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Douze Points For Peace The and Its Role in Processes of Transitional Justice

Verka Serduchka performing ‘’ for , 2007

MA Thesis Lou-Anna Druyvesteyn – 11574100 1 July, 2018 Holocaust and Genocide Studies Universiteit van Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. Karel Berkhoff Second reader: Prof. Dr. Nanci Adler Amount of words: 20.894

Table of content Abstract 3 Introduction 4 1. Transitional justice 6 1.1 The limited scope of transitional justice 6 1.2 Transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia 8 1.3 A broader scope 12 2. The Eurovision Song Contest 15 2.1 The beginnings: dreaming of unity 15 2.2 A dream come true? 16 2.3 The political side of the Eurovision 18 2.4 The case of Ukraine – ! 22 2.5 – The struggle for recognition 26 3. and Israel in the Eurovision 32 3.1 (West) Germany: to perform is to progress 32 3.2 Israeli participation – a celebration of the nation 36 3.3 A limited case study 39 4. (The former) Yugoslavia in the Eurovision Song Contest 41 4.1 Before 1992: unity without victory 41 4.2 The dissolution 43 4.3 A new chapter 46 4.4 : Changing the game 50 4.5 Your votes please 53 4.6 Why vote for each other? 56 Conclusion 58 Appendix A – Eurovision votes exchanged by Armenia, 60 and from 2006-2012 Appendix B – Eurovision votes exchanged by Germany and Israel, 62 1973-2017 Appendix C – Eurovision votes exchanged by the countries of the 64 former Yugoslavia, 2004-2017 Bibliography 68

2 Abstract Cultural manifestations that can play a supportive role in transitional justice are rarely seen as such or properly evaluated. The Eurovision Song Contest is a good example: it is a mega event that is one of the most watched shows in the world and therefore able to reach a mass audience for any message that is wished to be send. Officially it is not allowed to be political, but the contest is often implicitly full of political references. From songs and performances to voting, examples galore. This interplay between amusement, music and politics has potential in processes of reconciliation and restorative transitional justice after (violent) conflict or even genocides in (the former Yugoslavia, Germany) or within the borders of the Eurovision Song Contest (Armenia).

3 Introduction Every year around late April and early May, the countries of Europe (and beyond) come together for a singing contest that has become one of the world’s most watched events in the history of television. The Eurovision Song Contest (or Eurovision) started with seven countries, an orchestra and a conductor, and grew into the biggest international musical competition with over forty countries participating every year from east to west.1 The Eurovision has seen Europe change from the broken continent it was shortly after the Second World War, the economic growth afterwards; the growing unity initiated by that other European initiative: the ; the wall dividing not only Germany but also East and West, and then coming down; to the subsequent fall of the and the expansion of the cultural and political concept that was ‘Europe’. The Cold War was played out, wars were fought, but the Eurovision Song Contest happened every year since 1956. The contest’s explicit denunciation of politics on stage has had little effect on the reality, for implicit political messages have been present on the stage from the early years of the contest. These messages – my personal favorite is Turkey’s submission to the contest a year after the oil crisis of 1979, a love song for a man named Pet’r Oil – are often in the context of a conflict or its aftermath. The stage of the Eurovision Song Contest provides the perfect venue to convey a message to or generate attention from a mass audience. In this thesis, the cases of Armenia, Germany, and Serbia will be brought to the table to show how different sides to a conflict represent themselves variously at the Eurovision Song Contest in relation to their violent history. An analysis of these cases shows an opportunity for a mechanism of a more progressive approach to transitional justice by focusing on cultural elements and reconciliation, besides the judicial aspect of transitional justice. Research on the Eurovision Song Contest has mostly been focused on detecting voting patterns and blocs by means of statistical analysis by Derek Gatherer, Gad Yair and others. They have detected voting blocs based on cultural and linguistic affinities. The foundations for the Eurovision were not without political implications, and with the growth in participating countries came a growth in political dimensions to the festival.2 In the past few years, more research has been devoted to this by scholars such as Dean Vuletic, Catherine Baker, Marijana

1 Chris West, Eurovision! (: Melville House, 2017): 4. 2 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between: An Analysis of Political Voting Bias in the Eurovision Song Contest’, Master Thesis, Sanford School of Public Policy (2012), 38.

4 Mitrović and Ivan Raykoff. However, in relation to genocides and transitional justice, the Eurovision has been understudied. To demonstrate the relation between the Eurovision Song Contest and (cultural forms of) transitional justice, I elaborate on the ways in which the contest played a role in, or was a previous cultural manifestation of transitional justice, and how this can be used in future cases. My first point will be that the Eurovision Song Contest has had inherently, from the beginning onwards, political implications, whether it be on or off stage, especially in the validation of nations and states of their existence. I illustrate that side of the Eurovision Song Contest with the example of Ukraine, together with an elaboration on the voting systems. The latter can sometimes be a peculiar reflection of attitudes towards other participating countries. Following this, I show how the Eurovision Song Contest has been employed by Armenia as a cultural-institutional (coming from the broadcasters) initiative with regards to the Armenian Genocide. This case shows the side of the victims in a quest for demanding justice. Then I employ the case of Germany to show how in the early stages of the Eurovision, used this cultural event to distract from or deliberately create modifications of perceived stereotypes of perpetrators in the early stages of the Eurovision. This thesis will not analyze every entry of every participant of every year in this work, instead I will focus on the relevant years. And it goes without saying that not every entry is as political. There will always be enough songs merely about love, joy and happiness; here I have selected the ones that are politically charged. Finally – this will be the major part of this work – I discuss the case of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. I expand on the relations between these states and how these are strangely absent from the Eurovision stage. This will lead to the conclusion that mega events such as the Eurovision Song Contest, unintentionally serve as ideal venues for various manifestations of cultural transitional justice in multifold ways.

5 1. Transitional justice

1.1 The limited scope of transitional justice To end a violent conflict is often quite an achievement, yet conflict as such does not fully end. New issues arise: what to do with the perpetrators, the institutions and the judicial system? If these were part of the former conflict, they need to be adjusted. That is where transitional justice – as a (relatively) new field of study and practice – enters the stage to develop strategies on how to move forward in the most inclusive possible way.3 The first step of transitional justice is the criminalization of punishable acts that occurred, or retributive justice.4 Special courts or tribunals are then set up, because the judicial system in place is often not capable of handling the gravity, severity and multiplicity of the cases. When comparing the first case where transitional justice was implemented, the trials after the Second World War, to more recent cases, the shift in focus from perpetrator to victim becomes clearly visible.5 In the Military trials in Nuremberg, the focus on the victims was futile. That does not mean retributive justice should be discarded, it remains one of the cornerstones of transitional justice, because it shows (or intends to) a break with the previous regime, emphasizing the transformation to a post-conflict state.6 Transitional justice comes in all shapes and sizes; but its necessity – in any form – to a (post-) conflict society is by now widely recognized. Other components of transitional justice, next to – or instead of – criminal prosecution include truth-seeking and reforms. The truth- seeking aspect is especially important, as tribunals search for the truth in order to come to a just sentence. However, this truth is often not seen as the whole truth, since a court looks at the juridical aspects of the conflict only. This might (and should) be the truth, but it is not complete.7 Although it might not establish the entire truth, judicial truth does, as Michael Ignatieff has

3 Makau Mutua, ‘What is the Future of Transitional Justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 9 (March 2015): 4. 4 Rama Mani, ‘The Rule of Law or the Rule of Might? Restoring Legal Justice in the Aftermath of Conflict’, in Regeneration of Wartorn Societies, M. Pugh, ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 5 Rudi Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, no. 1 (2003): 71. 6 Mani, ‘The Rule of Law or the Rule of Might?’, 6. 7 Declan Roche, ‘Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’, British Journal of Criminology 45, no. 4, (July 2005): 573.

6 called it, ‘limit the range of permissible lies’ and formulates a ‘negative truth’ that excludes certain narratives from the possibility of being true or being considered true.8 Criminal justice has mostly contributed to the formal type of transitional justice that ensures the juridical duties are executed. But the field of transitional justice has expanded its scope over the years. Next to retributive justice, restorative justice has become a new point of focus. Instead of on hard laws and penalizing punishable acts, it is focused on the relation between perpetrator and victim, based on the (Western and liberal) belief that individuals can best heal through acknowledgement.9 Denial or incomplete acknowledgement is seen the continuation of the crime against the victims. The best-known example of restorative justice is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-Apartheid South- where truth was prevalent in importance over criminal prosecution. Restorative justice aims to reconcile the parties previously at conflict by means of mediation, truth establishing and conferences.10 But what if attempts to pursue all this remain unsuccessful? The case of transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia will make clear how some tools of transitional justice do not have the desired outcome. This gap, that occurs more often than only in the case of the former Yugoslavia, between transitional justice (classical style) and reconciliation shows that there is a need for a of transitional justice-thinking – one that includes both a penalizing approach as well as mechanisms for successful societal transformations, All of this requires a change of mindset. An important element of transitional justice, that has been addressed more specifically by attempts at restorative justice, is normalizing the relations between former enemies. To erase the dichotomy between victim and perpetrator is an important goal of such strategy, just as the decollectivisation of guilt and victimhood: that not every person belonging to a certain group out of which some were perpetrators ought to be seen as a perpetrator.11 Again, the case of Yugoslavia will make clear this is not as easy as it seems. To remove grudges is one thing, but to remove collective perceptions of guilt and blame is another. This aspect of transitional justice

8 Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The philosophy and practice of dealing with the past: some conceptual and normative issues’ in Burying the past. Making peace and doing justice after civil conflict, N. Biggar, ed. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 71. 9 Duncan Bell, ‘Introduction: memory, trauma and world politics’ in Memory, trauma and world politics: Reflections on the relationship between the past and the present, D. Bell ed. (London: Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 4. 10 Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, 75. 11 Michael Ignattief, ‘Articles of faith’, Index on Censorship 25, no. 5 (1996): 118. But see aslso Andrew Rigby, Justice and reconciliation. After the violence (Bolder: Lynne Rienner, 2001) and Ruti G. Teitel Transitional justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

7 has received less attention from scholars in the field than the legal aspect. Only in the more recent and more social approaches has this been addressed. Their aim is shifting from justice to social transformation: an ‘enormous experiment in social engineering’.12

1.2 Transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia Before the conflict had even ended, the United Nations issued resolutions to establish a justice mechanism to deal with the crimes that occurred in the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was a historical event: the birth of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (from here on referred to as the ICTY).13 Its mandate ran from 1993 up until 2017 and was the first UN war crime tribunal.14 The tribunal was given jurisdiction to rule over individual persons (not organizations or units) and can claim jurisdiction over the national legal proceedings.15 The categories of crimes over which it has jurisdiction were laid down in the statute and cover grave breaches of the Conventions of 194916, violations of the customs of war, crimes against humanity and genocide.17 The ICTY was successful in trying some of the key actors in the conflicts such as Radislav Krstić (commander responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica, convicted for genocide) and Slobodan Milošević (president of Serbia, died before the sentence was released).

12 Roland , At war’s end. Building peace after civil conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21. 13 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘A world unto itself? The application of international justice in the former Yugoslavia’, in My neighbor, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity, E. Stover and H.M. Weinstein ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32. 14 ICTY, ‘The Tribunal – Establishment’, n.d., http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/establishment (retrieved 28 March 2018). 15 ICTY, ‘Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction’, n.d., http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-and-crimes-under-icty-jurisdiction (retrieved 28 March 2018). 16 ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols’, 2010, https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties- customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm (retrieved 1 april 2018). 17 ICTY, n.d., ‘Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction’, http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-and-crimes-under-icty-jurisdiction (retrieved 28 March 2018).

8 The focus of the ICTY was mostly on the prosecution of war criminals, more than on attempting to restructure civil society.18 This is one of the main criticisms the tribunal has received (not the only one though). The aperture that was arising between the countries where the conflicts took place and where the tribunal was (The Hague, the ) became visible by the lack of information provision, translations and action on the ground. To provide a more restorative aspect to the ICTY, Outreach was set up, a program to create a resonance of the judicial progress with a more societal focused approach. It did so by setting up conferences in Bosnian-Serb villages that were closely related to the violence of the conflict, producing documentaries and providing information. The message to be transmitted was that justice was delivered to the individuals that took part and the truth has been established.19 It was believed that through conveying that message, the schism between the different ethno-political entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be tempered (Outreach focused mostly on Bosnia and Herzegovina and less on Serbia or the other Balkan countries. One explanation for this is that the worst atrocities had taken place on Bosnian soil).20 However, that message was not at all easily conveyed. The local people remained hesitant about whether justice had really been served.21 They were not convinced that these attempts would have any effect on the other side (of the conflict). Another reoccurring point of criticism was that the role of bystanders was largely ignored in the ICTY. The ‘big fish’ were prosecuted, yet many that played a more indirect in the violent conflict remained unpunished. This reproach came from both sides and subsequently fueled the perception that the collective of the other side was guilty, yet remained unpunished.22 Overall, the ICTY was not perceived positively in Bosnia23 and Serbia24. The strained relationship between the countries and the ICTY got off on a rocky start, since the Tribunal was more or less imposed on the countries of

18 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, ‘The “Silent Dilemma” of Transitional Justice: Silencing and Coming to Terms with the Past in Serbia’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 7, no. 2 (2013): 330. 19 Johanna Mannergren Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Focaal – Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 57 (2010): 55. 20 Ibid., 57. 21 Gregory Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia: An Unbridgeable Gap between Academe and Law?’, Law, Crime and History 2 (2013): 141. 22 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 54. 23 Ibid., 59. 24 Obradovic-Wochnick, ‘The “Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 330.

9 the former Yugoslavia by the international community, and citizens of the former Yugoslavia were barred from legal positions in the court.25 Out of the 8000 estimated perpetrators, a little over 400 have been prosecuted in trials in both the ICTY as well as regional and national trials.26 This number is perceived as rather disappointing in the area.27 This notion has returned numerous times in the research done into transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia. The dichotomy between victim and perpetrator is persistent amongst all sides. Moreover, every side feels like they are put in the position of perpetrator while they are actually not, the other side is. What their side did was self-defense and only necessary, the other side was abundant in violence and excessive.28 Some researchers have argued that the attempts at restorative justice have been counterproductive: the have only increased the polarization along the lines of ethno-political differences.29 The assumption made by the tribunal – that individual justice would pave the way for reconciliation – underestimated the ethno-political grudges that remained. Even the ICTY itself contributed to these grudges, and was used as such by political figures, who claimed that the tribunal was not neutral and targeted one’s own ethno-political criminals differently from those of other nationalities.30 The competing claims of victimhood and denials of guilt are simply too embedded to be changed by a conference and stand in the way of the creation of a collective historical narrative, often seen as one of the cornerstones of restorative justice.31 Cooperation with the ICTY was done reluctantly as it was believed to be partial. In 2013 only one out of six people in Bosnia and Herzegovina felt that reconciliation had been achieved.32 The Tribunal’s attempts to engage the public have been met with discontent in Bosnia, and in Serbia they were largely ignored. The same social mechanisms are at place, where

25 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 54. 26 Stephanie A. Barbour, ‘Making Justice Visible: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Domestic War Crimes Trials Outreach’ in Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach, Clara Ramírez-Barat ed. (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014): 98. 27 Ibid., 99. 28 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 51. 29 See Selimovic ‘Perpetrators and Victims’ or Kent ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’ 30 Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’, 141. 31 Dinka Corkalo, et a., ‘Neighbors again? Intercommunity relations after ethnic cleansing’ in My neighbor, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity, E. Stover and H. M. Weinstein ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 145. 32Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’, 139.

10 individual Serbian guilt at the ICTY is collectivized and victimhood of the other side rejected.33 But the silence to which it has led in Serbia should not be underestimated, as some researchers into transitional justice have done in the past, Political leaders have long encouraged silence by suppressing narratives different from theirs. The genocide of Srebrenica is a key issue within the competition for victimhood. Most (Bosnian-)Serbs deny the claim that it was a genocide and use the conviction of the ICTY that Srebrenica was a genocide as evidence that the ICTY is partial. They then point to other crimes of substantial gravity that were assessed to be crimes against humanity instead of a genocide and argue that they are framed for being only the perpetrators of genocide.34 Bosniac politicians in their turn argue that the foundations for the Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina were built on the Srebrenica genocide and other massacres and therefore Republika Sprpska has no right to exist.35 In short, as the Yugoslav case shows, retributive justice alone is not enough and restorative justice can also fall short. On the contrary, both have had the opposite effect. In both Bosnia and Serbia, denial was on the rise together with a renewed sense of ethno-nationalism. The complicated dynamic between victimhood and guilt created a chasm between ethno- nationalities.36 The international attempts to rebuild the region inadequately address the underlying waves of nationalism.37 Are there alternatives? Several transitional justice scholars have argued for the importance of education in post-conflict societies to create congruence on the narratives as well as to inform and to counter misinformation.38 It is part of the bigger context, with the same aim as restorative justice – peacebuilding. Education on the wars has been little to none in the former Yugoslavia, mostly because of the reluctance of politicians and the refusal to adhere to a more

33 Obradovic-Wochnick, ‘The ”Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 333. 34 Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’, 152. 35 Obradovic-Wochnick, ‘The ”Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 330. 36 Diane Orentlicher Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 21. 37 Fletcher and Weinstein, ‘A world unto itself? The application of international justice in the former Yugoslavia’, 35. 38 Elizabeth A. Cole, ‘Transitional Justice and the Reform of History Education’, The International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007), 116.

11 nuanced narrative.39 Outreach has been attempting to promote education on the history, but it has been met with reluctance and passivity.40 For all these reasons, therefore, perhaps the scope of transitional justice should be extended further to include socio-cultural events, or focus on the areas where there is a common ground.

1.3 A broader scope One of the researchers of transitional justice searching for more inclusive ways by highlighting the importance of culture and society is Pablo de Greiff, who currently serves as a UN- rapporteur on human rights. His line of reasoning is that in order to transform post-conflict societies, changes at the level of the individual are prerequisite, and that this requires employing cultural instruments.41 Since is foundation, traditional transitional justice has left out cultural elements of its tool package.42 However, cultural manifestations have always accompanied more acknowledged forms of transitional justice. De Greiff also mentions technological innovations and changes that societies go through after a conflict and the impact of this on cultural manifestations.43 In cultural forms of transitional justice, it is wise to distinguish between state- or institution sponsored initiatives from others. Examples of the former include the documentaries made by Outreach in the name of the ICTY as part of the information provision in the former Yugoslav countries.44 Other examples are the institutionalized places of remembrance and information such as museums or memorials. These contribute to awareness and acknowledgement, but are not developed by popular initiative. The latter initiative includes local artists creating exhibitions, novels written or movies made and distributed in the public sphere. They are the contributions to public interaction without ‘suggesting that such contribution is their only function or source of value’.45 Once picked up by the media or ,

39 Obradovic-Wochnick, ‘The ”Silent Dilemma” of International Justice’, 332. 40 Barbour, ‘Making Justice Visible: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Domestic War Crimes Trials Outreach’, 95. 41 Pablo de Greiff, ‘On Making the Invisible Visible: The Role of Cultural Interventions in Transitional Justice Processes’ in Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach ed. Clara Ramírez-Barat (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014): 14. 42 Ibid., 13. 43 Ibid., 12. 44 ICTY, ‘Outreach Programme’, n.d., accessed 30 March 2018. http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-programme. 45 De Greiff, ‘On Making the Invisible Visible’, 16.

12 cultural manifestations have the power to reach a great audience and generate attention, something the ICTY for example did not achieve. Not only do cultural expressions reflect opinions or shared values from a societal perspective, they can produce new opinions, generate discussions and promote reconciliation, just as well as state- or institution-sponsored interventions).46 Cultural transitional justice can also contribute to the visibility of victims and raise empathy. This visibility through cultural means could also be an effective answer to denial. However, this can only be done once institutional changes have been made (protection of citizen rights, guarantee of independent media and freedom of opinion).47 Research into cultural manifestations of transitional justice has been limited, and has been mostly focused on the visual art and media. This focus has been on transitional justice in the cultural sphere in South Africa48 and more general works on literature and film.49 It has not yet been extended to music, let alone the Eurovision Song Contest, although music, as well as the Eurovision, is known to play an important role in nation-building, or in what some have called ‘banal nationalism’50. Especially the Eurovision Song Contest is a well-fitting example of banal nationalism, which can best be described as everyday representations that (not always deliberately) support the existence of the nation-state and make citizens aware of belonging to that nation-state.51 But the contest can also be conceived as more than that: as an active promotion of nationalism by states on stage; overt nationalism. The latter is inherent to international events where countries compete, since the whole nation is represented by a group (or person) that is then reduced to his or her nationality (besides whatever it is doing in the context of the event). The contestant becomes an embodiment of the nation; when he, she or they win, the nation-

46 Clara Ramirez Barat, ‘Transitional Justice in the Public Sphere’, in Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach Clara Ramírez-Barat ed.(New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014): 34. 47 Ibid., 36. 48 Eduardo Gonzalez Cueva and M. Florencia Librizzi ‘Photography and Transitional Justice: Evidence, Postcard, Placard, Token of Absence’ in Clara Ramírez-Barat ed. Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014). 49 Nadia Siddiqui and Hjalmar Jorge Joffre-Eichhorn, ‘From Tears to Energy: Early Uses of Participatory Theater in Afghanistan’ in Clara Ramírez-Barat ed. Transitional Justice, Culture and Society: Beyond Outreach (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014). 50 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 51 Ibid., 13.

13 state wins. This aspect of nation-building comes close to or can overlap with aspects of transitional justice such as the desire for acknowledgement or the desire to ‘move on’. Eurovision provides a stage where messages can receive attention, including messages regarding former conflicts. It is also a place where countries are in contact with each other and forced to acknowledge each other in a setting where every participating country has an equal opportunity. Following performances come the votes, that can reflect relations between countries. The political side of the Eurovision Song Contest can be connected to certain aspects of restorative justice, such as searching for acknowledgement, looking forward, decollectivizing victimhood and guilt, and shaping perceptions of former enemies.

14 2. The Eurovision Song Contest

2.1 The beginning: dreaming of unity In 1954, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was given the task to develop and promote pan-European television.52 Television had just been introduced in households and it would not be long before most would have one (in 1966 already more than seventy-five percent of the households had a television).53 Marcel Bezençon, the president of the EBU, drew inspiration from the Italian San Remo Festival, a yearly song competition founded a few years before.54 He was an acquaintance (and admirer) of Jean Monnet, commonly known as one of the founding fathers of European integration.55 Two goals were set for the EBU: to manifest the EBU as a determining medium in television broadcasting and to create unity and ‘European’ identity. The idea was to have a mixture of the successes of San Remo and sports games on European level. Bezençon believed a festival centered around music could create unity in (Western) Europe that had for centuries been divided by wars and conflict.56 Two years later, the 24th of May 1956, the contest became reality. The Grand Prix Eurovision de la Chanson Européenne, as it was initially called, was organized in , . A location not only chosen because of Bezençon’s Swiss background, but also to prevent inevitable scuffling between the participating countries without a history of centuries of neutrality57. Seven states took part in the first contest and could all perform two songs. Seven states: Switzerland, the Netherlands, , Luxembourg, , and Germany, fourteen songs and only one place to reach: first - there was no second or third place. Switzerland won, not unexpectedly, since for some reason the Luxembourg jury was made up of two Swiss.58 It was a work in progress, but looked like a success. It was the first yearly returning event, apart from the European broadcast of the flower parade in Monaco, that aired all over Europe simultaneously.59

52 Geert Willem, Douze Points, Twelve Points (Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Unieboek, 2014) p. 17 53 Ger Sleijpen, ’60 jaar televisie in Nederland’, 2008, https://www.cbs.nl/nl- nl/nieuws/2008/49/60-jaar-televisie-in-nederland, (retrieved 25 March 2018). 54 John Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest (London: Carlton Books Limited, 2005): 8. 55 Willems, Douze Points, Twelve Points, 17. 56 Ibid., 18. 57 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 10. 58 Ibid., 7. 59 Ibid., 23.

15 From 1956, the Eurovision Song Contest has evolved one final with seven participants to the division of the program into the finals and semi-finals in which the participants compete for a place in the finals, of which there are 26 available. Participation is not limited to the borders of the European continent, but to the borders of the EBU, which are set by the International Telecommunication Union60. In order to be a member of the latter, a state needs to be recognized by the United Nations as an autonomous state. In the case of Kosovo, this has been problematic, because it has not been recognized as an official state by several European countries, amongst which Serbia. Kosovo has never participated in the Eurovision since its independence, although it wants to.61 The EBU borders and its non-confinement to the European continental borders explains the odd ones out at the competition like Israel (participating since 1973), Australia (since 2015) and Morocco (once, 1980). One thing that has not changed since the beginning is that participation is a matter of prestige as well as felt to be tantamount to inclusion to the European community.

2.2 A dream come true? The year that exemplifies the role of the Eurovision Song Contest in the development of Europe very well is 1990. The festival was hugely popular amongst the participating countries, and although televoting had not yet been introduced, popular engagement with the festival was significant. More and more countries had joined every year. More members required more rules, such as the length of a song, the number of composers and the nationality of the performers.62 In 1989, the Contest was won by Yugoslavia with what by some is called the worst song in Eurovision history.63 Regardless, this meant that the following year, the festival was to be held in . This was a first for , and although the Eurovision had travelled outside of Western-Europe (to Israel in 1979), most Eastern-European countries were until a year before still under the yoke of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Yugoslavia, that took part since 1961.64

60 Willems, Douze Points, Twelve Points, 21. 61 Ibid., 45. 62 Chris West, Eurovision!, 159 63 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 120. Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Eurovision 1989 Yugoslavia - Riva - Rock me’, filmed May 1989, YouTube video, 4:45, posted July 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_IJ3ukzLQp4 64 Ibid., 19.

16 1990, Yugoslavia, all around Eastern Europe protests were still raging, the Soviet empire was crumbling down, it had been half a year since the wall was torn down. Out of the twenty-two countries participating, six songs referred to European unity, the Wall and the end of the Cold War.65 The winning song ‘Insieme: 1992’ by representing Italy, advocates unity in Europe (even in English) as the lyrics go: ‘Insieme, unite, unite, Europe’.66 If the fall of the wall exemplified the end of the division of Europe, the Eurovision Song Contest in the following year made sure everyone got the message. The festival bursted from optimism, which was transferred to the living rooms in both east and west. A festival about music did not mean that repressive regimes immediately put down their arms and that Europe joined in a continental group hug, but it did have an influence on the general atmosphere over Europe. There was a sense of optimism, and it was at an optimum in these years.67 After 1990, the former Soviet states were eager to join, and to win. As always, to win means to organize the next festival and this is the perfect opportunity to show the rest of the world how far a country has progressed, even though the costs of organizing a festival are incredibly high. The Eurovision Song Contest in 1990 cost approximately six million euro, which was considered a large amount of money.68 Being a host meant not only to show how a state made progress, but also to show how well that progress fit in the European ideal of a modern state. For public broadcasts, these amounts of money are not so eagy to raise. There have been near bankruptcies because of the organizing the contest.69 Not only the organization, taking part is also very costly, and has withheld several countries from participating, such as Yugoslavia and later Bosnia and Herzegovina.70 On numerous occasions, the hosting country won a second time, but was unable to organize the festival for a second year in a row because of budgetary reasons, such as the Netherlands in 1959.71

65 Italy with ‘Insieme: 1992’, Ireland with ‘Somewhere in Europe’, with ‘Give a little love back to the world’, Germany with ‘’, Norway with ‘Brandenburger Tor’ and with ‘’. 66 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Insieme 1992 - Italy 1990 - Eurovision songs with live orchestra’, filmed May 1990, YouTube video, 3:24, posted February 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0b5whZydVZc 67 Karen Fricker and Milija Gluhovic, Performing the ‘New’ Europe, Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 21. 68 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 123. 69 Ireland for example, but also Ukraine struggled to finance hosting the event. 70 Willems, Douze Points, Twelve Points, 17. 71 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 15.

17 Regardless of the financial aspect, both hosting and taking part are a matter of great prestige, image-building and Europeanness, research has shown.72 In this regard, by seeing unity post-1989 as a sense of belonging to Europe, the Eurovision Song Contest serves its original purpose. It is a unique phenomenon that, with a few ups and downs, the EBU managed to have the majority of in the member-states tuned to the Eurovision.

2.3 The political side of the Eurovision Before 2004, winners were chosen by juries, each jury existing of five members.73 Before, votes were given by juries. The points distribution was the same as with televoting: countries cannot vote for themselves; the favorite entry gets twelve points, the second favorite ten points, the third eight and then from eight to one to the favorites in line. The votes of a jury of experts are likely to differ from votes from viewers. A professional jury will give a more professional opinion than the average family on the couch. The differences between jury and popular votes is often well seen in the announcements of the votes. In 2017 these were done separately: a new voting system was introduced, or rather an updated one, in which first the jury votes were announced in the traditional way of every country giving out its points. This showed the clear deviations between the two.74 In 1995 (before the influx of Eastern European states), the sociologist Gad Yair identified several voting blocs, such as a Scandinavian one, a Mediterranean one and more. These were based on different sentiments, not necessarily all political, but also linguistic and cultural. He notes that with most international mega events, winning is based on being the best. However, this is impossible in the case of transnational music, since musical taste is so culturally bound. The quality of music has no clear criteria (there are indicators, but no real objective criteria), so it remains a matter of (national or regional) taste. Songs and voting represent national taste in music. Even preferences in rhythm and such are culturally

72 Cornel Sandvoss, ‘On the Couch with Europe: The Eurovision Song Contest, the European Broadcast Union and Belonging on the Old Continent’, Popular Communication 6, no. 3 (2008), 198. 73 EBU/Eurovision, Public Rules of the 60th Eurovision Song Contest, 2015,https://web.archive.org/web/20150430201605/http://www.eurovision.tv/upload/pres s-downloads/2015/2014-09-02_2015_ESC_rules_EN_PUBLIC_RULES.pdf (retrieved 5 May 2018). 74 See for example: https://eurovisionworld.com/eurovision/2017 in comparison to https://eurovisionworld.com/eurovision/2006.

18 determined: ‘The evaluation of foreign songs is dependent on a cultural match between the evaluator and the evaluated’.75 Although it is a common outcry of frustration by participating countries that do not seem to do well in the contest – think of Terry Wogan, the British Eurovision-commentator who quit presenting the show after years of loyal service out of frustration of the lack of British victory for years, that was according to Wogan causally related to voting blocs in the rest of Europe – voting is not only political. Eurovision specialist Sietse Bakker argues that many elements determine voting behavior, there is cultural recognition, language preference, personal taste and of course the quality of the song.76 A really good song will transcend other voting variables. Opinions on the political side of the Eurovision seem to be myriad, yet what exactly is considered as political voting is rarely spelled out. Bloc voting is often seen as synonymous to political voting, an assumption that is not entirely correct. Simply put, one could argue political voting is that the choice of who to vote for is based on political preferences or standpoints. This means that when Ukraine would release a song on the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 1944 in the midst of the actual Russian annexation of the , and it is then voted for by many of the other participating countries, this would be political voting, because that vote is based on solidarity for political reasons (in 2016). A similar situation was the increase in votes for an openly transvestite performance, when the climate for gay rights seems to be deteriorating in other European countries (in 2015). Or the obvious decrease in votes between Great Britain and Ireland in the times of The Troubles.77 These are the type of votes that are political. Bloc voting, however, rarely ever is political. Instead it is cultural or linguistic, studies have shown.78 What is commonly called political voting actually is cultural voting, a term that has less of a sting to it and is far less controversial.79 Cultural voting can be explained by overlapping or transcending cultural habits, especially related to musical traditions or language. Shared conceptions of taste and style can transcend borders resulting in overlap amongst

75 Gad Yair, ‘”Unite, Unite Europe”. The Political and Cultural Structures of Europe as Reflected in the Eurovision Song Contest’ Elsevier 17, no. 2 (1995), 150. 76 Lucy Westcott, ‘Your Guide to The Politics of the Eurovision Song Contest’, The Atlantic, May 6 , 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/05/your-guide-to- the-politics-of-the-eurovision-song-contest/361707/ (retrieved 21 February 2018). 77 The Troubles is the name for two phases in 20th century Ireland revolving around the very violent conflict, by some qualified as a civil war, in Northern Ireland and Ireland. 78 Yair, ‘”Unite, Unite Europe’’. The Political and Cultural Structures of Europe as Reflected in the Eurovision Song Contest’, 152. 79 Victor Ginsburgh and Abdul G. Noury, ‘The Eurovision Song Contest. Is Voting Political or Cultural?’, Elsevier 24, no. 1 (March 2008), 44.

19 neighboring countries, that leads to bloc voting. I will go into this more when discussing the case of the Balkan countries and the so-called Balkan bloc. For now, what suffices is that political voting is not to be confused with bloc voting. Both might be considered as solidarity voting, but they are different forms.80 Not only responses (voting) can be political, submissions can be as well. The Eurovision has influenced national policies and political discourse.81 It has become an arena for ‘soft power’.82 Governments are not the organizers, national broadcasters are, and these are often under influence of more politically aimed institutions. Contestants are in their way ambassadors ‘behind whom stand not only backing groups and cliché set designs, but also ministers of culture, flags, prisons, border guards and armies’,83 especially when countries are determined to prove or showcase themselves as newly (or re-)established nations and to boost their images on the continent.84 There are guidelines for the level of politics in participation. The Reference Group – the executive expert committee on behalf of all Participating Broadcaster85 sees to that the EBU guidelines are followed. The executive supervisor of the organizing year has the last call on whether a song is eligible for participation, after it has been approved by a national board.86 An example of national political screening is the case of Italy in 1974 that would take part with a song called ‘Si’. However, in the upcoming weeks a referendum would take place in Italy and although the lyrics of the song had nothing to do with the referendum, the Italian broadcaster of the Eurovision, the RAI, was afraid it might influence the outcome of the referendum.87 In

80 Ibid., 44. 81 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between’, 40. 82 Frances Robinson, ‘13 times Eurovision got super political’, Politico, 3 May, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/13-times-eurovision-song-contest-got-political/ (retrieved 30 March 2018). 83 Stephen Coleman, ‘Why is the Eurovision Song Contest Ridiculous? Exploring a Spectacle of Embarrassment, Irony and Identity, The International Journal of Media and Culture 6, no 3 (2008): 132. 84 Westcott, ‘Your Guide to the Politics of the Eurovision Song Contest’. 85 The main rule is: The lyrics and/or performances of the songs shall not bring the Shows, the ESC as such or the EBU into disrepute. No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar nature shall be permitted during the ESC. No swearing or other unacceptable language shall be allowed in the lyrics or in the performances of the songs. Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Reference Group’, n.d., https://eurovision.tv/about/organisers/reference-group/ (retrieved 17 April 2018). 86 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Rules’, n.d., https://eurovision.tv/about/rules (retrieved 17 April 2018). 87 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 59.

20 the end, the song was allowed to participate but it was not broadcast in Italy until after the referendum. In the case of Georgia in 2009, the Reference Group had to intervene. It was the year after Russia had invaded South-Ossetia preceded by a protracted conflict in the region between the Georgian government and the people of Ossetia. The Georgian entry was the song ‘We Don’t Wanna Put In’ by Stephane & 3G and contained the lyrics: We don't wanna put in / the negative move / It's killin' the groove88, which sounds, once sung, a lot like ‘we don’t want Putin’, a reference to the Russian president. This is, according to an official statement by the EBU, a violation of the Eurovision policies. A spokesman declared: ‘No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar nature shall be permitted.’89 Georgia was given the choice to either rewrite the song, to withdraw or to be disqualified for the contest, which was coincidentally held in Russia that year. The country withdrew; another clear political message to Russia. There are countless examples of the political aspects of the Eurovision and the way the participating countries use the mega event to pursue their political agendas. From Turkey, first trying to seem more European by participating in the contest, ‘promoting Turkey’s European credentials’ to its refusal to take part anymore (but instead organizing Turkvision, a song contest for Turkish speaking or ethnically Turkish countries and regions) to Germany’s slogan (‘Feel Your Heartbeat’) when it was hosting the Eurovision Song Contest in 2011 – a small reminder as to who forms the heart (read: the driving force) of Europe.90 Countries trying to come across as more European is one of the most important aspects of the Eurovision that scholars have researched in the past years. Especially since the fall of the curtain, Europe suddenly grew with newly independent countries that aimed westward instead of east. In this context, the Eurovision Song Contest is just like any other mega event with a culture of hegemony in different fields, political economical or cultural. 91 In the case of Eurovision, the hegemonic powers are centered in Western Europe, the countries

88 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘We Don't Wanna Put In - Eurovision Song Contest 2009’, filmed May 2009, YouTube video, 3:11, posted September 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5P6-7Rw4xug. 89 BBC, ‘Eurovision axes ‘anti-Putin’ song’, n.d., BBC, 10 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/7935865.stm (retrieved 10 April 2018). 90 Westcott, ‘Your Guide to the Politics of the Eurovision Song Contest. 91 Mega events are places where ‘national identity branding’ is used to promote countries. One of the most important elements of national identity branding is culture, according to Simon Anholt. Simon Anholt, Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 1.

21 whose integration has been accomplished. These are the same countries that do not care much for the Eurovision as a tool to prove or showcase themselves.92 This hegemony makes winning more than a prestigious accomplishment, it is paired with a sense of belonging and acceptance for the non-hegemonic participants. 93 When won in the contest in 2001, it was perceived as a step into the direction of European integration and membership of the EU.94 The prime minister proudly proclaimed: ‘We are no longer knocking at Europe’s door. We are walking through it singing’.95 ‘Newly Europeanizing states’96 project an image on stage of how they wish to be seen by the rest of Europe, and through this (re)construct a sense of the self.97 In 1979, Turkey had to withdraw because of the oil crisis in the Middle East and the increasing tensions in the Region. The following year, it joined again with a song called ‘Pet’r Oil’, a love song about a man that goes by that name, but when combining the words, it becomes a love to Petroil, as an assertion that Turkey would remain a player in the field.98 The contest is thus often used to convey a message about the participating countries. These messages are predominantly about the nation itself (Turkey, Estonia), but can also be directed at others (Georgia), albeit indirectly (the rules still apply). The examples of Ukraine and Armenia embody every aspect of political connotations in the Eurovision, from nation- branding to history-sharing.

2.4 The case of Ukraine – Russia Goodbye! Political connotations in abundance, but there is one participant that embodies all the political aspects of the Eurovision: Ukraine. Joining for the first time in 2003, it has been eager to win

92 Ivan Raykoff, ‘Camping on the Borders of Europe’, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politicsin the Eurovision Song Contest, I. Raykoff & D. Tobin ed. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 7. 93 Coleman, Why is the Eurovision Song Contest Ridiculous?’, 133. 94 Irving Wolther, ‘More than Just Music: the Seven Dimensions of the Eurovision Song Contest’, Popular Music 31, no. 1 (January 2012): 167. 95 Joel Vessels, ‘The Congress of Eurovision: Building European Community One Bricolage at a Time’, E-International Relations, 8 May 2015, https://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/08/the- congress-of-eurovision-building-european-community-one-bricolage-at-a-time/ (retrieved at 1 April 2018). 96 Shannon Jones and Jelena Subotic, ‘Fantasies of Power: Performing Europeanization on the European Periphery’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 14, no. 5 (October 2011): 544. 97 Ibid., 550.c 98 O’Conner, 1980.

22 and prove itself as an independent nation.99 It won the second time participating with ‘’ by , a ‘breaking free’ song referring back to Hutsul folklore by the costumes and the instruments to emphasize the return to the before Russian and Soviet intervention.100 The song (and its energetic performance) symbolized the revival of the nation Ukraine.101 ‘Wild Dances’ scored high in charts all over Europe – even Western Europe – which is not so common for Eastern European musicians and put Ukraine on the map of Europe. It changed the Eurovision entries from Eastern Europe in the following years: more countries sang in their own language, political themes became more present just as pre-Soviet folklore.102

Figure 1. Ruslana performs ‘Wild Dances’ in the 2004 Eurovision.103

99 Dean Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018): 21. 100 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Ruslana - Wild Dances (Ukraine) - LIVE - 2004 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2004, YouTube video, 3:16, posted October 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10XR67NQcAc. 101 Ibid,. 102 Catherine Baker, ‘Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and National Identity at the Eurovsion Song Contest’, Popular Communication 6, no. 3 (2008): 177. 103 Image source: http://versuri-in-romana.blogspot.com/2015/10/ruslana-wild-dances- versuri.html

23 The following year, Ukraine took part with the song ‘, nas ne podolaty’ meaning: ‘Together we are many, we cannot be defeated’ by the band Greenjolly.104 The song was a direct protest to the 2004 elections in Ukraine that were the reason for the that took place. It later became the official for it.105 In 2007, Ukraine sent , a man dressed as a woman, with the song ‘Dancing Lasha Tumbai’. It is by far one of the most peculiar submissions for the Eurovision ever.106 Some critics have said it was ‘very end of history’ because of the outfits (more 80s futuristic than realistic), the suggestive dancing, the unusual beat and the combination of Russian, German and English lyrics.107

Figure 2. Verka Serduchka performing ‘Dancing Lasha Tumbai’, 2007.108

104 Alyona Zhuk, ‘What happened to Orange Revolution band Greenjolly?’ Post, 23 November 2011, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/guide/music/what-happened-to-orange- revolution-band-greenjolly-117460.html (retrieved 20 February 2018). Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Greenjolly - Razom Nas Bahato (Ukraine) Live - Eurovision Song Contest 2005’, filmed May 2005, YouTube video, 3:01, posted December 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5u6J_mbhLU. 105 Zhuk, ‘What happened to Orange Revolution band Greenjolly?’ 106 Verka Serduchka (Andriy Danylko) is dressed in all silver with a silver cross on her head and the number 69 on her back. The dancing is an eclectic mix of some sort of robot dance and folklore, just as the song itself, that features four languages. The lyrics come down to: Hello everybody! /My name is Verka Serduchka / Me English nicht verstehen! / Let's speak DANCE! / Sieben, Sieben / Ai lyu lyu and so on, accompanied by a Balkan beat.

Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Verka Serduchka - Dancing Lasha Tumbai (Ukraine) 2007 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2007, YouTube video, 3:12, posted January 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfjHJneVonE. 107 Dean Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 54. 108 Image retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/music/artists/10f87b54-0e95-4268-9857- e2660367c305.

24

Where it becomes political is that supposedly ‘Lasha Tumbai’ is Mongolian for cream or whipped milk. This turned out to be not true at all, as there are no such words in Mongolian. It fueled the assumption that originally Lasha Tumbai was supposed to be ‘Russia Goodbye’, as Verka Serduchka had sung it previously when performing the song in Ukraine.109 The rhyming connotation is not difficult to hear once listening. It is also not particularly surprising in the context of the aftermath of the Orange revolution, where one side in the conflict was pro- Russian, while the other side wanted to face the other direction: towards Europe. The song ended second, losing out to Serbia’s entry to the Eurovision (later more about this). The political controversy around ‘Dancing Lasha Tumbai’ might not necessarily have been the immediate reason for the amount of votes the song received, since the performance overall is quite unique, but it certainly played a role. In 2016, the Tatar Ukrainian singer performed ‘1994’ for Ukraine.110 The song is about the Soviet deportation of in 1944 and a direct analogy to the occupation of the Crimea by Russia in 2016. While being obviously anti-Russian, it is also clearly pro- Ukrainian. The vocal style is Mugham, a folklore singing style of Arabic descent but also popular in the Eastern regions of Europe. The same goes for the instrument used, a , a traditional folklore instrument in Tatar culture. It was also the first song in the Eurovision ever to use the (the use of dialects is not particular popular in the Eurovision). The song lyrics form an analogy and do not directly address the Crimean occupation, so accusations of political lyrics could be avoided, but at the same time, it was clear what the song was really about.111 The song sparked great controversy, especially in Russia, where a campaign was started to prevent the song from partaking in the Eurovision.112 In vain, because Jamala’s song came, saw and conquered. The song broke the Eurovision’s record for most points given to one

109 Robinson, ‘13 times Eurovision got super political’. 110 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘LIVE - Jamala - 1944 (Ukraine) at the Grand Final of the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2016, YouTube video, 3:17, posted May 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-rnM-MwRHY. 111 Tara John, ‘The Dark History Behind Eurovision’s Ukraine Entry’, Time, 13 May 2016, http://time.com/4329061/eurovision-jamala-russian-ukraine-crimea/ (retrieved 30 March 2018). 112 Heidi Stephens, ‘Eurovision 2016: Ukraine’s Jamala wins with politically charged 1944’, The Guardian, 15 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and- radio/2016/may/14/ukraine-wins-eurovision-jamala-1944 (retrieved 30 March 2018).

25 song.113 For this song the voting depended on the political context: public opinion was anti- Russia and pro-Ukraine. The song tied in perfectly, and apart from the vocal style was striking and the performance was convincing. Still, what really stood out was the obvious political message. These Ukrainian entries reflected the political development in the country. What these examples also show is that a political element to an entry generates controversy, which in turn creates attention. It has served more than one purpose: to win the contest or score high, but also to transfer a political message to the rest of Europe.

2.5 Armenia – The struggle for recognition In 2015, hundred years after the Armenian Genocide, Armenia participated in the Eurovision Song Contest with ‘’ by the group Genealogy. The song and the controversy around it exemplify the political agenda in the context of genocide. The Armenian Genocide, taking place in 1914 and 1915 on both sides of the borders of the Ottoman Empire, was aimed at the Armenian communities, who were deemed a threat by the regime of the Young Turks. Between 1 and 1,5 million were killed.114 The Armenian Genocide is seen as the first modern genocide, and although studied intensively, it is still denied by the perpetrator. Turkey instead speaks of a massacre against a real threat by the Armenians, of 300,000 to 500,000 victims and denies intent (the most important aspect of whether mass killings can be considered a genocide).115 The Turkish systematic denial (even legally stipulated in Article 301 of its Criminal Code116) has had its influence on the response of other states to what Turkey refers to as ‘the Armenian question’. While in some states, denial of the Armenian Genocide is criminalized, other states have withheld from labelling the events as a genocide. Ever since, Armenia has attempted to get acknowledgement of the genocide, especially from Turkey. So when in 2015, Armenia had to remember a genocide that is still being denied, the country brought it to the arena of the Eurovision Song Contest.

113 Eurovision, ‘Ukraine wins the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest’, Eurovision.tv, 15 May 2016, http://www.eurovision.tv/page/news?id=ukraine_wins_2016_eurovision_song_contest (retrieved 30 March 2018). 114 Donald Bloxham, ‘Cumulative Radicalization and the Armenian Genocide’ in Genocide: A Reader, J. Meierhenrich ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 54. 115 Ibid., 55. 116 Roger W. Smith, ‘How Does One Address the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and Modern Denial?’, Genocide Studies International 10, no.1 (2016): 104.

26 In the band formed for the occasion, five members represented the Armenian diaspora over the five continents where they had left to and settled after the events of 1914-15. The sixth member was an Armenian singer, representing Armenia as the heart of the diaspora117. The five ‘arms of diaspora’ formed the petals of a forget-me-not flower, the official symbol for the Genocide centennial, with (the singer representing) Armenia in the heart of the flower. 118 Reportedly (but not confirmed), the members of Genealogy were all descendants of survivors of the genocide.119

Figure 3. Genealogy during their performance in the 2015 Eurovision Song Contest.120

Already timing (the centennial) and the structure of group were highly politicized in a competition that does not permit political manifestations. Originally the song was called ‘Don’t Deny’, but after repeated objections by Turkey (which did not even participate), the Reference Group overlooking the applications said it could not accept the song under that title. Armenia protested, proclaiming the song was about ‘peace, unity and tolerance’, which is definitely not

117 Eurasianet 118 Smith, ‘How Does One Address the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and Modern Denial?’, 110. 119 Giorgi Lomsadze, ‘Armenia Takes Genocide-Recognition to Eurovision’, Eurasianet, 13 March 2015, https://eurasianet.org/node/72516, (retrieved 2 April 2018). 120 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Genealogy - Face The Shadow (Armenia) - LIVE at Eurovision 2015 Grand Final’, filmed May 2015, YouTube video, 3:08, posted May 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6O8pr7HH94.

27 a lie, but the implicit meaning went beyond that.121 Not only Turkey complained, also neighboring country Azerbaijan – another vivid denier of the genocide and in a state of almost permanent conflict with Armenia, and a participant in the Eurovision – spoke out harshly against the song and the Armenian intention to perform it. 122 Ever since the Armenian-Azerbaijani War from 1918 to 1920, the relation between the two countries has been tense. Several times war has erupted evolving around territorial disagreement. This has resulted in complicated diplomatic relations, which are reflected in the way countries behave towards each other in Eurovision. In 2009, Azerbaijani secret services even interrogated the (total of) 43 Azerbaijanis that had voted for Armenia in the contest. They had to justify their votes and (re)affirm allegiance to Azerbaijan. It was in the same year that Azerbaijan distorted the satellite signal for household televisions, blurring out the telephone number with which viewers could vote for Armenia. In the same year, the issue arose in the composition of the videos that are shown by means of introduction for every contestant. Because the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a territorial dispute, the countries disagree in which part of the land belongs to which country. In the introductory videos, Armenia showed landmarks that Azerbaijan claims are on Azerbaijani territory. 123 Following the insistence of the Reference Group, Armenia changed the title of the song to ‘Face the Shadow’. The lyrics remained the same and consisted of the following lines: ‘Face every shadow you denied / Feels like so many times life was unfair’, ‘Don’t deny / Ever don’t deny / Baby don’t deny / You and I’ and ‘Face every shadow purified’.124 As a mantra, the chorus echoes and repeats: don’t deny. It could very well be a song about how you should listen to your heart, but with the history of the genocide and the ongoing demand for recognition in the back of your mind, it becomes difficult to deny what this song addresses.

121 Eurovision, ‘Armenia to be represented by Genealogy!’, Eurovision.tv, 11 February 2015, http://www.eurovision.tv/page/news?id=armenia_to_be_represented_by_genealogy (retrieved 2 April 2018). 122 Bryon Bradley, ‘Can Eurovision Succeed Where Diplomacy Has Failed?’ Ararat, 18 March 2011, http://araratmagazine.org/2011/05/can-eurovision-succeed-where-diplomacy-has- failed/ (retrieved 29 March 2018). 123 Rupen Janbazian, ‘Azerbaijan Accuses Armenian, French Eurovision Entries of Being Political’, The Armenian Weekly, 20 February 2015, https://armenianweekly.com/2015/02/20/eurovision-2015/ (retrieved 30 March 2018). 124 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Genealogy - Face The Shadow (Armenia) - LIVE at Eurovision 2015 Grand Final’, filmed May 2015, YouTube video, 3:08, posted May 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6O8pr7HH94.

28 It was not the first Armenian song that was drenched with symbolism: in 2010, performed ‘’, another song referring to the diaspora. An apricot stone is the seed of an apricot, a symbol not only representing rebirth, but also Armenia itself. Apricots are the national fruit; one of the marketing slogans for tourism is ‘Armenia: the motherland of the apricot’. The song ‘Apricot Stone’ albeit less explicit than ‘Face the Shadows’ also refers to the genocide and the revival of Armenia afterwards.125 Back to 2015, the song and setting of ‘Face the shadow’ are referring to genocide, and the video of the song clearly is as well. We see a traditional Armenian family posing for a sepia photograph, set roughly between 1900 and 1920. With every photograph taken, the family becomes smaller as members disappear, with the young men first disappearing, then the older ones, leaving the women and children behind. It is in the same order people disappear in genocides. The women and children disappear as well, leaving the set empty but for the chairs they sat on. In the end, the seats are taken by the singers, supposedly the descendants of survivors.126 In the same year, France participated with a similar song called ‘N’oubliez Pas’, a song that commemorated the First World War quite literally translated as ‘don’t forget’. 127 About this song it was said as well that it referred to the Armenian Genocide. Perhaps because of the centennial year, but others claimed it was about the First World War. The lyrics are so generic they could refer to any war, but and this controversy around ‘N’oubliez Pas’ was nowhere near the controversy around the Armenian entry. Armenia’s positioning in the Eurovision Song Contest is noteworthy, because it has an explicit political agenda, for which it uses the European stage. That political historical agenda concerns the consistent denial of the Armenian Genocide. It illustrates how international relations are brought onto the stage and how genocide becomes a part of a cultural manifestation that officially is without political attitudes. It sends a strong message about what Armenia expects from the rest of Europe: acknowledging the Armenian Genocide.

125 Gayane Abrahamyan, ‘Conspiracy theory in Eurovision: Turkey claims genocide hint in Armenia’s ’, Armenianow.com, 17 February 2010, https://www.armenianow.com/arts/20973/armenia_eurovision_song_apricot_stone_genoci de_turkey (retrieved 4 April 2018). 126 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Genealogy - Face The Shadow (Armenia) 2015 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed March 2015, YouTube video, 3:04, posted March 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVVvgD0-Mu0. 127 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘ - N'oubliez pas (France) 2015 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2015, YouTube video, 3:09, posted May 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJful-Jtc9o.

29 Armenia debuted in 2006. From 2006 to 2012, both (the main) parties to the genocide took part in the Eurovision Song Contest. (See Appendix A for a complete table of the votes.) Azerbaijan is included here because of its ongoing conflict with Armenia, which has resulted in Armenia’s withdrawal in 2012, when the event was hosted in Baku after Azerbaijani victory in 2011, as well as for comparison for regional voting between Turkey and Azerbaijan. When looking at the voting outcomes, it becomes clear the relationship is still strained between Turkey and Armenia. However, the years that they both took part are limited to six, so whether anything determinative can be said is yet the question. Voting from Armenia to both Turkey and Azerbaijan is limited to little or no points. The other way around, the Turkish votes to Armenia deviate in amount but are substantially higher. One explanation for this could be in the Armenian diaspora that is still present in Turkey. Another explanation could be that for Turkey the issue is less pressing than for Armenia. The fight for recognition is a priority in the state where the genocide took place, but for the persevering denier, this is of less importance.128

Figure 4. Voting amongst Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2010.129 It was the year in which Turkey ended second place and Azerbaijan fifth. This is not reflected in Armenia’s points given to both countries at all.130

128 Smith, ‘How Does One Address the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and Modern Denial?’, 105. 129 Original image: Wikimedia Commons. For a more elaborate table on the voting between the countries, see Appendix A. 130 For the idea of making these maps, I would like to thank my supervisor Karel Berkhoff. For giving me the freedom to pursue my own fields of interest, the helpful guidance and a critical yet supportive view, many thanks.

30

The case of Armenia in the Eurovision and their distribution of votes shows a pattern of how conflicts between countries are reflected in voting behavior. The Armenian struggle for recognition continues on the stage of the Eurovision, not only by presenting songs that address it, but also by consistently abstaining from voting for the country it sees as perpetrator, which goes against the general pattern of countries with similar cultural preferences and often proximate geographical locations voting for each other.131 The Armenian nation, that sees itself as a victim still denied victimhood, fights for that right on the international stage of the Eurovision.

131 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between’, 31.

31 3. Germany and Israel in Eurovision

3.1 (West) Germany: to perform is to progress Originated as an initiative to stabilize post-Second World War Europe, the Eurovision Song Contest reflected political, cultural and social developments, not to forget technical ones, from the start.132 It was an era with clear divisions between the victors and the defeated. The main perpetrator Germany, recently divided into East and West, struggled to reintegrate into the European arena.133 From the beginning, it was obvious that only Western Germany would participate in the Eurovision. East-Germany was under control by the Soviet Union. At the start of the Eurovision, the Holocaust was closer in time to the contest than 2018 is to 9/11.134 The first contest took place in Switzerland: the choice for a neutral country was not incidental. Organizing the event the following year upon winning was not yet an official rule. The second year, in 1957, the contest took place in Frankfurt, where West-Germany did its best to show how it had evolved. But let us first go back to the year it all began. Germany struggled with its legacy and how to represent itself in the Eurovision. This was contrary to Italy, that was able to remodel itself by referring to pre-fascist Italian culture.135 West Germany was represented by (b. 1931) and (1913- 1992), who ‘were the faces of German innocence’136. Quinn sang ‘’ (That’s How It is Every Night), a light-hearted song about a loose girl, stripped of any reference to the past. Even the boogie-woogie style of the song is without any reference to traditional German musical styles. Every aspect of the performance symbolized progression, addressing the ‘burdens and the freedoms’ of the free West. 137 It also symbolized a definite turn towards the West, with an American style song with American names (like Freddy’s). The song symbolized the definitive focus on the renewal of West German national identity. It was emphasized even more by having Walter Andreas Schwarz perform before Quinn. Schwarz was a musician who was rejected from the academy during the Nazi era because of his Jewish heritage. He was sent to a concentration camp in 1938. His song ‘Im Wartesaal zum großen Glück’ (In The Waiting Room For Great Happiness) was an encouragement to live in

132 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 8. 133 Ibid., 32. 134 West, Eurovision!, 12. 135 Jan Feddersen, Ein Lied Kann eine Brücke Sein’ (: Hoffman und Campe, 2002): 12. 136 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 17. 137 Ibid., 18.

32 the present instead of remaining stuck in the past. 138 It was another German song about the present, but with a small melancholic element used to emphasize the future. Both songs presented the new Germany, with the aim to move away from the old clichéd image of Germany as aggressive, unemotional and militaristic.139 Especially Schwarz’ song symbolized how Germany learned from the past, was now ready to move on, and not eager to look back. Neither of the songs won, and since only the winner was announced, there is no hierarchy in which it could be placed. It would be the start of the German yearly participation with many low rankings and few wins.140 The second year, the contest was organized in Frankfurt, at the time the center of German economic progress. West Germany was represented by with ‘Telefon, Telefon’ (Telephone, Telephone), a song befitting the symbolism of the progressive location: the telephone was relatively new object coming to households.141 The introduction of telephones was a transnational European experience that appealed to the audience. ‘Telefon Telefon’ was another song that celebrated progression and change. Hielscher incorporated various European languages into her song, which showed how Germany tried to be part of modern Europe. The German word for telephone was at the time ‘Fernsprecher’, but no non- German speaking country would understand that and it might have accentuated the existing stereotypes about the , so Hielscher sung about a ‘Telefon’.142

138 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘ESC 1956 04 - Germany 1 - Walter Andreas Schwarz - Im Wartesaal Zum Großen Glück’, recorded May 1956, YouTube video, 4:55, posted November 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUXVPPfVpos.

Im Wartesaal zum großen Glück / Da warten viele, viele Leute / Die warten seit gestern auf das Glück von morgen / Und leben mit Wünschen von übermorgen / Und vergessen, es ist ja noch heute / Ach, die armen, armen Leute. / Und sie glänzte weit durch die Wirklichkeit / Und es tanzten die Boote im Licht / Nur im Saal am Kai der Vergangenheit / Da sah man die Sonne nicht. 139 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 20. 140 Derek Gatherer, ‘Comparison of Eurovision Song Contest Simulation with Actual Results Reveals Shifting Patterns of Collusive Voting Alliances, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9, no. 2 (2006). 141 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘ESC 1957 07 - Germany - Margot Hielscher - Telefon, Telefon’, filmed May 1957, YouTube video, 4:06, posted November 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoDpE2LtoZA. 142 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 32.

33

Figure 5. Margot Hielscher in rehearsal in Hilversum in 1958 for her song ‘Telefon, Telefon’.143

In the following years, the German entries were all comparable to each other: neither outstanding in subjects nor in score. The songs were about love or the joys of life, which was common in the early years of the contest. They were not political, but some were less light- hearted than others. The musical styles of the German entries were modern and trendy, and – except for the German language – not typical expressions of German culture.144 The first entry that was more German than European, was ‘’ (Two Little Italians) by Conny Froboess, which – between the lines – was about progress, the Wirtschaftswunder and the changes it brought to German society, especially the new phenomenon of immigrant workers.145 A remarkable German entry was sent to participate in 1979, when the contest was hosted by Israel. Germany submitted the song ‘’ by the disco-group with the same name Dschinghis Khan, after the Mongolian leader Genghis Khan, notorious for his mass slaughters while conquering lands. It was a peculiar choice to have a song and group whose name is connotated with bloodshed and mass murder perform in the state that was found after

143 Image: Beeld en Geluidwiki - Gallery: Eurovisie Songfestival 1958, Nederlandse Televisie Stichting, https://wiki.beeldengeluid.nl/index.php/Hoofdpagina. 144 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 24. 145 Feddersen, Ein Lied Kann eine Brücke Sein’, 54.

34 one of the biggest massacres ever, mainly committed by the country that sends in such song. What, if anything, it exactly was to symbolize… nobody seems to know.

Figure 6. Dschinghis Khan performing ‘Dschinghis Khan’ in the 1979 Eurovision Song Contest in Jerusalem.146

The performance featured a glittered disco version of Genghis Khan dancing all over the stage together with the singers. It preceded the winner of that evening Israel with its song that referred to peace and Jewishness – noticeable coincidence. The possibility of a backlash because of the theme of the song was there, but it did not occur. The song was received quite well and ended fifth. What does this mean? Perhaps for that in the case Germany and its avoidance in the critical years of the topic of history, its a-political take on the contest and its overt attempt to avoid controversy have had the intended effects. Germany rarely won the contest and it never became a popular contestant, but to say this is in relation to their history is hard to say. No one has ever done research on Germany’s mediocre scoring in the Eurovision, but reasons could be linguistic (although nowadays songs from German-speaking countries are rarely in German), cultural (although most German songs transcend German national music) or ‘just’ musical (although the quality of the German entries is not better or worse than the other west-European entries). Meanwhile, every other country that has participated from the start had won at least

146 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Eurovision 1979 Germany Dschinghis Khan Dschinghis Khan HQ SUBTITLED’, filmed May 1979, YouTube video, 3:36, posted January 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAEUrp2V4ss.

35 once, except for Belgium. It would be interesting to analyze German participation in the contest more in depth. For now, it suffices to say that German entries often focused – especially in the early years of the contest – on the future and progress instead of melancholy and the past. The Eurovision was used to reshape national identity and associations with the German identity. The multilingual singing, lack of traditional German music and the choice of song subjects and lyrics are indicators for this. It becomes even more interesting when Israel joins the contest and does refer back to the history of the Holocaust.

3.2 Israeli participation – a celebration of the nation As much as Germany tried to avoid any reference to the past, Israel took a different approach when it joined in 1973. This was not surprising, as the roles to that past differed as respectively perpetrator as victims and (indirectly – not the state of Israel itself, but the people). Its most symbolic entry was in 1983, and was, like the German entry in 1979 in Jerusalem, an accumulation of location, lyrics and performers. ‘Hi’ (A transliteration of ‘Chai’ which is Hebrew for ‘alive’) was sung by Ofra Haza together with five background singers.147 The lyrics refer to a group of people that is still alive and will always re-arise ‘from generation to generation’.148 It celebrates the Israeli nation and is in itself a fine example of constructing nationalism in a song by referring to invented, supposedly age old traditions.149 However, the location is what made it historically symbolic. The previous year, 1982, Germany had (finally) won with ‘Ein Bisschen Friede’ by Nicole so it became the host of the 1983 contest. 150 The contest took place in the city of , a city loaded with the history of Nazism (the Putsch, the place where the Nazi party was founded, the proximity to Dachau) and it was in the former heart of Nazism were Ofra Haza sung about how Israel will exist forever. It was a powerful and popular performance.151

147 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Ofra Haza - Hi – Eurovision’, filmed May 1983, YouTube video, 3:19, posted March 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqPGYSWnSFg. 148 Tamar Leachtman, ‘1983 Israel’, 21 March 2010, http://www.diggiloo.net/?1983il (retrieved 15 May 2018). 149 Ani od chai, chai, chai / Am Yisra'el cha / Ze hashir sheSaba shar etmol le'Aba / Vehayom ani, which translates into: Alive, alive, alive / Yes, I’m still alive / This is the song that Grandpa sang yesterday to Dad / 150 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Nicole - Ein Bisschen Frieden (1982)’, filmed May 1982, YouTube video, 2:59, posted June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9S3YMmIFdw. 151 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Ofra Haza - Hi – Eurovision’, filmed May 1983, YouTube video, 3:19, posted March 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqPGYSWnSFg.

36 Israel’s second biggest success (after in 1998) was ‘Hallelujah’ in 1979. It was performed just after ‘Dschinghis Khan’, the West-German entry, and became an instant success. The song itself is rather simple, sung by the band called ‘Milk and Honey’ (biblical references were not uncommon for the Israeli entries: it is a part of nation branding by emphasizing the long history of the people of Israel). ‘Hallelujah’ won and gained such symbolic values for international peace that it was sung during the 1999 Eurovision by all contestants to show support to all the victims of the wars of the .152 For Israel, the contest is an important element of nation branding. In 1987, the Israeli Minister of Culture Yitzak Navon threatened to resign if the song that was chosen nationally would represent Israel in the Eurovision.153 Since its first participation in 1973, Israel has become one of the most vivid participants with three wins that all left their mark on Eurovision history. 154 For instance, the Israeli participation created a backlash amongst Arab nations that wanted to participate but withdrew their applications in protest. In 2000, Israel sent PingPong with a song about peace in the Middle-East, that was accompanied by suggestive dancing, two male performers kissing and the waving of an Israeli and a Syrian flag. The Israeli authorities protested heavily against the song, but since it is in de hands of the broadcasters, there was not much they could do about it. The Israeli state later distantiated from the song, but still let them go to the contest, but not on behalf of the Israeli people or the broadcast company.155 Why PingPong was allowed to perform in the Eurovision by the broadcaster is not known. In the contest itself, it did represent Israel, because participants can not just perform without representing a state, but Israel itself did not support the entry. Nation-branding seems inherent to the Israeli entries, together with a fair amount of controversy. The Israeli choice for the subject of peace in their songs is also remarkable. It is understandable as coming from a nation that is made up of a social group that has been haunted for years, but it is also striking given Israel’s assertive stance in the region. The exchange of votes between Germany and Israel (see appendix B) starts with the Israeli participation in 1973. Since then, Israel won three times and Germany twice. The

152 Source for translation: http://www.hebrewsongs.com/?song=haleluyah-eurovision 153 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 110. 154 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 57. 155 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Outraged Israel disowns daring Eurovision entry’, The Guardian, 12 May 2000, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/12/israel (retrieved 30 April 2018).

37 coherency amongst the voting is not to the extent that the two countries were put in the same voting bloc or group.156 More on the contrary, the awarding of points to each other is often meagre. In the two years when Israel came in first (1978 and 1979), Germany voted divergently, giving the 1978 Israeli entry 12 points, but the one the year after no points at all. There are probably plenty of reasons for the amount of votes from both countries to each other every year, but whether they have anything to do with their history is hard to say.157 It can also be related to the quality of the songs and the (better) quality of other songs. Naturally, when the place in the rankings is higher, so are the number of points given. However, in some years, this does not seem to be the case at all. Germany in 1981, came in second and received zero points from Israel’ likewise in 2010 when Germany won. No research has been done into the voting exchange between the two countries (yet), and to assign a correlation between history and voting is difficult to uphold without extensive research. Israel’s stance in the Eurovision Song Contest is often paired with references to the nation, history or religion of its people, sometimes even all three combined. It has incorporated its history into a formula of taking part in the Eurovision. By emphasizing the eternality of the Israeli people, they inherently address the attempts to dispute this eternality. Every reference to forever is also a reference to when forever was not so certain.

Figure 7. Milk and Honey performing the winning song of 1979, ‘Hallelujah’158

156 Gatherer, ‘Comparison of Eurovision Song Contest Simulation with Actual Results Reveals Shifting Patterns of Collusive Voting Alliances’, 27. 157 Cornel Sandvoss, ‘On the Couch with Europe: The Eurovision Song Contest, the European Broadcast Union and Belonging on the Old Continent’, Popular Communication 6, no. 3 (2008), 199. 158

38 3.3 A limited case study The case of Germany in the Eurovision presents some limitations as an example or study. The Holocaust was directed not to a country but to a group of peoples that were spread all over the continent. Once the war was over, there were countries that won or lost in the war, but the Jewish people were not represented by means of a country on the European continent. The same was therefore the case in the Eurovision Song Contest. The former perpetrator was present, but the main victim group was not, or only indirectly, as part of other participating nations. Only in 1973, a country representative of the main victim group of the Holocaust joined the contest, almost thirty years later. This limits the comparison in the immediate years after the war. Germany’s avoidance as a contestant in the Eurovision of its past and the focus on the future in their entries in the contest was not unique, yet it remains remarkable. It is different from the Austrian attitude, that country did not try to avoid their history in its participation of the contest. Both countries never voted very enthusiastically for each other, supposedly to avoid easily made assumptions of new alliances based on old ones, while this would be expected when looking at voting patterns amongst countries that share a language.159 Twice, Austria was represented by Israeli citizens, once in 1963 by . In the eighties, during the Waldheim affair160, Austria once again send a Jewish and half-Israeli singer to the Eurovision, a highly symbolic act. Although Austria did not avoid its history, more western-European countries sang about innovations and progress. Another limitation in this case is that televoting was introduced in 1997 and completely integrated in 2004. Before that, juries chose the winners. Jury voting less representative than direct televoting and likely to be more based on the act than on secondary factors (juries do not have to publically account for their choices). Although Germany is an interesting example on how to deal with a country’s history of aggressive warfare, it does not provide clear answers. Votes from each country to the other do not show a clear pattern, except for some outliers (see Appendix B). With regards to the songs themselves, German and Israel approach it differently, also because of their different roles in history. The image of West Germany as a modern, progressive and forward-looking country that was constructed and translated onto the stage of the Eurovision is interesting and the first (but not the last time) the Eurovision is used to shape the image of former perpetrators.

159 Sofronis Clerides and Thanasis Stengos, ‘Love Thy Neighbour, Love Thy Kin: Strategy and Bias in the Eurovision Song Contest’ Ekonomia (2006), 24. 160 The Waldheim affair concerned a former UN-diplomat and president of Austria who was accused of having lied about his role in the Second World War.

39 Meanwhile Israel has incorporated a sense of nationalism and the revival of Israel as a Jewish state. For a case of transitional justice, the case of Germany and Israel can mostly illustrate how countries (or its people) that have been through a genocide translate their former positions in a conflict onto the stage of the Eurovision Song Contest and the clear distinction between perpetrator and victim in their performances on the stage of Eurovision become visible. Like Armenia, Israel has used symbolic elements of nationalism to emphasize its own nationhood in relation to a genocide. Like other perpetrators (as will become clear later) Germany tends (or tended) to avoid references to the past, with the peculiar exception of 1979. To assign an important role to its entries nowadays would be a stretch, but in the past the echoes of history were more present on the stage of the Eurovision than now.

40 4. (The former) Yugoslavia in the Eurovision Song Contest

4.1 Before 1992: unity without victory Before the fall of the curtain, the position of Yugoslavia in the Eurovision was unique. It was the only socialist, Slavic and Eastern European country that took part. In 1948, Tito, Yugoslavia’s leader, officially broke away from the Soviet Union. From that moment, Yugoslavia found itself (quite literally) in a position between East and West, and it chose to focus West. That is why it joined the EBU when it was established in 1950, as the only Eastern European country.161 The rapprochement with the West was not only political but also cultural: once Yugoslavia joined the Eurovision in 1961, it sought to combine traditional music with a more Western European musical preference. 162 Western music boomed in Yugoslavia from the 1950s onwards, following the economic growth and the subsequent rise in consumerism: televisions, radios and record players were in high demand. This combination of Western and Eastern music was not always even successful in Eurovision, the first Yugoslav success came in 1989, but participation had great political meaning.163 In the earlier years, the Eurovision was the opportunity par excellence for Yugoslavia to present itself as modern and successful. Like the Eastern European countries after the fall of the wall, Yugoslavia used the Eurovision to show its best side to Europe, albeit not entirely its true face; artistic and political freedom were still substantially limited and some artists who openly criticized the regime were prohibited from performing.164 But the country sought to keep up with the developments in technology and music in the West through Eurovision. Especially for a country that was caught in the middle and under pressure from the Pact Countries, the Eurovision Song Contest represented the embodiment of Western (musical) culture and participation meant one step away from the East.165 As a result, the Yugoslav entries were rarely political. They were not intended to provoke, but to integrate smoothly with the other songs. Provocation would be

161 Dean Vuletic, ‘The Socialist Star: Yugoslavia’ in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, Y. Raykoff and R. D. Tobin ed. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2007): 213. 162 It did not enter earlier because it did not yet have television services in place. This started to develop in Yugoslavia in the starting year of the Eurovision. 163 Vuletic, ‘The Socialist Star Yugoslavia’, 215. 164 Sandvoss, ‘On the Couch with Europe: The Eurovision Song Contest, the European Broadcast Union and Belonging on the Old Continent’, 203. 165 Vuletic, ‘The Socialist Star Yugoslavia’, 220.

41 counterproductive. The country often hired musicians (behind the scenes) from the West to help ‘westernize’ the songs. This trick was not unique to Yugoslavia, the smaller Western European countries also did that (a state like San Marino has 30,000 inhabitants, it would be very difficult otherwise).166 Politics were more present on national level during the selection process in preliminary national finals. Where a contestant came from sometimes gave rise to indignation from the other Yugoslav regions. The national broadcaster, JRT (Jugoslavenska Radiotelevizija) organized the selections, and subnational broadcasters from each province and region provided contestants. From the sixteen entries in the 1960s and 1970s, six were from , four from Slovenia, four from Serbia and two from Bosnia-Herzegovina. A sense of unfairness in the process was omnipresent, but explicitly addressing these grievances often meant the end of one’s career, as criticism was not permitted.167 Despite the yearly returning grumbling of unfair selection, Yugoslavia was a cohesive unity (under a dictatorship) in that time. But until 1989, this never translated into victory. In the late 70s, the broadcasters were so fed up with their low scores every year (they got the infamous nul points once and ended last another time) they decided to withdraw from the contest. Apart from the consecutive low scores, the participation was very costly for Yugoslavia. The broadcasters were eager to pull the plug. But the public did not react in accordance. The contest enjoyed mass popularity in Yugoslavia. Millions watched it, as well as the national contest of choosing the delegate to the Eurovision. When the decision to leave was announced, national debate sparked and letters of complaints were sent to the broadcasters. The popularity of the event was paired with the idea that it was still good for tourism and image-building, despite not winning. Moreover it was seen as part of the unity of Yugoslavia. Contestants were from a region, yet, the argument went, in the contest they represented Yugoslavia. In 1978, some magazines (spread over the regions) asked their readers whether they wanted Yugoslavia to reenter the contest. A 107,181 votes were received, out of which 97,5 per cent was in favor of reentering.168 And so it happened, in 1981.Yugoslavia reentered the contest with the intention of improving its chances to win. It was argued at the time that the poor

166 Ivan Raykoff, ‘Empire of Song: Europe and the Nation in The Eurovision Song Contest’, Music and Letters 95, no.2 (2014), 316. 167 As was the case for the Croat Vice Vukov, who represented Yugoslavia twice in the Eurovision but supported greater federal freedom for Croatia. 168 Vuletic, ‘The Socialist Star: Yugoslavia’, 219.

42 chances of Yugoslavia had not been because of the quality of the songs, but because of the selection process.169 Each regional broadcaster nominated some candidates and then they could all vote. It was said that the regional juries would deliberately vote for the outcasts to prevent the favorites of the other stations from winning and increase the chances of their own favorites. Upon return to the Eurovision, Yugoslavia slightly changed its procedure of national voting.170 In 1989, Yugoslavia (finally) experienced its first win with ‘Rock Me’ by Riva. According to tradition, Yugoslavia was to be the host for the following year. It was decided it would be hosted in Zagreb, as Croatia had sent the winning participant and it had the largest music venue. Hosting the show was an incredible prestige to the country, proving not only that it could compete with the musical quality of Western Europe but also in terms of organizing such event. The year after the hosting, in 1991, intense debate broke out amongst the broadcasters and the regions they were representing. Many believed that the voting was predetermined and that TV had thrown a deal with its allies, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina to unite against Croatia’s favorite. The tensions rose to the extent that they sent two commentators to the Eurovision, one from TV Belgrade and one from HTV (Zagreb). The latter was broadcast in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Slovenia, the former in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The show could not be broadcast live, since fighting had broken out in Croatia in the weeks before. It would be the last time Yugoslavia would take part in the Eurovision. What becomes clear from these years of participation as a whole is that the event was of great importance to the country for multiple reasons. It was popular amongst the people of the different regions, an element to the unity of the whole and a showcase to the rest of the world. To the state, participation meant a showcase to perform modernity and Europeanism, even when not successful in the contest.

4.2 The dissolution With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the former cultural differences and disagreements – coated by the veil of ‘Yugoslavia’ and a pan-Yugoslav identity – and longstanding grievances

169 Dean Vuletic, ‘European sounds, Yugoslav Visions – Performing Yugoslavia at the Eurovision Song Contest’ in Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia, B. Luthar and M. Pusnik ed. (Washington DC: New Academia Publishing, 2010): 123. 170 Vuletic, ‘The Socialist Star: Yugoslavia’, 213.

43 resurfaced. I will not describe the total proceedings of the Yugoslav wars here, but it is important to mention the extent of gruesomeness and (created) hatred, and in particular, the hypernationalist (political rhetoric meant to appeal to ethnic nationalist sentiment) that fueled the conflict. 171 With the Dayton Agreements of 1995, the conflict was officially over, but that did not mean all the nationalist and ethnic issues were entirely solved. Tito had managed to unite the different population groups that lived in Yugoslavia by the means of terror and repression. A substantial part of the pan-Yugoslav identity came from an official memory of the Second World War (this was different memory for the Croats and the Serbs) and the level of repression. Next to that, the socialist leadership attempted to make all the regions feel equal, that no one would feel neglected. With the death of Tito in 1980 and the attempt of democratization that followed, political instigation made the ethnic and cultural identities more prevalent than the overarching Yugoslav one. And although these nationalities had – and still have – a lot in common: language, (parts of) history and custom, there are also a lot of elements that distinguish them from each other, one of the most important ones being religion. The fears of one ethnicity (or political power or nationality) becoming more powerful than the others was felt in every corner.172 It resulted in preemptive responses fueled by forms of hypernationalism. These ‘ethnic differences’ (strengthened by extreme nationalism) and political fears escalated into bloody violence. The survival of one group was framed to be at the unavoidable expense of the other.173 Especially in Serbia under Milošević, the media was completely under state control and employed to arouse hatred especially against the Croats. But the same occurred the other way around, albeit to a lesser extent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The wars, and in particular the (1992-1995), were exceptionally brutal. Around 100,000 people were killed and around 2 million were displaced.174 The war crimes were numerous, from rape and ethnic cleansing to genocide (in the Bosnian Wars). This short description of the Yugoslav Wars is mostly intended to show how the conflict evolved around ethnic nationalism (or hypernationalism) and how rooted this became amongst the civilian populations.

171 V.P. Gagnon, ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia’, International Security 19, no. 3 (1995), 1333. 172 Billig, Banal Nationalism 173 Gagnon, ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia, 1336. 174 Barbour, ‘Making Justice Visible: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Domestic War Crimes Trials Outreach’, 94.

44 Fighting had started in 1991 after outbursts of ethnic violence in Croatia after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. From October 1991, the violence escalated in a full-scale war between the newly declared independent states and Yugoslavia/Serbia. A little over a year later, Bosnia declared independence and the fighting spread to that province. Yugoslavia then existed of only the remaining republics of . The fighting would continue until 1995, when a peace agreement was reached. Scholars have argued that the conflict was not based on ‘ethnic hatred’ per se, but that it was a political manipulation of beliefs that created hostility: the construction of an ethnic survival of the fittest.175 Regardless of the preexisting hatreds, the sentiments after the conflict did anything but change. Every nationality is dealing with grievances from the war. Johanna Mannergren Selimovic argues that the tribunal that dealt with the conflict has in fact contributed to the ‘magnitude gap’ between perpetrators and victims. The latter tends to see themselves as the righteous victim, and their own acts of violence committed were necessary and pampered over afterwards, whilst the (perceived) perpetrators (or opponents) were not really victims because they did not suffer as much as their own side did. This juxtaposition remains constructed along ethno-political lines.176 Nationalism is still strongly present in the region, just as the dislike for the other nationalities.177 Every so few years, news reaches the world that ‘ethno-tensions’ are resurfacing in the former Yugoslavia. These are mostly political issues, but they have repercussions amongst the public, as people grow anxious about the neighboring nationalities.178 There are examples in abundance, proposed by scholars how the ICTY failed to bring reconciliation. In Serbia, former leader Milošević, responsible for many of the deaths, is still seen as a hero by many. The same goes for the Bosnian Croat commander Slobodan Praljak, who played an important role in the ethnic cleansings: he is still considered a war hero in Croatia. (We mostly remember him from

175 Ibid., 96. 176 Selimovic, ‘Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 56. 177 Scott Gardner and Jonathan Evans, ‘Most in former Yugoslavia favor multicultural society, although some tensions remain’, FactTank, May 22, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/22/most-in-former-yugoslavia-favor- multicultural-society-although-some-tensions-remain/ (retrieved 11 May 2018). 178 Andrew MacDowall, ‘Rumbling Balkans threaten foreign policy headache for Trump’, The Guardian, 27 February 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/27/balkans- foreign-policy-headache-trump-kosovo-serbia-bosnia-montenegro (retrieved 11 May 2018).

45 dramatically drinking poison during his trial at the ICTY).179 In short, the aftermath of the conflict has not improved the relations amongst the ethnic/national groups in the region.

4.3 A new chapter In 1992, what was left of Yugoslavia invited all the (former) provinces to contribute to the national preliminaries to Eurovision, but as Croatia and Slovenia already received widespread acceptance of their independence, they did not accept the invitation. As newly found states, one of the first things these countries pursued was taking part in the Eurovision, which meant a stage to show themselves to the world.180 Their years of experience of taking part on behalf of Yugoslavia made it easier for these successor states to join than for other Eastern European states that had also recently gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union.181 Yugoslavia took part, whilst only consisting of Serbia and Montenegro at the time.182 In 1993, Bosnia took part for the first time as an autonomous state, still in the midst of war, with the song ‘Sva Bol Svijeta’ (‘All The Pain In the World) by the group .183 The song revolved around a man that had stayed behind in Bosnia while his lover had left, containing the lyrics ‘Sva bol svijeta je noćas u Bosni’ (All the pain in the world tonight is in Bosnia).184 The song received a lot of attention, especially because the members of Fazla had to flee the besieged and leave their conductor behind. Remarkably, the broadcaster managed to produce a song and to take part in the middle of the war that had started just a month before.185 This became painfully clear when, instead of being present on the screen, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian delegation had to give its points over a rustling telephone connection.186

179 Peter J. Verovsek, ‘Against International Criminal Tribunals: Reconciling the Global Transitional Justice Norm with Local Agency’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (2017), 180 Marijana Mitrović, ‘”New Face of Serbia” at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity’, European Review of History 17, no. 2 (2010), 173. 181 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between’, 42. 182 Extra Nena was send with the song ‘Ljubim Te Pesmama’, a love song 183 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Sva bol svijeta - Bosnia & Herzegovina 1993 - Eurovision songs with live music’, filmed May 1993, YouTube video, 3:38, posted February 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DREeDXs9ijc. 184 Translation from http://www.diggiloo.net/?1993ba 185 Mitrović, ‘”New Face of Serbia” at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity’, 172. 186 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 71.

46 Croatia came with a similar entry, ‘Don’t Ever Cry’ by Put, even more explicit than the Bosnian-Herzegovinian one, ending with the line: Don't ever cry, my Croatian sky.187 The last newly independent state of the former Yugoslavia to participate in Eurovision was Slovenia with ‘Tih Dezeven Dan’ (Quite A Rainy Day) by 1 x Band.188 Like its neighbors, the Slovenian entry was about dark and weary times, albeit less nationalist than Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Quite surprisingly for a Eurovision song, it gave no message of hope.189 In the years to follow, Bosnia and Herzegovina repeated that formula of referring to the war. In 1994, the newly independent state sent an inter-ethnic duo that sung a ballad about how love is stronger than anything else in the world, including war.190 ‘Ostani kraj mene’ by Alma and Dejan came in 15th. The following year, Bosnia and Herzegovina sent Davorin Popović with ‘Dvadaset prvi vijek’ or ‘The 21st Century’.191 Again, the war was made part of another love song: the singer is asking himself where his lover is, and the lover is a symbol for Europe. ‘The twenty-first century is coming, my dear / And you’re nowhere to be found’192 was directed towards the international community and its inability to do something about the grave violations of human rights that took place there at the time.193 All three new states used the Eurovision stage to present their version of victimhood and what was going on at the Balkans. No entry came higher than fifteenth place, but they did send a clear message to their global audience: they were ready to fight for their new independence.194 The songs were intended to affirm the establishment of new national identity,

187 Translation from http://www.diggiloo.net/?1993hr11 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Eurovision 1993 Croatia’, filmed May 1993, YouTube video, 2:54, posted December 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKanpKMeLfQ. 188 Kennedy O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 143. 189 Translation from http://www.diggiloo.net/?1993si11 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Eurovision 1993 Slovenia’, filmed May 1993, YouTube video, 2:54, posted December 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCnphh-wjsM. 190 Translated the lyrics are: ‘All the pain will vanish / Except this song, me and you’, I sva bol će prestati / Ostat će ova pjesma ja i ti. The reference to last years ‘All the pain in the world is in Bosnia’ shows the link between the love song and the war. 191 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Davor Popovic - Dvadeset I prvi vijek - ESC 1995’, filmed May 1995, YouTube video, 3:15, posted November 2006, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGYt_iYm4_g. 192 Translation from http://www.diggiloo.net/?1995ba 193 Mitrović, ‘“New Face of Serbia” at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity’, 177. 194 Ironically, the place where the Bosnian band Ambassadori performed (in the name of Yugoslavia in 1976 in the Hague is almost exactly opposite to where the ICTY would later be set up in 1993.

47 at the time in the context of the war, and just like after the Second World War, international broadcasting organizations were the first to adjust to the new situation.195 Their first entries were centered around the war, but later on – once the war was over – they sought for new identities that transcended their prior roles in the war and featured modern and more universal elements and developments.196 By 1998, fighting began again in the region after Kosovo had declared its independence from Serbia. The NATO initiated an aerial bombing campaign in the region as it intervened in the conflict. What happened during the Eurovision in the following year, 1999, was quite remarkable: all the artists that performed that night gathered to sing ‘Hallelujah’, the Israeli winner of 1979, both in support of Kosovo and as a message of peace. This was an exceptionally political message by the non-political Eurovision Song Contest.197 That Eurovision participants try to slip in a political message is one thing, but that it is endorsed and incorporated into the program of the evening was without precedent. In 2006 the Bosnian and Herzegovinian contestants changed strategy. 198 ‘Lejla’ performed by was one grande coalesce of Bosnian nationalist symbolism, but it was written by a Serb, 2004s winner Zeljko Joksimović. This goes to show how interconnected the former Yugoslav music industry was. This sparked a small bit of controversy as some critics saw it as an insult to invite a Serb to write a Bosnian song.199 All the ‘Bosnianism’ in the song was tailored to modernity. The song was a traditional Bosnian folk song and the extent of folklore was unprecedented. The performers wore traditional Bosnian jewelry, in the sense of pre-Yugoslavian. The promotional video entailed imagery of the reconstructed Old Bridge in the city of Mostar, an iconic landmark that had been destroyed during the war: another symbol for a renewed Bosnia combined with traditional folklore. Why Bosnia changed its strategy will become clear from the case of Serbia.

195 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 271. 196 Ibid., 273. 197 Nicole Janke, ‘Israel: & Milk and Honey’, Eurovision.de, n.d., https://www.eurovision.de/teilnehmer/Israel-Izhar-Cohen-und-Alpha-Beta,israel404.html (retrieved 3 April 2018). 198 Baker, ‘Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and National Identity at the Eurovsion Song Contest’, 177. 199 Catherine Baker, ‘Yugoslavia’s Last Summer Dance: Did Serbia and Montenegro Really Break Up Over Eurovision?’ Balkanist.net, 8 May 2017, https://balkanist.net/yugoslavias- last-summer-dance-did-serbia-and-montenegro-really-break-up-over-eurovision/ (retrieved 30 May 2018).

48 With ‘Lejla’ Bosnia and Herzegovina scored the highest it had ever done and the country came in third. This was a good reason to deploy the ‘Bosnian’ strategy further than the previous attempts of modernizing and westernizing without any reference to their own culture (for example ‘’ in 2004, or ‘Call Me’ in 2005). The songs did not refer to the war anymore, but rather to a pre-existing Bosnian identity that transcended the history of the last century. It should be repeated that not every entry is a manifestation of Bosnian nationalism, but some of the songs are and that is already relevant.

Figure 8. The Bosnian and Herzegovinian entry in 2006. The folklore is emphasized by the instruments used in the song and made particularly visible on stage. The white outfits were clearly inspired by Serbia’s entry from 2004 (See figure 8).200

These attempts to modernize followed the Germany example of choosing a different narrative, completely detached from recent history full of political struggle, violence and conflict. Actually, the integration of a pre-conflict ‘Bosnian’ identity into a post-conflict modernized identity went further than the German ‘rebranding’, as it created a vacuum in history that was internalized into a ‘created’ identity. It translated the national sense of silence and absence of effective means of transitional justice (apart from the Tribunal) into means of representation of the Bosnian nation on international occasions.

200 Eurovision, ‘Hari Mata Hari - Lejla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 2006 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2006, YouTube video, posted 26 December 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXlIN3mcsH4.

49

Figure 9. Željko Joksimović performs ‘’ in 2004.201

4.4 Serbia: Changing the game Although music had played an important role in Serbia since 1992, when it participated for the last time as Yugoslavia, the country did not join the Eurovision until 2004.202 That year, Serbia and Montenegro joined the Eurovision Song Contest as one country. Some scholars, such as Catherine Baker and Marijana Mitrović have pointed out that the Serbian and Montenegrin entry inspired all of the former Yugoslav countries. They managed to reach second place with a modern revival of Balkan culture. Željko Joksimović together with the Ad Hoc Orchestra, he performed the song ‘Lane Moje’ (literally translated as ‘my fawn’, but meaning ‘my beloved’) featuring a traditional Serbian instrument, the kaval, played by a

201 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Zeljko Joksimovic - Lane Moje (Serbia & Montenegro) 2004 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2004, YouTube video, 3:13, posted October 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7OvpjplJ_8. 202 Ivana Kronja, Politics, Nationalism, Music, and Popular Culture in 1990s Serbia: Natioanlism and the Destruction of Alternatives (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999): 11.

50 traditionally dressed man.203 As the song proceeds, more traditional instruments accompany Joksimović, who is dressed in all white, like the others, but more modern.204 The song, completely sung in Serbian, relied heavily on its visual identity, which was based on ‘recycled “memories” of medieval Serbia’.205 The traditional clothing of the Orchestra referred to the pre-Yugoslav medieval Serbian culture. All except Joksimović himself, who was dressed in slick white, modern and minimalistic, with one ‘ethno-accessory’206: a modern interpretation of a belt that belongs to a traditional Serbian costume with a golden pin attached. The outfits had the desired effect. By emphasizing the medieval Serbian identity, combined with an emotional and ‘timeless’ song (transcending traditional , yet still incorporating its softer elements) and Joksimović’s modern interpretation of Serbianism, the performance tried to transform the Serbian (or Balkan) stereotype suggested by turbo-folk of an aggressive, violent and barbaric nation into that of a civilized, sensitive and modern nation.207 Joksimović’s performance symbolized ‘the new face of Serbia’; a newly risen nation of peace and tranquility, referencing to pre-conflict cultural elements, rather than the agitated post-Yugoslav period. This contains a paradox, for as Marijana Mitrovic points out, since the new Serbian identity or the ‘New Serbia’ is a direct outcome of the years of conflict that have proceeded it and the nationalism that laid the foundations for conflict.208 Surprisingly, this new face was a success in the neighboring former Yugoslav countries. Not only was it voted for, it was copied. Serbia provided the model for the Balkan countries to promote itself on the Eurovision stage, by highlighting their culture in the frame of a modern and transformed new nation. By leaving out a substantial part of Serbian history, a discontinuity was created, leaving an empty gap in the nations memory, conforming to the general line of dealing with the regional history of violence and conflict. As noted, any form of restorative justice was, and still is, absent in Serbia (as well as the other part) of the former-Yugoslavia

203 Eurovision Song Contest, ‘Zeljko Joksimovic - Lane Moje (Serbia & Montenegro) 2004 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2004, YouTube video, 3:13, posted October 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7OvpjplJ_8. 204 Baker, ‘Yugoslavia’s Last Summer Dance: Did Serbia and Montenegro Really Break Up Over Eurovision?’. 205 Mitrović, ‘”New Face of Serbia” at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity’, 177. 206 Ibid., 169. 207 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 130. 208 Ibid., 181.

51 (see the chapter on restorative justice). It is barely taught about in schools and perceptions remain hostile and nationalist.209 It would be two years only that Serbia and Montenegro would jointly take part in the Eurovision, for Montenegro declared independence after a referendum in 2006. The Montenegrin quest for independence was reflected in the preliminary contest for the Eurovision where the Montenegrin broadcasters felt neglected and sidelined by the Serbian ones.210 The arduous preliminaries not only resembled the course of action in the preliminary that preceded the disintegration of 1992, it exemplified the Montenegrin desire for political independence and to get out of under the perceived yoke of Serbian dominance. The preliminary turned into a debacle with bottles being thrown at the winning band, people leaving halfway and jurors defending their own independence in the middle of the show.211 The year after, Serbia returned without Montenegro and won the contest. In 2007, Marija Šerifović represented Serbia with the song ‘’ (Prayer), interpreted by the Eurovision’s big queer fan base as a pro-LGBTQHAI song, but by Serbia itself as a ‘prayer’ for a new Serbia, after Montenegro had left the republic. Her victory was received as Serbia’s reintegration into Europe after years of isolation. It was believed that the image of the ‘benign’ Balkan country had changed to the new Serbia that could win the hearts of Europe.212 It was the first time any of the former-Yugoslav countries had won the contest. Although the song contained less ethno-nationalist features than the previous entries, the bridge was accompanied by a frula, a typically Serbian flute. When Šerifović received the twelve points from Bosnia and Herzegovina, she made the ‘three fingers’ gesture, a means of salutation that represents Serbianism, which caused a small controversy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.213 A ‘new’ Serbia was also what the country tried to convey the year after when it was hosting the contest. Marija Šerifović said repeatedly that she hoped her victory would be a sign of the ‘new Serbia’. Indeed, the hosting of the event had the desired effect: the media responded positively contrasting it with the previous Milošević years. For example, CNN reported: ‘The Serbian authorities went out of their way to throw a well-organized party, seizing the chance to

209 Kent, ‘Justice and Genocide in Bosnia’, 140. 210 Baker, ‘Yugoslavia’s Last Summer Dance: Did Serbia and Montenegro Really Break Up Over Eurovision?’ 211 Ibid. 212 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 45. 213 Baker, ‘Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and National Identity at the Eurovsion Song Contest’, 181.

52 present the country to the world as a normal European nation after years of pariah status in the 1990s under the late strongman Slobodan Milošević.’214 Although there were a few issues, amongst which Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the following conflict, the Serbian authorities put all their effort into organizing the contest and convincing Europe of the new Serbia. Joksimović, one of the hosts in 2008, kicked off the Eurovision by saying: ‘Welcome Europe, where have you been all this time?’. 215 The Serbian way of participating in the Eurovision shows once again the way its stage can and has been used to showcase a ‘new’ identity. Serbia did not use it to present its own version of the events and to emphasize its own victimhood, such as the other newly independent countries in the region did (when first entering the contest). Instead, it chose to shape its performances around a progressive ideal of a soft and peaceful ancient nation. It was a successful tool in this case, since they won and other countries copied their example. The 2004 and 2006 entries are good examples of how Serbia in general deals with its past, or fails to deal with its past, and instead focuses on the less gruesome aspects of its history. Its ‘prayers’ for a new Serbia seemed to be successful on the stage of the Eurovision.

4.5 Your votes please When Joksimović came second in 2004, his total of 236 points included the maximum amount of points awarded by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia – a surprising result given the tension in the region. After the voting, Joksimović rushed to his Croatian counterpart and thanked him for the Croatian twelve points to Serbia, one of the bigger surprises that evening, together with the other twelve points votes for Serbia and Montenegro from the other Yugoslav countries. We should not disregard the overall quality and popularity of the song. There were more maximum points given by other countries to Serbia. It remains surprising, as Anna Boulos puts it: ‘[how] the memory of an “old” Serbia could disappear so quickly because of the politics and pleasure of song’.216

214 Mitrović, ‘”New Face of Serbia” at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity’, 215 Goran Bolin, ‘Visions of Europe: Cultural Technologies and Nation-States’, International Journal of Cultural Studies 9, no.2 (2006), 31. 216 Anna Boulos, ‘Nil Points, Douze Points and Everything in Between’, 42.

53

Figure 10. The votes given amongst the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the 2004 Eurovision Song Contest. For a complete list, see Appendix C.

The generous exchange of points was widely reported in politics and press. ‘Music has won’, it was said. The Serbia and Montenegrin foreign minister Vuk Drašković proudly put it as follows: ‘When politicians can’t agree, they should look to the people. Recently at the Eurovision contest we saw Macedonians voting for Albanians, Croats voting for Serbs, and Serbs voting for Albanians, Bosnians and Croats.’ His predecessor Goran Svilanović agreed, emphasizing how this could have positive diplomatic effects. Joksimović himself declared that the twelve points from Croatia meant the most to him. People in the streets spoke of a ‘unifying message’ and a ‘new era’.217 The 2004 Eurovision showed how some form of loyalty or familiarity was present in the region, even though they had all waged war ten years ago and a genocide occurred. Whether this unity was a remnant of the former Yugoslav unity or a new post-war unity is not clear. The Balkan countries were not the only ones to give the Serbian and Montenegrin entry twelve points. The song ended second place, which means more countries than those in the Balkan regions gave it high scores. However, when we look at the following years and the points given between the countries (see appendix C), it becomes clear is that in those years as

217 Ana Petruseva, ‘Old Foes Serenade Serbia in Istanbul’, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 21 February 2005, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/old-foes-serenade-serbia- istanbul’ (retrieved 2 March 2018).

54 well, their highest points often go to the neighboring countries, even when those entries did not score that high in the finals. High points are often given out without high ultimate rankings. In 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina ended 17th and Serbia 13th, both gave each other the maximum amount of points, the same for 2009 (respectively 9th and 18th), 2008 (6th and 10th). In other years, the amounts deviated but points were always given to each other, regardless of the quality and popularity of the song. Put another way, the votes exchanged among the Balkan states were not congruent with the votes received from non-Balkan countries. The participating states that score low in the Eurovision ranking could often (not always) still count on votes from their neighbors. Croatia, ending 21st (out of 25) in 2010 received 10 points from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 from Slovenia (though only 3 from Serbia and 2 from FYR Macedonia and Montenegro). The examples for relatively high points given to each other are numerous (see the appendix). This also has been suggested by statistical research: Derek Gatherer identified a former Yugoslav voting bloc and Ginsburgh and Noury did as well.218 In short, bloc voting is an annual returning phenomenon in the former Yugoslavia, regardless of quality or popularity of a song.

Figure 11. Although voting is more spread in 2010, points given to each other in the region remain high, especially between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Both did not score particularly high in the final ranking, yet received the highest amount of points from each other. See for a complete list of votes and scores Appendix C.

218 Ginsburgh and Noury, ‘The Eurovision Song Contest. Is Voting Political or Cultural?’, 44.

55 4.6 Why vote for each other? The bigger former Yugoslav states, Serbia and Croatia, usually receive more points than the smaller ones. This is very likely to be related to the more developed music industries of these states that can manage bigger and more professional productions. It is no surprise then that they score higher in the Eurovision. Other reasons for the high scores given have been the Bosnian Serb entity in Bosnia, the so-called Republika Srpska that has voted faithfully for Serbia, as well as the large number of Bosnian Croats voting for Croatia. This might have very well been part of the voting, but it does not fully account for the phenomenon of consistently giving each other high points.219 In order to really find out why popular votes go to a certain country and not to another, research should be done on the ground, conducting interviews and collecting qualitative data. However, due to the limited scope of this work, that is not included here. A lot of research into Eurovision voting has focused on voting patterns such as voting blocs and does not seem to go beyond the collected votes. Valid conclusions can be based on such research, like patterns of linguistic voting or cultural voting. Still, in my opinion, qualitative, in depth research would also be useful in order to learn not only how people vote, but also why they do so. Previously existing research showed the correlation between linguistic affinities and voting in the former Yugoslavia. Another argument for bilateral voting (in general) that is used is religion. However, I think it is safe to assume this does not apply in the former Yugoslavia. Instead, cultural affinity seems more significant. The musical taste of the former Yugoslav countries is largely congruent.220 This is because up until the late 80s they all shared a common national musical industry, and most of the music of the Yugoslav years was produced in Zagreb and Belgrade, where musicians from all over Yugoslavia would gather.221 It was a successful business within Eastern Europe. After the disintegration, the national music found an audience outside its own borders.222 Moreover, many of the previously existing ‘Yugoslav’-formations reunited and continued to make music. Thus, the borders of the music industry were much more porous than those of the

219 Petruseva, ‘Old Foes Serenade Serbia in Istanbul’. 220 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 12. 221 Stef Jansen, ‘Who’s Afraid of White Socks? Towards a Critical Understanding of Post- Yugoslav Urban Self-Perceptions’, Ethnologia Balkanica 9, 1 (2005), 154. 222 Ana Petrov, ‘Yugonostalgia in the Market: Popular Music and Consumerism in Post- Yugoslav Space’, Faculty of Media and Communications’, Singidunum University, Serbia (2016): 206.

56 newly established states.223 Musicians would perform in the regions the new states were formerly in war with. This cultural continuity expressed through music in the post-Yugoslav states shows how not every aspect of Yugoslavia was disregarded after the disintegration. And although all the states have their own musical traditions, popular singers have been able to expand their markets to the neighboring countries.224 Because of these factors, musical preferences are similar in the countries, what is therefore considered a good song at the stage of the Eurovision is also similar. What would be useful to research is the difference in votes received with the musical entries that were more westernized and the folkloristic songs in the Eurovision after the disintegration. The only post- Yugoslav states that decided not to copy the Serbian success story and not to integrate folklore into their entries were Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Their poppy songs conform to the larger Eastern European ‘sound’, but are neither drenched nor drizzled with folklore, whether real or created.225 This regional congruence of music can potentially be used in an extension of restorative transitional justice into the spheres of culture. One of the main issues in the former Yugoslavia is that the different ethno-political entities see each other as the enemy, and themselves as victims. This persistent juxtaposition does little to nothing in support of restorative attempts of reconciliation. The Eurovision Song Contest is a festival that enjoys great popularity in the region, and has already been used to present and mould national identities. At the same time, and remarkably, once a year it shows how musical congruence prevails over ethnonational grudges. It is a unique situation, because generally countries that dislike each other, have not voted for each other, such as Azerbaijan and Armenia. It would be interesting to see if solidarity in voting in the region could be translated into changes of perception of former enemies by means of the Eurovision. The following step to this proposition is yet to be expanded on. That calls for more timely and qualitative research.

223 Ibid., 205. 224 Ginsburgh & Noury, ‘The Eurovision Song Contest. Is Voting Political or Cultural?’ 225 Vuletic, Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest, 165.

57 Conclusion Countries dealing with a history of genocide and mass violence face new challenges in the aftermath of the violence. Some fight for recognition, as Armenia has been doing for more than a hundred years after the Armenian Genocide. It took the stage of the Eurovision, not only to emphasize its own nationhood, but also to appeal to the larger global audience to acknowledge its victimhood in the Armenian genocide. Has it made a difference? That is difficult to say, but what it did do, is generate discussion and controversy, and with that awareness. Armenia managed to provoke Turkey into responding – and that reaction emphasized the on-going Turkish denial in front of the world. Thus, this victim-initiated outcry is an attempt at acknowledgement, an important aspect of transitional justice, through the means of an international musical event. The Eurovision Song Contest had been used before as a stage to display political messages, but never before so explicit about a case of genocide. Up to then, mass murder has been referred to before at the Contest, but only implicitly. The peculiar example of (West-)Germany in 1979 explicates this, when the country sent the group Dschinghis Khan to perform a song of the same name on the Eurovision stage in the self- declared ‘Jewish state’ Israel. The symbolic value was great, but the political weight was not as much as it would be for Armenia in 2015, for contextual reasons. For one, their role differed: Armenia performed as a victim on a quest for acknowledgement, Germany had no such intentions. What intentions it did have with that song remain unclear to this dy. The German entry digressed from the general German trend in the Eurovision, which, especially in the immediate postwar years, was intended to shape an image of Germany different from the stereotypes and memories of the war. In general, German Eurovision songs symbolized the transition Germany attempted to make into a modern, democratic and European state. The way Serbia presented itself on stage after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia is comparable: focusing on reshaping an image of the country, away from violent stereotypes shaped or embedded more deeply by conflict. The Serbian way was different from those taken by the other countries of the former Yugoslavia. It was only when Serbia won in 2006 with a successful combination of folklore and modernity that the surrounding countries decided to copy. The nationalist entries of the early years after the war, as well as the songs with a complete absence of folklorist elements (comparable to the German approach), made room for a sophisticated and carefully constructed national image on the stage of the Eurovision. The larger conclusions from this research are twofold. On one hand, countries have used the Eurovision Song Contest to get a political message across regarding a violent history (of genocide). The way and the message itself are dependent on whether a country was in the

58 position of a perpetrator or a victim. Contestant countries in the latter position have more often, and more easily, referred to that position to generate positive attention; see Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1993 to 1995; Armenia in 2010 and 2015; and Israel every couple of years). Perpetrators countries like (West)-Germany and Serbia seem more concerned with nation- branding that diverges from the painful past than to refer to it. In those cases, modernity and pre-conflict aspects of national identity are employed, bypassing the painful period in between. The second main conclusion is that however supierficial the contest may seem to many, performances on the Eurovision stage can promote a measure of reconciliation between former antagonists. Participating countries that are in conflict with each other or in the aftermath of one tend to have very strained relations, if not hostility – not only in diplomacy, but also in popular opinion. That makes the case of the former Yugoslavia highly relevant: here, as we saw, these strained relations were not reflected in voting patterns. Cultural, linguistic and musical affinities seemed more dominant than the existing dichotomies of perpetrators and victims Moreover, less aggressive national images were constructed on the stage. This would be interesting for further research to supplement existing tools and means of transitional justice, that have focused more on rectification than on reconciliation to see if it might influence negative perceptions and dichotomized victim-perpetrator thinking. Further research would also be needed to determine not only how countries voted and continue to vote, but why they vote in this way. That would add a qualitative dimension the concept of political voting and even to bloc voting. Likewise, more thorough research could be done on Germany’s struggle to redefine itself after the Second World War, how this reflected upon the stage of the Eurovision Song Contest, and moreover how other countries responded to this. This understudied aspect of postwar Europe needs much more attention. Of course, world peace will not come from the stage of the Eurovision Song Contest, but because of its immense popularity, enormous reach in Europe and the rest of the world, political dimensions and its role in previous conflicts, it could play a role in more progressive forms of restorative justice. As they say: when you cannot say it, sing it.

59 Appendix A – Eurovision votes exchanged by Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, 2006- 2012 Azerbaijan is included for regional comparison (Turkey and Azerbaijan do vote for each other, often with a high number of points) as well as to show how conflicts influence voting. The years are limited to the times were both Armenia and Turkey would participate. After 2012, Turkey withdrew from the contest. The table is to be read vertically. The column of Armenia indicates the amount of votes Armenia has given to other countries. I did not include all of Armenia’s votes every year, or Turkey’s for that matter, because it concerns these countries, not in relation to the votes given to other countries. The numbers immediately next to the columns with the countries indicate the place they reached in the competition. All the data comes from the website https://eurovisionworld.com that has categorized the votes of every Eurovision.226

2006 Armenia Turkey Armenia 8th - 10 Turkey 11th 0 -

2007 Armenia Turkey Armenia 8th - 12 Turkey 4th 0 -

2008 Armenia Turkey Azerbaijan Armenia 4th - 10 0 Turkey 7th 0 - 12 Azerbaijan 8th 0 12 -

2009 Armenia Turkey Azerbaijan Armenia 10th - 6 0 Turkey 4th 4 - 12 Azerbaijan 3rd 1 12 -

226 All votes and positions come from https://eurovisionworld.com, where there are yearly oversights provided.

60 2010 Armenia Turkey Azerbaijan Armenia 7th - 6 0 Turkey 2nd 0 - 12 Azerbaijan 5th 0 12 - The year of ‘Apricot Stone’ (see chapter on Armenia)

2011 Armenia Turkey Azerbaijan Armenia Not qualified - - - Turkey Not qualified - - - Azerbaijan 1st 0 12 -

2012 Armenia Turkey Azerbaijan Armenia Did not take - - - part * Turkey 7th - - 12 Azerbaijan 4th - 12 - * Armenia did not take part because the contest was hosted in Azerbaijan, and although it would participate at first, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the two countries escalated around that time, after which Armenia withdrew.

61 Appendix B – Eurovision votes exchanged by Germany and Israel, 1973-2017

Points given from Points given from Final place Final place Germany to Israel Israel to Germany Germany Israel 1973 7 4 8th 4th 1974 0 0 14th 7th 1975 1 0 17th 11th 1976 3 0 15th 6th 1977 0 5 8th 11th 1978 12 3 6th 1st 1979 0 6 4th 1st 1980 - - 2nd Not taking part 1981 0 8 2nd 7th 1982 12 12 1st 2nd 1983 10 2 5th 2nd 1984 - - 13th Not taking part 1985 7 7 2nd 5th 1986 0 0 8th 19th 1987 8 8 2nd 8th 1988 3 5 7th 14th 1989 3 0 12th 14th 1990 0 4 9th 18th 1991 0 0 18th 3rd 1992 4 0 6th 16th 1993 0 0 18th 24th 1994 - - 3rd Not taking part 1995 10 0 23th 8th 1996 - - Not taking part Not taking (too many part (too contestants)

62 many contestants) 1997 - - 18th Not taking part 1998 7 0 7th 1st 1999 12 7 3rd 5th

2000 0 0 5th 22th 2001 0 0 8th 16th 2002 5 0 21st 12th 2003 0 0 11th 19th 2004 - 0 8th Not qualified 2005 5 0 24th 4rd 2006 0 0 14th 23th 2007 - 0 19th Not qualified 2008 3 0 23th 9th 2009 0 0 20th 16th 2010 0 0 1st 14th 2011 - 0 10th Not qualified 2012 - 0 8th Not qualified 2013 - 5 21st Not qualified 2014 - 0 18th Not qualified 2015 5 0 27th (last) 9th 2016 12 (out of max 24) 0 26th (last) 14th 2017 0 0 25th 23th

63 Appendix C – Eurovision votes exchanged by countries of the former Yugoslavia, 2004- 2017 2004 Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia and 2nd - 12 12 10 12 Montenegro Bosnia and 9th 6 - 10 4 10 Herzegovina Croatia 12th 5 10 - 5 5 FYR 14th 12 8 5 - 7 Macedonia Slovenia was not qualified but eligible to vote

2005 Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia and 7nd - 10 12 10 10 Montenegro Bosnia and 14th 4 - 10 3 8 Herzegovina Croatia 11th 10 12 - 8 10 FYR 17th 7 7 8 - 5 Macedonia Slovenia did not qualify, but was eligible to vote.

2006 Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Bosnia and 3rd 12 - 12 12 12 Herzegovina Croatia 12 10 12 - 10 10 FYR 12 8 8 8 - 6 Macedonia Due to their splitting and political issues, Serbia and Montenegro did not take part in the contest but could vote. Again Slovenia did not qualify for the final

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2007 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia 1st - 12 12 12 12 12 Bosnia and 11th 8 - 10 4 8 7 Herzegovina FYR 14th 10 8 8 - 10 10 Macedonia Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro did not qualify but were eligible to vote.

2008 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia 6th - 12 10 10 12 12 Bosnia and 10th 12 - 12 5 10 10 Herzegovin a Croatia 21st 3 10 - 2 8 2

2009 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Bosnia and 9th 12 - 12 10 10 12 Herzegovin a Croatia 18th 5 12 - 4 6 8 Serbia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia did not qualify for the finals, but were eligible to vote.

2010 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia 13th - 12 7 8 8 - Bosnia and 17th 12 - 10 6 4 - Herzegovina

65 Montenegro did not take part due to financial issues, but was allowed to vote. Only Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were qualified for the final.

2011 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia 14th - 10 8 8 10 - Bosnia and 6th 12 - 7 12 12 - Herzegovina Slovenia 13th 10 12 12 10 - - Again, Montenegro could not partake in Eurovision because of its financial situation. Croatia and FYR Macedonia did not qualify.

2012 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Serbia 3rd - 10 12 10 12 12 Bosnia and 18th 5 - 10 7 7 6 Herzegovina FYR 13th 12 12 8 - 6 8 Macedonia Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro did not qualify for the finals.

2013 Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Slovenia did not qualify. Bosnia did not take part due to financial issues.

2014 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Montenegro 19th - - - 12 7 -

Slovenia 25th - - - 1 - 8

No Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. FYR did not qualify.

66 2015 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegr Herzegovina Macedon o ia Serbia 10th - - - 10 6 12 Montenegro 13th 12 - - 4 10 - Slovenia 14th 5 - - 8 - 4 FYR Macedonia did not qualify, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina did not take part.

2016 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegr Herzegovina Macedonia o Serbia 18th - 20 14 19 17 18 Croatia 23th 4 14 - 11 8 - Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia did not qualify.

2017 Serbia Bosnia and Croatia FYR Slovenia Montenegro Herzegovina Macedonia Croatia 13th 5 - - 10 12 17 Croatia was the only former Yugoslavian country that qualified. Bosnia & Herzegovina did not take part.

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Audiovisual materials These concern the songs and videos of the performances in the Eurovision Song Contest. They are arranged on the alphabetical order of the countries they represented.

Armenia: ‘Genealogy - Face The Shadow (Armenia) - LIVE at Eurovision 2015 Grand Final’, filmed May 2015. 3:08. Posted May 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6O8pr7HH94. ‘Genealogy - Face The Shadow (Armenia) 2015 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed March 2015. 3:04. Posted March 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVVvgD0-Mu0.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘Davor Popovic - Dvadeset I prvi vijek - ESC 1995’. Filmed May 1995. 3:15. Posted November 2006. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGYt_iYm4_g. ‘Hari Mata Hari - Lejla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 2006 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2006, YouTube video, posted 26 December 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXlIN3mcsH4. ‘Sva bol svijeta - Bosnia & Herzegovina 1993 - Eurovision songs with live music’, filmed May 1993. 3:38. Posted February 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DREeDXs9ijc.

Croatia: ‘Eurovision 1993 Croatia’, filmed May 1993. 2:54. Posted December 2007. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKanpKMeLfQ.

France:

74 ‘Lisa Angell - N'oubliez pas (France) 2015 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2015. 3:09. Posted May 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJful-Jtc9o.

Georgia: ‘We Don't Wanna Put In - Eurovision Song Contest 2009’, filmed May 2009. 3:11. Posted September 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5P6-7Rw4xug.

Germany: ‘ESC 1956 04 - Germany 1 - Walter Andreas Schwarz - Im Wartesaal Zum Großen Glück’, recorded May 1956. 4:55. Posted November 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUXVPPfVpos. ‘ESC 1957 07 - Germany - Margot Hielscher - Telefon, Telefon’, filmed May 1957. 4:06. Posted November 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoDpE2LtoZA. ‘Eurovision 1979 Germany Dschinghis Khan Dschinghis Khan HQ SUBTITLED’, filmed May 1979. 3:36. Posted January 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAEUrp2V4ss. ‘Nicole - Ein bisschen Frieden - A Little Bit Of Peace - Mehrsprachig - Final Song Song Contest `82’, filmed May 1982. 2:59. Posted June 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mnjahffO7eI.

Italy: ‘Insieme 1992 - Italy 1990 - Eurovision songs with live orchestra’, filmed May 1990. 3:24. Posted February 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0b5whZydVZc.

Israel: ‘Ofra Haza - Hi – Eurovision’, filmed May 1983. 3:19. Posted March 2007. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqPGYSWnSFg.

Serbia: ‘Zeljko Joksimovic - Lane Moje (Serbia & Montenegro) 2004 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2004.3:13. Posted October 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7OvpjplJ_8.

Slovenia: ‘Eurovision 1993 Slovenia’, filmed May 1993. 2:54. Posted December 2007.

75 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCnphh-wjsM.

Ukraine: ‘Greenjolly - Razom Nas Bahato (Ukraine) Live - Eurovision Song Contest 2005’, filmed May 2005. 3:01. Posted December 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5u6J_mbhLU. ‘LIVE - Jamala - 1944 (Ukraine) at the Grand Final of the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2016. 3:17. Posted May 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-rnM- MwRHY. ‘Ruslana - Wild Dances (Ukraine) - LIVE - 2004 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2004. 3:16. Posted October 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10XR67NQcAc. ‘Verka Serduchka - Dancing Lasha Tumbai (Ukraine) 2007 Eurovision Song Contest’, filmed May 2007. 3:12. Posted January 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfjHJneVonE.

Yugoslavia: ‘Eurovision 1989 Yugoslavia - Riva - Rock me’, filmed May 1989. 4:45. Posted July 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_IJ3ukzLQp4.

Images BBC - https://www.bbc.co.uk/music/artists/10f87b54-0e95-4268-9857-e2660367c305, there is no mention of the photographer or original source. Beeld en Geluidwiki - Gallery: Eurovisie Songfestival 1958, Nederlandse Televisie Stichting, https://wiki.beeldengeluid.nl/index.php/Hoofdpagina. http://versuri-in-romana.blogspot.com/2015/10/ruslana-wild-dances-versuri.html

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