Aristotelianism As a Commentary Tradition*
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What Is That Thing Called Philosophy of Technology? - R
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY – Vol. IV - What Is That Thing Called Philosophy of Technology? - R. J. Gómez WHAT IS THAT THING CALLED PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY? R. J. Gómez Department of Philosophy. California State University (LA). USA Keywords: Adorno, Aristotle, Bunge, Ellul, Feenberg, Habermas, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Jonas, Latour, Marcuse, Mumford, Naess, Shrader-Frechette, artifact, assessment, determinism, ecosophy, ends, enlightenment, efficiency, epistemology, enframing, ideology, life-form, megamachine, metaphysics, method, naturalistic, fallacy, new, ethics, progress, rationality, rule, science, techno-philosophy Contents 1. Introduction 2. Locating technology with respect to science 2.1. Structure and Content 2.2. Method 2.3. Aim 2.4. Pattern of Change 3. Locating philosophy of technology 4. Early philosophies of technology 4.1. Aristotelianism 4.2. Technological Pessimism 4.3. Technological Optimism 4.4. Heidegger’s Existentialism and the Essence of Technology 4.5. Mumford’s Megamachinism 4.6. Neomarxism 4.6.1. Adorno-Horkheimer 4.6.2. Marcuse 4.6.3. Habermas 5. Recent philosophies of technology 5.1. L. Winner 5.2. A. Feenberg 5.3. EcosophyUNESCO – EOLSS 6. Technology and values 6.1. Shrader-Frechette Claims 6.2. H Jonas 7. Conclusions SAMPLE CHAPTERS Glossary Bibliography Biographical Sketch Summary A philosophy of technology is mainly a critical reflection on technology from the point of view of the main chapters of philosophy, e.g., metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Technology has had a fast development since the middle of the 20th century , especially ©Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY – Vol. IV - What Is That Thing Called Philosophy of Technology? - R. -
The Place of Ethics in Aristotle's Philosophy
Offprint from OXFORDSTUDIES INANCIENT PHILOSOPHY EDITOR:BRADINWOOD VOLUMEXL Essays in Memory of Michael Frede JAMESALLEN EYJÓLFURKJALAREMILSSON WOLFGANG-RAINERMANN BENJAMINMORISON 3 THEPLACEOFETHICSIN ARISTOTLE’SPHILOSOPHY GEORGEKARAMANOLIS . The issue D the wealth of studies on Aristotle’s ethics, there has been almost nothing, as far as I know, dedicated to considering the place that ethics occupies in Aristotle’s philosophy. This issue does not seem to be interesting to modern students of Aristotle. There was, however, a debate and indeed a controversy about this issue in late antiquity, as I shall show in this paper. There are two questions in- volved here, which are interrelated, and the debate was about both of them. The first concerns the order in which ethics or practical philosophy, more generally, must be studied by the student of Aris- totle’s philosophy. The second concerns the relative significance of this part of philosophy within the framework of Aristotle’s philoso- phical work. Both questions arise from remarks that Aristotle himself makes. The second in particular, some might argue, is addressed by Aris- totle in various parts of his work. In Metaphysics Ε –, for instance, he famously discusses the relative value of theoretical, practical, and productive sciences. Aristotle there argues explicitly that the the- oretical sciences are preferable (hairetōterai) to all others, practical © George Karamanolis It is a pleasure to offer this contribution in honour of Michael Frede, who taught me so much. Drafts of this paper were presented at Princeton, Oxford, and the Department of Theory and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens. I have benefited from the comments of all these audiences. -
Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Library Philosophy and Practice (e-journal) Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln July 2005 Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information Ken R. Herold Hamilton College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac Part of the Library and Information Science Commons Herold, Ken R., "Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information" (2005). Library Philosophy and Practice (e-journal). 27. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/27 Library Philosophy and Practice Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2001) (www.uidaho.edu/~mbolin/lppv3n2.htm) ISSN 1522-0222 Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information Ken R. Herold Systems Manager Burke Library Hamilton College Clinton, NY 13323 “My purpose is to tell of bodies which have been transformed into shapes of a different kind.” Ovid, Metamorphoses Part I. Library Philosophy Provocation Information seems to be ubiquitous, diaphanous, a-categorical, discrete, a- dimensional, and knowing. · Ubiquitous. Information is ever-present and pervasive in our technology and beyond in our thinking about the world, appearing to be a generic ‘thing’ arising from all of our contacts with each other and our environment, whether thought of in terms of communication or cognition. For librarians information is a universal concept, at its greatest extent total in content and comprehensive in scope, even though we may not agree that all information is library information. · Diaphanous. Due to its virtuality, the manner in which information has the capacity to make an effect, information is freedom. In many aspects it exhibits a transparent quality, a window-like clarity as between source and patron in an ideal interface or a perfect exchange without bias. -
Aspasian Infidelities. on Aspasius' Philosophical Background (EN I)
apeiron 2016; 49(2): 229–259 António Pedro Mesquita* Aspasian Infidelities. On Aspasius’ Philosophical Background (EN I) DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2015-0028 Abstract: The discussion on Aspasius’ philosophical background has benefited in recent years from a wide consensus. According to this consensus, Aspasius should be regarded as a Peripatetic, or even as an “orthodox Peripatetic” (Barnes’ phrase). It is true that Aspasius’ commentary is generally in tune with Aristotle. It is true that he shows an extensive knowledge of Aristotelian research pertinent for the discussions and that he uses Aristotelian concepts, principles, and doctrines with ease as if they were his own, thus denoting an old assimila- tion of those materials and a long accommodation to them. In a word, it is true that Aspasius is an Aristotelian. He is, however, as I will try to show in this paper, an Aristotelian strongly influenced by Stoicism. I will do so by selecting those points from Aspasius’ commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics where the Stoic influence is most flagrantly evident, namely in his interpretation of art (τέχνη), his conception of continence and incontinence and, especially, his interpretation of the relation between happiness, virtue, and external goods in Aristotle. Keywords: Aspasius, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, happiness, virtue, external goods The Consensus The discussion on Aspasius’ philosophical background has benefited in recent years from a wide consensus. A good example of this consensus is the position Barnes sustains on the matter in his excellent “Introduction to Aspasius”, where he states the following1: Next, Aspasius’ philosophical position. Galen calls him a Peripatetic, and it is plain that his pupil taught Galen Peripatetic philosophy. -
Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, in Sehepunkte 15 (2015), Nr
Citation style Andrea Falcon: Rezension von: Michael J. Griffin: Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, in sehepunkte 15 (2015), Nr. 7 [15.07.2015], URL:http://www.sehepunkte.de/2015/07/27098.html First published: http://www.sehepunkte.de/2015/07/27098.html copyright This article may be downloaded and/or used within the private copying exemption. Any further use without permission of the rights owner shall be subject to legal licences (§§ 44a-63a UrhG / German Copyright Act). sehepunkte 15 (2015), Nr. 7 Michael J. Griffin: Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire This is a book about the reception of Aristotle's Categories from the first century BC to the second century AD. The Categories does not appear to have circulated in the Hellenistic era. By contrast, this short but enigmatic treatise was at the center of the so-called return to Aristotle in the first century BC. The book under review tells us the story of this remarkable reversal of fortune. The main characters in this story are philosophers working in the three main philosophical traditions of post- Hellenistic philosophy. For the Peripatetic tradition, these are Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon. For the Academic and Platonic tradition, Eudorus of Alexandria and Lucius. For the Stoic tradition, Athenodorus and Cornutus. A supporting role is reserved to the following interpreters of the Categories : Aristo of Alexandria, Ps-Archytas, Nicostratus, Aspasius, Herminus, and Adrastus. In broad outline, the story told in the book goes as follows: Andronicus of Rhodes rescued the Categories from obscurity by deciding to place it at the beginning of his catalogue of Aristotle's writings (chapter 2). -
Philosophy As a Path to Happiness
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Helsingin yliopiston digitaalinen arkisto Philosophy as a Path to Happiness Attainment of Happiness in Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili Philosophy Janne Mattila ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XII, University main building, on the 13th of June, 2011 at 12 o’clock. ISBN 978-952-92-9077-2 (paperback) ISBN 978-952-10-7001-3 (PDF) http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/ Helsinki University Print Helsinki 2011 2 Abstract The aim of this study is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in medieval Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct currents within Arabic philosophy between the 10th and early 11th centuries, Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. These two distinct groups of sources initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy. The attitude of the Peripatetic philosophers is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, the two currents of thought converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, merged together with the Neoplatonic goal of the soul’s reascent to the spiritual world. Finally, for both happiness refers primarily to an otherworldly state thereby becoming a philosophical interpretation of the Quranic accounts of the afterlife. -
Wittgenstein's Critical Physiognomy
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (No. 1) 2014 Daniel Wack [email protected] Wittgenstein’s Critical Physiognomy Abstract In saying that meaning is a physiognomy, Wittgenstein invokes a philosophical tradition of critical physiognomy, one that developed in opposition to a scientific physiognomy. The form of a critical physiognomic judgment is one of reasoning that is circular and dynamic, grasping intention, thoughts, and emotions in seeing the expressive movements of bodies in action. In identifying our capacities for meaning with our capacities for physiognomic perception, Wittgenstein develops an understanding of perception and meaning as oriented and structured by our shared practical concerns and needs. For Wittgenstein, critical physiognomy is both fundamental for any meaningful interaction with others and a capacity we cultivate, and so expressive of taste in actions and ways of living. In recognizing how fundamental our capacity for physiognomic perception is to our form of life Wittgenstein inherits and radicalizes a tradition of critical physiognomy that stretches back to Kant and Lessing. Aesthetic experiences such as painting, poetry, and movies can be vital to the cultivation of taste in actions and in ways of living. Introduction “Meaning is a physiognomy.” –Ludwig Wittgenstein (PI, §568) In claiming that meaning is a physiognomy, Wittgenstein appears to call on a discredited pseudo-science with a dubious history of justifying racial prejudice and social discrimination in order to 113 Daniel Wack BY-NC-SA elucidate his understanding of meaning. Physiognomy as a science in the eighteenth and nineteenth century aimed to provide a model of meaning in which outer signs serve as evidence for judgments about inner mental states. -
Avoiding the Void: Avicenna on the Impossibility of Circular Motion in a Void*
Created on 24 December 2006 at 20.51 hours page 1 Avoiding the Void: Avicenna on the Impossibility of Circular Motion in a Void* Jon McGinnis The topic of the void was of significant philosophical and scientific importance in the ancient and medieval world. Some, such as the atomists, maintained that the void was essential if one were to explain motion. Others, such as Aristotle, argued that the exis- tence of the void would absolutely preclude the possibility of motion. Moreover, there were disputes concerning even how to characterize the void. Thus the atomists claimed that interstitial voids were dispersed throughout every body and existed alongside bo- dies in an infinite space. Others, such as the Stoics, held that all bodies were localized in a plenum that was itself situated in an extra-cosmic, infinite void. Still others, such as the Neoplatonist John Philoponus, thought that the void was finite, and although as a matter of fact it is never devoid of a body, it at least is capable of existing independent of any body. The above roughly provides the gamut of positions concerning the void as it reached the medieval Arabic philosopher Avicenna ( 370–428/ 980–1037). In one form or another, Avicenna was aware of the various moves and counter-moves associated with the notion of the void. Like Aristotle, he maintained that the existence of the void would absolutely preclude the possibility of motion. His arguments in some cases simply rehearse those of Aristotle; in other places they expand on the thought of Aristotle in order to respond to new threats that arose after Aristotle’s own time; and in certain situations Avicenna constructs new arguments against the void used neither by Aristotle nor, from what we can gather, Aristotle’s later Greek commentators. -
Aristotelianism in the First Century BC
CHAPTER 5 Aristotelianism in the First Century BC Andrea Falcon 1 A New Generation of Peripatetic Philosophers The division of the Peripatetic tradition into a Hellenistic and a post- Hellenistic period is not a modern invention. It is already accepted in antiquity. Aspasius speaks of an old and a new generation of Peripatetic philosophers. Among the philosophers who belong to the new generation, he singles out Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon.1 Strabo adopts a similar division. He too distinguishes between the older Peripatetics, who came immediately after Theophrastus, and their successors.2 He collectively describes the latter as better able to do philosophy in the manner of Aristotle (φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελίζειν). It remains unclear what Strabo means by doing philosophy in the manner of Aristotle.3 But he certainly thinks that the philosophers who belong to the new generation, and not those who belong to the old one, deserve the title of true Aristotelians. For Strabo, the event separating the old from the new Peripatos is the rediscovery and publication of Aristotle’s writings. We may want to resist Strabo’s negative characterization of the earlier Peripatetics. For Strabo, they were not able to engage in philosophy in any seri- ous way but were content to declaim general theses.4 This may be an unfair judgment, ultimately based on the anachronistic assumption that any serious philosophy requires engagement with an authoritative text.5 Still, the empha- sis that Strabo places on the rediscovery of Aristotle’s writings suggests that the latter were at the center of the critical engagement with Aristotle in the 1 Aspasius, On Aristotle’s Ethics 44.20–45.16. -
Aristotle and Newman on the End of Liberal Education Mary Katherine Tillman
Document generated on 10/01/2021 6:29 a.m. Paideusis The Philosophic Habit of Mind: Aristotle and Newman on the End of Liberal Education Mary Katherine Tillman Volume 3, Number 2, 1990 URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1073397ar DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1073397ar See table of contents Publisher(s) Canadian Philosophy of Education Society ISSN 0838-4517 (print) 1916-0348 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Tillman, M. (1990). The Philosophic Habit of Mind: Aristotle and Newman on the End of Liberal Education. Paideusis, 3(2), 17–27. https://doi.org/10.7202/1073397ar ©, 1990 Mary Katherine Tillman This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ The Philosophic Habit of Mind: Aristotle and Newman on the End of Liberal Education Mary Katherine Tillman University of Notre Dame John Henry Newman fiJ'st read Aristotle in 1818 as an undergraduate at Trinity College, Oxford. For his degree examination in 1820, he prepared three of Aristotle's works, the Rhetoric, Poetics, and Nicomachean Ethics. After he was named a Fellow of Oriel College in 1822, Newman worked closely for six years with the influential Dr. Richard Whately, whose textbook on logic replaced the manual used at Oxford for over a century. -
Aquinas on Attributes
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by MedievaleCommons@Cornell Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003), 1–41. Printed in the United States of America. Copyright C 2004 Cambridge University Press 1057-0608 DOI: 10.1017/S105706080300001X Aquinas on Attributes BRIAN LEFTOW Oriel College, Oxford Aquinas’ theory of attributes is one of the most obscure, controversial parts of his thought. There is no agreement even on so basic a matter as where he falls in the standard scheme of classifying such theories: to Copleston, he is a resemblance-nominalist1; to Armstrong, a “concept nominalist”2; to Edwards and Spade, “almost as strong a realist as Duns Scotus”3; to Gracia, Pannier, and Sullivan, neither realist nor nominalist4; to Hamlyn, the Middle Ages’ “prime exponent of realism,” although his theory adds elements of nominalism and “conceptualism”5; to Wolterstorff, just inconsistent.6 I now set out Aquinas’ view and try to answer the vexed question of how to classify it. Part of the confusion here is terminological. As emerges below, Thomas believed in “tropes” of “lowest” (infima) species of accidents and (I argue) substances.7 Many now class trope theories as a form of nominalism,8 while 1. F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1955), P. 94. 2. D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 25, 83, 87. Armstrong is tentative about this. 3. Sandra Edwards, “The Realism of Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 79; Paul Vincent Spade, “Degrees of Being, Degrees of Goodness,” in Aquinas’ Moral Theory, ed. -
The Univocity of Substance and the Formal Distinction of Attributes: the Role of Duns Scotus in Deleuze's Reading of Spinoza Nathan Widder
parrhesia 33 · 2020 · 150-176 the univocity of substance and the formal distinction of attributes: the role of duns scotus in deleuze's reading of spinoza nathan widder This paper examines the role played by medieval theologian John Duns Scotus in Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s philosophy of expressive substance; more generally, it elaborates a crucial moment in the development of Deleuze’s philosophy of sense and difference. Deleuze contends that Spinoza adapts and extends Duns Scotus’s two most influential theses, the univocity of being and formal distinction, despite neither appearing explicitly in Spinoza’s writings. “It takes nothing away from Spinoza’s originality,” Deleuze declares, “to place him in a perspective that may already be found in Duns Scotus” (Deleuze, 1992, 49).1 Nevertheless, the historiographic evidence is clearly lacking, leaving Deleuze to admit that “it is hardly likely that” Spinoza had even read Duns Scotus (359n28). Indeed, the only support he musters for his speculation is Spinoza’s obvious in- terests in scholastic metaphysical and logical treatises, the “probable influence” of the Scotist-informed Franciscan priest Juan de Prado on his thought, and the fact that the problems Duns Scotus addresses need not be confined to Christian thought (359–360n28). The paucity of evidence supporting this “use and abuse” of history, however, does not necessarily defeat the thesis. Like other lineages Deleuze proposes, the one he traces from Duns Scotus to Spinoza, and subsequently to Nietzsche, turns not on establishing intentional references by one thinker to his predecessor, but instead on showing how the borrowings and adaptations asserted to create the connec- tion make sense of the way the second philosopher surmounts blockages he faces while responding to issues left unaddressed by the first.