Instant Runoff Voting: a Cure That Is Likely Worse Than the Disease
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Document Received by the CA 2Nd District Court of Appeal
No. B295935 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT ______________________________________________________ CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Appellant-Defendant, v. PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION; MARIA LOYA, Respondents and Plaintiffs. ____________________________________________________________ BRIEF FOR FAIRVOTE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS AND AFFIRMANCE ___________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles The Hon. Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge Presiding Superior Court Case No. BC616804 ____________________________________________________________ *IRA M. FEINBERG PATRICK C. HYNDS (Bar No. 64066) (pro hac vice pending) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP JOSEPH M. CHARLET 390 Madison Avenue (pro hac vice pending) New York, NY 10017 HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP Telephone: (212) 918-3000 555 Thirteenth Street NW Fax: (212) 918-3100 Washington, DC 20004 [email protected] Telephone: (202) 637-5600 Fax: (202) 637-5910 ZACH MARTINEZ (pro hac vice pending) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 1601 Wewatta Street, Suite 900 Denver, CO 80202 February 4, 2020 Telephone: (303) 899-7300 Counsel for Amicus Curiae Document receivedbytheCA2ndDistrictCourtofAppeal. Fax: (303) 899-7333 FairVote CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITES OR PERSONS FairVote is a non-profit organization headquartered in Takoma Park, Maryland that advocates for fairer political representation through election reform. Since its founding in 1992, FairVote has been committed to advancing ranked-choice voting, also known as a single-transferable-vote (“STV”) method, in both single-member-district and at-large voting systems. It does so by conducting original research and advocating for electoral reforms at the local, state, and national levels. FairVote believes that implementing alternative at-large remedies, including ranked-choice and cumulative voting, will allow voters to elect representatives who better reflect their communities’ and society’s diversity. -
THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY and MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election
THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY AND MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election by James C. Anderson A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2006 © James C. Anderson 2006 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Library and Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce,Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve,sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet,distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform,et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. -
Responsiveness, Capture and Efficient Policymaking
CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y DOCENCIA ECONÓMICAS, A.C. ELECTIONS AND LOTTERIES: RESPONSIVENESS, CAPTURE AND EFFICIENT POLICYMAKING TESINA QUE PARA OBTENER EL GRADO DE MAESTRO EN CIENCIA POLÍTICA PRESENTA JORGE OLMOS CAMARILLO DIRECTOR DE LA TESINA: DR. CLAUDIO LÓPEZ-GUERRA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO SEPTIEMBRE, 2018 CONTENTS I. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 II. Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 6 1. Political Ambition .............................................................................................. 6 2. Electoral Systems and Policymaking ................................................................. 7 3. The Revival of Democracy by Lot ..................................................................... 8 III. Lottocracy in Theory .............................................................................................. 12 IV. Elections and Lotteries ........................................................................................... 14 1. Responsiveness ................................................................................................. 14 2. Legislative Capture ........................................................................................... 16 3. Efficiency.......................................................................................................... 18 V. A Formal Model of Legislator’s Incentives .......................................................... -
Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1
1 Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1 Richard B. Darlington Cornell University Abstract For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly discusses about 20 systems. Comments invited. [email protected] Copyright Richard B. Darlington May be distributed free for non-commercial purposes Keywords Voting system Condorcet Minimax 1. Many thanks to Nicolaus Tideman, Andrew Myers, Sharon Weinberg, Eduardo Marchena, my wife Betsy Darlington, and my daughter Lois Darlington, all of whom contributed many valuable suggestions. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction and summary 3 2. The variety of voting systems 4 3. Some electoral criteria violated by minimax’s competitors 6 Monotonicity 7 Strategic voting 7 Completeness 7 Simplicity 8 Ease of voting 8 Resistance to vote-splitting and spoiling 8 Straddling 8 Condorcet consistency (CC) 8 4. Dismissing eight criteria violated by minimax 9 4.1 The absolute loser, Condorcet loser, and preference inversion criteria 9 4.2 Three anti-manipulation criteria 10 4.3 SCC/IIA 11 4.4 Multiple districts 12 5. Simulation studies on voting systems 13 5.1. Why our computer simulations use spatial models of voter behavior 13 5.2 Four computer simulations 15 5.2.1 Features and purposes of the studies 15 5.2.2 Further description of the studies 16 5.2.3 Results and discussion 18 6. -
Politician Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship
INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND ADVICE FOR THE PARLIAMENT INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICES Research Paper No. 4 2002–03 Politician Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship DEPARTMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY ISSN 1328-7478 Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2003 Except to the extent of the uses permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means including information storage and retrieval systems, without the prior written consent of the Department of the Parliamentary Library, other than by Senators and Members of the Australian Parliament in the course of their official duties. This paper has been prepared for general distribution to Senators and Members of the Australian Parliament. While great care is taken to ensure that the paper is accurate and balanced, the paper is written using information publicly available at the time of production. The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Information and Research Services (IRS). Advice on legislation or legal policy issues contained in this paper is provided for use in parliamentary debate and for related parliamentary purposes. This paper is not professional legal opinion. Readers are reminded that the paper is not an official parliamentary or Australian government document. IRS staff are available to discuss the paper's contents with Senators and Members and their staff but not with members of the public. Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2003 I NFORMATION AND R ESEARCH S ERVICES Research Paper No. 4 2002–03 Politician Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship Sarah Miskin Politics and Public Administration Group 24 March 2003 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Martin Lumb and Janet Wilson for their help with the research into party defections in Australia and Cathy Madden, Scott Bennett, David Farrell and Ben Miskin for reading and commenting on early drafts. -
On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidates∗
The Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18) On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidates∗ Yu Cheng Shaddin Dughmi David Kempe Duke University University of Southern California University of Southern California Abstract voters and the chosen candidate in a suitable metric space (Anshelevich 2016; Anshelevich, Bhardwaj, and Postl 2015; We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters Anshelevich and Postl 2016; Goel, Krishnaswamy, and Mu- are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal pref- erences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. nagala 2017). The underlying assumption is that the closer In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score a candidate is to a voter, the more similar their positions on from each ballot based on the ballot’s rank order; the candi- key questions are. Because proximity implies that the voter date with the highest total score wins the election. The cost would benefit from the candidate’s election, voters will rank of a candidate is his sum of distances to all voters, and the candidates by increasing distance, a model known as single- distortion of an election is the ratio between the cost of the peaked preferences (Black 1948; Downs 1957; Black 1958; elected candidate and the cost of the optimum candidate. We Moulin 1980; Merrill and Grofman 1999; Barbera,` Gul, consider the case when candidates are representative of the and Stacchetti 1993; Richards, Richards, and McKay 1998; population, in the sense that they are drawn i.i.d. from the Barbera` 2001). population of the voters, and analyze the expected distortion Even in the absence of strategic voting, voting systems of positional voting rules. -
Fair Representation Voting – Lessons from Cumulative Voting in Illinois by Rob Richiei Prepared for National Democracy Slam, April 22, 2015
Fair representation voting – Lessons from cumulative voting in Illinois By Rob Richiei Prepared for National Democracy Slam, April 22, 2015 We have more than 7,000 state legislators in the United States today. The great majority of them are elected in single-winner districts, where each legislator represents a group of people that no one else represents in that legislative chamber. But that’s not true in Maryland, where I and most other Maryland voters have three representatives in the House of Delegates, and it didn’t always used to be that way nationally. As recently as the 1950’s, more than half of state representatives shared constituents with other representatives in multi-winner districts, at a time when voters in several states had more than one U.S. House Member as well. One of those states with multi-winner state legislative districts was Illinois. Every voter had three representatives in the Illinois House of Representatives. But unlike other multi-winner state legislative districts elsewhere Illinois did not have a winner-take-all rule. That is, 51% of voters were not able to control 100% of representation in the way that they can today in my three-seat district in Maryland. Instead, if more than a quarter of like-minded voters wanted a certain kind of representation, they had the voting power to win one of the three seats. A 51% majority would have the power to elect two of three seats, but not all three of them. This “fair representation voting rule” was based on providing voters with cumulative voting rights. -
Automatic Food Intake Assessment Using Camera Phones
Michigan Technological University Digital Commons @ Michigan Tech Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's Reports - Open Reports 2012 Automatic Food Intake Assessment Using Camera Phones Fanyu Kong Michigan Technological University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds Part of the Computer Engineering Commons Copyright 2012 Fanyu Kong Recommended Citation Kong, Fanyu, "Automatic Food Intake Assessment Using Camera Phones", Dissertation, Michigan Technological University, 2012. https://doi.org/10.37099/mtu.dc.etds/494 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etds Part of the Computer Engineering Commons AUTOMATIC FOOD INTAKE ASSESSMENT USING CAMERA PHONES By Fanyu Kong A DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Computer Engineering) MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 2012 c 2012 Fanyu Kong This dissertation, "Automatic Food Intake Assessment Using Camera Phones," is hereby approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHI- LOSOPHY IN COMPUTER ENGINEERING. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Signatures: Dissertation Advisor Dr. Jindong Tan Department Chair Dr. Daniel R. Fuhrmann Date Dedication To my wife and my parents! . Contents List of Figures . .xviii List of Tables ......................................xix Preface .........................................xxi Acknowledgments . .xxiii Abstract .........................................xxv 1 Introduction .................................... 1 1.1 Obesity: A challenge to public health . .1 1.2 Food intake assessment . .3 1.3 Opportunity and challenges . .4 1.4 Goals and specific aims . .5 1.5 Organization of this thesis . .6 Reference . .7 vii 2 DietCam: Automatic Dietary Assessment with Mobile Camera Phones . 11 Abstract . 11 2.1 Introduction . -
"Eustace the Monk" and Compositional Techniques
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2013 An original composition, Symphony No. 1, "Eustace the Monk" and compositional techniques used to elicit musical humor Samuel Howard Stokes Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the Music Commons Recommended Citation Stokes, Samuel Howard, "An original composition, Symphony No. 1, "Eustace the Monk" and compositional techniques used to elicit musical humor" (2013). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 1053. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1053 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. AN ORIGINAL COMPOSITION, SYMPHONY NO. 1, "EUSTACE THE MONK" AND COMPOSITIONAL TECHNIQUES USED TO ELICIT MUSICAL HUMOR A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College In partial fulfillment of the Requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The School of Music by Samuel Stokes B.M., University of Central Missouri, 2002 M.A., University of Central Missouri, 2005 M.M., The Florida State University, 2006 May 2013 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Dinos Constantinides for his valuable guidance and enthusiasm in my development as a composer. He has expanded my horizons by making me think outside of the box while leaving me enough room to find my own compositional voice. -
Ranked-Choice Voting from a Partisan Perspective
Ranked-Choice Voting From a Partisan Perspective Jack Santucci December 21, 2020 Revised December 22, 2020 Abstract Ranked-choice voting (RCV) has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) majority rule with minority representation in multi-seat districts, or (c) majority sweeps in multi-seat districts. Such systems can be combined with other rules that encourage/discourage slate voting. This paper describes five major versions used in U.S. public elections: Al- ternative Vote (AV), single transferable vote (STV), block-preferential voting (BPV), the bottoms-up system, and AV with numbered posts. It then considers each from the perspective of a `political operative.' Simple models of voting (one with two parties, another with three) draw attention to real-world strategic issues: effects on minority representation, importance of party cues, and reasons for the political operative to care about how voters rank choices. Unsurprisingly, different rules produce different outcomes with the same votes. Specific problems from the operative's perspective are: majority reversal, serving two masters, and undisciplined third-party voters (e.g., `pure' independents). Some of these stem from well-known phenomena, e.g., ballot exhaus- tion/ranking truncation and inter-coalition \vote leakage." The paper also alludes to vote-management tactics, i.e., rationing nominations and ensuring even distributions of first-choice votes. Illustrative examples come from American history and comparative politics. (209 words.) Keywords: Alternative Vote, ballot exhaustion, block-preferential voting, bottoms- up system, exhaustive-preferential system, instant runoff voting, ranked-choice voting, sequential ranked-choice voting, single transferable vote, strategic coordination (10 keywords). -
"WEIRD AL" YANKOVIC: POLKAS, PARODIES and the POWER of SATIRE by Chuck Miller Originally Published in Goldmine #514
"WEIRD AL" YANKOVIC: POLKAS, PARODIES AND THE POWER OF SATIRE By Chuck Miller Originally published in Goldmine #514 Al Yankovic strapped on his accordion, ready to perform. All he had to do was impress some talent directors, and he would be on The Gong Show, on stage with Chuck Barris and the Unknown Comic and Jaye P. Morgan and Gene Gene the Dancing Machine. "I was in college," said Yankovic, "and a friend and I drove down to LA for the day, and auditioned for The Gong Show. And we did a song called 'Mr. Frump in the Iron Lung.' And the audience seemed to enjoy it, but we never got called back. So we didn't make the cut for The Gong Show." But while the Unknown Co mic and Gene Gene the Dancing Machine are currently brain stumpers in 1970's trivia contests, the accordionist who failed the Gong Show taping became the biggest selling parodist and comedic recording artist of the past 30 years. His earliest parodies were recorded with an accordion in a men's room, but today, he and his band have replicated tracks so well one would think they borrowed the original master tape, wiped off the original vocalist, and superimposed Yankovic into the mix. And with MTV, MuchMusic, Dr. Demento and Radio Disney playing his songs right out of the box, Yankovic has reached a pinnacle of success and longevity most artists can only imagine. Alfred Yankovic was born in Lynwood, California on October 23, 1959. Seven years later, his parents bought him an accordion for his birthday. -
2018 PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT Cesar Perales, Chair Rachel Godsil, Vice Chair Carlo Scissura, Secretary Matt Gewolb, Executive Director
CHARTER 2018 NYC REVISION COMMISSION 2018 PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT Cesar Perales, Chair Rachel Godsil, Vice Chair Carlo Scissura, Secretary Matt Gewolb, Executive Director LETTER TO THE CHAIR Dear Chair Perales and Commissioners: I am delighted to present this Preliminary Staff Report, which I hope will serve as an informative and useful guide for the ongoing work of the 2018 New York City Charter Revision Commission. As you know, the Commission has been extremely active in engaging with City residents during the initial stages of this revision process. From listening to in-person public testimony to engaging experts at our four Issue Forums to our “Commissioner- in-your-Borough” events, we have engaged the public in a serious—and enlightening— conversation about governance in New York City. We have considered the entire City Charter to identify areas for potential revision. The Commission received hundreds of comments from New Yorkers from across the five boroughs. Advocacy and good government groups, elected officials, academics, and others have made meaningful contributions, and we will continue to consult with stakeholders as this process unfolds. The New York City Law Department, and others within City government, have provided invaluable guidance. We tremendously appreciate their efforts, as well as those of all of the other organizations and individuals who have provided assistance. Ultimately, this Preliminary Staff Report reflects a focus on civic life and democracy in New York City—a theme that is particularly appropriate and relevant in contemporary times. The report also introduces a new and exciting phase in our process—one that I am confident will include a robust public discussion and debate about the future of the City Charter.