1

PEACE & SECURITY REPORT

NIGER CONFLICT INSIGHTS APRIL 2021

The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments. The opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. www.ipss-addis.org/publications

CONTENTS

SITUATION ANALYSIS 2 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 3 ACTORS 5 CONFLICT DYNAMICS 8 ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT RESPONSES 10 SCENARIOS 12 STRATEGIC OPTIONS 13 REFERENCES 14 CONFLICT TIMELINE 15

CONTRIBUTORS

MOUSSA SOUMAHORO (AUTHOR) DR. MESFIN GEBREMICHAEL (EDITOR IN CHIEF) CYNTHIA HAPPI (ASSOCIATE EDITOR) TIGIST KEBEDE FEYISSA(ASSOCIATE EDITOR)

© 2019 Institute For Peace And Security Studies | Addis Ababa University. All Rights Reserved. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Conflict Insights Report 2 control natural resources. insurgencies andinter-communal struggle to access and been enamelledby recurrent political divergences, armed Since the early 90s, Niger’s democratisation process has appropriately respond to needs of its the survival people. systems aslow income doesnot allow thestate to Niger’s andpaving apath citizenry for parallel economic hurdles foster socio-economic vulnerabilities affecting to approximately doubleinthecoming 23years. for while its survival 22.4 million population is forecasted farming andseveral other economic activities necessary territory is covered by desert lands unfavourable for shake its precarious stability. Two-thirds (77%)ofNiger’s security threats gradually spillover to Niger andtend to multi-nature local conflicts. These growing cross-border threats suchasviolentextremism, organised crimeand andSaharan regions majorlyaffected by security (GDP). sector representing 75%ofits Gross Domestic Product economic potential that deeplyrelies ontheinformal challenging ecological conditions seriouslyminimiseits islocatedcountry inoneofthehottest regions worldwide, 22.4M SITUATION ANALYSIS 4 3 rité dansleszones sahélo–sahariennesduNiger. Page 20. 2 diagnostic. Page 1. for endingpoverty andboosting shared prosperity. Systematic country 1 strip. Niger represents astrategic junction intheSahelo-Saharan With avast aridandlandlocked territory of1,267,000km2, org/en/countries/profiles/NER i Programme. Development Reports-Niger. (2020).HumanDevelopment indicators. Humandevelopment Retrieved from http://hdr.undp. FIGURE 1.COUNTRY PROFILEANDDEMOGRAPHICS , BENIN POPULATION NEIGHBOURS Bertelsmann Stiftung, Report-Niger.BTI. (2020).Country Page 4. République duNiger. (2016).Ibid.Page 20. République duNiger. (2016).Stratégie et dedéveloppement desécu- (2017,November 28).RepublicThe WorldBank. ofNiger priorities 1 Itshares borders countries withseven both inthe 3 By way ofriskfactors, theeconomic andclimatic 4 The country experienced Thecountry four RANK: 189/189 INDEX: 0.377 62.0 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX(HDI) LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YRS) 2 As the As Niger’s vast andquasi-aridterritory isasignificant factor defuse both theinternal andexternal securityturmoil. and securityinNiger soasto provide strategic options to This report aimsat scrutinisingtheriskfactors for peace vulnerabilities, isheading inanunstable region. poses aquestion ofwhere Niger, withvarious internal worldwide uranium top producers in2019. gold anduranium. was Thecountry ranked amongthe historically hadconsistent miningresources, particularly Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, BurkinaFaso andBenin.Niger has concerns shared withits neighbours includingMali, crimeswhichare cross-cuttingtrans-boundary security Currently, Niger isgrappling withviolentextremism and internallycountry fragile. state hasbeenstruggling to contain for decades. for covetousness andrevival oflocal tensions that the mining activities at Niger’s borderlands fosters ground growing interest ofcriminalandterrorist groups in oil discovery inNiger isrelatively recent. Besides,the Northern Niger. Africa Report N°285. Page 1. 7 from http://www.wise-uranium.org/umaps.html 6 brooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve?codeEve=1297 auNiger. Retrieved from https://perspective.usher 5 court. constitution aswell asdisbandment oftheconstitutional coupmilitary d’états, numerous mutinies, five changes of International 6).ManagingTrafficking crisisgroup. (2020,January in Uranium MapsandStatistics. (2019). WiseUranium Project. Retrieved Perspective monde.(2010,février 18).Renversement duprésident 5 Thecombination ofthesedevelopments leftthe I $1,745 UEMOA G5 SAHEL ECOWAS CONSEIL DEL’ENTENTE CEN-SAD GOURMA AUTORITÉ DULIPTAKO- GDP PERCAPITA RECS 6 However, 7 This - ranks 120outof180countries. perceived ofcorruption level intheirpublicsectors; it negligible. Infact, Niger isamongcountries withahigh that plaguestheNigerien publicadministration are not capacities, thenegative impacts oframpant corruption environmental factors that undermineproductive Although poorgovernance inNiger isembeddedby heel ofNiger leaves fragile. thecountry addition, poorgovernance whichisanimportant Achilles’ of reasons whichare eitheridentity-based orstrategic. In and farmers, for instance, could escalate dueto arange social cohesion astensions amongandbetween herders environmental constraints thepotential carry to disrupt neuralgic bodiesofthepolitical apparatus. criminal cartels to infiltrate thepublicadministration and is privileged. Theingrained corruption alsopaves way for between groups dependingonwhoisneglected andwho and risks of fragmentationnurtured among the citizenry could alsomean that there are multiplefrustrations that Nigeriens have abouttheirpublicadministration throughout the country. Thehighperception ofcorruption could suggest system aweak delivery socialservice https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fsi2020-report.pdf Page 7.Retrieved from 11 tions/land-conflict.pdf from https://www.un.org/fr/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdf/publica- naturelles. Groupe inter-agencespour lesactions préventives. Retrieved prévention et lagestion desconflits liésàlaterre et auxressources 10 9 8 retention (water andorganic matters). 88% ofits soilisprone to erosion withlow capacities of that constrains its potential for About development. CAUSES OFTHECONFLICT 40% ofits GDP. more than80%oftheworkforce andaccount for at least given that agricultural and livestock activities engage of Nigeriens are at riskofprecarious livingconditions ensure sustainable internal food security. such,most As Niger’s landsdoesnot allow productive agriculture to lands concentrated insouthernNiger. over scarce resources, especially over the12%fertile stiff competitions amongandbetween diverse groups The . (2017,November 28).Ibid. Page TheWorldBank. 1. (2017,November 28).Ibid. PageThe WorldBank. ix. TheFund for Peace. (2020).Fragile states index annualreport 2020. Organisation desNation Unies.(2012).Guidepratique pourla 9 Thiscontingent vulnerability fosters 11 Abasic comprehension 10 8 Induecourse, Amajorityof weapons. prompt groups to seekmeans of protection, notably convoys drugs, armsandminerals carrying suchasgold of concern. Robberies andarmedattacks oftrafficking tendency toward militarised trafficking is,therefore, part. quasi-uninhabited andpoorlygoverned septentrional ithasbeenproblematicnew; for decades inthecountry’s major threats to Niger’s stability. Thephenomenonisnot Currently, organised crime appears to be among the BP1-Niger.pdf http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS- arms Survey. Retrieved from 18 17 16 fraudulent large publicprocurements facilitated by hispolitical ties. current rulingparty). Theprosperity ofhiscompanies is strongly linked to Additionally, hewas animportant figure ofthePNDS-Tarraya party (the carbons, andMahmoudBTP operating inconstruction andpublicwork). Nigerien Companies: (2STV transport company, SST transport andhydro Abidine was a prosperous businessman,founder andowner of3major 15 tues_6025664_3212.html mee-subit-ses-plus-lourdes-pertes-a-chinegodar-avec-89-soldats- https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/01/13/au-niger-l-ar Retrieved from l’armée subitsespluslourdes pertes àChinégodar avec 89 soldats tués. 14 Page 9. Liptako-Gourma. Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS). Africa report no. 26. December). Violentextremism, organised crimeandlocal conflicts in 13 Northern Niger. Africa Report N°285.Page 6. 12 market are beingnoticed intheregion. uncontrolled trafficking routes andshares ofthe vacant clashes between diverse smallgroups oftraffickers over to thoseoccured inInatès andChinegodar. and executing cross-border deadly attacks comparable support eitherincommunity leverage orinplanning inversely cartels view aspartners ableto provide strategic on trafficking routes against cash, terrorist groups shadowy kingpintrafficker innorthernNiger. of CherifOuldAbidine,aprosperous businessmanand context, trend anew emerged in2016following thedeath weapons. at controling thecirculation ofsmall arms andlight there is aneedfor strategies to entrench actions aiming both organised crimeandviolentextremism. illegal) isanimportant enablingandsustaining factor for traffickers. Thebroad availability ofsmallarms(legal and are striving to defusethrough intricate arrangements with as excellent partners incrime. of terrorist groups intheunsteady Sahelregion, perceived DeTessières, S.(2017,March). Measuring illicitarmsflows. Small International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 6. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 6. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 6.CherifOuld Le Monde&Agence Française 13).Au Niger, dePresse. (2020,January W.,Assanvo, Dakono B.,Théroux-Bénoni, L-A., &Maïga, I.(2019, International 6).ManagingTrafficking crisisgroup. (2020,January in 12 Yet, ittends to deteriorate dueto theproliferation 17 Thiswould beget bloodshedthat state officials 13 Beyond ensuringsecurity Beyond 16 Anincreasing 15 Mounting 14 18 Inthat Hence, - - 3 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 4 between groups drawing oncommunal lines. help avoid generalised clasheswithsecurityforces, and with traffickers are akin to alaisser-faire approach to The intricate arrangements that the nurtures 20 19 connivance between securityforces andtraffickers. on whichparty isruling.Somefacts ontheground suggest and subsequently among government officials depending wealthy to anextent can they have tiesinpolitical parties arrangements allow traffickers to grow andbecome International 6).Ibid. Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 12. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 6. 19 Yet, such 20 At At with traffickers, onthe other. security forces, ontheonehand,andpolitical ties African average scale, that fosters salary greed among situation: therelatively compared low pay (salary), to the least two hypotheses could helpto comprehend sucha ture database 1949-2019. 22 21 citizenry’s purchasing power remains obviously low. part ofthenational annualbudget since 2015whilethe procurementmilitary which gradually takes an important crime-related activities, seemsto prompt thestate’s terrorist threat, nurtured by income from organised Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI)’s expendi military - Bertelsmann Stiftung, Report-Niger.BTI. (2020).Country Page 7. 21 Inaddition,thecurrent 22 Articles 46-82. 23 institutions. (team ofministers) andall the administrative includes thePresident oftheRepublic, thegovernment Niger’s Government istheleading bodyofthestate. It The and terrorist groups. Government, defence andsecurityforces, illicittraffickers Internal actors, inexhaustive though,includeNiger’s Internal actors either asinternal orexternal. arethe country diverse. Theseactors could beclassified actors havingcapacities to trigger ordefuseconflicts in Despite Niger’s relative stability inanunstable region, FIGURE 2.ACTORS MAPPING ACTORS Patriotic Movement for theRepublic (MPR-JAMHURIYA), at theparliament. Itrelies on two other majorparties: the Democracy andSocialism(PNDS)-Tarayya, with 75seats 22-party coalition dominated by the Nigerien Party for République duNiger. (2010).Constitution de la VIIèmeRépublique. Civil Society G5 Sahel 23 Thecurrent government comprises a Government of Nig L DSF CBC er Te Groups rroris resources. among theNigeriens inacontext ofscarce availability of be done.Currently, poverty culminates at arate of76.9% social gaps and poverty by 2035, there still is huge work to plan (Renaissance Programme 2011-2035) to reduce government initiated amultidimensionaldevelopment an important weakness. Notwithstanding that the current government to satisfy constitutes theneedsofits citizenry stability andintegrity. Inaddition,theinabilityof led to thecurrent circumstances threatening state between traffickers andpolitical parties have plausibly their dailyandelectoral activities. parties onbusiness communities to access fundingfor body dueto a(structural) highdependence ofpolitical the gradual infiltration ofcriminalsinto thegoverning remains exposed to risksofcollapse. Amongtherisksis 26 in West Africa andcentral Sahel.December 2020. 25 https://data.ipu.org/node/124/elections?chamber_id=13476 24 an absolute parliamentary majority. (MNSD)-NassaraDevelopment with20seats, to ensure with 13seats, andtheNational Movement for theSocial t Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI).Report —Niger. (2020).Country Page 3. Quote from aninternational expert ofterrorism and organised crime Inter-parliamentary Union(2020).Data retrieved from 26 Key 25 Intricate connections 24 Yet thegovernment Broken Alliance Discord/Conflict Links/Close Relationships 5 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 6 the procurement of equipment. accused top officers ofembezzlingfinance dedicated to underlined by diverse sources. Troops have for long between Nigerien troops andhigh-ranked officers are and low salaries,amongother issues.Discontentments emerge among troops probably over under-equipment peculiarly because ofgrowing frustrations that seemto Besides, thearmyisamajoractor actor to monitor, which isdrastically opposedto theirlegal missions. and itmaybeutilisedasatool to protect illicitactivities, apparatus by cartels maynegatively influence thearmy the country. However, thegradual intrusionofstate peaceful relationships withlocal populations throughout legal duties. ensure peace andsecurityaccording to theirrespective andother paramilitary forces collaboratively The securityforces whichconsist ofthepolice, the victims ofdeadly sporadic attacks region. intheTillabéry and BurkinaFaso. However, NAFhave recently become compared to its neighbouringcountries particularly Mali Niger’s territorial integrity seemsto bemajorlysecured ’s attacks isnoticed intheregion. Inaddition, indication oftheirresilience althoughrecent escalation of terrorist attacks intheDiffa region since 2017 could bean threats, peculiarlyviolentextremism. Thedeclinein forces show resilience infightingagainst theexisting Côte d’Ivoire), asimilarscenario shouldnot beneglected. region (the2012coup d’état inMaliand2002rebellion in Niger (1974,1996,1999, 2010)andcomparable cases inthe low-ranked officers. Knowing thehistory of coup d’états in risk of mutinies at the least, and coup d’état mounted by 31 Pays?codePays=NER &langue=fr to doubleinthecoming five years. NAF are estimated at 25,000active personnel expected Niger’s territorial integrity against anyexternal threat. The Forces (NAF).Theirmajorrole isto ensure thedefence of Defence forces ofNiger designate theNational Armed Defence andSecurityForces (DSF) trafficking networks remain highlyrisky. outreach inremote areas. Inversely its connections with who are thelongarmsofstate allowing governmental relationships through thelocal withthecitizenry elites controls thesecurityforces andnurtures relative peaceful In spite of thechallenges it isfacing, the government https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMHistorique Retrieved from 30 arm%C3%A9e-au-niger/5312989.html Retrieved from https://www.voaafrique.com/a/scandale-au-sein-de-l- sont passés lesmilliards destinés auxtroupes antijihadistes ?VOA. 29 Art 99. 28 arm%C3%A9e-vont-doubler-d-ici-cinq-ans https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20201130-niger-les-effectifs-de-l- de l’armée vont doublerd’icicinqans.Retrieved from 27 certain members oftheregular armyattempted acoup. In fact, inDecember 2015,President Issoufou claimedthat Larccher, L.(2015, December 12).Tentative decoup d’État auNiger. Perspective Monde.(2020,November 11).Niger. Politique intérieure. Abdoul-Razak Idrissa(2020,March où 3).Scandale auNiger: République duNiger. (2010).Constitution delaVIIèmeRépublique. Radio Internationale. leseffectifs (2020,November 30)Niger: 28 Generally, NAFandsecurityforces nurture 29 This carries a potential 27 Niger’s armed - 31 30

keeping the environment safe is suitable for business. entrepreneurs at bay. Traffickers endorse the game as uses thoseso-called agreements to keep violence informal andtacit accords. Inturn,thegovernment intricate relationships withthegovernment based on Niger. constitute seriousgovernance andsecuritychallenges in (ISGIS) whose cells are active at borderlands with Mali, and especially, theIslamicState intheGreater Sahara traffickers and terrorist groups (both potential spoilers) proliferation ofcriminalgroups inNiger. Thus,illicit government to minimisebloodshedandprompt the informal agreements have concluded they withthe economy inNiger. may exacerbate rivalries and prompt a militarised illicit the increment indrugsandgold convoys robberies emerging clashes between trafficking groups due to in order to guarantee Niger’s stability. Inaddition,the borderlands urge theneedto counter thephenomenon connections withterrorist organisations alongside for thestate’s long-term stability. More so, traffickers’ apparatus, suchcollaboration remains trickyandrisky manifestation ofcriminaltieswithinthegovernmental be part oftheinformal accords withstate officialsora protect convoys for cash. Nigerien securityforces are often said to be co-opted to prosperous businessmensuchasCherif OuldAbidine. which highlights thefact that key traffickers are generally alsoextendThey theirscope to businesscommunities, and trafficking migrants, among others. business activities suchassmugglingdrugs,arms,gold especially innorthernNiger, whoundertake illegal Illicit traffickers are mostly community members, Illicit Traffickers and Terrorist Groups instability could come from thearmy. andcivilians.Hence,among themilitary thespectrum of His declaration was followed by waves ofarrestations 36 35 in West Africa and central Sahel.December 2020. 34 33 tional-Organised-Crime-in-the-Liptako-Gourma-2772020.pdf loads/2020/07/Policy-Brief-Community-Engagement-in-Fighting-Transna- brief. Page 3.Retrieved from http://ipss-addis.org/wp-content/up Liptako-Gourma. Institute for Peace andSecurityStudies. Policy tional Organised Crimeinthe 32 rique/Tentative-de-coup-d-Etat-au-Niger-2015-12-18-1394672 La Croix. Retrieved from https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Af pour laTransparence budgétaire (ROTAB). TheCAPAN, Plateforme Paysanne (PFP)andRéseau desOrganisations the collectives have emerged. Amongthesecollectives are Since theearly 2000s,several formal thematic-oriented game-changer in Niger's volatile political landscape. Nigerien civilsociety (NCS) appears to beapotential Nigerien CivilSociety International 6).Ibid. Page crisisgroup. (2020, January 6. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 12. Quote from aninternational expert ofterrorism and organised crime International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 12. Soumahoro, M.(2020).CommunityEngagement inFightingTransna- Collectif desAssociationsPastorales duNiger(CAPAN), 36 That would, inturn,threaten the 35 Notwithstanding that this may 32 They nurture They - - 34 33

cost oflivinganddemocratic construction. dynamics through concerns raised they aboutthesoaring CCAC substantially influence the Nigerien socio-political social sectors were alsodemanded. allocationnecessary ofimportant resources to basic reduction ingovernment’s standards oflivingand to mining, telecommunication and oil companies, of disproportionate tax-related advantages granted act that itconsidered sociallyunfair. Cancellation the 2018protests to bringdown thenational finance be/IMG/pdf/2016_mta_niger_societe_civile_13852.pdf litiques. Centre Tricontinental. Page 2.Retrieved from https://www.cetri. 41 ciale-et-tr%C3%A8s-favorable-aux-entreprises-de tation-contr-la-loi-de-finances-conso%C3%A9r%C3%A9e-comma-antiso soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9-civile-arr%C3%AAt%C3%A9s-lors-dune-manifes https://www.business-humanrights.org/fr/niger-des-dirigeants-de-la- de télécommunications. Retrieved from contre laloidefinances jugée antisocialeet très favorable auxentreprises Niger :Desdirigeants delasociété civilearrêtés lors d’unemanifestation 40 la-loi-des-finances-conduit-en-prison/ https://www.brennpunkt.lu/en/article/le-niger-sous-issoufou-contester- finances conduit enprison.Brennpunkt. IssueNr. 302.Retrieved from 39 http://www.worldcoalition.org/fr/ROTAB.html Retrieved from 38 Associations%20Pastorales,unes%20par%20rapport%20aux%20autres. http://capan-niger.e-monsite.com/#:~:text=Le%20Collectif%20des%20 Retrieved from 37 militants threaten Niger’s stability, theG5SahelandLake External actors playvariable roles inNiger. Whilst Islamist External Actors protest against human rights violations inNiger. is alarger civilsociety platform that emerged in2017to The living conditions oftheNigerien citizenry. sharing acommon global visionwhichisto ameliorate the industries. The organisation encompasses 12 associations transparency inNiger’s publicaffairs, especiallyinmining The ROTAB, created in2006,aimsto struggle for regions. associations withbranches inNiger’s eightadministrative DLP ofApril29,2003.Itcurrently comprises 72herders’ state authorities following the order no. 133/MI/DGAPJ/ national TheCAPAN levels. was legally recognised by harmonise herders’ advocacy strategy both at local and in 2000by eightassociations. Itaimsto coordinate and as aframe for concertation amongherders, was created CSOs are largely informal. credibility. Additionally, most ofNiger’s unquantifiable dependence. Allthesefactors and hampertheirefficiency on political acquaintances andfavouritism, financial weaknesses suchasopacity inmanagement, biasbased governmental actions and decisions.However, NCS has ability to monitor andprompt reforms ofanti-democratic Nigerien civil society constitutes a serious check with the Alou,M.T. (2016).Niger :lasociété civileface auxmutations sociopo Business andHumanRights Resource Centre. (2018,September 9). Tcherno, H.B.(2020).Le Niger sousIssoufou :Contester laloides WorldCoalition against theDeath Penalty. (2020).ROTAB Niger. CAPAN. (2020).CAPAN :Collectif Pastorales desAssociations duNiger. Cadre de Concertation et d’Actions citoyennes (CCAC) 37 40 CAPAN, ROTAB and 38 41 Thus,the 39 Itled - - - facilitated ofhumanitarian thedelivery aid. reverse Boko Haram’s gain, freed captured civiliansand Operations in2017,2018and2019highlycontributed to helped stem Boko Haram’s proliferation in2015and2016. states. good governance for mutual benefits among its member- continuumdevelopment sustained by democracy and It seeksto implementpoliciesfollowing thepeace and including Mali,BurkinaFaso, Niger, ChadandMauritania. that brought considerable dividends. The MJTFledseveral operations military (2015-2019) MJTF The Lake ChadBasin's CommissionandTheir 16, 2014. on February The G5Sahelisaninter-governmental organisation created The G5Sahel (MNJTF) work towards fostering peace. Chad BasinAuthority’s Multinational JointTask Force 48 47 46 45 tional JointTask Force inFightingBoko Haram? Report 291/Africa. Page i. 44 43 www.g5sahel.org/presentation 42 misunderstanding over priorities. However, theeffectiveness oftheMJTFhassuffered Basin States (Cameroon, Nigeria, ChadandNiger). The Lake ChadBasin's Commissiongathers theLake Chad against terrorist factions that threaten allfive countries. a contribution of Benin, is commissioned to pool resources States created theMJTFwhichunderits current form, with coordination would benefitallfive states, includingNiger. delayed. Animprovement oftheforce andbetter this particular context, vital procurements are generally sufficient resources to ensure sustainable funding.In reveal reluctant to cede command to theforce andlack Niger andthewholeSahel region remains low. Burkina Faso. Yet, its influence onpeace andsecurity in strength inNiger’s borderlands, especially withMaliand the JointForce could beameans to reinforce military of Nigerien troops withrespect to thesize oftheterritory, light ofits mandate. Consideringtheinsufficientnumber region in with NAFinthe Tillabéry it jointly intervenes point preyed on by extremist groups and traffickers. Thus, Mali andBurkinaFaso, whichisasensitive andstrategic the Liptako-Gourma, athree-border area spanning Niger, trafficking intheSahel.Its actions particularly focus on (JFG5) that aimsto combat violentextremism andillicit International Crisis Group. (2020, July7).Ibid.Page i. International CrisisGroup. (2020,July7).Ibid.Page i. International CrisisGroup. (2020,July7).Ibid.Page i. International CrisisGroup. (2020,July7).Ibid.Page i. International CrisisGroup. (2020,July7).What Role for theMultina- G5 Sahel.(2014).Ibid. G5Sahel.(2014).Présentation duG5Sahel.Retrieved from https:// 43 Inthat context, theG5Sahelset ajointforce 42 It features five Sahelian countries 48 TheMJTF’s states 46 Thoseoperations 47 44 The 45

7 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 8 boxes. Omar vigorously contested the results from the ballot and the MNSD-Nassara of former Prime Minister Seyni jointly ledby MODEN/FA-Lumana Africa ofHamaAmadou a 23-party Coalition for theAlternative 2016(COPA 2016) the ballot boxes. million registered voters expressed their suffrages at to therun-off. delegates the process who observed from the campaigns well-conducted andpeaceful by ECOWAS andtheEU d’état, were notably hailedasgenerally fair, transparent, The 2011 elections that took place after the 2010 coup CONFLICT DYNAMICS 55 54 53 52 51 50 http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2237_11.htm in 2011.Retrieved from 49 organised onMarch 12. majority inthepresidential polls,run-off elections were parliamentarians representing parties inCOPA 2016cease the second round ofpresidential elections demandingthat opposition parties immediately andthey withdrew from the constitutional court exacerbated tensions among the validation results ofthepreliminary ofthefirst round by votes. Niger (MDN-Falala), was thenelected with58.04%ofthe by the Mouvement Démocratique pourl'Emergence du culprit for several irregularities andmassive fraud. enamelled by tensions. The 2016elections, contrary to thoseof2011,were was re-elected for asecond term of5years in2016. to generate incomes, necessary President Mahamadou a pincer movement andtheweak capacity ofthecountry mainly dueto growing securitythreats that cought Niger in difficulty intheimplementation ofhiselectoral promises mobilised to address thesecurityturmoil.Despite the resources allocated to other regions were certainly executions projects ofdevelopment while,ontheother, certain regions prevented (Diffa adequate andTillabéry) regions. Ontheonehand,securitythreats that spiltover to programmesdevelopment inalltheeightadministrative instability that prevents ahomogenous implementation of Unfortunately, since 2015, Niger has been experiencing ambitious multi-sectoral “Renaissance” programme. and materialised hispolitical promise by elaborating the ameliorate thelivingconditions ofNigerien citizenry the parliament. President Mahamadouthenvowed to with smallerparties to secure anabsolute majorityat Interparliamentary Union(2020). Ibid. Interparliamentary Union(2020). Ibid. Interparliamentary Union(2020).Ibid. Inter-parliamentary union.(2011).Ibid. Inter-parliamentary union.(2011).Ibid. Inter-parliamentary union.(2011).Ibid. Inter-parliamentary union.(2011).Niger National Assembly. Elections 52 54 In addition, the new rulingcoalition Inaddition,thenew set analliance TheCOPA 2016claimedtherulingparty was the 49 Itwas reported that 49.22%ofthe6.7 50 As nocandidate As secured therequired 51 53 , supported Oppositionparties gathered in 55 The victory of92%thevotesvictory intherun-offelections. President Issoufou was elected with a landslide anew from organised crime-related activities. efficient as Niger managed to minimise violence resulting a means ofconflict management. Thisstrategy isquite relies on (informal) agreements with criminal factions as through aseries ofinsurgencies. unfair management anddistribution ofstate resources communities whomanifested theirgrievances over the northern Niger and strained relationships withTuareg This isdueto state withdrawal from alarge portionof were ingrained insociallifestyles asameans ofsurvival. migrants smuggling are of concern. These illicit activities criminalisation. Drugandgold trafficking as well as northern part andtends to besuffering agradual state Niger isprey to transnational organised crimeinits democracy, little inthat hasbeenachieved regard. as welldevelopment as the promotion of rule of law and drew theirelectoral strategies onsocialandeconomic Although themajorparties, includingtherulingparty, activities intheNational Assembly. 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 organised crime-related activities asameans ofsurvival. true asanalysesshow that local communities consider European , that isnot pointofview locally activities are considered as profoundly reprehensible for crime inNiger would becounter-productive. Ifsuch but taking further aggressive steps to address organised recent miningboomabsorbedthethenidle individuals shook arrangements withtraffickers. issued by Niger’s state authoritiesunderEU’s pressure management systems. Themigrant smuggling ban of2015 Niger, could upset thealready strained local conflict in Niger, acore priorityintheEU’s strategy regarding another source ofdestabilisation. Disrupting trafficking The pressure exerts onNiger by theEUappears to be fragile into andturnthecountry acriminalstate. interests. That may render Niger’s institutional bases and nurture shadowy economic networks for personal priorities. State apparatus mightbeusedto protect be aboutgrabbing market shares instead ofnational aggravate political rivalries as the main interest would and political parties by traffickers ortheirproxies could Niger’s politicsandstability. Theseizure ofstate power kind ofapproach could have negative repercussions on Soumahoro, M.(2020). Ibid. Page 1. International 6).Ibid. Page crisisgroup. (2020, January 4. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January i. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January i. Soumahoro, M.(2020).Ibid.Page 2. Interparliamentary Union(2020).Ibid. Interparliamentary Union(2020).Ibid. 59 56 TheNigerien state Inspite oftensions, 61 60 Certainly, the However, such 57 62 58 mier-ministre-brigi-rafini-/1514306 https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/niger-motion-de-censure-contre-le-pre premier ministre . AA. Retrieved from 63 the current political openground. lead to aparticularly violentsocio-political arena dueto the infiltration ofcriminalsinto thestate apparatus may political parties could use it to their advantage. More so, negatively influenced by thecurrent socialturmoilas Furthermore, theupcoming election of2021maybe strategy to counter violentextremism, amongothers. Prime Minister Brigi Rafini’s government for his ineffective of Parliament (MPs) from oppositionparties against motion ofnon-confidence was introduced by 35Members an already weakened internal context. Infact, in2019,a should seek further financialresources to avoid upsetting to further equip Nigerien troops but state authorities and Chinegodar deadly attacks highlighted theurgency for better livingconditions. The2019and2020 Inatès to balance security needs andthecitizenry’s demand growing duringthelast 10years. Itis,therefore, critical expenses. expenditures Military have beenrelatively income aimingat supportingsecurityanddefence-related could belinked to tax increment imposedto generate remains. Someofthereasons for theinternal turmoil protests showed how fragile thesocialstability inNiger over the growing cost of living. The 2018 generalised Niger’s fragile situation isfurtherstrained by socialprotests Lassaad, B.,A.(2019,June6).Niger :motion decensure contre le 63 - be carefully addressed. living conditions isamongthemainconcerns that needto intertwined. Inaddition,theinternal turmoil over poor socio-political spheres andtheterrorist threats that are to thegrowing infiltration oforganised crimeinto its in crisis.However, remains thecountry underalertdue In sum,Niger cannot currently be classified as acountry their leadership. effectively track political andbusinessentrepreneurs in diversify andprivilege independentfundingsources and To materialise thisopportunity, Nigerien CSOs should an important soclefor theregulation ofstate actions. the interest of the people. In that sense, CSOs could be organisations (CSOs) could bendpolitical decisionsto the internal actors’ section) indicates how civilsociety highlighted above (seetheparagraph oncivilsociety in amelioration ofliving conditions. Theexample of2018 around criticalmobilise the citizenry issues related to the actions inNiger. Thisisillustrated by its capacity to the strength itshows inbalancing andcheckingpolitical Civil society may appear as a game-changer considering 9 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 10 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report country’s general elections. deployed in Niger for about two weeks to monitor the comprising 40members from 20African countries was impactful electoral observations. further efforts shouldbemade for more efficientand probably beexplained by budgetary concerns. However, contested President Issoufou’s victory. In fact, this could the 2016general elections were enamelledby riots that assess transparency andfairness considering thefact that data collected maynot have beensufficient to thoroughly in Niger. In that the 2016general vein, AU observed elections AU’s role inNiger hasbeenlimited to electoral observation. The AfricanUnion(AU) RESPONSES ASSESSMENT OFCURRENT 69 68 items/ int/ecowas-shows-solidarity-with-niger-through-the-donation-of-food- through thedonation offood items. Retrieved from https://www.ecowas. 67 66 65 Retrieved from https://au.int/fr/node/21006 andPresidentialmentary Elections intheRepublic ofNiger. Press release. 64 that affected the country. state authoritiesintheaftermath ofthesevere floods In 2018,itdonated 6,528tons ofgrains to theNigerien ECOWAS played arole inhumanitarian interventions. ECOWAS was little to entirely cover such a vast territory. among others. Yet, deployed thenumberofobservers Union's Electoral Observation andMonitoring Missions, and the AU Guidelines for the African AU Declaration onthePrinciplesGoverning Democratic including theAfrican Charter onDemocracy, theOAU/ light oftheAfrican relevant elections-related instruments of sorghum and 3,000 tons of millet. Food Securityandincluded 3,028tons ofmaize, 500tons million Euros obtained through theEUfundedRegional external supportto its achieve missions. EU indicates theinstitutional ofECOWAS dependency on the persons inneed.Funding of suchinitiatives by the Thus, ECOWAS could not ensure effective distribution to system oftheaiddistribution seemedto belacking. no guarantee oftransparency was given. dispatch the items to alleviate thethenfood security crisis, authorities vowed to identify the persons in need and ECOWAS. (2018,August 8).Ibid. ECOWAS. (2018,August 8).Ibid. ECOWAS. (2018,August 8).ECOWAS shows solidaritywithNiger The African 21).Ibid. Union. (2016,February The African 21).Ibid. Union. (2016,February TheAfrican 21).Arrival Union.(2016,February Statement -Parlia- 64 Its electoral observation mission(MOEUA) 67 Thedonation amounted to 56 65 Themissionwas deployed in 68 Although state 69 Amonitoring 66 Thus,the reflect anapplication oftheprinciplesubsidiarity. that AU’s mission failed to though this could even achieve, in allregions ofNiger for aneffective national coverage transparent elections inNiger. were deployed Observers Governance. It aimed to guarantee credible, free and ProtocolSupplementary onDemocracy andGood of themissionwas madeinlinewiththeECOWAS ensure impartiality andtransparency. the council ofthewiseandparliament, to necessary excluded members from theECOWAS court ofjustice, seized. calibre ammunitionaswell aswatching gadgets were pistols, grenades, anti-tank rockets, several boxes ofsmall 77 76 darmes-au-niger/ v taire-reprend-ses-operations-militaires-et-realise-une-importante-saisie- https://www.jeuneafrique.com/844330/politique/g5-sahel-la-force-mili- Retrieved from prend sesopérations et réalise une«importante saisied’armes auNiger. 75 au Mali.Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/afrique/44655942 74 73 72 71 tions-presidentielles-au-niger-2/?lang=fr Communique depresse. Retrieved from https://www.ecowas.int/elec 70 operations.military the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel (JFG5) had suspended Since the deadly attacks on their headquarters in 2018, The G5Sahel former president, (acting) AmosSawyer. member-states (except Niger) and was led by ’s The mission comprised from all ECOWAS 130 observers mission inNiger duringthegeneral elections of2016. Additionally, ECOWAS deployed anelectoral observation were approved by theNigerien constitutional court. elections, thus, partly failed results althoughpreliminary Their objective to ensure free, transparent andcredible opposition parties) that enamelledtheelectoral process. despite multipleviolence andprotests (instigated by mission hailedNiger’s 2016elections asfree andfair the G5SahelinMadama(northernNiger). in 2020.From October 1to 10,anoperation was ledby was appointed. Operations were subsequentlyresumed and Oumarou Namata Gazama, aNigerien commander illicit material were subsequentlyarrested. were loaded in the car. The five individuals conveying the Sniper weapons equipped withlaserandammunitions the G5Sahelintercepted a4x4vehicle coming from Libya. Jeune Afrique. (2019,October 18).Ibid. Jeune Afrique. (2019,October 18).Ibid. Jeune Afrique. (2019,October 18).G5Sahel:laforce militaire re BBC.(2018,June29).Uneattaque duQGG5Sahelfait sixmorts Ibid. CEDEAO. (2016,February). Ibid. CEDEAO. (2016,February). Ibid. CEDEAO. (2016,February). Élections Présidentielles CEDEAO.(2016,February). auNiger. 76 Earlier, onOctober 4,theNigerien battalion of 74 Theforce was thenrestructured 72 71 Thedeployment Itsystematically 75 77 Machineguns, 73 - - The 70

82 81 80 tions-/4750854.html https://www.voaafrique.com/a/la-force-du-g5-sahel-reprend-ses-opera- Retrieved from 79 78 Niger. overcome migration andcrime-related activities in EU tends to pressure theNigerien state authoritiesto onmigrationinterventions andorganised crime.The aprominent partnerAs ofNiger, theEUfocuses its (USA) the UnitedStatesofAmerica The EuropeanUnion(EU)and of standby. the Nigerien commander into hopeafter several months These recent successes tend to turntheappointmentof approaches. and crimeactors (traffickers); andprivilege aggressive arrangement systems between thestate authorities ignore thelocal context characterised by informal conflict strategic migration routes. TheEU, induecourse, tends to the potential to threaten Europe) and allow control on preventinterventions criminal “sanctuarization” (with actual benefit of European states considering that such security threats intheSahelandNiger, itwas merely to the Although theseactions officiallyled to the worsening of million. (UAE) promised to donate anaggregated amountof€420 countries including France and the United Arabic Emirates means, equipmentandadequate training althoughsome sporadic withlittle impact. Theforce lacksfinancial method. and mobilisethelocal potential to implementasmoother The EUneedsto adapt its response to thelocal constraints tools that would inturnfoster aprobable collapse ofNiger. be considered asriskyitstrains local conflict mitigation Nigerien state authoritieswas aresult oftheEUpressure. International 6).Ibid. Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 19. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 22. International 6).Ibid.Page crisisgroup. (2020,January 11. 20).LaforceVOA. (2019,January du G5Sahelreprend sesopérations. Jeune Afrique. (2019,October 18).Ibid. 80 The2015ban onmigrant smugglingissuedby 79 78 However, theJFG5 Sahel’s operations remain 82 As such, the EU’s As approach inNiger could 81

airbase 201established inAgadez (NorthernNiger). support aswell astroop transportation aircraft from its operating MQ-9Reaper drones for surveillanceandtactical terrorism strategy. More so, theUS Africom started cooperation isanimportant asset for Niger inits counter- Suchastrongequipment. andglobally healthy military Niger’s Armed forces concretely comprises training and in fightingsecuritythreats. TheUS Africom supportto to reinforce the capacity of the country’s armed forces Command (US Africom) supportto Niger’s forces aiming military. Thisismanifested by theUnited States Africa The USA’s bilateral collaboration withNiger isessentially com/daily-news/2019/11/01/us-begins-drone-operations-out-niger.html NigerNew Airbase. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military. 83 Oriana, P. (2019,November 1). US Begins Drone Operations Outof 83 11 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 12 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report SCENARIOS feeling ofmarginalisation amongcitizens. the increasing cost of living and the subsequent (eventual) This would helpto minimisegrowing resentments over particularly to rural remote zones that are more inneed. provide adecent livelihood to theentire citizenry, but enhancement inaridregions shouldbefacilitated to Alternatives suchasagricultural production andirrigation should alsocompulsorily occur to avoid anybloodshed. migration. Smooth changes instate-criminal relationships to thecurrent issuesrelated to security, crimeand local constraints andmobiliselocal potential to respond that allow flexibility. State authoritiesshouldconsider the partners. Thiswould needconcrete actions ontheground political willfrom theNigerien state authoritiesandtheir State criminalisation would beunderminedby astrong Best CaseScenario disparities. Niger’s Achilles’ heelthat crystallises North-South social task asfood insecuritywould remain to beamong environmental constraints willnot facilitate thestate’s emergencies.living andmilitary Moreover, thecurrent struggling to balance socialdiscontent over thecost of of suchhypothesis. Internally thegovernment willbe of the regional context could accelerate the realisation ground over extremist groups. Thegradual degradation regions tends althoughthemilitary Tillabéry to reassert sporadic attacks maykeep occurring intheDiffa and nurturing with organised crime entrepreneurs. Deadly the complacent arrangements that state authoritiesare state apparatus willcontinue havingfertile ground dueto responses are lacking.Theinfiltration ofcriminalsinto the The current situation inNiger maypersist asadequate Most LikelyScenario potential to jeopardize Niger's stability. of at least mutiniesorcoup d'états, whichhave ahigh the country's troops military may increase theprobality degrade. Additionally, thediscontements nurtured among livelihood andthehumanitarian situation would seriously handling social demands over the amelioration of citizen’s In due course, the state’s capacities would be weakened in strategically positionthemselves intheSahel-Sahara strip. game, knowing that are they currently targeting Niger to electoral race. Besides,extremist groups mayendorse the This could occur in the context of the 2021 upcoming among andbetween factions to control market shares. statehood. Political competitions mayturninto astruggle intoturn thecountry alawlessterritory withlimited infiltration into thestate by criminalentrepreneurs would Niger’s collapse isquasiplausibleinthisprospect. The Worst CaseScenario achieve betterachieve results onthesecuritization ground. discontentment oftroops against armyofficers andhelp forces.the military This may help to reduce the growing use ofthenational budget for defence andequipmentof Implement existing mechanismsto effectively track the last decade. showed limited impacts throughout theSahelduring intensification ofmilitary-centred approaches that region. FailureTillabéry to do sowould lead to anover- recently soasto sustain theirreach outstrategy inthe Implement concrete endogenous measures adopted Corruption. well as theAU Convention onPreventing andCombating good governance, theAfrican Charter onDemocracy as with theECOWAS additionalprotocol ondemocracy and the state apparatus. This should be implemented in line prevent theinfiltration ofcriminalentrepreneurs into andimplementatransparencyDevelop framework to the advantage to besmooth althoughitmaybelengthy. help to weaken traffickers’ communal leverage andhave perceived asmeans Thiswould particularly ofsurvival. livelihood asalternatives to criminalactivities locally Foster ground for the of licit development sources of To theStateofNiger STRATEGIC OPTIONS West Africa (GIABA),for example. Governmental Action Group against Launderingin Money thoroughly implemented in Niger through the Inter- on Preventing andCombating Corruption shouldbe thosewhoare inneed.Thus,theAUserves Convention have infiltrated the state apparatus. Aid diverted never of diversion by potential criminal entrepreneurs that may Elaborate anaidmonitoring system to minimise therisks are solidarityandeconomy prone. respective constitutional acts of theAU and ECOWAS that be a starting This should be done in light of the point. strengthen formal economy intheirnorthernpart could equitablein developing investment frameworks to and foster licitmeans ofresilience. SupportingNiger programmes that aimto mitigate risks ofconflicts through technical assistances inimplementing crime and violent extremism. This may be manifested Undertake actions to supportNiger infightingorganised To theAUandECOWAS methods that maybrutally upset thosearrangements. potential criminalbloodshed.TheJFG5 shouldnot adopt have certain advantages that keep Niger away from a repercussions on the consolidation of statehood, they and local communities mighthave several negative arrangements ofthestate withcriminalentrepreneurs in Niger whileplaying itcarefully. Although conflict Enhance actions against transnational organised crime To theG5Sahel 13 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 14 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report The World Bank. (2017, NovemberThe World Bank. 28). of Niger priorities for ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity. Systematic country The Fund for Peace. (2020).Fragile states index annualreport 2020.Page 7.Retrieved from https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/ Soumahoro, M.(2020).CommunityEngagement inFightingTransnational Organised CrimeintheLiptako-Gourma. Institute for Peace République duNiger. (2016).Stratégie et dedéveloppement desécurité dansleszones sahélo–sahariennesduNiger. République duNiger. (2010).Constitution delaVIIèmeRépublique. Organisation desNationUnies.(2012).Guidepratique pourlaprévention et lagestion desconflits liésàlaterre et auxressources Inter-parliamentary Union. (2011).Niger National Assembly. Elections in 2011.Retrieved from http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/ Inter-parliamentary Union(2020).Data retrieved from https://data.ipu.org/node/124/elections?chamber_id=13476 International CrisisGroup. (2020,July7).What Role for theMultinational JointTask Force inFightingBoko Haram? Report 291/Africa. International 6).ManagingTrafficking crisisgroup. (2020,January inNorthernNiger. Africa Report N°285. Global Firepower. (2020).Niger Strength. Military Retrieved from https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail. G5 Sahel.(2014).Présentation duG5Sahel.Retrieved from https://www.g5sahel.org/presentation Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI). Report —Niger. (2020).Country Assanvo, W., Dakono B.,Théroux-Bénoni, L-A., andMaïga, I.(2019,December). Violentextremism, organised crimeandlocal conflicts in Alou, M.T. (2016).Niger :lasociété civileface auxmutations sociopolitiques. Centre Tricontinental. Retrieved from https://www.cetri.be/ REFERENCES diagnostic. uploads/2020/05/fsi2020-report.pdf Engagement-in-Fighting-Transnational-Organised-Crime-in-the-Liptako-Gourma-2772020.pdf and SecurityStudies. Policy brief. Retrieved from http://ipss-addis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Policy-Brief-Community- conflict/pdf/publications/land-conflict.pdf naturelles. Groupe inter-agences pourlesactions préventives. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/fr/land-natural-resources- arc/2237_11.htm asp?country_id=niger Liptako-Gourma. Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS). Africa report no. 26. IMG/pdf/2016_mta_niger_societe_civile_13852.pdf 2010 October constitution -New adopted to restore civilianruleapproved inareferendum. junta2010 -Military appoints atransitional government ledby acivilianprimeminister, MahamadouDanda. government. TheAfrican Union suspendsNiger. 2010 February -President Tandja isousted inacoup andaseniorarmyofficer, ColSalouDjibo, namedhead ofamilitary candidates. attempts that block hisconstitutional changes. MrTandja’s supporters over victory independent winoverwhelming 2009 October -Oppositionboycotts election meant to replace theparliament that President Tandja dissolved to avoid more years andgives himbroader powers. 2009 August -Much-criticized referendum constitution endorses anew whichallows President Tandja to rulefor three Constitutional Courtrulesagainst hisplansfor areferendum onwhether to allow himto seekathird term. 2009 May-June -President Mamadou Tandja suspendstheconstitution and assumes emergency powers after after talks intheLibyan capital, Tripoli. 2009 April-Government andTuareg rebels oftheMovement ofNiger People for Justice (MNJ)agree to endhostilities 2008 June-Police arrest former PrimeMinister HamaAmadouoncharges ofembezzlingstate funds. staged deadly attacks over thepast sixmonths. 2007 August -Government declares alert inthenorth,givingarmygreater powers to fightTuareg rebels whohave 2005 July-International CourtofJustice awards Niger most oftheriver islandsalongits disputed border withBenin. The rebellions are putdown. 2002 August -Soldiers mutinyintheeast andthecapital demanding thepayment ofwage arrears andbetter conditions. 1999 August constitution -New reversing theincrease inpresidency’s powers approved inareferendum. lifted. constitution1996 May-New givingthepresident increased powers approved inareferendum; ban onpolitical parties -Ousmaneousted1996 January inacoup ledby ColIbrahim Mainassara, whobans allpolitical parties. constitution1992 -New allowing multiparty elections ratified. 1990 -Rebellion by Tuareg peopleinthenorthbegins. constitution1989 -Anew bringsNiger back to civilianrule,butunderaone-party system; re-elected Seybou president. thearmedforces’1987 -AliSeybou, chiefofstaff, succeeds Kountche whodiesofabrain tumour. 1974 -HamaniDiorioverthrown coup inthemilitary ledby Lt-Col Kountche. Seyni 1968-1973 -Severe drought devastates Niger’s livestock andcrop production. 1960 -Niger becomes parliament independent; elects HamaniDioripresident. 1960-2020 CONFLICT TIMELINE 15 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 16 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Niger Conflict Insights Report 2020 August -Terrorists kill8humanitarian agents, 6French citizens andtheirtwo Nigerien collaborators. the lives of89soldiers region). inChinegodar (Tillabéry - The deadliest2020 January terrorist attack undertaken by suspected Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) claims 2019 December -71Nigerien soldiers assassinated duringadeadly attack ledby ISGSinInatès region). (Tillabéry 2018 -Unrests against thefinance billwhichcriticssaidunfairly increases cost oflivingfor thepoorpeople. 2017 October -Three US commandos onajointpatrol withlocal troops are killedinanambushnear . to theMovement for OnenessandJihadinWest Africa. 2017 March - State of emergency declared in western areas bordering Malifollowing attacks blamedon militants linked in thecentral cityofAgadez. 2016 September -TheUS confirms that base itisbuildingamilitary that iscapable ofdeploying drones against militants Amadou. 2016 March -MahamadouIssoufou isre-elected inarun-offelection boycotted by supporters Hama ofhisopponent, child-trafficking charges. Heislater approved asa candidate for the forthcoming presidential polls. 2015 November -Oppositionleader HamaAmadouisarrested onhisreturn to ayear thecountry after fleeing to avoid 2015 February -Niger agrees to contribute to aregional force to fightBoko Haram militants. 2014 May-Amanissentenced to four years injailthefirst-ever conviction inthecountry. for slavery north. Thegovernment blamesal-Qaeda-linked militants. 2013 May-Suicidebombers stage separate attacks barracks onmilitary andaFrench-run uranium miningsite inthe misappropriating publicfundsare dropped. 2011 May-Former President MamadouTandja, whowas ousted inthe2009coup, isreleased from prisonafter charges of 2011 March -MahamadouIssoufou winspresidential elections.

Peace and Security Reports

Although key continental and regional institutions have their own early warning reporting systems, policy making within these institutions also benefit from a number of analytical and periodic reports generated by think tanks and research institutes. The Research Unit at IPSS provides brief and critical analyses of the state of peace and security in different African countries as well as critical appraisals of interventions by various African actors. The reports will cover African countries showing positive signs as well as those undergoing negative developments.