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Air Superiority Is the Prestige Mission. Sooner Or Later, Though, the War Usually Gets Down to Putting Bombs on Targets

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Air Superiority Is the Prestige Mission. Sooner Or Later, Though, the War Usually Gets Down to Putting Bombs on Targets Air superiority is the prestige mission. Sooner or later, though, the war usually gets down to putting bombs on targets. Improving the Odds In Ground Attack BY JEFFREY P. RHODES, DEFENSE EDITOR "You can shoot down every MiG the Soviets employ, but if you return to base and the lead Soviet tank commander is eating breakfast in your snack bar—you've lost the war, Jack." —A-10 pilots' axiom Mr HE prestige mission for fighter pounds of ordnance than could a Precision-Guided Munitions pilots is air superiority. It al- B-17G in its internal bomb bay. The first generation of responses ways has been, and it will likely stay The A-10 and the Air National to the growing threat came in the that way. If the enemy controls the Guard's A-7 exist to fight the air-to- form of precision-guided munitions. air, he controls the battle on the ground war. Ordnance delivery is so Shortly after the Linebacker I op- ground, too. Besides, fighters pitted crucial that Strategic Air Com- erations began over North Vietnam against fighters in aerial combat is mand, even though its main concern in 1972, four aircraft carrying Pave- the stuff of classic adventure. is delivery of nuclear weapons, ded- way I laser-guided "smart" bombs But important as it is, air superi- icates several of its bombardment knocked out the 540-foot-long rail- ority alone is not enough. Sooner or wings to conventional and theater road and highway bridge at Thanh later, aerial warfare gets down to roles. Hoa. The previous 871 sorties, with putting bombs on a target. It's diffi- For all of these aircraft and avi- losses of eleven aircraft, had pro- cult and dangerous, flying on the ators, the air-to-ground job is get- duced no more than superficial deck and into the teeth of defenses ting tougher all the time. damage to the "Dragon's Jaw." Al- to attack armor, airfields, troop con- "We fought a low-threat war in though Paveway I (officially desig- centrations, and command and con- South Vietnam," said Lt. Col. Ste- nated GBU-10) had been intro- trol centers. But it can keep the en- phen 0. Hammond, a former A-10 duced in 1%8, the destruction of emy tank commander out of your pilot and Forward Air Controller this bridge is regarded as a water- snack bar. (FAC) who now works in Air Force shed event in weapons evolution. Consequently—and regardless of Systems Command's Tactical Air- The laser designator of Paveway I where the prestige lies—a great deal craft Division's Plans and Programs and later munitions introduced of the serious work for tactical Directorate. "We could orbit at weapons delivery of far greater ac- squadrons today is in the air-to- 1,500 feet, stay above the small- curacy than was possible with the ground mission. Throughout histo- arms fire, and come in and hit the radio guidance previously used. ry, most "pure fighter" aircraft—in- target. The significance of laser-guided cluding P-51s, F-86s, and even "There is no low-threat scenario weapons was shown by both the F-15s—have come with structural in Europe," continued Colonel British in the Falklands War and by provisions to take on an air-to- Hammond. "There won't be too US forces in the April 1986 raid on ground configuration. Nearly all many targets that we will just roll in Libya. Both countries effectively eventually acquire the mission as on. We are outnumbered and out- employed the much-improved well. gunned, and there are too many tar- Paveway II bombs, which can make Any of USAF's first-line fight- gets to kill. Even with one kill per midcourse corrections to destroy ers—the F-15, the F-16, the F-111, pass, there are not enough passes in specific critical targets. and the F-4—can carry at least the world to do the job." As US technology improved, so 16,000 pounds of air-to-surface mu- To improve the odds, the Air did that of the enemy. The Soviet nitions. That's nearly twice the Force is counting on superior plan- SA-2 of the Vietnam era gave way to bomb load of a B-24 in World War II. ning, the quality of its aircrews, and the SA-6 that was so devastating to Even the F-5 can carry 1,000 more a familiar ally—technology. the Israeli Air Force early in the as AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1986 A view no enemy tank driver wants to see— an A-10 rolling in with its 30-mm gun blaz- ing. With up to 16.000 pounds of ordnance on eleven hardpoints and the GAU-8 A can- non firing up to 4,200 rounds of armor- piercing shells per minute, the A-10 will be devastating in its close air support role. 1973 Yom Kippur War, and that led variety of heavily defended targets. of Operations at the Pentagon. to the SA-10, which is said to be More and different types of standoff "With precision airplanes—such as capable of intercepting cruise mis- weapons are in development. the F-16, with its advanced elec- siles. As the threat evolved, the The advantages of standoff weap- tronics and computer-aided deliv- need grew for standoff weapons that ons are great. Munitions can be de- ery systems—go the iron bombs." could be employed outside the tar- livered from farther away, thus min- He went on to note that some tar- get area and then guided in by lasers imizing the time the launching air- gets can be destroyed more "eco- or TV for the kill. craft has to stay in the target area. nomically" with inexpensive iron "We are standing on the threshold This, in turn, lessens the chance of bombs than with costly precision- of a major change in the perfor- the airplane becoming a target for guided munitions. mance capability of our tactical air- surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) or Precision-guided munitions are craft by the addition of a standoff antiaircraft guns. Sortie generation, too expensive to use in large quan- capability," said Col. Richard K. or the ability to launch the same tities, and it would be impractical to Koehnke, Chief of the Tactical aircraft again and again, will im- use iron bombs alone against heav- Weapons Division of the Air Force's prove, while attrition rates will fall. ily defended targets far behind the Directorate of Operational Require- Furthermore, increased accuracy battle lines. Overall effectiveness ments. "The standoff weapon today reduces the number of shots needed depends on finding the right mix of is as revolutionary to the warfight- to "take out" a target. weapons to carry out the mission. ing concept as the introduction of The main disadvantage of stand- the Sidewinder [missile] was to air- off weapons—and laser-guided mu- How the Mission Divides Up to-air combat. nitions as well—is that these sophis- In simplest terms, the air-to- "Standoff weapons are needed in ticated and capable weapons are ground arena can be broken up into the early critical days of a war to very expensive. three relatively distinct areas, but as attack airfields and command and "We can't afford to use standoff with any battle, these distinctions control centers before our forces weapons for everything," said Col. can easily become blurred. Each of have had [enough time] to roll back Patrick R. Craig, Chief of the Avi- the areas—deep interdiction, battle- their front lines," Colonel Koehnke onics and Armament Development field air interdiction (BAI), and added. Division of the Directorate of Devel- close air support (CAS)—have opment at the Pentagon. "We have a unique characteristics and associ- Limited Standoff Capability large inventory of iron, or 'dumb,' ated problems. Currently, the US has only a lim- bombs, and we will have to use "Air interdiction sorties are pre- ited standoff capability with the them. The two types of weapons planned, and a pilot will take off, Rockwell GBU-15 electro-optical complement each other." won't talk to anybody along the glide bomb. Utilizing the 2,000- "The Air Force went down two way, and just go out and do his pound Mk 84 general-purpose war- avenues—precision munitions and thing," said Colonel Hammond. head, the GBU-15 has a standoff precision airplanes," added Lt. Col. "His thing" will include flying as range of roughly five miles, and the Stephen R. Pingel, who works in the deep as 800 kilometers behind the weapon is capable of destroying a Fighter Division of the Directorate Forward Edge of the Battle Area AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1986 49 (FEBA) through radars, SAMs, and behind the FLOT [Forward Line of Close air support of ground enemy fighters to attack targets that Troops], your actions will have a rel- troops in contact with the enemy is do not have a near-term effect on the atively near-term effect on the bat- the most complicated segment of battle, such as airfields, or critical tle," Colonel Hammond explained. the air-to-ground mission. There chokepoints, such as bridges and This intermediate area is best must be coordinated attacks by POL (petroleum, oil, and lubri- taken care of by F-16s, F-4s, and, to Air Force A- 10s and Army AH-1 cants) storage areas. a much lesser extent, F-15s. Other Cobras and the soon-to-come Currently, the responsibility for players in this arena would be the AH-64 Apaches.
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