The Cyprus Conundrum

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The Cyprus Conundrum TheAmerican Cyprus oreign Conundrum Policy Interests, 25: 299307, 2003 299 Copyright © 2003 NCAP 1080-3920/03 $12.00 + .08 DOI:10.1080/108030390236690 The Cyprus Conundrum Viola Drath he collapse of the latest rounds of the ex- begin with a new starting point and an agree- Thaustive reunification talks on Cyprus with- ment on basic principles. urthermore, he ad- out preconditions in early March 2003 stunned vised Annan that the government of Turkey was many in the international community, but for not ready to sign the requested security guaran- insiders the outcome of the torturous diplomatic tees because such an act would necessitate an au- contretemps did not come as a surprise. If one thorization by parliament.1 focused solely on the divisive core issues, chances for acceptance of the 192-page plan for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus The United Cyprus Republic Problem, presented to the leadership of the Greek and Turkish communities of the divided There was no agreement on the vital core is- island by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in sues. In an unspoken accord, however, the name December 1999, were remote at best. of the new unified state was virtually chosen. Annans desperate effort to force a re- Responding to hard-line Turkish Cypriot leader unification agreement by a yes or no reply Rauf Denktashs refusal to tolerate the continu- backfired. As he urged the leaders of the two ance of the Republic of Cyprus, a government that communities to approve separate, simultaneous had not represented the whole population since referenda to jump-start his bogged-down nego- the forceful destruction of the partnership by tiation process, tied to the date of the Cyprus the Greek Cypriots in 1963, the leaders discussed accession to the European Union, the proposal the terminology and focused on a compromise. came to possess all the earmarks of an ultima- The name of the new partnership state, composed tum. Greek Cypriot President Tassos of two partner or constituent states, would be the Papadopoulos of the Republic of Cyprus condi- United Cyprus Republic.2 tioned his acceptance by informing the secre- In his report Annan disclosed that the bud- tary general that time was needed for a proper get for his effort amounted to $3,148,500. The public campaign on the referendum. The people draft laws ran to approximately 6,000 pages, and, have to know what they are being asked to vote in an open competition, a total of 1,506 flag on, he stated. At the same time, he underlined designs and 111 suggested anthems had been the question of security as an indispensable pre- submitted. The secretary general was disap- requisite and reminded Annan of the importance pointed. Given the intractability and the vari- of Greeces and Turkeys agreeing and commit- able geometry of the issues, he wrote, it is not ting to the vital security provisions of the settle- far-fetched to describe the Cyprus problem as ment plan. a diplomatic Rubiks Cube. He ordered a de- Rauf Denktash, the embattled leader of the tailed report to be prepared by his Cyprus ne- internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic gotiator, Alvara de Soto, and submitted to the of Northern Cyprus, was less circumspect when Security Council. He also ordered the closing of he raised his fundamental objections to the plan his Cyprus offices. Nonetheless, he informed the and asserted that further negotiations had to people of Cyprus that his plan would remain on American oreign Policy Interests 300 Viola Drath the table and should a realistic prospect of fi- 30 years that free movement across the dividing nalizing negotiations with the full backing of line was allowed. Even before Turkish troops, in their motherlands present itself, he would be the wake of a failed Greek Cypriot coup backed ready to assist. by Greece, occupied northern Cyprus in 1974, UN Three weeks after a stalemate developed in peacekeeping forces guarded the 120-mile barbed- the UN-sponsored talks in the Hague, Turkish wired line to prevent violence. As expected, floods Cypriot leader Denktash3blamed by the secre- of Greek Cypriots made pilgrimages to the north tary general, the EU, and Greek Cypriots for the to see relatives and friends and inspect their prop- breakdownmade his move. Under pressure erty while Turkish Cypriots visited the south. from Ankara, which is vying for EU membership, It was a positive gesture, signaling that the he proposed the opening of a dialogue outside the Turkish Cypriot leadership intended to demon- United Nations. In a letter to President Tassos strate that the issue of reunification had not col- Papadopoulos, Denktash offered a six-point con- lapsed with the UNs proposed settlement plan. fidence-building plan.4 Pointing to the socio- Denktashs conciliatory act was lauded by the psychological dimension of the deep crisis of Greek Cypriot daily Alithia as a basis on which confidence between the two communities, he the reunification of the island will be built by the asked that they form a working relationship to people.5 prepare the ground for a comprehensive settle- On the surface, there was nothing objection- ment and, in essence, for the political equality of able about the UNs Comprehensive Settlement the Turkish Cypriot regime. Plan concept. It called for an affirmation that In return for territorial concessions, he re- Cyprus was the common home of Greek and quested the facilitation of freedom of movement Turkish Cypriots, both cofounders of the Repub- and association between the two communities and lic of Cyprus in 1960, and a statement affirming the normalization of the flow of goods, overseas that the tragic events of the past shall never be trade, and travel now impeded by economically repeated. The threat of force or of domination damaging restrictions involving rules on the ori- was to be renounced, and the distinct identity of gin of products that the EU and the Republic each sidemeaning a relationship of political of Cyprus have imposed on the Turkish Republic equality, not one of majority and minoritywas of Northern Cyprus. Denktash also asked for to be enshrined in a new partnership. This part- the elimination of barriers on cultural and sport- nership was to commit itself to respect democratic ing activities. His offer of a separate dialogue principles, individual human rights, and funda- was turned down by the UN, the EU, and mental freedoms as well as to respect each others Papadopoulos, who dismissed the psychological cultural, religious, political, social, and linguistic dimension as a problem and urged the Turk- identities. Previous treatiesabove all, the se- ish Cypriot leader to accept the Plan of the curity Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, assigning Secretary General as a basis for a further nego- Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom roles tiation process. as guarantor stateswere to remain in force. urthermore, the status and structure of the state of Cyprus were to be modeled on Switzerland, its ree Movement federal government, and its cantons. As an inde- pendent state possessing a single international Determined to convince the international legal personality and sovereignty in the form of community of his willingness to cooperate, an indissoluble partnership, Cyprus, it was Denktash took the initiative. In a surprise move, proposed, would have a common state govern- he opened the dividing Green Line for daytime ment exercising the powers specified in the con- cross-border visits. It was the first time in nearly stitution, which would ensure that Cyprus could American oreign Policy Interests The Cyprus Conundrum 301 speak with one voice internationally and in the Given that the majority of Greek Cypriots EU, with two equal constituent or component favor some kind of a settlement and the determi- states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cyp- nation of many Turkish Cypriots to break out of riot voice. Both would sovereignly take up all their political isolation by rallying around the EU powers not vested in the federal government and option that would be in their grasp should a settle- organize themselves freely under their own con- ment be signed before the Republic of Cyprus stitutions. Taking a lesson from the past, the plan becomes a member of the EU in May 2004, it is expressly prohibited partition or secession. This predictable that the world will witness yet an- concept was close to Denktashs resolution favor- other set of reunification talks. ing a good partnership but never the surren- der of our sovereignty and state. Between the Great Powers The Gordian Knot ailed diplomatic efforts to end the division of Cypruscreated by the dramatic events of In order to understand such reasoning, it is 1974, when an attempted coup by the Greek advisable to look to the past. Annan referred to a Colonels was countered by the massive in- Gordian knot of conceptual issues6: Born of vasion of 40,000 Turkish troops occupying bitter experiences and recurring nightmares, Northern Cyprus, amounting to 37 percent of they are psychological and practical in nature and the countrycan be traced over the last three relate to the legal and political interpretations decades. Supported by the continued engage- of the past that divide the parties. Having slowly ment of U.S. administrations and the United but systematically been deprived of the political Nations, the search for a solution of the Cyprus equality promised them during the short exist- problem has not come to an end with the often- ence of the partnership in the Republic of Cyprus, revised, unwieldy Annan plan or Denktashs the component states have sought assurances freedom of movement initiative, which presents that they will be granted equal status, which the best hope to establish the trust and confi- has emerged as the most important component dence that were missing in previous delibera- of any agreement on the future of the new state tions.
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