Surprise and Deception in the Hundred Years War
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This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ Unorthodox warfare in the Age of Chivalry : surprise and deception in the Hundred Years war Whetham, David Glenn The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 10. Oct. 2021 Unorthodox Warfare in the Age of Chivalry: Surprise and Deception in the Hundred Years War. David G. Whetham A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of War Studies King's College University of London April 2004 1 ,PM ..... Abstract The thesis provides important insights into the relationship between restraint in medieval warfare and the role played by chivalry. It is now widely accepted that the level of strategic and tactical competence of the practitioners of medieval warfare was often very high. The utilisation of both surprise and deception is recognised as vital to the conduct of any modem military campaign, but there is still a problem with reconciling their use with the expected conduct of medieval warfare under the code of chivalry. How can these tools be reconciled with the honourable conduct implied by such a code? If medieval practitioners of war really were competent at their profession and did employ such tools, was chivalry in fact a meaningless veneer, glossed onto accounts of battles after the fact while the actual conduct of war was far more pragmatic than chivalric chronicles may have led us to believe? If the practitioners did not employ all the tools at their disposal then how could they be considered as advanced as new research has suggested? The complicated and, occasionally, seemingly contradictory role played by surprise and deception in the warfare of the Middle Ages has not been satisfactorily explained before. By analysing the role of surprise and deception in the warfare of the Middle Ages and employing the ideas as methodological tools by which to view the whole world of medieval warfare, the thesis contributes to a better understanding of chivalry itself and medieval warfare as a whole. It argues that the rules governing the use of surprise and deception were not applied haphazardly or ignored when the situation demanded it, but that they were simply applied at different levels at different times depending upon the legal and moral context within which they were employed. Through taking this approach, chivalric warfare can be seen for what it is - a framework or system of rules that allow a result or decision to be reached which is accepted by both sides. 2 Contents Title Page 1 Abstract 2 Table of Contents 3 Chapter One - Introduction 7 Literature Review 11 The Problem of Surprise and Deception 24 Methodology and Thesis Structure 28 Language and Etymology 33 Chapter Two - The Role of War as a Legal Instrument in the Middle Ages 39 Historical Background 40 The Feud 42 The Judicial Ordeal 55 Conclusion 71 Chapter Three - Metaphysical and Legal Context: The Tree of Battles 73 Honore Bouvet: background, popularity, beliefs and influences 74 View of Warfare Reflected in The Tree of Battles 77 Christine de Pisan: background, popularity, beliefs and influences 87 Christine de Pisan's Fayttes of Armes and ofChyvalrye 91 Conclusion 95 Chapter Four - Froissart: The Management of Chivalric Expectation 98 Froissart: background 99 Popularity 100 Flavour and Accuracy of the Chronicles 101 Contents of the Chronicles 111 Conclusion 132 Chapter Five - The Epitome of Military Science 136 Vegetius: background 136 Purpose, Popularity and Influence of The Epitome of Military Science 137 Military Advice Offered by The Epitome of Military Science 150 Medieval Adaptations: 155 Translation for Lord Berkeley 157 Knyghthode and Bataile 161 3 The Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye 169 Conclusion 182 Chapter Six - The Works of Geoffroy de Charny 184 Chamy: background, popularity, exploits and influences 184 The Livres Chamy 192 The Livre de Chevalerie 195 The Demandes pour la joute, les toumois et la guerre 203 Conclusion 211 Chapter Seven - Case Studies 214 The CnScy Campaign 1346 214 The Battle of Najera 1367 223 The Agincourt Campaign 1415 230 Conclusion 240 Chapter Eight - Conclusion 244 Bibliography 251 Primary Sources Manuscript Sources 251 Printed Sources 252 Secondary Sources Books 256 Articles 263 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 Unorthodox Warfare in the Age of Chivalry: Surprise and Deception in the Hundred Years War. Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception. Thus although [you are] capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby. The tactics of the Medium D Tank are based on the principles of movement and surprise, its tactical object being to accentuate surprise by movement, not so much through rapidity as by creating unexpected situations. We must never do what the enemy expects us to do; instead, we must mislead him. The first extract is from the classic work The Art of War completed at some time during the fourth century BC by the Chinese philosopher Sun-tzu. 1 The second, by I.F.C. Fuller, was written during the Great War about a weapon that was still under development - the tank? Today, the principles espoused in the extracts are, or at least appear to be, taken for granted by the military organisations around the world. The utilisation of surprise and deception are part of the arsenal any competent military leader would attempt to draw from. As the extracts illustrate, this appears to have been true for thousands of years. Today, one would probably be considered irresponsible not to use them if the chance for effective employment of them arose. The fact that these techniques are used does not mean that such use is completely without reservation, even in today's world. Some feel that there is a stigma attached to these methods - they do not appear to be "fair" somehow. To give a modem example: Put simply, asymmetric threats or techniques are a version of not "fighting fair," which can include the use of surprise in all its operational and 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p.136. 2 J. F. C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1936), quoted from Gerard Chaliand, The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1994), p.925. 7 strategic dimensions and the use of weapons in ways unplanned by the United States.3 There is a certain unease associated with the use of 'underhand' tactics. Using surprise or deception appears unsporting or even cowardly - after all, one chooses a victim rather than an adversary in an ambush.4 This does not appear to be altogether right somehow. Although this may be the case, it is still accepted that today 'unpalatable' means do have to be adopted sometimes. However, some types of deception are not merely frowned upon, they are actually prohibited according to the laws of war that are generally accepted to be in use today: 'Dishonourable (treacherous) means, dishonourable expedients, and dishonourable conduct during armed conflict are forbidden,.5 This states what is known as the 'principle of chivalry' and stems directly from the very foundation of the laws of war - the acceptance that 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,.6 All other conventions, protocols and agreements that seek to moderate armed conflict come from a recognition of this assumption. While the laws of war are an attempt to moderate or restrain many different aspects of armed conflict, central to any chance of them being widely respected is the idea that adherence to them does not impose an intolerable burden upon the parties involved. The laws are attempting to regulate a situation where many customary norms and intemationallaws have already broken down and a law of war that prohibited any kind of violence whatsoever would not work for obvious reasons. If the utility of adhering to the laws was completely prejudicial to the conduct of military operations then Cicero's 3 Peter Wilson, 'Asymmetric Threats', Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace Hans Binnendijk (Ed.) (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.169.