TheAmerican Cyprus oreign Conundrum Policy Interests, 25: 299307, 2003 299 Copyright © 2003 NCAP 1080-3920/03 $12.00 + .08 DOI:10.1080/108030390236690 The Cyprus Conundrum
Viola Drath
he collapse of the latest rounds of the ex- begin with a new starting point and an agree- Thaustive reunification talks on Cyprus with- ment on basic principles. urthermore, he ad- out preconditions in early March 2003 stunned vised Annan that the government of Turkey was many in the international community, but for not ready to sign the requested security guaran- insiders the outcome of the torturous diplomatic tees because such an act would necessitate an au- contretemps did not come as a surprise. If one thorization by parliament.1 focused solely on the divisive core issues, chances for acceptance of the 192-page plan for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus The United Cyprus Republic Problem, presented to the leadership of the Greek and Turkish communities of the divided There was no agreement on the vital core is- island by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in sues. In an unspoken accord, however, the name December 1999, were remote at best. of the new unified state was virtually chosen. Annans desperate effort to force a re- Responding to hard-line Turkish Cypriot leader unification agreement by a yes or no reply Rauf Denktashs refusal to tolerate the continu- backfired. As he urged the leaders of the two ance of the Republic of Cyprus, a government that communities to approve separate, simultaneous had not represented the whole population since referenda to jump-start his bogged-down nego- the forceful destruction of the partnership by tiation process, tied to the date of the Cyprus the Greek Cypriots in 1963, the leaders discussed accession to the European Union, the proposal the terminology and focused on a compromise. came to possess all the earmarks of an ultima- The name of the new partnership state, composed tum. Greek Cypriot President Tassos of two partner or constituent states, would be the Papadopoulos of the Republic of Cyprus condi- United Cyprus Republic.2 tioned his acceptance by informing the secre- In his report Annan disclosed that the bud- tary general that time was needed for a proper get for his effort amounted to $3,148,500. The public campaign on the referendum. The people draft laws ran to approximately 6,000 pages, and, have to know what they are being asked to vote in an open competition, a total of 1,506 flag on, he stated. At the same time, he underlined designs and 111 suggested anthems had been the question of security as an indispensable pre- submitted. The secretary general was disap- requisite and reminded Annan of the importance pointed. Given the intractability and the vari- of Greeces and Turkeys agreeing and commit- able geometry of the issues, he wrote, it is not ting to the vital security provisions of the settle- far-fetched to describe the Cyprus problem as ment plan. a diplomatic Rubiks Cube. He ordered a de- Rauf Denktash, the embattled leader of the tailed report to be prepared by his Cyprus ne- internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic gotiator, Alvara de Soto, and submitted to the of Northern Cyprus, was less circumspect when Security Council. He also ordered the closing of he raised his fundamental objections to the plan his Cyprus offices. Nonetheless, he informed the and asserted that further negotiations had to people of Cyprus that his plan would remain on
American oreign Policy Interests 300 Viola Drath the table and should a realistic prospect of fi- 30 years that free movement across the dividing nalizing negotiations with the full backing of line was allowed. Even before Turkish troops, in their motherlands present itself, he would be the wake of a failed Greek Cypriot coup backed ready to assist. by Greece, occupied northern Cyprus in 1974, UN Three weeks after a stalemate developed in peacekeeping forces guarded the 120-mile barbed- the UN-sponsored talks in the Hague, Turkish wired line to prevent violence. As expected, floods Cypriot leader Denktash3blamed by the secre- of Greek Cypriots made pilgrimages to the north tary general, the EU, and Greek Cypriots for the to see relatives and friends and inspect their prop- breakdownmade his move. Under pressure erty while Turkish Cypriots visited the south. from Ankara, which is vying for EU membership, It was a positive gesture, signaling that the he proposed the opening of a dialogue outside the Turkish Cypriot leadership intended to demon- United Nations. In a letter to President Tassos strate that the issue of reunification had not col- Papadopoulos, Denktash offered a six-point con- lapsed with the UNs proposed settlement plan. fidence-building plan.4 Pointing to the socio- Denktashs conciliatory act was lauded by the psychological dimension of the deep crisis of Greek Cypriot daily Alithia as a basis on which confidence between the two communities, he the reunification of the island will be built by the asked that they form a working relationship to people.5 prepare the ground for a comprehensive settle- On the surface, there was nothing objection- ment and, in essence, for the political equality of able about the UNs Comprehensive Settlement the Turkish Cypriot regime. Plan concept. It called for an affirmation that In return for territorial concessions, he re- Cyprus was the common home of Greek and quested the facilitation of freedom of movement Turkish Cypriots, both cofounders of the Repub- and association between the two communities and lic of Cyprus in 1960, and a statement affirming the normalization of the flow of goods, overseas that the tragic events of the past shall never be trade, and travel now impeded by economically repeated. The threat of force or of domination damaging restrictions involving rules on the ori- was to be renounced, and the distinct identity of gin of products that the EU and the Republic each sidemeaning a relationship of political of Cyprus have imposed on the Turkish Republic equality, not one of majority and minoritywas of Northern Cyprus. Denktash also asked for to be enshrined in a new partnership. This part- the elimination of barriers on cultural and sport- nership was to commit itself to respect democratic ing activities. His offer of a separate dialogue principles, individual human rights, and funda- was turned down by the UN, the EU, and mental freedoms as well as to respect each others Papadopoulos, who dismissed the psychological cultural, religious, political, social, and linguistic dimension as a problem and urged the Turk- identities. Previous treatiesabove all, the se- ish Cypriot leader to accept the Plan of the curity Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, assigning Secretary General as a basis for a further nego- Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom roles tiation process. as guarantor stateswere to remain in force. urthermore, the status and structure of the state of Cyprus were to be modeled on Switzerland, its ree Movement federal government, and its cantons. As an inde- pendent state possessing a single international Determined to convince the international legal personality and sovereignty in the form of community of his willingness to cooperate, an indissoluble partnership, Cyprus, it was Denktash took the initiative. In a surprise move, proposed, would have a common state govern- he opened the dividing Green Line for daytime ment exercising the powers specified in the con- cross-border visits. It was the first time in nearly stitution, which would ensure that Cyprus could
American oreign Policy Interests The Cyprus Conundrum 301 speak with one voice internationally and in the Given that the majority of Greek Cypriots EU, with two equal constituent or component favor some kind of a settlement and the determi- states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cyp- nation of many Turkish Cypriots to break out of riot voice. Both would sovereignly take up all their political isolation by rallying around the EU powers not vested in the federal government and option that would be in their grasp should a settle- organize themselves freely under their own con- ment be signed before the Republic of Cyprus stitutions. Taking a lesson from the past, the plan becomes a member of the EU in May 2004, it is expressly prohibited partition or secession. This predictable that the world will witness yet an- concept was close to Denktashs resolution favor- other set of reunification talks. ing a good partnership but never the surren- der of our sovereignty and state. Between the Great Powers
The Gordian Knot ailed diplomatic efforts to end the division of Cypruscreated by the dramatic events of In order to understand such reasoning, it is 1974, when an attempted coup by the Greek advisable to look to the past. Annan referred to a Colonels was countered by the massive in- Gordian knot of conceptual issues6: Born of vasion of 40,000 Turkish troops occupying bitter experiences and recurring nightmares, Northern Cyprus, amounting to 37 percent of they are psychological and practical in nature and the countrycan be traced over the last three relate to the legal and political interpretations decades. Supported by the continued engage- of the past that divide the parties. Having slowly ment of U.S. administrations and the United but systematically been deprived of the political Nations, the search for a solution of the Cyprus equality promised them during the short exist- problem has not come to an end with the often- ence of the partnership in the Republic of Cyprus, revised, unwieldy Annan plan or Denktashs the component states have sought assurances freedom of movement initiative, which presents that they will be granted equal status, which the best hope to establish the trust and confi- has emerged as the most important component dence that were missing in previous delibera- of any agreement on the future of the new state tions. Located just 40 miles from the coast of of affairs. Turkey, at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and Problems with the oundation Agreement Asia, linking north and south, the island is of surfaced in discussions of the vital details. Sus- strategic importance to the United States in the picious Turkish Cypriots welcome neither a context of implementing policy initiatives in the revival or survival of the old Republic nor the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, political implications arising from the context including military action in Iraq. Although its of the dissolution of the partnership state, which peace-loving cabinet turned down the U.S. the Greek Cypriots associate with the Turkish request for the use of airports on the east side military invasion of 1974 and the Turkish mi- of the island, Cyprus has granted access to its nority associate with President-Archbishop airspace as well as humanitarian aid. Makarioss aborted pursuit of the union (enosis) The strategic position of the island of with Greece in 1963 and its bloody aftermath. Aphrodite in the Levant has sealed its fate. On Other disagreements involve complex core issues his way to Jerusalem, Richard the Lionheart concerning territorial claims, refugees and made a quick conquest. Throughout the centu- resettlement, property rights and just compen- ries, Cyprus, a state smaller than Connecticut, sation, and governance, as well as demilitariza- was a colony serving various masters. There still tion and security. are two British bases on the island that once
American oreign Policy Interests 302 Viola Drath served the empire by safeguarding its control over Cypriots differ. They accuse the Turkish Cypriot the Suez Canal as well as Jordan and Iraq. More leadership not only of strengthening their sepa- recently, Cyprus has become the focus and a po- rate municipalities but also of deliberately with- litical punching bag in the bitter power struggles drawing their representatives from parliament between Turkey and Greece over control of the and government offices in preparation for a divi- Aegean. Exacerbated by the bipolarity of the cold sive showdown in pursuit of Turkeys policy of war that led to the formation of two conflicting partitioning Cyprus. power blocs, hostilities between these powerful This skirmish was followed by a succession military motherlands created a negative climate of violent bicommunal conflicts, culminating in that is still reflected in the attitudes and actions the confrontation of Greek and Turkish forces of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Many historians in 1974. The military coup detat of the right- have come to the conclusion that the islands wing Greek Colonels to annex the island with troubles were brought on by meddlesome outsid- the help of the Greek Cypriot National Guard ers, not by its ethnically divided inhabitants who, and the ruthless National Organization of Cyp- notwithstanding their unequal numbers, have riot ighters (EOKA-B) was dramatized by the been living side by side for many centuries. ouster of the red Archbishop Makarios, sus- pected of being in league with the Soviet Union, and the subsequent installation of one of Wanted: Political Equality, EOKAs radical rightist leaders named Nikos 19631974 Sampon as president. But the Greek junta, se- cretly encouraged by Washington, which was fearful that Makarios would turn into a Medi- The question of reunifying Greek Cypriots terranean Castro, had miscalculated. Under the with Turkish Cypriots, a minority of more than pretext of guarding against a Greek threat, Tur- 20 percent of a population of 800,000 occupying key deployed its troops and occupied Northern more than one-third of the country, has always Cyprus. Ankara took the position that, as one of centered on true political equality and its safe- the guarantor powers, it had the right to mili- guards. Distrustful Turkish Cypriots have not tary intervention to protect the Turkish minor- forgotten the unsuccessful experiment of power ity and to fulfill its obligations. sharing in the turbulent past of the Republic of The uneasy period between 1963 and 1974 Cyprus, which gained independence from Great was marked by the introduction of UN forces in Britain in 1960. Well remembered by them is the March 1964 to help maintain order, stop the bloody experience of December 1963, when Presi- bloodshed, and establish the Green Line as a dent-Archbishop Makarios, an uncompromising buffer zone. Cypriots endured the arrival of partisan of enosis, supported by the Greek Cyp- 10,000 Greek troops and their enforced remo- riot militia, tried to force the union of the island val by Ankara; the devastation of churches, with Greece and, by subtle, unilateral changes of mosques, and villages; blockades of Turkish en- basic articles of the constitution, sought to abro- claves; hostage taking and ethnic cleansing; the gate the rights, including minority veto power, ramifications of not being able to find out what granted Turkish Cypriots in the 1960 treaties.7 had happened to thousands of Greek and Turk- The crisis started when Turkish Cypriot ish Cypriot men who were missing; and, finally, members of parliament, protesting discrimina- the flight of approximately 160,000 Greek Cyp- tory tactics against their vested interests, declined riots to the south of the island and of about 40,000 to vote for a tax law. Makarios used their stand- Turkish Cypriots to the north. This meant that off as a reason to declare the constitution unwork- half of the displaced persons were Turkish Cyp- able. Assessments of this power play by Greek riots, and one-third were Greek Cypriots.
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The civil strife ended in an unprecedented capital of Nicosiawas to be established as a po- domestic upheaval, the separation of the two litical canton in the north. Drafted by former people along ethnic lines, a redrawn map, the dis- Secretary of State Dean Acheson, acting as Presi- memberment of the independent Republic of dent Lyndon Johnsons Cyprus adviser, the plan Cyprus as a bicommunal partnership state, and was swiftly rejected by Makarios, who held out the emergence of a new political entitythe for independence as a precursor to the whole Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprusin 1983, islands enosis with Greece. after the proclamation by the Turkish Cypriot Expectations that the United Kingdom, one community in 1975 of the Turkish ederated of the guarantor powers for Cyprus, or the State of Cyprus. Seen in the regional context, the United States would intervene and stop the two peoples of Cyprus had become pawns in the Greek junta or the Turkish military assault in Aegean power politics of Greece and Turkey, 1974 proved to be in error. It is no secret in which severely taxed the already strained rela- Nicosia today that Greek Cypriots have never tions between these two NATO members. forgiven Henry Kissinger,9 at that time secre- tary of state, for his ambiguous no action stand or his Delphic diplomatic considerations. Stat- No Help from ing that he thought it most unlikely that Tur- the Guarantor States key would tolerate the union of Cyprus with Greece, he went on to explain that it was obvi- ous to him that Turkey was driving toward a As conditions deteriorated, help was asked of showdown. At the same time, Kissinger ar- UN Secretary General U Thant in March 1968. gued that the United States could not, without He recommended inter-communal talks aimed at cost, resist the Turkish invasion because that a unitary state with communal authority for would be considered as objectively supporting Turkish Cypriots. The negotiators were Glafcos the Greek junta. In Nicosia, many questioned Clerides, then president of the Greek Cypriot- this example of cool-headed realpolitik because controlled House of Representatives, and the it reminded Cypriots of the old divide-and-rule president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal policy perfected by the British Empire in bygone Chamber, Rauf Denktash. Calls for intervention centuries. by the guarantor states went nowhere. Interested in the stability of the southeastern flank of NATO and concerned about the encroachment by the Two Views of the Dysfunction Soviet Union, Great Britain opted for good rela- tions with Turkey and stood aside. Moreover, of the Republics Partnership because it was aware of Makarioss close contacts with Moscow, London exhibited little confidence Greek and Turkish Cypriots have decidedly in the archbishops willingness to compromise. differing interpretations of the timing of the Washington recognized an explosive multina- islands de facto partition. Turkish Cypriots main- tional dispute and recommended intercommu- tain that a functional unification of Cyprus only nal talks to keep the peace. It was an approach lasted from 1960 to 1963, when President that contrasted sharply with the Acheson Plan8 Makarioss relentless pursuit of enosis, with its of 1964, advocating the islands partition and al- religious overtones, and his unwavering intran- lowing the Greek-speaking part to be united with sigence toward Turkish Cypriots ambushed the Greece. or balance, a Turkish military base equal partnership concept on which the union of linking scattered, autonomous Turkish enclave- the two communities was founded. As president cantons in the Greek area, including those in the of Cyprus and archbishop of the Greek
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Autocephalous Eastern Orthodox church, Neglecting Confidence- Makarios embodied the union of church and state. or the religious Greek Cypriot leader, enosis Building Measures clearly meant a spiritual homecoming. To be sure, enosis was a process from which Turkish Mus- lims were automatically excluded. In anticipation When seen in this historical context, one can of achieving this goal, the archbishop proceeded point out fairly that crucial confidence- and to formulate a policy of constitutional amend- security-building measures were never deployed ments and modifications that effectively revoked to establish a climate of mutual trust between the equal political partnership negotiated during the two communities. The result is a profound the settlement of the 1960 oundation Agreement lack of confidence on the part of each party in and Treaty of Guarantee. the other partys goodwill and intentions. Pro- Setting the record straight, the permanent posals to rebuild an intercommunal relationship, representative of Cyprus to the United Nations severed three decades ago, were carelessly cast stated that far from it being President Makarios aside. There were no government-sponsored or his government who asserted that the Con- outreach initiatives to promote a better under- stitution was invalid and dead and buried, it standing between the islands ethnically divided was Turkish Vice President azil Kucuk who on inhabitants. Although some moves in that direc- December 30, 1963, declared the Cyprus Con- tion were made and adopted by the UN Security stitution is dead. There is no possibility of the Council in July 1994 (S 1994/785), there was little Turkish Community living together with the interest in youth exchanges or other means to Greek Community.10 foster cooperative efforts. Based on their assessment of the tempestu- Today, there exists no shared institution, ous events, Greek Cypriots believed the turning commented Ergun Olgun,12 undersecretary of the point that culminated in the partition was by no presidency of the ostracized Turkish Republic means the quest for enosis under the patronage of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Pointing to 30 years of President Makarios and its considerable col- of on-and-off negotiations conducted by the same lateral damage in 1963 but the brutal Turkish adversarial negotiators, Olgun expresses pro- invasion of 1974. found regrets about the crisis of confidence The violent years of civil strife, 19631974, between the two parties. He maintains that the marked by human rights infractions on both lack of dialogue has obstructed a common vi- sides, were followed by a period of tranquility and sion that could act as a blueprint for the new part- economic prosperity in the Republic of Cyprus, nership state, even though the two sides have culminating in its application for membership in overarching common security and economic in- the European Community in 1990, which was terests that could be instrumental in forging a supported at an EU summit in Corfu in 1994. The new relationship. In view of the extended reuni- tranquility was temporarily marred by tension fication talks, he challenges the continued impo- over a threatening massive Turkish military sition of the economically, politically, and socially buildup. To check Turkish air superiority, Greek crippling embargo on the TRNC as a hostile Cypriot President Clerides ordered 48 S-300 sur- act. Export restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot face-to-air-missiles from Russia. The controver- community are based on the contention that such sial decision, backed by Greece, caused Ankara goods are produced on stolen land and must be to threaten military retaliation and forced authorized by the Republic of Cyprus for export Clerides to deploy a costly Russian anti-aircraft by a certificate of origin. The enactment of this missile system, estimated at $227 million, on the process dates to 1977, when an agreement be- Greek island of Crete.11 tween the European Community and the Repub-
American oreign Policy Interests The Cyprus Conundrum 305 lic of Cyprus introduced preferential treatment lic of Cyprus, excluding Turkish Cypriots, prior for Cyprus products to be certified by the cus- to an overall settlement of the Cyprus issue has toms authorities of the exporting State. A UN helped or hindered attempts to resolve differences Security Council resolution of 1983 made clear between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus has that it would not recognize the newly proclaimed become a political pawn in Turkeys campaign to TRNC, established as an independent state in get a foothold in the EU. Moreover, Turkish Cyp- November of that year. Pronouncing the attempt riots were quick to point out that the accession to set up such a state as incompatible with the of Cyprus to the EU is illegal.15 Their claim is 1960 treaty on the joint establishment of the Re- based on international treaties of 1960 that pro- public of Cyprus and the Treaty of Guarantee, hibit the membership of Cyprus in international the Security Council ruled the TRNC to be le- organizations in which Turkey and Greece are gally invalid. In Resolution 550/1984, it con- not both members. Notwithstanding President demned any secessionist activities and advised all Cleridess declaration after the European states not to recognize the purported state of the Councils summit meeting in Copenhagen in De- Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and to cember 2002 that the Republic of Cyprus is now refrain from direct illegal commerce because such even more focused on using EU membership as a an act would equal recognition of the break- catalyst for reunification, it is argued (and not away territory. only in Turkish quarters) that the EUs formal This divide was amply reflected in the atti- invitation to the Republic of Cyprus to join the tude of the participants in the reunification talks. 15-nation regional organization regardless of the Without preparing ground for the resolution of outcome of the UNs settlement talks did not the contentious core13 issues with the simulta- improve the flexibility of the negotiators. neous introduction of small steps aimed at achiev- The collapse of the negotiations is widely in- ing a consensus on soft humanitarian issues of terpreted as a major setback to Turkeys aspira- mutual interest, there was no fallback position tions for EU membership. This assessment was when the talks began to stall. What was needed confirmed by the spokesman for the European to keep the process going and to complement and Commission in Brussels, Jean-Christophe ilori,16 advance the ongoing core negotiations was a dual- who indicated that it would, indeed, be difficult track approach. This perchance more promising to imagine starting negotiations for Turkeys ac- kind of an integrated procedure was bypassed by cession to the EU without an agreement to re- hurried UN negotiators. The concept of con- unite the Mediterranean island by May 2004, structive parallelismmeaning a two-track pro- when the EU completes its enlargement process cess within a framework that renders core issues and takes in a dozen new members. The EUs and humanitarian issues codependentwas in- conclusion appears to be echoed by officials of the troduced by the National Committee on Ameri- State Department, who just witnessed the defeat can oreign Policy (NCAP)14 in January 2000 of their effort to help Turkey onto the EU track and presented to then President Glafcos Clerides by an assertive Quai dOrsay. It also has been and UN negotiator Alvara de Soto. noticed that in order to orchestrate an urgently needed diplomatic success for the overextended United Nations, the secretary general used the Cyprus and Turkey impending EU membership of Cyprus to pressure and the European Union both sides to sign off on his apparently moribund settlement plan. Contrary to prognostications, the political By now it has become an open question equation was not changed by the election of the whether granting EU membership to the Repub- self-assured Greek Cypriot President Tassos
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Papadopoulos, Democratic opposition leader and Lusignans. Passed on to the Republic of Venice veteran of the EOKA, which fought for indepen- in 1489, Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans dence from Great Britain in the 1950s and enosis in 1571. In 1878, they leased Cyprus to Great in the 1960s. Occupied with its parliaments re- Britain, which, by the Treaty of Lausanne in volt against supporting a U.S.-led war against 1925, made it a crown colony and granted it in- Iraq, Ankaras new leadership had different pri- dependence in 1960, whereupon Cyprus joined orities and showed scant inclination to apply pres- the United Nations and the nonaligned move- sure on the reluctant Turkish Cypriot leader. As ment. Disagreements over the breakdown of the yet another deadline to end the division of Cyprus partnership state of the Republic of Cyprus, 1963 came and resulted in yet another deadlock, it be- in the Turkish Cypriot chronology versus 1974 came apparent that both sides harbored strong according to Greek Cypriot history, remain un- reservations not only about each other but also resolved. about the secretary generals high-handed at- tempt to short-circuit the negotiation process by calling for untimely referenda. Unresolved Core Issues
Also unresolved are a number of core issues. History Through Starting with governance and endless disputes Different Lenses over a federation versus a confederation, no agreement was reached on the question of whether a rotating copresidency, implemented by Notwithstanding growing multipolarity in the a Presidential Council consisting of six members, age of globalization, Cyprus remains divided. We two of them Turkish Cypriots, would provide a have managed to reunite Germany. Why is it so fairer political balance than an elected president difficult to reunify Cyprus? The question shows vice president model. There was no consensus on the frustration that exists among diplomats over property rights.17 Almost half of the population the smoldering Cyprus issue. A closer look reveals lost property as a result of intercommunal strife that such comparisons are specious. Greek Cyp- or military action between 1963 and 1974. Greek riotes and Turkish Cypriots, a minority of about Cypriots advocated a solution based on full re- 160,000 people, share no language, no religion, spect for property rights so that displaced per- and no culture. They fail to agree on ancient and sons from either community would have the right recent history. Settled by Mycenaean and to have their property reinstated. Turkish Cyp- Achaean Greeks between the 13th and 11th cen- riots argued that property claims should be turies B.C., the island reflects their language and settled through liquidation by means of a global culture. Yet, according to the historic scenario of exchange and compensation scheme. Stating that the Turkish Cypriots, the first settlers, dating to those properties were redistributed to Turkish- the Stone Age between 7000 and 3900 B.C., ar- speaking refugees and emigrants from Turkey rived from Anatolia and Syria. The parties almost long ago, Denktash called the UN plan not ac- agree on the end of the Hellenistic period, when ceptable to us because it envisages the removal Cyprus became part of the Roman Empire, and of about 100,000 Turkish Cypriots from their although Turkish Cypriots emphasize the inclu- homes. sion of the Byzantine Empire, 3301191, with Three different maps were devised to settle reference to the foundation of Islam, Greek Cyp- the difficult territorial question. With 37 percent riots dwell on Richard the Lionhearts conquest of the territory and 57 percent of the valuable of Cyprus in 1191 and his handover of the island coastline in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot to his rench vassal and counterpart, Guy de minority, hard choices had to be made to find a
American oreign Policy Interests The Cyprus Conundrum 307 balance. Helped by the United Kingdom, which project on Cyprus. She has written nine books, offered to give up less than half of its Sovereign among them Willy Brandt: Prisoner of His Past. Base Area, a proposal was made to allot 29 per- A long-time correspondent for Handelsblatt, she cent of the land and 45 percent of the coastline has taught at American University and writes a to the Turkish Cypriot state. Agreement was column on foreign affairs for The Washington reached on security issues. Resolving that the old Times and other publications here and abroad. Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force, the parties agreed to permit 6,000 Greek and Turk- Notes ish troops to be stationed in the prospective con- stituent states. On the economic front, it was decided that because of the glaring economic dis- 1. Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary Gen- parities between the two states, structural funds eral on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus (S/ and a special fund of 200 million euros, provided 2003/398, 56, 57). by the EU, would be turned over to the Turkish 2. Ibid., 8385. Cypriot state along with compensation for Turk- 3. Ibid., 130. ish settlers whose willingness to go back to their 4. Exchange of letters between Rauf Denktash homeland would alter the demography.18 and Tassos Papadopoulos, April 2, 2003. Secretary General Annan observed that one 5. Andrew Borowiec, The Washington Times, of the problems was that both sides perceived the Apri1 25, 2003. negotiations to be a zero-sum game: One sides 6. Kofi Annan, op. cit., 6263. gain was the other sides loss. Notwithstanding 7. oreign Relations of the United States, current hesitations by the protagonists, the next 19611963, vol. XVI. act of the complex Cyprus drama, involving nu- 8. or the Acheson Plan, see Christopher merous powerful players, may surprise skeptics. Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus (London Reflecting efforts to overcome its painful past, and New York, 1997). different languages, religions, and views of his- 9. Henry Kissinger, The Years of Upheaval tory, a reunited Cyprus with Christians and Mus- (New York, 1999). lims coexisting side by side could well become a 10. Ambassador Sotos Zakheos, General As- model of cultural integration and bicommunal- sembly Security Council, Agenda item 64, Ques- ism, serve as an inspiration to a world riven by tion of Cyprus, ebruary 13, 2001 (S/2001/135). religious hatreds, and validate the utopian hopes 11. Missile Crisis (Reuters), The Washing- of vulnerable ethnic minorities. ton Post, December 29, 1998. Hard-liners envision a less optimistic sce- 12. Address, Cyprus: Settlement and Mem- nario. Not lured by economic sugar plums dangled bership, Conference, European Parliament, by the EU for the price of compromises to gain June 3, 2002. reunification, the TRNC may prefer to wait for 13. Viola Drath, The Washington Times, June Turkeys accession to the EU to reap the same 29, 2000. benefits by clinging to the status quo. 14. Letters, personal presentations, January 4, 2000. 15. Kofi Annan, op. cit., 3032. About the Author 16. Press Conference, European Commission, March 11, 2003. Viola Drath, a member of the NCAPs Ex- 17. Kofi Annan, op. cit., 107124. ecutive Committee, is the director of the NCAPs 18. Ibid., 123, 124.
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American oreign Policy Interests