countries [to] relate to us with seriousness. Our external relations have been conducted by a policy of retaliatory reactions (Babangida, 1985:3; Omoigui, 1985; Folarin, 2010).

Apart from the discontent of senior military officers like Babangida, more mundane reasons adduced over the years for the August purge, were many and varied. For example, in an unpublished thesis titled “Military Involvement in Politics in Nigeria: The Effect on Nigerian Army,” written in 1989 by the then Major Habibu Idris Shuaibu, claims that the reason for General Babangida’s putsch against Buhari was that he did not offer positions to junior officers. Another unconfirmed report for example, suggests that Colonel Dogonyaro’s promotion to Brigadier, delayed by Buhari, may have infuriated him and his sympathisers. Clearly, these were the perspectives (if true) of some of the junior and middle ranking officers who were used to execute the coup, but this does not explain the coup at the level of its originators (Omoigui, 1985). With regards to civilian involvement, other unconfirmed reports speculate profound displeasure on the part of Chief MKO Abiola, a business mogul who was alleged to have helped finance the 1983 coup. Abiola, it is claimed, was upset not only with the decision of the Buhari regime to seize and auction a large consignment of his newsprint meant for Concord Newspaper (which had allegedly been smuggled into the country), but also with an inquiry into the possible role of a relative in the drug trade (Osahon, 2010). This, the story alleges, motivated Abiola to financially assist Buhari’s removal. But Abiola was not the only disgruntled figure in the private sector, as unconfirmed reports identified other individuals with business interests like Dantata to havea

Donald O. Omagu 35 personal grudge against the Buhari government (Omoigui, 1985). All sorts of calamitous events kept occurring at the time, including the arrest of one Ikuomola for trying to smuggle a large consignment of cocaine out of the country. He indicted a son of one of the Dantatas and they were both tried and sentenced to death. The Dantata family unsuccessfully mounted pressure on the Supreme Military Council to commute the sentence to life. This development, it is believed, heightened division among members of the Supreme Military Council, with a high-ranking military benefactor siding with the Dantatas. (Osahon, 2010). This and Gloria Okon arrest in 1985 at the Aminu Kano International Airport for a drug related offence, created serious friction in the hierarchy of the Nigeria Military. 1 Regarding the role of intellectuals, Professor Omo Omoruyi, who claimed to be ‘privy and party’ to Babangida’s “personal decision to overthrow the government of Major General Muhammadu Buhari,” revealed that President Babangida “came to office without a political programme and with no modality for putting one in place” (Omoigui,1985). Major General MC Alli (retired), on the other hand, described the coup as “an enigmatic, sleek and sophisticated purge received with press-inspired fanfare in August 1985” concocted by Babangida “in consort with northern officers, particularly of Middle Belt extraction based on the products of Regular Officer’s Course at the Defence Academy.” A cabal of company and field grade officers, who in due course, would come to be known as ‘IBB Boys’, executed the coup. Speaking with the benefit of insights gained as the then Deputy Director, Joint Services at Supreme Headquarters, Alli had this to say: “tensions between the Army (specifically Babangida and Abacha) and the Buhari regime (specifically Buhari and Idiagbon) came to a head when Ministry of Defence contracts and accounts were placed under scrutiny”(Omoigui, 1985). Others like Naiwu Osahon are of the view that President Babangida had removed Idiagbon/ Buhari from power to refute the heated allegation at the time about illegal drug links and to help the IMF/World Bank ruin the Naira and make the Nigerian market a dumping ground for American and European junk and decadence. The marginalisation of the Naira suited Babangida’s Machiavellian streak to quell mass protests of abject poverty, hunger, and basic survival pre-occupation. For example, the terroristic power of massive foreign exchange reserves in a private person’s possession is limitless as a tool for forcing a pauperised populace to acquiesce to the self- perpetuation antics of a potential despot (Osahon, 2010). In an effort to consolidate himself in power, the Babangida administration from inception promised, among other things, to safeguard the fundamental human rights and civil liberties of Nigerians. In good faith, he abrogated the draconian Decree 4 (Public Officers’ Protection against false publication), freed political prisoners and reorganised the intelligence services when he signed the National Security Agencies (NSA) Decree No. 19 of 5 June 1986 into law. The next section takes a critical look at Babangida’s policies and programmes to know the extent to which the leader followed them in fulfilling his promises. Thus, the discussion here will dwell on the administration’s human rights record, the Structural Adjustment Programme, corruption, censorship of the press and transition to civilian rule.

36 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Human rights record The UN Commission on Human Rights observes, among other things, that governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realisation of human rights. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law. The true test of ‘good’ governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (United Nations Human Rights Report, 1996-2012). In virtually every political system, there are a number of institutional mechanisms to safeguard the inalienable rights of man. The strength and efficacy of these safeguards differ from state to state and mark the level of political development-cum-democratic consolidation in each state. The constitution normally stipulates the catalogue of fundamental rights of citizens. Indeed, in the case of Nigeria, the 1999 constitution guarantees the following civil and political rights: The right to life (section 33); the right to dignity of (the) human person (section 24); the right to personal liberty (section 35); the right to fair hearing (section 36); the right to family life (section 37); the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (section 38); the right to freedom of expression and of the press (section 39); the right to peaceful assembly and association (section 40); the right to freedom of movement (section 41); the right to freedom from discrimination (section 42); and the right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria (section 43) (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Without a doubt, Nigeria’s successive constitutions from 1960 to 1999 made these rights justifiable so that citizens, whose civil or political rights were infringed upon either by another individual or group, could institute legal actions against such individual or body for redress (Ojo, 2006:15-29). It should be recalled here that President Babangida, in his August maiden broadcast to the nation, made many mouthwatering promises to Nigerians but the administration’s volt about-face on human rights issues less than a year after its inception, kept many wondering if his promises were a mere political ploy to win the support of the people so as to legitimise his government. Arguably, throughout President Babangida’s tenure, the government ignored the rule of law, which required government to exercise its power in accordance with well-established and clearly written rules, regulations, and legal principles (Human Rights in Development, 1992). Government agencies like the police, the State Security Services and Directorate of Military Intelligence perpetrated these abuses and operated with absolute impunity. Aside from creating horrifying detention conditions, torture centres were operated primarily to silence critics. Arguably, the optimism that heralded Babangida’s coup was short-lived following a myriad of brushes the administration had with organised bodies like the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), and Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC). A major recurring theme in the ASUU-Babangida regime confrontation was the poor state of university education in the country. ASUU argued that this was due to the combination of three factors: inadequate funding, lack of internal autonomy and poor remuneration of Nigerian universities (Olusegun, 2011). The first major crisis that prompted government’s proscription of the union in

Donald O. Omagu 37 July 1988 (it would be recognised again in August, 1990 and proscribed in August 1992) was ASUU’s rejection of an apparent government decision to de-emphasise university education. This was a position of the IMF as canvassed at the meeting of Vice-Chancellors of African Universities in Harare in 1986. The argument was that only pre-university and technical education was cost- effective in Africa (Amuwo, 1995). Continued struggle prompted the new proscription of ASUU, but by then it made little sense because the union had become better organised and more radicalised. An Association of University Teachers (AUT) rapidly replaced it nation-wide (Amuwo, 1995). While still not recognising ASUU, Babangida’s regime was forced to sign a historic agreement with the union on 3 September 1992. Eventually, an ASUU member could trace Babangida’s precipitated departure from Aso Rock partly to ASUU’s “role in destroying the regime’s myth of invincibility and refusing to be bought” (Ibeanu, 1993: 8-9; Olusegun, 2011). Students’ political activism and idealistic radicalism are the most dreaded by governments all over the world. President Babangida’s regime was not an exception. Governments in general have tended to use students and their unions as progressive support enclaves in pursuit of both legitimacy and popular appeals. In their traditional role as a bastion against all forms of retrogression and reaction, (Olugbade, 1990:5,1,39-57) NANS, like ASUU, was proscribed several times, but it continually defied the regime, meeting in Ibadan, its headquarters, and in other major cities of the country, often with the knowledge of either university authorities or state security services (SSS). In late May of 1991, students became the target of a renewed siege which began in response to an ultimatum issued by the proscribed NANS. They demanded that suspended students be reinstated, student unions on several campuses be unbanned, and reforms in university administration be initiated. In an attempt to nip the protest in the bud, a number of students were arrested in the days before the ultimatum deadline. These arrests resulted in nationwide protests on campuses, culminating in deadly clashes between students and armed security agents dispersed to quell the protest. NANS remained the voice of Nigerian students and its major political manifestations under Babangida during the anti-SAP riots of 1988, 1989 and 1991, which drew support from a cross-section of other non-State associations throughout the nation (Amuwo, 1995). In later years, NANS’ foot troops showed signs of fatigue, leading to a diminution of aluta continua, both at the rhetorical and practical level. Several factors were responsible for this development. These included: massive infiltration of the high command of NANS by State agents brandishing material incentives for good behaviour; the use of State governors and royal fathers to divide NANS’ highest hierarchy; and deepened pauperisation of students on campuses, a direct consequence of the diminishing incomes of their parents, guardians and sponsors in civil society. Other factors were the alarming rate of campus closures in the last four years or so, with the grave consequence of students losing an academic year; and the resultant pressures of kith-and-kin on students to earn their degrees added to their own legitimate personal ambitions to leave school

2 The Babangida administration offered him appointment as chairman of the defunct Peoples Bank of Nigeria Limited, established in 1989.

38 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 and pursue their respective careers. This does not suggest, however, that NANS was bought over by the Babangida regime­ far from it. State coercion rather brought NANS closer to ASUU and NANS consistently supported ASUU’s many attempts to restore the fading glory of the country’s Ivory Tower (Amuwo, 1995). The Babangida era slowed the growth of labour unions and decimated what was left of them after the Buhari administration. According to Comrade Abdulwahed Omar, the present NLC President, the Babangida regime caused the NLC (the umbrella body for labour unions) serious setbacks and reverses (Soji-Eze & Komolafe, 2009). Of the many forces against its survival, Omar said “10 years after its formation in February 1988, the congress was dissolved by the military junta of General Ibrahim Babangida, a dissolution that was to last for 10 months” (Soji-Eze, & Komolafe, 2009). An administrator was appointed over the affairs of the NLC for 10 months before the election of Comrade Paschal Bayfau as the new NLC helmsman. As Iyayi noted:

“A radical wing of the Nigerian Labor Congress, led by Mallam Ciroma, was in control of labor affairs when Babangida came to power. Well-informed about the role of Labor in pre- and post-independent Nigeria, Babangida’s overall strategy was to replace the radical wing with a moderate, if not conservative, faction. The killing of four students of the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (ABU) in May 1986 and the subsequent solidarity march against the genocide, as a section of the Press called it, provided an alibi for the first attack. NLC headquarters in Lagos were sealed up; it was thereby accused of provocation and insensitivity to the national economic emergency; the executive of the Congress was dissolved and a sole administrator appointed to run its affairs.” (Iyayi, 2008; Olusegun, 2011).

By 1988, there was a massive government infiltration of the union at its national convention in Jos where the government sponsored a group led by Shamang to cause a schism within the NLC. Comrade Pascal Bafyau, leader of the Railways Union, whose members’ economic woes were well-known under Babangida, became the president of the Congress. As Iyayi argues, Comrade Paschal Bayfau was very close to the General. Indeed, several of the Congress’ policy somersaults, both on labour union and political matters before and after the 12 June annulment, could be traced to Bafyau’s extensive informal networks with the military regime (Iyayi, 2008; Olusegun, 2011). Enumerating the missteps of the NLC under Bayfau, Iyayi noted some bizarre labour political options, which included the establishment of a political association that sought license from the regime to participate in Third Republic politics and indecision about supporting calls by Campaign for Democracy (CD) for public disobedience for the recovery of Abiola’s presidential mandate (Iyayi, 2008; Olusegun, 2011). For Ali Ciroma, the SAP project was the mother of all evils that the Babangida junta imposed on Nigeria, where dissident voices like labor unions and the NLC were clamped down, arrested and muzzled by the military president (Komolafe, 2009). However, Ali Ciroma believes the evil

Donald O. Omagu 39 intent of the regime was heightened after the annulment of June 12, 1993, where pro-democracy groups including labour, were victims of the burning repression unleashed on the Nigerian people. However, organised labour was getting stronger and more resilient in its activities at that time. It was also at this time, in 1989 precisely, that labour unions were again restructured to become 29 affiliate unions to the Nigeria Labour Congress (Imhonopi & Urim, 2011:244-245). Government high-handedness was not only directed at members of ASUU, NANS, and the Labour Congress. Other special interest groups including the Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities (SSANU) and Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), among others, ran afoul of the government and were outlawed (Omoigui, 1985). It should be noted here that for a government that laid claims to safeguarding human rights, acting on the contrary to avowed human rights left many questions unanswered. Suffice it to say that this was only the beginning of worse things to come as the incessant arrests and detention of Nigerians under trumped up charges became the stock-in-trade of a government that promised to uphold human rights. Indeed, the people who became regular visitors to the police station and other military detention facilities were civil rights activists. For instance, Justice Ayorinde Legali sentenced Chief Gani Fawehinmi, a radical lawyer and an ardent critic of Babangida administration, to a 12-month imprisonment for contempt of court, an offence that ordinarily attracted at most a three-month prison term. The Judge, however, justified his action on the premise that the sentence was to serve as a deterrent to Fawehinmi and his radical cohort to stay off anti-government cases. It should be emphasised that Justice Legali’s action was not only an abuse of judicial process but also a clear indication that the judgment was the dictate of a government that laid claim to the rights of its citizen. Without doubt, Legali’s action was symbolic of the biblical ‘hands of Esau and voice of Jacob’. Another activist who was a victim of persistent harassment and intimidation by the police and security agents was Dr Beko Ransome Kuti, leader of the Committee on the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR). For making remarks which government considered inflammatory, derogatory, and seditious, Ransome Kuti did not only lose his chair on the Board of the Lagos University Teaching Hospital, but was periodically taken for questioning. Femi Falana was also harassed on numerous occasions, apparently because of his role as defence counsel for Jennifer Madike, a Lagos socialite arrested on 12 May, and his involvement with student union leaders (Olusegun, 2011). Although these persistent human rights abuses by members of the police and security forces became an important focus of domestic human rights groups in 1991 and a major point of criticism of the government (Human Rights Watch, 1992), these issues were not given the seriousness and attention they deserved by the government. The Babangida administration, like most military regimes in Africa ruled by military decrees, shielded itself from being questioned by regular courts in the country. In 1991, the government used the State Security Decree 2 (Detention of Persons) of 1984, the most widely abused and feared decree which provided for virtually unlimited detention without trial to continue to hold relatives and acquaintances of suspected participants in the April 1990 coup attempt. Prominent

40 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 among such detainees were Gloria Mowarin, the girlfriend of a suspected coup financier. Others included Gloria Awhirin and Rhoda Ackah, sisters of Great Ogboru, the alleged coup leader, as well as Dorah Mukoro, wife of Major Saliba Mukoro, an alleged coup participant (Againstbabangida. com). Remarkably, the then executive directors of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, Clement Nwankwo, and the chairman of the CRP’s Lawyers Committee, Tayo Oyetibo, were grilled by officers of the Directorate of Military Intelligence about their defence of Dorah Mukoro (Human Rights Watch Report, 1992). One of the most damaging effects of military rule on the justice system was the use of special tribunals. Lacking internationally recognised judicial safeguards, they heard a variety of cases considered by the government to be particularly sensitive. Those who were convicted, in some cases, had no right of appeal (Olusegun, 2011). Even though others appealed to a Special Appeal Tribunal, the government then had to confirm the appellate decisions. Until 1991, military officers sat on tribunals along with judges, but according to Decree 9 of 1991, tribunals consisted of one civilian judge. While this change appeared to be a positive development, it did not address many of the fundamental problems of the tribunals, including a presumption of guilt, inadequate legal representation, disproportionately stiff sentences and strictly circumscribed provisions for appeal. In addition, the continued existence of a parallel court system weakened the authority of the regular courts (Human Rights Watch Report, 1992). The true picture of this unprecedented infringement on the rights of civilians is brought to the forefront clearly by Tai Solarin,2 who opined, “Babangida’s human rights policy is hitting zero and there is absolutely nothing to score.” He faced punitive repercussions over the years for his criticism of the Babangida government. Indeed, Nigeria’s poor human rights record is parallel to Zimbabwe’s record under Robert Mugabe. Mugabe stands accused of directing state-sponsored violence using security agents and militias to commit human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests, torture and killings of opposition members with little or no accountability for these crimes,’ also, ‘the government has not made any genuine effort to investigate, much less discipline or prosecute any of the individuals responsible’ (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The US and the EU used the claim of human rights violations to impose punitive economic sanctions on the Mugabe government in early 2002 (Lynette Mhlanga, 2012). It is imperative to state here that the handling of the coup d’état in 1989 and 1990 further elucidates the poor human rights policy the Babangida’s administration professed to pursue. Examples of government abuse of power are legion. For instance, Major General Mamman Vatsa, who allegedly masterminded the phantom coup of 1986, was tried along with other coup suspects under the Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree 1 of 1986. The coup plotters were found guilty by the Special Military Tribunal and on 6 March 1986, General Vatsa and other conspirators including Lt. Col. M. Iyorshe, Major D.I. Bamidele, Commander A.A. Ogwiji, Wing Commander B.E.N. Ekele, Wing Commander C. Sakaba, Squadron Leader Martin O. Luther, and Squadron Leader A. Akura were executed despite pleas for clemency by well-meaning Nigerians and other international figures and bodies (Vanguard of 13 March 1999). Closely linked to this

Donald O. Omagu 41 was the case of Major Gideon Orkar, who along with a dozen others, was shot in 1990 for a coup attempt against General Ibrahim Babangida. Despite the fate of Major Orkar and others, some of the plotters like Major Saliba Mukoro fled to the United States, earned advanced degrees in criminal justice, and became a Mississippi Valley State University professor prior to returning to run for a governorship in 2011 (Gideon Orkar, for a Nigerian coup, http://www.executedtoday.com/ tag/ibrahim-babangida/:1990). If the coup plotters did not receive spontaneous public support, it was due to the calculating instinct of Nigerians for personal safety (Ihonvbere, 1991:601-626). Babangida’s economic policy and the structural adjustment programme In the late 1970s and culminating in the 1980s, African countries, like their counterparts in other developing parts of the world, were confronted with massive economic decline and an overbearing debt burden, accentuated by the global economic down-turn (Nwagbara, 2004). Consequently, the absence of necessary finances brought to a halt the implementation of vital national programmes of economic development and political modernisation. This warranted the option of seeking aid from international financiers, which was not easily forthcoming due to uncertainties about the ability of borrowing countries to pay after accumulating huge debt. As a result, subsequent granting of financial assistance was tied with stringent conditions within some form of structural adjustment in the internal structure of the economy of the borrowing countries (Nwagbara, 2011:30-41). The IMF’s prescription to countries seeking financial assistance is that they stabilise their economies by fulfilling conditions such as adopting policies of fiscal and budgetary austerity; exchange rate devaluation; ‘getting the prices right’, stimulating investment instead of consumption; cutting real wages; cutting public expenditure; prioritising external debt service; devaluing currency; increasing real interest rates; and liberalising imports. States seeking assistance are required to comply with these guidelines in return for balance of payment assistance. The World Bank and creditor clubs also collaborate with the IMF and jointly insist on the fulfillment of conditions and the receipt of an IMF seal of approval before concluding any meaningful agreements. The Nigerian government was no exception, in large part; there was willingness on the part of Nigeria to fulfill the majority of the conditions required by the World Bank and IMF. However, the state became involved in deadlocked negotiations with the multilaterals for three years over its refusal to comply with some key conditions (Okome, 2000). Babangida made a startling move when he subjected Nigerians to a year-long dialogue on whether or not the country should accept a multi-billion dollar financial aid package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to keep the economy afloat. Capitalising on the Nigerian people’s acceptance of the package because its stringent measures for reducing Nigeria’s debt would have had negative economic repercussions, Babangida suspended talks with the IMF in the spirit of his people. In the alternative, he offered Nigerians his own economic recovery programme, which included many of the proposed IMF prescriptions (Sussman, 1993). The implementation

42 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 of these prescriptions led to many unpleasant consequences like soaring unemployment rates, a high cost of living due to wage cuts and withdrawal of subsidies, and a skyrocketing inflationary situation occasioned by currency devaluation, among others. In fact, the implementation of this economic policy came at a time when Nigeria was beset by a charged political atmosphere fuelled by crushing economic hardship, which hit most families (Nwagbara, 2011:30-41). The combined effect of these discrepancies increased discontentment and opposition from organised interest groups and members of the general public. The most prominent and vocal opposition against SAP came from the public sector employees ably represented by ASUU and the NLC. Being articulate and having an advantageous position in society, organised labour was able to mount public enlightenment campaigns against the adoption of the SAP by educating the general public on the adverse implications of such measures on their well-being and those of the yet unborn next generation (Nwagbara, 2011:30-41). Thus, in a frantic attempt to earn legitimacy and credibility for itself and its transformation policies, Babangida’s administration embarked on a series of strategic responses that were sometimes involved the subtle inclusion and exclusion of opposition and others, overt repression and incarceration (Nwagbara, 2004). Sponsors of SAP probably believed that a more authoritarian regime was a prerequisite for successful implementation of SAP (Bangura, & Beckman, 1993). However, the presence of military dictatorships in the nation’s political scene and their use of repressive decrees could not stop organised labour from using strike action’s whenever the need arose. At best, such legislation only caused a temporary setback to organised labour after some immunity against the harsh and hostile confrontations of the military was developed (Nwagbara, 2011:30-41). Corruption Corruption woven deep into every fabric of the country’s political and socio-economic life (Aiyede, 2008:37-54) is indeed the major explanation for the general, acute development tragedy that impeded on social and economic growth as well as the effective utilisation of resources in Nigeria. From its mild manifestation in the 1960s, corruption grew rapidly at an alarming rate during the Second Republic (Aiyede, 2008), as it had become an instrument of regime legitimisation and stability during the several years of military misrule in Nigeria. During the period under discussion, corruption became so pervasive and ravenous to the extent that it became the major reason for all military coups and authoritarian takeovers in the country. Indeed, Babangida’s regime, like many military regimes, became entangled in and ended up epitomizing corruption, the same reason they took over power in the first place. Indeed, during the Babangida autocratic regime, for instance, corruption was raised to the level of state policy and allegation of corrupt practices were treated with utmost levity, destroying all the achievements of the previous administration. Gboyega has this to say:

The benign treatment of corruption in the early years of the Babangida administration foretold a much more conscious instrumental use of corruption to ensure regime stability. For a military administration, Babangida’s government was unique in its

Donald O. Omagu 43 unconcern about corruption within its rank and among public servants generally; it was as if the Government existed so that corruption might thrive (Gboyega, 1996:3-12).

A few years after taking over power, some of the worst offenders who were found guilty and were serving various jail terms were released from prison on the pretext of Babangida’s human rights posture. Ribadu, former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), further reiterated this point. While speaking at the 3rd Media Trust Annual Dialogue in Abuja on the theme ‘Corruption: The Trouble with Nigeria’, he categorically acknowledged that IBB was the mastermind of institutionalised corruption (Ribadu, 2006) in Nigeria. According to him, “Public officers accused and convicted for corrupt practices were given as much as five lifetime jail sentences each and all their ill-gotten wealth confiscated,”(Ribadu, 2006) were returned to the corrupt politicians (Gboyega, 1996). This, he said, was done under the Forfeiture of Assets (Release of certain Forfeited Properties) Decrees No. 24 and 50 of 1993. Ribadu further opined that rather than encourage and promote the virtues of accountability, respect for the rule of law and patriotism, the Nigerian leadership destroyed institutions that sustain the growth of society, unleashing on the rest of the people an army of blind loyalists with explicit instructions to do whatever it would take, or using brazen theft and violence to strengthen their stranglehold on power. Indeed, Ribadu further remarked “There is perhaps no other country in the world where absolute power corrupts absolutely than Nigeria” (Ribadu, 2006). From 1985, when General Ibrahim Babangida seized power, he made it clear in no uncertain terms that his government was all about ‘settlement. ’ Thus, all government contracts, appointments and institutions became a means of patronage and settlement. This argument was made even more forcefully by Becquart-Leclerq’s study of corruption in France when he states it clearly that: Corruption functions like grease in the gears; it has an important redistributive effect, it is a functional substitute for direct participation in power, it constitutes the cement between elites and parties, and it affects the effectiveness with which power is exercised (Becquart-Leclerq, 1989). The monumental institutionalisation of corruption during the infamous Babangida era continued into the General Sanni Abacha and General Abdulsalami Abubakar regimes. By the time the trio left power and the democratic experiment began in 1999, Nigeria had been nurtured and indoctrinated into a system of institutionalised corruption that touched every facet of life for an unbroken period of 14 years from 1985 to 1999 (Nwobu, 2012). To sustain and boost the regime’s legitimacy, Babangida made even more extensive pay-offs to various groups of people and organisations in civil society. These included: Ecumenical Cathedral Abuja, 50 million Naira; Obafemi Awolowo Foundation, 30 million Naira; Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria, 20 million Naira; Zik Hall Zungeru, 40 million Naira; Arewa House Kaduna 35 million Naira; Yakubu Gowon Centre, 30 million Naira; Nigerian Union of Journalists National Secretariat Abuja, 30 million Naira; Nigeria Labour Congress Secretariat Building Fund, 50 million Naira, among several others (Committee for Defense of Human Rights 1992:35). He attempted to compromise some vocal critics by settling them and those he could not recruit, he fired where possible, detained, killed, or hounded into exile (Osahon, 2010).

44 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 The News Magazine 20 December 1993 edition captures clearly the administration’s economic profligacy and massive corruption culminating in the mismanagement of a US$ 2 billion Gulf oil windfall in 1991. Jeffrey Robinson’s book, The Sink, aptly captures Babangida involvement in the oil windfall thus: “Of the US$ 120 billion siphoned out of the Nigerian treasury into offshore accounts by dishonest politicians, US$ 20 billion is allegedly traceable to IBB directly as President from 1985 to 1993” (Osahon, 2010; Olusegun, 2011:169). Babangida’s mismanagement of taxpayers’ money includes 400 million Naira wasted on the Better Life Project, US$ 200 million siphoned from the Aluminium Project and other instances of colossal corruption at all levels of government too numerous to mention. This was the trenchant description of the Nigerian state, which became more relevant and forceful in 1993 than it was in 1960. The World Bank and other international sources of information put his total loot from the Nigerian treasury at over US$ 35 billion (Osahon, 2010; Olusegun, 2011:169). The African state of Angola is another case in point. The Economist in 2000 observed in an article that:

“The Angolan government earns around $3. 5 billion a year from its oil, the bulk of the money bypasses the budget, disappearing straight into the hands of the presidency. Angolans call the nexus of the presidency, the Central Bank and Sonangol, the state oil company, the Bermuda Triangle, the place where money vanishes without a trace. (The Economist, January 2000, 48) it is speculated that most of the money goes either to buy new weapons to fuel the devastating, never-ending war against the UNITA rebels, or to finance the lifestyles of the super-rich with whom the president has surrounded himself. This lucky bunch is alleged to arrange arms purchases with greater regard for the size of the backhanders than for the value of the weapons. When the cash runs out, the powers that-be take out short-term, high-interest loans, guaranteed against future oil production. Thus the entire profits from Angola’s oil production for the next three years are said to have already been spent” (The Economist, January 2000:48).

Highlights of the Pius Okigbo Panel on the Reorganization and Reform of Central Bank of Nigeria set up by Abacha in 1994 included a critique of the economic policies of the Babangida administration, the waste and mismanagement that characterised the government, and the indictment of the Central Bank as a regulatory organ which was under the direct control of the head of state. Specifically, the Okigbo Panel identified poor supervision, dearth of qualified personnel, corruption, poor management of the economy, inept management of foreign reserves, lack of independence, and the proliferation of two-branch banks. In short, the report concluded that the Central Bank of Nigeria had completely failed in its primary responsibility of supervising other financial institutions and managing the economy (Abdullahi, 2005: 3). Zaire presents another example of an African country plagued by systematic corruption. One estimate from 1970 puts the amount of the annual government-operating budget that was ‘lost or diverted’ under the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko (for thirty-two years the strongman of Zaire), at

Donald O. Omagu 45 60 percent (Callaghy, 1984:89). Zaire, under Mobutu, was the exemplar per excellence of what Stanislav Andreski termed ‘kleptocracy’ to differentiate it from simple corruption, which is merely the practice of using the power of office for making private gains in breach of laws and regulations nominally in force (Andreski, 1968:92). This scourge is not peculiar to Africa; in South America, General Marcos Perez Jimenez, former military dictator of Venezuela, notorious for brutality and corruption, provides another example of a corrupt leader. As at 2001 when he died, he was estimated to have siphoned $250 million from the state treasury (South Florida Sun-Herald, 24 September 2001). Censorship of the press The print and electronic media has been immensely active as a channel for the dissemination of information, sensitisation and conscientisation of the citizenry with insights into the goings-on in their environment and around the world (Nwagbara, 2010). The media has been described as:

… as a watchdog is in recognition of its watchful and critical role against the bad practices of the government and private individuals… The media have been irrepressible in holding the citizenry, particularly the political leaders accountable in Nigeria (Omoera, 2010: 35-6).

To successfully bring these responsibilities to fruition, the media must maintain its principal features, which include critical independence, democratic constructiveness and commercial viability (Bruns, 2008, 65-79; Oyeleye, 2004, 157-168; Kuper & Kuper, 2001, 355-376). The Nigerian press, which for years was regarded as the most vibrant in Africa, was increasingly vilified under the Babangida administration (Human Rights Watch Report, 1992). The relationship between the government and the media, contrary to Babangida’s promise in 1985, became badly frayed as he began unleashing his policy of intimidation and harassments on media houses over the years. His administration closed down newspaper houses and arrested journalists who reported on sensitive topics they felt would tarnish the image of the government. For instance, Government slammed a six-month ban on Newswatch Magazine simply because it made public their decision on the J. S. Cookey Committee on the political future of Nigeria, before they officially made it public. But “roughly a month to the end of the ban the President pardoned the outfit and immediately granted it an interview where he declared that the magazine is very close to his heart” (The African Concord, 31 August 1992). In a similar development, the African Concord, another leading news magazine, suffered the same fate in April 1992, when The News outfit was also sealed by security operatives for an interview with Chief Anthony Enahoro, an elder statesman and former Minister of Information, who called for a national conference and expressed some critical views of the Babangida Administration. Also, three newspapers in Lagos owned by John West Publications were temporarily shut down for what was described as ‘embarrassing publications’ against the president and his wife and on the Jennifer Madike’s case with the caption “IBB, Maryam [Babangida] named in Jennifer’s

46 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 deal”. This story appeared in the Lagos Evening News and reported the contents of a letter purportedly written by the chair of the Drug Law Enforcement Agency in which he justified the need to detain Madike under Decree 2 (Human Rights Watch, 1992; Olusegun, 2011). The editor and news editor of the paper were arrested, detained and released after a few days. Foreigners were not spared in the administration’s crusade of gagging the press. For instance, William Keeling, a correspondent for the British Daily Financial Times, was expelled from Nigeria and declared persona non grata for allegedly writing damning and inaccurate articles “ostensibly to cause mischief and disharmony among Nigerians and between Nigeria and the rest of the world.” The government’s statement cited an article in which Keeling had accused the government of not reporting about half of the extra five billion dollars that it was estimated to have earned from higher oil prices during the Gulf war (Human Rights Watch Report, 1992). Indeed, Babangida’s high-handedness directed at the press fit the profile of right-wing General Ordia Fujimori of Peru, who after coming to power through a coup in 1948, fined, arrested and exiled many journalists over the course of the following eight years, while several news magazines and newspapers were either closed or occupied by troops. At the beginning of his presidency, he introduced the Ley de Seguridad interior dela Republica (Law of Internal Security), which made verbal threats against the freedom or material interest of any Peruvian citizen punishable by expatriation or imprisonment and fine. Similarly punishable was ‘news and information of a false or tendentious nature, destined to upset the public order or damage the prestige or credit of the country’ (Gargurevich, 1991:191). An entirely new dimension of the intimidation of journalists was introduced in 1986, following the murder of Dele Giwa, then editor-in-chief of Newswatch, via a letter bomb allegedly planted by members of the state security apparatus. Rumours’ making the rounds at the time was that Dele Giwa stumbled on some vital information regarding Gloria Okon, a drug mule suspect convicted and sentenced to death in London, and threatened to publish the story even when he was presented with a cash bribe. Efforts by Gani Fawehinmi to investigate and prosecute those responsible directly and remotely, was frustrated by the military. In spite of Babangida’s complicity in Mr. Giwa’s death, he resolved to remain silent even when he had the opportunity to set the record straight at the Human Right Violations Investigations Commission setup by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 with the mandate “to establish the causes, nature, and extent of human rights violations between 15 January 1966 and 28 May 1999. The Babangida government also promulgated the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree No. 29 of 1993. This decree announced a prohibition on promoting “ideas that minimise the sovereignty of Nigeria” and contained a litany of restrictions on the press, including punishment by a ten-year prison term or stiff fine or both for publishing “false information”; the establishment of an office for each paper in Abuja within one year; and an order to submit all newspapers to the Information Secretary (Human Rights Watch, 1994). A special military tribunal established under the Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunal) Decree 1986 would try an offence under this Decree (Lagos Judiciary Library, 1993). This decree was later repealed by Decree no. 63 of 1999. Arguably, press censorship is not peculiar to Nigeria; most governments on the continent

Donald O. Omagu 47 are guilty of this crime, which has resulted in an unfriendly environment for journalists. Indeed, Babangida’s regime can be compared to Col. M. Gadaffi’s regime in Libya. Gadaffi, apart from having a reputation as one of the world’s longest serving dictators before his death in 2011, is a good example of an African leader with a trust deficit. Indeed, Gadaffi, during his 42-year reign, had a reputation for press censorship state-sponsored terrorism for personal gain, and corruption. Nigeria’s foreign policy and the Babangida regime, 1985-1993 Nigeria’s international image in the 1970s, according to Babangida, was of Nigeria’s “rise to greatness”, while the 1980s opened the chapter of “the decline to the state of a bewildered nation,” as a result of domestic happenings such as electoral violence, a high rate of corruption, economic mismanagement, oil doom, and the ridiculous role assumption in Africa (Otubanjo, 1989). These developments ultimately had grave consequences on Nigeria’s regional leadership (Babangida, 1985:3). From Babangida’s geo-strategic partnership in Africa, commitment to regional security, conflict resolution, and economic diplomacy, it was very clear that the regime had an unapologetic and uncompromising resolve to keep Nigeria’s number one position in the continent. To achieve this, the regime began a policy of damage control to Nigeria-West African relations, which were at its ebb owing to Buhari’s perceived xenophobia against West Africans. The Babangida administration provided assistance to needy West African states, and committed to a peaceful settlement of disputes in the region. The enormous regional and global burdens, which included Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somali, Chad, Togo, Namibia and South Africa, were costly in maintaining global visibility, at variance with national economic development, and contrary to the principles of economic diplomacy. In Liberia alone, Nigeria provided up to 80 percent of the ECOMOG troops (contributing 15000 out of the total 17000 soldiers) while spending up to US$ 12 billion (Ayam, 2004). According to Ayam, (2004a):

No other West African country but Nigeria would have been able to spearhead such an operation. Representing the interventionist phase of Nigeria’s foreign policy, it has shown the dominant position of Nigeria in ECOWAS and the region (Ayam, 2006 b: 19).

Nigeria was a financially committed member of ECOWAS and was reputed to be not only the highest due-paying member of the organisation, but also a major financier of ECOWAS programmes and projects. It made a regular contribution of one-third of ECOWAS’ annual budget. In terms of financial commitment to the OAU, Nigeria was assessed higher than most African states for statutory contributions and, as Bukarambe notes, it was responsible for between eight and ten percent of the total regular budget of the OAU (Bukarambe, 2000). General Babangida’s administration spearheaded the boycott of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games in 1986 to compel the west to stop apartheid South Africa from its racist imperialism in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Adeyemo, 2002), and frowned on the situation of a South

48 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 African military base in Equatorial Guinea, a close Nigerian neighbour to the south, considering this as abominable to its principle of secure neighbourhood, anti-apartheid stance and a threat to its national security. Pressure on Equatorial Guinea eventually compelled President Obiang Mbasogo to expel South Africans from the country (Fawole, 2003). The decisive and tactical roles in African affairs earned Nigeria a number of international positions. These included the headship of the UN Anti-Apartheid Committee, chairmanship of ECOWAS during three consecutive terms, secretary-generalship of the Commonwealth of Nations, President of the UN General Assembly in 1989, presidency of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), executive secretaryship of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and chairmanship of the OAU in 1991, with Babangida himself at the helm. One of his striking achievements was the establishment of the African Economic Community aimed at integrating African economies (Folarin, 2010). Babangida’s era represented the ‘golden age’ of Nigeria’s claim to regional leadership. The administration accomplished the grand African role conceptions of the Murtala-Obasanjo, while declaring its own fresh perspectives in unambiguous terms. Although at a very high price, Abegunrin’s observation aptly captures the period: the foreign policy exhibited Charles Dickens’ aphorism in his Tale of Two Cities “it was the best of times, it was the worst of times” (Abegunrin, 2003). It is regrettable to state here that the government’s huge spending to keep fulfill its international role promises was having more excruciating economic effects on the populace. In West Africa, Babangida was criticised at this time for his wastefulness, lack of strategic objective, and rationale, particularly in the intervention of Nigeria in Liberia. For instance, a group reasoned that these roles were accumulating serious economic costs for Nigeria at a time when the domestic economy was overstretched. Nigeria faced the SAP and the huge cost of nation building at home, and thus resorted to soliciting for African Development Bank (ADB) loans and the ECOWAS Fund (Folarin, 2010). Indeed, aid was in some cases unsolicited and some nations turned Nigeria down in suspicion and curiosity about Nigeria’s genuine intentions. Nigeria’s huge spending for the cause of West Africa was considered an avoidable wastage of national resources. This is in line with the general assumption that Nigeria’s African policy was characterised by a mere show of wealth. Throwing wealth around Nigeria’s neighbours was simply an essential feature of African policy (Bukarambe, 2000:58). Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso also opposed Nigeria, condemning its actions in Liberia, for instance, as a surreptitious means to dominate the region and subsume Francophone nations in its imperialism. They, thus, supported Taylor with arms and funding, and allowed their borders to be used for gunrunning, among other things, by the Taylor movement (Folarin, 2010). The outcry of the citizens, lack of support for Nigeria’s regional and global quests, and the litany of ethnic and religious conflicts at home, created a moral problem for Nigeria in its ‘corrective’ roles in Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa: Nigeria needed more ‘corrective roles’ to play in its own internal affairs. Indeed, Babangida was berated in the latter part of his reign for the serious image problem generated by (Adeyemo, 2002) a sporadic increase in the rate of drug peddling and unbridled corruption, with advance fee fraud (419) becoming a very embarrassing credibility crisis for Nigeria in the international community. There were also suppressions of civil society

Donald O. Omagu 49 and human rights abuses arising from protests against the SAP reform policy that constructed a grievous spatial economy (Folarin, 2010). The worst legitimacy and image problem the Babangida administration created was the continued cancellation of elections leading to the adjustment in transition timetable. The crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Africa where Nigeria was passionately involved were caused by the same kind of leadership and ethnic crisis that Nigeria could not tackle at home. The military was holding on to power for too long, had become an instrument of internal colonisation, and were no less promoting internal ethnic hatred and sectional imperialism than in South Africa. The spectre of horrible domestic problems and banality of the Babangida response had negative effects on the regime’s image in African and global politics (Saliu, 1999; Saliu, 2006). The Babangida administration was criticised for a lack of continuity in General Buhari’s foreign policies, which were jettisoned by him (Folarin, 2010). Babangida and the transition to civilian rule The history of Nigeria is replete with failed elections and the abortion of democracy occasioned by electoral fraud, among other factors. Since the country’s independence, the phenomenon of electoral fraud has perpetuated a political culture that has made the management of a credible electoral process that will usher a smooth transition of government a “noble dream” (Ogbeidi, 2010:43-56). It will be recalled that soon after taking over power from General Buhari in 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida consistently guaranteed an eventual return to civilian rule. Paradoxically, President Babangida, in order to perpetuate himself in power, relied on strong-arm tactics and a tightly controlled programme that derailed the transition to the third Republic. Indeed, in his highly regimental transition to civilian rule, Babangida prohibited all independent political parties that the AFRC replaced on 7 October 1989 with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the National Republican Convention (NRC), aimed at maintaining an ideological balance. The two parties were to be national in outlook and organisation, and politicians were to be imbued with a high ethos which government sought to instill in the people. The government further claimed that such controls were necessary to eliminate the ethnic, religious and regional violence that plagued the country in the past. Intriguingly, elections in the country were conducted using an experimental method known as the ‘open ballot’, in which voters queue up behind the poster of their chosen candidates rather than the secret ballot, as provided by Nigerian law. The possibilities for voter intimidation inherent in the open ballot system were obvious (Olusegun, 2011: 62; Human Rights Watch, 1992). Despite several years of manipulation of the transition to a civilian government, the Babangida administration conducted elections in 1993, which, although with minor exceptions, was applauded as free and fair by international and local election monitoring groups. The election was generally considered to be free and fair, partly because of the adopted open ballot system. Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola of the Social Democratic Party gained 57% of the votes cast from 16 states (Transition Monitoring Group, Final Report on the 1998-1999, 2002:9). Results from the remaining states were still being collated when the Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, in a special

50 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 broadcast on 24 June 1993 annulled the 12 June 1993 election, suspended the National Electoral Commission and (Ogbeidi, 2010: 43-56) also repealed Decree no. 3, 52 and 13 of 1992 and 1993, which provided for the transition to a civil rule programme (Olurode, 1983:2). Providing justification for annulling the election, President Babangida argued among other things that: “…these steps are taken so as to protect our legal system and the judiciary from being ridiculed and politicized both nationally and internationally…” he further stated that Government would not fold its arms or despair in the face of this unfortunate and unwarranted situation which is fast eroding the esteem, honour and confidence with which the public holds the nation’s judiciary…” (Ogbeidi, 2010:43-56). Following the cancellation of the elections, the Campaign for Democracy (CD) organised peaceful demonstrations in Lagos during which hundreds of human rights and pro-democracy activists, labour leaders, academics, students and workers were reported arrested or killed by military and security forces (Human Rights Watch, 1994). In addition, waves of protests unleashed against the Babangida’s administration by associations like the Campaign for Democracy (CD), Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), and Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), as well as the National Association of Nigeria Students (NANS) and Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), coupled with international pressure compelled President Babangida, to step down and handed over power to an Interim National Government led by chief Ernest Shonekan. Although Shonekan, who many saw as a surrogate of the Babangida regime, was named Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Defense Minister Gen. Sani Abacha actually held the reins of power. It was, therefore, no surprise to Nigerians when Shonekan resigned after only four months, transferring power to General Sani Abacha, who assumed control and removed all remnants of Babangida’s stillborn plan to reschedule democratic elections (Kaiser, 2005). One of the most unfortunate effects of the annulment was the impetus provided to the divisive influences of ethnicity and regionalism, which have tainted Nigerian politics since independence. The strong showing throughout the country by Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from the South, would have provided the nation’s more than 250 ethnic groups an unprecedented opportunity for unity, which was lost in the post-cancellation crisis. Conclusion African leaders fall short of their promise when they vie for public office to fight for the people and promote good governance. Indeed, President Babangida, in spite of his proclamation during his August 1985 maiden broadcast to the nation to strive for the rule of law, transparency, equity, and accountability, displayed an attitude of contempt and disregard for Nigerians. In collaboration with his lieutenants, Babangida ruled by draconian decrees and edicts, many of which negated the jurisdiction of the courts and trampled on the fundamental human rights of the people. Arguably, he jettisoned the majority of his promises, thus proving the trust deficit culture as to be as endemic in Nigeria in particular as Africa in general.

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54 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Perception of public corruption in Kenya DOUGLAS KIMEMIA Abstract Corruption decreases government efficiency and effectiveness, and influences the way citizens perceive the overall quality of the government. The main focus of this paper is to examine why perceptions of public corruption did not change during the Kibaki administration. This administration was in power for 10 years (2003-2013), and invested significant resources in setting up a legislative framework and an anti-corruption agency. Yet, according to the analysis of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) reports from 2003 to 2012, there was no change in the public’s perception of corruption and of government effort against corruption. Despite anti- corruption agency efforts, optimism dropped, while pessimism increased. To bridge this gap requires political commitment, which is demonstrated by charging all corrupt public officials and recovering any public funds and assets that have been stolen.

Key words: Kenya, corruption, perception, political commitment, public sector Sumário Corrupção declina a eficiência e eficácia do governo e influencia na forma como os cidadãos percebem a qualidade do governo. O principal foco deste artigo é examinar as razões das percepções da corrupção pública não mudaram durante a administração Kibaki. Esta administração esteve no poder durante 10 anos (2003-2013), e investiu recursos significativos na estrutura legislativa e uma agência anti-corrupção para combater corrupção. Mas, de acordo com a análise dos relatórios do Barómetro Global de Corrupção (Global Corruption Barometer, GCB) de 2003 a 2012, não houve mudança na percepção pública da corrupção e do esforço governamental contra corrupção. Os níveis de optimismo caíram enquanto o pessimismo aumentou, apesar dos esforços da agência anti-corrupção. Para fazer esta ponte é preciso compromisso político que é demonstrado por acusar todos oficiais públicos e recuperar quaisquer fundos públicos e bens que foram roubados.

Palavras chave: Quénia, corrupção, percepção, compromisso político, sector público Introduction Corruption contributes to the way citizens perceive the overall quality of government in their country because corruption increases inefficiency in public service delivery and decreases effectiveness in the public sector (Ledet, 2011). Corruption encourages a cultural tradition of gift giving which in turn generates a culture of distrust towards public institutions (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). Corruption perception is an indicator of the pervasiveness of corruption in a country, which differs from the actual experience of corruption, though the latter may influence the former. A lack of trust

Douglas Kimemia 55 in the democratic processes in public institutions not only alienates citizens from the very officials they have elected, but also undermines the ability to fight corruption (Hope, 2000; Uneke, 2010). The rampant levels of corruption woven deep into the fabric of the lives of most Kenyans, and in the public sector in particular, has resulted in debilitating economic, political, and social effects that can be felt everywhere. For instance, at the local level, lives have been lost at hospitals because of medical staff withholding drugs and medical equipment, public officials embezzling allocated funds, and patients’ not being able to give bribes to the medical staff. At the national level, those in power have been siphoning scarce public funds into their private accounts, leaving public services underfunded. Those who are in positions of leadership, like members of Parliament (MPs), have been using their power to raise their salaries unilaterally. For example, in 2013, the Kenyan MPs had a standoff with the Salaries and Remuneration Commission and the public as they attempted to raise their own salaries. The behaviour of the MPs, which was driven by self- interest because they are highly paid, compared to other public officials, was similar to previous parliaments that had raised their salaries even after huge public protest. Today, Kenyan lawmakers are ranked as the second highest paid legislators in the world, exceeding their counterparts from the developed economies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) indicates that Kenya is perceived as being one among the most corrupt nations in the world. There are clear measurement tools that indicate the corruption in Kenya is pandemic, and this needs to be addressed if democracy and economic progress are to be realised in the country. According to the Transparency International reports from 2003-2012, the CPI shows that Kenya ranged between 1. 9 and 2. 2 on a scale of 1 to 10. These scores indicate that the experts’ perception of the level of corruption did not changed significantly over those nine years, even in the midst of ongoing political and economic reforms. The CPI reflects the opinion of experts such as business people, expatriates, and risk analysts who might be living outside the country under assessment; the index can overgeneralise the extent of corruption. It is not a perfect index or measure of corruption but it is robust compared to other measures of corruption based on individual sources, such as Business International, International Country Risk Guide, World Bank Index, and the World Competitiveness Report. Furthermore, the relative stability perception measured over time captures some underlying feature of reality. Since 2003, there have been several GCB reports that highlight the public perceptions of corruption in Kenya and how they assess the government efforts in the fight against corruption. These reports point out public perception on the direction of corruption (increasing or decreasing), especially in the last three years. Furthermore, a survey carried out on behalf of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) – formerly referred to as Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission– in 2009, showed that 76% of the respondents perceived corruption as prevalent compared to only 10% who felt that it was declining. This result confirms that where corruption is pervasive, coupled with weak public institutions mandated to enforce the rule of the law, the values system encourages the perception that corruption is not only normal but also a survival strategy to get ahead (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

56 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 There is a gap between the public perception and the government efforts to end corruption. I intend to examine the public perception of corruption as measured by GCB during 2002 to 2012. The Transparency International (2005) GCB measures public perceptions of corruption among the citizens of a particular country, as opposed to the experts. Given that the CPI reflects the opinion of experts, some of whom are based outside the country under assessment, the GCB offers a different perspective on government and its demonstrated ability to reduce corruption. The research question is: Why did public perception on corruption remain the same regardless of the legal effort, investment of resources and establishment of an anti-corruption agency. To put this question into context, I will look at the Kibaki administration, which, under the banner of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition, came into power in 2003 with a significant majority (63%) of votes (Akech, 2011). The administration’s campaign centred on ending corruption, which resulted in widespread hope that the war against corruption would be over. Unfortunately, when Kibaki’s second term was over in March 2013, corruption perception was at its highest and distrust in the political institutions remained intact. I also selected this administration due to available data that was consistent. Compared to President Moi, who ruled Kenya for 24 years, it was during Kibaki’s administration that Kenya started making major political reforms, increased political participation, a new constitution was passed, and media freedom increased. I will analyse three survey questions that measured GCB public perception during 2003-2012, these questions are: 1. Do you expect the level of corruption to change in the next three years? 2. In the past three years, how has the level of corruption in Kenya changed? 3. How would you assess the current government’s actions in the fight against corruption?

These survey questions are very basic, direct, general, and very simplified but sufficient to respond to the main research question. These questions have been tested and capture the public perception in Kenya. Therefore, I hypothesise that the public expects corruption levels to increase over the next three years, and this leads to a conclusion that the anti-corruption efforts do not correlate with the CPI level. The conventional wisdom is that the public fight will reduce corruption, thus lowering public perception of corruption. I argue that there are more variables involved in improving the public perception of corruption as opposed to improving the economy and putting legal frameworks in place to reduce corruption. While the GCB data does not amount to an index of government effort to fight corruption, it does provide feedback on the power of governmental influence on the public agenda, its political will to fight corruption, and to effect real change in a country. To experience a real change in the public perception, there must be political commitment from those in power. Political commitment is conceived as the willingness of the president and other senior officials not to engage in corrupt practices, as well as the willingness of those officials to hold anyone accountable who engaged in such practices. According to Transparency International (2006), good performance by government in anti-corruption can only come about through sustained change that translates into better quality of life for ordinary citizens.

Douglas Kimemia 57 This paper is timely as, in 2013, Kenyans voted for a new administration under President Uhuru Kenyatta. The current administration, which enjoys the independent judiciary and anti-corruption agencies that were put in place during Kibaki’s administration, can avoid clientelism and self- interests in dealing with corruption. This paper is organised into three sections. The first section deals with the conceptual analysis; the second section focuses on the contextual analysis, and the third section on the GCB analysis and conclusion. Conceptual analysis Defining corruption Although corruption is a universal phenomenon, its definition still remains a complex issue because there is no single, comprehensive, and universally accepted definition due to the different ways that it manifests in various cultural settings (Langseth, 2006). Transparency International defines corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private benefits. According to Transparency International, any act that produces public damage in any public institution is corruption if the purpose is to promote undue personal or group advantage. Another similar definition is by Tanzi (1998), who defines corruption as any activity that is illegal, unethical, or a dishonest business practice carried out by a bureaucracy or by political leadership for personal gain. It is worth noting that corruption is not just one single act, as it is a variety of different practices carried out among different people in different ways. It involves behaviours such as “bribery [use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust]; nepotism [bestowal of patronage by reason of relationship rather than merit]; and misappropriation [illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses]” (Nye, 1967, p. 419).

Types of corruption Corruption also comes in different shapes and sizes, and can be classified as either grand corruption or petty corruption, depending on its magnitude. Petty corruption, sometimes referred to as administrative corruption, exists within the established public and social frameworks. It involves the exchange of very small amounts of money and the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment (Langseth, 2006). It is this kind of corruption that the regular citizens encounter daily in places like hospitals, schools, local licensing offices, police stations, and taxing offices. In most cases, petty corruption affects those living at the margin of the societywho cannot afford to bribe. Yoo (2007) points out that the cumulative impact of all these small bribes on the efficiency and welfare of many developing economies is substantial, if not staggering. For example, according to the EACC (2011a) report, 66% of the reported cases in Kenya involved low level personnel like police and clerks in the public sector. On the other hand, grand corruption, which is also referred to as political corruption, pervades the highest levels of government and involves huge sums of public funds (Langseth, 2006). This kind of corruption involves distortion of the central functions of government, leading to a broad erosion of confidence in good governance and respect for the rule of law.

58 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Contextual analysis Grand corruption cases between 2003 and 2012 Between 2003 and 2012, there were high-ranking corruption cases involving government ministers, among other top public officials. The cases mentioned here are selected cases based on their magnitude and impact and the various administrations’ failure to address them. Although Kibaki’s administration inherited some corrupt deals from the Moi administration, it continued to uphold the same contracts. For example, the first grand corruption case of the Moi administration was the Goldenberg scandal, which was facilitated by senior public officials and a businessman, Kamlesh Pattni, the owner of the Goldenberg Company in the 1990s. The deal required that the Moi administration, through the Central Bank of Kenya, subsidise exports of gold far beyond standard arrangement by paying 35% more than the foreign currency earnings. It is estimated that Kenya lost as much as US $600 million, which was more than 10% of the country’s annual gross domestic product. Two decades have passed, yet the ghost of this scandal still hovers over Kenya, as none was held accountable. The officials who were implicated in the corrupt deal were indicted and later freed by the court and cleared of all charges. The second case was the Anglo Leasing and Finance scandal, which involved abuse of lease finances and supplies credit meant to finance security and security-related projects (Mwangi, 2008). The government between 1997 and 2003 signed eighteen separate contracts involving Anglo Leasing worth over US $740 million. Some of these were completed prior to January 2003, while others were cancelled by the Kibaki administration after the media reported the corrupt deal. A total of US $243 million was spent on these contracts as of May 2005 (Mwangi, 2008). More than 10 years later, the Anglo Leasing Company case has not been solved and the few individuals implicated have been cleared of any wrongdoing by EACC. President Kibaki ended his second term without addressing the scandal or even prosecuting those involved. According to Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) reports from 2007 to 2011, some of the ministries involved in these allegations include the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Medical Services, and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation as well as officials from the prime minister’s office. Other government agencies include the National Social Security Fund, the Nairobi City Council, and the Kenya Medical Research Institute. In 2010, a government audit report found that significant portions of the fund for the free primary education programme could not be accounted for in the Ministry of Education. The report indicated that there were allegations of fraudulent disbursement of Kenya Education Sector support funds for seminars and workshops, which involved more than 524 million Kenyan shillings (EACC 2011). As a result, the United States suspended a planned five- year US$7 million capacity programme that was scheduled to begin in 2010. In addition, Great Britain, which had been supporting the programme since 2005, suspended its financial support of US $16 million. Unfortunately, the withdrawal of funds by both the United States and Great Britain put the free primary education programme at a risk of failing, which would hurt children from poor families who could not afford to pay the tuition.

Douglas Kimemia 59 A more recent report indicates that there has been an enormous loss of millions of shillings belonging to Kenyan civil servants invested in the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). It was revealed that the NHIF disbursed hundreds of millions of shillings to medical service providers that did not have enough medical equipment and staff. Both the prime minister and the head of public service disbanded the NHIF board of directors for engaging in malpractice, which ranged from contracting ghost medical suppliers to paying money to nonexistent clinics (Appollo, 2012). Unfortunately, the ownership of these medical service providers could not be established and none of those responsible has been held accountable, as more than 300000 public servants, who cannot afford quality healthcare, hope that their money will not disappear. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation was also suspected of misappropriating public funds in an emergency drought programme that involved more than 26 million Kenyan shillings. Additionally, the same ministry was accused of irregular procurement of supplies and inflation of prices; and a variation of contract pricing for Umaa Dam by the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation involving close to one billion Kenya shillings (EACC, 2011). The minister in charge ignored public pressure to resign even after the director of public prosecution recommended that EACC continue its investigations on the minister. The minister insisted on her innocence even after charges of conspiracy to defraud as well as violation of procurement and fraudulent acquisition of public property, were brought against her relatives and top ministry officials (Appollo, 2011). Unfortunately, the prime minister and the president turned deaf ears and for political reasons did not remove her from the ministerial position. Even amid previous accusations of corruption, the same minister was appointed in Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration as a cabinet secretary, equivalent to a minister. Uhuru’s administration lost an opportunity to build public confidence by addressing corruption over politics of votes based on where the minister comes from. Such corrupt cases and incidents involving senior public officials being reappointed in the government and not being held accountable indicates a lack of willingness to deal with corruption sufficiently. These cases can be attributed to the high perception of corruption and they undermine the efforts and commitment from the public to end the vice that affects them dearly. Perceptions of endemic corruption create a culture where corruption is necessary as it is practiced at the highest government levels. Unfortunately, the effects are interpreted at the lower administrative levels as the public willingly gives into this culture of corruption in order to receive its benefits.

Efforts to deal with corruption Literature indicates that in Hong Kong and Singapore, the reduction in corruption coincided with the establishment and strengthening of an independent anti-corruption agency with widespread powers (Svensson, 2005). In an effort to tackle graft, Kibaki’s administration has implemented adequate legislation and agencies to fight corruption (Wario, 2011). Among such agencies, the EACC replaced the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission in 2010 as per Article 79 of the Constitution of Kenya, and established it as a public body under Section 3 (1) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011 as part of anti-corruption initiatives mandated to combat and prevent

60 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 corruption. Although the EACC is an independent body, it does not have powers to prosecute alleged offenders. Rather, the case files are passed to the offices of the attorney general’s office and later to the office of the director of public prosecution, both of which are overburdened by decreasing human resource capacity (Gbadamosi, 2006). By looking at the analysis of the cases reported by the EACC annual reports of 2008/2009, 2009/2010, and 2010/2011, the results indicate that the number of cases were not significant, thus producing skepticism regarding the level of commitment upon the government. The data in these three operating periods indicate that the number of completed cases continued to fluctuate on a downward trend. The number of cases that were within the mandate of the EACC increased, which implies that there was more exposure of corrupt practices. The agency should ensure that cases that are exposed are quickly investigated. As seen in Table 1, the EACC reported in 2010/2011 that of the reported 2445 cases taken over for investigation together with another 67 cases that were carried over from previous years, only 130 of these cases were concluded by the end of that period. Another 25 cases were referred to other agencies for review after preliminary investigations, 364 cases were recommended for further action after the preliminary investigations, 1369 of the cases were under intelligence development, while 620 cases were pending for investigations. Unfortunately, even the few cases that were completed do not indicate whether they were successful after those involved with corrupt practices were taken to court. Some of those people indicted over the years have been cleared and none of the stolen assets or funds was recovered.

Table 1: Status of investigation in 2010/2011

No. of No. Status of investigation Cases % 2010/11 1 Cases completed and investigation files forwarded to AG 134 5. 3 2 Cases referred to other agencies for investigations after preliminary 25 1. 0 investigations 3 Cases recommended for no further action after preliminary investigations 364 14. 5 4 Reports under intelligence development 1 369 54. 5 5 Cases pending investigations 620 24. 7 Total 2 512 100. 0

Looking at the number of reported cases in the 2010/2011 EACC report, the fight against corruption can be termed as ‘big fish versus small fish syndrome’, where the big fish represents the top public officials (top bureaucrats, cabinet ministers as well as members of parliament) who are untouchable due to their powerful positions, while the small fish represents the street level bureaucrats (police, clerks, chiefs) (Gbadamosi, 2006). The former director of the anti-corruption agency, P. Lumumba, was often quoted as saying that he was interested in the ‘big fish’ but there was not much progress over a two-year tenure. According to the EACC report in 2010/2011,

Douglas Kimemia 61 there were 7106 reported cases of corruption. Figure 1 shows that only 7% of the cases involved big fish, while 66% of the cases involved small fish, and 27% involved middle level officers like inspectors and procurement officers. The number of reported cases for senior government officials was significantly smaller compared to those of the low-level government officials, as well as the total number of middle level public officials. As a result, the number of completed cases involving the senior public officials who were charged in the court of law was even smaller compared to those of low-level officers.

50

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% 25 2004 20 2005 15

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Figure 1: Level of corruption perceptions in next three years The EACC should address this syndrome of focusing on petty corruption without combatting grand scale corruption practiced by ministers and top public officials. Failure to address this syndrome has left citizens wondering whether the laws are being applied evenly and fairly among all Kenyans. Since the top senior officials are involved in grand corruption, it takes longer to complete investigations and build on evidence that is sufficient to convict. Unfortunately, the majority of them are set free and their charges cleared or cases drag in court for years before a verdict is reached (for example, the Goldenberg scandal that occurred in the mid-1990s). As a result, the EACC has to collaborate with the attorney-general’s office, public prosecutor, and judiciary to make sure that evidence is submitted in a timely manner to cut the long waiting period before cases are concluded. Another setback in the fight against corruption in Kenya is political interference. Before 2011, the judiciary was not independent and was manipulated easily by corrupt politicians. Political

62 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 interference in graft cases is a good indicator of political commitment from top leadership, including the president and the prime minister (Kpundeh, Stapenhurst, & World Bank Group, 1999). In Kibaki’s era, political interference has been very subtle compared to Moi’s era. President Kibaki’s hands-off style of leadership has given the ministers and other bureaucrats power to manipulate the judicial process. It is unfortunate that Kibaki’s administration has consistently recycled the same people implicated in previous corrupt practices, leading to a lack of public confidence in the administration’s political commitment. Instead, the administration should ensure that all those appointed in public offices are cleared by the EACC without favour or discrimination based on their gender or ethnic background. While the president has sole power to appoint ministers and their permanent secretaries, the prime minister has also turned a blind eye to the permanent secretary in his office and the chief of staff, who were implicated in a report of their involvement in corruption (Adan, 2010). According to the EACC annual report 2004/2005, one of the cases reported was embezzlement of public funds belonging to the National Museums of Kenya, which is a government agency. The EACC recovered 2. 5 million Kenya shillings from the museum’s former director-general after he was charged in court. Unfortunately, he has been the permanent secretary in the office of prime minister since January 2008. According to the EACC annual report of 2007/2008, another major gain was the recovery of the Grand Regency Hotel worth 2. 9 billion Kenyan shillings. The hotel was built using public funds unlawfully acquired from the Central Bank of Kenya. Recovered properties like hotels should be made public, and culprits should refund any profit accrued over the years that they held that property. Analysis of public corruption perceptions in Kenya The decision to use public perception indicates the inherent problems involved in obtaining objective and reliable measurements of corruption because experts’ perceptions can be biased, as it is not based in most cases on the actual experience of corruption (Miller, 2006; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2006). In this section, this paper analyses three questions that focus on how the public perceives the trend of corruption in the past and future, and how they feel about the government anti-corruption efforts in Kenya. The data analysed is from Transparency International reports of various years. Overall, by comparing the GCB reports of 2004 and 2005, the respondents seemed to be optimistic about the direction of corruption in Kenya. In assessing how the levels of perceptions had changed in the past three years, analysis indicated that the majority of the respondents felt that it had decreased. The first question was: Do you expect the level of corruption to change in the next three years? This question measured the public’s predictions about the change of corruption levels in the subsequent three years and appeared in the GCB surveys in 2004 and 2005. It is important as it indicated how the public perceived the direction and levels of corruption for the future. As Figure 2 indicates that in 2004, 35% of the respondents were pessimistic compared to 25% in 2005, who

Douglas Kimemia 63 felt that the levels of corruption in the subsequent three years would increase, while 20% in both years felt that it would remain the same. This trend indicates that 10% of the respondents in 2005 had changed their perspective on the direction of corruption and were hopeful. This optimism on the level of corruption could be attributed to different factors such as increased government anti- corruption efforts or the hope of change that was ushered in by Kibaki’s administration in 2003. According to the National Corruption Perception study conducted in 2005, Kenyans’ optimism increased as they hoped that the anti-corruption agency efforts would continue. The study stated that 58% of Kenyans were confident about the EACC’s ability to fight the graft. As a result, the majority of Kenyans believed that corruption had been reduced from the previous year. On the other hand, those optimistic about the levels of corruption increased by 2% in 2005 compared to 43% in 2004. This increase seems to be consistent with another study undertaken in 2009, which indicated that 62% of the respondents were optimistic that the fight against corruption would succeed compared to 38% who were pessimistic that it would not succeed (EACC, 2009). This optimism could also be caused by the country’s better economic performance in 2005, as indicated by the 5. 9% gross domestic product growth rate compared to 5. 0% in 2004. However, the CPI index remained at 2. 1 in both 2004 and 2005, after jumping from 1. 9 in 2003 when Kibaki’s administration took over. This indicates that the public’s perception does not align with the experts’ perception even when other factors that determine perception like economic progress are in place. Overall, the analysis above indicates that the public’s perception in those two years was more optimistic. This confirms the proposition that the corruption in Kenya was likely to increase in the subsequent three years. However, this finding does not support an earlier conclusion that respondents from countries with a low CPI score would expect the level of corruption to increase over the next three years instead of decreasing. In contrast, respondents from countries with a high CPI score did not feel that corruption influenced their lives significantly, and expected corruption to decrease over the next three years (Transparency International, 2004). In spite of this optimism, the CPI score did not waver over the two years, though the public perception was on the right track as more people were optimistic that corruption was on the decrease.

64 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Figure 2: Level of corruption in previous three years

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The second question was: In the past three years, how has the level of corruption in this country changed? This question appeared in the GCB surveys of 2005 and 2010/2011. This question examined how the public perceived the levels of corruption to have changed in the past three years. As indicated by Figure 3, in 2005, 30% of the respondents perceived that the level of corruption had increased, while 39% of the respondents in 2010/2011 held the same perception. This perception could be attributed to the fact that between 2005 and 2010, the media in Kenya exposed some of the major incidences of grand corruption, especially within the top level of government, which changed the public perception of corruption. Examples include the individuals within the Ministry of Agriculture re-bagging fertiliser donated by the government of Japan to boost food production and planning to sell it, the irregular sale and transfer of public land by the National Social Security Fund, embezzling of public funds by the Kenya Medical Research Institute, and fraudulent purchase of land for use as a public cemetery by the City Council of Nairobi (EACC, 2009/2010). However, the number of those who felt that corruption decreased did not change, but remained at 48% in both years. It is surprising that the public perception in 2010/2011 did not change; even over a period of five years during which many grand corruption cases were exposed and government ministers and other top public officials were indicted on corruption charges. On the other hand, those who perceived the level of corruption as the same decreased by 3% in 2010/2011. This dismal change, even in a period of five years, could be associated with the fact that in 2010, after Kenya attained a new constitution, top public officials implicated in corrupt deals were forced to resign for graft and misuse of public office investigations. Unfortunately, the

Douglas Kimemia 65 temporary resignations did not result in any convictions. This can possibly explain the number of respondents who were less optimistic amidst reforms and exposure of major corruption cases. In a separate study assessing the level of corruption in 2009, the findings closely matched those of the GCB survey 2010/2011. The study found that 41% of the respondents indicated that the corruption levels had decreased, while 37% were pessimistic as they thought that corruption levels had increased, and 21% felt there was no change (EACC, 2009). Although the CPI score did not change over that particular period, the public’s perceptions seem to have become more pessimistic. In spite of some respondents being pessimistic about the levels of corruption, a majority felt that the levels of corruption had decreased.

Figure 3: Level of corruption for three previous years 80

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30 Neither Ineffective 20

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The third question is: How would you assess your current government’s actions in the fight against corruption? This question focused on the anti-corruption efforts by the government or the related anti-corruption body. Public perception of the government’s efforts is an indicator of the success of anti-corruption policies and initiatives. However, literature suggests that citizens around the world are generally critical about the effectiveness of their government’s efforts to fight corruption (Mbaku, 2007). Additionally, the GCB indicates that government efforts to tackle corruption are largely seen as ineffective by the public, especially when the levels of corrupt practices are high. This question appeared in the 2006, 2009, and 2010/2011 GCB surveys. As shown in Figure 4, the analysis indicated that public perception of whether or not the efforts were effective varied. In 2006, more than 40% of respondents considered the efforts effective compared to 70% in

66 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 2010/2011. The analysis showed that in 2010/2011, the number of participants was the highest, while in 2009 it was the lowest, with only 24% of the respondents considering anti-corruption efforts to be successful. In contrast to the other survey periods, the low response in 2009 can be explained by the fact that only 14% of the respondents felt indifferent about the government’s efforts. Even if the 14% considered the efforts to be effective, 2009 would still have had the lowest number of participants who considered the government’s action as effective. On the other hand, the number of respondents who felt that the anti-corruption approach was not effective and needed alteration, varied in the three survey periods. In 2006 and 2009, the number of respondents who were skeptical of the government’s efforts was higher than 2010/2011, when it decreased by more than a half. In 2009, the results were startling. Despite 14% of the respondents feeling indifferent about the EACC efforts, distrustful respondents increased from 57% in 2006 to 62% in 2009 instead of decreasing. The decrease in the number of skeptical respondents could be explained by the fact that, in 2010/2011, there were increased anti-corruption efforts by the EACC director, who began his tenure in 2010. This brought high hopes of breaking the rampant culture of corruption, which led to the decrease of the public’s pessimism by more than 30% in 2010/2011.

Figure 4: Status offender 2010/11 Percentage

Ministers and top officials Middle level Low level

Although the GCB reports were diverse in the three survey periods, it is astounding that the CPI index remained the same at 2. 2 score in each year. This confirms that there is no correlation between a good CPI score and the public endorsement of a government’s anti-corruption initiatives (Transparency International, 2006). This is because some governments may be in power for only a short period of time when polling is done, while the CPI score reflects the performance of present administrations as well as the previous ones. In addition, effective government anti-corruption efforts can only come about through sustained change that translates into a better quality of life for ordinary citizens. Effective government anti-corruption efforts will, in return, alter how citizens perceive their government commitment, thus increasing the trust level and altering the public perception of corruption. The above analysis reveals that Kenyans during Kibaki’s administration have seen the corruption

Douglas Kimemia 67 level increase even after his promise to tackle graft during his first term. The majority of Kenyans have been pessimistic about the ineffective government’s anti-corruption efforts, regardless of the enormous resources spent to address it. Bridging the perception gap In order to bridge the gap between public perception and government efforts, the political leaders, and especially the president, have to be fully committed to the fight. From 2003 to 2012, the administration failed to investigate the high ranking public officials; appointed public officials previously implicated in corrupt practices in public positions; and failed to seize stolen public properties. The president and other political leaders should have made public declarations and statements that indicated their unwavering commitment (Kpundeh et al, 1999). There was a gap between the executive’s actions and the public’s declarations against corrupt leaders that were created due to the unwillingness on the part of top public officials to take action against those officials involved in allegations of corruption. The top leadership dealt with the senior government officials, including ministers, with much empathy. During Kibaki’s first term, five ministers implicated in the Anglo Leasing and the Goldenberg scandals were reappointed and moved to different ministries after being cleared by investigators and later by the courts. In 2010, five permanent secretaries, who had been mentioned adversely in reported cases of corruption, were suspended while under investigation (Adan, 2010). Even before the investigations were concluded, some had already been reappointed to their respective ministries or moved to other ministries. Only one permanent secretary was charged in court over a scandal of 280 million Kenyan shillings, which involved the purchase of an alternative burial site for the City Council of Nairobi (Adan, 2010). The top leadership, led by the president, should make sure that all those who misuse their public office for gain are held accountable. The administration should be committed to the recovery of stolen public properties and funds, which can be accomplished through property seizure and forfeiture, and by freezing culprits’ bank accounts (Wario, 2012). The government’s anti-corruption agency should increase its efforts to recover public funds and assets that have been hijacked over the years. Government appointments should be based on integrity as opposed to clientelism, and ethnic and political balancing. The president and his administration should be willing to sacrifice any public official implicated in any corrupt practice, regardless of his or her ethnicity or political influence. This will ensure a government composed of people of integrity, which indicates political commitment to the fight against corruption. Singapore and Hong Kong altered public perception by deregulating rules and rewarding public officials who resisted engaging in corrupt practices, and by showing political will and commitment from the top political leadership in fighting corruption (Svensson, 2005).

68 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Conclusion Although Kibaki’s administration came into power with a promise to deal with corruption, the results have not met public expectations. The economic and political gains that have been made during his administration have been undermined by his failure to address corruption effectively. Furthermore, public perception has not changed even after numerous resources have been spent setting up legislation and anti-corruption agencies. The analysis of the GCB reports over the years shows that the Kenyan public is divided on how the government and the EACC are handling the fight against corruption. While some of the people think that the efforts are working and that graft is decreasing, other Kenyans are skeptical about the fight against corruption. Regardless of the resources spent on anti-corruption initiatives, Kenyans seem more pessimistic about the trend of corruption, hence the high public perception of corruption. This can be attributed to a weak EACC due to the lack of prosecuting power and big fish versus small fish syndrome. This paper recommends that government officials who have unjustly enriched themselves with public funds and assets should be charged in the court of law regardless of their position in the government. Unfortunately, the top leadership led by the president has shown apathy to the ministers and other bureaucrats implicated in corrupt practices, even when the public expects the president to be the strategic leader in the fight against corruption. The president should not reappoint public officials to their public offices who have not been cleared by the court or the EACC. Instead, the president should appoint men and women of integrity to these positions. This will increase the public trust in the government’s commitment to an efficient and effective fight against corruption as opposed to just offering lip service.

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Douglas Kimemia 71 Health diplomacy and public policy in Nigeria: The impact of the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene Abstract The relationship between diplomacy and improvement in health has been an important theme contained within the literature on governance and development since the end of the Cold War. While it is true that prospects for health development are enhanced through medical and public health knowledge and technology, several scholars have understood the link between diplomacy and social, political and economic development. This article examines this theme by analysing the connection between health diplomacy and the development of public policy in Nigeria. It traces and analyses the impact of the multilateral negotiation within the World Health Organization (WHO), notably the International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes, which was adopted to counter the adverse effects of infant formula. The article is descriptive and analytical. It has utilised various sources, including government records, reports of intergovernmental organisations, as well as information obtained from fieldwork conducted in the WHO headquarters in Geneva and in Nigeria between 2011 and 2012 to explore the contributions of the WHO to the development of Nigeria’s health sector. The article argues that health diplomacy has been and remains a major influence on public policy in Nigeria. The article concludes that a religious implementation of the International Code of the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes would increase the breastfeeding rate in Nigeria.

Keywords: breastfeeding, breast milk substitutes, health diplomacy, Nigeria, public policy, World Health Organization Sumário A relação entre diplomacia e melhoria na saúde tem sido um tema importante contido na literatura sobre governação e desenvolvimento, desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Enquanto é verdade que o panorama de desenvolvimento de saúde fortalecido através do conhecimento médico e de saúde pública e tecnologia, vários eruditos perceberam a ligação entre diplomacia e desenvolvimento social, político e económico. O autor deste estudo, examina este tema analisando a conexão entre diplomacia na saúde e o desenvolvimento das políticas públicas na Nigéria. Este traça e analisa o impacto da negociação multilateral dentro da Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS), notavelmente o Código Internacional de Marketing de Substitutos do Leite Materno (ou leite do peito), que foi adoptado para conter os efeitos adversos da fórmula infantil. O estudo é descritivo e analítico e aplica várias fontes, incluindo arquivos do governo, relatórios de organizações inter-governamentais, assim como informação de trabalho de campo feito na

72 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 sede da OMS em Genebra e Nigéria entre 2011 e 2012, para explorar as contribuições da OMS no desenvolvimento do sector de saúde na Nigéria. O artigo argumenta que diplomacia na saúde foi e continua sendo uma grande influência nas políticas públicas na Nigéria. O artigo conclui que a implementação religiosa do Código Internacional de Marketing de Substitutos do Leite Materno poderia aumentar as taxas de aleitamento materno na Nigéria.

Palavras chave: aleitamento materno, substitutos de leite materno, diplomacia na saúde, Nigéria, políticas públicas, Organização Mundial da Saúde Introduction Breastfeeding has been recognised to be a crucial factor in the physical and mental development of the child. Breast milk is said to provide a form of immunisation against infection. It is also a natural form of family planning. Although these benefits and others have long been acknowledged, breastfeeding has declined considerably over the last two decades. This trend is associated with growing urbanisation with its concomitant absorption and adherence to modern tastes, which has encouraged mothers to adopt bottle-feeding. It has been argued that bottle-feeding threatens the lives of millions of children, particularly in the developing world. It is expensive and bottle fed children are said to be more likely malnourished and susceptible to diarrheal infections, arising from the use of unsafe water and unsterilised equipment when preparing the formula. This harmful practice should not be allowed to continue unchecked. To this end, several campaigns organised to defend and promote breastfeeding and to stop the spread of artificial substitutes, which gathered momentum during the 1980s. International efforts targeted the damaging marketing practices of infant formula manufacturers and also supported a worldwide boycott of company products(Global Health Watch 2, 2008). The WHO, as the leading United Nations health agency, was not left out of this campaign to stop artificial feeding and to accomplish this task, the WHO relied heavily on its legal instrument. It is instructive to note that the Constitution of WHO provides for three legal instruments, namely conventions and agreements, regulations and recommendations. Article 2(k) of the constitution authorises the WHO to:

Propose conventions, agreements and regulations and make recommendations with respect to international health matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned by thereby to the Organisation and are consistent with its objective(WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organization, 1948)

The policy outcomes of these WHO instruments are clear examples of health diplomacy based on its global reach and its negotiation process. They are also examples of various state and non-state actors coming together to create a legally binding tool to govern global health. This has led Kickbusch et al to argue that global health diplomacy still takes place within the WHO (Kickbusch,

Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene 73 Silberschmidt, & Buss, 2007). A glaring manifestation of this was the multilateral negotiation that gave birth to the WHO International Code of the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes in 1981. The WHO Assembly adopted it as a recommendation. It is a truism in international law that states are the most important actors. It is the responsibility of the states to translate an international agreement into national laws or policies and develop enforcement mechanisms. In fact, international agreements are mere blueprints for action but it is not until lawmakers put decisions into practice at home that they become functional. It is against this background that this paper examines the extent to which the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes has influenced public policy, particularly health policies in Nigeria. Conceptual and theoretical framework Within the purview of this paper, two major concepts frequently recur: health diplomacy and public policy. Discussing the concept of health diplomacy requires a definition of the term in order to provide a perspective. Health diplomacy in international relations does not seem to have a specific meaning. As a matter of fact, it can vary in meaning according to the context in which it is used. It focuses on the linkage between health and foreign policy. It is also part of the ‘new diplomacy’ that emerged following the expansion of foreign policy into new sector and issues since the end of the Cold War (Lee & Gomez, 2011). This is not to say that the term is entirely novel in international relations. On the contrary, the practice of health diplomacy in the modern sense dates back to the second half of the 19th century; it only gained importance and popularity in the past two decades. Health diplomacy has conjured disparate interpretations in the contemporary period. A proper understanding of health diplomacy is best done by a meticulous survey of its two broad conceptions. First are those definitions focusing on the field being driven by globalisation, diverse actors beyond nation states, health negotiations and the health impact of non-health negotiations. For example, Kickbusch et al defined health diplomacy as the “multi-level and multi-actor negotiation processes that shape and manage the global policy environment for health”(Kickbusch, Silberschmidt, & Buss, 2007, p. 230). Second are conceptions that de-emphasise both negotiations and the primary role of global health. They dwell basically on efforts aimed at improving health of a country on the receiving end within the larger context of supporting the providing country’s national interest. In other words, they emphasise the use of health interventions as instruments to advance foreign policy interests. For example, Fauci defines health diplomacy as ‘winning the hearts and minds of people in poor countries by exporting medical care expertise and personnel to those who need it most’(Fauci, 2007, p. 1169). Tommy Thompson, the former United States Secretary and Human Services, promoted the use of what he termed ‘medical diplomacy’ as an important element of the government’s anti-terrorism strategy (Thompson, 2005). Thompson remarked “what better way to knock down the hatred, the barriers of ethnic and religious groups that are afraid of America, and hate America, than to offer good medical policy and good health to these countries”(Thompson, 2005). For instance, the US$63 billion, six-year Global Health Initiatives under Obama Administration fits within this approach, serving as part of what the formerUS

74 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton describes as the “three Ds of smart power” – defence, diplomacy and development (Clinton, 2010). These definitions take a more holistic view of both health and the international community. It moves beyond an explicit focus on particular disease and instead recognises how various manifestations of ill health can have negative consequences for the international community. It would be wise to agree with Buss and Ferreira that health diplomacy addresses health issues that transcend national borders and expose countries to global influences (Buss & Ferreira, 2010). It also ensures a better, more coherent coordination between the government’s health policies and external relations sector, not only in advocating the acceptance of health- related goals in the millennium development goals, but also ensuring that those are incorporated into the countries’ health and development plans. Today, health diplomacy manifests itself in three ways: first, as disaster diplomacy, which involves providing relief to areas ravaged by natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis and drought (Ratzen, 2005);the second form deals with one country or a group of countries engaged in developing healthcare infrastructure in a country or a group of countries (Youde, 2008); and the third form (and the one that is the focus of this article) concerns international agreements and conventions designed to bring many parties together to address health concerns (Youde, 2008). An important part of health diplomacy takes place within the WHO. It is significant to state that improvement in global health had been negotiated within the WHO in such multilateral negotiations like the International Code of the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitute. Several definitions of public policy abound. However, for brevity, we shall quote the simple definition of public policy by Thomas Dye. According to him, public policy is what government chose to do or not do(Dye, 1975, p. 1). He went further to assert that: Government do many things. They regulate conflict within society, they organise society to carry on conflicts with other societies, they distribute a great variety of symbolic rewards and material services to members of the society and extracts money from the society, most at times in the form of taxes. Thus, policies may regulate behaviour, organise bureaucracies, distribute benefits, extract taxes or all of these things at once. . . (Dye, 1975, p. 1) Stella Theodoulou (Theodoulou, 1995, p. 2) has identified five elements present in the concept of public policy: It should distinguish between what government intend to do and what they actually do; that governmental inactivity is as important as governmental activity. It ideally involves all levels of government and is not necessarily restricted to formal actors. Informal actors are also important. Public policy is pervasive and is not only limited to legislation, executive orders, rules and regulations. It is an intentional course of action with an accomplished end goal as its objective. It is both long-term and short-term. It is an ongoing process; it involves not only the decision to enact a law but also the subsequent actions of implementation, enforcement and evaluation. From the aforesaid, it can be argued that public policy is a governmental programme found in a nation’s law or in public statements by a functionary of government. Since, it is a product of governmental process and activities, it affects a large spectrum of issues and sectors of the

Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene 75 society. It includes the economy, housing, defence, healthcare and education, among others. Public policies are in essence designed to resolve societal problems, particularly those considered to require public or collective action. It is generally agreed that public policy deeply affects the lives of every individual in society. Accordingly, Nigerian society is ordered and directed towards a desired end or goals by the State through public policies. Such policies, therefore, play a significant role in the State, which is also instrumental to the development and underdevelopment of a particular state. The collective and public good theory shall be adopted to guide this discussion. In the global context, collective or public goods are goods exhibiting a significant degree of public interest across national boundaries (Woodward & Smith, 2003). Kaul Inge, Grunberg. Stern, M.A. have argued that they may be tangible such as ‘natural commons’ like the high seas, atmosphere, ozone shield and the polar regions (Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 2003). They also include ‘human made commons’ such as universal norms, principles, knowledge and the internet, or intangible norms such as ‘global conditions’ ranging from peace, health and financial stability, to free trade environmental sustainability and freedom from poverty (Kaul I., 2000). The use of collective and public goods involves activities and choices that are interdependent. Decisions by one state have effects on other states. This means that states can suffer unanticipated negative consequences because of the actions of others. A central concern in collective or public good theory, therefore, revolves around the question of who provides the public goods. Without collective action mechanisms, there is a risk that such goods will not be adequately provided. Thus, if they are provided, the goods exist and everyone can enjoy them. Collective and public goods theory can be used to explain the role of the WHO in producing global public goods. The promotion of global health is a positive form of engagement within the global community due to health’s status as a ‘global public good’, a universal right for all. For example, promoting infant and child nutrition, controlling the spread of emerging infectious diseases, expanding the access to benefits of biotechnology, enhancing food security, and preventing further environmental degradation, are all global public health goods. The collective and public good theory sees international organisations such as the WHO as playing positive roles in facilitating cooperation and managing public health goods. They believe that the UN and its agencies have helped to check power politics by creating some degree of shared interests in place of national interests, and have provided a forum for international cooperation and promotion of human progress. Background to the International Code of the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes The establishment of a bottle-feeding culture can be traced to the development of industrial replacement products(Global Health Watch 2, 2008). The activities of infant formula manufacturers, particularly Nestle (the largest producer of infant formula) since the late 19th century, undermined

76 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 the confidence of women in their ability to breastfeed. Thus, through social marketing, Nestlé created a benign acceptance of its products. In many parts of the developing world, including Nigeria, special promotions and the provision of free samples drew women into the practice of artificial feeding(Global Health Watch 2, 2008). By the 1970s, it was estimated that only 20% of Kenyan babies and 6% of Malaysian babies were predominantly breast-fed (WABA, 2006). The situation in Nigeria is not too different. The breastfeeding rate gradually dropped from 80% in the 1970s and 1980s to as low as 15% today(Anuforo, 2013). According to WHO global data on infant and young child feeding in Nigeria, 22. 3% of children were exclusively breast-fed for less than four months, while 17. 2% were exclusively breast-fed for less than six months in the year 2003 (WHO, Data Bank on Infant and Young Child Feeding in Nigeria, 2010). The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey stated in 2008 that 17% of children were exclusively breast-fed for less than four months, while 13% were exclusively breast-fed for less than six months(NPC, 2009). The result of a study in 2010 showed that advertising of infant formula in Nigeria had a significant effect on mothers’ choice of infant feeding. The indication is that infant formula advertisements affected the practise of exclusive breast feeding(Onyechi & Nwabuzo, The Effect of Milk Formula Advertisement on Breastfeeding and other Infant Feeding Practice in Lagos Nigeria, 2010). The concern for the decline in breastfeeding and harmful effects of bottle-feeding dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this period, it began to manifest in the writings and activities of health professionals. For instance, in 1972, the United Nations Protein Advisory Group (PAG) issued a statement emphasising the critical importance of breastfeeding in the social and economic conditions that prevail in many developing countries(UNPAG, 1973). There was also the belief, especially in the early 1970s, that it would be possible to work with industry in regulating their marketing activities so that these would not impede breastfeeding. Reports by non-governmental organisations and articles in journals began to appear in the mid 1970s concerning the continued unethical promotion activities of industry. In 1974, the British- based development organisation War and Want published a report titled ‘The Baby Killer’ (Chetley, 1979). This report linked the incidence of malnutrition to the promotional practices of industry. Also, the Swiss Berne Third World Action Group published its German translation of the War and Want report 1974 with the title ‘Nestlé kills Babies’(Chetley, 1979). In response to this, Nestlé sued the group for libel. The trial ended in June 1976 with Nestle being awarded a minimal sum for libel on the part of the Berne Group. However, the judge remarked that the verdict was no acquittal and that Nestlé should rethink its advertising policies (Helsing and Traylor, 1984). The significance of the Nestlé case is that it served to garner publicity for the cause of critics of the industry. It also helped to further shape world public opinion concerning the negative effects of aggressive advertising and promotional policies of industry relative to infant malnutrition. In 1975, a West German film, ‘Bottle Babies’, documented aggressive industry promotion of infant formula and its effects on infant health in Kenya (Helsing and Traylor, 1984). It should be emphasised that the aforementioned publications were landmarks in the work of action groups critical of industry policies and activities.

Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene 77 Another important action in the campaign to influence changes in industry policies was the organisation of a boycott against Nestlé and its products as well as its subsidiaries in June 1977 in the United States. The boycott was started and coordinated by a group called the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT) based in the US (Helsing & Traylor, 1984). The boycott also spread to other countries, notably Western Europe, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the then Federal Republic of Germany. The industry was not left out in this process; it was also on the offensive. In 1975, it formed its own lobby group, the International Council of Infant Food Industries (ICIFI). ICIFI published its own code of ethics relative to marketing practices. However, the code was criticised as an attempt to disarm critics rather than a serious attempt to regulate the harmful effects of aggressive marketing activities. The process for the adoption of the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitute involved an intensive consultation and negotiation between the concerned parties. The major stakeholders were the WHO, representatives of governments, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, industry or experts in the fields of concern to the issues. The process also took the form of debates between religious, consumer-activist and local action groups on the one hand, and industry on the other. The WHO’s involvement in infant and child nutrition Two reasons underlie the WHO’s involvement in child and infant nutrition. The first is the urge to counter the negative health implications of formula feeding. Research on the risk of formula feeding found an increased risk of gastric and respiratory infectious diseases, higher levels of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, and lower IQ capacity and visual acuity (Malcove, 2005). Other studies have demonstrated mortality rates of up to 25%higher for artificially fed compared to breastfed children (Victoria, 1989). Evidence, however, shows that exclusive breastfeeding for the first months of life reduce both mortality and the risk of transmission(Guise, 2005). Another reason is the fact that the WHO has a particular responsibility for realising the right to food through measures within the health field. This responsibility stems naturally from the organisation’s definition of health in the preamble to its Constitution as “a state complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease”(WHO, Constitution of the World Health Organisation, 1948). This views health as a positive goal, not only as a negation of disease. Hence, the attainment of health requires that people’s right to food is realised. Article 12 of the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Right confirms the right to health as “the highest attainable standard of social and mental health.” The second part of the article states that steps should be taken by the state parties to the Covenant to achieve the full realisation of the right to health, which include “the provision for the reduction of the stillbirth and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child”(UN, 1966). In this way, the Article immediately draws the attention to the most vulnerable group of all: young children, and more specifically infants. It is in harmony with the well-known fact that young children are the ones who are most susceptible to ill health as a consequence of an inadequate food supply, quantitatively

78 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 and qualitatively. It is therefore no surprise that WHO has been particularly active regarding the nutrition of infants and young children. Of central importance have been the efforts to promote and protect breastfeeding against artificial bottle-feeding. The WHO’s concern for the decline in breastfeeding began in 1974 when the World Health Assembly (WHA) passed a resolution which related the general decline of breastfeeding throughout the world to socio-cultural and other factors. For the first time, the resolution, urged member countries to review sales promotion activities on baby foods and to introduce appropriate remedial measures, including advertisement codes and legislation where necessary. In 1978, the WHA, in its resolution, reaffirmed its concern about the continuing decline in breastfeeding and inappropriate sales promotion of breast-milk substitutes. Among its recommendations was one that member states should give priority to preventing malnutrition in infants and children by supporting and promoting breastfeeding, taking legislative and social action to facilitate breastfeeding by working mothers, and regulating inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods that could be used to replace breast milk (WHA, 1978). Another major development was the WHO/UNICEF meeting on infant and young child feeding, held in Geneva from 9 to 12 October 1979. One of the conclusions reached at the meeting was that poor infant feeding practices and its consequences was one of the world’s major problems and a serious obstacle to social and economic development. The meeting also issued recommendations under all the five categories listed above. However, the recommendation of the highest importance was that “there should be an international code of marketing of infant formulas and other products used as breast milk substitutes”(WHO, Meeting on Infant and Young Child Feeding, 1979). This meeting was significant in many respects. First, it attracted about 150 participants representing governments, organisations and bodies within the UN system, other intergovernmental organisations, experts in medicine and nutrition and the infant food industry. Second, the industry, through the ICIFI Chairman present at the meeting, pledged to abide by these recommendations, some of which went further in regulating promotion activities than the code eventually did(WHO, Meeting on Infant and Young Child Feeding, 1979). The 33rd WHA in May 1980 endorsed the statements and recommendations agreed by consensus at the joint meeting of the WHO/UNICEF and made particular mention of the recommendation that “there should be an international code of marketing of infant formula and other products used as breast milk substitutes”. The WHA also requested the Director General to prepare such a ‘Code’ in close consultation with member states and with all other parties concerned. In order to develop an international code of marketing of breast milk substitutes in line with the Health Assembly request, several consultations were held with all interested parties. Member states of WHO, as well as groups and individuals who had been represented at the October 1979 meeting, were requested to comment on successive drafts of the code, and further meetings were held between February and September 1980. In January 1981, the WHO Executive Board endorsed the fourth draft of the Code and gave its unanimous support to a resolution to the WHA that it should adopt the Code as a recommendation rather than a regulation. The Code was finally adopted in May 1981 by the 34th WHA by 118

Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene 79 votes: one member state, the United States, voted against the Code and three member states, Argentina, Japan and Republic of Korea, abstained. The United States opposed the WHO Code from the beginning, stating that its provisions were unrealistic, unworkable, that they operated against child health, served as an attack on the free market, and violated the right for free speech. Perhaps this is best summed up in a statement by Elliot Abrams, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisations Affairs, prior to the vote in May 1981:

The Code causes us serious problem[s] both on constitutional and legal grounds. It seeks to prescribe certain commercial practices, such as advertising and association between consumers and manufacturers which contradict our constitutional guarantee for free speech and freedom of association and our anti-trust laws, it does not provide the flexibility governments, companies and health workers need in accordance with varying legal, social, economic or cultural conditions of the member states of [the] WHO (Abrams, 1981, p. 54).

Despite these criticisms, it has been argued that the efforts of the WHO to protect the child through an International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes provided an example of an attempt at infants’ right to food. It also served to create a public awareness of the causes of infant malnutrition in the world, especially in the developing countries. The Code (the WHO, International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, 1981) sets out detailed provisions with regard to: Information and education on infant feeding. The Code urged governments to ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant and young child feeding, both to the families and to others involved in infant and young child nutrition. It also maintained that information and educational materials should clearly state the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding, the social as well as financial cost of using infant formula, the health hazards associated with artificial feeding, and instruction for the proper use of infant formula. Promotion of breast milk substitutes and related products to the public and mothers. The Code explicitly stated that there should be no advertising or other form of promotion to the public and that manufacturers and distributors should not provide to pregnant women, mothers or members of their families samples of products. Promotion through any type of sales device, including special displays, discount coupons and special sale, was prohibited. In addition, no company personnel should seek direct or indirect contact with or provide advice to pregnant women or mothers. Promotion of breast milk substitutes and related products to health workers and in health care settings. The Code advocated for a total prohibition of any type of promotion of products that fall within their scope in the health services. Furthermore, donations of free or subsidised supplies of breast milk substitutes or other products, as well as gifts or personal samples to health workers, should not be allowed in any part of the health care system. Also, information provided by the manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products should be restricted to scientific and factual matters.

80 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Labelling and explaining the benefits of breast milk. The Code stated that no pictures idealising the use of breast milk substitutes were permitted on the labels of the product. Information on artificial feeding, including that on labels, should explain the benefits of breastfeeding and the cost and dangers associated with the necessary or improper use of infant formula and other breast milk substitutes. Moreover, unsuitable products for feeding infants such as sweetened condensed milk, should not be promoted. The implementation and monitoring of the Code. The Code also mandated governments to act on the Code, taking into consideration subsequent relevant WHA resolutions. The governments could adopt legislation, regulations or other measures such as national policies and codes. The Code is a minimum requirement and therefore government could adopt additional measures to those set out in the Code and make them legally binding. It is pertinent to state that there is one version of the Code. However, there have been a number of WHA resolutions adopted since 1981 that referred to the marketing and distribution of breast milk substitutes. Noteworthy is the fact that the WHO has continued to promote infant and young child nutrition, including technical support to national governments for implementing the Code. For this purpose, the Innocenti Declaration was adopted, which set operational targets for the Code’s implementation within member states. The WHO and UNICEF jointly organised the Baby Friendly Initiative (BFI), which focused on the role of health services in the promotion of safe motherhood, child survival and primary health care. The initiative gave a number of criteria that hospitals needed to obtain to achieve baby friendly status. Among the criteria was a ban on distributing free or low cost supplies of breast milk substitutes. In 2002, the WHO member states endorsed a Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding. The Global Strategy included nine operational targets consistent with the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes and subsequent WHA resolutions, the Innocenti Declaration on the protection and support of breastfeeding, and the BFHI. To ensure full implementation of all its components, the Global Strategy requested governments to appoint a national coordinator with appropriate authority and to constitute an effective broad-based body to lead coordinated multi-sectoral implementation of the strategy by all concerned. The institutionalisation of the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes in Nigeria It is obvious that if health diplomacy is to become applicable, there is a need to implement the outcome of such negotiations at the national level. And the only way to achieve this is through public policy. As a matter of fact, Nigeria domesticated the Code in 1986 and backed it legally with Marketing (Breast milk Substitutes Act No. 41 of 1990) as amended by Act No. 22 of 1999. According to the UNICEF report, Nigeria is grouped among the countries that have enacted legislations or other legal measures encompassing many of the provisions of the Code(UNICEF, 2011). In May 1999, the Federal Government reviewed and amended the Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes. This gave birth to the National Agency for Drug Administration and

Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene 81 Control (NAFDAC)- Marketing of Infant and Young Child Foods and other Designated Products Regulations 2005, which was gazetted, launched and disseminated to stakeholders, including infant food manufacturers in 2006. This amendment introduced stiffer fines and a clearer definition of breast milk substitutes. One major challenge was the monitoring and enforcement of the Code. To address this problem, the government embarked on the development of a system for monitoring the marketing of breast milk substitutes undertaken by NAFDAC National Committee on Food and Nutrition (NCFN) and UNICEF. In accordance with the Innocenti Declaration, which set operational targets for the implementation of the Code of marketing of breast milk substitutes and recommended that all governments should develop national breastfeeding policies, a Nigerian National Breastfeeding Policy was adopted in 1998. The policy recommended exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months. A national breastfeeding coordinator was appointed. The coordinator provided an effective focal point. However, after two years, the office of the National Coordinator for Breastfeeding became non-functional. This was due to the persistent deployment of personnel in the Ministry of Health, which rendered that office redundant(the WHO Assessment Report on Infant and Young Child Feeding in Nigeria, 2008). In addition, inadequate funding also undermined the effectiveness of the coordinator. The BFHI has encouraged hospitals and facilities providing maternity care to follow the ten steps. It was recommended that hospitals and maternity facilities that need to purchase breast milk substitutes should do so at full price through normal procurement channels, accepting no fee or low cost supplies. According to WHO Assessment Report in 2008, 1052 of 21562 hospitals and facilities offering maternity services were designated baby friendly. Furthermore, the result of an evaluation of BFHI in 2000 revealed favourable changes in lactating mothers’ knowledge and practices of breastfeeding. The evaluation showed an exclusive breastfeeding rate of 62% at four months and 59% at six months in a sample of babies born in BFHI hospitals. However, it has been argued that should a similar survey be carried out today, it was unlikely that figures like these would be obtained. This is because the initiative lost its initial momentum. It was no longer pursued by the same vigour, as was the case when it was initially introduced. This is evidenced by only 39% of six-month-old children being exclusively breast-fed in 2012 (Anuforo, 2013). In 2005, Nigeria adopted a comprehensive National Policy on Infant and Young Child Feeding. The provisions of WHO recommendations such as the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes and other initiatives such as the Innocenti Declaration on the protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding and the BFHI were recognised in the articulation of this policy. The policy was adopted to fill the revealed gaps in policy provisions on infant and young child feeding in the available national policies on nutrition and maternal child health. A comprehensive national policy in Nigeria became imperative in view of the HIV/AIDs pandemic and the possibility of transmission of HIV through inappropriate feeding options. In relation to the Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, the policy stated that:

82 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 All health workers shall be made aware of, and comply with the national code of marketing of breast milk substitutes which prohibits promotional schemes by infant formula manufacturers directed at consumer and health workers e. g. posters, free samples, donations. The use of artificial milks or other breast milk substitutes shall not be encouraged except in exceptional circumstances and by prescription only (Nigeria, 2005).

The policy also recognises that there are children in special circumstances who need further attention and extra support to meet their nutritional requirements. In addition, there are situations under which breast milk substitutes or other artificial feeding may be necessary. These groups include: infants and young children of HIV mothers; sick infants and young children, particularly those with persistent diarrhoea and those living with HIV/AIDs; low birth weight infants; motherless/ adopted infants and young children; infants and young children in emergency situations; and infants with cleft-palate. Other policies included the National Plan of Action on Food and Nutrition in Nigeria 2005, which was aimed at improving the nutritional status of all Nigerians with particular emphasis on the most vulnerable groups such as children, women and the elderly. The National Policy on Food and Nutrition in Nigeria 2002 also emphasised the need to promote, encourage and support exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, and promote the continuation of breastfeeding well into the second year of life. It is important to note that despite legislative provisions, effective implementation of the Code has been poor. Nestlé and other companies have continued to promote infant foods through other means. Under the guise of its Nestlé Nutrition Services, Nestlé continues to sponsor doctors meetings and many strategies are being used to push the company’s products in Nigeria. In addition, an attempt has been made by these companies to circumvent the strong condemnation they receive from the global health community. To this end, many companies have formed partnerships with United Nation’s agencies to combat malnutrition. They have succeeded in linking their brand with the humanitarian image of the UN agencies in order to benefit from the aid funds pouring into these agencies from donor governments. For instance, Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)’s global health partnership opens its website with the message, ‘Improving nutrition can also seriously benefit your business by creating growth in new and existing markets’(Global Health Watch 2, 2008). Another major setback is the fact that civil society groups have not monitored compliance with the Marketing (Breast Milk) Substitutes Act. In India for instance, two civil society groups, the Breastfeeding Promotion Network of India (BPNI) and Association for Consumer Action on Safety and Health (ACASH), have been instrumental in exposing the unlawful practices of baby food manufacturing companies. In 1994 and 1995, the Government of India issued a notification in the Gazette of India to authorise BPNI and ACASH and two other national semi-government organisations to monitor compliance and they empowered them to initiate legal action (Global Health Watch 2, 2008). The situation in Nigeria is completely different. The non-involvement of

Benjamin Uchenna Anaemene 83 the civil society groups in Nigeria could be seen as an oversight of how sustained advocacy and action by such groups can influence public opinion and decision-making. Other factors have militated against the successful implementation of the Code in Nigeria. These include the problem associated with public policy implementation in the country. It has been observed that despite the availability of public policies that seek to improve the life of the average Nigerian, the State lacks the political will to realise such policy objectives. The argument is that even if the set objectives stand to benefit the public, some groups of people, usually the influential ones in government, will jeopardise or frustrate the implementation of such public policies. Another problem is that the Nigerian state downplays the crucial issues of implementation design of public policies. This trend translates to the advent of public policies without clear-cut modalities or mechanisms for implementation. In most cases, the government formulates national policies without adequate enlightenment and education. Corruption is also a major issue in the politics of public policy implementation in Nigeria. In fact, when corruption penetrates the implementation process, public policies become mutated and the desired goals may not be achieved. Most public policies are formulated but corruption ruins them and makes the implementation process impossible. Another problem of implementation may arise when the target beneficiaries are not involved in the formulation of policies that affect their lives. It should be noted that for policies to be successful, they should involve target groups and they should allow for a participatory system whereby policy makers plan with the people rather than for the people in meeting their needs. Such participation would give the target group a sense of belonging and get them committed to successful implementation of the policy. In addition, the failure of policy makers to take into consideration the social, political, economic and administrative variables when analysing for policy formulation could also mar the implementation process. It should be noted that some government agencies and institutions lack the requisite manpower and financial resources to implement these policies. High-level poverty and low literacy, as well as socio-cultural practices, have also constituted a serious albatross to the effective implementation of the Code in the country. Conclusion This paper has established that health diplomacy has been and remains one of the factors that have influenced public policy in Nigeria. It has examined reasons for the WHO’s involvement in infant and child nutrition, as well as various resolutions passed to that effect before the adoption of the Code in 1981. It has discussed the various legislations and policies adopted in Nigeria as a way of domesticating the Code. However, it is important to stress that legislation is insufficient; most public policies require action and enforcement to effectuate them. It is public policy implementation that is one of the challenges of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian experience demonstrates that the civil society has not done much to checkmate the activities of infant formula companies. Sustained advocacy by civil society groups can influence public opinion and decision makers towards implementation of that Code. Health messages about the positive advantages of breastfeeding require constant re-articulation and therefore should be

84 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 encouraged. Health workers should also ensure that women of childbearing age be adequately informed at the prenatal stage on the dangers of breast milk substitutes. In addition, nutrition education at antenatal and early registration should be encouraged to enable mothers to make informed decisions on infant feeding. It must be emphasised however, that campaigns and activist initiatives are doomed to fail if the political will to address such situation does not exist. The government should therefore show more concern in order to avoid the problems associated with the ineffective implementation of public policies. This is important so that breastfeeding, with its attendant power to influence the life course of children and prevent diseases that constitute a burden to health services, will be promoted.

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86 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Contributor’s biographies Dr Musibau Olabamiji Oyebode received his first degree in Language Arts (English) Education from the University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He earned a Master of Communication Arts as well as a Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. He also obtained his Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Dr Oyebode worked as a broadcast journalist, producer and presenter for over two decades before joining academia. He is a lecturer at the National Open University of Nigeria in Peace and Conflict Studies specialising in human settlement and traditional conflict studies and resolution

Douglas Kimemia is originally from Kenya and currently works as an adjunct professor at Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, in the Political Science Department. He holds a PhD in Policy and Administration from Virginia Commonwealth University.

Benjamin Anaemene is a lecturer at the Department of History and International Relations, Redeemer’s University, Ogun State, Nigeria. He has a PhD in History and Strategic Studies, an MSc degree in Political Science and a BA in History, from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. His areas of interest include international relations, with emphasis on health diplomacy and South- South cooperation, and Nigerian and African history.

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa, PhD is a Research Fellow at the Division of International Security and Strategic Studies, Research and Studies Department of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos. He is a graduate of the Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) Ile-Ife, the University of Ibadan (UI) Ibadan and the University of Lagos (UNILAG) in Lagos, Nigeria, where he earned his degrees with a specialisation in International Relations and Strategic Studies. He is also a Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (USA) scholar. He teaches international relations, peace studies and conflict resolution at the Lagos State University (LASU) and National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN) (on a part-time basis) respectively. His research interest is in Security, Defence and Strategic Studies, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building, Gender Studies, Humanitarian Intervention, Refugee Studies, IDPs and Migration Studies etc. He is a member of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs, Society for Peace Studies and Practice, Historical Society of Nigeria, Nigerian Institute of Management, African Refugee Foundation and the Nigerian Red Cross Society, among others. He has attended several National and international conferences, seminars and workshops. Bolarinwa has published in the area of international relations, strategic studies, peace studies and peace education, conflict and disaster management, security issues, gender, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, governance, corruption, migration and human trafficking, etc.

Contributors 87 Guide for authors The African Journal of Governance and Development is a multidisciplinary publication that seeks to bring academic researchers from beyond territorial and regional boundaries to share scientific knowledge focused at the intersection of governance and development. The journal aims at providing space for sharing and debating issues of social, political and economic development not only for academic consumption, but also for policy consideration. The journal is published on a biannual basis and is peer reviewed. Formatting • Submissions must be in English only. • Prospective authors should ensure that their papers are edited and proofread accordingly before submission. • Submissions must not have been previously published, nor be under review by another journal. • All papers should have a maximum of 8 000 words and at least five keywords. • All papers should have the name/s of the contributor/s, institutional affiliation, country and a short biography referring to the current and/or previous position/occupation of the contributor. • Contributors must employ the Harvard system of citation (see provided guide on the adjacent page). Where extended comments are necessary, they can appear in footnotes. • Manuscripts should be sent to: Simão Nhambi, Managing Editor: [email protected] and [email protected]

88 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Referencing

Notes: Please ‘copy’ the title of a book/an article/whatever (as far as the spelling of words such as ‘behaviour’/‘behavioural’ are concerned (and this also goes for direct quotations) exactly as in the original. • When referring to any work that is NOT a journal, such as a book, article, or Web page, capitalise only the first letter of the first word of a title and subtitle, the first word after a colon or a dash in the title, and proper nouns. Do not capitalise the first letter of the second word in a hyphenated compound word. • Capitalise all major words in journal titles. • If within the same paragraph, reference is made to the same author(s) for a second and further time(s), the year of publication is omitted in the second and further references – as long as it does not lead to confusion. Compiled by OpenJournals Publishing and assisted by Prof George Sieberhagen (North-West University)

Basic in-text referencing In-text reference where the …the result of this is a ‘technical super identity’ (Erikson, Simply use whatever you used as author of the source is 1967, p. 20). author in the reference, as well as known Azar and Martin (1999) found that… (As part of the the year of publication. sentence) Only insert the page number …thus Cox (1966, p. 52) refers to the modern urbanite when using a direct quote. Do not as… include suffixes such as Jr. In-text reference to more More recent studies (Bartlett, 1992; James, 1998) show In-text reference to more than than one source that… The researchers (Bartlett, 1992, p. 54; Brown, 1876, one author should be ordered p. 45; James, alphabetically. 1998, p. 45) refer to… General forms for reference lists Non-periodical Author, A. A. (1994). Title of work. Location: Publisher. Non-periodicals include items published separately: books, reports, brochures, certain monographs, manuals, and audiovisual media. Part of a Non-periodical Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (1994). Title of chapter. In A. Editor, B. Editor, & C. Editor (Eds.), Title of book (pp. xxx-xxxx). Location: Publisher. Periodical Author, A.A., Author, B. B., & Author, C.C. (1994). Title of Periodicals include items article. Title of Periodical, xx, xxx-xxxx. published on a regular basis: journals, magazines, scholarly newsletters, etc. Online periodical Author, A.A., Author, B.B., & Author, C.C. (2000). Title of article. Title of Periodical, xx, xxx-xxxx. Retrieved Month day, year, from web address Online document Author, A.A. (2000). Title of work. Retrieved Month day, year, from web address Referencing other sources A book with only one Rose, L. (1977). Crime and punishment. London: Batsford. author A book by two authors Gordon, E.W., & Rourke, A. (1966). Compensatory When quoting a book with two education for the disadvantaged. New York: College authors in the text, use the word Entrance Examination Board. ‘and’ between the names; if the In order to avoid possible communication problems all reference is in parentheses, use procedures should be explained to the patient (Gardner & ‘&’ examine the problem… Sheldon, 1967, p. 40)… Gardner and Sheldon (1967, p. 40)

Referencing 89 Referencing other sources (continued) A book by three or more Meyer, B.S., Anderson, D.P., Bohning, R.H., & Fratanna, In referring to a work by three, authors D.G., Jr. (1973). Introduction to plant physiology. New four or five authors all the relevant York: Van Nostrand. names have to be furnished in the …the traditionalist personality (Riesman, Denney & Glazer, first reference to the work. 1968, p. 40) restrains him from doing… In later references to this work only …due to his “other-directness” modern Western man in a the first author’s name is stated, sense is at home everywhere and yet nowhere (Riesman et and the abbreviation ‘et al. ’ is used. al., 1968, p. 40). In referring to a work by six or more authors, cite only the surname of the first author followed by et al. (italicised and with a full stop after “al”), and the year for the first and subsequent citations.In the reference list, provide the initials and surnames of the first six authors, and shorten any remaining authors to et al. Reference to more than Johnson (1994a, p. 48) discussed the subject… one publication of the In his later works (Johnson, 1994b, p. 56) he argued… same author in the same Johnson, P.D. (1994a). Pedagogy. London: Routledge. year Johnson, P.D. (1994b). Advanced Pedagogy. London: Routledge. Different authors with the According to B. Smith (1989) and F. Smith (1997), … When you refer to publications by same surname different authors with the same surname, use their initials in the reference. A book with an institution, You can also use the name of the body as part of the Where reference is made to organisation or association sentence. the work by a body (institution, as author …it had long been evident that the intellectual potential organisation, association, etc.) of the Afrikaners on the Witwatersrand was under utilised where no specific author is (Rand Afrikaans University,1976, p. 48)… responsible for the work, the official …thus the Rand Afrikaans University (1963, p. 30) name of the body is used as author. concluded that… Rand Afrikaans University (1970). The When the author and publisher are new university: A practical guideline. Johannesburg, identical, use the word Author as Gauteng: Rand Afrikaans University. the name of the publisher. A book with (an) editor(s) Driver, E., & Broisen, A. (Eds. ). (1989). Child sexual abuse. Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan Education Ltd. Strunk, W. (Ed.). (1976). Adult learning. New York: MacMillan. A chapter in a book (not Capra, F. (1983). The systems view of life. In The turning edited) point: science, society and the rising culture (pp. 376-399). London: Fontana Press Part/chapter of an edited Hartley, J.T., Harker, J.O., & Walsh, D.A. (1980). book Contemporary issues and new directions in adult development of learning and memory. In L.W. Poon (Ed. ), Aging in the 1980’s: Psychological issues, (pp. 239-252). Washington: American Psychological Association. Shirom, A. (1989). Burnout in work organisations. In C. L. Cooper & I.T. Robertson (Eds.), International review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol. IV (pp. 25-49). New York: Wiley. Anonymous work A recent article (Anonymous, 1993) stated that… In the When a work’s author is case of articles in newspapers or magazines where no designated as “Anonymous”, cite author is named, the title is used instead of the author. in text the word ‘Anonymous’. A recent article (War over, 1991) stated that… Anonymous. (1993, 17 February). Best practices. The Star, p. 10. War over. (1991, 7 January). The Star, p. 1.

90 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Referencing other sources (continued) A work with a foreign title Spyridakis, A. (1987). E historia tis Helladas [A history of Greece]. Athens: Therios ita Iona. Translated works Luria, A.R. (1968). The mind of a mnemonist: A little book In text, cite the original publication about a vast memory. (L. Solotaroff, Trans.). New York: date and the date of the Basic Books. (Original work published 1967). translation. A recent study (Luria, 1967/1968). Second, further or revised Dyson, G.G.H. (1977). The mechanics of athletics. (7th edn.). editions New York: Homes and Meier. Cohen, J. (1977). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (Rev. edn.). New York: Academic Press. Date of publication Wolverton, H. (n.d.). The geological structure of the Black unknown Hills. Wilmington: Prairie Press. Dictionaries The concise Macquarie dictionary. (1982). New South Wales: Lane Cove. Nguyen, D.H. (1966). Vietnamese-English dictionary. Rutland Vermont: Charles Tuttle Company. Sadie, S. (Ed. ). (1980). The new Grove dictionary of music and musicians (6th edn, Vols. 1-20). London: MacMillan. Encyclopedia Bergmann, P.G. (1993). Relativity. In The new If an entry has no byline, place the Encyclopaedia Brittanica (Vol. 26, pp. 501-508). Chicago: title in the author position. Encyclopaedia Brittanica. Personal communication According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April Personal communications may be 18, 2001)… letters, memos, some electronic communication (e. g., email or messages from non-archived discussion groups or electronic bulletin boards), personal inter­ views, telephone conversations, and the like. Because they do not provide recoverable data, personal communications are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and provide as exact a date as possible. Unpublished manuscript Jordan, B. (1989). Psychology of adolescent parents. submitted for publication Manuscript submitted for publication. Unpublished manuscript not Ryder, M. (1987). Wonder woman: An Amazon legacy. submitted for publication Unpublished manuscript. Newspaper article Lamb, J. (1970, 20 October). The perfect plants for lazy gardeners. Weekend Australian, p. 3. Periodical article Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene. Australian If a journal or newsletter does Journal of Ecology, 3(2), 25-29. not use volume numbers, include the month, season, or other designation with the year, for example (1994, April). Only indicate the issue number after the volume number if each issue begins on page 1. Journal article in press Phillips, E. (in press). The Australian scene. Australian Journal of Ecology. In text: Phillips (in press) or (Phillips, in press) Abstract Phillips, E. (1985). The Australian scene [Abstract]. Australian Journal of Ecology, 3(2), 25-29.

Referencing 91 Referencing other sources (continued) Non-English journal article Ising, M. (2000). Intensitätsabhängigkeit evozierter Give the original title, as well as Potenzial im EEG: an English translation in brackets. Sind impulsive Personen Augmenter oder Reducer? [Intensity dependence in event related EEG potentials: Are impulsive individuals augmenters or reducers?]. Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie, 21, 208-217. Published dissertation or Bevins, G.D. (1987). Theory and practice at an Australian thesis university. Doctoral dissertation. Montreal: McGill University. Unpublished dissertation Little, P. (1965). Helplessness, depression and mood in or thesis end stage renal disease. Unpublished master’s thesis, Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa. Or: Unpublished doctoral dissertation… Dissertation abstract Ross. D.F. (1990). Unconscious transference and mistaken identity: When a witness misidentifies a familiar but innocent person from a lineup (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1990). Dissertation Abstracts International, 51, 417. Government publications According to The Bill of Rights (1996)… When referring to a government Education is in the process of transformation (Department of publication, the date is sufficient for Education, 1995)… in text referencing. The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Provide all numbers, sections, African. (1996). Government Gazette. (No. 17678). chapters or volume numbers that is Department of Education. (1995). White Paper on Education. available, in brackets. Government Gazette. (Vol. 375, No. 45621). Commission on Civil Rights. (1967). Racial isolation in the public schools. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. Republic of South Africa. (1997). Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printers. Unpublished raw data, Bordi, F., & LeDoux, J.E. (1993). [Auditory response Use brackets to indicate that the untitled latencies in rat auditory cortex]. Unpublished raw data. material is a description of the content, not a title. Booklet, pamphlet or leaflet South African College of Advanced Education. (1976). Referencing: the footnote and Harvard system [Brochure]. Johannesburg: Wits Technikon. Research and Training Center in Independent Living. (1993). Guidelines for reporting and writing about people with disabilities (4th edn.). [Brochure]. Lawrence, K.S.: Author. Study guide Speedy, C. (1999). Study Guide: Electrical Engineering 1. America: South American College of Engineering. Conference proceedings, International Microcomputer Conference. (1984). no author or title Conference proceedings held at the Western Australian Institute of Technology, Perth, 22-24 May 1984. Perth: Western Australian Institute of technology. Conference proceedings, Field, G. (2001). Rethinking reference rethought. In with author Revelling in Reference: Reference and Information Services Section Symposium, 12-14 October 2001 (pp. 59-64). Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Australian Library and Information Association. Unpublished paper Lanktree, C., & Briere, J. (1991, January). Early data on the presented at a meeting Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children (TSC-C). Paper presented at the meeting of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, San Diego, CA.

92 African Journal of Governance and Development | Vol 2 No 2 • December 2013 Referencing other sources (continued) Publication of limited Klombers, N. (Ed.). (1993, Spring). ADAA Reporter. For a publication of limited circulation (Available from the Anxiety Disorders Association of circulation, give in parentheses America, 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 513, Rockville, immediately after the title a name MD20852). and address from which the publication can be obtained. Review Schatz, B.R. (2000). Learning by text or context? [Review of the book The social life of information]. Science, 290, 1304. Kraus, S.J. (1992). Visions of psychology: A videotext of classic studies [Review of the motion picture Discovering Psychology]. Contemporary Psychology, 37, 1146-1147. Electronic sources In-text reference where the The project website was created using Aldus Pagemaker Simply use whatever you used as author of the electronic version 3 (1987-1988)… author in the reference, as well as source is known Several films (e.g., Bertolucci, 1988) have used this the year of publication. technique… Azar and Martin (1999) found that… In-text reference to a web Rainbow MOO is a virtual space designed especially for To cite an entire web site (but site teachers and their elementary-school students (http://it. not a specific document on the uwp. edu/rainbow). site), simply give the site’s URL in Jones, 2000: ¶5) the text. Jones, 2000: Conclusion, para. 7) When a specific part of an electronic source has to be quoted and no page number can be found, use the paragraph number if available, preceded by the ¶ symbol or the abbreviation para. If these are absent, cite the heading and the number of the paragraph following it. Internet site with author Holmes, A. (1998). Greenpeace wins media war. Retrieved November 25, 1998, from http://www.independent.co.uk/ international/green25.htm Internet document without GVU’s 8th WWW user survey. (n.d.). Retrieved August 8, author 2000, from http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/ survey-1997-10/ Article from an online Author, A.A., & Author, B.B. (Date of publication). Title of periodical with DOI article. Title of Journal, volume number (issue number). doi: assigned 0000000/000000000000 Personal electronic According to T.K. Lutes (personal communication, April Because personal email do not communication 18, 2001)… provide recoverable data, they (like (email) other personal communications) are not included in the reference list. Cite personal communications in text only. Give the initials as well as the surname of the communicator, and provide as exact a date as possible. Article in an Internet-only Fredrickson, B.L. (2000, March 7). Cultivating positive journal emotions to optimise health and well-being. Prevention & Treatment, 3, Article 0001a. Retrieved November 20, 2000, from http://journals. apa. org/prevention/volume3/ pre0030001a. html

Referencing 93 Electronic sources Electronic copy of a journal Borman, W.C. (1993). Role of early supervisory article retrieved from experience in supervisor performance. Journal of Applied database Psychology, 78, 443-449. Retrieved October 23, 2000, from PsycARTICLES database. Internet articles based on a VandenBos, G., Knapp, S., & Doe, J. (2001). Role of If you have reason to believe that the print source reference elements in the selection of resources by article might be subject to change, psychology undergraduates [Electronic version]. Journal of you should add the date you Bibliographic Research, 5, 117-123. retrieved the document, and the URL Newsgroups, online FORMAT: Author. (Year, Day Month). Subject of message. If you cannot determine the forums, electronic mailing Message posted to Name mailing list, archived at URL author’s name or screen name, lists Brack, Ernie (1995, 2 May). Re: Computing short courses. then use the author’s email Message posted to LisLink mailing list, archived at http:// address as the main entry. When archive.lislink.com deciding where in your Reference Jensen, L.R. (1995, 12 December). Recommendation of List to insert such a source, treat student radio/tv in English. Message posted to IASTAR the first letter of the email address mailing list, archived at http://nrg.dtu.dk as though it were capitalised. Brett, P. (1999, June 6). Experiments proving the collective If the message is not retrievable unconscious from an archive, it should not [Msg 1]. Message posted to news://alt.psychology.jung be included in the reference list. [email protected] (1996, May 26). Thinking of adoption. It can be cited as a personal Message posted to news://alt. adoption communication. Paper presented at a Tan, G., & Lewandowsky, S. (1996). A comparison virtual conference of operator trust in humans versus machines. Paper presented at the CybErg 96 virtual conference. Retrieved May 16, 2000, from http://www.curtin.edu.au/conference/ cyberg/centre/outline.cgi/frame?dir=tan Abstract Isaac. J. D., Sansone, C., & Smith, J.L. (1999, May). Other people as a source of interest in an activity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 239-265. Abstract retrieved June 7, 1999, from IDEAL database: http://www.europe.idealibrary.com Article in an electronic Adler, J. (1999, May 17). Ghost of Everest. Newsweek. magazine (ezine) Retrieved May 19, 1999. Newspaper article Azar, B., & Martin, S. (1999, October). APA’s Council of Representatives endorses new standards for testing, highschool psychology. APA Monitor. Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct99/in1.html Review Parfit, M. (1997, December 7). Breathless [Review of the book The climb: Tragic ambitions on Everest]. New York Times on the Web. Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http://search. nytimes. com/books/97/12/07/ reviews/971207.07parfitt.html Letter to the editor Gray, J. (1999, May 7). Pesticides linger in land and air—and in our bodies [Letter to the editor]. Lexington Herald-Leader. Retrieved October 7, 1999, from http:// www.kentuckyconnect.com/heraldleader/news/050799/ lettersdocs/507letters.htm Government publication Bush, G. (1989, April 12). Principles of ethical conduct for government officers and employees Exec. Order No. 12674. Pt. 1. Retrieved November 18, 1997, from http:// www.usoge.gov/exorders/eo12674.html CD-ROM Hawking, S. (1994). A brief history of time: An interactive adventure [CD]. Sacramento: Crunch Pod Media.

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