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Unorthodox warfare in the Age of Chivalry : surprise and deception in the Hundred Years war

Whetham, David Glenn

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Download date: 10. Oct. 2021 Unorthodox Warfare in the Age of Chivalry: Surprise and Deception in the Hundred Years War.

David G. Whetham

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of War Studies King's College University of London April 2004

1

,PM ..... Abstract

The thesis provides important insights into the relationship between restraint in medieval warfare and the role played by chivalry. It is now widely accepted that the level of strategic and tactical competence of the practitioners of medieval warfare was often very high. The utilisation of both surprise and deception is recognised as vital to the conduct of any modem military campaign, but there is still a problem with reconciling their use with the expected conduct of medieval warfare under the code of chivalry. How can these tools be reconciled with the honourable conduct implied by such a code? If medieval practitioners of war really were competent at their profession and did employ such tools, was chivalry in fact a meaningless veneer, glossed onto accounts of battles after the fact while the actual conduct of war was far more pragmatic than chivalric chronicles may have led us to believe? If the practitioners did not employ all the tools at their disposal then how could they be considered as advanced as new research has suggested?

The complicated and, occasionally, seemingly contradictory role played by surprise and deception in the warfare of the Middle Ages has not been satisfactorily explained before. By analysing the role of surprise and deception in the warfare of the Middle Ages and employing the ideas as methodological tools by which to view the whole world of medieval warfare, the thesis contributes to a better understanding of chivalry itself and medieval warfare as a whole. It argues that the rules governing the use of surprise and deception were not applied haphazardly or ignored when the situation demanded it, but that they were simply applied at different levels at different times depending upon the legal and moral context within which they were employed. Through taking this approach, chivalric warfare can be seen for what it is - a framework or system of rules that allow a result or decision to be reached which is accepted by both sides.

2 Contents

Title Page 1 Abstract 2 Table of Contents 3 Chapter One - Introduction 7 Literature Review 11 The Problem of Surprise and Deception 24 Methodology and Thesis Structure 28 Language and Etymology 33 Chapter Two - The Role of War as a Legal Instrument in the Middle Ages 39 Historical Background 40 The Feud 42 The Judicial Ordeal 55 Conclusion 71 Chapter Three - Metaphysical and Legal Context: The Tree of Battles 73 Honore Bouvet: background, popularity, beliefs and influences 74 View of Warfare Reflected in The Tree of Battles 77 Christine de Pisan: background, popularity, beliefs and influences 87 Christine de Pisan's Fayttes of Armes and ofChyvalrye 91 Conclusion 95 Chapter Four - Froissart: The Management of Chivalric Expectation 98 Froissart: background 99 Popularity 100 Flavour and Accuracy of the Chronicles 101 Contents of the Chronicles 111 Conclusion 132 Chapter Five - The Epitome of Military Science 136 Vegetius: background 136 Purpose, Popularity and Influence of The Epitome of Military Science 137 Military Advice Offered by The Epitome of Military Science 150 Medieval Adaptations: 155 Translation for Lord Berkeley 157 Knyghthode and Bataile 161

3 The Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye 169 Conclusion 182 Chapter Six - The Works of Geoffroy de Charny 184 Chamy: background, popularity, exploits and influences 184 The Livres Chamy 192 The Livre de Chevalerie 195 The Demandes pour la joute, les toumois et la guerre 203 Conclusion 211 Chapter Seven - Case Studies 214 The CnScy Campaign 1346 214 The Battle of Najera 1367 223 The Agincourt Campaign 1415 230 Conclusion 240 Chapter Eight - Conclusion 244

Bibliography 251 Primary Sources Manuscript Sources 251 Printed Sources 252 Secondary Sources Books 256 Articles 263

4 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 Unorthodox Warfare in the Age of Chivalry:

Surprise and Deception in the Hundred Years War.

Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception. Thus although [you are] capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.

The tactics of the Medium D Tank are based on the principles of movement and surprise, its tactical object being to accentuate surprise by movement, not so much through rapidity as by creating unexpected situations. We must never do what the enemy expects us to do; instead, we must mislead him.

The first extract is from the classic work The Art of War completed at some time during the fourth century BC by the Chinese philosopher Sun-tzu. 1 The second, by I.F.C. Fuller, was written during the Great War about a weapon that was still under development - the tank? Today, the principles espoused in the extracts are, or at least appear to be, taken for granted by the military organisations around the world. The utilisation of surprise and deception are part of the arsenal any competent military leader would attempt to draw from. As the extracts illustrate, this appears to have been true for thousands of years. Today, one would probably be considered irresponsible not to use them if the chance for effective employment of them arose. The fact that these techniques are used does not mean that such use is completely without reservation, even in today's world. Some feel that there is a stigma attached to these methods - they do not appear to be "fair" somehow. To give a modem example:

Put simply, asymmetric threats or techniques are a version of not "fighting fair," which can include the use of surprise in all its operational and

1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p.136. 2 J. F. C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1936), quoted from Gerard Chaliand, The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1994), p.925.

7 strategic dimensions and the use of weapons in ways unplanned by the United States.3

There is a certain unease associated with the use of 'underhand' tactics. Using surprise or deception appears unsporting or even cowardly - after all, one chooses a victim rather than an adversary in an ambush.4 This does not appear to be altogether right somehow. Although this may be the case, it is still accepted that today 'unpalatable' means do have to be adopted sometimes. However, some types of deception are not merely frowned upon, they are actually prohibited according to the laws of war that are generally accepted to be in use today: 'Dishonourable (treacherous) means, dishonourable expedients, and dishonourable conduct during armed conflict are forbidden,.5 This states what is known as the 'principle of chivalry' and stems directly from the very foundation of the laws of war - the acceptance that 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,.6 All other conventions, protocols and agreements that seek to moderate armed conflict come from a recognition of this assumption. While the laws of war are an attempt to moderate or restrain many different aspects of armed conflict, central to any chance of them being widely respected is the idea that adherence to them does not impose an intolerable burden upon the parties involved. The laws are attempting to regulate a situation where many customary norms and intemationallaws have already broken down and a law of war that prohibited any kind of violence whatsoever would not work for obvious reasons. If the utility of adhering to the laws was completely prejudicial to the conduct of military operations then Cicero's

3 Peter Wilson, 'Asymmetric Threats', Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace Hans Binnendijk (Ed.) (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1998), p.169. 4 This sentiment was expressed by the French military writer, Ardant du Picq. See Du Picq's Battle Studies, trans. John N. Greely & Robert C. Cotton (Harrisburg, Penn: Stackpole, 1946), p.43. 5 United States, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, quoted from Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff (Eds), Documents on the Laws of War 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.5. The same sentiments can be found in the US Army law code. See The Law of Land Warfare: Department of the Army Field Manual FM27-10 (US War Office, 1956), Section V. 49, 50, & 52. 6 According to Roberts and Guelff, this is the most fundamental customary principle of the laws of war, being incorporated into the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1880 Oxford Manual. Later, it was formally codified in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1977 Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva

8 famous adage would quickly become true - inter arma silent leges (in war the law is silent).7 Rather, the laws of war attempt to limit the 'chain reaction of negative reciprocity' towards complete anarchy by installing some barriers setting out certain minimum standards of the conduct of war.8

Concerning the focus of this thesis, the laws of war that are in force today do not exclude the whole area known as "ruse". This area of legitimate deception includes things such as the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and the spreading of misinformation, these all being means intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly. The employment of certain clandestine measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy, the enemy's military operations or their country are also 9 accepted. The treacherous or dishonourable means referred to in the principle of chivalry relate to a type of deception seen as perfidious. This is not allowed under any circumstance. It is an act or behaviour that is contra fidem and involves the use of the law of war itself to deceive one's adversary. It includes cases such as the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or surrender, or the feigning of an incapacitating injury with the intent to kill, injure or capture an adversary.lO One of the reasons behind this prohibition is that perfidy potentially erodes trust in the actual laws of war designed to moderate the excesses of conflict. In addition to this it makes the return to peace

'unnecessarily difficult', by damaging the prospects of any future negotiated settlement. I I Perfidy is one of the oldest forms of war criminality. This type of charge can be found in the Penitentials of Theodore, written in the latter half of the seventh century and

Conventions, and in the Preamble to the 1981 UN Weapons Convention. See Roberts & Guelff, Laws of War, ppA & 409. 7 To those that would claim that this was indeed the case, I simply draw their attention to the widely respected practice of recognition of prisoner-of-war status, the immunity generally afforded to medical personnel and, despite their widespread proliferation and the number of conflicts that they could have been employed in, the fact that chemical weapons have rarely been used following the First World War. S Georg Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers of International Law (London: Stevens, 1962), p.257. 9 See: 1907 Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, II. 1.22, and; 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, III.l.37 .2. Quoted from Roberts, Laws of War, pp.53 & 409. 10 See A.P. 1. ill. 1.37. 1. Quoted from Roberts, Laws of War, pA09. See also: pp. 5, 52, 54,127,128,409, 412, & 482. 11 Antonio Cassese (Ed.), The New Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 1980), p.78.

9 used, adapted and repeated by many later English and Frankish sources. 12 In book 1, paragraphs 6 and 7, Theodore sets out the situation with regards to manslaughter:

One who slays a man by command of his lord shall keep away from the church for 40 days; and one who slays a man in public shall do penance for 40 days ... if through anger ye shall do penance for three years; if by accident for a year; if by a potion or any trick seven years 13

It is quite clear from this extract that to kill somebody by stealth or in an underhand manner was considered a very serious matter, especially when contrasted with the punishment for killing in an open or public conflict. Such deeds were contrary to the faith and honour of the military classes because they were 'essentially acts of treachery and cowardice' .14

The current laws of war are based upon a codification of existing practices and codes, and as such, have been and still are open to revision as time passes. The laws on perfidy can be seen as a vestigial sense of chivalry, demanding a minimum level of fairness in attack and defence, based upon the idea of a mutual respect between antagonists. In this principle there remains some sense of past honour, even if other aspects of chivalry, in particular the notion of a fair and open fight, have been undermined by, amongst other things, the use and recognition of irregular forces. Irregular forces avoid direct confrontation and employ asymmetric tactics, forcing states to also adopt alternative methods to counter them:

Older rules about the "openness" of the conduct of warfare, the avoidance of stealth or trickery, born of the ideals of chivalry and honour, and the practical and humanitarian need to recognise the adversary, meet. .. the claims of nationalism and military needs. I5

12 Theodore of Tarsus was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 669 and died in 690. The Penitentials were written at some time in between. For biographical details, see John Cannon (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to British History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.918. 13 Theodore of Tarsus, Penitentials, Bk.1, §6&7. From Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey (Eds), Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts: The Selected Works on the Laws of War by the Late Professor Colonel G. I. A. Draper, OBE (HaguelBostonILondon: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p.23. 14 Meyer & McCoubrey, Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts, p.157. 15 Ibid, p.73. The idea that nationalism undermines the restraints on warfare by raising the stakes is a relatively common theme and is not restricted to the period following the Middle Ages. For example, it is widely held that until the late fifth century BC, strategies based on the destruction of an enemy's social and

10 The idea of open, "straightforward" war is essential to our conception of chivalry and this idea still informs our opinion and judgement about certain types of behaviour, even though in practice, it is only the charge of perfidy that remains from this body of rules. As long as perfidy is not involved, surprise and deception, while not necessarily options that everyone is comfortable with, are not in any way banned. Commanders are free to employ all the tricks in the book to outwit or overcome their opponents, safe in the knowledge that they will not be judged harshly for employing such underhand tactics. Practicality and military usefulness supposedly over-rule any lingering doubts that come from the moral sphere of reasoning. Camouflage, night attacks, decoys, feigned retreats, lightning raids, the spreading of false information, ambushes; all are weapons that form the arsenal of competent soldiers. However, what about the period that was supposedly dominated by the code of chivalry from which today's 'watered-down' laws of war evolved? Although the clever use of stratagems involving the use of surprise and/or deception have doubtlessly been employed throughout history, as has been seen above, it is widely believed that there was a period when warfare was conducted in a rather different way. Until fairly recently, the Middle Ages were seen as a time in which certain things were simply not done. It was generally held that rudimentary tactics and the non-existence of anything resembling strategic understanding or mastery of time and space meant that any thought of subtlety in medieval warfare was impossible. Warfare conducted in western Christendom fitted the Achilles model of face-to-face confrontation and the use of open force and was contrasted with that of the East where a more Odyssean ethos asserted the superiority of clever strategies, trickery and cunning to outwit opponents in a more indirect manner where

economic system were effectively banned by the informal system of rules adhered to by the Greek city states. This system was undermined by the Persian Wars in which national survival became an issue. Then the system was shattered by the Peloponesian Wars between Athens and Sparta, where the existing rules favoured the organisation of one state over another, so were abandoned by the disadvantaged side. See Josiah Ober, 'Classical Greek Times', in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman (Eds), The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp.17ff.

11 16 possible. Deception was simply not something that the knights of medieval Europe practised. Neal Wood contrasts the inhibitions of the period of chivalric warfare with the pragmatism of Machiavelli in the period that immediately followed it:

Between medieval foes there was the bond of Christian conduct and gentlemanly behaviour ... [so that they] did not make full use of the stratagems that had been a common part of the classical military leader's repertoire. Conversely, the medieval commander seemed particularly susceptible to the employment of deception and trickery by a ruthless and unchivalrous opponent.17

The proud chevaliers were bound in their behaviour by the rigid code of chivalry that meant that honour above all else was the thing for which men fought. Even if they had wished to, the use of effective surprise was simply impossible. It was believed that knights fought essentially as individuals so this simply did not allow the level of co­ operation that the effective use of surprise required. Thus the argument that if surprise happened, it was probably down to pure accident or lack of effective reconnaissance rather than design. Medieval knighthood and the feudal structure clearly had inherent organisational limitations and the individualism at the core of chivalry was an expression of this. Chivalry provided additional restrictions, sometimes distancing its adherents from the requirements of the battlefield. This explained how knights were so categorically defeated when they were challenged by those who did not respect or adhere to the rules that chivalry dictated. Supposedly, they were simply incapable of adapting and so were swept away by the tides of change. This was the view of medieval warfare that, until recently, dominated understanding of the period. It was blatantly wrong and based on a number of false assumptions. The people largely responsible for this erroneous understanding were influential authors such as Charles Oman and Hans Delbriick. They were writing around

16 E.L. Wheeler, 'Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery', Mnemosyne Supplement 108 (Leiden: 1988), p.xiii. 17 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art a/War, Neal Wood (Ed.) (1990). Taken from Matthew Bennett, 'The Knight Unmasked', Military History Quarterly, Vol. 7 No.4 (Summer 1995), p.9. Bennett dispels many of the myths associated with these outdated views in this brief but excellent survey of the subject and demonstrates many of the positive aspects of chivalry for the conduct of war.

12 the tum of the twentieth century, a period dominated by interpretations of the works of

Carl von Clausewitz, "the philosopher of war" .18 This led them to see the primary military objective of any campaign as the destruction or overthrow of the enemy's forces in order to impose one's will on him. This meant an almost exclusive focus on battles because they were how this primary military objective was supposed to be satisfied. The idea that warfare could be dominated by a different conception of strategy was simply not entertained. The result was that other aspects of warfare in the Middle Ages like sieges or raids, while they were acknowledged as present, were then practically ignored as they did not appear to contribute to what was considered important. This also had the effect of concentrating attention exclusively on knights for it was they who supposedly dominated the battlefield. For the knight, courage was the sole requisite for victory so any kind of organisation or planning did not fit into this simplistic picture. It was taken for granted that 'the young Frankish noble deemed his military education complete when he could sit on his charger firmly and handle a lance and shield with skill' .19 Knights, the only important type of soldier, fought essentially as individuals and 'from the start of the battle on, knights were moved only by the instincts of the mass itself .20 This fascination with battles meant that Oman and Delbriick both failed to see that they were largely irrelevant to the type of logistical and economic warfare that was actually being conducted. When Oman noted that the twelfth century did not actually see many battles he then explained this by citing the widespread development of fortifications that made the defensive supreme and denied the possibility of large-scale confrontation?1 This whole century and important campaigns such as those of Bertrand du Guesclin against the English in the fourteenth century were therefore practically written off as there was nothing of interest here for Oman or Delbriick. Unfortunately, they were ignoring some important evidence - the unproductive nature of battles was demonstrated by the eventual French victory in the Hundred Years War, even after their huge defeats at Crecy,

18 Hans Delbriick, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History Vol. III: The Middle Ages, trans. Walter J. Renfroe Jr. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1982) & Charles Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (London: Methuen, 1924). 19 Oman, Art of War, Vol. 1, p.172. 20 Delbriick, History, p.158. 21 Oman, Art of War, Vol. 1, p.380.

13 Poitiers and Agincourt. It was not necessarily who won the battles that was important, but who controlled the land at the end of the day. Oman saw the guerrilla campaign of Du Guesclin, like the construction of fortifications, as essentially negative because it denied the opportunity for decisive confrontation. He thus ignored the fact that it was a very successful period for the French?2 Delbriick, too, saw battle-avoidance as a failure to appreciate open battle's function as a 'truly decisive action' and ignored the successes that came from exactly this strategy.23 This 'failure' was supposedly down to the general lack of strategic thought in the Middle Ages and the idea that a radically different conception of war was actually being pursued was simply not entertained. The strategic culture of Delbriick' s age did not fit comfortably with the aims of the warfare in this period and it is easy, with hindsight, to see why the period was dismissed as backward in many respects. It is also hardly surprising that the subtler elements of strategic and tactical thought were also ignored. Ruse, surprise, deception or clever tactical or strategic ingenuity simply do not fit into this picture and it became the accepted view that the art of war in the West was practically non-existent from the fall of the Roman Empire to the 24 Renaissance. The idea of chivalry itself reinforced this view by being seen as 'empty­ headed bravery and foolish courtesy to the enemy, completely undermining the necessary cunning of the art of war' .25 This view was challenged in the 1950' s with the publication of two works: Verbruggen's Art a/War in the Middle Ages, and Smail's Crusading Warfare. 26 V erbruggen' s excellent revisionist account dispelled many of the erroneous beliefs associated with the warfare of the Middle Ages, directly challenging the view that the knights of the Middle Ages were blundering amateurs with no kind of organisation,

22 See J. Cuvelier, Chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin, E.Charriere (Ed.), 2 vols (Paris: 1839). 23 Delbriick, History, p.325. 24 This is reflected in the way that many books on the history of strategy or the art of war just skip straight over this period in the West. For example, W. Murray, M. Knox & A. Bernstein (Eds.), The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Although it considers seventeen case studies, the only chapter devoted to a period covering nearly eighteen hundred years is about the development of Chinese strategy between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century. 25 Bennett, Knight Unmasked, p.16. 26 J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of War in the Middle Ages (London: North Holland, 1977). Originally published as De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, IXe tot begin XlVe eeuw (Brussels, 1954). A new 1996 edition in English includes more of the annotation that was heavily abridged in the 1977

14 strategy or even tactics. Under the subtitle 'Weaknesses of modem military historians in discussing medieval warfare' he cited a number of authors whose historical methodology was questionable by the standards that were being set for historical research even in the fifties. Oman and Delbriick were amongst those whose views were directly challenged. 27 Most critically he noted that the individual nature of combat in many battles had been overemphasised thanks to incorrect reading or misuse of the source materials:

In many instances ... historians, due to a preconceived notion or plain prejudice, have simply not read certain passages in their source carefully. They have kept the name of the prominent nobleman who fought at the head of his unit, but...they forget the words cum suis, avec sa gent, cum sua acie, with the result that the fighting of entire formations is represented as a duel fought out by two champions.28

It was this type of 'misreading' that had helped to strengthen Delbriick's thesis regarding the rudimentary military and political organisation at the time. By demonstrating that military organisation was, in fact, highly developed in the Middle Ages, Verbruggen not only assumed that surprise and deception were used throughout the period, he even gave the topic of surprise its own, brief, sub-heading. He gave examples demonstrating that the practitioners of war in the Middle Ages were clever enough to utilise this powerful weapon in their plans of attack and were well aware of its effects. He gave cases of night attacks and ambushes, all treated in much the same way that we would view surprise now - as another weapon in an army's arsenal. 29 The whole topic was handled in a very matter-of-fact way. The implications of Verbruggen' s examination of the warfare of the period were enormous and this helped force a thorough re-evaluation of the subject as a whole. Of

translation. Also, R. C. Smail, Crusading Waifare, 1097-1193, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 27 This has been a popular activity for medieval historians since then. One recent paper goes as far as to claim that Delbriick 'should now be given an honourable burial': Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance', Journal of Military History, Vol. 58 (1994), pp.119-133. Verbruggen saw that while the subject had attracted a fair amount of attention, 'it [was] not easy to be deeply versed in the military problems of the period and at the same time to possess considerable knowledge of medieval historical writing, with its particular problems of historical criticisms'. Verbruggen, Art of War, p.l. 28 Ibid. p.19. 29 Ibid. pp.253f.

15 course, in such a groundbreaking work, it was impossible to explore every aspect of the subject and some areas were not covered particularly well. For example, while he noted that the small size of armies and the widespread use of fortifications meant that war aims were often limited, he did not pursue the implications of this any further. Like Oman, he saw castles and fortifications as negative things, ways of avoiding battles rather than as an essential part of a strategy based on control of territory. Smail, on the other hand, was the first amongst the growing number of historians who saw raids and sieges in the context of attritional warfare aimed at undermining the economic base of the enemy and gaining control of the means of producing wealth. First published not long after Verbruggen in 1956, Smail too noticed that battles were actually very rare in the Middle Ages but he attributed this to the type of warfare that was being conducted. Fortifications were merely a symptom of this rather than a cause because they were what made the control of the land possible.

Land was the essential basis of Latin dominion. The policy of the Latin rulers centred on its possession, and war, as an instrument of policy, was employed in the interests of territorial expansion or defence. 3o

Although battles could still be important, the primary military objective was normally the control of fortifications because they were the key to controlling the land. It was not to destroy or overthrow the enemy in order to impose one's will on him. This is the approach that most scholars have taken following these two great works. It gradually became taken for granted that the level of organisation and skill involved in medieval warfare was actually very high and the period as a whole saw many advances in military technology. The Middle Ages were no longer seen as simply a period of stagnation between the fall of the Roman Empire and the "intellectual awakening" of the Renaissance. The new framework of analysis allowed many aspects of warfare to be re-evaluated. For instance, the repeated chevauchees that were so common during the conflict known as the Hundred Years War, could now be seen as having some kind of strategic purpose, rather than being dismissed as mere mounted plundering expeditions.

30 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p.24.

16 While the acquisition of plunder was an undoubted part of any commander's plan if he intended to keep his followers contented, by being able to move unchallenged through an area, one could demonstrate one's opponent's inability to defend the land and people. The literal translation of chevauchee is procession rather than raid as it is often translated and this speaks volumes about what its role actually was?1 In a period that had a very positivist conception of rights, if one was unable to defend something, one did not have a right to it. Therefore a chevauchee could be used to, very publicly, call into question the legitimacy of the position of the impotent lord and demonstrate the justice of one's own cause at the same time. If an army intercepted an invader then a battle might result, but the defeat of an army was merely another means of achieving the actual military aim, which was in this case to weaken the moral and economic base of rivals. 32 Apart from rapid raids and chevauchees, it gradually became accepted that the mounted knight, while important, often played only a supplementary role to that of the infantry or got off their mounts and became infantry. However, while the opportunities for mounted knights to be tactically decisive during a siege were extremely limited, they were still indispensable for the supplementary role of maintaining lines of communication and patrolling the countryside to defend against (and conduct) raids and skirmishes which formed part of the logistical war to reduce the material resources of rivals. 33 It was this kind of campaign that was advocated by the most widely distributed and read 'manual of warfare' to be found in the West during the Middle Ages - Vegetius' Epitome of Military Science. For example, in the first decade of the fifteenth century, Christine de Pisan

31 Alfred H. Burne, The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955), p.245. Burne did not develop the implications of this important point. 32 Compare this with Delbriick's denial that William had deliberately devastated the countryside after his landing at Hastings because that would have contradicted the basic political idea of the campaign: 'In no case can they have had any strategic significance' (History, pp.154ff.). Although Verbruggen did not focus on this issue, and indeed saw many chevauchees as mere 'plundering expeditions' devoid of any strategic purpose beyond the quest for booty (Art of War, p.285), the alternative (complementary?) function of the raids only strengthens his broader thesis. 33 This is a point that Carroll Gillmor focuses on in 'Practical Chivalry: The Training of Horses for Tournaments and Warfare', Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, Vol. XIII (1992), pp.7-29. She goes somewhat further by claiming that the high level of skill required for mounted combat could not have been justified by the rare number of times it was actually put into practice. Rather, tournaments must have had a far greater role than was previously thought, and knights may have had something approaching the role of our contemporary professional athletes, 'admired by his peers for his athletic ability in a rough sport' (p.20).

17 paraphrased Vegetius to instruct that battle should only be joined 'in a playne feld' if one has a decisive advantage over one's enemy and this should be determined after carefully comparing the forces and calling a council of war.34 If the enemy are discontented through lack of food or money or if they are not used to hard living, then there should be no hurry to battle, but instead:

moost secretly that he can he shal sende hys men in to busshementys for to ouer take hem vnbeware there as they shal passe by... grete proffyt cometh to a captayne of an oost that wysely can sett busshementys35

Although this is obviously not how "the Age of Chivalry" is often portrayed, within the context set out above, surprise and deception clearly had an important role to play. Guerrilla warfare and its associated methods of sudden and unexpected raids and attacks in the least likely places, was an excellent weapon for disrupting the enemy's economic plans. A chevauchee, such as that conducted by Edward III in 1346, relied upon just the effect that Fuller speaks of in the opening quote when he said that one must 'accentuate surprise by movement, not so much through rapidity as by creating unexpected situations. We must never do what the enemy expects us to do; instead, we must mislead him,?6 Fitting with this perfectly the English historian (and retired colonel) Alfred Burne noted that Edward refused to allow foreigners to leave English ports ahead of his invasion force and kept his destination secret so that the French would not know where he was to land. 37 The French historian Perroy claimed that it was this surprise that allowed the English force to take Caen straight away and then travel through Evreux right into the heart of

34 The original can be found in Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, trans. N.P.Milner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), book. III, chapter 9. In addition see chapters 1,3,6, 7,8, 10, 18,22, & book IV, chapters 26, 27, 28,37 and 45. 35 Christine de Pisan, The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye: Translated and printed by William Caxtonfrom the French original by Christine de Pisan, A.T.P.Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p.61. 36 Fuller, Memoirs, p.925. 37 Burne, Crecy War, pp.137f. Orders were given to the ship captains in sealed envelopes, not to be opened until the ships were at sea, and an extensive dis information campaign was launched aimed at convincing the French that the landing was to be in Gascony. See PRO C76123, m. 23v. (Chancery, Treaty Rolls) for the orders sent by Edward to the officers in charge of the various ports. Henry V was to take similar precautions before the Agincourt campaign, see J.R. Alban & C.T. Allmand, 'Spies and Spying in the Fourteenth Century', in C.T. Allmand (Ed.), War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1976), p.78.

18 C·apetlan terrItory.. 38 In this respect, both Burne and Perroy pre-empted Verbruggen by allowing a fair degree of sophistication in the military campaigns of the Hundred Years War. Burne noted (with some satisfaction) that secrecy was paramount in the Earl of Derby's attempt to raise the siege of Auberoche in 1347. Even foraging was forbidden in case it gave away the presence of the troops before their surprise descent upon the superior numbers of unsuspecting besiegers?9 Neither of these examples caused Burne to 'raise an eyebrow' and he treated them as if they were simply examples of behaviour that was to be expected, conforming to the general behaviour of the times. Chivalry was simply not a code that interfered with the mechanics of war when it came to situations such as this. With the changes in the way the whole period was portrayed by historians, chivalry came to be seen in brutally pragmatic terms rather than a "brotherhood of arms" where chivalric honour and duty dictated behaviour. While proving one's right to resort to violence was obviously important, it became widely accepted that it was the legal phraseology in the rediscovered Roman law rather than the spirit of the just war that actually counted. If a cause could be justified using the correct legal jargon, it helped ensure popular support for military action. Once the Aristotelian political philosophy elucidated in Aquinas' works became widely accepted and the basis for the independent secular state had been established in his Summa Theologica, it was only a matter of time before sovereigns were claiming to be acting in the interests of "the common good",

justifying just about any action on the grounds of raison d'etat. 40 While the ius ad bellum (the laws governing resort to war) came to be seen in a purely legalistic light, the ius in bello (laws governing behaviour once a conflict was underway) were also seen to be eroded or discarded. The period in which the knight in his armour was practically

38 Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), pp.118f. (This English translation from the original French is the revised edition.) 39 Burne, Crecy War, pp.l06ff. 40 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p.286. Thomas Aquinas has been attributed the 'rediscovery' of Aristotle and the incorporation of his ideas into a Christian framework. For further reading, see Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy: and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 1994) pp.444ff.

19 invulnerable was ending by now thanks to 'all kinds of ungentlemanly, free-thinking

innovations by centralizing monarchs and urban patricians' .41 So what had happened to the idealism associated with the code of chivalry? While the fact of its actual existence was not seriously challenged, it came to be seen as merely a veneer to cover purely financial interests:

beneath the high idealism of chivalric honour, war continues much as before, as cruel, atrocious and thoughtless as ever. Knighthood becomes a kind of guild of warriors, who may put the ordinary soldier and the civilian to the sword, but who rarely kill each other intentionally on the battlefield, and who see to it that military enterprises have a suitable financial reward. The occasional feat of arms is a diversion from the more serious business of pillage and destruction, and chivalry owes more to the pen than the sword.42

While medieval chroniclers may have tried to cast a 'golden spell of chivalry', the reality of Medieval warfare remained an extremely unpleasant business - 'Chivalry was in fact

compatible with stark, ruthless slaughter' .43 Certain aspects of the violence were simply restrained for a time as those who considered themselves as belonging to Christendom's knighthood generally respected the code relating to the laws of ransom. This was thanks to a professional class of fighters who successfully employed agreements that limited their potential losses in what was, for the most part, a financial exercise.44 Knights were not unchivalrous for not attempting to limit the effects of war on anyone else for 'as a

code, chivalry had next to nothing to do with ordinary people' .45 This, then, was what chivalry was about. There was no idealism or romantic sentiments here, just hard-nosed

41 A. T. Hatto, 'Archery & Chivalry: A Noble Prejudice', Modern Language Review, Vol. 35, No.1 (1940), pp.40ff. Hatto is, of course, referring to the large-scale use of missile weapons that threatened the knight, his social position and way of life. He also refers to the use of short knives by the fourteenth century, to dispatch fallen riders once they had been brought down, their horses having been shot out from under them. 42 Richard Barber, The Knight and Chivalry (Woodbridge, Suff.: Boydell, 1995), p.246. This view is discussed from pp.24lff. 43 H.J. Hewitt, The Black Prince's Expeditions of 1355-1357 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), p.1 O. 44 While the Welsh were regarded as rebels during the Owen Glendower uprisings of the early fIfteenth century and therefore could expect little comfort from the laws of war, Prestwich notes that it was probably purely fInancial motives that led to many prisoners being killed by the English. Nothing was actually to be gained from ransoming the Welsh for they had little or no money. Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.1 04.

20 46 business sense. Within this context, honour can be seen as simply the way of holding together this business relationship. Most disagreements likely to arise during conflict could be seen as questions of contract, either between men who were fighting on the same side or between a victor and his prisoner. As the finer points of legal theory were unlikely to appeal to soldiers, the whole system was enforced and maintained largely through the institution of honour (although more drastic measures could be employed in certain circumstances). This acted as a type of guarantee, for to lose honour was to expose oneself to the public charge that one did not "play by the rules".47 Infamy meant exclusion from "the game" which had both financial and health implications if one continued to fight without the safety net of ransom being offered. The laws of war and chivalry, the code of honour which buttressed these laws, therefore came to be seen as essentially pragmatic damage-limitation devices, and 'one cannot, indeed, help wondering whether the law of arms would have meant anything if it had not been for the financial stakes at issue in battle' .48

The romance of chivalry has now been firmly put in its place, but is this really a fair reflection of how things really were? Can chivalry and the romantic imagery the concept invokes really be dismissed quite so easily? Scholarship since Verbruggen's masterpiece has largely accepted the relative sophistication of the medieval military machine. It has therefore become taken for granted that surprise and deception were weapons used alongside many others on and off the battlefield by men who were well aware of the effects of their use. The attitude of the medieval warriors has been assumed to be similar to that of today' s - while perfidy was unacceptable, other forms of deception were perhaps frowned upon but otherwise accepted due to the necessities of the battlefield. A cursory examination of some of the source material of the period will appear to agree with this view. For example, Honore Bouvet's late-fourteenth century account of the laws

45 Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.185. 46 The implications and mechanics of this system are excellently covered in M.H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). 47 Keen, Laws, p.20. 48 Keen, Laws, p.244.

21 of war, better known as The Tree of Battles, after much moral discussion, reaches the conclusion that:

according to God and the scriptures, I may conquer my enemy by craft or fraud without sin, once the war has been ordained and declared and ordered between him and me, and I have given him defiance.49

Bouvet then cites biblical precedent by giving the example of how God himself commanded Joshua to set an ambush for his enemies.50 However, while this type of deception was to be allowed, one was not to break one's word, particularly if one's word was in connection with the laws of war themselves. Thus it would be a 'condemnable deception' for one to give one's promise to meet an enemy for parley and then make him a prisoner. Due to the breaking of faith, this would clearly go against God Himself.51 It would also clearly be against God and reason, for example, for anyone to take a town during a truce 'for the laws say that once a pledge is given to one's enemy it must be kept' .52

The case of perfidy aside, once it became accepted that the practitioners of medieval warfare were in fact highly competent at the type of war that was being conducted through the Middle Ages, then it also became accepted that they could not have failed to use such important tools as deception and surprise. This is demonstrated by famous cases such as Edward Ill's Crecy campaign, already mentioned above. Here, Edward, a well-respected soldier, used subtlety to gain the upper hand over an opponent who was fooled into believing that the English were within their grasp. The situation arose through King Philip of France challenging the English ruler to a duel.53 Rather than

49 Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949) pp.154ff. 50 Joshua 8.2, Old Testament (Authorised Version): ' .. .lay thee an ambush for the city behind it.' 51 For the belief that God would not favour the perjured, see M.J. Russell, 'Trial By Battle and the Writ of Right', Journal of Legal History (London: Frank Cass, 1980), p.lli. 52 Bouvet, Tree, p.153. This is view that can clearly be seen in the writings of the chronicler Froissart too. See Froissart, Chroniques, Kervyn de Lettenhove (Ed.), 29 vols. (Brussels, 1867-77), V pp.97ff, where an enemy knight's passport of free passage is interfered with by the king of France and one of his own knights, whose word has been effectively broken, refuses to serve him until the situation is resolved. 53 This challenge comes from a long list where the two kings manoeuvred around each other in a bid to present legitimacy to their actions and demonstrate the lack of conviction the enemy obviously felt when the offer was refused. Despite the reputation of Edward III in the lists, Philip, probably due to the necessities of

22 immediately replying with the customary defiance, Edward took some time over it, burning the Parisian suburbs in the meantime.54 Using this as a cover, he had a group spend this time constructing bridges further down-stream. When he did finally send his (sarcastically worded) reply it was at the end of his first days' march across the river giving him a considerable head-start on the pursuing French force. Alfred Burne, writing in the 1950' s, appears almost proud of the king's deception: 'Thus Edward had completely outwitted Philip' .55 He sees no problem with this example of deceit in warfare and accepts it as just that, for 'deceitful it was. One of the maxims of war is to deceive your opponent, but the good cleric of the Abbey of St. Denys would not be conversant with such maxims.,56 The 'good cleric' of which he speaks was the author of the Grandes Chroniques, which take a rather different view of the king's behaviour. The chronicle stigmatises the King's conduct due to his apparently calculated deceit that gave Philip a false impression regarding the English force's whereabouts. After apparently agreeing to give battle Edward instead crossed to the north bank of the Seine, leaving the French king in totally the wrong place and 'greatly angered'. As the King of France raced north he told everyone in his path that he had been betrayed: 'and the king doubted whether otherwise he could have been led back and forth thus. The people murmered too, and said that such a way of going and returning would not be without treason' .57 It may have been that the author was seeking to justify his own king's behaviour by giving him an excuse for his dallying in the city but the moral language of the writings clearly seeks to place Edward's actions in the area of one who has used deceit to gain an unfair advantage.

domestic politics, needed to demonstrate that while he was unable to halt the devastation and plunder of his rival, this was due to Edward refusing, as he surely would, the offer of judicial combat. Edward could be presented as not playing by the rules therefore the legitimacy of his actions could be dismissed. It was also probably the only face-saving option that Philip could come up with, holed-up in Paris but unwilling or unable to defend its suburbs. Indeed, by all accounts, Edward was not interested in actually fighting if he could help it. An earlier offer was to Edward III in person, but this particular one was for a set battle between the two armies on mutually agreeable ground. Considering the numerical superiority of the French, it is hardly surprising that Edward declined the offer. 54 Contamine describes Edward's actions delightfully as 'a question of intimidating the enemy ... Snapping one's fingers at him' . (Middle Ages, p.222). 55 Burne, Crecy War, p.154. 56 Burne, Crecy War, p.154. 57 Grandes Chroniques de France, Jules Viard (Ed.) (Paris: Societe de l'histoire de France, 1920-53), Vol. 9: pp.274-82. From Clifford J. Rogers (Ed.), The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), pp.126ff.

23 This is the contradiction between chivalric literature and the actual realities of war which writers such as Maurice Keen and lohan Huizinga noted.58 While prescriptive texts such as Geoffrey de Charny's Book of Chivalry might preach against the use of 'excessive subtlety', the reality was that if subtlety was required, then theory quickly gave way and weapons such as surprise and deception were certainly not to be ignored.59 This was borne out by the very example of Geoffrey de Chamy himself who attempted to seize Calais from the English, during a truce, by clandestine, subtle and very questionable 6o methods. In another example, Keen noted that while the laws of war stressed the importance of unfurling one's banners and using heralds before a battle, it was also accepted that 'the exigencies of war' could make these formalities impossible: 'A captain who planned to take a town by escalade at night did not send a herald round in the

afternoon to announce his intentions' .61 In effect, if a situation was going to be "tactically embarrassing", then Keen believed that in the majority of cases the law or custom was simply put aside. However, not all historians are quite as eager to ignore the chivalric literature or dismiss the trappings of chivalry as mere "business law". Perroy, for one, was actually fairly reserved in his attitude towards the use of such tactics and was not ready to claim that resort to ruse was done without second thought. He considered that the behaviour of the English knights at Crecy, and again at Poitiers, was unworthy of their position. The use of concealment, ambushes and feints, along with archery aimed at the knights' mounts broke the rules that governed warfare of the time.62 Pragmatically, he accepted that for Edward to have attempted any other kind of engagement at Crecy, although it may have been more acceptable to his contemporaries, would have been 'unpardonable folly' given the position he was in. However, this acceptance of the realities facing the

58 Keen, Laws, p.244 & J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London: Edward Arnold, 1924), pp.56f. 59 Richard W. Kaeuper & Elspeth Kennedy (Eds), The Book of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p.151. 60 Froissart, Chroniques, Ms. Rome, George T. Diller (Ed.) (Geneve: Droz, 1972), pp.861-871; E. Maunde Thompson (Ed.), Chronicon Galfridi Ie Baker de Swynebroke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), pp.l 03-8, and; Jean Ie Bel, Chronique, J. Viard & E. Deprez (Eds), 2 vols (Paris: 1904-5), ii, pp.176-82. See Chapter Six for an analysis of this episode. 61 Keen, Laws, p.103.

24 English king did not change his view that it was a clear breach of custom and that Edward, himself a chivalrous knight, recognised the laws of war and 'was somewhat ashamed' of his improvised ruses.63

Although he did accept that the laws gave way under the pressures of real combat, Perroy is not alone in having reservations. Other authors who accept the relatively high level of strategic and tactical competence of the practitioners of medieval warfare, are still not totally happy with the supposed use of deception and surprise even though common sense appears to state that they go hand-in-hand. While in one respect they are trying to convince readers that the military organisation of the Middle Ages was actually extremely advanced, in another respect, there are obviously still some reservations about medieval soldiers actually using all the weapons that were at their disposal. For example, in a recent work, Christopher Allmand talked of the Free Companies - mercenaries who lived off the French countryside - developing skills different to 'more conventional soldiers' . These men did not work within the same framework as those concerned with national expeditions or conflicts and they did not respect the "traditional" way of waging war as a result. They specialised in mobility and war of surprise where 'the dawn raid was more

effective than the siege' .64 Implicit here is the view that this was unconventional war. Even though the 'regular' soldiers of the day were tactically competent, they did not generally fight in this way. The success of the Free Companies speaks for itself, so this was obviously an effective way of conducting war. Why was it the preserve of "irregulars" or mercenaries to fight this way? Another author, while happy to concede that 'most late medieval knights seem to have adopted a ... practical attitude when engaged in the more mundane aspects of warfare' was also convinced that chivalry was not a meaningless veneer, glossed on to accounts of battles after the fact:

chivalrous notions often had a significant effect upon the way real battles were fought. Not only individual knights ... but commanders ... and princes ... commonly exposed themselves to unnecessary dangers and

62 Perroy, Hundred Years, pp.118ff. esp. pp.119 & 131. 63 Perroy, Hundred Years, p.119. 64 Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France c.1300 - c.1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.74.

25 sacrificed strategic and tactical advantages in order to maintain their heroic reputations or avoid the possibility of appearing less than honourable.65

The last author appears to have been considering cases like that involving Henry "the Bastard" before the battle of Najera where he supposedly gave up an advantageous position against the advice of his captain so that no-one could accuse him of acting unfairly or unchivalrously (he then lost).66

This reserve was even demonstrated by Burne who had happily stated that 'one of the maxims of war is to deceive your opponent', but then, later, appeared to hold a 67 somewhat different view. When he was exploring reasons for why the French neglected to employ a flank attack at Cn!cy, he concluded that they were obstructed by terrain and that the rear of the English force could not be attacked because 'such things were not done in the pitched battles of the time.,68 Clearly Burne felt that while certain types of deception could be and were employed, in pitched battles one did not surprise an opponent by making him think you were engaging him in the front while attacking him unexpectedly from the rear. This is again curious, as no competent leader of troops in the present era would hesitate to attack an enemy in the flank or surprise him in the rear if that were possible. If the practitioners of war in the Middle Ages did not see how effective this was, how could they be so advanced? Even if flank attacks were employed in the period, and there is much evidence to support the idea that they were, the point here is that the otherwise pragmatic Burne, so fond of his "inherent military probability", still allows himself to be influenced by perceived notions of chivalry.69 The whole concept of chivalry as a restraining influence on warfare is certainly not wholly dismissed.

65 D' Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, The Knights of the Crown: The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe 1325-1520 (Woodbridge, Suff.: Boydell, 1987), pp.14f. 66 Mildred K Pope & Eleanor C. Lodge (Eds), Life of the Black Prince, by the Herald of Sir John Chandos (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), editors' notes, p.212. This case has echoes of the (much earlier) Battle of Maldon in 991 where Anglo-Saxon alderman and his levies allowed the Viking invaders to come across an easily held causeway so that they could have a fair fight. The Vikings proceeded to defeat the outnumbered Anglo-Saxons. See Magnus Magnusson, Vikings! (London: Bodley Head, 1980), p.268. 67 Burne, Crecy War, p.154. 68 Ibid. p.203. 69 For example, Geoffrey Le Baker claims that the Battle of Poi tiers was decided by a rear attack on the French force by the Captal de Buch combined with the Black Prince's frontal charge: Thompson, Chronicon Galfridi Ie Baker, p.151. Also, the chronicler Monstrelet speaks of a group of two hundred English archers sent by their King to attack the rear of the French line at Agincourt: Enguerran De

26 There are other areas that do not appear quite straightforward. For example, the French chronicles of the period are highly contemptuous of the way that the Welsh conducted their war against the English. The Welsh were the allies of the French at the time of the Glendower uprisings but the few French soldiers that were supplied to aid the rebellion were supposedly disgusted with the surprise attacks and ambushes used against the English - this was not how they thought war should be conducted.7o The idea that the chronicles that record this disgust were keen to promote an ideal rather than actually discuss the real brutality of the battlefield is compelling if it were not for the fact that in other cases they are happy to list examples that certainly do not glorify chivalry (at least in the way that it is popularly understood). For example, that most famous of chroniclers, Froissart, tells matter-of-factly of a page called Croquart who turned brigand and made a successful career by taking towns, castles and ransoms, and fighting at times on behalf of the English cause. He became so good at this that the king of France offered to knight him and give him a good marriage if he would fight for him instead.71 In another case, Froissart tells the story of how a squire and his master deceived some knights as to their identity in order to make them appear to be allies. Once the deception had been carried out and the two parties were marching together, the knights were taken by surprise and captured.72 When surprise and deception were used, this chronicler obviously did not shy from discussing it and in these particular instances no moral objections appear to have been raised. Yet when King Edward used subtlety on his successful chevauchee in 1346 his behaviour was roundly criticised in the Grandes Chroniques (see above). There appear to be some inconsistencies here - why should this type of behaviour be acceptable on one level and yet not on another, or is it simply a matter of different authors having different views?

Monstrelet, La Chronique: en deux livres avec pieces justificatives 1400 -1444, L. Douet-d' Arcq (Ed.) (Paris: Societe de l'Histoire de France, 1859), p.l05. It should be noted that partisanship may have influenced these accounts. In the case of Monstrelet, it is possible that he was seeking to shift the blame of the defeat away from his Burgundian masters and towards the unfair tactics of the English (the Burgundian contingent had not been at Agincourt). 70 R.R. Davies, The Revolt ofOwain Glyn Dwr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.195. 71 The offer was refused but Croquart came to a sticky end when he fell from his horse: 'Ensifina Crokars'. See Froissart, Chroniques, Ms. Rome, Diller (Ed.), p.860. 72 Froissart, Chroniques, Kervyn de Lettenhove (Ed.) 29 vols (Brussels, 1870-7), VI, pp.225ff.

27 Another area that appears to pose problems for the idea that medieval commanders were far more proficient than previously thought is that they appeared very keen to announce their intentions to the enemy. One cannot help wondering, if the concept of surprise was so well understood, why military leaders felt it necessary to send defiance and attempt to arrange a time and place for hostilities to commence. Considering the time required to marshal a medieval host, why announce one's intentions in advance when surprise might result in an easier victory? To illustrate this point: before the battle of Neville's Cross, the Scottish army issued a challenge to battle and then supposedly waited for the English to arrive at the site and deploy themselves. No attempt was made to disrupt this even though the Scots were obviously ready to fight long before the English force was properly deployed.73 One cannot imagine a modern commander waiting for hi s enemy to finish their breakfast before attacking! Froissart also gives the confusing example of Sir Walter Manny's expedition into France to surprise and capture the town of Mortaigne. As part of the expedition of Edward ill, Froissart was adamant that Manny did not 'chevaucha secretement' into France to surprise the town until the King of France had received a challenge and defiance from the English King.74 Again, it appears that surprise was acceptable on one level but not on another as the town was still going to be surprised by the attack, even if King Philip, presumably miles away, was not.

Any kind of attempted analysis of the concept of chivalry appears to be confronted with these and many other strange inconsistencies. There is an obvious difference between the way that some medieval campaigns were apparently conducted and the way that modern military thinking would see the same situation. It might be that considered that once the Clausewitzian mode of thought about warfare in the Middle Ages has been abandoned, the military activity of the period makes more sense. However, it is clearly not as straightforward as this as there appear to be a number of different factors or assumptions involved depending upon the people concerned in any specific conflict and their exact

73 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), V, pp.124ff. & Froissart, Chronicles of England, France, Spain, and the adjoining Countries, trans. Thomas Johnes, 2 vols. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1857), I, pp.174f.

28 situation, both geographically and socially or politically. This problem demonstrates that there are definitely still areas that require some thought and analysis if the military campaigns of the period are to be properly understood. Chivalry is a somewhat all-embracing concept, and even if one attempts to focus on its military function, it still embraced moral, religious, social and legal codes of conduct. It is clearly an enormous subject and, as such, it is unfortunately beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis to look at it directly. However, this thesis will "step back a little" from the enormous subject and employ a bottom-up methodological approach. The twin ideas of surprise and deception can provide a methodological tool by which the whole world of medieval warfare can be viewed. An analysis of the relationship between the use of surprise and deception and the conduct of armed conflict is an excellent way of illuminating the complicated concepts embraced by the term chivalry. As has already been noted above, surprise and deception are widely considered to be opposed to the concept of chivalry although their relationship with both the theory and practice of the military code appears somewhat more complex than this simplistic view allows. This thesis will examine the restraint, or lack of restraint, in the employment of surprise and deception in both the theory and practice of medieval warfare. The conclusions that are reached about this relationship will allow a little light to be spread on the broader and even more complicated subject of the institution of chivalry itself. The thesis will examine the phenomena of surprise and deception in the period of the Hundred Years War, c.1337-1453. This period coincides with the formation of the exclusive orders of knighthood like the Order of the Garter in England (following the much celebrated victory of the English at Crecy) and, shortly afterwards, King John's Order of the Star in France.75 The body of rules that make up chivalry are seen to be, in some degree, institutionalised through this period.76 At the same time it is widely perceived as the period in which the laws of war were challenged by a number of factors such as the rise of professional mercenaries not interested in the "discipline of chivalry",

74 Froissart, Chroniques, Ms. Amiens, George T. Diller (Ed.), 4 vols (Geneve: Droz, 1991), I, p.253; Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), II, pp.485f., &; Froissart, Chronicles, Johnes (Ed.), I, p.49. 75 Juliet Vale, Edward III and Chivalry: Chivalric Society and its Context 1270-1350 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1982), pp.76-91. 76 Anne Curry, 'Chivalry', in Cannon, British History, pp.202f.

29 increased use of archery and the "popular wars" of the Flemish Communes and the Swiss Cantons.77

To determine the role, importance and perception of the use of surprise and deception in the warfare of the late Middle Ages, Chapter Two will begin by looking at the legal framework that governed the use of violence in the Middle Ages. It will examine the feud, the duel and trial by battle to demonstrate how war was perceived and what its place in society was. This will provide a strong foundation on which to build the next stage of the thesis: what could one actually do in war and how did this relate to the use of surprise and deception? Laws, in theory, reflect the values of the society within which they are created so, if there were what we would call laws, did they cover cases such as surprise, deceit and related areas such as ambush and ruse de guerre?78 How was the law or code of conduct and its relationship with this kind of behaviour actually perceived by different people? The following chapters will determine if there was a difference in the perception about what one could and could not do in warfare between scholars, canon and secular lawyers, chroniclers and, perhaps most tellingly of all, those who actually did the fighting. Chapter Three analyses a legalistic account of the laws of war provided by the Benedictine monk Honore Bouvet in his Tree of Battles.79 This was written in the late fourteenth century and because Bouvet was interested in what was wrong with contemporary chivalry, he gives us examples of how things were being done in an incorrect manner before demonstrating the correct course of action. The work came to be

77 E.g. James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Johnson uses the case of the institution of truce to illustrate this point. According to him, in the Middle Ages a truce was a complete cessation of hostilities, like an adjournment, for the purposes of arbitration etc. By the Thirty Years' War, a truce had become a tactical thing, to be used for military advantage (p.62.). However, there is good reason to suppose that truces could be used for tactical purposes in the Middle Ages too. 78 An obvious question that comes from this type of analysis is what difference did these laws or codes of conduct actually make? The strong counterfactual element of this particular enquiry is difficult to contend with. However, if one believes that laws do tend to reflect the values of a society then the laws themselves do not necessarily have to be a motive for action themselves, they may merely articulate motives already present. In other words, one does not always obey the law simply because it is written down, but because it is consistent with the values of the society of which one is a member. 79 Where the original texts are in medieval French or Latin, I have used recognised translations or my own translations combined with careful additional cross referencing with the original editions to ensure that the spirit as well as the literal meaning of the original is included.

30 considered as an authority on the legal conduct of war and it was quoted alongside other written laws in legal disputes by the end of this period.8o Also contained in Chapter Three is an analysis of part of the writings of Christine de Pisano Christine based an important part of her Book of Fayttes of Armes and Chyvalrye on Bouvet's work. This popular work was intended for the military education of the Dauphin himself and, when taken as a whole, was intended as a practical guide for the practising knight. The section in which Christine employs Bouvet's help follows his legalistic arguments and clarifies them for the reader, highlighting certain examples and exploring them further. Chapter Four turns to that most famous of medieval chroniclers, Jean Froissart. Froissart provided us with one of the most important and detailed accounts of the later Middle Ages and his exposition of chivalric and courtly ideals is peerless. Along with many of the other chronicles that have survived, Froissart tends towards normative or prescriptive accounts. This can make many of the chronicles, including Froissart, dubious as an exact historical record. However, it does allow a strong impression of contemporary attitudes. In addition to some historical inaccuracies, the medieval chroniclers also tend to be prejudiced towards those of rank. Again, this can be useful because as they were generally written with a particular audience in mind, they 'provide insights into the aristocratic mentality which the records can rarely offer' .81 Although in some respects Froissart's Chronicles can give a false impression, they do not simply portray an ideal and do not avoid criticism of behaviour when it appears justified. Froissart goes some way towards bridging the gap between the theoretical, prescriptive advice offered by Bouvet and (in places) Christine de Pisan, and actual medieval practice by utilising the beliefs and expectations of the expected audience while narrating historical or relatively contemporary events. Essentially, Froissart provides a framework for the management of chivalric expectation. Chapter Five moves from the literary to the pragmatic. The Epitome of Military Science by Vegetius proved to be one of the most popular texts to survive from antiquity into the Middle Ages and many copies were made. The majority of these were in the original Latin, but as with The Tree of Battles, the work was also translated into a large

80 E.g. the duke of Norfolk vs. the duke of Somerset in 1453. See Bouvet, Tree, p.23.

31 number of vernacular languages.82 Vegetius' work provided an epitomization of Roman authorities on the successful conduct of war and was basically a handbook on how to conduct military operations. It is the changes made to the contents of the various copies to make them more concurrent with medieval belief and experience that are of particular relevance to this thesis. After seeing what the original work has to say on the subject of surprise and deception, the chapter looks at three popular medieval adaptations of the Epitome, beginning with John Trevisa's 1408 translation made for Thomas, Lord Berkeley. The Poem of Knighthood was completed in the closing years of the Hundred Years War and translated the Epitome into verse form. The Epitome was also paraphrased extensively (and adapted) in Christine de Pisan's Book of Fayttes Armes and Chyvalrye. Some of the changes or adaptions are subtle but are also highly illuminating of medieval attitudes. Chapter Six contains an analysis of the works of Geoffroy de Charny who, according to one of his contemporaries, was 'a knight more skilled in military matters than any other Frenchman, so that his fame was widespread' .83 His eminently practical works include the Demandes and the Book of Chivalry both written in the mid-fourteenth century. The Demandes is of particular interest as it consists of a list of questions addressed to the knights of King John's Order of the Star, concerned mainly with technical questions regarding how they, as experts in these matters, would interpret various rights and duties. Geoffroy's pragmatic concerns were for how the actual practice of the rules in operation affected him and other knights.84 This provides a strongly positivistic approach and each of Charny' s works has some genuine contributions to make for the purposes of this thesis by discussing the type of behaviour that was not only expected of knights, but was also practised by them. Following on from these different perspectives on the laws of war and their relationship with the use of surprise and deception, Chapter Seven looks at a number of

81 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (London: Routledge, 1985), p.X. 82 See Charles S. Shrader, 'A Handlist of Extant Manuscripts Containing the De Re Militari of Flavius Vegetius Renatus', Scriptorium, 33 (1979), pp.286ff. 83 Geoffrey Ie Baker, Chronicon Galfridi Ie Baker de Swynebroke, Edward M. Thompson (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), p.1 03: 'miles plus quam aliquis Gallicus, ut fama ventilavit'. 84 N.A.R. Wright, 'The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and the Laws of War' in C.T. Allmand (Ed.), War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1976), p.22.

32 specific case studies from the period of the Hundred Years War. These include particular campaigns and battles and the evidence for these comes from a variety of sources including personal accounts, letters, and a wide mixture of chronicles. While there is always the military historian's problem of piecing the events of a campaign or battle together from disparate and often contradictory sources, the point here will not necessarily be to provide a narrative of these events, but to determine the kind of behaviour that was expected within the realm of different people's experience. The exact manner in which a specific event actually happened is not the concern of this thesis. However, if a particular course of action or turn of events is considered a definite possibility by the sources, then it may illustrate what was considered to be normal or acceptable behaviour. It is this consideration that is most important for the focus of this thesis. Any attempt to analyse the role of surprise and deception in medieval warfare must involve an analysis of the language used to portray the concept. The thesis will look at the way that the terms are used, the contexts within which they operate and the different attitudes to them that are expressed by different sources. However, before this can be tackled, it is necessary to address the problem of how we are actually to define the terms used throughout this paper. What do surprise and deception mean in a linguistic and technical sense? This question, as it will quickly become obvious, is not a simple matter as the terms are extremely value-laden. A very good illustration of this is provided by looking at an example from an earlier time. The Roman author Valerius Maximus gave the example of Tarquinius' capture of Oabii. This feat was made possible through the efforts of Tarquinius' son, Sextus, who infiltrated the enemy in the guise of a refugee. This apparently acceptable form of deception is contrasted with Hannibal's 'tricks' at Cannae which, being carried out by a non-Roman against a Roman army were clearly unfair and detestable.85 Valerius 'portrays the common Roman bias that trickery against the Romans is base, but trickery by the Romans is prudence' .86 Specific actions can be

85 Valerius Maximus, 7.4.2 & 7.4 ex 2. 86 E.L. Wheeler, 'Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery' Mnemosyne Supplement 108 (Leiden, 1988), p.13. This mentality rejects the traditional propagandist view accepted by historians such as Giovanni Brizzi that the Romans were a morally upright people who abhorred trickery and stratagems until

33

, f judged to be either of these depending on the perspective (and allegiance) of the interested party and the language used to describe them will change as a result. Thus it will be necessary to try and reach a working definition that minimises the sUbjective element as far as possible, allowing specific examples to be judged clearly as cases of surprise and deception or not, regardless of one's perspective.87 This should in tum allow a qualitative assessment of the behaviour surrounding examples that clearly fit into our model. While it is conceded that the grey area here may be substantial, this area may also prove to be the most interesting. The use of the word "trickery" in the quotation above leads us onto the other question that this chapter will discuss. There are clearly words that are, or have been used as, synonyms for surprise and deception and there are other words that are so inextricably linked to these concepts that they cannot be ignored. It will be necessary to look at these and clarify which terms and definitions are going to be employed in this study, either explicitly or implicitly. Only then can this thesis successfully explore the way that these concepts were understood in the Middle Ages. The word 'surprise' has a number of related meanings, only some of which are relevant to this thesis.88 It can mean to cause (someone) to feel amazement or wonder, but this is clearly not helpful to this particular study except in the sense that a surprise military move, by deliberately doing something unexpected, can cause wonder or amazement in an enemy's camp. Surprise can also mean the act of encountering or discovering someone or something unexpectedly or suddenly. As this is essentially a passive sense of the word and carries the implication of an accidental rather than intentional encounter, it really falls outside of the scope of this study. However, it can clearly be imagined how encounters of this nature could be described in such a way so as

the Second Punic War where they learnt the value of these skills from Hannibal. See Wheeler, Statagem, p.x. 87 This process of moving towards an objective position from a personal and therefore subjective one is set out very clearly in Thomas Nagel, The Possibility ofAltruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) and is further developed in The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Nagel's argument points out that, not only is it impossible to reach a genuinely objective viewpoint, it is also undesirable as information about the world must be related to something we know or it is useless. The important thing is to move away from the purely personal while keeping the subjective and therefore meaningful information. 88 The Collins English Dictionary (HarperCollins, 1994), S.v. 'surprise'.

34 to wrongly ascribe to one party the intention to surprise another, particularly by the side that was slower to react or who came off worse from any ensuing engagement. The difference is subtle, but one could also envisage a situation where both parties were initially surprised (in the passive sense with no expectation of the surprise by either party) but one side chose to capitalise on the situation by quickly acting and taking advantage of the other side's hesitation or shock (thereby changing the initial passive surprise into an active one). This would be to surprise by consciously seeking to exploit an originally non­ intentional or accidental situation. In this case, the example would be closer to the next sense of surprise: to capture or attack (someone) suddenly and without warning. The medieval author Christine de Pisan gives a Biblical example of where God commands Joshua to 'surpyse and ouercome hys enemyes' using an ambush.89 In Froissart we find an example of a French force attempting to attack an English one at night so that they would be surprised and unable to arm themselves properly.90 These examples clearly fall within the meaning of surprise that the thesis is focusing on, as is the idea of surprise into, where someone is provoked into an unintended action through a trick etc. Clearly one cannot surprise somebody cautiously and sedately and "suddenly" appears to be a prerequisite of surprise. This thesis will concentrate on the conscious decision to surprise rather than the passive meaning of encountering or discovering by chance or unintentionally. Although there are surprise meetings that can result in military confrontation, they are only of interest to this thesis if that confrontation comes about due to the conscious efforts and considerations of one of the two parties or if an otherwise surprise meeting for both sides is then consciously exploited by one side to the disadvantage of the other. To deceive is to 'intentionally mislead either by lying or by failing to correct a false belief', while deception is either: a) the act of deceiving someone or the state of being deceived, or; b) something that deceives such as a trick. There are types of deception where, for example, an enemy is misled through the spreading of false intelligence, or fooled into believing that a particular plan is being implemented when there is no such intention. An example of intentionally misleading someone by lying

89 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.9f & pp.20lf.

35 would be the case of William of Graville who assured the governor of the castle that his gate could be opened without fear and then split his head open with an axe the second the 91 gate was unlocked. An example of deception brought about by failing to correct a false belief would be Sir Galahaut de Ribemont concealing his pennant (by which he would be recognised) and also failing to raise his helmet visor so that Sir Reginald de Boullant would continue in his false belief that Galahaut was a friend. 92 There are also other types of deception that go further than this and, certainly according to contemporary opinion, appear to undermine the very basis of the minimum standard of conduct in military affairs. That is to say deception that is contra fidem and involves the use of the law of war itself to deceive one's adversary.93 A modern example of this that would also be applicable to the medieval period would be the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or surrender. There can clearly be a very fine line between some types of behaviour that are universally judged as acceptable, acts of war that are strictly speaking permitted (but not necessarily condoned) by the codes or even the spirit of the law, and clear acts of perfidy. The keeping of good faith appears to be one of the key points in distinguishing which category particular acts of war are judged to fall into and this will be a theme that is repeatedly brought up throughout this thesis. Where this line is thought to be and, therefore, what actions are considered acceptable in the warfare of the late Middle Ages should prove to be extremely enlightening. The term stratagem is of relevance to this thesis where it is employed as a collective term for various types of surprise and particularly deception in a military context. Wheeler, in his analysis of the Greek and Roman language of military trickery, used the following definition of stratagem:

a strategic or tactical act of trickery, deceit, or cunning in military affairs and especially war, whereby one attempts to gain psychological or material advantage over an opponent, to neutralize some part of an opponent's superiority, to minimise one's own expenditure of resources, or to restore the morale and physical state of one's own forces. 94

90 Froissart, Chroniques: MS. Amiens, Diller (Ed.), ill pp.200f. 91 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI p.28. 92 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.228ff. 93 See discussion above. 94 Wheeler, Stratagem, p.x.

36 I believe that this is a valid, working definition of stratagem and, as one can see, it fits very neatly into an analysis of surprise and deception. I would like, however, to broaden this approach just a little and simplify the working definition of the concept I wish to examine to: attempts to gain military advantage over an opponent through the employment of acts intended to mislead, cause confusion or to be unexpected so as to catch that opponent in an unprepared or disadvantaged state. I will leave the question of what exactly constitutes a military advantage for the moment as I do not believe that it can easily be reduced to a simple formula. It instead includes tangibles such as the occupation of a specific territory or achievement of an objective through to such intangibles as relative morale and psychological states. As such, I do not feel that leaving the exact definition slightly open in this way is unwarranted. Through focusing on surprise and deception in the medieval theory and practice of warfare, this thesis will provide a window through which to view the period. If the accepted laws of war did in fact pragmatically allow deceit and surprise to be employed then what does this say about the way that we view medieval knighthood and the warfare of the Middle Ages? If the laws do not accept the unconditional use of these weapons, when and where were they acceptable and by whom? Did the rules about surprise and deception change depending upon the parties or the situation involved? Can chivalry really be seen as simply a way of regulating business relations, a code of conduct motivated purely by self interest? The thesis will provide insights into the relationship between restraint in medieval warfare and the role of chivalry. The complicated and, occasionally, seemingly contradictory role played by surprise and deception in the warfare of the Middle Ages has clearly not been satisfactorily explained before. By analysing the role of surprise and deception in the warfare of the Middle Ages, this thesis will contribute to a better understanding of chivalry itself and medieval warfare as a whole. It will argue that the rules governing the use of surprise and deception were not actually applied haphazardly or ignored when the situation demanded it, but that they were simply applied at different levels at different times depending upon the legal and moral context within which they were employed. Through taking this approach, chivalric war can be

37 seen for what it is - a framework or system of rules that allow a result or decision to be reached which is accepted by both sides.

38 Chapter Two

The Role of War as a Legal Instrument in the Middle Ages.

Before it is possible to examine the laws or codes of behaviour that were accepted or expected to govern the conduct of warfare in the Middle Ages, it is necessary to provide the context within which those restrictions (if they existed) operated. This chapter is concerned with the role played by force in the legal and belief systems of people in the Middle Ages and the decline of its accepted use as a means for settling most, but importantly not all, disputes. While this is a large topic, I will concentrate upon two related areas, beginning with an examination of the feud, the legal reasoning behind it and the way violence was used and increasingly restricted within it. From here I will move on to look at the rise and fall in the use of the judicial ordeal, concentrating in particular on the duel and its relationship with the feud. Although often ignored in military histories, both of these areas are inextricably linked to any understanding of medieval warfare. This chapter will provide a strong and original foundation on which to build the rest of the thesis by setting out what exactly war was and how the law itself was understood in the Middle Ages. This will allow the chapters that follow to look within warfare to see how it was actually conducted with specific reference to the phenomena of surprise and deception. Force or might of arms has always been used to resolve disputes but in the Middle Ages, certain types of violence came to be placed within a formal context. Feuds were an accepted way of recovering or asserting legal rights. Battle, whether between individuals or groups, was seen as a legal contest with extensive rules governing its use. Alternative legal procedures were gradually developed to replace both of these instruments. However, the contest itself was not necessarily abandoned but merely moved into an alternative, and more restricted, environment. The formation of the modern state is closely linked to the way that the right to resort to violence for private ends was gradually restricted and monopolised until it was only an accepted legal practice when carried out with a king's authority.

39 Background

The period in question is long and extremely complicated. The geographical area of Western Europe encompassed a multitude of legal systems that developed at different rates and were influenced in different ways by local conditions. The fall of the old Roman state led to its division, in the west, among several Germanic tribal kingdoms. While culture became dominated by the Roman church and the Latin language, the legal systems here returned (where they had changed at all) to local and customary Germanic law. The development of feudal law from about the eighth century onwards, with its stress upon personal relations, landed property and lack of written, formal legislation, is related to this rather than Roman Law. 1 The canon law of the Church was the only legal code that did not vary considerably from place to place. Even so, for a long time they were primarily concerned with church affairs and in particular administrative matters, and so had little influence upon most people's lives. However, ecclesiastical law did become increasingly important when the church began to extend its influence into secular areas. With the crowning of Charlemagne in 800, 'the entwining of the interests of church and state ... [became] a distinctive and a fundamental element in the organisation of medieval society' .2 The Church's law was based upon Roman law but had a flavour of its own thanks to its distinct rules and ideas. This meant that Roman law was never entirely lost. As intellectual life began to blossom once more with the growing prosperity towards the middle and end of the period, Roman law again became increasingly important, fusing with customary and feudal law, and gradually incorporating their values into written law once more. Thus the distinction between the different kinds of law is not always clear. The complicated situation was further confused by 'vertical dividing lines' that separated freemen from serfs, townsmen from countrymen, churchmen and students from laymen, and members of guilds from those who were unaffiliated. Each group had a distinct network for applying their rules, it being the norm that 'everyone should be tried by his peers,.3 There was certainly no single set of laws in the Middle Ages and it took some time for the tribal law, based on people bound by blood-ties and kinship, to develop

1 R.C.Van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Private law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.16ff. 2 Ibid., p.22. 3 R.C. Van Caenegem, Legal History: A European Perspective (London: Hambledon, 1991), p.118.

40 into territorial law covering anyone within its area regardless of their personal relations. This was demonstrated by the way that official titles began to change in England in the thirteenth century, later elsewhere, from 'king of the English', to 'king of England'. The crown now, in theory, constituted the sole government within the territory. This was what we would now think of as public law, for it applied to every-one within the territory over 4 which the king ruled. Until then, and even then for some time afterwards, the feudal class kept their own network of courts, just as the rising burgher class had their own municipal courts. Villagers were still likely to have had their disputes settled by whatever manner court was in their area meaning different laws were being invoked in different areas.5 Aquinas explains this by saying that:

human law may be divided according to the categories of men who perform specific tasks for the common good, as priests who pray on behalf of the people, and knights who fight for their protection.6

Demarcation disputes between the different laws may have been frequent but all law, whether it had originally come from a Christian, Roman or Germanic background, was fundamentally seen to be based upon reason. It appears that although there may have been different ways of looking at the law in the Middle Ages, and varying ways of applying it, it was more a question of looking at the same underlying law from different perspectives rather than the application of totally unrelated laws. While we now may consider law to be an instrument of social regulation, this idea was alien to the early Middle Ages. Law was considered 'an unwritten and unchanging eternal norm' that could not just be changed or adapted for social reasons; it was society.7 While the law may have been clarified or interpreted by various authorities, it was unthinkable (until the centralised monarchies of Europe consolidated their power over territorial areas) that anyone apart from God made the law. Kings might declare the law just as judges found the law or ecclesiastical lawyers discovered the law from the Bible, but nobody could

4 R.C.Van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.72ff 5 Van Caenegem, Legal History, pp.115ff. 6 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 2ae, Q.xv, Art.4. Quoted from M.H.Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p.15. 7 Van Caenegem, Legal History, p.123.

41 make it. The natural order that God intended upon earth was the legally ordered society that actually existed and any infringement of this order was 'a blow against God and law,.8 'Nothing is more self-evident in medieval thought than the idea that all law is rooted in God,.9 Needless to say, to go against the law was automatically to go against morality, for the law came from God and therefore was equated with that which was moral. Within this way of thinking, custom was everything and to say that a law was new was to question its validity. The Magna Carta was an attempt to restore traditional laws that had been 'perverted by the king's arbitrary rule' .10 Custom, of course, did change or progress would have been impossible, but it did so in different places at different speeds, unconsciously or imperceptibly over time and not as an instrument of social change until towards the end of the period. These are important considerations to bear in mind when considering legal attitudes towards the use of surprise and deception. t*: C) ." ,~ . fr' 'I, The Feud . ( ( From the earliest of times, men knew that killing brought vengeance from the kinsmen of ,.)(·;1 the deceased. Lesser wrongs could be avenged in person and the attempts at regulating , ("\ . , , i ( these blood-feuds form the basis of the first laws. As kin extended to sixth cousins, disputes could involve whole communities and there was obviously incentives to sort out internal tribal problems by a system of 'honourable compensation' rather than just recourse to violence that could prove damaging to the community. In the sixth century Ethelbert, a local king in Kent, wrote down the ancient custom of his subjects in the form f . ,,'( , ... , , of laws. These consisted of the various levels of compensation payable to those wronged, t, , or their families, based on the nature of the wrong and the social status of the person ~ ..... whose rights had been violated along with a fee payable to the king himself because of the violation of his personal peace. 11 If the person who had committed the wrong refused to suffer arbitration then he would be declared an outlaw and would lose the protection that the community offered. A state of enmity appeared in which the bonds of peace and

8 Otto Brunner, Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria (philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp.24 & 118. 9 Ibid., p.114. 10 Van Caenegem, Legal History, p.120.

42 friendship that had existed between the individual and his community were dissolved leaving the way open for the wronged party to bring the perpetrator to justice themselves. I2

This provided the basis of Germanic tribal law that was eventually to develop into feudal law. While we might now see revenge as something negative based on emotion, it was considered a moral duty into the Middle Ages, for law came from God and represented the natural order of things. To violate it was to act against God as well as the person whose rights had been violated and this could not be left to pass. Peace, the state where no rights were being challenged or asserted, could not exist between the two parties until vengeance or compromise leading to reconciliation had been achieved. Until then, the state of enmity that existed between two feuding parties was the same as that which existed between two enemies in a state of war. There was no legal distinction between the two until the very end of the period. All political actions involving force were essentially feuds and considered as such. Both were really struggles for right and the resumption of peace where no rights were in dispute. The only real difference was normally the size of the resources used. Even a king fighting a king had to begin with a challenge to feud as a matter of law and this took the same essential form as any other 13 challenge. The Hundred Years War was no exception. In May 1338 Henry Burghersh, Edward Ill's senior diplomat/advisor and Bishop of Lincoln, delivered a letter of defiance (written several months before) to King Philip in Paris. In the letter Philip was addressed merely as 'Philip of Valois' and Edward asserted his own right to the throne and the

intent to claim it through force of arms. 14 Prohibiting or abolishing the feud within society was not simply an act, but required a fundamental structural change in both law and politics. The feud had to be

made superfluous by legal institutions backed by sufficient power to enforce them. IS Therefore self-help in the form of the feud remained a legal process where there was a

11 Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law (London: Penguin, 1966), pp.13ff. 12 Brunner, Lordship, pp.16f. 13 Ibid., pp.34f. . 14 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p.232 & 294; Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), 1. ppA03ff, and; Chronographia regum Francorum, H. Maranville (Ed.), 3 vols (1891-7), ii, pp.38ff. 15 Brunner, Lordship, pp.28f.

43 lack of central power. 16 In most cases the right to feud was restricted to certain people who were considered to have sufficient authority (see below). This authority became increasingly qualified as time went on, and the feud came to be seen as an alternative form of attaining justice rather than the only way. The feud could go to arbitration, in or out of court, at any point and a truce would be called to allow the dispute to be resolved. As the law and its institutions developed, it is easy to see how the idea of a struggle or battle between the two parties dominated jurisprudence, for in effect the two parties were still in conflict but one that was simply suspended from the battlefield. This relationship between the two parties can still be seen in today's legal thought: 'Smith v. Jones or Rex

v. Jones' .17

For a feud or a war to have legal consequences and actually be a legal process, it had to have a particular form. While originally this would have been bound by local custom, it came to be set out in the formal code of arms, the ius militare; a product of, amongst other things, feudal law, custom, chivalric ideals and religious thinking. A useful starting point for looking at conflict as a legal process is the Roman Just War Tradition as articulated by Cicero in the first century BC. 18 However, to understand the ideas that inform the Just War Tradition properly, it is prudent to go back further than this and examine the legal code and system of war in the Greek world first. The great philosopher Aristotle stated some of the most important principles of the Just War and saw force as

'not without virtue' with war a means to higher goals such as peace. 19 Drawing on some of the ideas developed within this long tradition of western thought, the main authority referred to in the Middle Ages was Augustine who wrote in the fifth century AD but continued to have an impact long after this. To the Greeks, warfare was considered quite natural and was 'simply one aspect

of a much vaster power at work in all human relationships and even in nature itself .20 In Athens in particular, all political decisions, including the decision to engage in, and the

16 Brunner notes that the feud was not replaced as a legal instrument in Austria until after the ISth century, remaining the main way that the nobility solved its disputes. Brunner, Lordship, p.43. 17 Harding, English Law, p.123. 18 Cicero was by far the most popular Roman source to survive into the Middle Ages. See Philippe Richardot, Vegece et la Culture Militaire au Moyen Age (V - XV siecles) (paris: Economica, 1998), p.193. 19 Aristotle, 'Politics' from J.L. Ackrill (Ed.), A New Aristotle Reader (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), I, 6.1255aS-25 & VII, 14. 1333a30-3S. 20 Jean-Pierre Vemant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. J. Lloyd (London: Methuen, 1992), p.19.

44 preparations for conducting warfare, were made in public by those eligible to vote (admittedly a fairly limited franchise, but still a very significant minority within the community). At least before the Peloponnesian War, conflict between the city states was seen as a contest in which force of arms in a ritualised clash replaced verbal argument. In an attitude that would have been familiar to many in the Middle Ages, the complete destruction of the opposition side was not the intended result of military confrontation. Rather, the aim was to achieve a moral supremacy, forcing the other side to acknowledge one's superior strength and therefore justice of one's argument. It was not necessary to annihilate the opposition to do this so a pursuit of a fleeing enemy was superfluous: by then, the victory was already achieved as it was 'sufficient that their line should not have held, that one should remain in control of the field, that they should have sought permission to gather up their dead and that a trophy should have been set up' .21 Polybius noted that for an encounter to be accepted as decisive, a hand-to-hand struggle at close quarters was required. Although missile weapons were used, they were employed as part of the preliminaries to the real test and were not expected to result in a decision on their own. Polybius also notes how utterly useless the phalanx was in any kind of engagement other than a very limited, head-to-head confrontation with little tactical manoeuvring.22 Despite this, no effort appears to have been made to establish a strategy of defending the mountain passes to defend the lands of the various city states before the hoplites even arrived at the plains for the battle. It was the struggle of the two opposing phalanxes (and all that they represented) that was required to settle the matter. In the Republic, Plato reports Socrates as he sets out his idea of a perfect society. Part of this is his view about warfare and the limits that should be observed in disputes between Greeks which were not to be considered true warfare at all. Unlike conflict with the non-Greek barbarians, which could properly be called warfare and involve enmity and hatred, 'Greeks ... are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction,?3 As such, quarrels should be conducted with a view towards reconciliation. The enemy should not be enslaved or their

21 Vernant, Myth and Society, p.27. 22 Polybius, 13.3.2-7 & 18.31.2. From W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Vol. II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p.173.

45 homes and farms destroyed (although taking food was acceptable). One was to act as a 'corrector', and only those who were actually at fault for the quarrel should be considered gUilty of anything and therefore deserving of punishment.24 It is commensurate with this attitude that Hellenic law banned stone monuments to a victory and even the maintenance of wooden ones so that the memory of a conflict should not be perpetuated.25 At least until the informal rules of Greek warfare broke down from the last third of the fifth century BC, the contest of phalanxes decided the issue at stake. Warfare was effectively limited in scope by both sides to allow a clear result to end the conflict. The Roman attitude to war was a little different and the influential Cicero wrote from a perspective dominated by Roman legal thinking and its particular view of just causes for military activity by the state. In this respect he was primarily interested in contractual obligation and the parallel between civil law suits designed to recover damages and injuries, and relations between city-states who enjoyed similar rights although they were acting as both judge and party. If the citizens of one state injured the citizens of another state in some way and they were not punished by their own state, then the whole state could be punished by war. This process shared the same general form as a private legal process, not a criminal one: 'it would be inconsistent with the dignity of the approach to regard the enemy as a criminal; rather, the opponent is treated as being on the same level' Roman law (at least in theory) treated both parties as equals.26 A just war was seen as an extraordinary legal procedure designed to seek justice and could only be waged to recover lost goods (whether these were tangible or incorporeal rights), in defence or as punishment. 27 Given the very strict legal definition of just war, any war waged without just cause was piracy. Legally, a formal and authoritative declaration of war from the

23 Plato, 'Republic V', line 470, Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns (Eds), The Collected Dialogues of Plato (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).p.709. 24 Whilst Socrates' view was intended as an ideal, it appears generally accepted by modem historians that the rules, or traditions of restraint, that governed intra-Greek warfare were generally followed from 700 to 450 BC and that they only really began to break down from 450-300 BC. See Chaper One, n.15. 25 Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (London: MacMillan, 1911), p.296. 26 Alan Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome: War and Religion (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p.20. .. .. 27 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambndge: Cambndge Umversity Press, 1975), pp.4ff.

46 Emperor was also required, but this could not come until between thirty and thirty three days after a formal demand for redress had been made and not met. 28 This delay was consistent with the domestic legal procedure for private actions, after which a debtor could be physically brought before the magistrate and either find a guarantor or face chains. However, in the civil procedure, the delay was intended to provide time for a judge to be decided upon and agreed by both sides. In the international procedure, the god Jupiter had already been chosen as the judge. If redress was not forthcoming, the people involved were called unjust and a council was called to determine the best way of obtaining right. The judgement itself had already been given and, as long as the ritual had been satisfied, judgement favoured the Romans. The legal consequences of war itself were supposed to be limited by mercy in the case of those who were not guilty of resisting Rome. Otherwise, the declaration of war meant that there was no longer an obligation to respect the enemy's rights. Capture of civilians, plunder and devastation were all permitted and many of these ideas passed straight into the Middle Ages. Augustine, writing in the fifth century, drew heavily from the Old and New Testaments but was also influenced by Roman Law. He saw war as both a consequence of and a remedy for sin but was faced with the problem of reconciling the pacifistic doctrine of the New Testament with the reality of his environment. He did this by agreeing with Aristotle that the goal of a just war was peace and added that it should be motivated by love. While Christians did not have the right to defend themselves as individuals from violence, they could use violence to defend the innocent from evil and this was how Christians could defend the Roman Empire - 'the intention rather than the hostI ·1 e act was normatIve. ,29. Rulers had an obligation to maintain peace, and it was this obligation that gave them the right or even duty to wage war in order to maintain peace. In addition to this, injustice was a greater evil than war, and it was clearly proper to carry out a lesser evil if it would prevent a greater evil:

28 There is a split in the sources between thirty and thirty three days. For thirty, see: Livy, 1.22.5, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 2.72.7. For thirty three, see: Livy 1.32.9. 29 Russell, Just War, p.17.

47 Wars are defined as just when their aim is to avenge injury, that is when that people or city against whom war is to be declared has neglected either to redress the injuries done by its subjects, or to restore what they have wrongfully seized.3o

War still required valid authority, be it God Himself or a ruler, but this way of thinking broadened the legitimate scope of warfare because now it was also equated with righteousness. While the idea of securing redress and compensation is to be found in both Cicero's and Augustine's account, now God had to be given his due too for the injury to the moral order. Instead of merely seeking a return to the status quo ante bellum, war as an act of justice could now legitimately become practically unlimited with compensation as well as damages sought. The guilt of the enemy merited the punishment of the whole enemy population 'without regard to the distinction between soldiers and civilians' just as God had commanded Joshua to make war on the people of Ai. 31 Although Augustine does not guarantee victory to the righteous, other works prompted by him see divine aid favouring those with a just cause. The influence of this way of thinking was enormous and its logic can be seen in many areas including judicial ordeals, the feud and the religious crusades. All were seen as attempts to realise an ideal of justice and righteousness. One of the problems facing legal theorists in the Middle Ages was that of determining or defining a legitimate authority. For the Greeks, legitimacy came from the decision of the polis, whilst when Roman law was written the problem did not exist because there was only one recognised authority; the Emperor. This was no longer the case with the fall of the empire and the resulting dispersal and devolution of power. The Germanic tradition of self-help allowed anyone to seek vengeance for a wrong done to them or their family. This right was gradually restricted with the growth of feudal law that concentrated it in the hands of the nobility who were seen as the protectors of society. Eventually this right was to disappear completely with the growth of centralised power and the state's monopoly of legitimate violence. When the monk Gratian was writing his influential compilation of twelfth century canon law known as the Decretum, he saw the just war as a legal procedure employed by a competent authority in defence of

30 Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX.7. Quoted in Keen, Laws, p.66.

48 rights and justice. What exactly constituted a competent authority was not made clear however reflecting the lack of clear definition at the time. 32 Canonic law debates in the thirteenth century focused upon the problem of valid authority, some seeking to limit it to the Emperor or pope, and some to those with no superior which was itself a problem with the growing assertiveness of the new territorial kings and in turn their efforts to limit the powers of the nobility.33 In reality there is a long period of time when it is impossible to distinguish between those who did feud and those who were theoretically entitled to do so, according to the different laws. Certainly the nobility believed that, under the feudal law, they had a mandate to conduct their own legal process. While this view may have conflicted with other theories of law, in practice they continued to conduct feuds for as long as they were able to, using the rules set out in the ius militare. As individual monarchs struggled to concentrate power in their hands, there was an attempt to assert more control over the process of the feud. The right to conduct a feud was qualified by the introduction of a licensing system where one was supposed to appeal for special permission to conduct a feud only once the offending party had refused to submit to arbitration. Upon his accession in 1272, Edward I had it announced on his behalf (he was on crusade) that:

we are and will be prepared, by the authority of God, to give full justice to each and every person in all cases and matters concerning them against any others great or smal1 .34

Although the actual prevalence of illicit knightly violence continued regardless of these efforts, the alternative process for seeking justice continued to develop. It was regulated by statute by the time of Henry V, both in England and in France. Now redress had to be sought from someone with authority over the defendant, and it was only after this form of legal process had been conducted and resisted that a letter of marque would be awarded

31 Russell, Just War, pp.19f. 32 Ibid., p.71. 33 Ibid., p.298. . . 34 Quoted in Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford Umverslty Press, 1999), p.I07.

49 to allow the challenger to restore his rights and recover his losses?5 Only when the state itself was in a position to conduct the whole process was the feud finally obsolete. Even in the ius militare, burghers and peasants retained for some time the right to conduct blood feuds as retribution for a killing, wounding or mortal injury, probably thanks to the strength of tradition and custom.36 French townspeople claimed the characteristic chivalric right to what was effectively private war through much of the Middle Ages. French knights indirectly recognised such rights by following the process of issuing formal challenges of war against these 'collective lordships' .37 There was no right to feud at all for those considered unarmed such as the clergy, women or children. They could, however, seek redress through their right of protection and safeguard resting with their lord who could, and had a duty when necessary, to pursue a feud on their behalf. Along with the challengers, a feud could include their kin, patron when necessary and subordinates depending upon the severity of the claim. Thus a king's feud was likely to involve far more people than a minor noble with little support. In the same tradition as Cicero and Augustine (and many other contributors over the centuries), the feud had to have a legally recognised cause otherwise it was legally (and implicitly morally) wrong. A lawbreaker became an enemy of the individual or community whose rights had been violated and it was this that allowed the challenger to seek redress. If it was found that the cause was in fact not a just one, then it could be the challenger himself that found himself being pursued for violating rights. While quarrels may often have been motivated by purely material considerations, if a feud had no legal foundation then it could be classed as criminal. For example, Nicholas of Tudeschi voiced the legal view that 'knights who take part in a war without just cause should rather

be called robbers than knights' .38 It was essential for a legitimate feud to have a just claim regarding retribution and reparation for violation of rights. It appears that even if the ideology was not accorded constant attention, the phraseology of the just war was essential - it had to be seen to be just by the correct application of and adherence to the

35 Keen, Laws, pp.220f. 36 Brunner, Lordship, p.16. 37 Richard W. Kaeuper, War, Justice, and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford: 1988), p.190. 38 Quoted in Keen, Laws, p.65.

50 established code of conduct.39 There is no doubt that many got away with the most tenuous of just causes, however the penalties could be severe. For example, in 1391 Merigot Marches was surrendered (presumably forcibly) by his cousin and tried before a panel of judges at the Chatelet in Paris on the charge of making war unjustly. In the summing up the judges stated that he had 'by way of treason, taken, raised, and levied 40 appatiz and ransoms in the king's realm and [had] done so since the truces were cried' .41 It was determined that he was a French citizen and so had no right or authority to conduct open war against the French, and even though the land was disputed between the French and the English, the fact that the acts of war had been conducted during a truce to which he had agreed meant that no adequate defence remained. He was found guilty and beheaded. The actual means that the feud involved varied with the end it was aiming to achieve. Rather than being a Clausewitzian style battle of annihilation, the goal of the feud was to get the other party to accept the challenger's view of what was right thus restoring the peaceful state. This could be achieved through what in peace time would be regarded as criminal acts such as forced contributions, arson, plunder, injuries, destruction of property, ransom, or in the most serious cases, manslaughter. Aspects of this are referred to by Girart, Duke of Burgundy when he talks of the local warfare that was going on around him in the Chanson d'Aspremont:

If my neighbor starts a quarrel with me, With fire burns my land to cinders; And I, his, on all sides; If he steals my castles or keeps, Then so it goes until we come to terms, Or he puts me or I put him in prison 42

The chevauchees of various English kings during the Hundred Years' War, designed to undermine the strength and prosperity of regions of France and show the impotence of the French monarchy, can be seen in this light. For example, Chandos Herald records the

39 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p.284. 40 Tribute extracted through threats of devastation. 41 Quoted in Keen, Laws, p.99.

51 actions of the English army between the Seine and the Somme in 1346: 'the English to disport themselves put everything to fire and flame. There they made many a widowed lady and many a poor child orphan' .43 The important thing to note is that while motivations may have been varied and, contrary to what many historians have written on the matter, these actions were not considered the end in itself of the feud. This was not simply a devastating raid and plundering expedition, but was actually a means of achieving the goal of forcing one party to accept the argument of another. As such, the means were supposed to be proportionate to the injury suffered. The influence of the Scriptures can also be seen in limitations placed upon the means used. For example, produce could be taken but the means of producing it could not be touched (there is little doubt that this was often ignored).44 The chevauchee could also be used as a powerful demonstration of moral right. In a period dominated by positivist attitude towards law, the chevauchee or procession through hostile territory demonstrated the justice and moral superiority of one's claim, undermining the position of the impotent lord who was clearly not capable of defending that which he claimed. This could force the issue by putting the other party in a position where offering battle was the only appropriate response. The pressures of this type of behaviour are beautifully illustrated in the Gesta Henrici Quinti where the author describes the effect on the French nobility of Henry's ride through France:

Tam nobilis olim fortudo et milicia The military strength and armed Gallicana, si adhuc esset cor vel forces of the French, once so aliqua humanitas in eis, non possent noble, could not possibly (if they tolerare tanti dedecoris maculam still retained any heart or quod diceretur de eis per mundum manliness) bear the stain of the ad sempiternum opprobrium, eos great dishonour which, to their tam excordes et ignaves crevisse et everlasting reproach, would be tantum degenerasse a nobilitate attributed to them throughout the antiqua quod in Regem Anglie world, namely, that they had venientem in terram eorum, diu become so irresolute and cowardly moram facientem, villam and had so much fallen away from

42 Quoted in Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.177. 43 Chandos Herald, Life of the Black Prince, by the Herald of Sir John Chandos, Mildred K Pope & Eleanor C. Lodge (Eds) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1910), line 236-9. 44 Deuteronomy, XX. 19-20.

52 obsidentum et capientem, et tandem their ancient nobility of character cum tam pauca familia et diminuto that against the king of England excercitu abinde in tam longa (who had entered their land, distancia eorum patriam remained there for so long, populantem, non auderent immo besieged and taken a town, and, at timerent vires extendere militares. length, with so small a following and so reduced an army, laid waste their country at so great a distance from it) they did not dare, nay rather feared, to exert their mi Ii tary strength.45

The actions of Henry did indeed prove too much for the French nobility to stomach and the result was the battle of Agincourt. The result of the feud could therefore come about in a number of ways, through agreement forced by the means used, or the parties could agree to go to arbitration, either privately or through submitting to the judgement of the appropriate court. While actual direct confrontation appeared fairly rare compared to other means, it was always available as a last resort. If the issue was decided by battle, the challenger who held the field for a specified number of days was considered the victor and therefore vindicated in

a practice that was 'handed down over the centuries' .46 When a cause was regarded as just, defeat could sometimes be explained by referring to God's temporary displeasure with the people involved rather than their actual cause. This explains how campaigns could continue even after a set-back or defeat. If one of the challengers were actually killed then it was a clearer judgement on whose side the just cause lay. In the late fourteenth century, the Benedictine monk Honore Bouvet, drawing upon contemporary legal sources and personal experience, still regarded war as part of a divine purpose for the world:

We must understand that war comes from God, and not merely that He permits war, but that He has ordained it.. .. Our Lord God Himself is lord and governor of battles and for this reason we must accept and grant that war comes from divine law, that is, the law of God: for the aim of war is to

45 Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti, trans. Frank Taylor & John S. Roskell (Eds) (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp.64f. 46 Contamine, Warfare, p.261.

53 wrest peace, tranquillity and reasonableness, from him who refuses to acknowledge his wrongdoing.47

By this time the feud had started to become differentiated into varying forms depending upon the authority on which it was declared. 'Real' war was starting to become recognisable as something distinct from the feud. In the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV, adding to the work of his predecessor, differentiated between different levels of licit violence. It is not clear whether this described the situation at the time, the trend in contemporary views, or an ideal that had yet to be reached (although the differing rates of development of different areas meant that these all could have been the case). Defence against attack was always justified and did not constitute war (or feud) because it was a right that did not depend upon authority. If an immediate defence was impossible, then a feud could be waged with the superior authority of a prince to recover a violated right. In the case of a revolt by a subject or subjects, a lord could declare war although this was not really war but rather the exercise of the lord's jurisdiction and authority. Finally, 'real' war was that declared by an independent prince with no superior, against enemies that were outside his jurisdiction.48 This way of thinking was gradually accepted into the ius militare which eventually restricted the right to conduct all-out feuds to the rising regna. This was now regarded as public or open war (what we would regard as war today). Feudal or private war was still permitted but it was now limited in even more ways. Not only did redress have to be sought through other legal channels first, but if a letter of marque was awarded, it only permitted the challenger to fight, wound and kill without blame. Burning or the taking of spoil was limited to public wars. This, of course, had the consequence that only the king could now use the feud or warfare for profit. This would have strengthened the position of the monarchs by making their causes very popular as the only legal way to take plunder through violence, but it also demonstrates that they had more power anyway by this time to be able to make this kind of restriction. Bouvet tells us that it was still acceptable to recover goods or rights through the principle of self-help

47 Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), p.125. 48 Russell, Just War, p.146.

54 in the fourteenth century, 49 but the idea of further punishment or the taking of compensation and damages now appears to have become the sole right of a sovereign king.5o

This was a major change in thinking for it now saw the established territorial kings as having a different relationship with the law. By the end of the period it was becoming accepted that, as they were considered emperors in their own realm, kings could actually make laws. The trends of political thought moved slowly in this direction aided by works such as Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica, written at the end of the thirteenth century, which provided the philosophical basis for the independent secular state, with the ruler acting to further the common goOd. 51 This meant that the king could act as a superior authority in all disputes within the territory over which he had jurisdiction. This power was to eventually make the principle of self-help redundant so the feud was no longer a necessary process in the pursuit of justice within the state. The attractions of private justice were drastically reduced once 'one was not only liable to be

defeated by one's private enemies but to be punished by public authority as well' .52 Disputes between sovereigns, however, could not always be resolved by a 'supreme decision-making authority'. Technically the Pope filled this role, for example acting as arbiter between Emperor Frederick III and the Austrian Estates in 1452. But in practice, this authority was very limited. Secular powers seemed only to refer to it when it was to their advantage and the Church was rarely able to enforce its decisions.53 This meant that the basis for the principle of self-help was still valid in disputes between sovereigns, so the feud continued on past the Middle Ages in the form of inter-state warfare. The nature of the king's authority meant that while in theory his feuds were still expected to conform to the requirements of the just war, in practice his authority alone was all that was needed because he was generally seen to be acting for the common good.54 Nearly all wars could be justified on the grounds of raison d'etat which gradually eclipsed the idea of war as a legal procedure, thereby changing its very nature.

49 Bouvet, Tree, pp.155f. 50 Keen, Laws, p.104. 51 Contamine, Waifare, p.286. 52 Keen, Laws, p.74. 53 Ibid., pp.122f. 54 Ibid., p.71.

55 The judicial ordeal

The origins of the judicial ordeal lie in the development of alternative means of resolution to the feud. While we have seen that the feud itself was a legal process, the law also developed in another way by providing a framework for resolving disputes when a feud had been suspended for arbitration or bypassed completely. The ordeal was used by the court as a means of reaching a decision in cases of a particularly difficult nature. Most disputes would never get to this stage, having been resolved through clear evidence on one side or the other, or perhaps having been successfully arbitered by an agreed referee outside of the court. However, in some cases, there was a lack of evidence, lack of credible witnesses, or simply the two parties both had what appeared to be valid arguments. When this happened, use of an ordeal was often the only acceptable way of obtaining a satisfactory outcome to the dispute. The ordeal, like the feud, was also really a contest and had several forms. It could be 'fought' with oaths (sworn by the accused and accuser and perhaps also oath-helpers, or compurgators, who would vouch for the parties); proven unilaterally by the ordeals of fire or water (in which the accuser who was proved wrong could face the punishment he had hoped to see inflicted), or; it could be literally fought by a duel with weapons. The testing character of all of these ordeals is clearly evident, with God's judgement coming after He had searched the challenger's hearts in the contest. The human judge of the ordeal might have been a member of the local clergy, the lord of the area, or an appointed royal official depending upon the time and place. The main duty of this judge was to decide the form of proof that would be acceptable to the court as the actual judgement was supposed to be unequivocal. Oaths, while not being immediately equated with the notion of an ordeal, were considered a contest in much the same way as the other forms. They were 'the cornerstone of medieval judicial procedure', with one's reputation being of paramount importance to the case. Notoriety could be a dangerous thing and often could be 'as good a reason for condemning a man as proof of a particular crime' .55 In other cases a man could clear his name if enough people could be convinced to vouch for one's good

55 Keen, Laws, p.22.

56 character, the number of people required varying with the nature of the allegations, reputatlon. 0 f th e accused and the customs of the area. 56 One's word was considered a serious thing and perjury had its own, non-temporal punishment for those guilty of it.57 A perjurer could also have a more immediate punishment if he was found wanting during the trial, with death or mutilation being possible. It was part of the testing character of the ordeal that oaths required 'strictly prescribed words and ritual gestures'. Nervousness could clearly affect these, especially surrounded by the words and ceremony 'calculated to inspire a salutary fear in the heart of the criminal'. A stutter could be enough to decide an issue, for a person's conduct reflected the state of his soul. Lack of confidence was indication of a guilty conscience.58 The other forms of the ordeal appear mostly to have been employed only when there was no other way of obtaining proof to solve a legal dispute within this framework. In twelfth century England, it was pronounced that 'the ordeal of hot iron is not to be

permitted except where the naked truth cannot otherwise be explored' .59 Ordeals were only used in cases where tangible evidence or witnesses were lacking, or when the reputation of the accused meant his word could not be trusted. Certain cases needed resolving for society to function. Sexual issues such as adultery or disputed paternity needed to be settled with a definite verdict for vital questions of inheritance to be determined, while other charges such as stealth-murder, clandestine theft, heresy or trials of faith often had no other proof than public belief. For many cases uncertainty was 6o intolerable and the ordeal allowed a decision to be reached in these difficult situations. Apparently of Frankish origin, the ordeals based on fire and water date back to at least the sixth century. Van Caenegem attributes their spread to a 'widespread 61 barbarization of Roman practices' after the fall of the Empire. The ordeal of the 62 cauldron is mentioned in Salic law around 510 and by Gregory of Tours about 580. This involved retrieving an object from boiling water, the judgement being made after a set number of days depending upon the degree of healing of the scalded limb. Other trials

56 Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p.30. 57 Harding, English Law, p.24. 58 Van Caenegem, Legal History, pp.77f. 59 Quoted from Bartlett, p.26. 60 Bartlett, Trial, p.33. 61 Van Caenegem, Legal History, p.74.

57 included walking on hot irons, complete immersion in water or holding a hot iron for a set amount of time. These different ordeals had two features in common: they were usually undertaken by only one party, and; they all required a natural element to behave in an unusual way, for example not burning or scalding or water not allowing the guilty to sink. The first century of the Carolingian dynasty saw a growth in the use of the ordeal and a multiplication of its forms as it was encouraged by successive leaders. The Carolingian influence spread it into neighbouring areas that had previously resisted the Frankish custom.

Trial by duel or battle was another form of ordeal but it was different in a number of important ways. Although it was just as much an appeal to God for a decision in a matter, it was not unilateral but involved both parties. It also relied upon a very straightforward struggle in which both sides risked mortal injury as a verdict, rather than relying on an element acting unnaturally to provide the required evidence. Might really

was right for it was generally considered that 'God would never favour the perjured' .63 According to Nicholas Upton, the author of the mid-fifteenth century legal treatise De Studio Militari, the judge overseeing the ordeal by battle had to ensure that the fighting did not begin until the oaths had been taken to demonstrate that each party believed its cause to be just. Both parties that were willing to fight to prove their version of the truth would have to swear that they were not using deception or other dishonest motivation for the action: 'that as far as they knowe ther cause or quarell ys trew, & that they scholde

use no frawde, Guyle, or deceyte' .64 In Lombardy this oath had the special Latin term of 'iuramentum de asto', or oath of standing by what one has said, much like the oath taken by a plaintiff and defendant in court. As well as being fought for the right reason, without craft or fraud as a motivation on either side, the duel also had to be conducted in a clear and open manner. The weapons to be used had to be inspected by the judge 'that he may

62 Bartlett, Trial, p.4. 63 M.J. Russell, 'Trial By Battle and the Writ of Right', Journal of Legal History, Vol.l (1980), p.ll1. 64 Nicholas Upton was the precentor of Salisbury Cathedral from 1446 until his death in 1457. He was a priest with degrees in both Roman and canon law, and previously had been a clerk in the service of the Duke of Gloucester, travelling with his master in France during the conflict. De Studio Militari is a treatise on intemationallaw and heraldry and was completed before 1446 as it was dedicated to the Duke who died on the 28th February in that year. The English translation was completed by John Blount while a student at All Souls College, Oxford, at the very start of the 1500s. See Nicholas Upton, The Essential Portions of Nicholas Upton's De Studio Militari, trans. John Blount, Francis Pierrepont Barnard (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), pp.lOf.

58 examen them whyther they be lawfull wythowte fraude or deceyte' .65 The actual weapons themselves clearly also had to be "above board" and one can imagine that something like a concealed knife would not be acceptable. Deceit about one's motivation was clearly possible if one was prepared to take the risk of perjuring oneself. The use of deceit actually in the contest would have been harder to practice given the presence of a judge and other spectators. Surprise about the ordeal actually happening would have been impossible as both parties had to agree to or at least be instructed about the time and place of this form of arbitration before it could take place. Employing surprise within the actual ordeal would have also have been difficult, with the weapons being checked by the appointed judge. However, it is less clear what the result would be if one were able to employ some kind of stratagem once the fighting had begun.66 The role of the judge in the conduct of the trial or ordeal by battle is repeatedly stressed in the Studio Militari and Upton makes clear that the fighting only continues for as long as the judge says so 'under payne off perpetuall dishonowre' .67 If the duel was not concluded within the day then it was also up to the judge to appoint another day for it to continue. Just as in the feud, agreement was often reached before the actual battle or even during it, although this was restricted to the more private cases and excluded such crimes as treason (a case particularly suited to trial by combat for it involved the accusation of bad faith meaning oaths could not be accepted as evidence).68 In the case of more private issues such as land rights, a payment may have been payable to the crown or the presiding court for the privilege of settling once the duel was underway, and this was considered binding on both parties. If a compromise was not reached but one party surrendered instead, this was considered a terrible disgrace. The court or the victor then had the power to decide the fate of the vanquished, although this appears to have varied with the time, place and nature of the dispute. Disputes over private rights became increasingly fought by champions, while what we would now think of as criminal cases, such as charges of murder, were resolved in person (or by the closest relative if this was

65 Upton, Studio Militari, pp.13ff. 66 These themes will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. 67 Upton, Studio Militari, pp.13ff. 68 Bartlett, Trial, p.108.

59 impossible) if this form of the ordeal was deemed suitable by the court and was accepted 69 by both parties. The actual death of the protagonists or their champions during the struggle appears to have become rarer with time although the punishment afterwards continued to fit the crime.70 Cases of seisin (disputed property rights) were one of the areas often tried by judicial duel. Most dealings with regards to property were conducted verbally even after the written word had become more widespread. This meant that there was much scope for disagreement over the exact nature of a particular right, a serious matter in a society where land meant power. The right of seisin further complicated matters referring to the length of time somebody had spent on a piece of land. The longer the time, the greater the claim, although by its very nature this was a right that was rarely presented in a written form.71 It was the property-owning nobility who were most likely to have this type of dispute and as the feudal classes consisted of many trained fighters, they naturally favoured a system of trial by combat to decide many of them.72 Challenges were not particularly aristocratic until the rise of chivalric ideals in the late Middle Ages. However, it did became established early on in feudal law that the unfree could not challenge the free (unless the serf had been especially enfranchised) for one was only supposed to be able to challenge one's social equals. For example, in Galbert of Bruges' account of Flemish life in the twelfth century, the unpopular new count is accused of acting wrongfully by a subject and replies:

I wish, then, to make myself your equal by rejecting the homage you have done to me, and to challenge you without delay to combat, because as count I have thus far acted rightly and reasonably in every way.73

While other forms of ordeal were of particularly Frankish origin, the notion of trial by battle is to be found in many of the Germanic peoples' codes of law. It appears to have been a widespread custom of the Burgundians, Lombards, Alamanni, Bavarians,

69 MJ. Russell, 'Trial By Battle and the Appeals of Felony' , J oumal of Legal History Vol. 1 (1980), p.145. 70 Russell, Writ of Right, pp.123f. 71 Harding, English Law, p.45. 72 Van Caenegem, Legal History, p.77. 73 Galbert of Bruges, The Murder of Charles the Good, translated and Edited by James Bruce Ross (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p.269.

60 Thuringians, Frisians and the Saxons, while it seems to have been introduced to England 74 by the Normans. It probably dates from the time that every able bodied man was expected to be able to protect his tribe and thus any man could be expected to defend his rights by his body if necessary. It was certainly encouraged, along with the other forms of ordeal, by the Carolingians who 'regarded it as an essential and regular part of judicial procedure' .75 This way of thinking was still very clear in the mid fifteenth century when Upton stated that the procedure came directly from the law of nature where a man has the right to prove himself through 'hys bodly strength' .76 It was thought that it limited the danger of perjured oaths by backing them up with combat to halt the 'detestable and wicked custom ... whereby those who do not fear God and are not afraid to perjure themselves, make acquisitions by their oaths with the appearance of legality,.77 The range of cases where trial by combat could be employed was probably as broad as for the other ordeals, although it does appear to have been used more frequently by the feudal classes as time went on, while other forms of the ordeal were preferred by other social groups. The Liber Papaensis, an eleventh century Italian law book, lists twenty-three 'actions which may result in judicial duel'. 78 These included challenges to documentary evidence, property cases, treason, adultery, arson and poisoning. This list had not radically changed by the fourteenth century when Bouvet listed sixteen cases that could be settled by combat in his Tree of Battles.79 By the mid fifteenth century, Upton lists twenty cases which could result in trial by combat. The continuity over time is demonstrated here by the fact that these are taken from the laws of Lombardy and contain the same type of cases.80 Just as in the other ordeals, judicial duels appear largely limited to those cases where the allegations were of a serious nature but there was little or no tangible evidence or witnesses. They still had the juridical function of reaching a decision in cases that could not otherwise be satisfactorily decided. The nature of the duel became increasingly ritualised as time went on. While before the ordeal was Christianised it may just have been a way of resolving disputes

74 Bartlett, Trial, p.l03. 75 Ibid. p.l05. 76 Upton, Studio Militari, p.6. 77 Otto I, in 967. Quoted from Bartlett, Trial, p.106. 78 Quoted from Bartlett, Trial, p.l 06. 79 Bouvet, Tree, pp.195ff.

61 with the strongest taking the spoils, it later came to be seen as much more although in effect it retained the same purpose. By the thirteenth century, the formal proceedings had become increasingly exclusive with duels being bound up with the codes of chivalry and the ius militare. This appears to have reflected social change for the right to duel became restricted to the nobility even as others were voicing their preference for alternative means anyway.81 Rules had developed for the expected behaviour of spectators, and the type of weapons to be employed were largely determined by the social status of the combatants, although the custom of shield and club remained 'remarkably resistant to change' .82

A clearly demarcated spot had to be agreed upon by both parties and different points of the compass appear to have been appointed to the champions. A chance encounter would simply not suffice as this could imply a lack of agreement on the part of one of the agents.83

And when the day apoynetyd to fyght ys come A great wyde & playne place schall be provydyd for them, other wythyn the cyte or withowte, whyche schal be closyd abowte wythe ropes & cordes or els strongly raylyd. & ther proclamation schall be made under payne off losse bothe of body and goodes that no man be so hardy to make eny soche clamoure, noyse, or owtecry, whereby eny of bothe paretyys may be dyscomfyrte or hynderd. 84

Any interference was punished severely and this clearly included even a shout by a

spectator. This was enforced by knights or other men appointed by the presiding judge. 85 This was presumably to ensure an equal contest. Despite the growing ritualisation, and in spite of Upton talking of trumpeters and minstrels, the duel itself was not a theatrical event, but a deadly affair. 86 Galbert of Bruges describes how the 'strong knight' Herman the Iron challenged Guy of Steenvoorde to single combat for betraying his lord. The place had clearly been agreed in

80 Upton, Studio Militari, pp.17ff. 81 Keen, Laws, p.19. As early as the eleventh century, the Doomsday book shows that there were always alternatives and that clerics were automatically exempted. See Russell, Right, pp.113f. 82 Bartlett, Trial, p.llO. See also William H. Jackson, Chivalry in the Renaissance (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1990), pp.82ff, for an account of the kolben, a wooden club used up until the 15th century in Germany. 83 Upton, Studio Militari, p.9. 84 Upton, Studio Militari, pp.13f. 85 Russell, Writ of Right, p.115. 86 Upton, Studio Militari, pp.14f.

62 advance and their knightly status was demonstrated by the fact that they began the duel on horseback, until this was made impossible by the death of Guy's horse. Rather than keeping the advantage of fighting on horseback, Herman dismounted to continue the fight with Guyon equal terms.

Now there was a continuous and bitter struggle, with alternate thrusts of swords, until both, exhausted by the weight and burden of arms, threw away their shields and hastened to gain victory in the fight by resorting to wrestling .... Herman seized [Guy] by the testicles, and summoning all his strength for the brief space of one moment he hurled Guy from him ... so that Guf" now prostrate, gave up, crying that he was conquered and dying. 8

Guy was hanged for his crime, although some would not even survive the process of the duel itself. Froissart tells us of a case in 1387 that aroused public interest in Paris and can tell us much about what the processes involved by this time. His account tells us that while John de Carogne was undertaking a voyage to the Holy Land, it appeared that James Ie Gris, being influenced by the devil's 'divers and perverse temptations', took advantage of John's wife: '/l pro/ita de la solitude pour abuser d'elle, lui ordonnant de garder Ie silence, so us peine de deshonneur'. She told her husband upon his return and the matter was taken up with their joint lord, the count d' Alenc;on. James proved 'by the household of the count' that he could not have done what he was charged with, and the count decided in his favour. However, at the obvious risk of incurring the count's displeasure, John de Carogne went above the authority of his lord and appealed directly to the parliament at Paris. After much pleading and because they could not produce any evidence other than the lady's word, the matter was decided in the tilt-yard, by a 'duel judiciaire' for life or death. All were imprisoned until the event, and it was implicitly accepted that the wronged party would be punished by death, by burning in the case of the lady. Many people gathered, perhaps because of the notoriety of the case or because duels of this nature were by now becoming rare, and even the king was present. By the way that Froissart speaks, it appears that a compromise would normally have been

87 Galbert, Murder, p.212f.

63 reached by now but the nature of the matter meant that John could not back down without dishonour. The lady was vindicated with a clear result in the death of James. 88 Here the last resort nature of the duel is clear, with the authority of the lord being sought first, then his superior, parliament, and finally, God in the verdict of the duel. Parliament only decided upon this form of proof because of the lack of any other form of evidence. The nature of the stakes involved meant that it would appear that most disputes were resolved long before this stage. Just as in the Just War, it was important, at least theoretically, that a duel was fought for the right reasons. Upton makes clear that honour and praise can only go to those with the right intent. If battle is undertaken from pure malice aimed at the destruction of one or both then it is contrary to the Commandments which clearly state thou shalt not kill nor intend to slay any man.89 Here though is the key to Upton's justification of the duel. If the battle is undertaken principally for the intent of killing is it wrong and 'detestable'. However, it is the 'fynall intentes' that should be considered. Just as:

He that usyth a whoman more for money than bodly pleasure ys not to be cownetyd as a lechowre, but as a covetowse man. Also thys maner off fyghtyng .... whyche ys for honowre, ys done pryncypally to prove one hys strength & manhode, whych manhod & fortitude ys A morall vertewe

And not just a virtue, but a cardinal one! Therefore, Upton concludes that in his opinion, this type of duel or battle is clearly lawful if done to uphold or pursue honour.9o Evidence for the decline of the ordeal is extremely fragmented as it appears to have grown unpopular in different areas at different times. The growing use of exemptions undermined its use from about the twelfth century onwards, as did increased opposition within the Church. Increasingly, clerics were exempted as the Church asserted itself, and Jews were exempted on the grounds that it was a meaningless process for non-

88 Jean Froissart, Chroniques de 1. Froissart: Tome Treizieme 1386-87, Leon Mirot & Albert Mirot (Eds), (Paris: Societe de I'Histoire de France, 1957), XIII, pp.31ff. For one English translation see Froiss~, Chronicles of England, France, Spain and the Adjoining Countries: From the Latter Part of the Relgn of Edward II to the Coronation of Henry IV, trans. Thomas Johnes (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1857), Vol.II. fr·203-206. Deut. V.17. 90 Upton, Studio Militari, p.16.

64 Christians. Urban exemptions also become increasingly frequent with the burgesses of Ypres among the first in 1116.91 These did not mean that the ordeal was abolished in towns, but that townsmen could not be forced to undertake it against their will. It remained an accepted form of proof but other forms were used as well such as increased reliance upon the oath and compurgators. Strangers would still be expected to undertake an ordeal because they would be unable to find people to vouch for them if they were unknown. The jury began to take on a new role, moving away from that of accusers to being a representative body of the community with the role of deciding upon the truth through witnesses and interrogation. When the jury was not used, the judge's role became more inquisitorial based on rational inquiry rather than proofs gained through ordeals. The importance of written evidence increased dramatically, as princely grants, records of private rights etc. all came to be documented. There were a growing number of acceptable alternatives to the ordeal. While more and more exemptions were granted through the twelfth century, religious scepticism also increased. There had always been some who doubted the methods of the ordeal, and even those who trusted it could be confused by the results. Galbert of Bruges explains how Lambert of Aardenburg 'cleared himself by the ordeal of hot iron' but was killed in a combat a few days later.92 This was taken, by Galbert, to mean that God might suffer a guilty man to pass the ordeal if he was penitent, but the ordeal of battle still provided less doubt about a person's guilt. More importantly, the Church began to regard the ordeal as wrong in the way it required God to provide miracles. Whilst it was still accepted in cases which could not be tried by other means, such as in the lack of compurgators for strangers, growing theological discussion and concern about the lack of mention of the ordeal in the Bible led to a clear condemnation by Pope Gregory IX in 1234. The growing influence of Roman law once more may also have contributed to its decline for there was no parallel to the ordeal here either. It appears that by this point, the ordeal was fairly rare anyway, having been gradually eclipsed by other forms of proof and abolished by many secular authorities.93 It is interesting to note, however, that it was not until 1601 that the Paris Parliament finally

91 Bartlett, Trial, p.55. 92 Galbert, Murder, pp.282 & 287-9. 93 Van Caenegem, Legal History, pp.86f.

65 passed a decree that trials by immersion in water were no longer to be permitted in sorcery cases.94

While the others disappeared or were replaced by other forms of judgement, the judicial duel appears to have fared better than the other ordeals. This was in spite of fairly continuous religious condemnation throughout the period, even when the Church supported the use of other forms of the ordeal. Bouvet noted in the fourteenth century that:

according to the law of the church, to prove one's right by combat, that is wager of battle, is a thing condemned, especially if it is done of free will. According to the rights of royal custom and temporal lordship, such combat is due where the matter calls for it.95

Whether this ecclesiastical hostility was universal is debatable for, while Bartlett notes a consistent opposition to trial by battle, Russell points out that clerics often presided over them until quite late in the period.96 The duel did not require any natural element to behave in a strange way and, as Aquinas states, it was expected that the just would overcome the unjust 'except in the case where the champions are extremely unequal in strength or skill,.97 However, Upton stated that he was fully aware that the use of the duel to decide the cases he set out was prohibited according to the law of God, 'yet in every chrysten region lyghtly thys batell & maner off fyghtyng of hytt ys usyd among them' . Upton continued that he had witnessed it himself many times in France between noble men.98 The support of the nobility, if perhaps not the Church, was probably one of the major factors in its continued use. The chivalric codes and the ius militare became increasingly exclusive as a kind of defence mechanism as the position of the knight and the nobility came under increasing threat from the rising merchant classes and standing armies.99 While the nobility may have found their traditional right to pursue justice through the feud limited by the centralisation of power, it is only natural to suppose that

94 Francois Billacois, The Duel: The Rise and Fall in Early Modern France (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), p.IS. 95 Bouvet, Tree, p.117. 96 Bartlett, Trial, pp.117ff.; Russell, Writ of Right, p.127 & Appeals of Felony, p.148. 97 Quoted from Bartlett, Trial, p.122. 98 Upton, Studio Militari, p.22. 99 Jackson, Chivalry, p.79.

66 they would have continued using the same type of means within the alternative legal framework being imposed upon them. As society diversified, this particular trial became, understandably, less popular with those from a non-militaristic background, who preferred the alternatives. Any limitation on the right to trial by battle was probably seen as further eroding aristocratic judicial power and was resisted as such. In 1306, Philip IV of France was forced by his nobles to reinstate the duel and it was practised there throughout the fourteenth century.IOO The duel was only finally abolished in England in 1818, although the last time it was actually used as a legal process appears to have been IOl in 1571 over a land dispute. With the growth of the King's effective jurisdiction, the state made use of approvers in criminal cases whose appeals were the equivalent of turning Queen's evidence today. A person accused of a crime (this was not used in private disputes) could escape liability if he successfully challenged a specific number of accomplices. In many cases this meant the community was rid of a rogue whatever the result. The right to resort to the duel was defended as late as 1601 on the grounds that when one was violently assaulted, one had the right to defend one's life with one's life and in the case of capital crimes the penalty was, of course, death. It was this popular way of thinking, the use of approvers and the continued support of the nobility that helped the

judicial duel to survive past the decline of the other ordeals. 102 However, with the growth of alternative forms of judicial procedure, and amid growing social and religious pressure, the judicial duel too finally became redundant as a means of proof. It appears easy to draw parallels between the feud and the use of the judicial duel to decide certain issues. The two are clearly hard to distinguish in many cases. When a feud resulted in a battle, the similarities with the judicial duel is striking. Just as the judicial duel took place in a clearly marked area agreed upon by both parties, battles were often conducted in agreed areas. If a feud involved a siege, it became accepted practice that any relieving force arriving within an agreed number of days would be fought in a

specific location decided upon by both besiegers and besieged. 103 Apart from this, challenges to battle often suggested a particular place or asked where the other party

100 Van Caenegem, Legal History, p.91. 101 Billacois, Duel, p.27. 102 Russell, Appeals of Felony, pp.149ff. 103 Keen, Laws, p.129.

67 would prefer to meet. The rules governing battle, the ius militare, only referred to those for whom it was acceptable to bear arms, i.e. for a long time, the nobility. This may help explain the lack of restraint exhibited by the nobility when dealing with archers and other

social inferiors on the field of battle, regardless of the indicated code of conduct. 104 The view of some may have been that they simply were not supposed to be involved in what was considered a legal dispute between social equals and as such they had no recognised legal status. Their presence could be related to an attempt at interfering in a judicial duel which, as we have seen above, could also be punished severely. In the mid fifteenth century, Upton made clear that he saw no clear distinction between a judicial duel and a battle. He clearly stated that in his experience, noble men often claimed lands and countries that were held by another and this led to battles to decide the issue, 'as in example the kyng off ynglonde hathe a grete Tytle to the realmes

off ffraunce & other cowntreyys thereyn' .105 The right to these titles supposedly stemmed back to the fictional exploits of 'kyng Beluyne', who had conquered France at some point in the distant past.106 Although the lands and titles had been subsequently lost, when King Arthur began his reign, he set out to recover them. At the time, Fullo was ruling France under the Emperor Leo. Both Fullo and Arthur swore oaths stating their rightful claims to the Kingdom of France. Having no other way of determining whose words were indeed true, they decided the issue through a trial by combat. They fought outside Paris:

the one that he had trewe tytle to calenge, The other lyke tytle to defende, & so came strongly armyd wythowte the cyte off paris to a certen grownde apoyntyd for them to ffyght, wyth a houge multitude off people folowyng to beholde & loke apon them

After a c1ose-fought duel, Arthur was victorious and the civic leaders of Paris, seeing the clear and unambiguous judgement of God, opened their gates to him. Upton makes clear that this was not merely something that was of historical interest, but that it was a process practised in his own time as a way of resolving certain types of dispute:

104 Charles Oman, A History o/the Art o/War in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1924), vol.1, pp.357f. 105 Upton, Studio Militari, pp.1lf.

68 Thys maner of ffyghtyng ys dayly exercyde In a maner in the Realme off ffraunce, and I meny tymes my selffe have sene paretyse ffyghtyng after thys wyse where as they have chosen for there lugge to breke thys stryffe my specyall good [lorde] & mayster the lorde Thomas, some tyme yerle off Salysbyryl07

Apparently, Lord Thomas would often see the whole process through from the beginning to the end, reconciling both parties 'to a goode concorde & agrement' at the duel's conclusion and sending both parties off with bountiful rewards and gifts to their renown. 108 Upton switches from talking about a battle between kings for the city of Paris and kingdom of France back to the duels that he had witnessed himself on his travels through France. If he sees a difference between one and the other, it is certainly not obvious here. There were many such challenges issued by both sides in the Hundred Years War. To take just one example, in 1340 Edward III sent a challenge to King Philip to meet him in a duel 'that the debate of our challenge be conducted by our two bodies' . Failing that, Edward suggested the two kings and one hundred of their liegemen should battle each other. If that was unacceptable, then Edward asked Philip to designate a time and place within ten days of the date of his letter where their whole forces could decide 109 the issue. Philip declined the offer of personal combat because the request was made not to king Philip, but instead insultingly to Philip of Valois.110 He did, however, state his intention to give battle, 'perhaps sooner than his adversary would like' even if this did not 1 actually prove to happen. 1 1 Just as the outcome of an ordeal was seen as an expression of God's judgement, so too was the outcome of battles. The religious implications of victory in battle are clear to see throughout the medieval world, but two examples here make the case clearly. Royal Manuscript 17 A in the British Library contains an astronomical calendar in

106 A fictional British king, also known as Belinus, recorded by Geoffrey of Monmouth in his History of the Kings of England completed c.1136. 107 Thomas Montagu, 4th Earl of Salisbury (died at the siege of Orleans in 1428). 108 In B ysshe' s edition of Upton a reproduction of a drawing from an Assize Roll dating from the reign of Henry III shows clearly the fate of the loser of a duel. Hamo Ie Stare was beaten by Walter Blo~eberme . and appears hanging from the gallows in the near distance. Upton concludes the chapter by statmg that this procedure was what was done while Henry V and his son Henry VI both reigned over England and France. See Upton, Studio Militari, pp.36f. 109 The challenge is translated and reproduced in Clifford J. Rogers (Ed.), The Wars of Edward Ill: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), pp.9lf. 110 Robert of Avesbury, De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii. Quoted in Rogers, Edward III, pp.92f.

69 pictorial form. It was made for the year 1420 and one part of it consists of an illustrated grid, three columns across and five down with the dates given counting back from 112 1420. The first box represents Creation and is dated 7118 and this is followed by representation of Adam, Eve and the devil. Also shown are the Flood, the Nativity and the Martyrdom of St Thomas of Canterbury. The murder of Edward II is shown followed by the battles of Crecy (1346) and Poitiers (1356).113 The Plague that swept Europe is depicted by three bodies in shrouds. The next battle is a little hard to pin down and may be Shrewsbury (1403) where the rebel Hotspur was killed. 1l4 The next box shows a castle wall surrounded by houses although again, which specific event it is referring to is not clear as the date is difficult to determine. The last square with any illustrations in it is dedicated to the accession of Henry V (1413) who is shown holding a sword. The very last square has been left blank and it looks unfinished. Given the other subjects and the date of completion, it would be difficult to conclude that Agincourt was not supposed to have been represented here. Given the huge religious importance of the first half of these items, it is difficult to see why the other items were portrayed alongside them if they did not have significant meaning in this context. Even if they did not automatically have that meaning, the fact that somebody has tried to make the connection is important in itself. An extremely explicit connection between God's will and trial by battle can be found in the Gesta Henrici Quinti when it reports the speech made by Henry, bishop of Winchester to open Parliament:

Sicut inter habentes superiorem in Just as a dispute between those terris controversia subcelesti having a superior on earth is iudicio discutitur, ita inter non resolved by an earthly judgement, habentes superiorem de sub celo so one between those having no celesti arbitrio dec1aratur gladio superior under Heaven is made exequente. Et sicut in plain by a Heavenly arbitrament subcelestibus iudiciis tres carried out by the sword. And just sentencie diffinitive conformes pro as in earthly judgements three

111 Jan de Klerk, Edouard III, roi d'Angleterre, en Flandre. Quoted in Rogers, Edward III, p.92. 112 British Library Manuscript Royal 17 A. XVI. 113 Crecy is represented by three spears in the centre flanked by two axes or halberds, all upright. The~e is a very feint arrow pointing to the right. The arrow in the Poitiers depiction is much clearer and was obVIOusly drawn fIrst. 114 The battle is represented by three spears and two axes although, unlike the previous two battles, no arrow is depicted here.

70 iure petentis ius plene declarare similar definitive sentences are videntur et eis omnino fore regarded as making a title fully parendum, ita et in celesti iudicio plain in favour of the right of a divinarum sentenciarum trinitas claimant and must be completel y ius plenissime terminare videtur et obeyed, so too in a heavenly eciam eis omni modo obediendum judgement is a sequence of three fore, concludens ex isto quod ius divine sentences regarded as corone Anglie ad regnum Francie determining a title absolutely and tribus sentenciis conformibus esse must also be in every respect divinitus declaratum, et igitur obeyed; and he concluded from contra eas nullatenus fore this that the title of the crown of perstandum. England to the kingdom of France had been divinely made plain by three similar sentences, and that these should in no way, therefore, be persistently opposed. I IS

The bishop listed the battle of Sluys as the first judgement, the English victory and capture of king John at Poitiers as the second and the destruction of the French nobility at Agincourt as the third 'ultrice sentencia' or 'avenging sentence'. This last victory is also described as 'hac ultima terrifica sentencia dei in Agincort' - 'that last dread sentence of

God at Agincourt' .116 Even if this is seen as nothing short of propaganda, the fact that the relationship could be made shows that this way of thinking was clearly familiar.

Conclusion The accepted rules covering the two procedures of feud and duel in the ius militare were clearly more than simply very similar. The real distinction between them is however very important. The feud was not an end in itself, but rather a way of forcing or 'persuading' the other party to accept a particular version of right. The process of the feud was not for seeking a judgement but rather to gain an outcome that was accepted by both sides. Although at one time the feud was something that was widely practised, it gradually became more and more exclusive. Eventually, it was something only conducted by princes or kings and this was what we would now call war. War was simply the feud of kings. However, a duel, whether it was between two men fighting over an alleged case of adultery or a full scale battle between two sovereign lords and their followers, was not

115 Gesta Henrici Quinti, pp.122f.

71 actually war but rather, technically, it was a suspension of it for arbitration; a truce. That the arbitration was also armed in this case does not matter. Whilst for everyone else in the social hierarchy the duel was only one of the forms of evidence acceptable to a court when it was seeking a judgement, kings simply had no higher temporal authority to judge their cases. There was no judge on Earth who was competent to try their case. If the process of the feud in the form of chevauchees etc. had proved unsuccessful in forcing an agreement out of the two parties, an ordeal was required. A judicial duel or trial by battle was the only way of resolving the situation and allowing a decision to be reached through the judgement of God. It is essential to the understanding of medieval warfare and chivalry and their relationship with surprise and deception to see the way that warfare was perceived by those in the Middle Ages. It was far more than simply a case of fighting to see who was the strongest or who was the better general on the day. It was clearly a moral and legal contest. Battle was certainly not the logical or necessary conclusion to the feud or warfare as it was conducted for the vast majority of the Middle Ages. The feud was an attempt to force an agreement, while a true battle was a way of actually reaching a decision through an ordeal and the judgement by God. As the next chapters will explore in their examination of surprise and deception within the medieval legal and social framework, this metaphysical perspective informs and permeates the views of those who lived in the Middle Ages and those who wrote about medieval warfare.

116 Gesta Henrici Quinti, pp.124f.

72 Chapter Three

Metaphysical and Legal Context: The Tree of Battles

Honore Bouvet's account of the laws of war, known as The Tree of Battles or simply the Tree, was completed in the last quarter of the fourteenth century.1 It provides a fascinating insight into the role played by surprise and deception in medieval warfare. Compared to some of the authorities that this thesis will look at, Bouvet is less concerned with the private rights of knights and more concerned with public interest. The result of this is that the Tree provides a highly prescriptive account of how things should be, which also allows us to see what things are actually like from Bouvet's perspective. After establishing that the Tree was indeed an important medieval authority, the chapter will briefly cover Bouvet's metaphysical appreciation of the role of war in the Divine plan, before examining in detail the way that he views the use of surprise and deception. The second half of the chapter analyses the part of the Fayttes of Armes and Chyvalrye by Christine de Pisan that was based upon Bouvet's Tree. This popular work was intended for the military education of the Dauphin himself and, when taken as a whole, was intended as a practical guide for the practising knight. The section in which Christine employs Bouvet's help follows his legalistic arguments and clarifies them for the reader. Between them, the two authors provide a good understanding of the different levels on which surprise and deception mayor may not be employed in medieval warfare. The author of the Tree was born in Provence c.1343. He became a Benedictine monk and went to Rome in 1368 before being made Prior of Selonnet in the diocese of Embrun in 1382. In 1389 he was attached to a Royal Commission, headed by a Pierre de Chevreuse, and found himself being sent to replace Jean de Berry as the governor of Languedoc (Berry had been charged with maladministration). Due to his opposition to a

1 It was generally thought that the Tree's author was called Bonet until G. Ouy published an article in 1959 - 'Honore Bouvet (appele atort Bonet) prieur de Selonnet' , Romania, lxxxv (1959), pp. 255ff - which established the now accepted spelling. A copy of the original French text was published in 1883 by Ernest Nys. This remains the only modem edition of the work in French and was based on a fifteenth century MS. by the famous calligrapher, Aubert, one of four MSS. of the Tree in the Bibliotheque Royale in Belgium. See Honore Bouvet, L'Abre des Batailles, Ernest Nys (Ed.) (Brussels & Leipzig, 1883). References below are from Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949). Coopland relies on the Nys text with a comparison of the Seilliere MS. in a few places (see pp.22lf.).

73 legacy claim, Bouvet himself was to be driven from this post at sometime after 1390 by Raymond Roger, Viscount of Turenne. Bouvet retired to Paris and completed the satirical Apparition de lehan de Meun, criticising abuses of politics and religion and detailing some of the events he had recently been witness to. The Tree was an earlier creation and was written during, or slightly before, 1387 while Bouvet was still Prior at Salon. This can be deduced from the dedication to Charles VI and this being the last year of a civil war in Provence alluded to in the text.2 Bouvet drew upon contemporary legal sources, particularly John of Legnano's De Bello, de Represaliis, et de Duello which was completed in about 1360.3 Bouvet also drew upon the knowledge and experience of knights with whom he talked in his youth, and personal experience of living in a period marked by civil strife from which he could not have remained isolated. The result was a widely distributed and therefore presumably popular work. While printed editions of the Tree were being produced in Paris and Lyons after 1477, further broadening the work's accessibility, by that time it was already available in manuscript form in at least four different languages besides its original French - Anglo-Scots, Castilian, Catalan, and Proven<;al. 4 The fact that it was originally published in French is immensely important because it indicates the intended audience of

2 Christine de Pisan, The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye: Translated and printed by William Caxtonfrom the French original by Christine de Pisan, A.T.P. Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 'Introduction' p.xl vi. 3 Bouvet, Tree, pp. 18-19. John of Legnano held the Chair of Civil Law at the University of Bologna and Bouvet borrows extensively from his work in both form and content although he himself appears familiar with Canon Law, and to a lesser extent, Civil Law (see Bouvet, Tree, pp.25-36). Bouvet himself may have become a Doctor of Decretals in 1386. See Raymond L. Kilgour, 'Honore Bonet: A Fourteenth-Century Critic of Chivalry', Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, 1(1935), p.352. 4 The British Library has three copies of the MS.: Old Royal and King's Collections 15. E. VI, 20. C. VIII (the Berry MS.), and Add. MSS. 22768. Edinburgh University Library also has one copy. In France, the Bibliotheque Nationale has 27 copies of the MSS: f.fr. 587,673,674, 1260-1277, 1695,5389,9690,9691, 17184, 23020. The Musee Conde has two, one is at Aix, one at Soissons, and one at the University of Lyons. Other copies can also be found in Belgium and Spain. See Bouvet, Tree, pp.217f. See also N.A.R. Wright, 'The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and the Laws of War', C.T. Allmand (Ed.), War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1976), p.13. The translations of Sir Gilbert of the Haye, dated 1456, and preserved in a single volume now in the collection at Abbotsford, are the earliest examples of Middle Scots vernacular prose. The first of these translations is The Buke of the Law of Armys, or Buke of Bataillis, based on the work of Honore Bouvet. The second translation is The Buke of the Order of Knichthood, following L'Ordre de Chevalerie and the last is a version of the pseudo-Aristotelian Government of Princes. See The Cambridge History of English and American Literature in 18 Volumes (1907-21), Volume II: The End of the Middle Ages, XI, 17. http://www.bartleby.coml21211117 .html

74 the work. If it was intended to be an academic piece, concerned with fine subtleties of semantics but somewhat divorced from actual practice, then it would have been written, or at least published, in the language of scholars, i.e. Latin. Instead, it appears safe to infer that Bouvet was writing with a far wider audience in mind. As Coopland eloquently puts it: 'He is writing for the layman in the vulgar tongue,.5 The way that the Tree found its way into other vernacular languages, such as Anglo-Scots, is further evidence of the work's accessibility and popularity.

As was the custom at the time, Bouvet sent copies to King Charles of France, as well as his uncles, in the hope of patronage. In a period where the Sovereign and other senior nobility were still expected to lead troops into battle, the work may well have met an appreciative audience who found it of specific interest. Bouvet was rewarded by Charles VI with a pension and an appointment of trust. 6 It was in no way unusual for works to be presented in this way. For example, Walter of Milemete, a chancery clerk, gave Edward III a military treatise in 1327.7 The importance of military training was not lost through this period and the need to ensure that those who would lead armies were well versed in military matters was well recognised. Royal patronage had other benefits too. It was an excellent way of gaining pUblicity as royal interest would guarantee a wider demand for the work. The royal family were expected to set an example and were always likely to be copied by sycophantic courtiers. What went on in the court was bound to become popular elsewhere in the kingdom. Whether or not this can be put down to patronage, the Tree certainly achieved a high level of popularity in the century following its original publication. One author noted that 'there was hardly a single aristocratic library which did not contain a copy of Vegetius, Bonet or Lull,.8 It was known to a wide range of interested parties including heralds, officers and clerks of the military courts in Paris and London, as well

Coopland believed that Gilbert of the Haye's version was so accomplished that 'No modem translator can hope to equal this in life and dignity' . Bouvet, Tree, p.II. It was published in: Gilbert of the Haye' s Prose Manuscript (1456), J. H. Stevenson (Ed.) (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1901), vol. 1. 5 Bouvet, Tree, p.2l. 6 Kilgour, Honore Bonet, p.352. 7 Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.I6l. 8 R.F. Green, Poets and Prince Pleasers: Literature and the English Court in the Late Middle Ages (Toronto: 1980), p.144.

75 as the aristocracies of England, France and Spain.9 To give two examples, the commanders of rival English and French forces in the fifteenth century had copies of the work: archive sources indicate that John II, duke of Bourbon, and the Constable of France, Arthur of Brittany, both had copies, as did their opponent John Talbot, the Earl of Shrewsbury.lO John Holland, Duke of Norfolk, also had a copy and took it on an expedition to Scotland in 1481.11 One of the first questions to be asked is whether or not it is safe to infer from the large number of extant copies, that the book was, in fact, widely read, or indeed, if the work was read at all. Just because notable men like the redoubtable John Talbot had a copy, does this mean that they actually looked at it? Could it have been, in other words, a medieval coffee-table book? Some commentators have implied this by asserting that The Tree was essentially a theoretical treatise at the time that it was written, knightly practice falling somewhat short of the ideals set out in the work. 12 It follows from this view that even if it had been read, little or no notice would actually have been taken of what it contained - perhaps an interesting conversation piece, but no more. Perhaps the work was viewed in the same way as the tales of King Arthur. Again, these were popular, but it is doubtful that many expected contemporary behaviour to exactly match the tales of how things were supposed to have been for the knights of the Round Table. Others have taken a different tack, preferring to see the Tree as an authority on correct soldierly custom for the period in which it was written. This implies that the reason a man like John Talbot had a copy was to refer to it when a query about the correct course of action arose.I 3 The truth is probably somewhere between these two positions. Just because everyday behaviour may not always have accorded with the code of behaviour set out in The Tree, this does not mean that the laws were meaningless. Any normative body of rules will invariably be broken, perhaps on a small scale or perhaps even on a much larger one, but this does not stop it from being a law in the sense of a prescription

9 Wright, Tree, pp. 12-31. . .. . 10 Wright, Tree, p.12. Talbot gave a collection of material to Margaret of AnJou which mcluded kmghtly romances and the Abre des batailles. See Alison Lee, Thomas Malory and fifteenth Century Chivalric Literature (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis: New College, Oxford, 1989), p.4. 11 Lee, Thomas Malory, p.29. 12 J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp.10lf. 13 For example: M.H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), esp. p.157. This view can also be found in Kilgour, Honore Bonet, p.353.

76 towards adopting a particular mode of behaviour, or an articulation of accepted values. That is the essential difference between a prescriptive social law and a scientific descriptive law, the latter relating to subjects such as physics rather than social behaviour. If a law was never broken then it would simply become descriptive in the scientific sense - the law of gravity does not say how things ought to be, it describes things as they are in the physical world according to an accepted scientific paradigm. Bouvet did not claim to be creating a new body of rules to govern warfare. Rather he was attempting to interpret or 'find' the law that he believed was already present, even if it was not always adhered to. While it appears fair to question the influence of theoretical treaties on the actual conduct of hostilities, the work was clearly taken seriously. For example, in the early fifteenth century, Christine de Pisan took the work very seriously (see below) when she paraphrased many passages into her popular work the Livre des faits d'armes et de chevalerie, as did the author of the Bake of Noblesse addressed to Edward IV of England in 1475.14 As well as influencing several other works, it was also quoted alongside other written laws in legal disputes, a clear indication of the standing the work was to have only half a century after it was written. IS It defies belief that a military man such as John Talbot would go on campaign with a fictional account of the laws of war (see above) and he was clearly not alone in regarding the Tree's contents as more than mere fantasy. This clearly shows that not only were there many copies of the work in circulation, they were also being referred to and taken seriously as an authority on military matters.

The Tree reflects the medieval view that war was part of the manifestation of the divine will. All events, not just conflict, were perceived as an insight into a divine purpose above and beyond that being played-out in the world. Collingwood elucidates extremely well the way that history was perceived by those in the Middle Ages:

History, as the will of God, orders itself, and does not depend for its orderliness on the human agent's will to order it. Plans emerge, and get themselves carried into effect, which no human being has planned ... [and

14 See Bouvet, Tree, pp.2lff. 15 E.g. the Duke of Norfolk vs. the Duke of Somerset in 1453. See Bouvet, Tree, p.23.

77 the ]. .. duty of the individual is to become a willing instrument for furthering its objective purposes.I 6

With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the place of conflict is of special interest. Bouvet states:

We must understand that war comes from God, and not merely that He permits war, but that He has ordained it.. .. Our Lord God Himself is lord and governor of battles and for this reason we must accept and grant that war comes from divine law, that is, the law of God: for the aim of war is to wrest peace, tranquillity and reasonableness, from him who refuses to acknowledge his wrongdoing. I7

In this way, warfare formed an essential part of the medieval constitutional structure; a way of ordering society and ensuring it conformed to the natural order identified with Divine Law:

War is nothing other than discord or conflict that has arisen on account of certain things displeasing to the human will, to the end that such conflict should be turned into agreement and reason. I8

War was to be found throughout nature and was even found in Heaven itself. It was here that the very first war was fought 'when our Lord God drove out the angels', referring to the casting out of Lucifer and his adherents. I9 Although the world was obviously going according to this divine plan, this did not change the fact that things did not always appear to be in accord with what was perceived as just to man. This was clearly a problem that Bouvet wished to address, either to reassure his readers that things were going to plan, or perhaps to convince himself. In a chapter concerned with whether the just or sinners were stronger in battle, Bouvet is concerned that the just do not always appear to win. After providing a list of sinners who overcame their opponents, he concludes that as in the case of David and Goliath, the just will surely overcome the unjust unless the Divine plan ordains that things should happen

16 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.53. 17 Bouvet, Tree, p.125. 18 Bouvet, Tree, p.8l. 19 Bouvet, Tree, p.8l.

78 otherwise. 'A very wicked man' may occasionally set a good man low but this was due to God's will and was intended to give the defeated man patience or to test his virtue. This was obviously what had happened to St. Louis when he was made prisoner in the Holy Land, for there was no doubting the justness of his cause in the medieval mind. 2o The very purpose of war was to pursue justice so while evil deeds may have come from 'false usage' of war, they did not come from the nature of war itself which was just part of the process assuring that the natural order ordained by God was maintained. This, of course, is a very different attitude to conflict than the one that we are familiar with today. With the legacy of two world wars behind us, contemporary thought tends not to be that sympathetic to the idea that war is simply a way of ordering the world in accordance with the Lord's wishes. However, this is precisely what has to be borne in mind when examining accounts of warfare in the Middle Ages. The Tree is no apology for war, for no apology was seen to be required. Once the author's explanation of war itself and his history of the world has been set out, the Tree moves on to an examination of the correct way of conducting this important and necessary activity. However, Bouvet does not present his work as a definitive account of the laws or customs governing the regulation of warfare, but rather as an appeal to how things ought to be if the standard of conduct was as it should have been. For example, he states that although the law prohibits the taking of excessive ransoms, 'God well knows that the soldiery of to-day do the oPPosite,?l Bouvet has similar reservations about the actual observance of restraint during feast days and also the respect due for the immunities that should have been extended to foreign scholars and their visiting relatives.22 The Tree, therefore, does not necessarily set out contemporary customs that were actually in use, but rather, is concerned with how these customs ought to be. In this respect, it is quite different from works such as Geoffroy de Charny's Demandes written in the mid-fourteenth century (see Chapter Six). This consists of a list of questions addressed to the knights of King John's Order of the Star, concerned mainly with technical questions regarding how they, as experts in these matters, would interpret various rights and duties. Geoffroy's pragmatic concerns were for how the actual practice

20 Bouvet, Tree, pp.156f. 21 Bouvet, Tree, p.153. 22 Bouvet, Tree, pp.155 & 181.

79 of the rules in operation affected him and other knights. This provides a positivistic approach as opposed to Bouvet's more theoretical treaty. This, however, does not diminish the importance of the Tree and if anything, makes it even more useful as a source for the purposes of this study. By setting out standards which were perhaps higher than those actually practised at the time, and by telling us when practice did fall short of the behaviour expected, he provides us with an invaluable insight into military practice at the time.23

Another major difference between Geoffroy and Bouvet is their attitude to the whole notion of rights and duties. While Geoffroy is very much interested in how the rules affected him and his activities as an individual, Bouvet speaks, with a decidedly Aristotelian flavour, of public good as opposed to private interests (one gets the feeling that Geoffroy is writing to see what he can get away with while Bouvet is writing about what it is right and correct to do). As such, Geoffroy presumably is merely expressing the attitudes of those professionals to whom war was, amongst other things, an important financial exercise, rather than the desires or wishes of those who had nothing to gain by it. There is more to it than this though, for Bouvet, deliberately or not, is bringing out the tension within his society caused by the complicated structure of law in the Middle Ages combined with the strengthening of the central authorities both in England and France and the crisis of sovereignty that this implied for the nobility.24 The very right to wage war was becoming increasingly limited to the monarchy itself. 25 War, or rather the legal process of employing violence in pursuit of justice, requires the licence of a sovereign as 'a man cannot take upon himself to do justice on another who has wronged him, but the prince must do justice between these men,?6 This did not just apply to individuals - Bouvet makes clear that whole cities are to be treated in the same way if they fall under

23 On the curious attitude to the difference between chivalric practice and theory at the time see Huizinga, Waning, pp.48 & 56ff. He stresses the essentially static view of the nobility, meaning they continued to receive the respect supposedly due to their station even when their actions did not accord with the behaviour expected from their position. Huizinga also notes the way that authors could glorify knights and speak of chivalric ideals even as they list their acts of treason and cruelties. 2 See Keen, Laws, pp.220f., and Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), in particular p.298. 25 Bouvet does not dispute the right to legitimate self-defence that comes from the Law of Nature. One may lawfully defend oneself against anyone, even one's lord, the only exception being one's judge. Here the only legitimate defence is to appeal above the judge to a senior authority (Bouvet, Tree, pp.137ff & pp.170ff). 2 Bouvet, Tree, p.129.

80 the jurisdiction of the same sovereign.27 Bouvet was writing from a perspective heavily influenced and informed by the type of thinking set out in Thomas Aquinas's works which provided the philosophical basis for the independent secular state, seeing the ruler acting to further the common good (see Chapter Two)?8 The idea that only the king or emperor could act as a superior authority in all disputes within their territory was not quite the case in practice when Bouvet completed his work, but the trend was definitely in this direction, with different geographical areas moving at different speeds.29 Geoffroy, writing from a different and extremely pragmatic perspective, is only concerned with private rights while Bouvet writes with the distinction between public and private rights clearly in mind. He expresses that private interests should never be allowed to run counter to the public interests of the crown, even though they often did. 3o In part three Ch. VII Bouvet asks 'Whether a man should prefer death to flight from battle'? Depending upon the circumstances, Bouvet does not have a categorical ban on fleeing the battlefield but the distinctions that he raises and adds to his discussion of accepted views are interesting. For example, if when fighting Saracens the battle is clearly lost and nothing can be done to retrieve it, then it is permissible to escape the hands of the enemy. However, one must never flee if flight might mean the losing of a battle against the Saracen or if fleeing would not save the life of the warrior anyway. If one was in the service of a lord then fleeing was not permissible either as this would be to break one's oath: 'for since he has pledged to him his faith and oath he must die in defence of him and his honour, and thus does he maintain in himself the virtue of courage, so that he fears nothing that may befall in fighting for justice'. The difference here would be that the justice of one's cause versus the Saracen was a given and could not be called into question through one's own conduct, whereas for more earthly causes

27 Bouvet, Tree, p.15l. 28 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages translated by Michael Jones (paris: Blackwell, 1992), esp. p.286. For further reading, see Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy: and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 1994) pp.444-454. 29 Bouvet is not convinced that the King of England, Spain and others actually have the right to declare war, give marque or allow trial by battle. His concern stems from the idea that only one with no s.uperior can do these things and their position with regards to the Holy Emperor was not totally clear (while of course the French King was in a different position as far as Bouvet was concerned). He does however point out that this made little practical difference as they all actually did these things anyway (Bouvet, Tree, Pf· 178f). 3 Wright, Tree, p.26.

81 where justice was not perhaps as clear cut or God's will was not immediately obvious, to flee was to undermine the whole legal process of trial by combat.

I say that for nothing in the world should a man do what is dishonourable and reprehensible. But it is plain that to flee is wicked, and brings great reproach and shame ... to flee and quit the right thing is an evil thing3!

This is very interesting as it is far more illuminating than the simple cliches about courage and bravery, but actually places that into the context of justice and conviction in one's cause. Fitting in with this idea of the exercise of justice, Bouvet is keen to promote this idea of discipline and obedience in pursuing it. As such he appears to accept that the marshal or constable should have unconditional control over the assembled host. However, he also pragmatically accepts that if orders are disobeyed but the outcome is favourable to the cause, then the punishment should not be too severe or the knight should even be pardoned: 'A deed of great utility should excuse disobedience to the sovereign's command, and because of the happy issue he should not lose his head' .32 A theme that will become obvious in this thesis is stated here - that it is not necessarily the act itself that is right or wrong, but the context within which it is done. Given Bouvet's attitude to warfare itself and the laws that he sets out in the Tree, the way that he treats the whole subject of surprise and ambush (along with ruses and stratagems) is not what one might expect. One would think that although actual practice might not always concur, Bouvet would at least state that to take one's opponent unawares would be contrary to the expected behaviour of the knightly classes. This initial attitude is reflected at first when Bouvet raises the issue of the use of deceit or subtlety by a king or prince to overcome his enemy. To begin with, Bouvet says that although the Scriptures show that war is just under certain circumstances, 'a just thing must be performed justly' .33 Redress must be sought in the correct way, which means appealing to the superior of one who has committed a wrong, not by using 'force, craft, or fraud'. Jesus had spoken to the world 'openly and without concealment', condemning all work done in darkness. A victory won using craft, subtlety, or deception was 'won in obscurity

31 Bouvet, Tree, p.122. 32 Bouvet, Tree, pp.122f. 33 Bouvet, Tree, pp.154ff.

82

, . and deceit' . It follows from this that to use such means must be against reason, i.e. that which accords with the Lord's wishes. Anyone who feels that their cause is sufficiently just should have faith and rely on the Lord not trickery. Finally;

according to the Holy scripture, a man should not do to another what he would not wish another to do to him. But no one in the world would wish to meet another who conquers him in battle by subtlety, so how can a man conquer his enemy by fraud or craft without offence to God?

This is the view that one expects from a work on the place of warfare within God's creation. The preconceived notion of chivalry that is so ingrained in our thinking on the subject accords with what Bouvet has to say on the topic. However, all is not as it at first appears. Whether or not the move is prompted by considerations of practicability, Bouvet then asserts the contrary view:

there is no possible doubt that, according to God and the scriptures, I may conquer my enemy by craft or fraud without sin, once the war has been ordained and declared and ordered between him and me, and I have given him defiance.

Bouvet then gives the example of how God himself commanded Joshua to set an ambush for his enemies?4 Here Bouvet is clearly setting out the view that as long as there is sufficient cause for the conflict itself, the ius ad bellum, the actual conduct of the war, or ius in bello, was not of as much concern. In effect, as long as the correct procedure had been followed, and both appellants were aware of the situation through the sending and receiving of a properly worded defiance, both parties were free to employ the means necessary to pursue their case. This meant that in regular warfare, as a properly sanctioned feud with the correct legal procedure followed, an ambush aimed at taking prisoners set in the place where the enemy was known to make his recreation was perfectly acceptable and is treated in the same way as ensuring that the enemy had the disadvantage of the terrain or the sun in his eyes. This also brings out the distinction between strategic and tactical surprise, for if the correct procedures had been followed, strategic surprise was, in effect, curtailed. A just

34 Joshua llX.2, Old Testament (Authorised Version): 'lay thee an ambush for the city behind it.'

83 cause must be present and defiance must have been physically given and accepted meaning both sides were, at least in theory, aware of what is going on and likely to happen in the near future. However, once the actual process of the feud was under way, the use of tactical surprise against an enemy was viewed as just another weapon to be used in the pursuit of justice. Consistent with this, Bouvet makes clear the sentiment that the Lord helps those who help themselves:

although the King of France may have a good cause against the King of England, yet he must not trust in God without doing what in him lies, by diligence, and by taking good counsel, to overcome the enemy. When he has done what he can, wisely and discreetly, then for the rest that lies beyond his power he must put his whole hope in God. 35

Clearly, not everything could be left up to the Divine judgement as one had to prove oneself worthy of the decision by doing everything within one's power to ensure the result would be favourable. Interestingly, although one must attempt everything in one's power to ensure that the enemy was overcome, certain things were not acceptable, even in the pursuit of a just cause. In a close parallel with our modern laws of war, Bouvet is strictly opposed to the use of perfidy on or off the battlefield. While using certain types of deception was acceptable, one was not to break one's word. Thus it would be a 'condemnable deception' for one to give one's promise to meet an enemy for parley and then make him a prisoner. Due to the breaking of faith, this would clearly go against God Himself.36 It would also be against God and reason for anyone to take a town during a truce 'for the laws say that once a pledge is given to one's enemy it must be kept' .37 This means that if a truce in the king's name - a 'royal surety' - was broken, and a fortress etc. was taken, it was the king's duty to restore it. Without this, how would the people be safe under the king's protection? The king's surety would have become worthless or at least been undermined.38 Bouvet claims unequivocally that the penalty for breaking the king's peace

35 Bouvet, Tree, pp.154ff. 36 For the belief that God would not favour the perjured, see M.J. Russell, 'Trial By Battle and the Writ of Right' , Journal of Legal History Vol. I (1980), p.ll1. 37 Bouvet, Tree, p.153. This is view that can clearly be seen in Froissart's Chronicles too. 38 Bouvet, Tree, pp.189ff.

84 should be death, and as far as he was concerned, no 'warning' penalty was acceptable in this case.

In the same way that Bouvet recognises that the right to wage war had become severely restrained and that it was now only princes who retained such prerogatives, deciding issues through trial by combat was also no longer acceptable because the innocent could lose and because: 'Holy scripture condemns everything by which we tempt God, our Lord ... to ascertain the will of God by experiment is an unworthy thing, and divine law does not allow it,?9 However, in spite of what Bouvet may have wished, trial by combat or 'wager of battle', was clearly still practised.

[A]lthough we have seen that wager of battle is a thing reproved by law [Divine Law, the Law of Nations, the Law of Decretals, and the Civil Law], for the reason that worldly customs and usages have ordained the contrary I pray you to allow us to consider the cases in which law allows and suffers such battle to be made.4o

The rights granted through royal custom and temporal lordship meant that combat of this type could be practised when the matter called for it.41 Bouvet provides a long list of . cases where a sovereign may choose to allow an ordeal of this type and they all involve the conflict of two oaths or hidden crimes for which solid evidence was lacking.42 In many cases the trial would hinge upon one man's word against another's. If any tangible evidence existed at all and could be brought before a judge, then the matter should be taken up in court rather than the lists.43 Otherwise, an ordeal such as trial by combat provided a framework within which a decision in these important matters could be reached and be accepted. A judge would preside over the event and determine, if necessary, who had justice on their side. Of course, in a dispute between sovereigns, no judge could be appointed who had legitimate authority to decide the issue so a wager of battle between sovereigns was judged by God. The fact that a dispute of this nature would generally involve many people did not affect the essence of the process - trial by battle

39 Bouvet, Tree, p.1l7 & p.195. 40 Bouvet, Tree, p.196. 41 Bouvet, Tree, p.1l7. 42 Bouvet, Tree, pp.195ff. 43 Bouvet, Tree, p.207.

85 was just a duel to decide an issue that could not be resolved in an alternative way on a much larger scale.

Once the correct procedure had been followed for proposing the ordeal, the means actually involved are dealt with very briefly, the mechanics of battle itself not being extensively covered anywhere in the Tree. However, what he does say about the actual conduct of behaviour, in the lists in this case, is quite informative. Once "Do your duty" had been pronounced, according to good reason and the written law:

the appellant may do his duty, whether by deceit, or by subtlety, whether by craft or by striking the first blow, and may, if he will, choose the better .. 44 posItIon.

The two appellants were now effectively in an armed contest whose arbitration would decide the issue at stake. The correct procedures having been followed, once the contest was agreed to have started, one was entitled to do what was necessary to win that contest. Nothing could be done until the legal situation had been made explicit and the armed arbitration had begun, because a state of war or feud did not exist once the arbitration process had begun and a truce was in place to allow this to proceed. Once the decision-making section of the process had actually begun, it was literally, as far as Bouvet is concerned, "no holds barred". Bouvet does not merely liken trial by battle to a courtroom; he actually sees it in the same way. While accepting that certain people, such as clerics, had alternative means of obtaining justice, he states that:

we must clearly understand the real nature of these single combats, for such battles are plainly the figure of a trial by law. As in a trial by law there are the judge and the appellant and the defendant and the witnesses, and a sentence is given, so in trial by battle there are the judge - the lord before whom the battle is waged - and the appellant and defendant, also the witnesses, which are their harness, their blows and their threats, by which each of them strives with all his power to prove his claim.45

44 Bouvet, Tree, p.20l. 45 Bouvet, Tree, pp.l98f.

86 It is important to remember that only those with sufficient authority or sovereignty could declare a war, and Bouvet, well versed in his Aristotelian reasoning, does not see fit to question further the motives of the ruler who is presumed to be acting in furtherance of the common good. They obviously have no temporal sovereign that can be appealed to, leaving warfare as a legitimate option. The enemy can be forced into accepting one's version of right through direct action, or in the extreme case, through divine judgement in battle. If a battle were to take place, then God Himself, as we have already seen, would be the governor of that confrontation, in the same way that the sovereign would be the governor of trials or ordeals within his jurisdiction.46 Even though the combat is depicted in specifically legal terms, Bouvet has no objection with the tactical use of trickery and deception, although drawing on what he has said earlier, the use of perjury is still viewed differently as it would subvert the legal process. In the general process of the feud, once it had commenced following the correct legal procedures, one could employ any of a number of methods (short of perjury) to persuade one's enemy of the error of his ways. However, one could not legitimately be tricked or deceived into taking part in a battle as this was discrete legal situation from the process of the feud. The implications of trial by battle needed to be understood and accepted by both sides, otherwise the contest remained as simply an armed clash during a feud. Once a trial by combat had been agreed upon and commenced, one was again entitled to employ such methods in pursuit of justice.

The Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye As has already been noted above, Christine de Pisan used Bouvet's account of the laws of war extensively in her own works, written around the tum of the fourteenth century. Although Italian by birth, Christine de Pisan became a leading medieval French author. She was the daughter of a scholar and statesman active in Bologna and Venice, who later became the astrologer to the French King Charles V. Christine was provided with an excellent education by her father, the type normally reserved for boys. She married Etienne du Castel, the king's notary and secretary, and after his death in 1389, and with three children to support, concentrated on her own writings under the patronage of the

46 Bouvet, Tree, p.125.

87 French King and the Dukes of Burgundy. Her early work consisted of the creation of popular prose and verse, but later 'turned to more didactic and historical themes'. Her main works were written at the start of the fifteenth century, including a history of Charles V, tracts 'in favour of the honour of women' and suggestions for their literary education.47

Christine's patron, John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, was appointed official governor of the Dauphin on 28th December 1409.48 With his new office, one of the Duke's main concerns was the military education of the Dauphin. The young man was made captain of the royal chateau of Creil in an effort to give him experience of command. It appears that Christine was appointed by the Duke to produce the F ayttes of Armes at about this time. The mention of the battle of 'Hasbain' or 'Lyege' happening 'awhyle a goon' suggests that the book could not have been completed before 23rd September 1408.49 Although Christine demonstrates some concern at her lack of expertise in the subject, 'the Duke of Burgundy's plan for the Dauphin's military education was certainly the inspiration for this manual on warfare' .50 Interestingly, many copies of Christine's work had her gender disguised, probably in disbelief that a woman could have produced such a text or as an attempt to disguise the authorship for fear of detracting from the work's appeal in some way. Although the author's name appears many times in Books 3 and 4, these are replaced with the masculine forms 'l'aucteur' or 'Ie disciple'. An address to Minerva is also ommitted in these copies. 51 While Christine wrote her work in French, the Faits d'Armes et de Chevalerie was translated into the English Fayttes ofArmes and of Chyvalrye by William Caxton for

47 H.R. Loyn (Ed.), The Middle Ages: A Concise Encyclopaedia (London: Thames & Hudson, 1991), p.87. 48 This appointment was made after the Duke had recovered his reputation following the assassination of the Duke of Orleans. John had commissioned a long oration based on the arguments of the Italian jurist John of Legnano (a source also used by Bouvet - see above), setting out permissible action to be taken against a tyrant. A formal pardon was granted following the deli very of this oration, and the Duke's reputation was re-secured with his victory over the rebellious citizens of Liege. see Charity Cannon Willard, Christine de Pizan: Her Life and Works (New York: Persea Books, 1984), pp.182f. 49 Christine de Pisan, The Book of Fayttes ofArmes and of Chyvalrye: Translated and printed by William Caxtonfrom the French original by Christine de Pisan, A.T.P. Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p.82. 50 Willard, Christine de Pizan, p.183. Christine's concern is demonstrated in her opening chapter which begins with an explanation of her presumption to deal with such matters. Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.5ff. 51 Manuscripts that have the authorship omitted include: Ms. 824 Bodleian, Oxford; Ms. 10205 Bibliotheque Royale, Brussels, and; French Mss. 585, 1242, 1243 & 23997 Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.

88 Henry VII in, or just before, 1489. It was published in printed form in the following 52 year. According to the epilogue, this was done so that:

every. gentylman born to armes & all man ere men of werre captayns, souldlours, vytayllers & all other shold have knowledge how they ought to behave theym in thefayttes of warre & of bataylles.53

This was six years after Caxton's rendering of another classic chivalric text, Ramon Lull's Ordre ofChyualry. According to Byles, Caxton had continued to improve as a translator in the mean time: 'He has a much firmer control of sentence structure, though he still loses his way occasionally in dealing with a complex French sentence' .54 Fortunately, he takes 'no liberties with his subject-matter' and the only departures from the original text

are the accidental ommission of an anecdote from Valerius ... the addition of a few short explanatory phrases [not relevant to this study] ... the substitution of Cambridge for London in speaking of the rights of scholars ... and the omission of one or two uncomplimentary references to the English.55

The first of these references to the English is the relatively inconsequential substitution of "som of his enemyes" for "the English" (p.128) and the more general "it hath be som tyme vsed" instead of explicitly blaming the English for truce-breaking when fighting the French (p.2S1). Both of these are easily understandable when one considers that Caxton was translating it for a specifically English audience. The only real and continuous departure from the original text is Caxton's consistent addition of synonyms, such as saying 'socoure and helpe' or 'hurt and damage'. This does not detract from the translation at all, and 'there is some justice to the claim that Caxton enriched our vocabulary by this means' by introducing anglicised French words alongside native

English ones, such as 'poys or weyght' .56 This style of translation is not unique to this translation either as the 'curious doubling of terms' also appears in the English

52 This was less than two years after the work was first published in printed form in Paris in the original language by Verard. See introduction to Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.xxvi. 53 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.291. 54 See introduction to Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.lii. 55 Introduction to Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.liii.

89 translations of Vegetius such as that made for Thomas, Lord Berkeley in 1408 by John of Trevisa (see Chapter Five). Byles concludes that apart from some awkward sentence construction, 'Caxton shows a sound knowledge of French, and "The Fayttes of Armes" is one of the most careful and exact of his translations' .57 As such, I do not hesitate to employ Caxton' s translation of the original text with additional notes and clarifications where necessary. After looking at the general flavour of the Fayttes of Armes, this chapter will specifically focus on Christine's handling of Bouvet's Tree of Battles (her treatment of Vegetius' Epitome of Military Science is dealt with in Chapter Five). Christine was not interested in writing for a learned audience and makes it clear from the very beginning that she is writing for the practitioners of war who could not be expected to be well-versed in the Latin classics: 'they that been excersyng & experte in tharte of chyualrye be not comunely clerkys ne instructe in science of langage' .58 Christine was attempting, in effect, a popularisation of respected material on the conduct of war although she was doing more than merely pilfering from classical sources. As well as the contemporisation of much of this advice, there are also many original passages that appear to be by Christine herself. She employs the advice that Vegetius gave in his Epitoma Rei Militaris extensively in the majority of chapters in both book one and two. The Strategemata by Frontinus is also used in book two and this is supplemented with the Facta et dicta memorabilia by Valerius Maximus. An anonymous authority on siege warfare is also consulted in book two to provide a detailed account of the provisions and ordnance required for the siege of a fortress. Bouvet's law of arms is used at the beginning of book one and makes up most of books three and four, which concludes with a short treatise on heraldry.

56 Introduction to Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.liii. 57 Introduction to Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.lv. Of the extant copies of Caxton's translation of Christine's work, Byles chose manuscript I B 55131, at that time held in the British Museum but now in the British Library, to take his own text from. Byles believed that the French language manuscript Royal 19 B xviii, also in the British Library, most closely corresponded to Caxton's translation (although it is incomplete and finishes with bk. IV, ch. xvi, detailing the correct procedure for challenging the right ?f another to a coat of arms, omitting the final chapter, xvii, dedicated to the colours of heraldry and theIr meaning) and he uses this as the basis for his comparison. There is. little va.?~tion .between t~s and the French language MS. Royal 15 E vi and Harleian 4605, both also III the BntIsh LIbrary. BesIdes I B 55131, there are two other copies of Caxton' s translation held at the British Library: G 10546 and C lOb 11. Other copies are held at, amongst many other places, the Royal Library, Windsor, the Bodleian Library and the Bibliotheque Nationale. 58 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.6.

90 In book one Christine discusses the circumstances which justify war and chapter ii repeats Bouvet's discussion about the nature of war as well as justifying her choice of topic. Whilst she is in no doubt that 'many grete euyllis, extorcyons & grieues' come from war and that it must appear to many as if the subject is 'acursed', she also believes

passionately that 'waITes emprysed by iuste cause be permysed & suffred of god' .59 A very interesting passage in chapter ii echoes Bouvet's findings from his chapter xlix _ 'Whether it is fitting for a King or Prince by Deceit or Subtlety to Overcome Another Prince His Enemy' and 'In What Way He May Offend In This Matter'. Here, after making it clear that war for the execution of justice is permitted by God, Christine goes on to say:

Our lord him self ordeyned to captaynes of hostes that whiche they shold doo ayenst theyr enemyes, Lyke as it is wreton of one that was called Ihesus, to whom he saide that he shold ordeyne him to bataylle ayenst his enemyes, & made an enbusshe for the better to vaynquisshe theym. 6o

This use of Biblical precedence makes it clear that, at least in the case of waging a war on the command of God, tactics such as ambushes were permitted. Chapter iii states that legitimate wars can only be waged by sovereign princes who are the heads of their jurisdictions and have no temporal superior. Chapter iv sets out the possible causes of a just war. It was clearly lawful to wage war to 'susteyne right & iustice', to withstand 'euyl that wold ... oppresse the londe the contree & the people', or to recover 'londes, seignoryes, or other things' that have been usurped unjustly. However, it was wilful and wrong to wage war for such things as the pursuit of revenge or aggression. 61 Although the passage above makes clear that Christine has no qualms about using an ambush in a war, the nature of that war is absolutely central to her thinking. Christine goes to some lengths to make sure that the justness of one's cause was determined before going to war. For a prince to take up personal justice, impartial advisors should first be consulted and arbitration should be attempted before the war is truly just. In certain cases, the war is automatically just, such as when fighting for the church or for the oppressed. Before war,

59 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.9. 60 Christine is referring to Joshua IIX.2. Jesus is Joshua in Hebrew.

91 Christine suggests calling a council of nobles (who are knowledgable in war), lawyers (to ensure the war is just), 'bourgeises' (commoners and merchants - as they will pay for it), and craftsmen (for if they are consulted, they will be more inclined to support their lord with their goods). While the whole operation is supposed to be in pursuit of justice, it is very interesting that the Church is not mentioned here at all. 62 Chapter iv discusses the pros and cons of the king taking part personally in war. Although there are advantages such as the boost to the courage of the men through the glorious examples of royal prowess, the realm can suffer if the king is killed or captured in battle. Therefore, except during civil wars where his presence is required to make the enemy 'lose hertes and membres like as they were vaynquisshed', the king should instead be represented by a constable when he seeks to pursue his just cause. Chapter xiv, although in the middle of a section dominated by Vegetius, takes a passage from Bouvet xxxiv which states that pillage should not be permitted in friendly territory.63 This sentiment is repeated in book three chapter xiv which discusses the permissibility of pillage. It is clear that this element of the feud should only harm those who are connected with the cause of the other side. The Tree of Battles is introduced properly in book three and continues through much of book four. Christine uses the clever and particularly medieval device of a dream sequence to clarify~ agree or disagree and discuss the contents of the Tree with Bouvet, in which he invites her to pluck fruit from his tree to help her own task. 64 Whilst Christine frequently initially disagrees with her master, it is invariably through the ensuing discussion that what Bouvet was trying to say is made clear. Christine then, on the whole, ends up agreeing with Bouvet. Stevenson points out that it is Bouvet's 'scholastic method of stating each argument in turn' that makes this possible as Christine can rearrange his material to suit herself in the form of questions and answers.65 Various sections from Bouvet are discussed, from the duties required of followers and rewards to be expected, to questions on returning borrowed armour. An interesting section is in book three chapter vii where Christine agrees with Bouvet (xxxvii) that any man may take wages in

61 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.ll. 62 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.16. 63 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.44. 64 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.189. 65 Gilbert of the Haye, Prose Manuscript, p.lxxxv.

92 a just war but it is up to the individual to enquire into the justice of the cause.66 This has the implication that although it is up to the sovereign prince to establish the justness of his own cause, individual conscience is still an important consideration. 67 Chapter xiii of book three turns to the the subject of wiles and deceptions. Christine asks 'Whether subtyltees and polycyes of armes are goode and Iuste to be doon' . After much discussion (as in the original text), 'Bouvet' clarifies for Christine that this is acceptable (and of course widely done) as long as the cause is just and that both parties have been notified in the correct manner. Christine again gives the example of the Lord's instruction to Joshua how he should 'surpryse and ouercome hys enemyes' (this has already been mentioned in passing during a discussion within chapter ii of book one). However, there are certain types of behaviour that remain unacceptable. To give one's assurance of a safe meeting and then to take or slay one's opponent would be 'a ryght euylle treason', as would feigning a truce or peace. This would be be evil and 'grete dyshonoure and repreef shulde come to me therby, and grete synne shulde one doo to doo soo'. Echoing Bouvet (xliv), Christine makes clear that one should always keep one's faith, even to one's enemy. Ambushes are perfectly acceptable as long as 'they be not ayenst feyth promysse nor ayenst thassuraunce that men had made' .68 This accords with the legal position that battle held as a thing distinct from the process of the feud. Chapter xiv returns to the subject of pillage, which is not to be permitted and is unacceptable for paid troops. Christine is particularly concerned that this is something that is common in France and claims that it is not in the rights of war to do this: 'It is an evylle extorcyon and a grete vyolence made wrongfully and wyth grete synne vpon the people'. Christine again echoes Bouvet (xxxiv) by conceding that, if it proves absolutely necessary to take provisions, as little damage as possible should be done to the poor labourers. Christine makes clear that the common people should only be imprisoned if they are assisting the enemy. While it would not be hard for a medieval (or a modem) commander to link the labours of civilians with intentional or non intentional

66 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.200. 67 That Christine was writing for the future king of France is interesting given this sentiment. There is little doubt that the growth of centralised power led to raison d'etat replacing the traditional just cause criteria. That a guide for the future. ~onarch .himself. wo~l~ still provide .the right of his subjects to question royal motives is interesting and It IS questIOnable If thIS Idea would stIll be found a century later. 68 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.213f.

93 contributions towards a military effort (provision of food, economic base, taxation to support war effort etc), there is at least an attempt here to limit the suffering of the peasantry.69 This attitude does appear to be in contrast with that of the practitioners of medieval warfare, as we shall see in later chapters. Perhaps having seen the suffering caused by devastations and chevauchees, Christine is simply trying to state that while this may be how things are done, they should be done differently. Christine agrees with Bouvet on when it is permissible for a prisoner to escape (only if he has not given his word or if he is mistreated) and that oaths may only be broken if it is to avoid a greater evil. In this case the lesser of the two evils should be taken. One's word should even be kept with the Saracen as long as no Christian is 7o disadvantaged by it. Safe conducts, like truces, should not be abused for military advantage and can only cover those of equal or lower rank. Christine, like Bouvet, deplores that safeconducts are now routinely broken 'the tyme is now come that where the lawes doo calle frawde and barat [fraud and strife] it is now called subtyltee and cawtele [stratagem]'. This repeats the common medieval sentiment that things were getting worse and standards were declining. What is particularly interesting here is that Christine is clearly stating that the boundaries of acceptable behaviour were being pushed so that actions that were at one time condemned, such as fraud, were now simply referred to as subtlety. This demonstrates that there must have been a fine line dividing the two categories. Such subtleties should categorically never apply to the use of truces. Truces should never be broken as they are a royal assurance, they offer safety to goods and a hope of future peace (Bouvet, ciii). Again Chrsitine reiterates that lawful stratagems do not involve treachery. However, she does agree that once one party has already broken a truce, the other is no longer bound by it (Bouvet, cvii).71 As found in Bouvet, there is a discussion in the following section as to whether trial by combat is permissible. It is made clear that whatever the theory may state, trial by battle was still in use 'in the dedes of noble men & in thexcercyce of armes & of knyghthode', and used by the 'kynges, prynces & lordes' regardless of it being a thing

69 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.217ff. 70 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.236, 239 & 250. From Bouvet, lv, lvi & cvi. 71 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.245ff.

94 reproved.72 Given the actual reality of the situation (and remembering that she was attempting to write advice for a king rather than a polemic) Christine finds it prudent to set out the judicial aspects of trial by combat. Bouvet is asked why kings do not have to swear oaths but protagonists in a judicial duel judged by kings do. The answer (Bouvet, cxiv) is that unlike a battle, the prince judging a confrontation cannot be sure of each sides' case:

such grete bataylles are enterprysed by deliberacyon of a grete counseyl and Iuged of the lordes/soo behoueth there noon othelBut to suche a partyculer werre/the prynce can not knowe so weI the certeynte of the quarelle.

It must be fought in the presence of a prince as a judge of the conduct is required. Kings or sovereign princes do not need or require human judges for they have no temporal superior. God will be the judge of the justness and right of their causes. Apart from this important factor, this once again demonstrates the equivalence of battle with other less grand ordeal procedures. It is for this type of legal argument that Christine finds Bouvet particularly useful. The metaphysical beliefs that underpin the medieval conception of the universe and the Divine Will are clearly presented and are therefore incorporated into the Fayttes of Armes. Where Bouvet's advice is surpassed by the knowledge of others, Christine defers to the appropriate authority. For example, whilst Bouvet talks of the particular circumstances under which retreat can be considered, Christine bases her section on the practicalities of the battlefield on the writings of those who she feels is better qualified. In this particular case, Vegetius (see Chapter Five). In the sections where she feels the advice of Bouvet is more appropriate, she invariably ends up agreeing with him after clarifying his position, both for herself, and for her reader.

Conclusion Taking the Tree of Battles as a whole, we have a fascinating and informative view of the role and purpose of warfare and the use of deception, ambush and surprise within it. Bouvet was concerned with how things ought to be as well as how they actually were.

72 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.267f.

95 The Tree continually stresses that the private rights of individual soldiers must not run counter to the public rights of the crown. While custom took precedence over written law (with respect to duels etc), this was only in cases where the crown approved. To Bouvet, it appears that custom was less important than how knights should behave. This shows a radically different focus and different concerns to those of the practising knight Geoffroy de Charny. Instead of a third of his work being concerned with booty (as in Charny's Demandes) it gets one single paragraph in the Tree where all booty should be handed over to the duke of the battle for him to share out according to their valour. Only four of the Tree's questions deal directly with the scale of ransom or the terms of parole, while at least twenty others are concerned with the class of people entitled to immunity from imprisonment etc. The Tree was not intended as a means for protecting the rights of practising soldiers, but for protecting society from those soldiers.73 As such, Bouvet stresses things such as the exemption of students from hostilities, or the restraint of conflict on feast days. However, although he is quite happy to let his reader know of the things that he sees going on and disagrees with, he does not appear at all concerned with the use of trickery or ruse de guerre to overcome one's opponent in a tactical situation once a war has been declared as just. Biblical precedent is quoted and he takes it for granted that this is how conflict is conducted. Even though his text is in places highly prescriptive, he does not appear to think that this is something that ought to be different to contemporary practice. Above this level, both surprise and deception had no place as the correct procedures had to be followed before a war was considered just. This involved the possession of authority which was very closely bound with Bouvet's conception of just cause. Deception would have been very hard to fit into this part of the process (and Bouvet's equation of social position with justice makes it impossible for him to ascribe anything but the highest of motives to princes and kings). The sending of a correctly worded defiance effectively meant that surprise at this level was also impossible as one simply could not launch a just war without giving notice of one's grievance. While he places great stress on the importance of just authority and cause, once a conflict or feud has been decided upon and notice has been given, the means to be employed are fairly unrestrained as long as treachery or perfidy is not involved and the various immunities

73 Wright, Tree, pp.22f

96 were respected. However, the repeated emphasis on keeping one's word meant that the change in legal status from feud to trial by battle could not come about through such underhand means. One could not claim an ordeal had taken place unless both sides were aware of the new context of their situation. Christine de Pisan takes Bouvet's work and presents it in a new format. By clarifying and drawing out the meaning of the original legalistic arguments, Christine explains the Tree's legal and metaphysical ideas to a new audience. She is also concerned with how things ought to be although she clearly accepts that the real world does not live up to these standards. Christine takes time to question the validity of certain motives such as revenge or aggression in the just cause of a feud, stresses the importance of negotiation in the ongoing legal process, highlights the laws of ransom, and asserts the rights of the common people and non-combatants. She makes it clear that even in a public war, the responsibility remains with the conscience of the individual - therefore further stressing the importance of the just war and effectively warning her future king that support of his follows was not necessarily unconditional - his wars must be seen to be just. Christine also makes it very clear that she agrees with Bouvet that once a just war was under way, as long as it was being conducted by a legitimate authority and that one's word was not being broken, surprise and deception were perfectly legitimate weapons of war when employed at the tactical level. This may simply reflect the notion that the Tree and the ideas that were represented by this way of thinking were more concerned with ius ad bellum than ius in bello. Or, it may simply be that it was taken for granted that surprising an opponent and taking him off guard was a clever, legitimate and prudent move as long as it took place within the framework of a legitimately conducted feud. However, implicit within her advice is that the change in the legal and functional role of conflict from feud to trial by battle could not come about through deception or surprise although either may be employed once the both sides are aware of the new environment. Clearly both authors feel that within the metaphysical and legal framework governing the use of force in medieval society, God helps those who help themselves.

97 Chapter Four

Froissart: The Management of Chivalric Expectation

Froissart is, without doubt, the most famous of the medieval chroniclers. His enormous histories of the fourteenth century remain as one of the most important and detailed accounts of the later Middle Ages and are one of the best contemporary expositions of chivalric and courtly ideals. Given his place in history and his importance as a source of information, both generally and in some of the case studies used in this thesis, it would appear to be prudent to examine the works of Froissart in a critical manner to see just how useful they really are in explaining medieval attitudes towards the use of surprise and deception in warfare. The chapter will first establish Froissart's popularity and importance as a source before moving on to looking at the 'flavour' of his works. Who was he writing for and what events did he regard as important to his audience? This will be answered by examining the attitudes Froissart expresses and the type of themes he chooses to focus upon. Different case studies from the various editions of Froissart' s Chronicles will then be presented to highlight the role of surprise and deception in a variety of different circumstances and contexts. The chapter will demonstrate that Froissart does indeed provide very useful insights into many aspects of the warfare in the period. As well as encouraging brave men to perform deeds of arms, in many places Froissart also reminds them of what their duties were. However, in spite of his stated intention to focus upon 'honourable enterprises' , episodes detailing the use of surprise and deception are well covered in his works. On one level it appears that the words he places in the mouth of the Duke of Lancaster at a joust reflect his own view of chivalric practice when he says 'I consider a man wise who knows how to seize the advantage in combat' . 1 On another level, although often subtle, the context within which those advantages could legitimately be grasped are absolutely vital to understanding medieval warfare and this is also reflected in Froissart' work. As such, although the lessons are not always obvious to us today, Froissart's Chronicles provided and represented a framework

1 Froissart, Chroniques, Kervyn de Lettenhove (Ed.) 29 vols. (Brussels, 1867-77), XII pp.121 f. This edition contains variations found in different versions of the manuscript.

98 of understanding within which medieval chivalric expectations could be effectively managed.

Who was Jean Froissart?

Froissart was born in Valenciennes, Brabant, around 1333 although the year 1337 is also suggested by a number of sources.2 As well as the exact dates of his birth and death being unknown we are also unaware of his family background. We do know that after receiving ecclesiastical tonsure he travelled to England in 1361 at the invitation of Queen Philippa, a fellow Hainaulter. This may have been to present an account in verse of the battle of Poitiers (1356). He remained with the English court, on and off, for the next six years, joining the Black Prince in Aquitaine in the winter of 1366 during one of his own frequent excursions which also involved a trip to Scotland where he met David Bruce. 3 Froissart was a poet in the tradition of Guillaume de Machaut, and produced a number of works in this genre including L'Horloge amoureux, which compares the heart to a clock, and Meliador, which is a chivalrous romance in the style of the Round Table cycle.4 His ballades and rondeaux expose some of the poet's personal feelings while his l' Epinette Amoureuse relates the story of his own life. Although he was later to find fame as the chronicler of the first half of the Hundred Years War, it is more than possible that for much of the time that he spent in England, Froissart was in fact more interested in poetry than history. The romance Meliador alone is a vast work of over 30,000 lines and is dated to before 1373 at the latest. 5 It would clearly have taken quite a substantial amount of time just to complete this one work. Scenes from some of Froissart's travels around the British Isles are incorporated into the poem demonstrating that, at least at the time, Froissart was obviously interested in more than simply acquiring information for an historical account. However, there is little doubt that the people he met whilst present at the English court and the conversations that he had with the people who passed through there were important sources for his Chronicles. Many noble French prisoners from the

2 Richard Barber, 'Jean Froissart and the Black Prince', Froissart: Historian, J.J.N Palmer (Ed.) (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1981), p.25. See also http://www.bnf.fr/enluminures/texte/atx301.htm (accessed 30103104) for the Bibliotheque Nationale's thoughts on the matter. 3 Barber, Froissart and the Black Prince, pp.25f. 4 Froissart, Meliador, A. Longnon (Ed.) (Paris: Societe des Anciens Textes Fran<;ais, 1895).

99 battle of Poitiers were still to be released from captivity so it would have been possible to gain accounts from a number of differing perspectives. Upon the death of his patroness in 1369, Froissart returned to the continent and entered the service of Robert de Namur, the Count of Hainault, before coming under the protection of Duke Wenceslaus of Brabant. Next, he entered the service of Guy de Chatillon, Count of Blois, who appointed Froissart as his chaplain. He continued to travel and accompanied Guy into Flanders and to Blois before visiting the court of Gaston Phebus, Count of Foix. Upon his return to London from Paris in 1392, he was to offer his poems to Richard II. However, despite Froissart's obvious success in life and the widespread popularity of his work, he apparently died in relative obscurity in Chimay, Hainault, at the start of the fifteenth century. His tomb has never been discovered.

How Popular were Froissart's Chronicles? Froissart had hoped that his works would survive him and would immortalise him when he was 'dead and rotten,.6 However, Froissart did not have to wait until after his death to be appreciated. By the 1380s Froissart was established as 'an historian of European stature and as the historian of the epic struggle between the dynasties of Plantagenet and Valois for hegemony in Western Europe,.7 In England the French language employed by Froissart may have temporarily delayed the Chronicle's popularity, but, by the fifteenth century, the works were very popular throughout Europe. There is little doubt that the advent of printing helped to increase Froissart's popularity even more. In the twenty five years after 1495 there were at least ten editions printed of the Chronicles. From these, translations were made and the work was also published in English and Dutch. Working on the principle that imitation is the best form of flattery, the chronicler Monstrelet paid Froissart an enormous compliment by continuing Froissart's history in a similar style. The works were also plundered by such authors as Jean de Waurin, Jean de St Paul and the authors of the Chrono graphia regum Francorum. 8 Froissart may not have just been

5 Roger Sherman Loomis (Ed.), Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p.390. .. ., , 6 Froissart, Chroniques de J. Froissart, S. Luce, G. Raynaud & A. Mrrot (Eds) 15 vols. (Pans: SOCIete de l' Histoire de France, 1869-1899), XII, 2. 7 J.J.N. Palmer (Ed.), Froissart: Historian (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1981), p.l. 8 Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.l.

100 used as a Source of literary inspiration. For example, when the English herald Thomas BenoIt, Clarenceux King of Arms, left his library to his colleague Carlisle Herald in 1534, Froissart could be found amongst translations of De Regimine Principum by Giles of Rome, Geoffrey de Charny's Livre de chevalerie, Bouvet's Tree of Battles and 9 Vegetius' De Re Militari. Whether this was kept alongside these other works as another source of chivalric advice, a form of record of names, banners and emblems or simply as a record of events, we cannot know. However, the company that the tome kept surely indicates the high regard held for the work. Today, more than 100 manuscripts survive, many of them beautifully illustrated and on display to the public to help bring the dramatic and festive events narrated by Froissart to life.lO

'Flavour' , Accuracy and Content of the Chronicles The stated purpose of Froissart' s Chronicles was so that:

Afin que honourables emprises et The honourable enterprises, noble nobles aventures et faits d' armes, adventures, and deeds of arms, lesquelles sont avenues par les performed in the wars between guerres de France et d' Angleterre, England and France, may be soient notablement registrees et properly related, and held in mises en memoire perpetuelle, par perpetual remembrance - so that quoi les preux aient exemple d' eux brave men should be inspired to encourager en bien faisant, je veux follow such examples, I wish to traiter et recorder histoire et matiere record these matters of great de grand' louange. 11 renown. 12

Froissart does not disappoint us and provides an almost continuous stream of examples of such honourable enterprises. To pick just a few of the many examples, Froissart tells us that in 1359 the English knight Sir Robert Knolles led an excursion of 3,000 men along

9 Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984), p.14l. 10 One of the most lavishly illuminated copies of Froissart's history was commissioned by an important Flemish nobleman, Louis of Gruthuse, around 1470-1480. The four volumes of this copy (BNF, Fr 2643 ; BNF, Fr 2644 ; BNF, Fr 2645 ; BNF, Fr 2646) contain 112 miniatures painted by the best Brugeois artists of the day, among them Loiset Lyedet, a renowned painter to whom the miniatures in the fIrst two volumes are attributed. They can be viewed directly at the Bibliotheque National de France, or more conveniently at: http://www.bnfJr/enluminures/themes/tllstl02/al02002.htm (accessed 30103/04) 11 Froissart, Chroniques de sire Jean Froissart: qui traitent des merveilleuses emprises, nobles aventures et faits d'armes advenus en s~n temps en France, Anglete~re, Bretaigne, Bourgogne, Ecosse, Espaigne, Portingal et es autres partles, l.A.C. Buchon (Ed.) (pans: A. Desrez, 1835), I p.l. 12 The following French to English translations of Froissart are my own unless noted otherwise.

101 the course of the Loire and into the province of Berry where they were eventually met by a large group of enemy soldiers under the leadership of the lords of Auvergne. After several days spent manoeuvring and watching each other from their respective vantage points, the French advanced until there was only a meadow in between them.

Quant li Engles virent venu les When the English saw the French, Franchois devant yaux, par they immediately drew up in order samblant il en fissent grant chierre of battle, and placed their archers et s' ordonnerent tantost si comme on the downward slope of the hill, pour combattre et missent tous leurs in the front. The French lords who saw the troops archiers ou pendant de Ie assemble in this way also drew up their anny montaingne devant yaulx. Li in two good battalions, each of which consisted signeur de Franche qui perchurent of five thousand men. The Count of ce convenant s' ordonnerent ossi et Clermont, dauphin of Auvergne, fissent deux bonnes bataillez bien et commanded the first battalion; his rn faiticement: en chacunne avoit V • name was Berault. He was knighted hommes. Si avoit Ie premierre li on the spot, and displayed his daufins d' Auviergne et comtes de banner, which was quartered with Cleremont; si l' apelloit on «Beraut» the arms of Auvergne and et devint Hi chevaliers et leva Mercueil .... [Froissart includes a bannierre esquartelee d' Auvergne long list of nobles] and great et de Merquel .... [Froissart includes numbers of knights and squires, a long list of nobles] et pluisseur with a thorough good will for the autre chevallier et escuier, en grant combat, as was apparent. On the volIente de combattre ces other hand, Sir Robert Knolles and Captal de Buch compaingnes, si comme il Ie and their troops showed an equally good countenance monstroient. D' autre part, messires to engage. Thus then they remained until the evening, Robers CanolIes et AIle de Buef et one in front of the other, leurs routtez par samblant each in their entrenchments, monstroient qu' il euuissent grant without moving, except some volIente. Ensi se tinrent jusquez au young knights and squires, who, in soir I'un devant I'autre, chacun en hopes of gaining glory by feats of son fort sans lui mouvoir fors tant arms, descended into the meadow, qu'il y eut aucuns jones chevaliers with the leave of their marshals, in et escuiers qui pour acquerre pris order to tilt with their opponents. d' armes, descendirent, par Ie He who conquered his adversary congiet de leurs marescaux, des carried him off prisoner. montaignes et vinrent ens ou pre jouster li ungs a l'autre. Et qui pooit concquerre se compaignon ill' en menott.·13

102 As one can clearly see from just this extract, Froissart is keen to demonstrate the honour demonstrated by both parties and their willingness to engage each other, even if they do not actually join in battle on this particular occasion. Both sides were prepared to put their cause to the test of battle but not enough to lose the advantage of their defensive position. The heroic spirit is shown by the younger knights who joust in between the main force, watched by their fellows from their ranks on either side. That the occasion was considered serious by both sides is indicated by the knighting of squires and it is also obvious that Froissart is particularly concerned to show the presence of any 'celebrities' or notable commanders and leaders of men. In this and many other cases, the way he does this can almost seem like a list, perhaps in the same way that a modem newpaper article might name a respected football squad who took part in a match. He is keen to describe the banners that are displayed, presumably because many of his readers would have been able to identify the protagonists and their allegiances from these insignia. It is not difficult to imagine some of his readers perhaps taking note that the banner of such and such a noble was decorated in a particular way if they were previously unaware of this piece of information. In another account, shortly after the battle of Poitiers, Froissart explains that the Duke of Lancaster besieged the town of Rennes. Unfortunately for the Duke, his many assaults on the town were gaining him very little because defending the town were 'Ii viscomtes de Rohem, li sires de Laval, messires Carlos de Dinant, Ii sires de Gargoulie,

messires Henris et messires Oliviers de Pennefort, [etJ messires Bertrans de Claiekin' .14 The last name here presumably refers to the famous Bertrand du Guesclin. Froissart tells us that at one point during the siege, du Guesclin fought a single combat with an Englishman named Sir Nicholas d' Angourne:

Et fu li emprise telle que .III. The terms of the combat were to be joustes de fer de glaive, trois cops three courses with spears, three d'espee et .III. cops de daghe. Et s'i strokes with battleaxes and three

13 Froissart, Chroniques: Livre I Le Manuscrit D'Amiens municipale no. 486, George T. Diller (Ed.) 5 Vois (Geneve: Droz, 1992-1998), III pp.198f. .' 14 Froissart, Chroniques: MS. Amiens, Diller (Ed.), III p.133. See also FrOlssart, Chromques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.21ff.

103 porta, au voir dire, chacuns des .11. stabs with daggers. The two knights chevaliers vaillanment. 15 behaved most valiantly.

It was not just the 'noble adventures' that were taken seriousl y. Froissart clearl y wished to share his respect for the law of arms and took the subject extremely seriously. References to these laws are scattered throughout the work. For example, in Froissart's account of the siege of Limoges, three French knights surrendered to the Duke of Lancaster saying 'Lord, we are yours and you have vanquished us: now treat us according to the law of arms' . Later, Froissart also tells how the slayer of Sir John Chandos was left to die of his wounds. This was 'ill done, for it is an improper thing to

treat any prisoner other than as the law of arms requires' .16 It is easy to see the prescriptive elements in such accounts. As well as encouraging brave men to perform deeds of arms, all men were being reminded of what their duties were. Themes that we have seen elsewhere are immediately obvious in the opening chapters. For example, Froissart relates the story of how King Edward II and Sir Hugh Despenser were captured at sea after their escape attempt from the Castle of Bristol was foiled by eleven days of contrary winds. God would not allow them to escape because their sins weighed so heavily against them - 'mes Dieux ne Ie vat mies souffrir, car lars pechies leur encombra,.17 However, while the hand of God can clearly be seen in this extract, the overall flavour is far more secular than religious. Great deeds of arms are portrayed not simply as examples of God's will, but as individual acts that can encourage others to achieve such things for the honour of chivalry. Froissart believed that he was more than just a chronicler of events and it is in Book One of his great work where this is closest to the case: 'he is writing at a distance in time from the events he describes, recreating the past from such material as he can obtain, whether oral or written' .18 While later books do not rely upon earlier histories completed by other people, Book One principally relies upon two written sources. These were Jean Ie Bel of Liege for the years 1325 to 1361, and Chandos Herald for the mid 1360s. Jean Ie

15 Ibid. 16 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VII p.459 & vm p.43. For a discussion of this, see N.A.R. Wright, 'The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and the Laws of War', in C.T. Allmand (Ed.), War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1976), p.19. 17 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), IT p.8l. 18 Richard Barber, 'Jean Froissart and Edward the Black Prince', Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.35.

104 Bel had been one of the first chroniclers to abandon Latin for French. He was a soldier and constant companion to the Count of Beaumont with whom he went to England and Scotland in 1327. It was at the Count's request that Le Bel wrote his Vrayes Chroniques

(True Chronicles) recounting the events of the reign of Edward III. 19 Le Bel had held a canonry at the cathedral of Liege since his early twenties and it was to here that he retired later in his life. Until 1861, Le Bel's work was only known in fragments and a complete edition was not published until 1863. Le Bel was one of the the first historians to use the

technique of interviews as a basis for establishing historical fact. 20 This method was developed by Froissart who acknowledged his debt to Le Bel. While not a great deal is known about the person Chandos Herald, we do know that he was the domestic Herald of Sir John Chandos, famous follower of the Black Prince, and that he wrote an account in verse form of the important events in his master's life. 21 Stylistically, the Herald was more interested in the history itself than the poetical form it took on the page. However, one of the difficulties of the work as a historical document is that the poetic structure is not conducive to providing a clear historical chronology, therefore it can be had to work out the relative order of events. The Herald provides accounts of the 1346 campaigns culminating in the battle of Cn!cy and the capture of Calais. There are details of the plot of Calais in 1349 and then the text jumps to 1355 and 1356 with a detailed account of the battle of Poitiers. By his station, Chandos Herald was an eye-witness at some of the events he chronicles and it is in these particular accounts that his history is particularly interesting. This is particularly true of his account of the Spanish campaign of the Black Prince on behalf of Pedro of Castile that culminated in the battle of Najera. The text then moves on to the loss of Bretigny, the end of Sir John's career and his dying moments in the year 1376. While the later books of Froissart' s Chronicles are relatively straightforward with none of them going through more than two editions of relatively minor changes, Froissart spent the best part of his life reworking the first book. There are at least five different

19 Jean Ie Bel, Chronique, (Ed.) J. Viard & E. Deprez, 2 vols (paris: 1904-5). . 20 E.g. Le Bel's account of the Battle of Crecy was based upon the direct account o~ John of Hamault. 21 Chandos Herald, Life of the Black Prince, by the Herald of Sir John Chandos, MIldred K. Pope & Eleanor C. Lodge (Eds) (Oxford, 1910, reprint New York, 1974).

105 editions of this one book and 'three of them are by any standards major works' .22 The number of different editions and the long period of time spent completing them means that they are an excellent way of tracing the development of Froissart' s writing and seeing the way that he shaped his material. Unfortunately though, it is not quite that straightforward, as there is, and has been for a considerable time, some debate about the order in which the different editions were completed. The different manuscripts have traditionally been ordered with Manuscript A as the first edition with Manuscript B as a revised first edition. Manuscripts A and B are identical for at least three quarters of their lengths but do differ in a number of other sections, in particular, the opening chapters, the years 1350-56 and 1372-78?3

Luce based his famous edition of Froissart on the B manuscript because he believed that the version found in the AlB Manuscripts was the real first edition. It was his argument put forward in support of this belief that was accepted by perhaps the majority of scholars for many years. The second edition is known as the Amiens Manuscript. Apart from Manuscripts A and B, this is the only complete version that covers the period from 1325 to 1378. Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove employed the Amiens Manuscript for his edition of Froissart' s Chronicles completed in the late nineteenth century. He, however, argued that the Amiens Manuscript was in fact the first version. Palmer, a little more recently, has also set out a number of powerful arguments for a re­ ordering of the traditional ranking.24 Fortunately, at least one of the manuscripts can be safely placed as the last version that has survived. The structure and presentation of the Rome Manuscript has clearly been affected by the events leading up to and the death of Richard II. This allows us to state that this was clearly the last version as it could only have been begun after the year 1399. At 'something like a quarter of a million words' it is safe to infer that the enormous size of this version means that it must have taken up a very large proportion of Froissart' s last years before his death.25 Many of the extant manuscripts which include more than a single book have actually been put together from different editions of the separate books. Linked to this

22 Palmer, 'Book I (1325-78) and its Sources', in Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.7. 23 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), I pp.1-26, IV pp.84-198, VII pp.60-252. 24 Palmer, 'Book I and its Sources', pp.7-24. 25 Palmer, 'Book I and its Sources', p.8.

106 particular problem, the many arguments as to which order the texts were completed in is further complicated by the fact that very little is known about the effect that scribes and copyists may have had upon the extant manuscripts. This rich area of research has so far 26 received little attention. While one must bear the last point particularly in mind, fortunately, for the purposes of this study, it is unnecessary to attempt a definitive judgement on the order in which the manuscripts were completed. Whilst the actual order of the completion of the different versions of Book One has caused some debate, it has also been traditional to view the different versions of Book One as having different attitudes towards the English and the French protagonists, depending upon where Froissart was at the time that he wrote them. The AlB version, traditionally seen as having been completed first, was supposed to have been written shortly after Froissart left the English court, and is viewed as being biased towards the English. The second recension, the Amiens Manuscript, was supposed to have been written under the inspiration of Guy de Blois and is more favourable to the French. The third recension, the Rome Manuscript, was seen by some as actually being hostile to the English.27 This supposed level of partisanship was questioned as early as 1930 and has also been challenged more recently by Palmer.28 For example, as stated above, Le Bel was the original source of a large portion of Book One and is particularly relied upon for the material found in the Amiens Manuscript. It is clear from his writing that, rather than being more favourable to the French than the the English, he shows admiration for Edward III and a certain degree of contempt for Philip VI. Perhaps recognising this, it looks as if Froissart has simply attempted to balance this by omitting Le Bel's denunciation of Philip's role and several eulogies of Edward. He has also dropped the references to 'the noble king Edward' while giving no such title to Philip. Palmer 29 dismisses other claims of partisanship by Luce in a similar fashion. Whilst I find Palmer's argument convincing, questions of potential bias need to be constantly asked and borne in mind if any kind of prescriptive statements are being examined in Froissart or any other author's works.

26 Diller, 'Froissart: Patrons and Texts', Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.145. 27 For one articulation of this popular view, see the Catholic Encyclopedia reference at: http://www.newadvent.org/cathenl06308b.htm 28 F.S. Shears, Froissart, Chronicler and Poet (London: Routledge, 1930), pp.98ff.

107 As stated above, even within his own lifetime, Froissart had become a respected source of information on the early events of what was later to become known as the Hundred Years War. This reputation lasted over four hundred years until he perhaps reached the height of his popularity in the mid-nineteenth century. As the discipline of history began to become more vigorous, it began to become popular to criticise Froissart for his many inaccuracies. This is particularly true of Book One which, as a mere quarry of historical facts, ranks well below the other three books. Since this time, attacks on Froissart's veracity have 'become legion and are scattered in scores of periodicals and

hundreds of books on dozens of different subjects' .30 To compound matters, Froissart's obvious emphasis on the pomp and ceremony of his time, coupled with his concentration on the activities of a minority connected with the nobility at the expense of the more rounded picture further undermines his status as a true historical source for the period simply because he has ignored so much of what was also happening beyond the romantic ideals of chivalry. Once this narrow focus is combined with his frequent deviations from known historical events, it would appear that Froissart should be placed alongside other authors who 'sense no gap between the actions they describe in chronicle or biography

and those in imaginative literature' .31 Even where Froissart has interviewed people to gain information, the actual historical value of the information provided can often be questionable. As has been a concern throughout the course of recorded history, different people were sometimes in receipt of vastly differing recollections of events. The result of this is that Froissart's accounts of the same event can differ enormously from one edition to the next. Even though this is very clearly the case, nowhere does he appear to make an attempt to compare his two versions of event, 'however naIve such a narrative procedure may at times appear to us coming from an author who proclaimed himself to be a historian and not a simple chronicler' .32 There appears to be no effort made to reconcile the differences to determine the definitive version of events.

29 Palmer, 'Book I and its Sources', pp.16f. 30 Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.5. . . 31 Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford UmversIty Press, 1999), p.31. 32 Diller, 'Froissart: Patrons and Texts', p.153. Froissart makes the claim in Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), XIII p.222.

108 One begins to wonder if there is any real worth in reading Froissart at all beyond his work's obvious entertainment value. However, before this author is cast aside it is worth taking another look as his method does have certain advantages. Most importantly. it communicates directly to us the 'voices and emotions of his century, an advantage which would have been lost had he carefully filtered his accounts by means of a critical, comparative and synthetic method' .33 In many ways, Froissart's methodology would sit very comfortably with a post-modernist conception of historical truth with the same event being viewed in different ways by different actors, questioning the very idea of a single historical or even metaphysical truth. Froissart has also been frequently criticised for emphasising the glamorous side of warfare rather than dwelling on the more sordid day to day activities of campaigning. However, he certainly does not ignore the latter and there are many, many references to brutality, the slaughter of innocent people, and greed as a prime motivating factor. For example, Froissart almost casually mentions that great famine ran through the land because nothing had been cultivated for three years - 'grant famine y couroit, pour Ie cause de ce que on n'avoit III ans en devant riens ahane sus le plat pays' ?4 This detail about the effects suffered through the process of the feud was simply mentioned as an aside to the information that Froissart considered his readers were actually interested in: a long list of the important celebrities that were there and whom they fought. However, on the rare occasion where Froissart gives us details of the make-up of a force or information beyond that about the nobility, about the people who made up the majority of any expedition, it can be very illuminating. For example, Froissart describes the army of King Edward III as he left Calais and marched towards

Reims:

Apries celIe grant bataille, In the rear of the king's battalion, chevau~oit et charioit li grans was the immense baggage-train, charois qui duroit bien .II. lieuwes which occupied two French leagues franchoises et plus qui menoit in length, to carryall the provision touttes coses que on pooit adviser for the army, including many don't on a besoing en ost et en terre utensils not normally carried with an army de gerre et que on n'avoit oncques into the area of war, such as handmills to grind plus en avant veu, si comme their com, ovens to bake their

33 Diller, 'Froissart: Patrons and Texts', p.153. 34 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI p.224.

109 moulins a Ie main, fours pour quire bread ... After thi s marched the pain ... Apries venoit li forte bataille strong battalion of the Prince of dou prinche de Gallez et de ses Wales and his brothers. And this freres. Et avoient chil signeur gentlemen, the king's son, had a enffant dou roy .XXVc. armures de host of two thousand five hundred fer, noblement montes et richement 35 with iron armour, most excellently pareS. mounted and richly dressed.

The description continues with details about the formation employed to ensure readiness against attack and the subsequent slow progress of the army on the move (three leagues a day). While one must always be slightly sceptical about numbers in any medieval chronicle, Froissart has imparted much pertinent information about a medieval army on the march. He has chosen to do this because he considered it to be something unusual. He considered it to be the largest army and best appointed train of baggage-waggons that had ever left England: 'vint sus les camps iltout son grant ost et a tout Ie plus grant charoy et Ie mieux atelet que nuls veist oncques yssir d'Engleterre'. Froissart thought that this, as something beyond the ordinary, was going to interest his readers. However, even while he has been generous here with some details, what Froissart does not do is treat the everyday brutality and devastation of war as an exceptional event or circumstance. These things are a matter of routine, on the whole not requiring elaboration because his audience would have known that they were an inevitable part of warfare. 36 As a source for this thesis, the actual historical accuracy of individual facts in Froissart's work, or the order that the different versions of Book One were written in, is less important than the 'flavour' of what he is saying. While, particularly in Book One, Froissart's account may be dubious as an exact historical record, he does give a strong impression of contemporary attitudes to different types of behaviour. In addition to some historical inaccuracies, Froissart does without a doubt tend to be prejudiced towards those of rank and social standing. However, as the Chronicles were written with this particular audience in mind, it should be able to 'provide insights into the aristocratic mentality

35 Froissart, Chronique: MS. Amiens, Diller (Ed.), III pp.214f. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.224f. . . 36 See John Bell Henneman, 'The Age of Charles V' , Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.46. FrOlssart IS not alone in portraying events even if they are distasteful: Chandos Herald is more than happy to detail the methods employed by Prince Edward on his chevauchee before the battle of Crecy or elsewhere. See Chandos Herald, Life o/the Black Prince, lines 236-9.

110 which the records can rarely offer' .37 It does go further than this though by demonstrating contemporary attitudes towards political society, the social dimensions of warfare and the nature and techniques of warfare itself. It really matters very little if the date of a particular event is incorrect, or even if the event was completely made up: Froissart is a very valuable source as long as we are to 'prefer a knowledge of mankind to a mere acquaintance with their actions' ?8

We can now move onto the actual contents of the Chronicles. Considering that recording 'honourable enterprises' was the stated aim of Froissart at the start of his first book, some of the exploits that he chose to record appear a little surprising. Contrary to some of the criticisms heaped upon Froissart over the years that as a chivalric chronicler he is only interested in pomp and ceremony, his texts are littered with examples of behaviour that would hardly be classed today as honourable. The first example I have selected from many potential candidates details the underhand behaviour of one Sir William of Oraville in the middle of the fourteenth century during the retaking of Evreux from the King of France who had himself taken it from the King of Navarre?9 Oraville was attached to the King of Navarre through his 'faith and oath' or 'Joy et de sierement' and after much conversation, sought to do something by collaborating with a local citizen. The plan was formed and after convincing the citizen to find like-minded men, 'hardis et entreprendans', and offering to arm them, Oraville promised that they would enter the castle using a trick:

Messires Ouillaumes de Oauville Sir William went in and out of the aloit et venoit en Ie cite sans nulle town without any suspicion; for he souspe~on, et ne s' estoit point had not borne arms in the last armes dou temps pas set avoecques expedition with the lord Philip de messire Phelippe de N avare, ne les Navarre, because the greater part of N avarois, pour Ie cause de ce que his property lay near to Evreux, and sa revenue gisoit toute ou en partie the king of France, at the time he asses pries de Evrues, et li rois de conquered Evreux, had made all the France, dou temps que il conquist landholders in the neighbourhood Evrues, avoit toutes les tierres obey him, otherwise he would have d'environ fait obeir alui, taken possession of their lands. He

37 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle, (London: Routledge, 1985), p.X. 38 Quote by Sir Walter Scott. From Palmer, Froissart: Historian, p.5. 39 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.26ff.

III aultrement illeur euist tollues. II en had thus only gained their bodies avait eu les corps tant seulement, for their hearts remained attached mes les coers non; car toutdis to the interest of Navarre. estoient-il demore Navarois.4o

Armed with a concealed small battle axe - 'desous son brach une courte hace bien aceree' - Oraville loitered at the castle gate where he knew the governor made frequent visits and then, when the governor arrived, engaged him in conversation about news and current events. The governor had been somewhat removed from regular news from the outside and was very interested to hear what was going on. Oraville proceded to make up some events about the Danes planning to invade England. When the governor asked how he had come by this news, Oraville, knowing that the governor enjoyed a game, answered that a knight in Flanders had written it to him as a fact, and added that the knight had also sent a handsome set of chess pieces - 'qui m'a envoyet le plus biel jeu de esches que je veisse onques'. This lie had the desired effect and Oraville's servant was sent home to retrieve the chess set so that William and the governor could have a game in the castle. Oraville had lulled the governor into insecurity by insisting that the door could be opened without fear: 'Chastellains, ouvres ceste aultre porte, vous le poes bien ouvrir sans peril' . The governor went ahead and opened the gate to let Oraville in, at which point, as the servant blew a hom to summon the accomplices:

Messires Ouillaumes de Oauville Sir William of Oraville drew out encoise celIe hace que il portoit the axe he had under his cloak, and desous son mantiel, et fiert Ie struck the governor such a blow chestellain en Ie tieste, telement que that he split his head asunder, and ille pourfent tout jusques es dens et felled him dead on the sill of the l' abat la dou travers dou sue1.41 door.

While the shouts of 'Treason!' echoed around the castle, Oraville guarded the gate from the defenders until his support arrived and proceeded to take the castle, much to the pleasure of Lord Philip de Navarre who promptly stationed a large garrison there so he could take the war on into the rich lands of Normandy - 'pour guerryer le bon pays de Normendie'. At the time there was no truce between the King of Navarre and the King of

40 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI p.28. 41 Ibid.

112 France so, although the attack was a complete surprise and involved deception, it was not a challenge to the laws governing such activities. The status of Graville in respect to the oath he had made to the King of France in order to retain his lands is perhaps more of an issue here although this is not highlighted by Froissart beyond stating that Graville would never have dared if the French king had been in the territory.42 As further examples will demonstrate, the breaking of faith is not an issue that Froissart would normally fail to comment upon. In this case it is the context of the action that appears to have led Froissart to refrain from passing comment through the assumption that Graville' s true loyalties remained with his original lord, the King of Navarre. Another example of taking a town through a stratagem is given a few years later. In 1384 Froissart explains that the garrison of the town of Oudenarde were causing much mischief. Because of this and despite a truce (which the garrison were not respecting themselves), Lord Destournay decided to retake the town using a stratagem. When spies indicated that the governor of the town, Francis Atremem, had left for Ghent, two carts were led through the gates by men disguised as carters but well-armed under their frocks: 'On prist deus chars cargies de pourveances, atout quatre caretons vestis de grises cotes et armes desous, et estoient hardit varlet et entre-prendant' .43 The guards on the gate were surprised and overpowered as reinforcements followed up and seized the town. As the town had been taken during a truce, the people of Ghent who had held the town appealed to the Duke of Burgundy to support their case or risk the truce being considered broken. The Duke pointed out he had no knowledge of the events and attempted to right the potential damage to the truce by writing to Destournay to order him to return Oudenarde:

car ce n'estoit pas cose honnerable For it was neither honourable to ne aceptable de prendre en trieues him nor agreeable to the duke to et en respit ville, castiel ne capture any towns, castles or forts .j: .... 44 lorterece. during a truce.

The reply given was:

42 Ibid. 43 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), XI, pp. 18 Off. 44 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), XI, p.182.

113 tous jours li garnisons d' Audenarde every day the garrison of Ii avoient fait guerre en trieue et Audenarde had conducted war and hors trieue, et tolut son hiretage, et had never respected the truce, that que a eux il n'avoit donne ne he had never consented to any truce accorde nulle trieue, et que il avoit with them and that he had pris Audenarde en boine guerre 45 conquered Oudenarde in fair war.

The new ownership remained in this state for nothing better could be done. It is at Francis Atremem that the real criticism is levelled for not having better guarded the place even though there was technically a truce in place. The whole incident is particularly interesting as it was not the fact that the town was taken through the use of a stratagem that was used as the basis of the appeal, but the status of the truce at the time. In another example, which continues from a passage already mentioned above, Froissart has just impressed his readers with tales of the jousting that went on between the younger knights of Sir Robert Knolles' party and their French counterparts in the province of Berry in 1359. As night fell and the two armies remained in position with neither wishing to give up the advantage of their position, the French lords held a council in which it was decided that they would attempt to surprise their opponents. At the hour of midnight, they drew their host up into battle array and resolved to:

Descenderoient leur montaingne, Descend the mountain not on the non deviers les ennemis mes au side next to the enemy, but to the plain par ou il y estoient monte. Et plain by the way that they had pour tant seullement tourniier les ascended. And, by making a circuit montaingnes deux lieuwes, il of only two leagues, they would veroient tout au plain la ou li come to the plain where the English Engles estoient et encorres si matin were, hoping to arrive there so que espoir ne seroient il mies tout early, that the English would not be arme.... 4{) all armed.

Fortunately for the English force, word of the impending surprise night attack got back to the them via an escaped prisoner. Knolles duly summoned a council of those in whose opinion he most confided, who, considering the superiority of the French forces - 'Ie puissanche des Franchois' - thought it advisable not to wait for them to attack. They

45 Ibid. 46 Froissart, Chroniques: MS. Amiens, Diller (Ed.), III pp.200f. See also Froissart, Chroniques, (Ed.) Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.196ff.

114 decamped and the French force arrived to find an empty hill waiting for them. The attempted use of surprise here receives no criticism. Both parties were waiting for a battle to take place so there was no question of surprise at this level. On the tactical level, if the English had been caught by surprise then it appears obvious that it would have been they who were at fault for allowing it to happen. Given the context, withdrawal in the face of an attempted surprise attack appeared to be acceptable and prudent while withdrawing actually in the face of an army arrayed to offer trial by battle may have posed greater moral problems and undermined the cause for which one was willing to fight. Froissart provides many examples of the lengths to which individual knights would go to keep their word. While not in the legal context of a battle, the events at Vannes in Brittany in 1381 do provide some interesting insights into the importance of carrying through with one's word. These events were formal deeds of arms with the rules and scope of combat set out very clearly for everyone present. In this particular case, perhaps unusually, the protagonists had agreed to strike each other only within the four members (i.e. the body), and to hit anywhere else would be disgraceful - 'entre les IIII membre;

autrement it prendre li a/aires estoit villaius' .47 If this was because they only had body armour and lacked adequate protection on their limbs, the outcome was to be disastrous for one of them:

Adont s'en vinrent-il de grant They advanced to each other with volente, arme au vray de toutes great courage, completely armed, pieces et Ie carne dou bacinet abatu the visor down and helmet tightly et arreste. Jehans de Castiel-Morant fixed on. John de Chatelmorant assegna Ie chevalier moult gave the knight such a blow on the gentement et li donna grant horion breastplate that Sir William enmy Ie poi trine tant que messires Farrington staggered a little, on Guillaumes de Ferinton fleci, et, a account of his foot slipping: he held 49 ce qu'il fist et que li pies li falli un his sword stiffly with both hands, petit, il tenoit son glave roit devant and, lowering the point because of ly a deus mains. Si l'abaissa (car the stumble, struck John de amender ne Ie peut) et consieuwi Chatelmorant on the thigh. He could Jehan de Castiel-Morant bas ens es not avoid it and the sword passed quisseus et li pecha dou glave les through his thigh and came out the paus tout oultre et les quisieus, et li length of one's hand on the other bouta Ie fier dou glave tout parmy side. John de Chatelmorant reeled Ie quisse tant que il apparoit oultre from the blow but did not fall.

47 Froissart, Chronicles, Lettenhove (Ed.), IX pp.329f.

115 d' aultre part bien une puignie. Jehans de Castiel-Morant pour Ie cop canchela; mais point ne chei.48

This caused outrage on both sides and some harsh words were spoken causing William to humble himself before the assembled lords:

Adont furent li signeur engles et The English lords and the knights chevalier et escuier de une part et and squires on both sides were d'autre moult durement much enraged by this, and said, it courouchiet, et fu dit que c'estoit was infamously done. The knight villainement pousse. Li chevaliers excused himself by saying he was s' escusa et dist que che li extremely sorry for it: and if he had desplaisoit tres-grandement; et, se thought it would have so happened il cuidast, au commenchement des at the commencement of the armes, avoir ainssi ouvre, il n' euist combat, he would never have encores commenchie, et, que, se undertaken it, but as God may help Dieux li aidast, il ne l' avoit peut him make amends for his mistake, amender, car il glicha dou piet his foot had slipped from the pour Ie grant coup que Jehans de violence of the blow he had Castiel-Morant ly avoit donne.5o recei ved from John de Chatelmorant.

It is worth noting here that it was the English lords who were particularly enraged. After the knight's apologies, the matter was considered closed: 'Si demora la cose enssi'. However, this does clearly show the importance of keeping one's word. It is not the fact that an injury was received that causes the outcry, it is the fact that an injury was caused to an area that was considered out of bounds by the agreement of both parties. After promising to fight, the protagonists are bound to accomplish victory within the terms of the challenge and there are great pains taken to avoid disgrace. The parallel with the framework provided by the ordeal of trial by battle are clear - the rules were known and conduct was expected to conform with them by both sides for the contest to be considered satisfied.

48 Froissart, Chronicles, Lettenhove (Ed.), IX pp.329f. 49 In modern French, glaive is translated as a short and/or double edged sword. In Medieval French the term can also mean spear, jousting lance or even javelin although the context here would suggest a sword. See Algirdas Julien Greimas, Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Fran9ais (Paris: Larousse, 2001), p.292. 50 Froissart, Chronicles, Lettenhove (Ed.), IX pp.329f.

116 Another example of the importance placed on keeping one's word can be found in another theatre entirely. During the siege of Calais in 1346, the Scots launched an invasion of England. An English force headed north to defend the kingdom and arrayed themselves before the Queen at Newcastle. Hearing that this was to be the rendezvous for the English forces, the Scots headed towards the town as well. After setting fire to the suburbs of Newcastle in an attempt to force a battle but receiving no response, the Scots deployed just outside of the town and formally challenged the English to come out and meet them for battle:

Li pn!lat et li baron d'Engleterre The prelate and the baron of furent avise de respondre, et disent England were advised to reply and que oil, et qu' il enventurroient leurs said yes and that they would risk vies avoecques I' iretage de leur their lives for the realm of their lord signeur Ie roy d'Engleterre. Si se the King of England. They sallied traisent tout sus les camps et se out from their camps in number trouverent environ XIIc hommes about twelve hundred men at arms, d' armes, IIIm arciers et V m autres three thousand archers, and five 51 hommes parmi Galois. thousand other men, including the Welsh.

While the battle of Neville's Cross does then ensue, according to Froissart it is only once both sides have finished deploying. Even while the English were drawing up their forces, the Scots do not engage. Perhaps, after he was taken prisoner, the king of Scotland was to rue this although there appears to be nothing but praise for him in the chronicle as he fought most gallantly - 'vaillamment' - before his capture. A battle had been offered and it does not appear as if it was considered anything other than normal here that the battle would not begin until both sides were ready. It would be interesting to see what the situation would have been if the two armies had arrayed themselves and then nothing had happened for the rest of that day. Would it have been acceptable then to employ an attempt at surprise during the night such as that attempted by the French in the province of Berry in 1359? From the evidence presented in the Chronicles, I would say yes. Although the difference between the two situations appears a little subtle, it would be entirely consistent to avoid attacking before an opponent was ready and to then try and catch that same opponent by surprise at a later point. The context is vital to understanding

117 this. Once the contest was underway, one could employ surprise. However, the contest or ordeal was not underway until both sides were ready because a formal challenge had been made. To attack earlier would be to break one's faith and this was obviously not something that was lightly done. More fundamentally, to do so would be to undermine the framework of the ordeal and would prevent the battle being accepted as such by both sides. In a case that appears to be rather different to this formal challenge to battle, Froissart gives the intriguing example that involves Sir Walter Manny's expedition into France to surprise and capture the town of Mortaigne in 1339. As part of the expedition of Edward III, Froissart was adamant that Manny had not ridden into France until the correct legal defiance had already been sent to the King of France from the English King.52 After this had been done and just enough time had elapsed to make Manny believe the challenge had arrived safely, he collected a small group of forty men and secretly rode into French territory on a 'secret chevauchee', apparently because he had promised to be the first one into France and to take a castle or strong town in a feat of arms.

Encorres avint que messires It so happened that Sir Walter Gautiers de Mani qui avoecquez Ie Manny, the King of England' roy d 'Engleterre estoit apasses Ie representive, had crossed the sea mer par decha et qui en Anwiers se and spent a while in Anvers, tenoit, mist sus une chevauchie et undertook a chevauchee and chose quella des compagnons environ LX from his companions about sixty et chevaucha secretement parmy men. They rode secretly across Braibant et Haynnau et fist tant que Brabant and Hainault and then one .1. soir il s' enbuscha ens es bos de night entered into the Forest of B laton dalles Condet sus Escaut et Blaton near Conde sur l'Escaut. No encorres ne savoit nulz de se route one among his companions knew in quel part il volloit traire mes la il which way Walter intended to go, s'en descouvri et leur dist que il but at that time, demanding that it tenissent ses parollez en secret et be keep secret, he told them it was que il avoit entente de venir a his intent to go to Mortaingne to

51 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), V pp.124ff. 52 Froissart, Chroniques: MS. Amiens, Diller (Ed.), I p.248. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), II pp.485f.

118 Mortaingne et faire la aucun fait take part in a feat of arms. d'armes.53

Just because the king of France may have received his defiance, the garrison of Mortaigne may well have still been unaware of this new situation. Having given no advance warning of his intended action, Manny found the wicket gate open when he got to the town and proceded to enter it with his pennon flying. Once those inside the castle attached to the town saw this they raised the cry of treason - 'Trail Trail'. The garrison in the castle refused to sally forth and engage Manny and, with Manny wishing for a speedy victory rather than a prolonged siege, he instead burnt the town and proceeded on to the next. The correct legal situation obviously existed for this action even though the inhabitants of the towns and castles attacked by Manny may well have been completely unaware of the state of war that existed. There does not appear to be any question over Manny's behaviour precisely because the legal situation was clear at a much higher political level. Sir Walter Manny appears in another example a few years later that illustrates just how seriously a knight viewed his reputation in this period. With the hostilities several years old by this point, Manny was the recipient of a free passage negotiated in lieu of a ransom from a prisoner. The safe conduct was obtained from the Duke of Normandy by the prisoner and upon its delivery, Manny (perhaps a little pretentiously) set out with twenty companions across France, paying for things as they proceeded and demonstrating their credentials to any who challenged them, thus clearly acting within the limitations of their pass and not carrying out anything that could be construed as an act of war. The situation continued until Manny and his companions reached Orleans where he was arrested even though he showed his papers. When he heard of this, the Duke who had issued the safe conduct was not impressed and went immediately to the king to remonstrate with him. He demanded that Manny was released immediately as it looked as if the Duke had betrayed him. When the king calmly announced his intention to execute Manny instead as he was one of the greatest enemies of the country, things got even more

53 Froissart, Chroniques: MS. Amiens, Diller (Ed.), I p.253. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), II pp.485ff.

119 heated. The Duke threatened that neither he, nor any of his followers would take up arms for the king again if this happened.

Et eut adont entre Ie roy et Ie duch Very high words passed between de Normendie grosses parolles, et the King and the Duke of se parti li dus par mautalent. Et dist Normandy and the Duke left with li dus au partir que james en I' ostel bad will, declaring he would never dou roy il n' entreroit, tant que serve in any of the King's armies messires Gautiers de Mauni seroit again, as long as Sir Walter Manny 54 en prison. remained in prison.

The threat that the Duke made to never take up arms for his sovereign again is obviously taken seriously as Manny did indeed regain his freedom. This was a serious argument though, caused by one party believing that their promise had been undermined. Of course, while one's word was absolutely central to a knight's reputation, that did not mean that the rules of the game could not be pushed a Ii ttle. In another example of deeds of arms, again very close to war if not quite war itself due to its function rather than its means, there is a question raised about the legality of the tactics employed. Two prominent knights, Sir John Holland and Sir Reginald de Roye, had agreed to fight with

lance, sword, axe and dagger, in fact with everything, 'excepte l'oultrance' .55 They began by jousting with lances of war although a problem was quickly discovered. Although each knight hit the other squarely in the visor, only De Roye's lance was broken, meaning that Holland did not score:

Messire Regnault avoit lachie son Sir Reginald had laced his helm on heaulme a son avantaige; il ne to give him an advantage. It was tenoit fors a une petite laniere. Si held by one thong only, which rompy la laniere contre la lance, et broke at the blow, and the helmet Ie heaulme vola hors de sa teste et flew over his head, leaving Sir demoura messire Regnault a nud Reginald bare-headed. chef.56

The knights returned to their stations. De Roye's helmet was returned to him, and he was given another lance. Holland retained his own, which had not been damaged. When they

54 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), V pp.97ff. 55 'Except to the death.' Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), XII, pp.119ff. 56 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), XII p.120.

120 were both ready, they set off again at a full gallop towards each other. The same thing happened again, although this time Holland received a very severe blow because De Roye's lance did not break. De Roye's helmet came off again, leaving him bare-headed.57 Whilst this feat of removing an opponent's helmet in this way, not once but twice, may appear to us to have been an impressive achievement, it was not viewed in quite the same way by the spectators for it meant that the lance remained unbroken and the knight remained on his horse in spite of receiving a blow to the head. Complaints were made:

"Ha!" dirent lors les Anglois aux "Ha!" cried the English to the Franc;ois, "il prent avantaige. French, "he takes advantage. Why Pourquoy n' est aussi bien son is his helmet not tied on in the same heaulme bouclt! at lachie comme way as Sir John Holland's? We say celluy de messire Jehan de he is doing something deceitful. Hollande est? Nous disons que Tell him to put himself on an equal c' est barraterie que on lui fait. On footing with his opponent". lui die qu' il se mette en l' estat de son compaignon". 58

It was clear that it was believed that an unfair advantage or ruse was being employed. At this point, the highest ranking member of the nobility who was present, the Duke of Lancaster, stepped in to defend the Frenchman:

"Taisies-vous", dist Ie duc, "Hold your tongues", said the duke, "laissies-les convenir. En armes "and leave them alone. In arms chascun prent son avantaige au everyone takes what advantage they rrueu. Ix qu ' 1·1 scet prendr e. ,,59 can".

The Duke stated that if Holland believed himself to be disadvantaged then he should loosen his helmet as well. Nobody challenged the Duke's opinion although it was obvious that the majority of those present dissagreed with him. At the conclusion of the

joust:

Tout et toutes dirent qu'ils avoient All now stated that both had moult bien jouste; mais tous les jousted well, although, all of Anglois blasmoient trop the English greatly blamed the

57 Ibid. 58 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), XII pp.120f. 59 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), XII p.l2I.

121 grandement I' ordonnance de decision of Sir Reginald de messire Regnault de Roye. Mais, Roye. But, it is said, the Duke comme dit est, Ie duc de Lancastre of Lancaster did not blame him ne la blasmoit point, et disoit "Je and said, "I consider a man tiens hornme a saige, quant il doit wise who knows how to sieze faire en armes aucune chose et il the advantage in combat". monstre que il se scet aidier a son avantaige".60

Even though a ruling had effectively been given by the Duke on the matter, there was clearly a split in opinion on De Roye's behaviour. The loosely attached helmet was regarded by some of the spectators as cheating, whilst the Duke felt that one must take an advantage where one could as long as it was not explicitly against the rules. Through this example, Froissart was demonstrating the question mark that existed over the tactic and the general dissaproval even after it had been declared legitimate by the ranking noble present.

Clearly, one was expected to employ an advantage if it was available. Sometimes, gaining that advantage might involve the use of outright deception. One of the most brazen tales of lies and deceit in Froissart's Chronicles involves a deliberate attempt by a knight to pass himself off as a friend for the explicit purpose of causing an injury to his enemy. After detailing the army accompanying Edward III, Froissart recounts an adventure which befel Sir Galahaut de Ribemont, a very gallant and expert knight of Picardy - 'un tres-hardit et appert chevalier de Pikardie' .61 He was requested by the people of Peronne to come to their assistance as they had lacked leadership and were unfortunately on the direct march route of the approaching English army. For his troubles, he was to receive twenty francs, ten francs for each knight under him, and one franc a day for each lance in possession of three horses.62 Due to his eagerness for warlike enterprises, Ribemont agreed to the terms and set out to join them. As he approached Peronne, Ribemont's force had swollen in numbers. The party agreed with him that they would launch an excursion on the flanks of their opponents because he believed that some of the English may have set out early in hope of gaining honour or booty by pillaging the countryside. This would be a good time to make them

60 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), XII pp.121f. 61 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI p.225.

122 pay for their activities. Two squires were sent on ahead to scout the way. In the process of doing this, they found themselves a little too close to some knights who, being in an ambuscade themselves, naturally looked as if they belonged to their own group. However, they were on closer inspection, in fact German knights under Sir Reginald de Boullant who belonged to the enemy Duke of Lancaster's division. The two squires agreed that they would have to pretend to be Germans too. Upon being challenged in German and asked to which party they belonged, Bridoul de Tallonne replied in the same language:

"Nous sommes a monsigneur "We belong to Sir Bartholomew Bietremieu de Brucs". "Et ou est Burghersh." "And where is Sir messires Bietremieus de Brucs?" Bartholomew?" asked the knight. dist li chevaliers. "Sire", respondi Ii "Sir", responded the squire, "He is escuyers, "il n'est pas loinch de ci, not far away, down below in that il est chi desous en ce village". 63 village."

Explaining that their fictional master was foraging, Boullant introduced himself and bid them go and collect Burghersh so that they could ride together. Ribemont, their real master, was intrigued by the story that his squires told him. He consulted Sir Roger de Cologne and some other knights present who told him he was, after all, seeking adventure and 'by all means, allowed by the laws of arms, every man ought to molest his enemy' - 'car en toutes manieres doit-on et poet-on par droit d'armes grever son ennemi'.64 This was advice that Ribemont could cheerfully assent to. He ordered his horse to be prepared and:

Mist son bachinet avisiere, par He put on his helmet with the visor quoi il ne pouist estre congneus, et down, that he might not be known. ensi fisent tout Ii aultre, et fist The rest did the same and then he encores renvoleper son pennon. 65 covered/wrapped his pennant.

62 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI p.226. 63 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.228ff. 64 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.228ff. 65 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.228ff.

123 They rode towards the woods where the outnumbered knights awaited them. When Boullant saw them approaching, he left his ambush and, with his pennon displayed before him, rode towards the French knights believing them to be allies.

En appro<;ant, illeva se visiere et When he was come up with them, salua monsigneur Gallehaut, ou he raised his visor, and saluted Sir nom de monsigneur Bietremieu de Galahaut, by the name of Sir Brues. Messires Gallehaus se tint Bartholomew Burghersh. Sir tous couvers et li respondi asses Galahaut kept his face covered, faintement et puis dist: "Alons, and replied in a low voice, adding, alons, chevau<;ons avant". Dont se "Come, come, let us ride on." traisent ses gens tous d'un les et Upon which, his people drew off fisent leur route, et li Alemant Ie on one side, and the Germans on 66 leur. the other.

When Boullant finally realised all was not well and challenged the knight to raise his visor and reveal his name, Ribemont did finally raise his visor and attempted to grab the reigns of Boullant' s horse as he gave his cry of "Our Lady of Ribemont!" Boullant quickly defended himself and dealt the architect of the deception such a furious stroke with his sword that it pierced his armour and passed through his body. Boullant then fled, successfully beating off any attackers who were able to pursue him.

Tant fist li dis chevaliers que il In this manner did the knight eslonga les Fran<;ois et qu' il se escape from the French, without sauva, et n' i eut point de damage de receiving the smallest wound, son corps, de quoi si ennemi Ie which his enemies, as well as all tinrent a grant proece, et tout cil qui those who heard of it, considered depuis en oirent parler, mes ses as a most gallant act, but it fared gens furent ou tout mort ou tout otherwise with his people, as they pris, petit s'en sauverent. Et la sus were almost all killed or made Ie place on entendi a monsigneur prisoners, scarcely any escaping. Gallehaut de Ribeumont qui estoit They placed Sir Galahaut de durement navres, et fu amenes au Ribemont, who was very severely plus doucement que on peut en Ie wounded, on a litter, and carried ville de Peronne, et la medicines. him to Peronne to a physician. He De ceste navreure ne fu-il onques was never perfectly cured of this puis sainnement garis, car il estoit wound, for he was a knight of chevaliers de si grant volente et si such wilfulness and courage that corageus que pour ce ne se voloit-il he did not want to spare himself,

66 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.228ff.

124 mies espargnier, et ne vosqui point so that he died shortly afterward. trop longement. 67

This is a story that has everything and begins with a reminder about the duty within the law of arms to molest one's enemy. I believe the meaning of 'renvoleper son pennon' to be wrapping or covering his pennant and, therefore, further disguising his identity. The argument hardly hinges on this however as the knight also deliberately covered his face with his visor to maintain the deception, declined to raise that visor as was customary in greeting and answered to the false name of Sir Bartholemew. Not only was there the intention to deceive by pretending to be a friend, there was no pretence whatsoever that this was going to be a an even fight with the Germans outnumbered by more than two to one. The German knights themselves begin the tale waiting in ambush for some unwary passers by, but were themselves duped. The architect of the deceit is subsequently dealt a mighty blow in the ensuing battle, which turns out to be fatal. This could be a very clear moral statement on Froissart's behalf, demonstrating that this kind of deceit has consequences. Instead, it looks as if Froissart chooses to emphasise Ribemont's courage. It was not the blow itself that proved fatal, it was that Ribemont was too brave to rest and let it heal. Boullant was lucky to escape with his life but lost all of his followers. At least his retreat was done with honour as he only fled once it was obvious he was about to be overwhelmed and 'disgraced' through being captured. Was there any reason for this particular deception to be deplored by Froissart? A state of war existed and all parties were clearly aware of this. The deception involved duping the German knights rather than actually lying. Again, although the distinction appears very subtle to us today, to a medieval audience, it was up to the German knights to make sure that they were amongst friendy forces. They were in enemy territory and had themselves been preparing to ambush any French forces that unwittingly passed by. While Ribemont was probably pushing the boundary of acceptable behaviour, he had not actually broken the rules and did not actually attack until he had raised his visor thus revealing his identity. The last examples I have chosen for this chapter out of the many to be found in Froissart's Chronicle involve classic ruses de guerre. They are described in some detail and occurred just after the death of King John of France in captivity in 1364 (to which he

67 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.228ff.

125 returned after he proved unable to repay his ransom following the Battle of Poitiers). It involved a French knight, one Bertrand du Guesclin, who although at that time was little known outside of the knights of Brittany, was:

Estoit et fu toutdis durement A valiant knight, and well-beloved ewireus chevaliers et bien ames de by his brethren at arms. He was toutes gens d' armes, et ja estoit il already in the good graces of the grandement en Ie grasce dou duc de Duke of Normandy, on account of Normandie, pour les vertus qu'il en the great acts of valour that he had ooi t recorder. 68 heard related of him.

Shortly after Du Guesclin attempted to parley with the people of Evreux and was met with a hail of stones, he rejoined a larger force under Lord Boucicaut, where they decided upon the best way of taking the town of Mantes, their principal objective:

Si consillierent entre yaus que They determined that the Lord messires Boucicaus, lui centime de Boucicaut, with only one hundred chevaus tant seulement, of his knights should ride to chevauceroit devant et venroit a Mantes, and pretend to be in fear, Mantes, et feroit l'effrae, et diroit a telling the townsfolk that the chiaus de Ie ville que cil de garrison of Roulleboise was in Roleboise Ie cacent et que ille pursuit of them, and begging that laissent entrer ens. Se il y entre, they would give them admittance. If tantost il se saisira de la porte, et he entered, he would seize the gates, messires Bertrans et se grosse route and Sir Bertrand would direct! y tantost venront ferant batant, et follow with thc remainder of the enteront en Ie ville et en feront leur army. They would enter the town .... 69 vo I ente. and do with it as they pleased.

Knowing that they were not in a strong position to take the town in any other way, they resolved to employ a stratagem. This was going to require more than simply an extension of the truth as Boucicaut was Marshal of France and under the Duke of Normandy, who was no friend of the people of Mantes:

Quant messires Boucicaus et se When Lord Boucicaut was near route deurent approcier la ville de to Mantes, he and his troops Mantes, il se desrouterent ensi separated, to look like people comme gens desconfis et mis en that had been beaten and were

68 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed) 15 vols, VI, pl00. 69 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.l0lf.

126 cace. Et s' en vint li dis mareschaus, being pursued. The marshal, espoir lui dixime, et li aultre petit a attended only by ten others petit Ie sievoient. Si s'arresta devant (followed however, by the rest at la barriere, car toutdis y avoit gens a small distance), came to the qui Ie gardoient, et dist: "Harou, barricades of the town and all bonnes gens de Mantes, ouvn!s vos cried out to the guards, "Help! [portes et nous laissez entrer good people of Mantes, open dedens] et nous recueillies; car veci your gates, I beg of you, and let ces mourdreours et pillars de us come in, for the murderers Roleboise qui nous encaucent et and thieves of Roulleboise who nous ont desconfis par grant are chasing us have done us great mesaventure". "Qui estes vous, harm." "Who are you?" asked sire?" dient cil qui la estoient et qui the guardian of the gate. "I am, la barriere et Ie porte gardoient. gentlemen, Boucicaut, Marshal "Signeur, je sui Boucicaus, of France, whom the Duke of mareschaus de France, que Ii dus de Normandy had sent against N ormendie envoioit devant Roulleboise, but he is not to have Roleboise, mais il m' en est trop mal an impressive feat of arms pris; car li larron de dedens m' ont ja because those rogues there have desconfi, et me couvient fuir, voelle beaten us, and made us flee ou non, et me prenderont a mains et whether willing or not, and they ce que j' ai de remanant de gens, se will capture me and the rest of vous ne nous ouvres Ie porte bien my people unless you open your tost". Cil de Mantes respondirent, gates to us." The people of qui cuidierent bien que illeur desist Mantes thinking he had said verite: "Sire, nous savons bien nothing but truth, replied: "Sir, voirement que cil de Roleboise sont we know well that those in nostre ennemi et Ii vostre ossi, et Roulleboise are our enemies as n' ont cure a qui il aient la guerre, et well as yours, and that it is d'autre part que li dus de indifferent to them on which N ormendie vos sires nous het pour party they make war. However, Ie cause dou roy de Navarre nostre the Duke of Normandy, your signeur: si sommes en grant doubte lord, hates us, on account of our que nous ne soions deceu par vous attachment to our lord, the King qui estes mareschaus de France". of Navarre. We are therefore in "Par rna foy, signeur, dist il, nennil; great doubt, if we shall not be je ne sui ci venus en aultre entente betrayed by you, who are que pour grever, comment qu' il Marshal of France." "By my m' en soit mal pris, la garnison de faith, gentlemen, that shall never Roleboise".70 be, for I have come into this country without other intent or grievance other than to destroy in a feat of arms the garrison of Roulleboise. "

70 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.101ff. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.396ff.

127 This reassurance obviously did the trick as the people of Mantes opened the gate to allow Boucicaut into the security of their walls. However, the marshal did not enter in quite the way that they were expected:

Aces parolles, ouvrirent cil de At his word, the people of Mantes Mantes leur barriere et leur porte, et opened their gate and Lord laissierent ens passer monsigneur Boucicaut entered along with some Boucicau et se route, et toutdis of his companions but he was venoient gens petit a petit. Entre les followed so slowly by the darrainiers des gens monsigneur remainder, that the people of Boucicau et les gens monsigneur Mantes did not have time to shut Bertran, n' eurent cil de Mantes nul their gates upon Sir Bertrand's men, loisir de refremer leur porte; car who came in with the last of Lord quoique messires Boucicaus et li Boucicaut's party. Athough Lord plus grant partie de ses gens se Boucicaut appeared to go with his traissent tantost a hostel et se men directly to an hotel, where they desarmerent pour mieuls apaisier disarmed themselves, in order the chiaus de Ie ville, li darrainnier qui better to pacify the townsfolk, those estoient Breton, se saisirent des Bretons who were in the rear seized barrieres et de Ie porte. Et n' en the barriers and the gate. And in the furent mies mestre cil de Ie ville, car blink of an eye they were masters of tantos messires Bertrans et se route the town for then Sir Bertrand and vinrent les grans galos, qui estoient his force came at a full gallop into mis en embusche, et entrerent en Ie the town, from where they had been ville, et escriierent: "Saint Yve! in ambush, and entered the town, Claiekin! A Ie mort, a Ie mort tous and they cried, "St. Yves!Guesclin! Navarois!" Dont entrerent cil Breton And death, death to the N avarrois." par ces hostels; si pillierent et These Bretons entered, pillaged and roberent tout ce qu'il trouverent, et robbed the houses of whatever they prisent des bourgois desquels qu' il found, and made prisoners of whom ve~rent po~r le~rs7prisonniers, et en the pleased. They also killed tuerent OSS1 asses. several.

Boucicaut clearly lied about his intention and stated 'by my faith' that his intention was not to take Mantes and only to destroy a joint enemy. He also lied about being pursued so as to add urgency to his request. However, it is interesting to note that he and his men still disarmed themselves even as Du Guesclin's force galloped into town through the open gate and began to pillage, capture and kill. It is not clear from this account whether the

71 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.l03f. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.396ff.

128 marshal participated in this although it appears as if he did not, sticking to the letter of his agreement if not the spirit. Any defence that he did not participate in the actual taking of the town would be pretty tenuous at best. Technically, although lying blatantly about being pursued in an effort to get the gates opened, he did not break his faith by actively participating in the taking of the town. Through his actions though, or rather inaction, the town was taken by others. This is sailing pretty close to the wind and the defence depends upon semantics that do not appear to be particularly convincing to us today. The King of Navarre did not look upon it as a fair act either, as we shall see. There is more to this tale than one successful ruse de guerre. As the plan had worked so well once, it was decided to try it again on the next town along. A detachment of Bretons advanced to the town of Meulan with a cunning plan:

II disent que c' estoient gens They said they were men at arms d' armes que messires Guillaumes whom Sir William de Oraville, de Oauville, chapitainne d'Evrues, Captain of Evreux, had sent, and envoioit Ul, et que otant ou plus en that as many or more had estoient demoret a Mantes. Cil de remained at Mantes. The people of Meulent cuidierent proprement que Meulan believed the truth of this il deissent verite, pour tant qu'il the more readily because they estoient venu Ie chemin de Mantes came by the road from Mantes, et ne pooient venir aultre voie que and because they could not have par la ne avoir passe Ie Sainne fors crossed the Seine unless they had au pont a Mantes. Si les crurent used the bridge at Mantes. legierement et ouvrirent leurs Thinking what they had told them barrieres et leurs portes et misent en must be true they opened their leur ville ces Bretons qui tantost se gates, which were instantly seized saisirent des portes et escriierent: by the Bretons, who entered, "Saint Yve! Claikin!" Et crying out, "St. Yves! Ouesclin!" commencierent a occire et a and began to kill and massacre. decoper ces gens qui furent tout When the inhabitants found esperdu et prisent a fuir et a yaus themselves deceived and that all sauver, cescuns qui mieuls mieulz, was lost, and they see that they quant il se veirent ensi deceu et must flee or be taken, it was clear trahi et n'eurent nul f200ir d'yaus that this was the best option when recouvrer ne sauver. they had been deceived and betrayed and they were not going to be recovered or saved.

72 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI p.l04. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.396ff.

129 William de Gauville, as we have seen above, was a prominent figure on the side of the King of Navarre. If the men had indeed been sent by him as they claimed then they were friends. That they had obviously passed through a friendly town to get to Meulan only strengthened their deceit. Here again, a blatant lie is met with success and a town falls. There does not appear to be any moral indignation on the part of Froissart - he is simply recounting the facts as he is aware of them. However, he does tell us that the King of Navarre was in a furious rage when he learnt of the events:

En lui complaindant dou duch de He complained to the Duke of Normendie, comment on li avoit Normandy, saying that he had pris et emble ses villes, Mantes et stolen his towns of Mantes and Meulent, et se mettoient encores en Meulan and tried very hard painne tous les jours li Fran~ois de everyday to get the French to leave. tollir Ie demorant.73

An alternative text explains:

Si en fu durement courouchies, et He was very angry and pondered regarda et avisa comment il se how he could damage and take poroit contrevengier et grever Ie revenge on the Kingdom of royaumme de Franche.74 France.

Lord John de Greilly, otherwise known as the Captal de Buch, was charged by his king with repossessing the towns and many others. Perhaps Froissart uses this device to impart some kind of lesson on the right and proper way of conduct in war? Perhaps he redresses the balance at a later point, showing a judgement against Du Guesclin or the French capture of the the two towns? In fact, the capture of the two towns is confirmed in a clear and incontestible manner just a few short chapters later at the pitched battle of Cocherel in Normandy. The Captal de Buch led a Navarrois army (including some English) against a French army led by Du Guesclin (as the honour had been declined by the count of Auxerre as he had never fought in a pitched battle before). However, the supposedly more experienced Captal, fighting to reclaim the

73 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI p.I04. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.396ff. 7 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI p.401.

130 towns and castles lost through apparent deception was himself soundly defeated. 75 He had sensibly formed his host up on a mountain that offered a secure defence while the baggage and attendants were sent into the security of a wood. When the French force arrived to engage him, they had expected that they would fight immediately. Because of this, they had no food or drink with them and were not prepared for a wait in the hot sun. Froissart states that the English and N avarrois had therefore deceived them through subtlety - 'Ii Engles et Ii Navarois par soutillete ce qu 'it peurent' .76 Some of the French knights wanted to engage immediately but this was over-ruled by others who were better advised and realised that they would lose three out of every five - 'car des cinq it aroient les trois' - if they were to attack uphill into a prepared position.77 After waiting much of the day, Du Guesclin came up with a plan to get the English and N avarrois to move out of their position so they could be fought on more favourable terms. He addressed the assembled leaders of the French host:

"Signeur", dist il, "nous veons que "'My lords," said he, "We perceive nostre ennemi nous detrient a that our enemies are very eager to combatre, et si en sont en grant fight us, and have a great wish for it volente, si com je I' espoir; mes as I hope; but, they will not descend point ne descenderont de leur fort, from their fortress unless by a plan se ce ne n' est par un parti que je which I shall propose to you. We vous dirai. Nous ferons samblant de will make it look as if we are about nous retraire et de non combatre to withdraw and do not intend to meshui, ossi sont nos gens fight today because our men are durement foule et travilliet pour Ie severel y afflicted by the great heat. chaut; et ferons tous nos varIes, nos We shall order our servants, harnois et nos chevaus passer tout baggage and our horses to cross the bellement et ordonneement outre ce bridge and river in good order, and pont et I' aigue et retraire a nos retire to our quarters. At the same logeis, et toutdis nous tenrons sus time, we will keep close to them, ele et entre nos batailles en agait, watching attentively the enemy's pour veoir comment il se behaviour. If they really wish to maintenront. Se il nous desirent a fight us, they will leave the hill, and combatre, il descenderont de leur follow us into the plain. As soon as montagne et nous venront requerre we have seen their intentions, if tout au plain. Tantost que nous they act as I think they will, we verons leur couvenant, se ille font shall be ready armed to wheel

75 This particular story can be found in: Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.ll0-130; Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), VI pp.416-443, &; Froissart, Chronicles (Ed.) Johnes, VoU, pp.317ff. 76 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI p.118. 77 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI p.120.

131 ensi, nous serons tout appareillie de about, and thus shall have them retourner sus yaus, et ensi les arons more to our advantage." nous mieulz anostre aise.,,78

Du Guesclin's plan was approved by those present. Each returned to their men and the trumpets sounded the retreat - 'puis sonnerent leurs trompetes et fisent grant samblant

d'yaulz retraire' .79 The Captal recognised what was happening and was not taken in by the ploy having no intention of pursuing the French. When Sir John Jouel excitedly announced that he wanted to chase after the fleeing French - "Sire, sire, descendons apertement; ne vees vous Ie maniere comment Ii Franc;ois s'enfuient?" the Captal calmly explained that they were only doing so out of malice to provoke a reaction - "il ne la Jont Jors par malisse et pour nous attraire".80 However, ignoring this sound advice, Jouel rashly led the English contingent down the hill against them, forcing the Captal to follow him down to the plain or split his force. 81 In the ensuing fight, the Captal was singled out and overpowered by thirty knights who removed him from the battlefield. He was considered a particularly daring and hardy knight - 'un ossi preu et seur chevalier et conJorte de ses besongnes que on trouveroit aujourd'ui en toutes terres' - and it had already been agreed that he would be too difficult to deal with if not separated from his 82 men. Even with this cunning plan, it was by no means an easy victory, with many prominent dead on both sides, including Sir John Jouel who, we are told, performed many gallant feats of arms, and refused to retreat. However, the field was eventually won by the French and when a party of Navarrois reinforcements arrived as the dead were being stripped, rather than retreating to regroup, the French fixed pennons and retained the field thus indicating that they were the clear victors. Although it was a pitched battle, it was a ruse that gave the French knights the advantage. Against the better judgement of their commander, the Navarrois and English

78 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.12lf. 79 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI p.122. 80 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.122f. 81 Froissart brings out the tension here and in many other places between individual action and t~e importance of group discipline. He stresses the importance of individual heroism and yet makes It clear that the side that coordinates its tactics has the advantage. Although Du Guesc1in was successful at Cocherel, this was his only success in a pitched battle. It was in guerrilla and small scale operations that he was particularly successful as it was here that individualism was still particularly important. See Henneman, The Age of Charles V, p.47. 82 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), VI pp.122f

132 were defeated after giving up their well-defended position. It is clear that if there is any moral to this story, it is to act as a coordinated unit and to retain the advantage. If one is stupid enough to fall for a trick then one gets what one deserves. In this case the battle only went to confirm the earlier victories and there is certainly no condemnation of the clever tactics employed, either earlier in the events leading up to the battle, or in the battle itself.

Conclusion Whether these events actually took place or not is an interesting question, but is really a side issue here as it is not necessary to rebuild an exact account of the events as they took place. For example, Sumption provides a different view of the last case mentioned beginning with the taking of Mantes. By cross referencing accounts such as the Chronique des quatre premiers Valois the continuation of the Chronique of Guillaume de Nangis by Jean de Venette and the Chronique Normande du xive siecie, Sumption states that the town was actually taken by Du Guesclin's cousin Oliver de Mauny and his men, disguised as shepherds.83 The other events also have slight variations. Whatever the actual events, there is no doubt that Froissart does indeed provide very useful insights into many aspects of the warfare of the period. What actually happened is in many ways less important than what Froissart thought happened. In choosing the type of events that he has, and given the intended audience of his writing, Froissart illustrates examples of the code of chivalry in action and thereby provides a framework for managing chivalric expectation. After claiming his intention to concentrate on 'honourable enterprises, noble adventures, and deeds of arms' Froissart proceeds to give many examples that involve the use of deception or ambushes, surprise and ruse. Does this mean that he has strayed from his task? The most interesting thing here is not that Froissart has chosen to detail this type of activity, from clever ruse and cunning to outright deception and blatant lies, but in

83 Chronique des quatre premiers Valois (1327-1393), S. Luce (Ed.) (Paris: Societe de l'histoire de France, 1865), pp.139ff; Jean de Venette, 'Continuatio Chronici Guillelmi de Nangiaco', H. Geraud (Ed.), Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis, II Vols. (Paris: 1843), I, pp.336f.; Chronique Normande du xive siecie, A. & E. Molinier (Ed.) (Paris: Societe de l'histoire de France, 1882), p.169; Richard Lescot, Chronique, J. Lemoine (Ed.) (Paris: Societe de l'histoire de France, 1896), pp.163ff. From Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (London: Faber & Faber, 1999), p.507.

133 many cases the apparently morally neutral tone of his record when he is recounting these events. It is not immediately clear that Froissart believes that victories involving underhand tactics are any different from the glory of the other jousts and great battles. Again and again it is the clever party rather than what we might think as the just party, that succeeds. However, Froissart provides far more information than a simple narrative of these events and the idea that he is in any way morally neutral is actually quite misleading. It is clear that the laws of war were very important to Froissart. As well as encouraging brave men to perform deeds of arms, in many places Froissart is also reminding them of what their duties were. In contrast to some passages that appear to reflect little or no judgement on a knight's more questionable activities, there are also many prescriptive passages in his accounts. Many of these may not even appear prescriptive at first, the subtleties of the environment and the level at which the behaviour was taking place are easily overlooked and some of the nuances can be hard to see for a modern audience. Subtle they may be, but often it is the context of the actions that Froissart describes that determine their legitimacy and this would not have been lost on a medieval audience. The underlying rules that he communicates to his readers would have been familiar to most of them but they were reinforced by the messages and values expressed in his writing and the normative environment otherwise reflected in the culture of chivalry. That a knight should keep his faith is a recurring theme throughout the work and clearly, Froissart takes the word of a knight very seriously, as do the people in his stories. The lengths that different parties are willing to go to ensure that their word is not broken or the lengths they will go to put things right after it has, demonstrate unequivocally that a knight's word was a thing taken incredibly seriously. When lies or deception are employed it is essential to consider the context that Froissart has given. Boucicaut clearly lied as part of his ruse to get inside the town of Mantes. However, he is still seen to go through the motions of going to the hostel and disarming to keep the letter of his word. He does not take any part in the sacking of the town because he had promised he was not there to do this. Semantics it may be, but while Boucicaut could use deception, he was not going to break his faith. In this and other cases, those who are caught out by an opponent's deception have only themselves to blame, whether it was a party planning

134 their own ambush and then fooled into somebody else's, or an army fooled into leaving a good defensive position. Deceit, practiced in a legitimate way was acceptable on this level in a way that it would not have been if the the Scot's army had descended upon the English while they had still been deploying at Neville's Cross for a formal trial by combat to decide the issue at stake. The importance of context can also be seen in the episodes that recount the use of surprise. Although Walter Manny's expedition into France was aimed as surprising and capturing the town of Mortaigne, he did not ride into France until the correct legal defiance had been sent to the King of France from the English King. This made absolutely no difference to the people in the town who would still have been unaware that the legal situation had changed and that they were now at war. However, the legal situation had been transformed and Manny's attack was entirely legitimate (if a little opportunistic). Surprise at the strategic or political level had not been practiced, only at the tactical. When Froissart recounts the Duke of Lancaster explaining that he considered a man wise if he knew how to seize the advantage in combat, it is easy to think that the rules were not that important and surprise and deception could be freely employed without restriction. In fact, what Froissart makes abundantly clear is that while it was a knight's duty to molest his opponent, it was also implicitly understood that any advantage gained still had to be done within the rules.

135 Chapter Five The Epitome of Military Science

This chapter focuses on the medieval treatment of sections on surprise and deception in a popular Roman source of military advice, the Epitoma Rei Militaris by Flavius Vegetius Renatus. The first part of the chapter looks at who Vegetius was and why he wrote what he did. Then the chapter will move on to examine some of the many medieval copies of the work that were made. The majority of these were in the original Latin but, as with The Tree of Battles, the work was also translated into a large number of vernacular 1 languages. It is the changes that were made to the contents of the various copies to make them concur with medieval belief and experience that are of particular relevance to this thesis. The difference between what the original text had to say on the subject of surprise and deception and how this was changed or adapted for a medieval audience is sometimes subtle, but it is also highly illuminating. The chapter will look at John Trevisa's 1408 translation made for Thomas, Lord Berkeley, and also the treatment of the various themes in the Poem of Knighthood, which translated the Epitome into verse form. The work was also paraphrased and adapted extensively in Christine de Pisan's Book of Fayttes of Armes and Chyvalrye. The chapter will conclude that although much of Vegetius' writings remained relevant to medieval warfare (and indeed to warfare today), there was a subtle difference in attitudes between those of Roman times and those of the Middle Ages. Surprise and deception had different normative values depending upon the context within which they were employed and this is reflected in the medieval adaptations made to the contents of Vegetius' work.

Who was Vegetius? Very little is actually known about Vegetius, apart from that which can be pieced together from his works, of which two are known to have survived. The Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae was a vetinerary work on the ailments of cattle and horses.2 His other known work, and the one we are interested in here, was the Epitoma Rei Militaris or the

1 See Charles S. Shrader, 'A Handlist of Extant Manuscripts Containing the De Re Militari of Flavius Vegetius Renatus', Scriptorium, 33 (1979), pp.286ff.

136 Epitome of Military Science. Close verbal and stylistic parallels between the two works demonstrate that it was the same Vegetius who was responsible for the two rather 3 different texts. Apart from being a prominent breeder of horses and extensive traveller through the Empire, the title 'Flavius' given to the author in many of the surviving manuscripts indicate that he was also a high-ranking civil servant in the imperial bureaucracy.4

What was the purpose of the Epitome of Military Science? The Epitome was written at sometime between AD 383 and 450 and although debate continues as to the exact date within these parameters, the general consensus is that it was written in the late Fourth Century, probably between 384 and 389.5 It is a collection of the writings of earlier authorities on the practice of war, and provides a 'convenient discussion of how to wage war, a discussion providing both practical instructions and abstra(;t principles,.6 Rather than being simply an historical text on military thought or practices, the Epitome has a very definite agenda. It was written to offer a 'remedy for alleged military failures in recruitment and training, army organization and strategy, and arms and equipment,.7 While the exact date of the work remains contentious, it is clear that the Epitome was written in the period of relati ve decline in the Roman Empire's fortunes. The task Vegetius set himself was to address the problems that he saw around him and attempt to correct them. Incidentally, because Vegetius wished to concentrate on those areas that he considered weak or requiring of improvement, the Epitome omits what would probably have been the most interesting topic to the knighthood of the later Middle Ages: cavalry warfare. Vegetius chose not to dwell on cavalry matters as it was his consideration that 'this branch of the military has progressed in its training practices, type of armour and breed of horses [and] I do not think there is anything to be gained from

2 Vegetius Renatus, Digestorum artis mulomedicinae libri (Leipzig: E. Lommatzsch, 1903). 3 For the literature on this debate and discussion on Vegetius' life see Milner, 'Introduction' from Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, N.P. Milner (Ed.) (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), xxi-xxv. 4 Philippe Richardot, Vegece et La Culture Militaire au Moyen Age (V - XV siecles) (Paris: Economica, 1998), p.7. Richardot states that the title Flavious was introduced by Constantine following the victory over Licinius in 323. 5 See Milner, 'Introduction' from Vegetius, Epitome, pp.xxv-xxix for a guide to literature on the debate. See also Walter Goffart, 'The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' De Re Militari', Traditio 33 (1977), p.65. 6 Shrader, Handlist, p.280. 7 Milner, 'Introduction' from Vegetius, Epitome, xvi.

137 books, for the present state of knowledge is sufficient' .8 He preferred to concentrate on what he perceived as the weakness in the Roman military machine - the decline in infantry standards.

To provide a context for Vegetius' work, a brief examination of some of the reasons behind this decline in infantry standards is necessary. It had come about gradually as a result of a number of different factors but probably stemmed from the reforms under Emperor Constantine (AD 306-324). Under previous emperors, the Romans had relied upon a preclusive strategy of keeping opponents out through a reliance on linear defences. It was, however, the army and not the walls and fortifications that provided the actual security, with the walls only providing somewhere relatively safe to fall back upon should the situation demand it. The Roman army was spread out along the frontier and hard-pressed areas could be reinforced from non-threatened areas if necessary. Under Constantine, it was decided to move to a system of defence in depth with fortifications along and near the frontier, and a large mobile reserve (comitatenses) to meet threats. Garrisons (limitanei) in the frontier could meet small scale incursions and hinder large scale ones by defending fortified towns and supply bases and denying the enemy communications. The lack of effective barbarian siege technology meant these were relatively safe and invaders would be forced to disperse to forage leaving them vulnerable to mobile detachments. If they remained grouped together then the comitatenses could overcome them in the field. Whether or not this was the correct response to changing military circumstances, or dictated by political considerations (the emperor was closer to his legions insuring against usurpers), it helped, over time, to undermine the discipline and training of a large portion of the Roman army. 9 There was a tendency for the comitatenses to become an elite and the limitanei to deteriorate as they came to be seen as merely guards, often settling down and carrying on with other professions. Naturally, the more glamorous comitatenses received the best recruits and officers, which must have affected the morale and discipline of the limitanei as they became, what were effectively, second class

8 Vegetius, Epitome, III.26, p.lli. Vegetius omits the whole topic of river patrol-boats for the same reason. See Vegetius, Epitome, IV.46, p.142. 9 For these contrasting views see Peter Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London: Macdonald, 1988), p.251 & A. Ferrill, The Fall of the Roman Empire: the Military Explanation (London: Thames, 1986), p.47.

138 troops.l0 Zosimus writing in the fifth century felt that Constantine had 'personally planted

the first seeds of our present devastated state of affairs' . 11

The reforms also had the consequence of undermining the infantry as a whole. A mobile reserve naturally favoured the most mobile units and this was cavalry who could 'combine mass with mobility' .12 This was why Vegetius did not feel the need to aim his polemic at these units - they were already of a very high standard because they were the focus of official policy and funding. Cavalry was of course more expensive to maintain than infantry which meant that focusing on this type of troop had the effect of limiting the number of troops that Rome could field. This, combined with the growing difference between the comitatenses and the limitanei, meant that by 363, with the whole empire to draw from and no other commitments, lulian's two armies that invaded Persia numbered only 65,000. There was a gap forming between the Empire's paper strength and its actual fighting strength, with this strength further eroded by a long-term decline in the standard of the equipment and armour that the legions used. 13 This force though was still impressive and well disciplined as demonstrated by lulian's victory over a numerically superior confederation of the Alamanni at Strasbourg in 357. Even in defeat the infantry still held its ground. Both the Persian's victory in 363 and the victory of the combined VisigothlOstrogoth army at Adrianople in 378 were probably due to failures in Roman leadership rather than in the quality of the army. 14 By far the largest blow to discipline was the defeat at Adrianople followed by the civil wars of Maximus, Arbogast and Eugenius (383-394). There was simply no way that the huge number of replacements required in haste were going to be as effective as seasoned veterans. Barbarians had been employed in the army individually long before this without any hint of discipline problems,15 but in the reign of Theodosius (378-395)

10 A. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-602 vol.II (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), p.1037. 11 Zosimus II.34, quoted from Ferrill, Roman Empire, p.25. 12 Richard Humble, Warfare in the Ancient World (London: Guild Publishing, 1980), p.237. 13 From the middle of the second century, the arms so long associated with the Roman army began to disappear. Shields found at the site of the siege at Dura (303) had a rim reinforced with hide rather than the bronze previously used. The use of armour also declined from the third century until it was only cavalry and officers that wore body armour at all and that was only mail or scale shirts except for the small number of heavy shock cavalry. In the fourth century, infantry helmets too had become crude affairs so that by Vegetius' time, they had become a mere leather cap. For a good discussion of these issues see Connolly, Greece and Rome, pp.259ff. 14 Ferrill, Roman Empire, p.65. 15 Jones, Later Roman Empire, p.l038.

139 foederati were seen as necessary to make up the numbers. These were barbarian warriors who fought under their own chieftains with their own methods of discipline which were not up to normal comitatenses standards. This also meant that the forces of Rome were no

longer acting with 'one mind and equal commitment' .16 'The Empire was now enlisting burglars in the police force' and discipline of other troops was bound to be affected. I7 If Goffart is correct in his dating of Vegetius then this was when 'military training ... was at

first discharged rather neglectfully, then omitted, until finally consigned .. .to oblivion' .18 It was this perceived decline in standards that Vegetius was attempting to address. According to Vegetius, the success of the Roman people in the past against 'hordes of Gauls', the superior numbers and physical strength of the Spaniards, the 'treachery and money' of the Africans or the 'arts and intelligence' of the Greeks, was due to effective military training and the current lack of it was to blame for Rome's sad state.

what succeeded against all of them was careful selection of recruits, instruction in the rules ... of war, toughening in daily exercises, prior acquaintance in field practice with all possible eventualities in war and battle, and strict punishment of cowardice. Scientific knowledge of warfare nurtures courage in battle. No one is afraid to do what he is confident of having learned well. A small force which is highly trained in the conflicts of war is more aRt to victory: a raw and untrained horde is always exposed to slaughter.

Unfortunately, it was not obvious who exactly could teach the new recruits this 'science of arms' because 'whom can you find able to teach what he himself has not learned?,2o Thus the Epitome was to help redress this situation by providing a collection of material that could then be used to help Rome back to greatness. The teachings of men such as Cato, Celsus, Frontinus and Patemus are all employed at different points in the text. This was not done as some sort of antiquarian reconstruction but as an attempt to utilise the knowledge and skill of the past and apply it to the military machine of Vegetius' day.21 The Epitome was written as a polemic, not a history. Although the ancient legions are

16 Vegetius, Epitome, 11.2, p.32. . ., 17 Sir John Hackett, Warfare in the Ancient World (London: GUIld Pubhshmg, 1989), p.232. 18 Vegetius, Epitome, 1.28, p.26. See also Goffart, 'Date and Purpose', p.8l. 19 Vegetius, Epitome, 1.1, pp.2f. 20 Vegetius, Epitome, 1.8, p.9. 21 Vegetius, Epitome, IT.18, pp.5lf.

140 presented as a model, the institutions, armaments and titles are mixed with contemporary practices to see what lessons could be drawn for the Empire's present predicament. A wide variety of issues are discussed in the work, from recruitment and building camps through to some principles on naval warfare. The fourth book concentrates on attacking and defending cities, siege warfare and aspects of naval combat. However, it is the third book that is of particular relevance to us at the moment as it illustrates a wide variety of tactical and strategic skills required for an effective military campaign. Vegetius himself explains that while the First book 'set out the selection and training of recruits ... [the] Second explained the formation of the legion and military discipline. This Third book sounds the classicum,?2 The classicum was referring to the bugle call of the high command and was so important because while earlier chapters provided advice on preparation, this was the chapter that dealt with the actual conduct of war. It is in the introduction to this book that Vegetius coined for the first time one of the most famous paradoxes of all time: si vis pacem, para bellum - he who desires peace, let him prepare for war.23

How Popular was the Epitome? Considering the nature of the work, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Epitome of Military Science was, without doubt, one of the most popular texts to survive from antiquity into the Middle Ages.24 There are 331 extant manuscripts containing at least part of the Epitome. Of these, 232 are in Latin and were completed before 1500. 104 existed in Italy, 39 in France where they started to appear in the ninth century, and 30 in England where they began to appear in the tenth century?5 One of the reasons that Vegetius' writing can be found in so many places is that many medieval writers employed his passages or pieces of advice in their own works. Isidore of Seville (c.560-636) was one of the first medieval writers to make use of Vegetius, while in England, a little later, certain of the

22 Vegetius, Epitome, III. 1, p.62. 23 Vegetius, Epitome, Preface to Book III, p.62. 24 For those copies still surviving, see Shrader, Handlist, pp.280ff. . " , ., , 25 Richardot claims that before 1300, Vegetius is the 'premier auteur techmque de I OCCIdent medIeval , Vegece, p.28. See also p.191 and R.F. Green, ~oets.and Prince Pleasers: Literature and the English Court in the Late Middle Ages (Toronto: Toronto Umversity Press, 1980), p.144.

141 Venerable Bede's (672-735) passages are identical to those ofVegetius,.26 The Kollerktaneum, Sedulius' ninth century book of maxims, was clearly influenced by Vegetius, and John of Salisbury's Policraticus written in 1159 employed Vegetius extensively to elaborate on his ecclesiatical program for knighthood.27 In the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224-74) referred to Vegetius as an authority on political matters, directly quoting passages in the Epitome in his Summa Theologiae. 28 Giles of Rome incorporated substantial sections of the De Re Militari in the late 1270s when he produced De regimine principum on how a ruler could best defend his people.29 Complete copies of the Epitome in its own right were also popular in medieval Europe. Distinguished early owners of copies of the Epitome included the Abbey of St Augustine in Canterbury in the eleventh century, and Geoffroi Plantagenet, Count of Anjou in the twefth. The thirteenth century saw Winchester Cathedral and Edward I of 3o England acquire copies. In 1340, Jacques de Bauchant, royal sergeant at Saint-Quentin, had a translation by Jean de Meun. Amedee VIII, first duke of Savoy (1383-1451) possessed a translation coupled with Christine de Pisan's Livres desfais d'armes. 31 Prominent English captain Sir John Fastolf (1378-1453) had a French copy of Vegetius and Christine de Pisan's L'Epftre d'Othea a Hector de Troie drawn up for 'l'education des chevaliers' .32 Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester (1390-1447) also had a French translation in his library. Both men had a large amount of military experience in France and Ireland. Then Thomas, Lord of Berkeley (1352-1417) commissioned the first English translation in 1408.33 Richard III (1452-1485) had a copy of this at his disposa1. 34 The

26 For specific evidence, see Foster H. Sherwood, Studies in Medieval Uses of Vegetius' Epitoma Rei Militaris (Los Angeles: University of California, 1980, unpublished Ph.D. thesis), pp.69ff. 27 Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius, pp.94, 106 & 163ff. See also Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), p.5. 28 Sherwood, Medieval Uses of Vegetius, pp.221. E.g. Thomas Aquinus, Summa Theologiae, Ia Iiae, Question 40, 5, (Paris: ed. du Cerf, 1984), t. 2, p.266. Unde Vegetius dicit, in libro de ReMilitari: 'Nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse confidit'. This phrase is taken from Vegetius, Epitome, 1.1, pp.2f. 29 Gilles de Rome, Li Livre du Gouvernement des Rois. A X/IIth French Version of Egidio Colonna's Treatise De Regimine Principum, S. Molenaer (Ed.) (New York: 1899). 30 Richardot, Vegece, pp.195ff. 31 S. Edmunds, 'The medieval Library of Savoy', Scriptorium, no.26 (1972), p.284. 32 V.J. Scattergood, 'Literacy Culture at the Court of Richard II', in English Court Culture in the Later Middle Ages, V.I. Scattergood & I.W. Sherborne (Eds) (London: Duckworth, 1983), p.34. 33 G. Lester, 'The Earliest English Translation ofVegetius' De re militari edited from Oxford M. Bodl. Douce 291', Middle English Texts, 21 (Heidelberg: Karl Winter, 1988), pp.23ff. 34 A.F. Sutton, L. Visser-Fuchs, 'Richard Ill's Books: IV Vegetius de Re Militari', The Ricardian, n.7, 1987.

142 year 1458 saw another translation at the command of John, Viscount de Beaumont, who conducted the military education of Henry VI. 35 Henry was a diligent reader of chronicles, annals and particularly Vegetius, probably an English translation.36 Copies could also be found on Rhodes with the Knights Hospitallers. Other copies were found with prominent people in Spain, and the condottiere captains in Italy.37 When attempting to determine the real popularity of Vegetius it is useful to compare the number of existing known copies with those known to be extant from other authors of antiquity. Pre 1300 there were 600 manuscripts featuring Cicero, 305 containing Ovid and 223 containing Virgil. Vegetius comes next on the list with 58 extant manuscripts ahead of the Elder Pliny with 52. Out of the classical authors concerned with military affairs, there is no doubting the importance of Vegetius ahead of any other. In 1300 Caesar, Titus Livy and Valerius Maximus could be found in only 41 extant manuscripts, while Frontinus was only present in nine?8 Richardot points out that Caesar was not even translated into French (clearly the most important of the vernacular languages in Western Europe at this time) until 1473 while Vegetius had already been available in translated form for 200 years by this point. 39 Valerius Maximus, who was an important Roman historian and moralist from the first century AD, was only translated once, and this was at the end of the fourteenth century. While any argument has to be based upon the evidence provided by extant manuscripts, it would appear obvious that in the Middle Ages, Vegetius was at least as important, and probably considerably more important than any other classical author who was concerned with military affairs. Even while still in the original Latin, Vegetius was clearly a popular author. He was quoted in other people's works as an authority on political and military matters. Many people or institutions held full Latin copies of the Epitome itself. However, the whole Epitome was

35 A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses. Military Activity and English Society, 1452-1497 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p.166. 36 John Whethamstede, 'Register'. From Richardot, Vegece, p.53. 37 Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c.1300 - c.1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.162. 38 Richardot, Vegece, p.193. e 39 'Vegece fut aussi Ie premier auteur militaire aetre imprime des les annees 1470. Du ye - XV siecle, de tous les auteurs c1assiques et medievaux qui ont ecrit sur la guerre, Vegece fut Ie plus celebre'. See Richardot, Vegece, p.5.

143 also translated into a large number of vernacular languages. 4o For the purposes of this thesis, the fact that the text can be found in such 'reader friendly' languages is very important for it means that it was available to a wider audience than would otherwise have been the case: one would not necessarily require a clerical education to make use of Vegetius.

Although dates are not exact, the earliest known translation of Vegetius as an author in his own right (rather than just quoted in an extract) into a vernacular language was probably completed by the Anglo-Norman Master Richard for the prince who was to become Edward I. This was completed in the early 1270s, probably between 1271- 1272.41 Jean de Meun (1240-1305) produced the next known translation shortly afterwards in 1284 at the commission of Jean de Brienne, Count of Eu (a friend and contemporary of JOinville).42 This translation became widely known and was to form the basis for French translations and copies throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth 43 centuries. Within his text, Jean de Meun attempted to make the writings of Vegetius slightly more contemporary by employing some feudal terms, swapping chevalier for the original term miles even though the original did not necessarily refer to a mounted warrior. Recruits or tirones became squires or ecuyers. This appears to indicate that at least in Jean de Meun's time, the connotations we have today of the term chivalry are not the same - at that time it signified simply the art militaire. This view remains remarkably consistent across the range of translations and adaptations of Vegetius.44 Jean explained the invincibility of the Romans by 'La hantance des armes et par la science de bien ordener leur herbeges [camps] et par I 'usage de chevalerie' .45 With the type of information stated in Vegetius it is hardly surprising that de Meun would have reached

40 Shrader, Handlist, pp.286ff. Out of the 324 extant mss., 243 are in Latin, 46 in French and 17 in English. The other languages can be found in smaller numbers. Richardot adds another seven mss. to this list: three in Latin and another four that have been translated into vernacular languages. See Richardot, Vegece, p.19. 41 L. Thorpe, 'Mastre Richard a Thirteenth-Century Translator of the de Re Militari of Vegeti~s' , . Scriptorium, no.6 (1952), pp.39ff. It is possible that it was meant for Edward's son, but the eVIdence gIven by Richardot suggests otherwise. See Richardot, Vegece, p.57. 42 Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius, p.309. 43 Jean de Meun, L'Art de Chevalerie, Ulysse Robert (Ed.) (paris: Societe des anciens textes fran«ais, 1897). . ., E . . .1. . 44 R.G.B. Mongeau, Jean de Meun's Translation of Military Terminology m Vegetlus plfoma rel mlltan (New York: Fordham University, 1981), pp.18ff. 45 Jean de Meun, Li Abregemenz noble honme Vegesce Flave Rene des establissemenz apartenant a chevalerie. From Richardot, Vegece, p.147.

144 such a conclusion. De Meun's translation inspired other and more diverse versions of Vegetius' work such as Jean Priorat's verse version Li Abrejance de l'ordre de 46 Chevalerie. Christine de Pisan paraphrased Jean de Vignai's 1320 French translation in her popular work Livres desfais d'armes et de Chevalerie (see below).47 An anonymous translation into French, generally thought to be by Eustache Deschamps, dates to 1380. However, one of the most interesting of the French works is Le louvencel by the Count of Sancerre, Jean de Bueil (1405-1477).48 The author of this work had a large amount of practical experience concerning warfare and had played a significant role in the reconquest of France through 1433-1443 as the English war effort collapsed, earning the nickname "Ie fleau des Anglais", the scourge of the English. His vast experience in martial matters was captured between 1461 and 1468 when he wrote this semi­ autobiographical work. Jean de Bueil does not quote the Epitome directly, but Vegetian precepts can be found throughout. For example, 'l'oppinion de Vegece pour as sieger une ville forte' utilises Christine de Pisan's treatment of the text in chapters 21-39 of her Livres des Fais d'Armes (see below).49 What is clear from this is that 'Vegece appartenait au bagage intellectuel des chefs de guerre occidentaux' .50 While John of Trevisa's translation into English for Lord Berkeley appears late when compared with some of the translations into other vernacular languages, Sherwood, quite correctly, points out that an earlier translation was unnecessary due to the availability of French translations which would have, until then, been more than acceptable to the nobility.51 The name of Vegetius was clearly considered familiar enough in England in the late fourteenth century to be mentioned in a poem by Thomas Hocc1eve, a contemporary and

imitator of Chaucer:

46 Jean Priorat, Li Abrejance de l'ordre de Chevalerie, mise en vers de la traduction de Vegece par !ean de Meun, par Jean Priorat, de Besan~on, Ulysse Robert (Ed.) (Paris: Societe des anciens textes fran~als, 1897). . l' J d V' ., R . 47 Paul Meyer, 'Les Anciens Traducteurs Fran~ais de Vegece et en partlcu ler ean e 19nal, omama, XXV (1896), pp.401-423. .., . 48 For a good literary introduction, see G. Coopland, 'Le Jouvencel RevIsIted, Symposlum V (1951), pp.137-186. 49 Jean de Bueil, Le Jouvencel, II pp.45-59. From Sherwood, Medieval Uses of Vegetius, p.333. 50 Richardot, Vegece, p.87. 'Vegetius is part of the intellectual baggage of the Western masters of war.' 51 Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius, p.315.

145 Beware, Oldcastel, and for Crystes sake Clymbe no more in Holy Writ so hie! Rede the storie of Lancelot de Lake , Or Vegece of the Aart of Chiualrie52

Nine surviving fifteenth century manuscripts ascribe to the popularity of this translation, many of them bearing marks of provenance 'showing circulation among the noble

families of England' .53 Robert Parker produced an English translation in verse entitled Knyghthode and Bataile in the late 1450s and Adam Loutfut composed a Scottish dialect version in 1494 omitting sections rendered obsolete by advances in artillery and navigation (see below). In a period in which the less privileged majority would simply not have had access to the written word, we are fortunate to be able to determine what many of these people would have heard through one of the most significant forms of communication of the day. From the beginning of the thirteenth century, the 'great age of popular preaching' began which, 'through the untiring travels of the friars, developed and mirrored a popular culture'. There is good evidence to suppose that Vegetius was a favourite source of inspiration for those writing and conducting those sermons through the Middle Ages. The sermons of many famous preachers are preserved and there are also many surviving collections of sermons and exempla. The exempla were model sermons for presentation by less original preachers. Vegetius is mentioned many times in these religious texts.54 Warfare provided valuable material for capturing an audience's attention. It has always made good theatre and also provides a fertile source for illustrations of great heroism, self-sacrifice, duty or even greed and treachery. Even so, the dry, rather academic nature of the Epitome would not easily have been plundered as there is a distinct lack of heroism, tales of great deeds or moral content. Instead, the texts that cite Vegetius make the most of other, more mundane themes. For example, De

52 Quoted from Henry N. MacCracken, 'Vegetius in English', Anniversary Papers by Colleagues and Pupils of George Lyman Kittredge, E.S. Sheldon, W.A. Neilson & ~.N. Robinson.(Eds) (Boston, 19131' , p.389. Some historians have argued that elements of the the Arthunan cycle were mfluenced by VegetlUs teachings. See D. Bomstein, 'Military Strategy in Malory and Vegetius' De Re Militari', Comparative Literature Studies, Vo1.9, no.1 (1972), pp.123ff. 53 Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius, p.316 & MacCracken, Vegetius in English, p.390. 54 Sherwood, Medieval Uses of Vegetius, pp.287ff.

146 Mondo componendi sermones cum documentis, written c.l346 by the English Dominican Thomas Waleys, states that just as Vegetius advised training new soldiers against posts fixed to the ground, so new priests should practice their delivery in private before facing an audience, for, no-one fears to do that which is learnt well. 55 John Bromyard completed the Summa Praedicantium in 1348.56 This was an exemplum intended as a work of reference for others. Bromyard correctly attributes his statement to Vegetius when he states that the prudent general will take care to be in the field first so that he may take advantage resulting from the positions of the sun, dust and wind. This passage is placed in a moral context by saying that, in the same way, the advantages on the spiritual

battlefield must be seized by constantly being prepared for death. 57 Many other exempla also refer to Vegetius.58 Vegetius would clearly have been known as an authority on military matters by anyone who regularly heard ministers or the clergy: 'The frequent citations of Vegetius in this literature testify to his widespread medieval reputation as an

exemplar of Roman virtue and martial prowess' .59 Apart from Vegetius' place in popular culture as promoted through the works of poets, storytellers, the friars and the church, one of the reasons for the more specific popularity of his work with the nobility and those concerned with military affairs, was its epitomization of Roman authorities on the whole subject of successfully conducting warfare. The attitude of those in the Middle Ages was to see the ancient Roman Empire as an ideal, whose order and glory should again be sought. For example, Geoffrey de Charny writes in his mid-fourteenth century work Livres de Chevalerie that 'quant a parler de prouesce, Jullius Cesar, qui si tres bon chevalier fu et tant fist et fu en tres

grans et merveilleuses batailles et tantfist de belles conquestes pour ceulz de Romme' .60

55 See Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius, pp.287ff. Saying taken from Vegetius, Epitome, 1.1 & 1.11, Pf.2f & p.12. 5 L. Boyle, 'The Date of the Summa Praedicantium of John Bromyard', Speculum XLVIII (1973), pp.533ff. 57 Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius, p.291. 58 E.g. see Jean Th. Welter, L'exemplum dans la litterature religieuse et didactique du moyen ag~ (Parisrroulouse: Bibliotheque d'Histoire ecclesiastique de France, 1927), pp.194ff & 325ff; A. LIttle, Studies in English Fransiscan History (Manchester: 1917), pp.139ff. 59 Sherwood Medieval Uses of Vegetius, p.295. 60 'As for miiitary achievement, there was Julius Caesar, who was such a very good knight and engaged in so many great and wonderful battles and made so ~any fine conquests for those of Rome.' ~ichard W. Kaeuper & Elspeth Kennedy, The Book of GeoffrOl de Chamy: Text, Context, and TranslatlOn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p.158.

147 The medieval idea of Roman prowess also provided a standard against which contemporary affairs could be judged. For example, in the mid-twelfth century John of Salisbury's pupil, Peter of Blois (c.1135-1204), 'made a heated attack on the knights of his day for failing to live up to the ancient standards as taught by Vegetius' .61 As Canon of Canterbury, Archdeacon of Bath, and Royal Secretary to Henry II and Eleanor of Aquitaine, Peter was in a privileged position to reach this opinion and he went as far as to say that the situation was bad for the stability of the country as a whole.62 A different view of the knighthood of the latter part of the Middle Ages was expressed by the fifteenth century chronicler Jean de Waurin who stated that Henry V 'kept well the discipline of chivalry, as did the Romans formally'[sic].63 This view was echoed by John Lydgate who in the second half of the fifteenth century praised Henry for his habit of training in arms 'after the doctrine of Vygecius' .64 Thanks to this attitude, the wisdom of antiquity was eagerly sought after. When it was found, it was treated as authoritative: 'men read it because they knew the Romans conquered the world and wanted to know how they did it' .65 Philippe de Vitri (c.1290-1361), secretary to Philippe Ie Bel, concluded that study of Vegetius' general rules of war would lead to the invincibility of the chevaliers concerned.66 Invincibility aside, the Epitome was obviously considered a practical guide for those involved in warfare. Presumably this was why Jean Gerson (1363-1429) recommended a translation of Vegetius should be put in the Dauphin's library, along with Frontinus, Valerius Maximus and Giles of Rome. 67 This sentiment was put into practice by Christine de Pisan who used large portion's of Vegetius' writing alongside several other classical authors in her work The Fayttes ofArmes and ofChyvalry written for the education of the future King of France (see below). In many cases, military works, often from the distant past, could only really usefully provide generalities rather than particular

61 Sherwood , Medieval Uses ofVegetius, pp.163ff & p.189. . . 62 Militaris hodie disciplina, quam Vegetius Renatus ac plerique alii docuerunt, prorsus euanult, et se In quamdam deliquendi libertatem, et scurrilitatis speciem deformauit. Olim se jurame~ti uincul~ mili~e~ obligabant, quod starent pro reipublicae statu, quod in acie non fugerent, et quod ultae propnae utllztatem publicam praeberent. From Richardot, Vegece, p.102. . 63 Jean de Waurin, Chroniques, W. Hardy & E. Hardy (Eds) (Rolls Senes: 1864-91), II, p.429. 64 Quoted in Richardot, Vegece, p.124. 65 Keen, Chivalry, p.111. 66 Richardot, Vegece, p.62. See also Lucus, Speculum XLV, p.250. 67 Richardot, Vegece, p.50.

148 points. However, Vegetius was far more useful than this because he discussed specifics. He is referred to as a technical master by Honore Bouvet Bouvet is discussing the most suitable place for a fort or encampment and after detailing the requirements of a good position - not too high in the mountains or too low and risk flooding, but near sufficient wood and water - he claims that this is the doctrine of 'a doctor called Monseigneur ·,68 F V egetlus . rom the tone of the entry, Bouvet obviously regarded Vegetius as a respected authority on these matters and he was not alone. John of Marmoutier was keen to portray Geoffrey the Handsome of Anjou as a great military leader and enthusiastic about tournaments and chivalry, but also as 'a cultured prince, who had found tips for his

siegecraft from the reading of Vegetius' .69 The existence of folding, pocket-sized manuscripts show that the Epitome was produced in a form that would make carrying and referring to it on campaign possible.7o That this was put into practice is perhaps demonstrated by cases such as in 1147 when Count Geoffrey IV of Anjou called for it during a siege in order to employ a recipe for Greek fire. 71 He was also supposed to have consulted it at the siege of Montreuil-Bellay in 1150 to discover how to prevent the

defenders froni rebuilding a damaged wall at night. 72 The English kings Henry II and Richard the Lionheart are both reported as having carried the book on campaign.73 In the chronicle of Jean Molinet, Molinet is seen to deplore his master's actions when he ignored Vegetius' advice on where to put up their tents. 74 Such sentiments and the evidence above show that the Epitome was clearly a popular text in our period. It would also suggest that the Epitome was considered to be a highly regarded source of military advice by those practising war in the Middle Ages.

68 Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles of Honore Bonet, trans. G.W. Coopland, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), p.132. This advice is contained in Vegetius, Epitome, 1.22, p.22. 69 See Chroniques des Comtes d'Anjou, L. Halphen & R. Poupardin (Eds) (Paris: 1913), pp.194ff. Taken from Keen, Chivalry, p.31. 70 It has been suggested that the Lansdowne Manuscript 285 (see below) could originally have been intended to be used in a booklet form. See P. R. Robinson, 'The Booklet: A Self-Contained Unit in Composite Manuscripts', in Codicologica III (1980), pp.46-69. This view has been challenged on the grounds that it may have always appeared as part of a substantial codex. See G. A. Lester, Sir Joh~ Paston's 'Grete Boke': A Descriptive Catalogue, with an introduction of British Library Manuscnpt Lansdowne 285 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1984). 71 Nicholas Hooper & Matthew Bennett, Cambridge Illustrated Atlas: Warfare in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.168. 72 Charles R. Shrader, 'The Influence of Vegetius' De re militari' , Military Affairs (December 1981), pp.167ff. .. . 73 Henri Delpech, La Tactique au XIII sleele, Vol. II (Pans: A. PIcard, 1886), p.264.

149 Military Advice Offered by the Epitome of Military Science If in view of the weight of evidence presented above we are to accept that the Epitome was indeed considered to be a relevant source of military advice, then what are we to make of the actual information that Vegetius provides? The evidence I have outlined above clearly demonstrates that the Epitome was, without doubt, a popular medieval text. However, rather than being what one would think of as a classic chivalric text, it turns out on closer examination that Vegetius was an exponent and enthusiastic advocate of guerrilla-style warfare. Book III of the Epitome specifically dealt with the actual conduct of war and this was the section most frequently copied or adapted by those in the Middle Ages. Surprisingly, nearly half of its chapters deal with at least some aspect connected with surprise, ambush, raids, deception, trickery or treachery. Chapter one of Book III begins with a slightly more predictable theme that recurs throughout the work: quality over quantity.75 Vegetius advocates the use of a smaller well-disciplined rather than a larger one, one of the reasons being that:

a longer column often suffers ambush even by small numbers; in broken country and at river-crossings it is often caught in a trap as a result of 76 delays caused by the baggage-train.

Chapter three pragmatically notes that there are more ways of hurting an enemy than just the use of force:

armies are more often destroyed by starvation than battle, and hunger is more savage than the sword .... On any expedition the single most effective weapon is that food should be sufficient for you while dearth should break the enemy. 77

One must always be on one's guard against the lies spread by an enemy whilst be willing to use misdirection oneself to bring him to ruin:

74 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages trans. Michael Jones .(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p.214. 75 The following excerpts employ Milner's excellent English translatIOns. 76 Vegetius, Epitome, p.63.

150

. ., ~spec.i~l care shou.ld be taken lest provincials in their unsuspecting sImplIcIty be deceIved by the treachery and perjuries of the enemy. Pretended trade and peaceful relations have more often caused harm to gullible people than arms. By this strategy the enemy if they collect together suffer famine, and if they disperse are easily beaten by frequent surprise attacks. 78

Chapter six discusses the degree of caution required when moving in the vicinity of the enemy.

Those that have made a careful study of the art of war assert that more dangers tend to arise on the march than in battle itself. For in battle everyone is armed, and they see the enemy at close quarters and come mentally prepared for fighting. On the march, the soldier is less armed and less alert; he is thrown into instant confusion by a sudden attack or concealed ambush. Therefore the general should take steps with all caution and prudence to ensure that the army suffer no attack on the march, or may easily repel a raid without 10ss.79

This was to be done by good information about the area to be travelled: familiarity with maps and possible routes as well as local intelligence provided by natives under compUlsion but with the offer of rewards for accurate information.

But the most important thing to be careful about is to preserve secrecy about the places and routes by which the army is to travel. The safest policy on expeditions is deemed to be keeping people ignorant of what one is going to do. It is for this reason that the ancients had the standard of the Minotaur in the legions. Just as he is said to have been hidden away in the innermost and most secret labyrinth, so the general's plan should always be kept secret. A safe march is that which the enemy least expects to be made. 8o

Vegetius then stresses the importance of scouts, not just in front but on all sides, to prevent the enemy laying ambushes. The baggage train should be enclosed on the flanks and a screen of cavalry and light troops should be employed.

77 Vegetius, Epitome, p.65. 78 Vegetius, Epitome, p.67. 79 Vegetius, Epitome, p.71. A good medieval parallel here would be Henry V's orders to carry sharpened stakes on the Agincourt campaign to ward off cavalry charges. 80 Vegetius, Epitome, p.72.

151 In the same chapter, Vegetius also stresses the psychological impact of surprise: the most damage can be expected when troops are ill-prepared for an attack by the enemy. Mental preparation was essential: as well as simply having weapons in hands _ one must be expecting to use them. 'In an emergency sudden things are terrifying, things that are foreseen do not usually strike panic.' This chapter concludes that any opportunity to catch the enemy at a disadvantage should be taken, from holding the high ground, soliciting traitors and deserters for plans and preparing ambushes to catching the enemy by 'unforeseen threats while marching or seeking fodder and food'. Chapter seven talks of the risks of ambush while crossing rivers, while eight discusses the opportunity provided for surprise attacks when the army is camped and going about its business. When deciding whether to engage the enemy in raids and ambushes or else in pitched battle, chapter nine advises that:

good generals do not attack in open battle where the danger is mutual, but do it always from a hidden position, so as to kill or at least terrorise the enemy while their own men are unharmed as far as possible.81

Terrain should be employed to give every advantage possible, such as ensuring that open terrain is sought if strong in cavalry, or confined places if the infantry is the stronger arm. Hunger itself was a weapon to be employed if possible as it 'often conquers without a blow' . If one has an army containing new recruits or those unaccustomed to fighting then chapter ten notes that one of the ways of gaining experience and raising morale is to rout the enemy while they are carelessly ravaging or roaming about.

Let him set up ambushes in complete secrecy at river-crossings, mountain passes, wooded defiles, marshes and other difficult passages. Let him so regulate his march that, fully prepared, he attacks the enemy while they are suspecting nothing, when they are eating meals, sleeping or at any rate resting, when they are relaxed, unarmed, unshod and their horses unsaddled, to the end that his men may acquire a self-confidence in battles of this kind ... Also, if the enemy are ranging abroad, let him attack when they are fatigued by a long march; let him harass the rear, or at least attack

81 Vegetius, Epitome, p.80.

152 by surprise, and .those who loiter at a distance from their people for fodder or plunder, let him attack suddenly with picked men. 82

As well as military means to discomfort the enemy, civil discord should also be fostered in the enemy nation 'For no nation, however small, can be completely destroyed by its enemies, unless it devours itself by its own feuding'. Chapter eighteen stresses the importance of being in position first as it allows you to attack first while the enemy is unready and still deploying.

Always strive to be first to draw up the line .. .it allows of the greatest advantage because you may attack first while you are drawn up and prepared and the enemy is still ordering his forces and unsteady. For part of victory consists in throwing the enemy into confusion before you fight, with the exception of raids and surprises which are undertaken if opportunity offers, which an experienced general never misses. When soldiers are marching wearily, divided while crossing a river, bogged down in marshes, struggling over mountain-passes, dispersed and careless in fields or sleeping in a temporary camp, an attack is always made on favourable terms, for the enemy is preoccupied with other business and is killed before he can prepare himself. 83

Chapter twenty-two focuses on the correct way to retreat, as 'nowhere is the threat of danger greater.' One's soldiers must be made to think that the withdrawal is to lure the enemy into a better position 'or at least to set up a concealed ambush'. One should leave light troops and cavalry as a screening force to disguise the withdrawal which is best done at night. The screen can prove very effective for 'nothing is thought more perilous than for careless pursuers to be attacked by men lying in ambush or who have prepared themselves in advance' . One should always be ready to take advantage of the overconfidence of an opponent, but to be overconfident oneself in such a situation is unforgi vab Ie:

Attacks are usually made on those who are unready, whilst they are eating a meal, wearily marching, grazing their horses and suspecting nothing of the kind. This should be avoided by us and damage inflicted on the enemy on such occasions. For neither bravery nor numbers can assist those caught in such a case. He who is beaten in battle in a general engagement,

82 Vegetius, Epitome, p.84. 83 Vegetius, Epitome, p.96.

153 though there too art is of very great advantage, can nevertheless in his defence accuse fortune; he who suffers a sudden attack, ambushes or surprises cannot acquit himself of blame, because he could have avoided these things and discovered them beforehand through good scoutS. 84

When on the march, the risk and chance of setting ambushes are shared by pursuers and pursued. A feint can be used to make the enemy believe an ambush has passed, so that the enemy general 'relaxes into incaution.' A force sent secretly by a roundabout route can then attack unexpectedly. Care must be taken to occupy possible ambush sites to deprive the enemy of their use. Surprise can be especially useful when the enemy is asleep.

Book three concludes with chapter twenty-six and a list of general maxims summarising much of what has been said earlier.

It is preferable to subdue an enemy by famine, raids and terror, than in battle where fortune tends to have more influence than bravery.

No plans are better than those you carry out without the enemy's knowledge in advance.

Surprises alarm the enemy, familiarity breeds contempt.

A great strategy is to press the enemy more with famine than with the sword.

The mode in which you are going to give battle should not become known to the enemy, lest th ey rnak e moves to reSIst.. WIt h any counter-measures. 85

Book four of the Epitome discusses ways to make and avoid surprise attacks in siege warfare, and even how to set an ambush at sea. Feigned withdrawal and mining under walls can be effective for launching surprise attacks against any fortified enemy that fails to take adequate precautions. One should also get to know one's adversary so that his habits and routines can be learnt and then used against him. 86 Echoing the modern idea of painting warships in 'battleship grey' to make them harder to spot on the world's oceans, Vegetius states that scout ships should have their sails and rigging dyed Venetian blue to

84 Vegetius, Epitome, pp.l02f. 85 Vegetius, Epitome, pp.l08f. 86 Vegetius, Epitome, IV.24, 26, 27 & 28.

154 keep them concealed, while the passages between islands can be used to hide and descend upon unwary and unsuspecting opponents. As on land, Vegetius advises that battle should only be given if the caution of the enemy sailors make ambush impossible.87

Attitude and 'Flavour' of the Epitome Some historians have suggested that Vegetius' interest in the more subtle aspects of warfare were due to the author writing in the aftermath of the disastrous Roman defeat at Adrianople in AD 378.88 If this is true then Vegetius may well have been preoccupied with the perceived numerical inferiority of the Roman military machine compared to the barbarian hordes that were seen to be encircling the empire. This would accord with the constant references to the importance of quality over quantity and the careful use of surprise and guerrilla tactics would have allowed smaller numbers to have a greater impact by multiplying their effectiveness. But even if this is the case, the constant references to infantry rather than cavalry and the use of guerrilla-style conflict would not appear to fit comfortably with the manner in which medieval warfare is often portrayed.89 Vegetius' choice of subject matter has led some historians to draw the conclusion that his popularity in the Middle Ages simply could not be due to the military content of his work. This opinion is derived from the traditional, but I believe erroneous, view of medieval warfare that I outlined in the introductory chapter. This view sees a complete lack of tactical thought or understanding and a general lack of appreciation of the use of infantry in this time period. This is the same view that considers that medieval warfare was dominated by heavy cavalry so it is no surprise that it leads to the conclusion that a book such as the Epitome, aimed at reforming the infantry, was simply talking about the wrong topic. The fact that the book also concentrated on, what were effectively, guerrilla tactics rather than 'legitimate' knightly conduct only helped to reinforce this misconception.

87 Vegetius, Epitome, IV.38 & 45. . . . 88 Milner suggests this in n.!, Vegetius, Epitome, p.80. Sherwood also shares thIS VIew, see Medieval Uses of Vegetius, p.1l. . . . . 8~ It is unsurprising that the arch-realist Machiavelli employed the teachmgs of VegetlUs m hIS own works. See Sherwood, Medieval Uses ojVegetius, p.266.

155 [There is] an attitude discernible throughout Vegetius' work which is in striking opposition to the ethos of the medieval warrior class. Vegetius' work reflects the preoccupations of the late Empire, an Empire on the defensive, concerned to preserve the status quo. To distress the enemy by stratagems and surprise, to prevail by indirection, guile, and all measures short of open battle, to offer battle as a last resort and only in circumstances clearl y favourable to one's own side - these are, for the author of the Epitoma, the fundamental principles of the military art. It is difficult to see the appeal of such principles for men whose whole military orientation was towards the offensive mode, whose very raison d'etre was the acquisition of wealth, preferment, honour, and renown through feats of arms. 90

Given these assumptions about the warfare of the Middle Ages, it is hardly surprising that some historians have sought other reasons for the Epitome's obvious popUlarity. As seen above, one possible source of this popularity is Vegetius' role as a source of military metaphors for illustrating religious sermons and as a stylistic model for offering advice to one's superiors (admittedly, rarely an easy task).91 By providing a familiar model for imparting advice, Vegetius allowed opinion-formers to circumvent the difficult job of telling a ruler how to rule by providing a format for imparting wisdom. For example, "As Vegetius states ... " dissociates the author from any criticism. Sherwood felt that it was Vegetius' reforming and moralising nature that helped to give his work such a wide application beyond the organisation of war. It was not the actual military advice that was of sole importance. Allmand agrees to some extent by looking at what else Vegetius can offer beyond the detail of conducting warfare:

Vegetius was important less for his technical advice than for the general philosophical message on the conduct of war which his work contained .. .leaders did not choose themselves, but had to be chosen ... according to criteria which took merit and experience, as well as birth and social standing.

Even Henry V's chroniclers are supposed to have stressed that his inherent qualities benefited from training and experience and this, Allmand believes, is connected to the growing attention being focused on the nature of nobility and leadership.92

90 Sherwood, Medieval Uses of Vegetius, p.5. 91 See Sherwood, Medieval Uses ofVegetius. . . . . 92 Allmand, Hundred Years War, pp.68f. Allmand does accept that Vegetius was read for hIS mIlItary detaIl but that this should be placed and understood within a broader context.

156 These attempts to find an alternative explanation for Vegetius' popularity are well-established. Although there may have been many copies of Vegetius' work made during the Middle Ages, it was thought to have had more of an influence on, and relevance to, the actual detailed conduct of warfare after the end of the period as the circumstances of armed conflict changed. For example, 'His work exercised great influence on European tactics after the Middle Ages ... [when] the crossbow, the longbow, gunpowder, and the pike had deprived cavalry of much of its shock power'. Up until then his use was supposedly limited to providing advice on the conduct of siege operations.93

The following section will challenge this view by looking at how the material in the Epitome was actually used in the Middle Ages, how it was translated, what was changed and adapted, what was simply omitted and what remained verbatim. Beginning with the straightforward translations of the Epitome into the vernacular languages of medieval Europe, it looks at who copies were actually made for or commissioned by and what their likely uses were. This should allow an assessment of the explanation and standard view given above.

The Translation for Lord Berkeley94 According to the colophon or passage at the end of the manuscript this 'turning' of Vegetius was completed at Lord Berkeley's bidding for the pleasure of old knights and

93 'Vegetius', Encycloptedia Britannica (CD 1999 Standard Edition). Although not a normal academic source, I believe that this represents the currently established consensus. 94 The work was originally ascribed to Trevisa by Thomas Tanner, Bishop of St Asaph from 1732, due to the ample evidence of Lord Berkeley's patronage. See Thomas Tanner, Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica (1748), p.721. From MacCracken, Vegetius in English, p.392. John of Trevisa translated from Latin both Ranulph Higden's universal history, the Polychronicon (c. 1385-87), and Bartholomaeus Anglicus' encyclopaedia De proprietatibus rerum (1398) and there is a very high degree of internal consistency between these and the Vegetius translation. However, three of the earliest extant manuscripts have colophons that appear to ascribe the text to someone whose name is - toun or - ton. Bodley Digby 233, fols. 183-227 and Bodley Douce 291, fols. 4-120 are both mid-fifteenth century manuscripts held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. The other manuscript is slightly older, dating to the early fifteenth century and is Magdalen College, Oxford 30, fo1. 1-115. The first part of the name is represented by what appears to be some kind of ensign or flag with the pole on the right. As the other manuscripts appear to be anonymous, this has led to some speculation as to alternative names for the author with suggestions ranging from "Bannerton" to "Cliftoun". See MacCracken, Vegetius in English, p.392. The British Library Online Mss Descriptions attributes Add. 4713 to "Clifton". There are good reasons to suppose, despite the questions raised by the strange colophon, that Tanner was indeed correct.

157 warriors and the instruction of younger ones.95 At the time, Lord Berkeley was campaigning in the marches of Wales against rebels led by Owain Glyndwr. He was present at the siege of Aberystwyth Castle and served as general commander and engineer in the timber-works under the command of Prince Henry (later to be King Henry V). 'Consequently, Lord Berkeley had a practical and immediate reason for commissioning the translations.,96 As well as practical military advice the Epitome could well have provided a useful source of propaganda. According to Vegetius, men grow soft in peacetime. Military prowess requires cultivation since good warriors are the best asset of a country.97 This militaristic attitude 'is just what Lord Berkeley and Prince Henry would have wanted to instil into the men who were fighting in Wales and France' .98 The extant original manuscripts of this translation that I have examined in the British Library are mostly faithful to the original text although, as with the Caxton translation of Christine de Pisan's Fayttes ofArmes, there are additional synonyms that 99 can be found throughout the text. This is thought to be a common feature of prose at the time and is not the exclusive preserve of translations or adaptations of Vegetius. lOO There are also some minor cases of repetition that look like accidental slips by the transcriber. For example:

This chapter telleth ... what is the most amenable tyme to ley emusshementis both for hym both for hym that fleeth & hym that followeth. 101

95 Bodley Digby 233, folio 227. From MacCracken, Vegetius in English, p.389. 96 Diane Bomstein, 'Military Manuals in Fifteenth Century England', Medieval Studies 37, (1975), p.470. 97 Vegetius, Epitome, p.14. 98 Bomstein, Military Manuals, p.472. 99 The manuscript Lansdowne 285, now in the British Library, formed part of Sir John Paston's Great Book of Arms and is mentioned in the Paston Letters from about 1470. See MacCracken, Vegetius in English, p.391. This Ms. ends with the words 'quod W. Evesham' and this has been taken to denote the scribe responsible for this particular copy of Trevisa's original translation as William Ebesham. See Shrader, Handlist, p.303. Additional Manuscript 4713, also in the British Library, is ~ late fifteenth .ce~tury vellum manuscript. It has 'per W Caxton imprimendum' written in one?f the mar~~s altho~gh this IS clearly a later addition and the text bears little resemblance to the translatIOn of Christme de Plsan that Caxton completed in 1489 (see below). It would appear that a later scholar looked at the similar content and eroneously took them to be by the same person. Both Add. 4713 and Lansdowne 285 appear to be very similar and, thanks to the colophon, can be seen to be based on the same 1408 translation. 100 Introduction to Christine de Pisan, The Book of Fayttes of Armes and ofChyvalrye: Translated and printed by William Caxtonfrom th~.l!rench original by Christine de Pisan, A.T.P. Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p.hn. 101 British Library, Add. 4713, fo1.75r.

158 As the last quotation also illustrates, although there were some minor transcribing slips, the manuscripts are careful to follow Vegetius' advice on the conduct of military campaigns, even where this appears to contradict with what is commonly thought of as chivalric behaviour. For example, the British Library's Additional Manuscript 4713 and Lansdowne 285 both state faithfully that 'good leders & wise chiefteyns ne fyt not. .. in opyn battaill and opyn felds' they should, instead, employ 'enbusshementis kepyng hole

hez people [while] they destroy hez ennemyes' . 102 Following on from this, both manuscripts discuss at length the best times and places to lay ambushes 'Both for hym

that fleeth and hym that foloweth' .103 Vegetius' advice on the use of spies is reproduced so that they can be used to determine the best times to 'falle on thou enemyes sometyme

while they ete or slepe' or are otherwise disadvantaged. 104 Additional 4713 follows Vegetius' advice about what to do if one has a host that is inexperienced or unused to fighting and warfare. An easy victory should be sought with the commander being 'redy to fall on hez enemyes some tyme while they be still and unarmed and hiz horsf e away' .105

Additional 4713 faithfully repeats the advice in Book III chapter 6 that advises the duke that, just as the Minotaur was concealed in the labyrinth, his own plans should

remain hidden away so that 'no man shuld knowe his hole witt but he hym selfe' .106 Unlike the original, the advice on retreat does not have its own chapter heading in Additional 4713 but parts are translated, particularly those concerned with laying 'embusshementis' against pursuers in valleys, woods or hills. Lansdowne 285 splits this advice over several chapters although the advice is the same. This appears to demonstrate that retreat was accepted as at least a possibility but that it should be turned into an

ordered fighting withdrawal of one's forces, traps being prepared for those that pursue. 107 One should not be in any hurry to engage one's opponent but if one must engage one's enemy, then the field chosen should be 'profitable' according to the other force's

102 Originally stated in Vegetius, Epitome, Ill.9. Restated in Add. 4713, fo1.58v. The same passage is translated in Lansdowne 285, fo1.111 v, also in the British Library. 103 Lansdowne 285, fols.120v f. Also Add. 4713, fo1.75r. 104 Lansdowne 285, fols.113r & Il3v. 105 Add. 4713, fo1.60v. From Vegetius, Epitome, Ill. 10. 106 Add. 4713, fo1.52r. 107 Lansdowne 285, fols.120v ff. Also Add. 4713, fo1.75r. From Vegetius, Epitome, Ill.22.

159 strengths and weaknesses. 108 One should deploy quickly thus increasing the chance of attacking whilst one's opponent is still unready. The advantage is clearly with the side that is 'sooner redy to fight' .109 However, just as Vegetius clearly states, rather than engage in battle at all, 'it is bettr to tame thyne enemy by hunger than by fightyng'. 110 It would be easy to claim that these and other references are only there because the translator has just taken the whole text and rendered it straight into English. However, the texts are not literal translations, rather they are adapted in different ways to the specific environment of their patrons. For example, the manuscript at the Pierpont Morgan Library contains references to contemporary plated armour and habergeons instead of the cuirasses in the original text. It also refers to the 'grete gunnes' used in the

'northe contrey and .. .in the werres of Wales' .111 The translation notes that the skills that knights have learnt in illegal quarrels and 'unlawfull werres' have made them 'more sotyll and sly when they comen to open werres in the felde' .112 It also laments that many Christian knights fight for the money rather than any noble cause. l13 Examination of the original manuscripts reveals that Additional 4713 and Lansdowne 285 both refer to elephants when they translate the appropriate sections from the Epitome. One would think that the presence of an elephant on a battlefield during the Hundred Years' War would have warranted a mention in the chronicles so it is clear that not everything that was translated was pertinent! However, the equipment list in

Lansdowne 285 is updated to that found in a medieval host. 114 Additional 4713 also has contemporary additions. When reproducing Vegetius III 6, it looks like the trusted scouts that are sent 'before the oost to sppye and serche the weyes on eny side and before and behynde' have an additional task. Whilst it is extremely difficult to make out the exact letters, these troops are also expected to carry out ,.apazattls , . 115 I canno t fiIn d an appropriate word in the original Latin that this could be intended to represent even when

108 Add. 4713, fo1.59r. From Vegetius, Epitome, TIl. 13. 109 Lansdowne 285, fol.117r. From Vegetius, Epitome, TILI8. 110 Lansdowne 285, fol.l23r. The same translation is in the Pierpont Ms.775, fol.l00. For the latter see Bornstein, Military Manuals, pp.471f. . . . III Vegetius, Epitome, 1.16 & IV.22. Pierpont Ms.775 fol.ll0. From Bo~stelll, Mllitary Manuals: p.470. Shrader dates this ms. to c.1470 although it is a copy of the 1408 translatIOn. See Shrader, Handlzst, p.303. 112 Pierpont Ms.775 fols.34r-34v. From Bornstein, Military Manuals, p.471. 113 Pierpont Ms.775 fo1.35. From Bornstein, Military Manuals, p.471. 114 Lansdowne 285, fols.82ff. 115 Additiona14713, fols.52r-52v.

160 allowances are made for the spelling. 116 If it was a French word then it may have been apparaillier - to prepare. However, I think that another word better fits the context of the passage and the spelling of the word itself. In medieval warfare, appatiz was a tribute extracted through threats of devastation and this would fit in well the type of warfare conducted on a chevauchee. It appears reasonable to assume that this is what is meant. There is no correlation in the Epitome for this type of activity beyond scouting itself so this is probably another medieval addition to bring the text up to date. The medieval additions demonstrate that the scribe did not appear to be attempting a pure copy. The strong correlation between the contents of the translations (where they can be read) demonstrates that sections were changed or adapted by 117 Trevisa. If that is indeed the case, and considering the intended audience, then why would extensive passages that appear to clearly oppose the chivalric spirit of warfare have been translated at all?

Knyghthode and Bataile Knyghthode and Bataile or Poem of Knighthood is contained in at least three extant manuscripts. 118 It is an anonymous verse treatment of the Epitome in English that manages to combine poetic quality with more than merely the gist of Vegetius' original work. The language, diction and versification appear to be modelled on Chaucer. 119 According to a number of convincing internal consistencies, the author could well have been the same scribe who penned Agriculture, a version of the De Re Rustica by

116 For a searchable copy of the Epitome, see http://www.intratext.comlXlLAT0189.htm 117 Either this or that a copy was made relatively quickly and that this was used as the basis for the later copies with this version containing the adaptations. This would still have been made well within our period of interest. 118 R. Dyboski & Z. M. Arend [Eds.], Knyghthode and Bataile: A Fifteenth Century Verse Paraphrase of Flavius Vegetius Renatus' Treatise "De Re Militari" (London: Oxford University Press, 1935). The Dyboski and Arend edition reproduces manuscript no. 243 from the Library of Pembroke College, Cambridge, entitled Poem of Knighthood. (See Montague Rhodes James, Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Pembroke College, Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), p. 219.). This has been presented with additional readings and glosses of the Titus A. XXIII manuscript in the Cottonian Library held in the British Library and the Ashmole manuscript number 45 to be found in the Bodleian (See the Catalogue of the MSS. in the Cottonian Library deposited in the British Museum (London: British Museum (department of Mss.), 1802), fol., p. 515a, & W. H. Black, Catalogue of the Ashmole MSS. in the Bodleian (Oxford, 1845), columns 69 - 70, respectively). The first of these manuscripts is complete, while the other two Mss. lack the prologue. The Ashmole Ms. also lacks book two. 119 Dyboski, Knyghthode and Bataile, p.xxxix.

161 Palladius. This was written in about 1439 for the king's uncle, Duke Humphrey of Gloucester. Apart from the similarities in style and form of the writing, there are certain biographical details that indicate the author of both was one Robert Parker who was made the parson of St. Nicholas, Calais in 1450 after serving as chaplain and king's clerk. 120 The author states that he is the parson at Calais in the fifth stanza of the preface and Calais is mentioned again during a discussion of storms at sea in part IV.121

The Pembroke Manuscript of the poem was probably begun in 1458, being presented to Henry VI in an unfinished state, possibly during the "love-day" on March 25 when Henry VI, Warwick, York, Salisbury, and Queen Margaret went arm in arm to St. Paul's to swear their ill-fated oaths of peace. The work was then continued in the 122 following year. Indeed by part three of the poem, the thoughts of peace had passed and the prologue to this section describes the fleeing of the defeated Yorkists to Calais, Ireland and Wales with the various protagonists being identified by their badges and 123 heraldic signs. The other two manuscripts are dated at around this time too although only the Pembroke manuscript retains the original dedication to Henry VI.124 They are likely to be based upon the same copy of the manuscript due to internal consistencies of a very high degree. This was unlikely to have been either John Trevisa's. 1408 English translation or the French translation of Jean de Meun completed a century earlier, but .. I L . . 125 rath er, a copy 0 f t h e ongIna attn manuscnpt. The author makes it clear, both in his prologue and in the body of the text, from where he found his inspiration: "What werk is it?" "Vegetius translate Into Balade".126 He may not have been as familiar with the technicalities of the battlefield as his intended audience. He is open about this and asks every warrior to 'mende' or correct him where his ignorance lets him down. 127 Motivations similar to those exhibited by Vegetius can

120 For a summarised list of these consistencies and biographical information, see McCracken, Vegetius in English, pp.398f. 121 Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.2 & 99. 122 Dyboski, Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.xvi-xxii. 123 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.37. See also Bomstein, Military Manu.a~s, p.472., . . 124 Despite the claim in the Pembroke Ms. that the author would not Jom Henry s eneIllies to WIn all England, the other two Ms. have both been changed to support Edward IV. See McCracken, Vegetius in English, p.394. . . 125 This is the opinion of the editers, Dyboski and Arend, Knyghthode and Batalie, Xlff. 126 This is also repeated in book one. Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.5&12. 127 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.5.

162 clearly be detected early on in the text. The author wishes to be of help to contemporary knighthood and is not a historian interested in events in the distant past except were they can be used to provide instruction for the present. The work is also clearly a product of its time and adds a unique medieval flavour to the Epitome with its own focus and concerns. The troubled times are reflected in the poet's desire to improve the performance of knights so that they can effectively defend the kingdom and crush any rebellion. The author condemns violence, treachery, and disorder and presents 'an ideal vision of

England as a peaceful, unified country under a just, strong king' .128 As in the other treatments of Vegetius, the poem stresses the importance of supplies, 'for iron smyteth not so sore as honger doth, if foode faile' . The enemy but not

you should therefore be deprived of supplies. 129 This advice accords with the practice of the chevauchee through this period. Interestingly, the poem also warns that one must constantly be on guard against the practice of deception by one's opponents. Despite the importance of keeping one's own word, even to one's enemy, the enemy's oaths should not be trusted:

And best be war, when that thin aduersary Wil swere grete, ye by the Sacrement, And vse that, ye and by seint Mary, And al that is vndir the firmament: Beleve nat his othe, his false entente130

A good commander will remain diligent on the move and ensure that all routes are adequately scouted. Local scouts should be used (under compulsion but with the offer of reward for correct information) whenever possible due to the dangers of travelling. The poem also highlights the importance of keeping one's plans secret, being wary of enemy spies and going the way least expected by one's foe. 131 Th e poem d'lscusses at some length how to guard against ambushes and also how to set them in the best places. It follows Vegetius in advocating careful observation of the enemy and the use of fugitives

to glean additional information:

128 Bomstein, Military Manuals, p.473. 129 Vegetius, Epitome, I1L3, p.65 & Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.4lf. 130 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.43. . 131 Vegetius, Epitome, III.6, pp.7lff & Knyghthode and Batazle, pp.49f.

163 Leme of him aI, and thenne aday or nyght, When thei suppose leest, mak hem afright. 132

Vegetius states that good generals often avoid battles if ambushes offer their own advantages. The poem portrays the duke asking his council whether 'vinqueshinge couertly by prudence' or 'bataile' is the best option given the tactical circumstances. 133 This is interesting as the commander is not only expected to ask advice about the martial and legal opportunities available, but it could be inferred that he only takes the 'covert' option at the advice of his captains. Just as Vegetius advocates the blooding of new recruits in an easy engagement to give them courage, those who are inexperienced in combat or 'vnexpert Of were' should be heartened by attacking an unarmed or sleeping enemy and every possible advantage over the opponent should be secured:

At brigge or hard passage, or hillis browe, Is good to falle vppon; or if ther be Mire or mareys or woode or grovis rowe Or aggravaunt other difficultee, To falle vppon is thenne vtilitee; The hors to sech vnarmed or aslepe To falle vppon is good to take kepe. 134

Although this may sound underhand, as long as the correct legal situation existed, the process of the feud could easily embrace such options and it is clear that the advice operates in both directions - it was important to be prepared and to guard against being caught out by the enemy just as his weaknesses should be exploited. Treachery should also be encouraged in the enemy camp. For a site of battle, the best ground should be chosen, with the sun and wind behind one's back. Superior height is to be considered of particular importance, both because missiles have more force when cast downhill and

because the enemy must fight both 'the ground & the[e]' .135 One should also strive to be ready before one's opponent.136 Interestingly, although this advice is taken from the

132 Vegetius, Epitome, ITL6, pp.7lff & Knyghthode and Bataile, p.53. 133 Vegetius, Epitome, ITL9, & Knyghthode and Bataile, p.58. 134 Vegetius, Epitome, ITLIO, pp.82ff & Knyghthode and B~taile, p.61. 135 Vegetius, Epitome, ITL13, p.88 & Knyghthode and Batazle, p.64. 136 Vegetius, Epitome, m.18, p.96 & Knyghthode and Bataile, p.73.

164 original, it is not expanded upon to imply that in a trial by combat one's opponent should be engaged before he was ready. However, if a time and place had been agreed upon for this legal process to begin then it was clearly important to make sure that one was ready in good time. A lack of preparation signalled weakness, both militarily and morally and this was bound to have some effect on the ensuing engagement. Although on the whole Vegetius is paraphrased very accurately, there are many differences between Knyghthode and Bataile, and the Epitome. There are many omissions of details which are irrelevant to the warfare of the Middle Ages. For example, the dry and rather academic technical information and language about the Roman Legions that can be found in the original are simply inapplicable to the warfare of the Middle Ages so are omitted in Knyghthode and Bataile. Many of the Latin terms used in the original do not have English words that are equivalents and the author ends up using 'the crudest Latinisms on every page' .137 For example, whilst talking about the types of troops to place in the fifth line of battle, the author realises that the titles Vegetius uses such as carrobalistae (carriage ballista) or funditores (slingers) are not really relevant any more so simply renders them as carrobaliste andfunditours. 138 To make this section of more practical value to contemporary practice, the author adds the contemporary 'bumbardys' and 'gunne' in this row of battle toO.139 In the third row of battle, the author renders the Roman termferentarii, light infantry armed with bows and javelins, as ferentayris, and explains that they are lightly 'herneysed ... with dartys'. The medieval use of longbows is recognised and they are added to the troops to be placed in the fourth row of battle along with the scutate (these would also be light troops and shield-bearers). Sometimes terms are simply made current through the application of common sense. The author even tells us at one point that he does not find the information he seeks in the original text but believes he is right because of the context. 140 It is obvious to the author throughout the work that a tirone (recruit) in the Epitome was referring to a knight bachelor, whilst a signati (a full soldier) was a knight or chevalier.

137 Dyboski and Arend, Knyghthode and Bataile, xxviii. 138 Vegetius, Epitome, III. 14, p.90. 139 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.68. 140 'Though in my book so wry ton I ne fonde', from Knyghthode and Bataile, p.32.

165 There are many other additions to bring the text up to date on certain matters. For example, chapter IV of the poem begins with talking of driving out and chastising the 141 king's enemy's in Normandy and France. Whilst gunpowder was unknown to Vegetius, Knyghthode and Bataile could not hope to leave out a mention of the new weapons if it was to be of any use to the practitioners of medieval warfare:

The canonys, the bumbard & the gunne, Thei bloweth out the voys & stonys grete 142

Guns are also enthusiastically advocated for use against other siege devices such as the ram or the 'tortoys' .143 The older forms of siege engines are referred to disparagingly as they have been replaced by more effective weaponry:

The fifthe cours was the carrobaliste, Manubalistys and fundibulary And funditours~ but now it is unwiste, Al this aray, and bumbardys thei cary, And gunne and sepentyn that wil not vary, Fouler, covey, crappaude and colueryne 144 And other soortis moo then. VIII. or IXne.

145 It is noted that guns could be used to dismast ships toO. Tourneying is added to the list of useful exercises that soldiers should conduct to enable them to develop.146 The pavice or large shield used by crossbowmen whilst reloading their weapon was unknown to Vegetius, but the poem includes it along with 'sheeld', elsewhere also mentioning the medieval shield or 'targe' .147 Counter-mines are added to the Epitome's discussion of cuniculi (mines) and markets and 'fayres' are added to darkness as times when a surprise 148 attack is best made on fortresses and besiegers. Another adaptation of the text to the requirements of the time is the omission of Vegetius' statement that the main strength of

141 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.82. 142 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.l04. 143 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.93. 144 Knyghthode and Bataile, lines 1846-1852, p.68. 145 Knyghthode and Bataile, lines 2854-60, p.l04. 146 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.44. 147 Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.84 & 86. 148 Vegetius, Epitome, IV.27 & 28, pp.129f. &Knyghthode and Bataile, p.95.

166 the army lies with its infantry. 149 Whilst this might have been true, it probably would not have been prudent to state this quite so explicitly to the mounted nobility who were likely to be the audience.

There is a striking departure from the original text in the heavy editing of the advice on retreating one's force. Vegetius' provides lengthy information regarding the correct way to conduct an orderly retreat. Book III chapter 22 demonstrates 'How to retreat from the enemy if the plan to fight is rejected' .150 This advice is obviously regarded as superfluous by the author of Knyghthode and Bataile. 151 It appears that, unlike the Roman legions, the medieval author's side will not retreat under any circumstance and this reflects the utterly different function of battle in Roman and medieval times. War was an exercise in justice to the Romans rather than a process to either wrest justice from those who deny it or to determine whose cause was actually just in a judicial duel. Clearly the legal and moral subtext was completely different and this is reflected in the changes that have been made to the advice on retreat. Therefore it is not surprising that the poem also omits the section on what to do if the whole army flees. This eventuality is simply not entertained and only partial defeat is dealt with in the context of an overall victory. It would be ill-judged to provide advice on retreating as this situation meant that the cause had been effectively declared for the other side. However, interestingly the use of ambush is still advocated against a retiring enemy meaning that retreat is dealt with - it is just assumed that it will be the other side doing the retreating. 152 The paraphrase of the chapter on siege and naval warfare still contains the advice on employing camouflage through disguising scout boats by dyeing the sails, mast and the garments of the sailors' 'see colour' so that they may safely 'aspie fer & neer' .153 A digression from the text is provided in a narrative of an imaginary sea battle between the ships of the 'suuerayne' (Henry VI) and the 'traitors' (the Yorkist rebels). The battle includes trumpet calls, angels and legions 'To countour periurie & myscreaunce And surquydrye [arrogance] and disobeyssaunce', reflecting the metaphysical spiritual contest

149 Vegetius, Epitome, m.9, p.80 & Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.58f. In the French translation of Jean de Meun, this is actually changed to cavalry. 150 Vegetius, Epitome, m.22. 151 The poem also omits the obviously redundant chapters 23 (On camels and armoured cavalry) and 24 (How scythed chariots and elephants may be resisted in battle). 152 Vegetius, Epitome, m.22, pp.102f. & Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.78f.

167 as well as the physical one.154 The battle reaches a climax with the surrender of the enemy leaders and the author returns to his task of rendering Vegetius into verse-form. In the Epitome, Vegetius emphasises the qualities required in recruits, stating that the strength of the realm depends upon the physique and moral quality of her troops. After listing the range of suitable occupations (masons, blacksmiths etc) that can join the military, he also states that 'Decent birth makes a suitable soldier, while a sense of shame prevents flight and makes him a victor' .155 Knyghthode and Bataile also has the list of suitable and unsuitable occupations but then emphasises the importance of nobility far more than the original, equating land and honour with the desire to avoid the shame of fleeing. This clearly reflects the fact that although followers may be drawn from the lower social ranks, by the later Middle Ages the feud was a process reserved for the nobility. The author goes on to question whether anyone not born of noble rank can even have the required moral virtues that the calling requires:

What helpeth it, if ignobilitee Have exercise in were and wagys large; A traitour or a coward if he be, Thenne his abode is a disceypt & charge156

Another obvious difference between the medieval poem and the original work is that although the verse appears in many places to have a rather secular flavour in the same style as the Epitome, the author does state that while one must organise one's troops correctly, one must also trust in God to prevail. 157 This was to be helped by the impact on morale of the fact that the reader's host was obviously fighting for a just cause whereas his opponent was not. 158 The sacred nature of the order of knighthood is also made clear very early on as knights (obviously) would rather die than disobey God. A comparison is also made between the order of chivalry and the ranks and orders of angels in the

153 Vegetius, Epitome, IV.37 & Knyghthode and Bataile, p.97. 154 Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.l04ff. 155 Vegetius, Epitome, 1.7, pp.7f. 156 Knyghthode and Bataile, p.11. 157 Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.74f. 158 Knyghthode and Bataile, line 2007-45, pp.73ff.

168 159 heavenly hOSt. Religious imagery also crops up elsewhere in the text reflecting the function of war as a remedy for insults to the divine order. 160

Despite the fact that many of the passages have been changed, adapted, omitted or added to, and that the flavour of the original has been given a medieval dash of religious colouring, the poem still faithfully reflects the overall themes of the Epitome. In particular, Vegetius' enthusiasm for guerrilla tactics remains evident throughout and is nowhere challenged or substantially altered by the poet. Considering how much is different, it appears no accident that these passages are preserved in this way.

The Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye Apart from utilising the Tree of Battles by Honore Bouvet, Christine de Pisan also employed Vegetius alongside several other classical authors in her work The Fayttes of Armes and ofChyvalrye. As noted in Chapter Three, the work was written between 1408 and 1409 for the education of the future King of France. 161 Following in the footsteps of Giles of Rome, Christine found that Vegetius could provide an ethical lesson for her readers as well as a military one. The Peace of God movement had been active for four centuries by the time that Christine was writing and was an attempt to extend protection to clerics and churches and to others likely to suffer oppression. The use of violence was also supposed to be restricted by the great festivals and the period from sunset on Wednesday to dawn on Monday.162 It is not particularly surprising to note that these efforts met with only limited success. However, Christine saw that military effectiveness and the importance of restraint could be put together to mean the same thing. For example, edit Vegece en son livre, que son office est de garder et deffendre Ie prince, Ie cle rg ie, les femmes, Ie commun ,.163 In this way Christine employed Vegetius extensively

159 Knyghthode and BataUe, p.6. 160 For example, Knyghthode and Bataile, pp.73 & 104ff. 161 For biographical and editorial notes on the work of Christine de Pisan, see Chapter Three. The same translation of the Fayttes ofArmes is used here: Christine de Pisan, The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye: Translated and printed by William Caxton from the French original by Christine de Pisan, A.T.P. Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1937). 162 Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (London: 1962), p.414. 163 Richardot, Vegece, p.l03.

169 in Book One and Two of Fayttes of Armes to provide the solution to both technical and moral problems of knighthood. 164 Vegetius is first employed in chapter vii of Book One where the attributes of a good commander are discussed with reference to contemporary practices. In the previous chapter, and also later on in chapter xxiii, Christine presents her own interpretation of an ideal commander, diplomatically using Charles VI's victory over the rebellious Flemings at Roosebeke in 1382 and, her patron, the Duke of Burgundy's, victory over the men of Liege in 1408.165 The importance of quality over quantity is echoed from the Epitome in Christine's chapter viii. 166 Chapter xiii follows Vegetius in stressing the importance of taking the advantage of terrain 'to the hurt and hynderaunce of his enemyes', placing one's host in the best place possible. An anecdote attributed to Titus Livy follows giving a case where a Roman force deployed between their opponent's and a river so that 'they vaynquisshed and ouercome theyre ennemyes more by thurst / than by armes'. Vegetius' advice on the importance of good logistics and 'vytayllyng' is then stressed as a vital ingredient to military success as famine itself can clearly be used as an effective weapon of war. 167 The first entry concerned specifically with the use of subtlety is at chapter xv where Christine advocates the captain sending out spies:

he shal be therfore curiouse & diligent to sende forthe here & there his espies subtylli for to enquere & vnderstande ... [the] purpos of his enemyes & what theyre way be. 168

The correct time to attack should be chosen carefully and one should be wary of being caught unready. At the same time:

164 There is some debate over the original source used by Christine and whether it was a Latin manuscript or a French translation. Paul Meyer, demonstrated with some success that Christine de Pisan made direct use of Jean de Vignai' s French translation of Vegetius in preference to other French manuscripts or a work in the original Latin. Jean de Vignai (or Vignay) was a hospitalier of l'ordre de Saint-Jacques du Haut-Pas and produced his French translation of Vegetius in 1320. See Paul Meyer, 'Les Anciens Traducteurs Franc;ais de Vegece et en particulier Jean de Vignai', Romania, XXV (1896), pp. 401-423. Sherwood suggests 1320 as a date for this translation although other dates from 1325-1349 or even 1360 have also been put forward. See Sherwood Medieval Uses of Vegetius, p.314. 165 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.18 & 82. 166 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.27. From Vegetius, 1.1. 167 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.42. Vegetius, 1.22 & IIL3. 168 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.48ff.

170 the hed captayne yf he see hys tyme to assayle hys enemyes whyle they be at mete or slepe / or ellis when they be traueylled and wery of the waye / or ellis when theyre horses taken theyre pasture & theyre fode

Anyone hurt by the subtleties of the enemy in this manner have no-one but themselves to blame as they clearly should have been as diligent as their opponents. Spies are seen as most profitable when they are used to uncover the enemy plans. They can also spread dissension and cause the enemy to disobey their captain. 169 Chapters xvi and xvii note that care should be taken to avoid enemy spies while one's own spies should be used, disguised as labourers or pilgrims, to detect and avoid ambushes. If an ambush is discovered it should be made to suffer more damage than it was intending to inflict. There is also a long and familiar discussion of march order and discipline, the protection of the baggage from ambush and the dangers of surprise attacks when crossing rivers. 170 Chapter xviii notes that if an invasion of one's land is imminent, one is better to go and meet the enemy. This is explained pragmatically by stating that 'muche bettre it is to hurt anothers lande than to suffre his owne to be dommaged'. Of course, given the moral and legal injury suffered by such an invasion, it would not simply have been the land that was damaged and Christine's audience would have been well aware of this. She continues, paraphrasing Vegetius and adding her own gloss. Battle should only be joined 'in a playne feld' if one has a decisive advantage over one's enemy and this should be determined after carefully comparing the forces and calling a council of war. 171 This 'playne feld' implies an area free of obstructions and offering neither side an advantage as one would expect for a judicial arena. However, there was still no need to rush into such a contest even if one did have a decisive advantage. If the enemy were discontented through lack of food or money or if they were not used to hard living, then there should be no hurry to battle, but instead:

169 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.50ff. From Vegetius, ill.10. 170 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, pp.56ff. From Vegetius, III.6 & 7. 171 This can be found in Vegetius, Epitome, ill.9, pp.80ff.

171 moost secretly that he can he shal sende hys men in to busshementys for to ouer take hem vnbeware there as they shal passe by ... grete proffyt cometh to a captayne of an oost that wysely can sett busshementysl72

Christine then gives an example of a Roman ambush against Hasdrubal where the Carthaginians were defeated despite fielding their war elephants. This, according to Christine, is affirmed by Vegetius. The enemy should be taken at a disadvantage appearing to suggest that only a fool fights a fair fight! However, this would be to miss the subtleties of the context. Here Christine is not talking about a battle in a 'playn feld' but of the day-to-day activity associated with a military campaign - a feud. A commander had a duty to be aware of such dangers and to take measures to avoid being attacked while at a disadvantage. There was certainly no contradiction with the code chivalry to employ such measures in this context or Christine would not have offered such advice. Vegetius gives a list of tactics to be used when leading recruits or poor-quality troops to give them experience or raise morale. This includes surprise attacks during meal times or when the enemy is relaxed and unarmed, ambushes in difficult places or picking off stragglers. Christine uses this advice but gives it for any captain, not particularly for one handling poor quality troops. The enemy should be observed until:

hys oost be deuyded in gooyng ouer floodes or ryuers / Or tyl that they be wery of the way / or ellis combred [encumbered] wyth ... mareys [marshes] or of some narow passagis / so that they ... may be sooner slayn than sette in ordynaunce [order] 173

If the enemy outnumbers you and one is in a fortification, then one should remain there until the enemy withdraws, and then:

whan suche shall tourne theyre backis / Yf he perceyue them to be somwhat out of gode array / or ellis besy about som proie / he shal thenne yssue out of hys lodgys wyth hys men of armes weI renged and in fayre ordynaunce [order] / And corageously at a pynche shal renne vpon hem 114 and shall hurt and dommage to hys power

172 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.61. 173 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.63. 174 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.63.

172 It is noted that a tired enemy is already half beaten but that a 'set-piece' battle should never be taken lightly because the outcome cannot be known in advance. 175 If battle is offered by your opponent, do not automatically take it. 'As a ryghtewys juge doeth the trouthe of a matere' decide if it is to your opponent's advantage and only accept battle if the advantage is yours. This is not quite how Vegetius says it although Christine attributes it to him:

But yf it happe saith vegece / that thyn enemye presse the muche for to gyue hym a day of bataylle and that he hasteth to be fyght the / take hede whether it is at hs aduauntage and to thy hurt and dommage / but doo nothyng nor medle not but yf thou see thy tyme 176

Vegetius does not talk of "set" or "day of' battle, only of entering a battle, but Christine earlier in the chapter talks about having 'a day of bataylle sette'. This clearly reflects different expectations and practices from the two periods. This in tum reflects the different role played by battle in the wars of Rome and those in the Middle Ages. A battle to the forces of Rome provided an opportunity for justice to be exercised. It was sought and could happen at any time and, in a very Clausewitzian sense, was the most efficient way of overthrowing an opponent's instrument of force and then imposing one's will upon him. In the Middle Ages, battle was not simply a part of war but something separate from it - specifically the suspension of the feud for arbitration through a judicial contest. The arbitration was also armed but its function was to determine whose cause was just rather than exercising a justice that had already been determined and granted by the gods. Battle could therefore be offered at a set time and place in the same way that a judicial duel could be arranged and then carried out to decide an issue. In practice, this distinction could be subtle and effectively to many people the two situations would be the same. However, in the Middle Ages, the two situations were qualitatively different and the context meant that different rules applied. Both could be very serious affairs - one could lose a combat in a feud and the result could be capture or death. The same could be true

175 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.64f. Vegetius, III.9 & 11. Christine's advice is repeated in chapter xxi v. 176 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.65.

173 in a judicial battle but one could also lose the moral and legal argument and therefore the cause for which one had decided to fight in the first place. That did not mean that Vegetius' advice was any less useful in the Middle Ages, however, simply that the context that the advice was being employed within was different. Although Christine has been very careful to warn her audience about the dangers of offering or accepting battle because of the issues at stake, in chapter xix, she is also, for the same reason, very careful in her discussion of leaving the field without fighting. Her title states:

Here sheweth the manere of behauyng that a chyef captayne ought to holde yf hyt happe that he wyl departe from the feld without abydyng or gyuyng of eny bataylle. l77

Note that "retreat" is not actually mentioned. The title that Vegetius himself uses here is rather more explicit: 'How to retreat from the enemy if the plan to fight is rejected' .178 Christine stresses the important medieval principle that only the prince or the 'chyef captayne' can order the army to leave the field and then erroneously claims that Vegetius states that retreating at night or when the men are already drawn-up in front of the enemy is shameful:

For vegece saith that noon so grete shame ther nys than to departe the felde in presence of hys enemyes or euere they medle togider / wythout that it be by accorde made betwyx bothe partyes / For in thys appered two thyngis that be not honourable / that one is / that semyth hym to be aferde and that cowardnes moeuith [move] hym therto / and by that other he gyueth to knowe that lytel trust he hath to hys folke / and wyth thys he gyueth hardynes vnto hys ennemyes 179

Actually, Vegetius does acknowledge that retreatingfrom the line before an encounter 'diminishes confidence ... and gives courage to the enemy', but he then adds pragmatically that 'since this must often happen, the means of safely achieving it need exposition'. There is certainly no consideration of shame here at all, nor would one

177 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.65ff. 178 Vegetius, Epitome, ll1.22, p.102. Quemadmodum ab hostibus recedatur, si consilium displicet pugnae. http://www.intratext.comlXfLAT0189.htm

174 expect there to be given the different context that battle had in Vegetius' day. Christine then notes Vegetius' advice about the importance of spreading a cover story to retain the morale of the men who must not be allowed to believe that their leader is frightened to give battle. Instead, they must be made to think that the decision has been made to harm the enemy in another place. The enemy should be kept unaware of any withdrawal to protect the army during the manoeuvre. Cavalry should be employed as a screen. To retreat at night or when the men are drawn up is shameful unless there is no other way to save the army:

Some other haue departed by nyght whyche is the moost shamefull manere / by cause it is called a rennyng awaye / And other departe the felde playnly in gode ordynaunce of bataille and in renged array / But thees maneres of departyng saith he [Vegetius] are not moche to be preysed / but yf grete nede causeth hyt for saluacion of the oost1 80

In fact, Vegetius clearly advocates withdrawing at night along scouted routes with light troops employed to ambush any careless pursuers. Christine does suggest the use of skirmishers too but while they should withdraw 'softly', it appears preferred that they do not depart under cover of darkness. This difference in attitudes is perfectly understandable once the context is understood. To slink away under a cloak of darkness implies a lack of confidence in the justice of one's cause. Again, this was not an issue for Rome as she could be confident of justice being on her side regardless of the outcome of a battle. However, in the Middle Ages where the battle was the judicial procedure and trial before God, such lack of confidence in one's cause could potentially undermine support for the entire campaign and therefor the cause. While Vegetius pragmatically acknowledges the morale implications of not giving battle, it is Christine, concerned with the specifically metaphysical implications and medieval legal function of battle, who introduces the idea of shame into the text. Back to her core moral reasoning, Christine argues that prisoners should be treated well but uses Vegetius to provide a practical justification for this. Men fight harder if they have nothing to lose: 'it is a grete peryll to fight suche men / for theyre

179 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.65ff. 180 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.67.

175 stregthe groweth and doubleth wyth in hem' .181 For this reason, Vegetius advocates leaving an escape route rather than surrounding a desperate enemy. Christine simply replaces the idea of escape in this way with the option of surrender and capture to be ransomed at a later date (this example of noble spirit is somewhat undermined by her later advice of setting an ambush for any that do escape!).182 Chapter xxii echoes Vegetius' advice on taking the field stating that the wise captain secures any advantages before the enemy can. There are three principle things to remember, the first being advantage of height, the second being that the sun is in the enemy's face, and the third that the wind should be against them. I83 Much of this advice is then reiterated in xxiv along with some additional concerns such as obtaining information about the state of the enemy, keeping the troops fresh, maintaining good morale in one's army, and;

that theyre ennemyes knowe not what theyre entencyon and pU[f0os is / I8 nor what they thinke for to doo / nor what cours they wyl take

Before recapitulating various of the Vegetian maxims at the end of his Book III, in her last chapter of Book One, Christine brings up the subject of what to do if part of one's army flees. She suggests that in the confusion, victory can still be claimed by holding the field as if victorious with the rest of the force. If more widespread and 'yf it happeth that the myscheffe be thrughe al thyn oste ... [and] ... they al beginne to flee' , fortune can still be recovered. Just as the 'goode pastour doeth his shepe', the army should be saved by withdrawing to a hill or something similar in good order. If the enemy foolishly pursue and become disorganised then they can 'ben soone putte to flyght' .185

Christine begins her Book Two with eleven chapters based on historical examples taken from the Strategemata by Frontinus. The next two chapters are based on the Facta et dicta memorabilia by Valerius Maximus. Christine then returns to her treatment of

181 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.65. Vegetius, III.20. 182 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.94. 183 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.69-74. Vegetius, III. 13 & 14. 184 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.86f. 185 From Vegetius, III.22 & 25

176 Vegetius when she reaches the advice on how to actually conduct an assault on a fortified place. Book Two, chapters xiv-ixxxx of the Fayttes are taken straight from Vegetius' advice on siegecraft but are made contemporary by the inclusion of detailed lists of provisions, armaments, and artillery etc. Some of this reads more like an inventory than merely advice on withstanding a siege. For example:

yf men thynke that the gonnes must be caste to often / a thousand pound of gonne pouldre shal suffyse / or ellis / v / C / pound more / and six thousand pound of leed to make pelettes for gonnes. 186

Much is made of the importance of using trusted men and the constant threat of treachery: 'in armes is subtylyte mykel more worthe than is strengthe / as it happeth ofte / namely in takynge of castelles and cytees' .187 Given that a siege was qualitatively different to a judicial duel, this is again perfectly consistent. A medieval siege was far closer to a Roman legal procedure where justice was assumed and exercised through the process rather than determined by it. While the sentiment about the use of subtlety is certainly evident in Vegetius', the illustration is taken from elsewhere as Christine tells the story of a 'subtyl polycye' by the Romans who set a 'nyght abusshement' for some ambassadors as they returned to the city after entreating for peace. The Romans took the gate and then the city, 'thus by crafte and subtyl witte was the cyte taken that was so stronge and so weI gamysshed'. While these tactics are not necessarily advocated, they are given as a warning and are certainly not condemned. Christine adds a medieval metaphysical flavour to this section by asserting the central theme of God's judgement being played out on Earth once more when she explains that Hannibal chose not to attack the city of Rome after all once his plans had been foiled three times by torrential rain: 'he wolde not entrepryse noo were ayenst the goddes, for well he sawe that they were favourable unto rome' .188 This pattern of giving Vegetius' advice and then elaborating on it with examples, stories and contemporary details and values is repeated through this section. Christine covers Vegetius' writing on surprise sorties and feigned retreat to catch

186 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.145. There are many other references to 'gonne stones' throughout this section. 187 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.168f. 188 Christine de Pisan, F ayttes of Armes, p.170.

177 defenders unaware, the use of spies to target sorties most effectively and gives repeated warnings about the dangers of treachery, constantly reminding the reader that:

it hath be seen many tymes that euyl couenaunces and peas by fyctyon made vndre coloure of gode concordaunce haue letted moche more than hath doon strengthe of armes. 189

The reader is left in no doubt about the precautions to be taken when defending a place from assault. Although Vegetius is obviously employed as a main source for both of the Fayttes' first two chapters, it is very obvious that Christine has done far more than simply copy out passages from the Epitome. Not everything that Vegetius states is used by Christine and she can be quite discerning in the material she employs. There are passages where the advice of Vegetius is acknowledged by Christine as being superseded by contemporary practices. For example, it is noted in Book One chapter xxiii that Vegetius' methods for drawing up an army were different because the ancients 'comynly in tho

dayes faughten more on horsbacke than on fote' .190 Christine also finds little or no use for the technical information Vegetius provides about the Roman legions in book two of the Epitome as this is simply irrelevant to her time. It is therefore mostly omitted. When Christine feels that Vegetius may not have covered the subject fully enough or when current practice dictates a different approach she adds her own advice or examples. For example, in Book One chapter xxiii Christine uses the contemporary examples of Roosebeke (1382) and Hesbain (1408) to illustrate the importance of a rear guard. 191 In Book One, otherwise dominated by Vegetius after the introductory six chapters, Christine inserts original chapters of her own that help to add more medieval context to Vegetius' advice. Chapter xxi contains a speech of encouragement by the captain containing such terms as 'iuste quarell' and 'good ryght'. This emphasises the just nature required of the quarrel, a topic that Vegetius does not need to be concerned

189 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, pp.177ff. 190 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.80. This statement appears to have been largely ignored by many commentators, intent on concentrating on medieval mounted warfare at the exclusion of all else. This statement supports the idea that the comitatenses became the principle Roman force thanks to the mobility offered by being mounted.

178 with as the justice of Rome's cause would have already been established before the legions were expected to fight (see Chapter Two above). In chapter xxiv, Christine continues with the theme of justice and the role played by battle in the medieval view of the world. She points out that even if all the material factors are taken into account by the commander, 'hyt happeth at suche a tyme as god wylle helpe that one partye and nought that other' . 192 Here is the medieval belief in the justice of one argument over the other. One can, and must, do everything in one's power to ensure victory, but God will still favour the just cause. This was exactly what the risk of accepting a true trial by combat held for both protagonists. Christine's chapter on truces and their possible dangers contains some interesting perspectives on the medieval attitude towards conflict and the way a feud should be conducted. 193 During any negotiation, the captain must be cautious and 'take thaduys [the advice] of them of hys counseyll vpon euery poynt that they putte for the [you]'. She points out that these occasions are sometimes used to gain time. If one is to be subject to arbitration then one must 'declare weI. .. the gode ryght and the Iuste and true quarelle that thou hast to make were ayenst the other partye' . Genuine offers of peace should be embraced and arbitration should be accepted. In a particularly insightful passage on the actual ends being fought over and the means that should be employed to pursue them, Christine advocates that if one is sure of parts but not all of one's claim, one should be prepared to compromise during this process. This must surely have often been the case in practice and one can see exactly how the process of the feud promoted the reaching of a compromise far more often than a battle was actually required to settle an issue. Christine makes clear that genuine peace attempts should be heeded and even if the enemy is outnumbered, God will look badly upon a refusal of a reasonable offer 'and punyssheth hem ther for'. However, there was still a responsibility to take precautions and one should still beware that 'thou be not deceyued by trayson thrughe false meanes vndre the shadowe of the treatyng of the peas' .

191 This would no doubt have pleased her patrons as the House of Burgundy featured prominently in both battles. 192 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.86f. 193 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, pp.69ff.

179 As stated above, the first eleven chapters of book two of the Fayttes detail the 'cawteles or wyles of armes after frontyn that calleth theym Stratagemes'. What is interesting here is Christine's choice of lessons. Chapter i gives an example of disguise and deception used to gain information on an enemy camp. Chapter ii gives the stratagem of burning branches to buy time whilst retreating across a river while iii talks of ambushes in the forest with trees nearly cut through and the army 'hided hem self within the thykke busshes of the forest'. Chapter iv tells how Alexander the Epirote disguised his men as the enemy and then led them into an ambush. Scorched earth tactics were used too to deceive the enemy into burning their own source of supplies. Also drugged wine left in an abandoned camp so that sleeping men could be put to the sword and false intelligence, using an enemy's signal, is used to lure an enemy army into an ambush. Chapter v shows false intelligence being used to fool enemy into believing dissent was forcing an army to withdraw. Ambushes are then set for the pursuing enemy. In chapter xi Christine adds her own moral example to those provided by Frontinus. When Charles V was reproached for buying a garrison out of a fortress when he could have fought, Christine has him reply that that which could be bought should not be paid for in blood. This is possibly replying to contemporary criticism that the king was too eager to negotiate and not eager enough to fight. Chapters xii and xiii are based on the Facta et dicta memorabilia by Valerius Maximus. Includes several cases of 'wylis & subtyltees' and Hannibal's attempt to portray Fabius as a traitor by sparing only his lands and sending 'secret' messages to him. They also detail Hannibal's use of the wind and sun, partial retreat, 'abusshement' and false defections at Cannae. It is interesting that Christine chooses not to judge any of these example, she simply sets them out as examples for her reader. Not even the use of drugged wine gets a comment here but poison is mentioned in xxxix inserted in the middle of a section dealing with Vegetius' ideas on naval warfare. The reader is left with no doubt that poisoned weapons should not be used by Christian men:

there be made certeyne poysons so strong & so mortall that yf eny yron were touched with the same / and after ward shot or thrawen to the body of eny man so that the blode lytyl or grete cam out / the wounde shulde be dedely / But suche thynges ought not to be doo nor taughte for cause of the

180 evylles that myght folowe For they that soo doo are deffended and accursed It is not gode to wryte them in bokes nor more plainly to recyte them / be cause that it is not lycyte to noo crysten man to vse of noo suche inhumanitees that namely ben aienst all right of werre194

This is extremely prescriptive and is a completely original addition to the advice in the Epitome. Christine does not hesitate to criticise behaviour she believes to be wrong and against the laws of war. This prohibition of poison also strengthens the point made elsewhere that victory was not to be achieved at any cost. The point was not simply to win, but to have the result accepted by the other side. A short story given in Book One, chapter xxii, equates the use of poison with treason, neither of which should have a place In war. One historian has claimed that 'the political and social thought of the Fayttes of Armes reflects a medieval point of view'. There is supposedly a Christian chivalric spirit utterly foreign to the Epitome and this is a valid comment. 195 Parts of the Fayttes of Armes clearly attempt to mitigate the excesses of war. To take just one additional example, sandwiched between two chapters that employ Vegetius extensively, book one chapter xiv states that 'the gode captyne ... ought to endeuoire himself to see his soudyours be payed so weI that they nede not to lyue of noo pillage vpon the contrees of theym that ben theyre frendis' .196 Now admittedly, this is not talking about hostile territory in this particular place (although this is mentioned in later passages) and justifies it by talking of the discipline advantages and the way that merchants will be easy to find once money is involved. However, the fact that Christine feels the need to explain the need not to pillage friendly land in the first place shows that this was not a thing taken for granted by soldiers. These issues were simply not a concern for Vegetius but can be seen as recurring themes that appear throughout the F ayttes of Armes. As has also already been demonstrated in the chapter on the Tree of Battles, Christine is happy to take a prescriptive or judgmental tone in her work and that idea is also obvious throughout her treatment of Vegetius. Christine does not hesitate to change or adapt Vegetius' text when it conflicts with contemporary values. In particular, the idea

194 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, p.184. This mention of poison, whilst clearly in the section based upon the Epitome, may have been inspired by Bouvet. See Byles, Fayttes of Armes, p.xlv. 195 Diane Bomstein, 'Military Manuals in Fifteenth Century England' , Medieval Studies 37, (1975), p.477.

181 that once deployed in order of battle, a withdrawal before the enemy must only be done after reaching some sort of an agreement with the other party if face and honour are to be preserved - a consideration that Vegetius' pragmatic treatise does not need to address. Christine still credits Vegetius with these views however, presumably to give her own text credibility. As with the advice given by Bouvet, Christine is keen to impart to the future king of France all of Vegetius' advice concerning the use of subtlety, deception, surprise and stratagems for achieving victory, while tempering it to the circumstances of her own time. It is difficult to conclude that this was purely incidental and not exactly what Christine intended. The differences, when they happen, are often subtle but are concerned with the context that the actions are performed within.

Conclusion The view that Vegetius was a popular author in the Middle Ages in spite of his chosen focus on infantry reform and indirect or guerrilla tactics does not appear to concord with the evidence. I think it is clear that one does not need to seek alternative reasons for the popularity of the Epitome, although I do not doubt that the work probably fulfilled other functions in addition to its intended one. It cannot be doubted that Vegetius was popular for more than simply his military knowledge, or that he became even more popular as artillery developed and, coincidentally and more importantly, printing made his work more accessible to the general public. However, it does appear valid to draw the conclusion that Vegetius was a popular authority in the Middle Ages wi th those concerned with military matters because what he wrote made sense in the context of medieval warfare. The advice that he was giving for resurrecting the fortunes of the Roman Legions was just as applicable to the type of warfare that was actually being conducted in the Middle Ages. 197 Despite the outdated view that heavy cavalry dominated the medieval battlefield, infantry were considered to be important, even if the chroniclers did not necessarily devote that much attention to them. Medieval commentators such as Christine de Pisan even acknowledged that the ancients fought

196 Christine de Pisan, Fayttes of Armes, p.44. 197 Riehardot goes as far as to suggest that 'Vegeee offrait une methode permanente pour obtenir la vietoire. C'etait done un modele theorique absolu, eomme Karl von Clausewitz pour l'etat-major allemand avant 1914'. See Richardot, Vegece, p.146.

182 more on horseback than in her own day where fighting on foot was actually more common. More significantly, while there were certain narrowly defined restrictions concerning the areas of treachery and perfidy, guerrilla-style tactics were the daily fare, the bread and butter of the medieval soldier when conducting the legal process of the feud and this is reflected in the lengths that the translators and paraphrasers have gone to preserve the language and flavour of the original text. This was not in addition to or instead of chivalric warfare, this was chivalry in one of its many guises. What is important to remember is the context of the actions rather than simply the actions themselves. A properly ordered feud was not the same as a judicial trial by combat and this was something that did not always need to be made explicit in the literature of this period as an appreciation of this legal issue could be safely assumed. Chivalry and the laws of war did not prevent such behaviour being employed but it had to take place in the correct context. The subtleties of those contexts are often difficult for us to see today but, on the whole, they would have been obvious to the practitioners of medieval warfare. The captains of war such as Lord Talbot or Sir John Fastolf were familiar with and highly proficient at this type of warfare and I believe that the translations, adaptations and medieval variations of the Epitome are a fair reflection of strategic culture in the late Middle Ages. The use of surprise and deception appears, then as now, to have been an essential part of any successful soldier's armoury, although it is vital to understand the context within which they could be employed. It was because of its content, not in spite of it, that the Epitome of Military Science remained one of the most important and popular texts in the Middle Ages.

183 Chapter Six

The Works of Geoffroy de Charny

Geoffroy de Charny was one of those comparatively rare people to be considered by his 1 peers a model knight. Geoffrey Ie Baker, a contemporary historian and chronicler of Charny's period, described him as 'a knight more skilled in military matters than any other Frenchman, so that his fame was widespread,.2 Froissart states that he was 'Le plus preudomme et Ie plus vailant de tous les autres': the worthiest and most valiant of them 3 all. He is described by the historian Richard Kaeuper as being 'the very soul of courage' and 'the quintessential knight of the age,.4 This is not praise to be taken lightly. As well as being a knight exemplar, Charny was also the author of several chivalric texts. His works include the Demandes and the Book of Chivalry, both written in the mid-fourteenth century and both concerned with the practicalities of knighthood. The Demandes is of particular interest as it consists of a list of questions addressed to the knights of King John's Order of the Star, concerned mainly with technical questions regardi ng how they, as experts in these matters, would interpret various rights and duties. Geoffroy's pragmatic concerns were for how the actual practice of the rules in operation affected him and other knights. In contrast to the other sources examined in earlier chapters such as Bouvet, Christine de Pisan and Vegetius, Charny has a strongly positivistic approach to the rights and duties of his contemporaries and so his contribution completes the spectrum of perspectives on the use of surprise and deception in medieval warfare. Charny rose from relatively humble origins as a younger son in a family placed somewhat on the periphery of events. His father was Jean de Charny, Lord of Lirey and his mother, Marguerite de Joinville, was the daughter of Jean, Sire de Joinville, friend

1 Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999), pA7. One of the others to be accorded such status was William Marshal in the late twelfth century. 2 Geoffrey Ie Baker, Chronicon Galfridi Ie Baker de Swynebroke, Edward M Thompson (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), p.1 03: 'miles plus quam aliquis Gallicus, ut fama ventilavit'. 3 Froissart, Chroniques, Kervyn de Lettenhove (Ed.) (Brussels, 1867-77), V pA12. . 4 Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, p.166: Richard W. Kaeuper & Elspeth Kennedy,. The Book of Geoffrol de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation (Philadelphia: University of PennsylvanIa Press, 1996), p.3.

184 and chronicler of Louis IX.5 Charny's martial career appears to have begun at the same time as the Hundred Years War opened in 1337. Charny participated in the wars of Languedoc and Guyenne under the command of Raoul de Brienne, Count of Eu and High Constable of France.6 This man appears to have been Charny's patron and his wife was related to Charny's wife which might explain how he came to serve under this particular captain. Described as a bachelier, Charny would probably have been between the age of eighteen and twenty-five at this time. This suggests that he had not yet acquired a fief (the fact that he was still referred to as Geoffrey de Charny rather than by the title of a fief strengthens this assumption). Geoffroy was still under the command of Raoul at Lille in 1338 and at the defence of Tournay in 1340.7 Froissart lists Charny along with many other knights who were present although he does not appear to have been specific all y named as being engaged in any of the particular actions that are detailed. However, he does provide accounts of some of the attempted assaults, and states that 'much valour was shown, for all the knights that were in Tournay were present' .8 The siege was eventually raised after 'eleven weeks all but three days', by means of a truce. Although the English and their allies had been able to besiege 'one of the best towns the [French] king had, burning and destroying his country before his eyes', according to Froissart, 'the French thought they had gained much honour in this business ... [as they had] ... prevented the city of Tournay from being lost, and separated the large army which had lain before it and done nothing,.9 The year 1341 saw Charny in Angers on the frontiers of Brittany with three ecuyers or squires preparing for a campaign with John, Duke of Normandy (who was later to become King of France). His activities here must have brought Charny success as the following year he was given a position of some authority and honour by Charles of

5 Philippe Contamine, 'Geoffroy de Charny (debut du XIVe siecle-1356), Le plus prudhomme et Ie plus vaillant de to us les autres,' Histoire et societe: Melanges Georges Duby, Le tenancier, le fidele et Le citoyen (Aix-en-Provence, 1992), pp.l07f. 6 Michael Taylor, 'A Critical Edition of Geoffroy de Charny's Livre Cha~ny an~ the ?emandes pour L~ joute, Les tournois et La guerre' (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Chapel Hill: Umverslty of North Carolma, 1977), p.xiv. . . .. 7 Dictionnaire de biographiefran~aise so us La direction de M. Prevost et Roman d'Amat (pans: Llbrame Letouzey et Ane, 1959), p.614. 8 Froissart, Chronicles of EngLand, France, Spain and the Adjoining Countries: From the Latter Part of the Reign of Edward II to the Coronation of Henry IV, trans. Thomas Johnes (London: Henry G Bohn, 1857), p.76. 9 Froissart, Chronicles, Johnes (Ed.), p.86.

185 Blois in September 1342. The English, under the Earl of Northampton, had been besieging Morlaix and, in an attempt to relieve the town, Charny was given command of the first line of attacking cavalry. His classic frontal charge at the dismounted, and dug-in English force proved disastrous thanks to their use of concealed trenches and pit traps. At least fifty French knights were killed and Charny, along with possibly as many as 150 of his companions, was taken prisoner. 10 After being taken by Richard Talbot, Charny ended up as a prisoner of the Earl of Northampton but was quickly released from England to find his ransom. 11 The fact that he did not return indicates that this must have been settled satisfactorily. This experience does not appear to have caused any real harm to Chamy's career as he was promoted to chevalier at some point between 1343 and 1347. In his edition of Froissart, Luce suggests that this took place in August 1346 but there are references to him in both English and French sources indicating that he was a knight in 1343. 12 Following this, Charny acted as one of the marshals in the army sent to raise the siege of Vannes in 1342. Rather than an engagement with the English, however, papal legates brokered a truce in early 1343 that was to last until talks broke down in 1345. 13 It was in that year that Charny took part in an ill-fated overseas expedition to the Levant. He joined the unsuccessful crusade of Humbert, Dauphin of Viennois. This was prompted by the recent capture of Smyrna by Christian forces which had renewed interest in the subject across Europe. Thanks to weak leadership, lengthy negotiations and many quarrels among the various allies, the expedition took ten months to reach Smyrna from Marseilles. Although Charny arrived to battle the Turk in June 1346, sources indicate that he had returned to France by that same summer so his crusade was certainly shortlived. 14 In Runciman's History of the Crusades the entire expedition was summed up as having been 'singularly futile' .15

10 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (London: Faber & Faber, 1990), p.402. 11 Kaueper & Kennedy, Geoffroi de Charny, p.6. 12 Keen suggests a date as late as 1347 although Kaueper believes that the earlier date is convincing. See introduction to Froissart, Chroniques de J. Froissart, S. Luce, G. Raynaud & A. Mirot (Eds), 15 vols (Paris: Societe de l'Histoire de France, 1869-1899), IV, xxxi; Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984), p.12. For other sources, see Kaueper & Kennedy, Geoffroi de Charny, p.6. 13 Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), p.115. 14 Contamine, Geoffroy de Charny, p.110. 15 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom ofAcre (Cambridge, 1954), p.452.

186 Although back in France by the summer of 1346, Charny was to miss the great battle of Crecy. He was involved in a totally separate theatre of operations, again under the command of the Duke of Normandy, and took part in the defence of Bethune against a Flemish force. It has been suggested that Charny's reputation may well have benefited from this successful action, which took place at the same time as 'French chivalry in

general had suffered a humiliating defeat' .16 Following the Crecy disaster, the French now found Calais under siege. Charny, perhaps because he was not tainted with the brush of recent defeat, was one of the two emissaries chosen by King Philip to go and challenge Edward to combat. The challenge was refused and, due to the strong position of the besieging English, Philip chose not to take Edward up on his offer of a fight on his own terms. The French army instead withdrew and Calais fell six weeks later. During the following period of political upheaval in France, and with the king under heavy and sustained criticism, Charny emerged as one of the fresh faces on the Royal council as new ideas were sought by the French political elite. However, rather than being employed to provide military solutions, Charny was involved in negotiations and diplomacy and had been involved in securing the truce of September 1347. 17 Any other large-scale military ideas that might have been planned during this break in hostilities were soon scuppered by the devastation wrought by the Plague in 1348. During this time Charny was ordered to St Orner to watch the military frontiers. Froissart records that in doing his job he acted as if he were a king in all things touching on war - 'y estoi

et usoi de toutes coses touchans as armes, comme rois' .18 Perhaps this leadership went to his head as it was shortly after this that Charny hatched a plan to recover Calais from the English. In return for an enormous bribe, Aimery de Pavia, an Italian who was in charge of one of the gate-towers, entered into a 'secretement tretier', agreeing to surrender the gate to Charny and his followers. 19 What exactly happened next is unclear. It may have been that King Edward heard rumours and summoned Aimery to London or alternatively

16 Kaueper & Kennedy, Geoffroi de Charny, p.8. 17 Contamine, Geoffroy de Charny, p.ll1. 18 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), V, pp.229f. 19 Froissart, Chroniques: Derniere redaction du premier livre. Edition du manuscrit de Rome Reg lat. 869, George T. Diller (Ed.) (Geneve: Droz, 1972), p.861. See also Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenh?ve (Ed.), V, pp.229-51; Chandos Herald, Life of the Black Prince, by the Herald of Sir John Chandos, MIldred K. Pope & Eleanor C. Lodge (Eds) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), pp.12f., and; Geoffrey Ie Baker, Chronicon Galfridi Ie Baker de Swynebroke, Edward M. Thompson (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), pp.l 03ff.

187 it is possible that Aimery went of his own accord. Either way, we do know that Aimery reported the plot to Edward who quickly and secretly assembled a small army and crossed the Channel to Calais.

Utterly unaware of the trap awaiting him, Charny quietly gathered his own men, including such eminent knights as Eustache de Ribemont, the military governor of the march of Flanders along with about 1,500 men-at-arms and another 4,000 other infantry.2o Under cover of darkness, Charny's army drew up his men outside of the gate house noting that the small gate was open and the citadel was therefore undefended. Sending forward some of his men to conclude the transaction with Aimery and open the main gate for his force, Charny stated that:

Je voel entrer en Calais par la I will enter into Calais by the main porte toute ouverte. Je n'I enterai gate when it is opened. I will not ja par Ie guichet, ne moi, ne rna enter by this little gate, not me nor baruere.· 2T my banner.22

Charmy had every intention of riding into Calais displaying his banner. This would have had important moral implications as well as legal ones and Charny wanted to be seen to be riding unopposed through the main entrance rather than sneaking in through the side gate. However, things were not to work out in this way. Firstly, the men who had already entered were ambushed and forced to surrender. Then the English force, well supported by archers, emerged and engaged the French force outside, eventually defeating and 23 capturing both Chamy and Eustace. Although the Chandos Herald talks of the attempt to take the castle 'par traison et 24 par pechie', his account is very confused. It is certainly not clear that the King Edward saw it in these terms. Instead of throwing his prisoners into captivity and destroying their reputations as one might have expected if their conduct really had been dishonourable, the king put on a feast with the Prince of Wales and other knights serving their French

20 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire, (London: Faber & Faber, 1999), p.61. 21 Froissart, Chroniques: MS de Rome, Diller (Ed.) p.866. 22 The translations from French to English in this chapter are my own unless noted otherwise. 23 Froissart, Chroniques: MS Rome, Diller (Ed.), pp.870f. 24 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, p.13.

188 guests. Admittedly, the king was a little harsh with Charny, the architect of the plan, in his after dinner address:

S'adrec;a sus mesire Jofroi de When he came to Sir Geoffry de Cargni; et la, en parlent a lui, li Chargny, his countenance altered, canga un petit contenance, car il and looking at him askance, he regarda sus coste et dist: "Mesire said, "Sir Geoffrey, I have few Jofroi. .. je vous doi, par vostre reasons to love you, when you deserte, petite amer, quant vous wished to take from me by night, volies par nuit embler ce que j' ai what had cost me such sums of si comparet et qui m' a coustet tant money. I am, however, rejoiced, to de deniers. Si sui moult lies, quant have caught you in your attempt. je vous ai pris a I' esprueve. Vous You wanted to gain it cheaper than en volies avoir millour marchiet I did, and thought you could que je n'aie eu, qant vous Ie purchase it for twenty thousand quidies avoir pour .x.x.m. escus; crowns. However, through God's mais Dieus m' a aidie que vous assistance, you have failed in your aves falli a vostre entente." attempt." ... Sir Geoffrey was ... Mesires Joffrois fu tous honteus ashamed and did not say a word in et ne respondi mot. 25 reply.

Charny was clearly of strong enough moral character to take a little public humiliation. The context suggests that the humiliation was due to having failed in a rather ambitious exercise rather than because he had been dishonourable. This is born out by Charny's companion in the episode, Eustace de Ribemont, who was actually honoured at the feast for his valour in the battle, an event hardly likely to happen if there really was a legal or moral problem with their actions. Nor did the event appear to do any harm to Charny's career. 26 Charny was ransomed on 31st July 1351 with the new French king Jean II contributing towards the sum required for his freedom.27 His reputation does not

25 Froissart, Chroniques: MS de Rome, Diller (Ed.), pp.873f. 26 Interestingly, Charny later took his revenge on Aimery de Pavia as a traitor to his word. Aimery had escaped punishment by Edward but was no longer in a position of responsibility at Calais. Charny surprised Aimery in a night attack in his new abode and took him prisoner. Aimery was taken back to St Orner where he was decapitated and then quartered. To demonstrate that it was a private matter of justice and not a breach of the truce, Charny only took and punished Aimery himself and did not claim or damage his property. Ironically, Charny had expected and encouraged Aimery to become a traitor and help Charny get into the castle. Nevertheless, Charny now punished Aimery for breaking his personal oath to him. Perhaps the key here was not to get caught. 27 The ransom is recorded as 1000 ecus in Lettenhove's edition of Frois s art, but Anselme records it as 12,000 ecus. See: Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), XX, p.543; Pere F. Anselme, Histoire geneaLogique de La maison royaLe de France 9 Vols (Paris: 1726-1733), IX, p.201.

189 appeared to have suffered at all and upon his return he was made Conseiller du roi es parties de Picardie et sur les frontieres de Flandres et d'Artois. He faught at Ardres where an outnumbered English force was overwhelmed by a much larger French one and then, ironically considering his previous activities, returned to attend the negotiations that prolonged the Anglo-French Truce. On the 6th January 1352, he was made a member of the newly created and extremely prestigious Ordre de I 'Etoile (or the Ordre de Nostre Dame de la Noble Maison).28 In 1355 Charny was involved in affaires secretes in Normandy on behalf of his king and his career peaked on 25 th June of that year when he was named as the bearer of the Oriflamme thanks to him being' Ie plus preudomme et Ie plus vaillant de tous les aultres,?9 Displaying the Oriflamme was the sign that the battle would be to the death with no quarter to be given or expected. As such, it was only to be

unfurled at times of dire necessity. 30 Charny had the immense honour of carrying the Oriflamme in September 1356 at the Battle of Poitiers, dying with' la baniere de France entre ses maIns.. ,31 H owever,

Vigorous and valiant as he may have been, he was captured twice, went on a useless crusade, failed to secure Calais for his king, and was hacked to death in the great set-piece battle for which he had presumably longed all his life. Yet he was vastly admired by his contemporaries. 32

One must wonder how exactly Charny gained this position of being respected by both those he fought for and with and those he fought against. One of the reasons for Charny's colossal reputation has to be that, apart from being a practitioner of chivalry, he was also an author who penned at least three works on various aspects of chivalry: the Livre Charny, the Demandes pour la joute, les tournois et

la guerre and the Livres de Chevalerie. 33 There is evidence to suggest that these works

28 For a history of the glorious but shortlived order, see D' Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, The K~ights of the Crown: The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe 1325-1520 (Woodbndge: BoydeU, 1987), p.47. . 29 Froissart, Chroniques, Lettenhove (Ed.), V p.412. It is possible that he was also granted this supreme honour in 1347. See Anselme, Histoire genealogique, p.202. 30 See M.H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p.106. 31 Froissart, Chroniques, Luce (Ed.), V, p.54. 32 Kaeuper & Kennedy (Eds.), The Book of Geoffroi de Charny, p.18. 33 For both the Livres Charny and the Demandes I employ Taylor's Critical Edition. Taylor reproduces MS 1124-1126 of the Bibliotheque Royale de Belgique as the base Ms. According to Menestrier, this is the

190 were all commissioned by, or at least written for, King John and the newly created order 34 of knighthood. The Demandes are clearly addressed to the Prince des Chevaliers de Nostre Dame de la Noble Maison. As such it appears safe to assume that the work was completed shortly after the creation of this order in 1352. The other works are harder to ascribe dates to although the Livre Charny is likely to have been written after his voyage to the Levant due to the realistic description given of the hardships facing a knight on a 35 voyage overseas. Charny's background as a practising knight, one who was personally familiar with the wide variety of experiences and hardships that medieval warfare offered, gives Charny's works a refreshing honesty and pragmatism that can be lacking in many of the prescriptive texts on the subject of chivalry from the period, written by observers rather than practitioners. Some of Charny's concerns may, at first glance, appear mundane. For example, the rights of a constable to reclaim his lodging after an absence, or the details that should be observed when restoring lost or borrowed horses on campaign.36 However, it is precisely the mundane nature of many of Charny's concerns that prove to be so interesting today for those who are interested in the real face of chivalry. Charny's writing allows us to see what was genuinely important to the everyday life of a practising knight. The Livre Charny is a 1934 line verse work written in the form of a tercets coues. It consists of a realistic description of the life of a knight and sets out the qualities required for the participation in such a life. The Demandes pour la joute, les tournois et la guerre was written in prose, and comprises 134 questions concerning feats of arms. Addressed to the French King, twenty of the questions deal with jousting, twenty-one with tournaments and ninety-three deal with various aspects of warfare. While answers to these questions are unfortunately not given, this work still provides an original Ms. of the works of Charny and contains all three on 136 folios of parchment. See Fran<;ois Menestrier, 'De la chevalerie ancienne et modeme', Collections des meilleurs dissertations relatifs a l'histoire de France XII (Paris: R.J.B. de la Caille, 1826), p.215. The language used is Francian with occasional use of other dialects such as Picard and Champenois. The Livre Charny is on folios 1r-40v with each face containing 24 lines with a few having up to 26 lines. Each line begins with an enlarged capital with some of these illuminated. The flrst folio has leaf-like decorations and the coat of arms of Jean Ie Bon. The Demandes begins on f. 41r ending with 82r. Each of the demandes begins with an illuminated capital and the flrst folio of each of the three sections of the Demandes is decorated like the first folio of the Livre Charny. The Livre de Chevalerie, for which I employ the Kaeuper & Kennedy edition and translation contained in The Book of Geoffroi de Charny, occupies folios 82v-136r. 34 Boulton, Knights of the Crown, pp.185f & pp.208f. 35 Taylor, Critical Edition, p.xvii.

191 excellent indication of the types of concerns that knights actually had through this period. The Livre de Chevalerie duplicates some material from the preceding works but also offers some original ideas of its own. This work was clearly popular and was one of the translations that the English herald Thomas BenoIt, Clarenceux King of Arms, left to his colleague Carlisle Herald in 1534, along with Bouvet's Tree of Battles and Vegetius' De 37 Re Militari. Each of Charny's works offer various insights into the life, duties, rights and concerns of practising knights and the belief system within which they practised their profession.

The Livres Charny38 The introduction of the rhyming Livres Charny deals with the subject that, it quickly becomes apparent, is the one of most significance to Charny: the importance of honour. It emphasises that perfection in arms can only be achieved with God's help and that both God and the Virgin Mary should be asked for guidance to ensure honourable action in all

undertakings and so that one acts 'sanz vilanie' .39 Honour is the most important thing a knight should be concerned with and it can only be achieved through great personal sacrifice and suffering due to the countless hardships involved. Charny makes clear what this is likely to involve - a good knight must become used to fasting and to sleeping little, he must be prepared to constantly be ready to move around and go where he is needed. There is a good chance that he will sometimes be wounded in battle and he constantly faces the disdain of his companions if he has not fought well. There is also the risk of being humiliated in the presence of his lady if he has not acquitted himself well.4o This

36 Geoffroi de Charny, Demandes pour lajoute, les tournois et la guerre: demandes pour la guerre, questions 1,3,4,5,11,12 & 26. From Taylor, Critical Edition, pp.90ff. 37 A.R. Wagner, Heralds and Heraldry in the Middle Ages (Oxford: 1956), Appx. F, pp.150ff. Taken from Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984), p.141. Kaeuper doubts that the Livre de Chevalerie was as popular as Ramon Lull's Book of the Ordre ofChyvalry, probably due to its close association with the short-lived Company of the Order of the Star. However, other influential chivalric authors such as Jean de Beuil do appear to have been familiar with his writing. See Kaeuper & Kennedy (eds.), The Book ofGeoffroi de Charny, pp.63f. & Malcolm Vale, War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France, and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages (London: Duckworth, 1981), p.31. 38 Translations from the Livres Charny are my own. 39 Charny, Livre Charny, line 36. 40 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 61-362.

192 section concludes by reminding the knight that he is helpless without God - 'se Jehu Crist ne t'I convoie Tu n'as povoir,.41

The work provides a particularly graphic account of what it is like to be a knight on campaign and in battle with a vivid description of the horrors waiting for those involved:

Or vois tu gens entretuer, Fouir, You see men killing each mourir et arrester, Tes amis mors, other ... people dying taken prisoner. Don't devant toy gisent les Your friends are dead, their bodies COrpS.42 lying all around you.

Even if the knight avoids death then the chances are that he will be wounded or captured instead. If one is taken prisoner, then one must return and continue fighting once one has given one's word, just as God has given his word.43 This is very interesting as, apart from providing a naturalistic account of the dangers that warfare holds, it also explicitly speaks about being taken prisoner and then being released from captivity. This makes Chamy's approach rather different to certain other medieval works, such as Knyghthode and Bataile, which do not speak of even partial defeat in such a pragmatic way and only mention total defeat in relation to the other side.44 Chamy is clearly concerned with the practicalities facing a real knight and, as his own career demonstrates, defeat and capture were very real possibilities. Chamy vividly describes the 'peines' and 'perils' of foreign adventures, the storms, lack of water, pirates and battles involved.45 After listing all the great hardships, Chamy does answer the obvious question that springs to mind after reading the tales of suffering and hardship - why would one choose to follow such a path in the first place? The answer for Chamy is simple - he who does nothing, is worth nothing: 'cilz qui n'a rien, s' il pert il ne li chaut de rien, se il fait mal ou s 'il fait bien'. 46 Sloth is the root of evil for any fighting man and therefore the deadliest of the Seven Sins for a knight. Simply put, one

41 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 366-7. 42 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 446-449. 43 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 452-593. 44 R. Dyboski & Z. M. Arend [Eds.], Knyghthode and Bataile: A Fifteenth .Cent.ury Verse Paraphrase of Flavius Vegetius Renatus' Treatise "De Re Militari" (London: Oxford UmversIty Press, 1935), pp.78f. 45 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 594-845, esp. lines 608-618. 46 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 988-9.

193 must never appear like a lazy person - 'Ne ressemblent et sont pareulx' .47 Apart from losing one's honour through slothfullness, one will also find that other people will capitalise on one's perceived inaction:

L' en te plumera si tes elles; They will pluck you and you will pay several Souvent en paieras de telles; Et tes times over; and your neighbours will voisins Prendront tes blez et puis take your grain and then take your tes vins; De maulx soirs et de wines; bad evenings and bad maulx matins Auras tu don.48 mornings will be your gift.

This is possibly Charny's most pressing concern - that a worthy knight should be a man of action. After discussing which youths have the correct qualities for knighthood, Charny then gives the essentials for their training.49 Charny avoids the detailed and comprehensive religious education advocated by Lull in his Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry.5o Instead, the parent is simply reminded that the budding knight must be taught to love God and the Virgin Mary for one cannot succeed without God - 'Sanz Dieu rien faire ne puet on' .51 One must love, honour and protect women and guard against sin, for example pride: 'D'orgueil te garde' .52 It is little surprise that he also reiterates that one must never be guilty of sloth: 'Pereceux ne soies nul temps' .53 One must never allow God, honour, generosity and courtesy to leave one's mind - 'Et Dieu n'oublies; Honneur, largesce, courtoisies' .54 One must also be careful to speak honestly and act honourably without any form of villainy - 'que deshonnestement ne parIes ... Honneur a tous sanz vilanie' .55 It is in taking up arms that a knight will find honour but God's help should be sought for achieving feats of arms. This way he will be protected and granted victory.56 A knight should prefer death to shame which must be feared more than anything else-

47 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1349. 48 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1286-1291. 49 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1387-1870. 50 Ramon Lull, Book a/the Ordre o/Chyvairy, Alfred T.P. Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp.90ff. 51 Charny, Livre Charny, line 1425. 52 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1502-1513. 53 Charny, Livre Charny, line 1792. 54 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1595-1596. 55 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1768 & 1796. 56 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1876-1888.

194 'Mourir avant que hontes soies' .57 Charny's knight has honour and the pursuit of valour as his earthly goals and Lull's Christian emphasis on the punishment of earthly sin is completely lacking, although this is not to indicate that Charny was opposed to faith. Rather, he was a man who was of 'bon sens and practicality'. Taylor asserts that:

He was a man who was aware of the fact that not only the social and economic factors of his time posed a threat to his profession, but that the unrelenting position of the Church concerning knights killed in tournaments and vainglory introduced elements of hesitation and confusion into the psyche of the fourteenth-century man of action ... He knew that to be victorious in battle knights must be valiant; therefore any inspiration to fight and to be valiant was good. 58

Rather than their being a contradiction between the demands of chivalry and religion (as seen in Raymond Lull's work for example), the role of religion 'in its pure, non-political form' actually helped knighthood. Through confession, the knight was prepared for death as peace with God had been made. Hesitation caused by worries over impending mortality could therefore be removed or at least minimised. The man of action could serve God better by having a clear head and an unburdened heart when he went into battle.

The Livre de Chevalerie59 The Livre de Chevalerie repeats many of the themes that are found in the Livre Chamy and also raises some new issues and highlights certain areas that are particularly relevant to this thesis. Charny begins by reiterating the theme that qui plus fait, miex vault: he who does more is of greater worth.6o There is no stigma or reproval attached to any deed of arms as long as it is conducted for the right reasons. This specifically meant that it was not only the large scale and prestigious campaigns that were important and those unable to participate in the prosecution of a feud but were bound to defend a locality instead were still engaged in honourable exploits:

57 Charny, Livre Charny, lines 1894-1895. 58 Taylor, Critical Edition, p.xxx. 59 The following translations for the Livres de Chevalerie are taken from Kaeuper & Kennedy (~s.), The Book of Geoffroi de Charny with some corrections, suggestions and clarifications by P~of Beatnce Heuser. 60 Chamy, Livre de Chevalerie, from Kaeuper & Kennedy (Eds.), The Book ofGeoffroz de Charny, pp.86f.

195 Qui ont guerre en leur chief pour Those who have to wage war on deffendre leur honneur et leur their own behalf in order to heritage, come de ceulx qui veulent defend their honour and faire guerre pour aidier a deffendre inheritance, or those who want to l' onneur et heritage de leurs amis wage war to assist in the defence charneulx, come de ceulx qui of the honour and inheritance of demeurent et servent leur droit their kinsman, or like those who setgneur en ses guerres pour stay to serve in the wars to deffendre et garder I' onneur et defend the honour and heritage de leur dit seigneur inheritance of their rightful lord 61 sOUbZ. who maintains them.

The important thing for a man of action is that he is involved in armed combat somewhere: all deeds of arms were considered honourable 'qu 'il soit fait sanz reproche' - as long as they were conducted without reproach. 62 Charny continues that the military art can be divided into three different kinds: jousting, tourneying, and waging war. Those who undertake the last of these deserve the most honour as this requires all of the skills that are involved in the others and more. However, he then details the other exploits that can bring a knight honour, from undertaking pilgrimages or distant journeys through to deeds undertaken for the love of a lady, ending with a warning to those who are brave but too eager for plunder, a theme that is repeated in later chapters (it would be fitting if the period of captivity that Charny suffered in England, following his ill-fated attempt to retake Calais using bribery, was used to write at least part of this chivalric treatise as he frequently offers advice that would appear to be appropriate to this particular episode). In chapter sixteen, which discusses How the Highest Standard in Deeds of Arms Is Achieved, Charny states:

D'eulx mesmes pour la grant et They themselves, through their bonne volente qu'il y ont, great zeal and determination, learn aprennent ill'usage et la maniere the true way to practice the military du faire, et tant qu' il ont la arts until they, on every occasion, cognoissance de tousjours faire et know how to strive towards the tirer au plus honorable, tant de most honourable course of action, tous faiz d'armes come en autres whether in relation to deeds of arms manieres, de tous bons or in relation to other forms of

61 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, pp.86ff. 62 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.88.

196 gouvernemens qui a leurs estaz behaviour appropriate to their rank. appartiennent. 63

Although knights were expected to conform to the highest standards of behaviour, interestingly that did not mean that knights should automatically be trusted. In chapter twenty-three, Charny gives the advice that one should be extremely wary when talking with one's enemies:

ne devez pas parler longuement ne You should not converse at any tenir parole avecques voz ennemis, length nor hold speech with your qui vous devez penserqu'il ne enemies, for you should bear in parolent pas a vous pour vostre mind that they do not speak to you bien, fors que pour traire de vous for your own good but to draw out don't il se puissent aviser de vous of you what they can use to do you porter plus grant domage.64 the greatest harm.

Given the events that surrounded Charny's attempt to retake the citadel of Calais this is particularly interesting. In the same spirit, Charny warns that a good knight needs to stay on his toes:

vous gardez de trop grant Be careful not to be too guileless, simplece, quar qui riens ne scet, ne for the man who knows nothing, bien ne mal, son cuer est aweugle neither of good nor of evil, is blind et non voyant, ne il ne scet and unseeing in his heart, nor can conseillier ne lui ne les autres; que he give himself or others good se un aweugles veult mener un counsel, for when one blind man autre, certes il meismes chiet en la tries to lead another, he himself will fosse premiers et li autres ampn!s fall first into the ditch and drag the luy. 65 other in after him.

Clearly, one must have some knowledge of evil or one will be unable to protect oneself from it. This is expanded a little in a later chapter discussing those who act loyally and serve God. Here Charny speaks of those who may be wise but direct their intelligence towards 'grant malice'. It is clear here that it is not their intelligence that is considered

63 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.IOO. 64 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.128. 65 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, pp.128ff.

197 bad, but the intention behind it: 'It is not good to have knowledge combined with such

intentions' - 'it n'est mie bon de savoire ne de avoir tel veus' .66 Charny makes clear that lasting benefit comes not from luck but from wisdom: 'One should not put trust in the benefits of fortune, which are not earned, for fortune is fickle and is destined to come to an end' - 'on dire que l'en ne se doit pointfier es biens

de fortune qui viennent sanz desserte, que elle est muable et doit perir' .67 One should be wary as luck can fail at any time which is exactly why one should strive to succeed through one's own merits and hard work. The role of fortune naturally leads Charny to discuss those who were raised up and made lords over other people. Drawing on the mythology of chivalry, Charny states that these men did not gain their positions through luck or good fortune, but because they were 'the persons with the best physical qualities and the highest standard of moral conduct' - 'les plus convenables personnes de corps et

les plus parfaiz en toutes bonnes meurs' .68 It was from these men that the leaders of Charny's time were descended. They were not chosen to harm the people or make a profit for themselves, or to eat and drink as much as they could or go hunting instead of performing great deeds. Nor were they chosen to be cowards, to be generous to the unworthy or to be idle. Charny makes it clear that the lords with their responsibilities over other men have a duty to keep their word and to avoid inciting other people to commit anything that could be regarded as a misdeed:

Furent il faiz pour mentir et faire Were they chosen to lie and to contre leurs promesses, seremens break their promises, oaths, and ou seellez? Certes nennil. Furent il sealed agreements? Indeed no! fait pour avoir nulle plaisance ne Were they chosen to have no amistie a genz de mauvaise vie? pleasure nor friendship with men of C ertes nenn!·169 . bad lifestyle? Indeed no!

The true function for which rulers were created was to fulfil their duties and responsibilities: 'to endure more and to strive harder than any of the others' - 'pour avoir

66 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.148. 67 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.134. 68 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.138. 69 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.138.

198 plus grans paines et travaulx que nulz des autres' .70 Those responsibilities ranged from giving people good government and serving God, to administering justice tempered with pity and mercy where appropriate. The theme of exertion and activity is evident throughout and this is linked with a strong and familiar moral theme. For example, the prince was chosen 'to be the first to take up arms and to strive with all their might and expose themselves to the physical dangers of battle in defence of their people and their land' - 'jaiz pour eulz armer les premiers et travaillier et mettre leurs corps es aventures

de batailles pour la deffension de leur peuple et de leurs terres' .71 Among all the other things that are considered to be pertinent to the true function of princes, Charny returns to the theme of honesty. Although treason itself is not mentioned, 'they were, therefore, chosen in order to keep their spoken promises, and so, for even stronger reasons, they should keep their sworn and sealed undertakings and never declare them null and void.' - 'il promettoient et disoient de leur bouche veritablement, don't par plus forte raison devoient il tenir leurs seremens et seellez sanz corrumpre,.72 Of course, ill deeds bring one to a 'malvaise fin' or bad end while those who undertake deeds of valour will find themselves born safely along by their 'bonne oeuvres' and noble undertakings.73 Charny specifically dedicates a chapter to those who are too ingenious and over-subtle. If one focuses one's efforts into 'subtilz engin' or cunning schemes, this can result in a failure to reach a true, loyal and sensible conclusion in the same way that one can become lost by leaving the main road to follow a minor path.74 Those who are truly wise realise that to profit fully from their 'bien de sens' or natural intelligence, they must learn what the right thing to do is, act in such a way so as to protect rights, provide good advice, 'not using excessive subtlety, and without incurring shameful reproach' - 'non pas ses tres grans

subtilletez et sanz nul malvais reproche' .75 Of course, it is not always possible to think through every action or weigh-up the balance of benefit and advantage. Charny, above all else, favours the man of action. Rather than criticising those individuals who act before they think, Charny makes it clear

70 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.140. 71 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.142. 72 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.142. 73 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.146. 74 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, pp.148ff. 75 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.150.

199 that they cannot be reproached in relation to their honour as they are clearly brave. We have seen that other writers on this subject emphasise the importance of cohesion and organisation. Charny takes the line that those who refuse advice and spur on regardless and in a disorderly way, probably do so to their own disadvantage.

II n'y regardent profit, ne They do not consider the benefit or advantage pour leurs amis, ne a advantage for their friends or the la grant grevance de leurs harm done to their enemies, but, ennemis, mais sanz conseil without giving or taking advice, they donner ne prendre fierent des spur forward in a disorderly way and esperons et a po d' arroy, et font perform personally many feats of d' armes assez de leur main et arms. This is often more to their moult de fois plus a leur do mage disadvantage than to their advantage. que a leur profit.76

This finds echoes in Bouvet's Tree of Battles where, although the author is keen to promote this idea of discipline and obedience, he also pragmatically accepts that if orders are disobeyed but the outcome is favourable to the cause, then the punishment should not be too severe or even ignored: 'A deed of great utility should excuse disobedience to the sovereign's command, and because of the happy issue he should not lose his head,.77 Charny's admonishment is limited to the statement that it is possible to do better than this: 'quant a estre preus a droit, l'en y pourroit encores miexfaire' .78 Chapter twenty-three emphasises the importance of just cause for the process of war. Charny states that one must 'take care not to be so greedy as to take what belongs to others without good cause' - 'gardez que convoitise ne soit en vous pour tolir ne pour avoir l'autruy sanz cause'. What follows from this is the equally important moral statement that 'as you value yourself, you do not let anything of yours be taken from you'

- 'vous amez que vous ne vous laissiez rienz tolir du vostre' .79 The positivistic conception that standing up for one's rights is a moral duty is very clear here. The idea of just cause and due process is returned to in a later chapter dedicated to describing the men-at-arms of supreme worth. After giving examples of those who deserve the highest

76 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.150. 77 Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), pp.122f. 78 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.150.

200 praise, Charny assures his readers in chapter thirty-five that to follow the true path of chivalry is to save one's soul through one's actions. One must only take up arms in those struggles that have followed the correct procedure, are started in the appropriate manner, and then conducted in the right way:

quant es mestiers d' armes, don't When in the profession of arms, in l' en peut et doit acquerir ces tres which one can and should win these hautes honnours, l' on y peut bien high honours, one can indeed faire les corps honoreement et acquire honour and valour by one's vassaument et a sauver les ames, body and save one's soul, as for que quant les fais d'armes des example in the practice of arms in guerres deuement encommanciees wars which have begun in the et les batailles qui s' en ensiuent, proper manner and in due form and ainsi come se lurs seigneurs ont in the battles which ensue. This is guerres, leurs subgiez peuent et the case when lords have wars, and doivent guerrier pour eulz et entrer their men can and should fight for seurement et hardiement pour them and move confidently and 8o cestes causes en batailles. bravely into battle.

Fighting for one's lord was clearly ajust cause and it was not up to an individual soldier to question this duty or the motives of the competent authority. Defence of one's own property or rights, or those of defenceless maidens or widows also automatically concurs with these restrictions as long as measures short of war would prove inadequate. This view is consistent with the position set out by Pope Innocent IV in the thirteenth century (see Chapter Two). One who fights the enemies of religion is also assured to be acting in a noble way and acting towards the salvation of one's soul as long as there was no other option and one fights with a purity of conscience and without fear of death:

Ceste guerre est bonne, que l' on This kind of war is good, for one n'y peut perdre ne les corps ne les can lose in it neither one's body nor armes. Si ne doit l' on rienz doubter one's soul. Nor ought one to fear ycelles guerres dessus dites qui de those wars mentioned above which grant neccessite et a leur droit are started from great necessity and garder sont encommanciez, mes to protect one's rights, provided que elles soient maintenues et they are carried on and conducted gouvernees en tele maniere que in such a way that one is always in

79 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.128. 80 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.164.

201 I' on soit touzjours en tel estat de such a state of purity of conscience concience que I' on ne doubte point that one does not and should not ne doie doubter a mourir pour fear to die in order to avoid all 81 toutes hontes eschever. shame.

This idea of being in the appropriate mental state for military endeavours echoes the ideas explored in the Livres Charny.

The moral dimension of the Livre de Chevalerie comes across particularly strongly when Charny discusses those who are unworthy to be men-at-arms. Chapter forty-one also gives us the clearest indication yet of Charny' s views on the specific matters of surprise and deception. Some people fail to meet the standards required of a man-at-arms due to their 'very dishonest and disordered behaviour under these arms' _

'tres deshonestes et desordenees vies qu 'it maintiennent en celle armeure' .82 The list of crimes is telling: waging war without due cause and failing to give the correct defiance or warnIng:

Ce sont ceulz qui veulent guerroier It is these men who want to wage sanz nulle raison de guerre, qui war without good reason, who prennent les uns et les autres sanz seize other people without prior deffiance et sanz nulle bonne cause, warning and without any good et les robent et raimbent, blecent, et cause and rob and steal from them, tuent. .. Si vont encores courre sur wound and kill them ... they attack es uns et es autres en prenant anyone, taking booty, prisoners, proies, prisons et autres biens, s' il and other valuables, if they find les treuvent, et sanz nulle bonne them, and without justification. cause. 83

To act in this dishonourable way is to be cowardly and treacherous. It is not surprise itself that Charny is objecting to, but the type of surprise that would result from the lack of a legal challenge. It is the context of the act rather than the act that is important and this refers to wounding and killing, the taking of booty and prisoners etc as well as surprise. If one has just cause, one has a duty to make this clear to the party that has committed the injury. To fail to do this reduces what is otherwise a true and honourable course of action to a criminal activity. Wicked men who abuse the practise of arms do so in four ways and

81 Chamy, Livre de Chevalerie, p.164. 82 Chamy, Livre de Chevalerie, p.176.

202 three of these are concerned with lack of just cause or due process while the fourth category of wickedness is to harm the Church or its servants. So, seizing another's goods on a highway becomes treacherously stealing or 'mauvaisement robee' for it is done for no good reason or cause. It is also clearly wrong to kill someone without a just cause as this is considered 'murdrir', whereas it may be legitimate given the correct legal situation. Seizing, plundering and robbing others who have not been challenged or have done nothing wrong, 'sanz deffiance ne sanz melfait', is clearly a treacherous deed. 84 One is also not excused if one does not do these things oneself but employs others instead. As Charny made clear with his views of those given the responsibility of leadership, knights are different and special precisely because their causes are just. Those who fail to provide warning cannot be involved in a legal process and are therefore not worthy of the station. Law comes from God so those who are worthy men-at-arms and knights and act to uphold it can be favourably compared to priests. 85

The Demandes pour La ;oute, Les toumois et La guerre86 Charny's Demandes were written in prose and comprise 134 questions concerning feats of arms. Chamy's questions are aimed at receiving a definite ruling on cases ranging from jousts and tournaments, to war. Each of these questions are concerned with definitions, terminology and of the rights and duties of knights, whether in the lists or in the field. Unlike the Canon or Civil laws, the law of arms was clearly not codified in the same way and the type of question asked (and the way it is addressed by Chamy) confirms that the law of arms was a matter of military custom and usage rather than a single recorded body of accepted rules. People would generally have known what was expected of them and what to expect but that did not always help with some of the more unusual things that could happen to a practising knight. Even where a certain event was of the more mundane variety, some customs and traditions could vary from place to place. It was at least important that those who were fighting under the same banner would

83 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, pp.176ff. 84 Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, p.178. 85 Priests also serve God but do so from the safety of their pulpit and do not undertake to suffer the same risks and hardships through their office as those that are cheerfully born by the worthy knight. Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, pp.180ff.

203 have the same view of the customs and laws that pertained to their activities. To get definitive answers to his concerns about what to do when, 'no group of men would have been more competent to rule on such questions than the eminent and experienced knights of the Order of the Star' .87 As such, Charny's perspective is radically different to that of a writer such as Bouvet to whom custom is less important than how knights should behave. Charny wants to know how knights actually do act and is confident that the type of person whom he is addressing will act in the correct way. While it is unfortunate that the answers to these questions have not survived, the questions themselves are quite illuminating by their choice of subject.

Out of the Demandes, twenty deal with jousting, twenty-one with tournaments and ninety-three deal with various aspects of what we would now regard as real warfare. What exactly constitutes a war is dealt with in several places. Chapter twenty five deals with two different types of war: une guerre guerriable and une guerre de conqueste and asks about the correct manner for conducting each.88 This would be an important distinction for those involved in hostilities. As this thesis has demonstrated, different levels of war involved different legal rights and imposed different obligations on those who were involved. The guerre guerriable or 'working war' was the open or public war, a legal feud sanctioned and carried out on the behalf of a competent authority and giving the participants the right to take booty and ransom prisoners. The guerre de conqueste of which Chamy speaks would probably equate to the guerre mortelle where the right to take prisoners was subjugated to the perceived importance of the cause and it really was a matter of fighting to the death.89 That different categories of armed force existed is made very clear by Chamy's questions thirteen to sixteen concerning the three different types of fighting that could take place in the field. The questions makes clear that a bataille was not the same and nor did it have the same implications as a simple armed clash or rencontre or even the same rights and duties as everyday work or besoigne. Even though

86 Translations from the Demandes are my own unless noted. I am grateful for the help and advice of Lisa Jefferson and Prof Beatrice Heuser in this section. 87 N.A.R. Wright, 'The Tree of Battles of Honore Bouvet and the Laws of War' from C.T. Allmand (Ed.), War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1976), p.20. 88 Charny, Demandes, p.l02. . . 89 Innocent IV, Commentaria X.2.13.12. Quoted from Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Mlddle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.144. For a discussion of these distinctions and their meanings, see Chapter Two.

204 a rencontre might look very similar in process and could result in the death of the protagonists, the legal, moral and social functions of different activities could be very different. Charny asks:

Pour ce que trois manieres sont a For there are three types of combat combatre sur les champs. L'une in the field. One is called an s' apelle une rencontre. Comment encounter. In what circumstances doit elle estre appelee rencontre et does one call it an encounter, and pour quoy, car aucuns dient que why, because some people say that rencontre se fait de mil hommes an encounter takes place when d'armes ou de plus que d'une part there are a thousand men at arms or que d'autre? Et si se combatent et more on each side. And they fight des confisent l'une partie l' autre et and one side defeats the other and recueillent Ie champ, et si n' est gains the field, and yet it is not dicte ne besoigne ne batille. called either a 'besoigne' [an Comment doit it estre ainsi?90 'affair', an 'action', a 'conflict', 'work'] or a battle, why should it be thUS?91

Question fourteen asks:

Gens d' armes sont sur les champs, Men at arms are in the field, and a et se combatent bien mil hommes good thousand men or more are enseble ou plus; et disconfisent fighting each other, and one side I'une partie l' autre, et recueillent Ie defeats the other and wins the field. champ. Et ne dira l'en que c'est And one will say that this is nothing fors que une besoigne, arrestee but a 'besoigne' [an 'action'], which ainsi comme elle est chelle Ie jour. has stopped there as it happened on Et ne sera tenue ne rencontre ne the day. And it will not be held to bataille. Comment doit ce estre?92 be either an encounter or a battle. Why is this so?

While question fifteen asks simply 'in what circumstances should a battle be called a battle, and why thus and not otherwise?' - 'Comment doit estre appelee bataille a estre dicte bataille et pour quoy et non autrement?' .93 From what has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, one of the criteria required before a trial by combat could take place was an acceptance from both sides that this would be a judicial procedure. If this agreement was lacking then an encounter, even on a large scale, would be referred to as besoigne or

90 Charny, Demandes, p.96. • 91 My great thanks to Lisa Jefferson for translating this and questions 14, 15 and 16. 92 Charny, Demandes, p.96.

205 something else other than battle. Question sixteen asks the knights to determine which name to call an armed clash when neither side is sure what the status of the engagement IS:

Deux chevetaines sont sur les Two captains are in the field of champs pour combatre et grant combat along with a large host of foison de gens d'armes d'une part men at arms on both sides. And one et d'autre. Et si est 1'un des of the captains and his men are chevetaines desconfiz et ses genz; defeated, and the other captain who et li autre chevetaine qui a Ie has the upper hand and his men kill dessus et ses gens tuent et and take prisoner a very large prennent grant foison des number of the defeated and they desconfiz et gaaignent chevaux et win horses and many other goods. autres biens assez. Et quant ce And when evening comes, no one vient Ie soir nulz ne tient que ce considers that this has been either soit rencontre, ne besoigne, ne an encounter, or a 'besoigne' batille. Comment puet ce estre ne ['action'] or a battle. Why is this comment sera ce appeles?94 so, and what should this be called?

These questions clearly demonstrate that the different levels of war were qualitatively different. One had different rights and obligations depending upon the type of armed venture one was engaged in, and in this context it is obviously important that one knows in advance what is expected. The importance of clarity in this area and knowing the context of one's actions is highlighted in question twenty-two:

S'il y a deux compaignons qui ont Two men are at war with each guerre l'un a l'autre don't 1'un est other, one of them is your close plus pres vostre voisin que l' autre, neighbour but you are not mais vous n'estes point de leur involved in their dispute. Your guerre. Si avient que celui qui plus neighbour requests your help to pres vous est voisin vous requiert defend his house which will be que vous Ii aidi<.~s a deffendre sa stormed the day after. You get maison que l' en doit assaillir there the evening before. The demain, et vous y ales Ie soir. Li enemy of the neighbour comes to anemi de celui vienent assaillir la attack the house and you try your maison; et vous li aidies a deffendre best to defend your neighbour's si bien comme vous povez sanz house. The assailants fail in their faillir a eulx. Et faillent a prendre la attempt and retreat, leaving in maison et se retraient; et en y a p lace the dead and wounded, the

93 Charny, Demandes, p.96. 94 Charny, Demandes, pp.96f.

206 demore de mors et de bleciez de other assailants having fled. The ceulx qui ont assailli; et s' en vont comrade who came to defend his ceulx qui s' en pueent aler. Et cil qui neighbour goes home, but shortly est compains qui est venu desfendre afterwards, he is himself la maison a son voisin s'en va a sa assaulted by his neighbour's maison; et assez tost apres li anemi enemies, he is kept prisoner and de son voisin Ii vienent courre sus his belongings and home are et prennent prisons et autres biens looted. The victim claims he was et les emmainent. Cil compains dit attacked without a formal qu'il ont couru sus li autrement declaration of war, as once he qu' apoint et sans defiance, quar had left (the neighbour), he was puis qu'il n'estoit issu hors, il no longer at war. The others say n'avoit point de guerre; l'autre dit yes he was. Each party has pretty que si a. Pluseurs raisons y a d'une good reasons. What will the Rule part et d'autre. Qu'en sera il jugie of Arms judge and decide? par droit de fait d'armes?95

This clearly has implications for the use of surprise as in this case, the party who has been taken off guard assumed a different legal state existed to the one that his attackers claimed. This does not rule out the use of surprise, however it clearly demonstrates that it cannot be employed in a military sense until warning has effectively been given through the sending of a properly worded defiance to change the legal situation between the two parties. This question was asked by Charny because it was not clear which legal situation was actually present at the time due to previous events. Just as with the questions under the headings of joust and tourney, many of the questions under the heading of war are concerned with etiquette regarding prisoners and booty. They ask detailed questions about who is entitled to take particular prisoners given different circumstances and also the rights and duties of prisoners themselves. These are particularly interesting when they concern the swearing or implications of the breaking of faith. For example, maya prisoner who has sworn faith escape without reproach if the opportunity arises?96 It is unlikely that the answer to this question was yes. Once one's faith had been given, it could not be broken without reproach or the loss of honour. Given that warfare was itself a legal process, the status of one's oaths within it was bound to be extremely high. However, there are other situations suggested where the answer is a little less obvious. For example, what if the prisoner was being mistreated or beaten? This

95 Charny, Demandes, p.101.

207 could then be a case where the captor has broken his own oath to protect his prisoner in which case the contract would presumably be null and void. One would assume that the prisoner would then be free to escape with his honour intact as the agreement was no longer in place to be broken.

The status of an agreement is also the subject of chapters sixty-nine and seventy. These are concerned with one's obligations if a promise was made but one was misled when it was made. The first details a case where a knight has surrendered to another knight after checking that he was indeed of the correct standing: 'Ii chevaliers Ii demande s'il est gentilz horns, et Ii autres Ii respont "oil'''. It later transpired that the knights had in fact surrendered to someone who was not a knight at all: 'uns sergens sanz nulle

gentillesce' .97 In this case, the status of the agreement is again called into question and one would imagine that the knights were no longer bound by their promise not to escape. This question has implications for the results of being deceived into a legal situation. That situation, and by implication any results that came from such a situation (such as the result of a trial by combat) could be questioned if deception was employed to bring about the state of affairs in the first place. However, it would be most peculiar if the Knights of Our Lady believed that the knight in chapter eighty-one deserved any sympathy when he lies in an attempt to avoid being taken prisoner in the first place. 98 Still on the subject of agreements and faith, chapter twenty-four raises a very pertinent issue about when it is permissible to break a truce. Specifically, it is interested in how far a truce must have been broken before it can be abandoned by both sides. Charny sketches out a situation where two neighbours have brokered a truce but that truce is then threatened by men acting outside or beyond their instructions:

Deux seigneurs ont guerre I'un a Two lords are at war with each l' autre et marchissans I'un vers other because they are neighbours l' autre et pluseurs marches de pais. and they disagree about who Si avient que ils prennent treves possesses some pieces of land. If it tout generaument de leur guerre happens that they make a general sanz rien excepter ne en une truce they have to extend it to all of marche ne en autre. Si avient que their territories without exception.

96 Charny, Demandes, p.121. 97 Charny, Demandes, pp.125f. 98 Charny, Demandes, p.132.

208 les treves se rompent en une ou .ij. If the truce is broken in one or des marches qui marchissent entre several parts of the territories ces .ij. seigneurs, et y ont leurs gens [about which they have waged war d' armes et prennent villes et previously] and men-at-arms take chastiaux et ont a faire pluseurs sur towns and castles and in doing so, les champs les autres marches. Se cross the disputed territories, doivent il tenir en treves, ou qu'ilz should they hold to the truce or soient de guerre, combien qu' il should the war resume while they n' aient encore rien forfait sur les have forfeited nothing to the other autres et que les treves soient routes and while the truce has been sent comme dessus ?99 off course. What say you?

Clearly the presence or absence of a truce affected the legal situation and what one was allowed to do. For example, one could certainly not take prisoners during a truce. Apart from the rules concerned with prisoners and ransoms, questions concerned with the allocation of spoils and booty feature in a large proportion of the Demandes on war and include questions two, nine, forty-one, forty-two, forty-four to fifty-five, and eighty-three. This is a huge departure from Bouvet's Tree where only one paragraph of the entire work is dedicated to this question and Bouvet states simply that all booty should be handed over to the duke of the battle for him to share out according to their valour. Only four of the Tree's questions deal directly with the scale of ransom while at least twenty others are concerned with the class of people entitled to immunity from imprisonment. The Tree is concerned less with protecting the rights of practising soldiers, and more with protecting society from those soldiers. Charny however is concerned with precisely the issue of the rights of himself and his fellow knights. Therefore the Demandes are concerned with many different circumstances and situations that affect the material well-being of the practitioners of war, from the allocation of spoils to those who for various reasons were not involved in the battle, to the rules about restoring or awarding horses during and after war. Some of the more interesting Demandes on war are concerned with the qualities of an ideal knight. For example, in chapter nineteen Chamy asks if sens or prouesce is to be preferred. 100 Chamy is also particularly concerned with honour, loyalty and reputation. He asks when it is possible for a knight to leave the battlefield or surrender honourably,

99 Charny, Demandes, pp.l00f. 100 Charny, Demandes, p.97.

209 and when a challenge can be declined without dishonour. For example, chapter eight asks should knights accompany a defeated captain from the field or stay and fight?101 One of the questions concerned with reputation asks; a group of fifty knights defeat a group of one hundred knights:

Le quel ameries vous miex: ou a How would you prefer to be estre tenu pour Ie meilleur chevalier known: as the best knight of the des cent ou Ie pire des cinquante defeated hundred or the worst of quant pour la journee?102 the victorious fifty on the day?

These questions and others are particularly interesting as they show how practical the questions are by admitting the possibility of defeat. This question may simply be referring to the individual effort of a knight in a fictitious thought experiment, but it is interesting to speculate as to the importance of being seen to lose well as opposed to winning but with a question mark over one's conduct. As he did in the Livres Chamy above, Charny, accepts that defeat is something that is going to happen from time to time. Knowing one's rights and obligations in these circumstances was important. The highly practical nature of the Demandes is also evident when Chamy asks in the penultimate question if it is better to know how to flee well or to know how to pursue well: 'Le quel est le plus grant sens pour fait de guerre: ou de savoir bien fouir ou de savoir bien

chacier?' .103 Again, the possible subtext of this question is intriguing. Pursuing a defeated foe is considered necessary in modem times to ensure destruction of the enemy and therefore the decisive nature of the clash. Pursuit could also fulfil the same function in the Middle Ages but destruction of the enemy was not necessary for a decisive result. Following the trial by combat, one only had to hold the field for a certain amount of time for the legal challenge to be satisfied and victory to be clear. 104 If one were to retreat well and employ the advice of Vegetius to turn a withdrawal into a fighting chance, the nature of the answer to the question becomes very interesting indeed.

101 Charny, Demandes, p.93. 102 Charny, Demandes, p.136. 103 Charny, Demandes, p.137. 104 Thus the term champion - holder of the champ or field.

210 Conclusion

The works that Charny completed in his lifetime provide a valuable insight into the practicalities of warfare in the late Middle Ages. These works are not moral treatises concerned with prescriptive judgements saying how things should be. There is a very clear moral tone throughout all of the works but it is concerned with the importance of warfare as a duty and the clear belief that wars are a normal and essential part of life. The whole moral universe that Chamy inhabits is underpinned by his idea of honour. This is a martial conception of honour where all feats of arms carried out by worthy knights are to be considered positive, from the jousting field to the battlefield, although, almost as an afterthought it sometimes appears, one must remember that the knight is helpless without God. The tone of Charny's writing is radically different from that of someone like Bouvet. Bouvet is concerned, amongst other things, with limiting the effects of war on the general popUlation and peasantry. Charny only mentions this in passing in the general requirement of a good knight to be generous to the poor. The actual lives of the peasantry are of no concern to him or the class the he represents as a whole. Nor should he be criticised for this lack of concern. Knights were not unchivalrous for not attempting to limit the effects of war on anyone else for as Kaeuper asserts: 'as a code, chivalry had next to nothing to do with ordinary people'. 105 It was a code, reserved for those whose disputes warranted it, that provided a framework for resolving legal disputes about rights. In two of his three works Chamy focuses on sloth as the root of evil for a fighting man. If knighthood had gained, in its own eyes at least, a religious role and, perhaps, even considered itself superior to the priesthood by this point as they embraced life instead of partitioning themselves from the world, then sloth would be the worst sin for an active man using his prowess to serve God. In this context, the ill-fated crusade of Dauphin of Viennois that Chamy took part in could be seen as a positive thing. It was only after a year and a half of truces with the English that Chamy decided to participate in the venture. It could easily be argued that, for a man of action, the enforced inactivity was impossible to live with. Going on crusade during what appeared to be a long period

105 Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.185.

211 of inactivity would be in perfect accord with this attitude. Even the short-lived nature of Charny's expedition can be seen in a positive way. His rapid departure from fighting the Turk coincided with the resumption of hostilities with England. Edward III formally renounced the truces on the 14th and 15th June 1346 although the first of his armies had left for the continent up to two weeks ahead of that date. I06 It is possible that Charny had heard of this and realised that his services were required at home. At the great set piece battle of Poitiers in which he lost his life, the Chandos Herald suggests that Charny attempted to organise a combat of one hundred French versus one hundred English knights. I07 While this is the only source to suggest it, it would be consistent with the ideas and spirit that are contained in Charny's writings above. In the same battle, Froissart tells us that Charny had cut down the first man who had laid a hand on the bridle of his king's horse. I08 Whether or not that is Froissart's artistic licence, it is certainly true that Charny died attempting to defend his king and his king's cause while carrying the most important symbol of his nation in arms. There was no greater service a knight could provide and he certainly did nothing to contradict his own advice in his last acts of chivalry. All of Charny' s works exhibit the strong view that a worthy knight should be a man of action. Charny not only believed that qui plus fait, miex vault, or he who does more is of greater worth, he actually practised it and this probably explains his phenomenal status amongst his contemporaries. Whilst he may have 'sailed a little close to the wind' with some of his exploits, one can conclude that, either everybody was entitled to a second chance, or 'perhaps most fighting men of the time would simply have

thought that Charny played the game by a hard set of rules' .109 Whether this was the case or not, Charny's works provide us with important insights into the use of surprise and deception and the attitude towards them held by practitioners of war. One must clearly avoid being too ingenious or over subtle - cunning schemes can go astray and take a knight with them. This would appear to cover the area of deception. One must be careful to speak honestly, and avoid villainy. Actually conducting any kind of deception that involves the breaking of faith is clearly out of the question although one should also stay

106 Sumption, The Hundred Years War, p.454. 107 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, lines 729ff. 108 Lettenhove, Oeuvres de Froissart, V, p.543. 109 Kaeuper & Kennedy (eds.), The Book of Geoffroi de Charny, p.13.

212 on one's toes as one has a duty to avoid being deceived too. The knight should be extremely wary when talking with his enemies and Charny makes the interesting observation that one must have some knowledge of evil to defend oneself from it. 110 People in a position of authority also clearly have a duty to keep their word, regardless of the importance (or perhaps precisely because of the importance) of their cause. Any deeds that are done on one's behalf are also covered by this attitude and one must avoid

getting other people to carry out any misdeeds on one's behalf. I II When Charny speaks of those who may be wise but direct their intelligence towards 'grant malice', it is not the intelligence itself that he regards as bad, but the intention. In the same way, he does not appear to regard surprise itself as wrong. Once again we return to the idea that it is not the act but the end towards which it is employed that is normative. It is the context that it is employed in that is important as one must have just cause for one's actions and this determines the normative value of the act. The idea of just cause and due process is repeated in multiple places and it is made abundantly clear that one must only take up arms in those struggles that have followed the correct procedure, are started in the appropriate manner, and then conducted in the right way. Waging war without due cause or failing to give the correct defiance or warning is clearly regarded as dishonourable, criminal, cowardly and treacherous. This effectively means that grand strategic surprise cannot be employed due to the requirements of giving one's defiance and setting out the charges and the injury suffered, be that physical, financial, legal or moral. Once the process has been followed, one should be expecting an attack due to the state of war that exists. If an armed clash resulted from a surprise meeting during the process of the feud, the fact that a rencontre or besoigne and a bataille are clearly treated differently by Charny and have different rules applied to them supports the view that a judicial trial by combat could not have been brought about through a surprise because, while the result might well look like a battle, it would not have the same legal context.

lID Perhaps Charny has in mind the impetuous youth that attempted to retake the fortress at Calais. With a bit more experience, he would not have undertaken this venture (or perhaps would have been successful at it). . . . 111 Charny can be seen to be moving towards the idea that moral duty IS for the supenor to ensure aJust cause and for his subordinates to follow it.

213 Chapter Seven Case Studies

The following case studies are used to highlight the importance of context in the use of both surprise and deception in medieval warfare. Both phenomena are examined in different circumstances, employed by different people in different environments and at both the tactical, strategic and grand strategic level. Each account draws upon a number of different sources to build up a picture including personal accounts, letters, and a wide mixture of chronicles. While there is always the military historian's problem of piecing the events of a campaign or battle together from disparate and often contradictory sources, the point here will not necessarily be to provide a narrative of these events, but to determine the kind of behaviour that was expected within the realm of different people's experience. As with the accounts of Froissart in Chapter Four, the actual historical accuracy of the events is an interesting question but it is not necessarily central to the value that the accounts have as records of attitudes and the normative framework within which the events described took place. If a particular course of action is considered a definite possibility, then it illustrates what was considered to be normal or acceptable behaviour. The chapter will examine elements of the 1346 Crecy campaign, the campaign culminating in the Battle of Najera in 1367 and will conclude by looking at the Agincourt campaign of 1415. The case studies have been chosen to cover a wide range of situations to examine the phenomenon of surprise and deception and demonstrate the significance and importance of context on the conduct and expected conduct of the parties involved in hostilities through the Hundred Years War.

Crecy Campaign 1346 The military phase of the campaign that resulted in the battle of Crecy began with 15,000 men under Edward III landing at the small port of St-Vaast-Ia-Hougue in the Cotentin peninsula, Normandy on 11th July 1346. The efforts to preserve secrecy for this operation had the desired effect and it was not until the end of June that word somehow got back to

214 the French court and preparations were begun to protect the north. l This was still not sufficient for there to be any resistance when the English force landed at St-Vaast-Ia­ Hougue. They expected to join with an allied Flemish force from Flanders and they rapidly advanced towards Caen, burning and devastating the countryside and taking those castles and towns that could be overcome quickly. The small French force in the area under the command of Robert Bertrand, withdrew ahead of them, attempting without much success to slow them down. It was during this advance that the Grandes Chroniques levels the first of its charges of treachery at Edward:

It was commonly said that he sent to the bourgeois of Caen by his messengers and his letters, saying that if they would leave the King of France, and submit to the King of England, he would protect them faithfully, and give them many great liberties, and at the end the letters threatened them that if they did not do as he had instructed, they could be quite certain that he would assault them very soon. But the people of Caen, united in will and courage, defied him, saying that they would not obey the King of England. And when the King heard the answer of the bourgeois of Caen, he summoned them to give battle on the following Thursday; and this he did treacherously, because already in the morning of the day before, which was Wednesday the twentieth of August, he arrived before Caen ... [and] assailed the town in four places.2

Even if one is to give the benefit of the doubt to the Grandes Chroniques over the dates and chronology of the events described here (Caen actually fell in July), there are other reasons to doubt details of this account although the way it is set out is still highly interesting. It would have been highly unusual to summon a town to give battle. A letter from Edward at this time makes no mention of any challenge to battle although the

intention to hurry on past Caen to meet his adversary, i.e. Philip VI, is clear. 3 If a town had been commanded to surrender in this way and had chosen not to then legal practice regarding the matter was clear. In this case, Edward was certainly under no obligation to

1 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (London: Routledge, 1985), pp.499ff. 2 Clifford J. Rogers (Ed.), The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), pp.124ff. 3 See PRO C811314117803 in Kenneth Fowler, 'News from the Front: Letters and Despatches of the Fourteenth Century', Guerre et societe en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne. XlVe Siecle, Philippe Contamine et al (Eds) (Lille: Centre d'histoire de la region du nord et de l'Europe du nord-ouest, 1991), pp.83f.

215 keep to any timetable. Once the refusal had been sent, a legal situation akin to Roman war existed (see Chapter Two). Unlike a normal trial by battle where the justice of a cause was decided by the outcome of the duel, under the Roman legal system, the justice of the cause was already demonstrated and assumed before military activity commenced. The military phase of the legal procedure was the administration of justice rather than a way of finding out whose cause was just. In the same way, the process of taking a town or castle that had refused to surrender was exercising justice rather than determining it as far as Edward and contemporary practice was concerned. That was why the lives and property of those in a disputed town or castle who resisted a demand to submit were technically forfeit if it fell as they could legitimately be treated as traitors for resisting the rightful owner.4 Whilst de facto possession was required to exercise such a claim, the legal process was clear. Edward may well have claimed that he would be before the town on a certain date, but once the town had refused his terms, he could begin its conquest at any time. Clearly, given this situation, the charge of treachery would be disingenuous. However, the charge that the Grandes Chroniques makes is based upon the notion that Edward did take the unusual (and unlikely) step of challenging the town to battle once it had refused his terms. If the bourgeois of Caen had accepted the challenge then this would have changed the legal context of Edward's actions, imposing restrictions on what could be done in what was now a judicial ordeal to determine the rightness of Edward's claim on the town. To have then broken those conditions and returned to the format of the feud rather than actually carry out the ordeal in the correct way would have allowed a charge of treachery to be levelled at the English King. It would appear that the Grandes Chroniques may have been attempting to explain the rapid fall of the town of Caen on 26th July by blaming it on the 'treacherous' tactics of Edward rather than the panicked defence in an action that was confused on both sides, even though such a claim would have fooled very few people. Following the fall of the town of Caen, and leaving a small force behind him to continue the siege of its castle, Edward now headed east towards Rouen, with his army

4 See Chapter Two for a discussion of these issues and the difference between various approaches to conflict.

216 burning everything in their path. With Philip unable to come up with a coherent plan in the face of multiple threats (apart from Edward, the next most pressing threat to France came from Flanders) the king proclaimed the arriere-ban calling every available man to come to the land's defence and meet him in Rouen.s Initially planning to hold Edward south of the Seine, Philip changed his mind at the last minute and withdrew into the town , breaking the bridge as soon as it was crossed, now planning to hold Edward at the river. While this went on, the mechanics of the feud continued. Edward received Philip's cardinals at Lisieux on the third of August expecting them to have been authorised to negotiate on the French King's behalf. When they failed to produce letters of authority, Edward dismissed them. As Edward continued to advance, destroying the land as he went, the cardinals returned, this time bearing formal concessions from Philip for the first time. Philip offered to restore Ponthieu and the areas of Aquitaine that had been lost as long as they were held as fiefs of the French Crown and also proposed a marriage alliance. These were the types of concessions and compromises that the process of the feud was intended to achieve but what was being offered here was insufficient for Edward who made it clear that he would not lose a single day's march discussing such 6 trifles. If the process of the feud proved unable to force the required settlement, its other function could be to try and force a battle where the issue could be decided through judicial combat and Edward's intention to follow through with this plan is clear from his actions. Unable to approach Rouen while the French held the north bank of the Seine, Edward was forced upriver towards Paris with the French shadowing on the opposite bank. Continuing to burn everything in and on either side of their path, the English attempted to find a crossing but were foiled by the walled towns that controlled the only bridges and were easy to support and defend as long as the French army controlled the north bank. By 12th August, Edward was within twenty miles of Paris and the strategic problems for Philip were growing as he could not protect Paris both north and south of the Seine and he could not protect both of the main crossings due to the huge bends in the river that meant the crossing were much closer together for the English on the south bank

5 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p.513. 6 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p.514.

217 than they were to the French on the north. 'A bold spirit might have crossed the river and confronted the enemy ... But Philip VI was not a bold spirit.,7 Instead, seeking to reduce the number of dilemmas he faced, Philip had the bridge at Poissy destroyed and the town abandoned. The Grandes Chroniques laments that the French nobility destroyed bridges and avoided the English instead of actually doing something about the invader who was

'residing for six days in the King's own houses, and in the middle of France besides'. 8 The implied shame that such actions provoked demonstrate just how the chevauchee was far more than simply a physical threat. Clearly the failure to prevent or halt such a procession was a severe moral blow as well. Instead of proceeding closer to Paris, Edward began to rebuild the bridge at Poissy. Unable to prevent Edward crossing at Poissy, running out of options and still worried about the loss of face he had already suffered, Philip at last issued a public challenge to Edward, suggesting a series of dates and a choice of venues either north or south of the river. 9 It is not entirely clear what exactly Edward's reply was but it was during these events that the Grandes Chroniques presents the charge of treachery at Edward once more. The Grandes Chronique states that Edward replied to Philip's challenge by agreeing to a combat before Paris, causing Philip to return to his capital to await the encounter that the English had no intention of meeting. The Grandes Chronique's opinion of the cowardly English is scathing here even before the alleged deception took place. It describes how Edward chose not to attack Mantes where the English had heard it said that they were good fighters. In the mean time, the Chroniques records that intelligence was received that Edward was not planning to head to the south of Paris but was instead rebuilding the bridge at Poissy. This intelligence was ignored leaving Philip and his army in entirely the wrong place. Once Edward crossed to the north bank of the Seine, the French king was 'greatly angered' and headed north telling everyone in his path that he had been betrayed, 'and the king doubted whether otherwise he could have been led back and forth thus. The people murmured too, and said that such a way of going and returning would not be without treason,.10 The moral tone of the language of

7 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p.517. 8 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, pp.126ff. 9 Froissart, Chroniques, Kervyn de Lettenhove (Ed.) 29 vols (Brussels: 1867-77), IV, pp.496f. 10 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, pp.126ff.

218 the writings clearly seeks to place Edward's actions in the area of one who has used deceit to gain an unfair advantage.

Whilst it is not clear if Edward gave anything more than an indication that he would meet Philip on the French King's terms, just before (or possibly just after _ see below) the English crossed the Seine and headed away from his position, a letter was sent to Philip.

We have come without pride or presumption into our realm of France, making our way to you to make an end to war by battle. But although you could thus have had a battle, you broke down the bridges between you and us ... When we came to Poissy and had the bridge there which you had broken repaired, and stayed there for three days, waiting for you and the army which you have assembled, you could have approached from one side or the other, as you wished. Because we could not get you to give battle, we decided to continue further into our realm ... if you wish, as your letters purport, to do battle with us and protect those whom you claim as your subjects, let it be known that at whatever hour you approach you will find us ready to meet you in the field, with God's help, which thing we desire ab0ve all else for the common good of Christendom, since you will not deign to tender or accept any reasonable terms for peace. But we would not be well advised to [allow ourselves to] be cut off by you, nor let you choose the place and day of battle. 1 1

The letter clearly demonstrates the process of the feud, the attempt to wrest reasonable peace terms and the desire to give battle if this proves impossible. The idea that the argument is also an affront to the whole of Christendom because God's natural order on Earth was being damaged is also clear. Subsequent events, the military situation as he saw it, the nature of the letter and the delay in its delivery to the French camp led Alfred Burne to conclude that 'Edward had completely outwitted Philip'. Rather than immediately replying with the customary defiance, it is alleged that Edward took some time over it, burning the Parisian suburbs in the meantime. Using this as a cover, he had a group spend this time constructing bridges farther downstream. When he did finally send his reply it was at the end of his first day's march across the river giving him a considerable head-start on the pursuing French force. Burne dismisses the criticisms of the Grandes Chroniques of this behaviour by stating matter of factly 'deceitful it was. One of the maxims of war is to deceive your opponent,

219 but the good cleric of the Abbey of St. Denys would not be conversant with such . ,12 A f maXIms. s ar as Burne was concerned, Edward had no intention of giving battle and had cleverly manoeuvred his opponent into a position that allowed him to escape to the north. Sumption partially agrees by failing to see the letter as demonstrating any real commitment to battle, saying it was purely for internal consumption.13 However, in this instance, I disagree with Sumption. The use of such loaded language in the Grandes Chroniques as 'trayson', and stating that the English fled towards Picardy have helped to build up a picture of the French King pursuing his quarry after being deliberately deceived in a successful attempt to wrong-foot him and gain the upper hand. 14 Although the evidence is somewhat confusing, it can however suggest a completely different take on events. Despite various interpretations by historians over the years, the chevauchee of Edward III was actually a battle-seeking one. The evidence of the chronicles, campaign and private letters, Parliamentary advice and other histories is straightforward and to portray the chosen strategy as one of battle-avoidance is to ignore much contrary evidence and instead rely upon some modern notions of inherent military probability which states that no commander would knowingly seek an engagement in which he was vastly outnumbered. As Clifford J. Rogers has eloquently demonstrated, this view is to utterly ignore the medieval mindset and belief systems as well as to go against the actual military situation in which Edward found himself. In spite of the criticisms found in the Grandes Chronique, it also clearly states that the King of England was marching with 'armes descouvertes et banieres desploiees' - uncovered arms and with banners displayed - a clear offer of battle if Philip dared to catch them and accept, confirming Edward's claim in his letter that he could be found ready to meet his enemy in the field at any

time. IS On the other side, Geoffrey Ie Baker describes the English King as being always

ready for battle. 16 A letter written by Edward to Thomas Lucy explains that after waiting at Poissy for three days for the French to come to them to give battle, he 'had the country

11 Calender of Patent Rolls (1345-48), pp.516f. From Rogers, Wars of Edward III, p.278. 12 Burne, The Crecy War, p.154. 13 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p.520.. .., , ,. . 14 Grandes Chroniques de France, Jules Vlard (Ed.), 10 vols (parIs: SOCIete de I historre de France, 1920- 53),9, pp.274ff. 15 Grandes Chroniques, Viard (Ed.), 9, p.279. 16 Geoffrey Ie Baker, Chronicon Galfredi le Baker de Swynebroke (Ed.) E.M. Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), p.82.

220 burnt and devastated all around ... And to better draw our enemy to battle, we headed towards Picardy', a sentiment repeated in another private letter to his Council in London.17 When Contamine described the English King's behaviour as being aimed at

'intimidating the enemy ... Snapping one's fingers at him', this was completely accurate. 18 He wished to fight but to do so on his own terms with his own force deployed on the far 19 stronger position of the tactical defensive. It is quite possible that Philip himself was keen to decide the issue by battle by this stage as the political pressure and public discontent had been growing by the hour as the threat posed by Edward's force to Paris and the lack of any obvious opposition combined to undermine Philip's position. By now Philip may also have wished to end the feud through battle but he did not want the English to be able to fight on the tactical defensive, a posture in which they had already demonstrated themselves to be particularly effective. Philip instead wished to force the English into an attack which may explain his apparent hesitation. Edward would have been making the same calculation and would have been trying to force a battle using the strategic offensive whilst engineering an actual engagement on the tactical defensive to give himself the best possible chance. Following on from this, Rogers suggests that there may actually have been no deception, either intended or unintended by Edward. His letter (dated 15th August) may well have been sent before he crossed the Seine, especially if he crossed at Auteuil th (reached 17 ) rather than Autes, a name similar enough to have been confused by the scribes. His letter states that the English force were 'making our way to you to make an end to war by battle'. The last two words are omitted in the more usual copies and translations?O If it had been a case of deliberate deception aimed at putting some serious distance between the English and French forces, it is curious that Edward chose not to 21 capitalise on this in the two days following the crossing of the Somme. It also seems odd that Edward would slow his 'retreat' down by continuing to burn and plunder if he had no intention of fighting. This is the type of action that allowed Burne to criticise the

17 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, p.277. . . 18 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages trans. MIchael Jones (pans: Blackwell, 1992), p.222. 19 Rogers, 'Edward III and the dialectics of Strategy', in Rogers, Wars of Edward III, pp.272ff. 20 Rogers, 'Edward III and the dialectics of Strategy' , p.278. . . 21 This otherwise odd behaviour is highlighted in Richard Barber, Edward, Prince of Wales and AqUltame (London: Allen Lane, 1978), pp.58 & 62.

221 campaign, precisely because he did not see this as a deliberate action aimed at forcing the

French into attacking the English where they could fight on the tactical defensive. 22 According to one source the bridge at Poissy could be crossed by horse and cart by the end of the first day although, as we have seen, they actually stayed for three. 23 The view that the English were fleeing, simply grabbing booty on the way, also has trouble explaining why the English chose to wait again at Crecy. Even if Edward had employed deception, would it actually have mattered or was B ume correct in his dismissal of the Grandes Chroniques' complaints? As we have seen, Bouvet and Christine de Pisan make clear that craft and fraud could be employed without sin as long as the war had been ordained, was just and defiance had been sent and 24 received. However they make it very clear that perjury and treachery are completely incompatible with the code of chivalry and repeatedly stress the importance of a knight keeping his word. The breaking of faith appears to be the critical issue here and this is not a point lost on either Bouvet or Christine who both agree that whilst using certain types of deception was acceptable, one was not to break one's word. Due to the breaking of faith that this would involve, it would clearly go against God Himself: 'the laws say that

once a pledge is given to one's enemy it must be kept' .25 Philip could only claim to have been deceived because he could also claim that a time and place had been agreed upon. If a time and place had been agreed upon then this would have been notice of a judicial combat to decide the issue and the subsequent failure to attend was a breaking of faith going against God and reason. If a time and place had not been agreed, then Edward and Philip were still in the process of conducting a feud. In this case, Philip would have been admitting dereliction of duty by claiming he had been deceived as this would have meant he had been duped with no battle being offered in that particular place at all. Whether the deception actually happened or not, the charges made by the Grandes Chroniques were serious ones for both parties and were presented as such. If the battle of Crecy had not

22 Burne, The Crecy War, pp.152ff. 23 Joseph Moisant's Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine (paris, 1894), pp.l70f. From Rogers, Edward III and the dialectics of Strategy, p.279. . .. 24 Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: LIverpool UmversIty Press, 1949), pp.l54ff; Christine de Pisan, The Book of Fayttes ofArmes and ofChyvalrye: Translated and printed by William Caxtonfrom the French original by Christine de Pisan, A.T.P. Byles (Ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp.9f. 25 Bouvet, Tree of Battles, p.153 & Christine de Pisan, Fayttes ofArmes, pp.213f.

222 resulted in a crushing defeat for the French, one can imagine the French chroniclers concentrating on the just desserts for the perfidious English.

Najera 1367

Edward, Prince of Wales and known to history as the Black Prince had been alarmed by political events in Castile in 1366. The Prince was the ruler of neighbouring Aquitaine and the removal of Pedro I 'the Cruel' and his replacement by his brother Henry 'the Bastard', with the help of the Free Companies led by Bertrand du Guesclin, meant that Castile was now, if not pro-French, at least very sympathetic towards them. In 1367 the Prince marched into Spain in an effort to reverse the coup. At Najera, Edward's army met and defeated the much larger Franco-Castilian force. The various accounts of the encounter and events leading up to it provide some interesting perspectives on the correct conduct of battle. The sources are partisan and this may actually help in working out the attitudes of the chroniclers and their intended audience. The domestic herald of Sir John Chandos has given us an invaluable account of the events at this time. Sir John was an intimate friend and follower of Edward and this meant that the Chandos Herald was in a particularly privileged position from which to write his Life of the Black Prince and it is clear that he was present as an eye witness on 26 the Spanish expedition. His account is also interesting as, although writing as a biographer here, he was still a herald, with the training, perspective and professionalism that this post would have demanded. Once the Prince had decided to aid the deposed Don Pedro, Henry apparently attempted to make life difficult for him:

Trencher lour fist les chimyns He let cut all the roads, and night Et toutz les soirs et les matyns and morning he made to spring out Maint embusshee sur eux sailler.27 many an ambush on them.

26 Whilst no doubt biased towards his hero, as 'a eulogy upon his prowess and piety' , the infonnation he chooses to give was intended to show the Prince in a favourable li~ht. Theref?re, we ~an fairly s~ely assume that, knowing the herald's intention, he would not have wntten anythmg detnmental to hIS hero. Froissart based his account of the Spanish campaign on the Herald's testament. See Chandos Herald, Life of the Black Prince, by the Herald of Sir John Chandos, Mildred K. Pope & Eleanor C. Lodge (Eds) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910, reprint New York, 1974), pp.liv.ff. 27 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2001ff. For Chandos Herald's passages, I have used Pope & Lodge's translation with additions where I have felt this is necessary. For this work I have used line numbers rather than page numbers to aid cross-referencing.

223 In the period preceding the battle Chandos Herald tells that Henry the Bastard, upon hearing of the Prince's advance into Castile, sent a letter to him stating:

Bien sauons qe vous tous Since we know well that you and Les vres acquerez sanz faille your men seek only to have fforsq pur auoir la bataille battle, we beg you in all courtesy Vous proms amiablement that you will inform us merely in Qe vous nous voillez soulement what place you will enter our Lesser sauoir p quelle partie sovereign territory, and we Entrerez en nre seigniourie pledge our word to you that we Et nous vous auons en couenant will be over against you to give Qe nous vous serrom a deuant battle. [for judgement] Pur vous batailler del iuerer.28

The wording of this challenge (at least as Chandos Herald records it) is significant in the way that he sought to offer the ordeal of trial by battle as soon as the Prince had entered his territory. The Prince convened his council to help form his reply, although what exact}y that was, Chandos Herald does not tell us. However a letter written one or two days before the battle of Najera stated that Edward would enter into Spain without asking anyone's leave (see below). Next comes an account of a night attack by the English after spying on Henry's force whilst it was camped:

Entre ce iour ce temps Meanwhile his men were at A N aueret feurent ses gents Navaretta, who often rode out and Qe bien sauoient hors chiuachoient spied on the Bastard's army until it Et loost du Bastard espioient happened that one night they made Tant qil auient qe sur lour gait their attack on the watch. All on Vn noet emprissent lour fait horseback they charged upon them Tout a chiual en eux sefrirent and took the knight that had Et Ie Chiualer de gait prirent command of the watch, and two or . 29 Et des autres ou d eux ou trOIS. three others.

This does not appear to have any moral significance as far as the Herald is concerned and the two armies ended up camped warily near each other on the plain. The Spanish force then decided to tum the tables and launched a surprise night assault of their own on the camped army of the Prince. This was on a larger scale and apparently involved 'six

28 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2426ff. 29 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2515ff.

224 thousand mounted men' - 'vi mill homes a chiuall' .30 The herald tells us with no apparent sense of outrage that 'many were killed in their beds' - 'en leur !itz maintz tuez sont' .31 The attack would have been more devastating if it had not been for the quick rallying of the troops. The Duke of Lancaster demonstrated the qualities of genuine knighthood by keeping his head in a crisis:

La eust estee si dieux me garde The vanguard would have been Ffortment supprise lauant garde sorely surprised had it not been for Si neust estee li ffranks ducs the noble Duke of Lancaster, full of De Lancastre plein des vertuz valour; for as soon as he heard the Car si tost qil oy Ie cry shouting he sallied forth from his Hors de son logement sailly lodging and took his station on the Et prist pas sur la montaigne.32 mountain.

From this position, others rallied around his banner to form an effective fighting force. Here it is the quick thinking and professionalism of the Duke that receives praise rather than the surprise attack at night receiving criticism. This is consistent with the advice we have found in Vegetius, Charny and even Bouvet.33 Diligence is clearly required. A challenge had been sent and presumably replied to, meaning that the process of the feud was legally under way but that the issue was expected to be resolved through trial by combat. Within this context with both sides aware of the moral and legal environment, there was no reason that surprise should be avoided as at this point the legal situation remained one of feud. Indeed, as Sumption points out, Henry was an experienced soldier who had fought the English before. 34 This was just the kind of hit-and-run, harrying operation advocated by Vegetius, and as a competent military man, Henry would have known that both legally and militarily, this was a pertinent strategy to adopt. The experienced and successful war leader Bertrand du Guesclin also advised Henry to avoid battle with the English and instead to harass their scouts and foragers to keep them moving, eventually forcing them to withdraw through hunger and exhaustion rather than

30 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2670. 31 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2704. 32 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2705ff. 33 For example: Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, N.P. Milner (Ed.) (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), most of Book ill; Charny, Livre de Chevalerie, pp.176ff., and; Bouvet, Tree of Battles, pp.154ff. ~4 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (London: Faber & Faber, 1999), p.549.

225 fighting. Chandos Herald vividly describes the privations suffered by the English while waiting for their recalcitrant foe, drawn up with banners unfurled, offering battle but being left waiting with no food or water.35

Several sources, including the Spanish historian and chronicler Pedro LOpez de Ayala who was present in the Castilian camp, give details of a letter sent by Edward and Don Pedro to Henry on the day or two before the battle of Najera offering mediation or the chance of a negotiated compromise.36 Chandos Herald records that the letter concludes with:

Si accorder vous ambedeux purroie You have such renown, and are Moult voluntiers menpeneroye held so valiant, we would very Et ferroi tant de rna part gladl y be at pains to accord you Qen Castille aurez grant part both, and would ourselves see to it Mais raison droit si se donne that you should have a large share Qe lesser vous faut la corone in Castile. But reason and right Et ensi se purroit nurrir ordain that you must give up the Bon paix entre en Espaigne crown, and thus in truth fair peace Sachez qe moy rna compaigne might be nourished between you. Ouesq I' eide de dieu And as to the entrance into Spain, Y entreroms p Ie quellieu know that I and my company with Qe nous y plerra a entrer the help of God will enter there by Sanz null conge demander. 37 whatsoever place it shall please us to enter, without asking leave of any man.

The process of the feud is vividly illustrated by this letter, with a result being sought through agreement or compromise. If this is not forthcoming, then the feud will continue, possibly resulting in exhaustion and capitulation by one side, compromise by both parties or arbitration at the highest level, before God on the battlefield. One source claims to give details of a second letter sent as a reply by Henry to Edward's offer of compromise and negotiation. Walter of Peterborough, monk of Revesby and secretary to the Duke of Lancaster, states that the letter contained an interesting request for two knights from each side to choose a place of battle.38 Walter is

35 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2827ff. 36 See Pope & Lodge, 'Historical Notes' in Chandos Herald, Black Prince, p.212. 37 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2907-2951. 38 Thomas Wright, Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, 2 Vols (London: 1859-61) I, 97ff.

226 not considered particularly well-informed by Pope and Lodge who suggest that he was prone to fill in details using his own imagination at times. 39 The attempt to get an agreement on a place to fight is 'absolutely foreign to the contents of the document, which was a recapitulation of the charges against Don Pedro and a defence of his own claims by national right of election' .40 However, just because this may not have appeared in the letter does not mean that it did not happen at all. One of the hardest things to explain about the whole battle of Najera is the reports that Henry the Bastard abandoned a strong position on higher ground and chose to fight Edward on the plain instead. The sources split down national lines on this matter with the English sources (and those based on the English sources) choosing to ignore the episode entirely. Ayala stresses that Henry left his favourable position to cross the river on to the plain of Navarete, so that no-one could accuse him of acting unfairly or unchivalrously.41 Another partisan source, Cuvelier the chronicler of Bertrand du Guesclin, laments that the battle was lost because 42 Henry gave up his favourable position against the advice of his captain. If this did indeed happen then it appears to go against everything that the military experts Vegethls and Geoffrey de Charny advised about military matters and even contradicted the advice of Henry's most experienced adviser in Du Guesc1in. On the face of it, it falls into the category of 'empty-headed bravery and foolish courtesy to the enemy, completely undermining the necessary cunning of the art of war' .43 It certainly appears difficult to square this action, if it did indeed take place, with the argument that the practitioners of warfare, and the experienced Henry in this case, were competent professionals who knew their craft well and were prepared to employ the means necessary to ensure they were successful. However if seen from a medieval legal and moral perspective, the empty-headed chivalry takes on a whole new meaning. A judicial duel was to take place. Both sides had made their intentions clear and Henry could not afford to have his recently gained position undermined through failing to defend his new territory vigorously. The English were in the same position as that of the Scots in 1327:

39 Pope & Lodge, 'Historical Notes', p.212. . 40 Pope & Lodge, 'Historical Notes', p.212. This is made with particular reference to Ayala, Cronzcas de los Reyes de Castilla 4 Vols (Madrid: 1779), I, p.449. 41 Pope & Lodge, 'Historical Notes', p.212. .,. 42 Cuvelier, Chronique De Bertrand Du Guesclin, Ernest Chamere (Ed.) (pans: 1839), p.410

227 'they were in his kingdom, and had burnt and devastated it; if this annoyed the [English] king, he might come and amend it, for they would stay there as long as they liked' .44 It probably would have been acceptable for Henry to simply have retained his advantage on the high ground. The outcome of the battle, if it had favoured him, would have vindicated his usurpation and therefore right to the kingdom. However, the incentives for Edward to attack a superior sized force in an advantageous position would have been slight, even if he was having problems with supplies. He was already making his moral argument successfully simply by being in Castile. Every moment he spent there with Don Pedro he was undermining Henry morally and politically. To chose to fight to decide the issue at an obvious disadvantage would simply not have made sense. Henry could have waited longer for the Black Prince to withdraw through lack of supplies, but this would have done nothing to bolster his moral position. The failure of Edward II to deal with just such a threat had led to the popular and baronial discontent that had resulted in his deposition. For Henry, only recently installed as the ruler and with his position less than secure, a judgement from God in the form of a victory would have been extremely welcome. If a battle was to take place to decide the issue, then it would have been up to Henry to abandon his advantage and meet somewhere agreeable to both protagonists. Whilst Chandos Herald omits the episode where the advantage was surrendered, he does state after his account of the battle that:

La place ou on combati The battlefield was on a fair and Estoit sur un bel plain joly, beauteous plain, whereon was Ou il n'eut arbre ne buysson neither bush not tree for a full · . 45 D'une gran de 1leuwe enVIron. league round.

If anything, Chandos Herald is eager to demonstrate the fairness of the contest. Nearly exactly the same language was used by Walter Bentley in his dispatch following the English victory at the battle of Mauron in 1352 where he describes the battle taking place 'in the open fields, without woods, ditches, or other obstacles' and Jean Ie Bel uses very

43 Matthew Bennett, 'The Knight Unmasked', Military History Quarterly, Vol. 7 No.4 (Summer 1995), p.16. 44 Le Bel, Chronique, in Rogers, Edward Ill, p.269. 45 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, l.3425ff.

228 similar language to describe the battlefield at Crecy.46 This almost appears to be a standard confirmation of the fair nature of the contest. Before the battle there is no mention of any advantage being squandered. Perhaps the herald chose to omit the episode relating to Henry either leaving or surrendering his position as with it the Black Prince's victory would not have appeared quite so impressive. A fascinating story intertwined with that of the Spanish campaign is that of King Charles of Navarre and his attempts to avoid antagonising either side in the conflict. Navarre was strategically placed between Aquitaine and Castile leaving its king in an unfortunate position. When Don Pedro fled to Edward for support, Charles was summoned to a council and agreed, in return for certain concessions, that the English force could pass through his territory.47 Having been approached for help by Henry, his neighbour in Castile, it appears that Charles was persuaded to make some kind of alliance with him forcing his diplomatic position to be rather contradictory. According to Ayala, whilst at Santa Cruz de Campezo Charles agreed to prevent the passage of the English troops through his territory.48 Following rumours of this new alliance and the implied duplicity, Hugh of Calverley was dispatched to bring Charles round to the English way of thinking.49 He captured, or at least sacked, the towns of Miranda and Puente-la-Reina. Perhaps realising the destruction that would be wrought by hostile troops passing through 5o his kingdom, Charles returned to Edward and renewed his oaths and original alliance. It is interesting that the records show that in late September, Edward signed a promise to forbid pillage whilst marching through Navarre.51 It seems more than probable that Charles, knowing he was stuck right in the middle of two warring parties, sought to try and please both sides as far as he was able to. Perhaps realising that his diplomatic mission was in tatters and that his double-dealing had been uncovered, Charles organised

a staged ambush in which he was captured 'par traison' .52 The Grandes Chroniques suggests that the King of Navarre's capture was duplicitous and aimed at avoiding

46 Robert of Avesbury, De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii & Le Bel, Chronique, in Rogers, Edward III, pp.144f. & p.134. 47 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.1885ff. 48 Sumption, Trial By Fire, p.549. , .. 49 Chandos Herald, Black Prince: 1.2177ff. (rumours); 1.2196ff. (Hugh s expedItIon). 50 Chandos Herald, Black Prince: 1. 2209ff. , ' 51 Brutails, Documents des Archives de Navarre (Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes, 1894), p.155.

229 commitment and obligation to fight. He was released after he thought that the danger had passed and later gave many gifts to his captor even after supposedly capturing him in 53 turn. Ayala agrees with this interpretation, stating that it was arranged with his captor, Oliver De Mauny, so that Charles could avoid the impossible choices he was being asked

to make. 54 Given the wide agreement amongst the sources that Charles had staged the whole thing, fooling no-one in the process, it is unsurprising that he became 'a laughing

stock throughout western Europe' .55

Agincourt 1415

The Agincourt campaign of 1415 allows an exploration of the role of surprise and or deception on a number of different levels, from the strategic, through the grand tactical, down to the tactical level. The battle itself is one of the most famous of all medieval encounters, with folklore recording the 'brave British archers' overcoming the 'arrogant French chivalry' . It would be impractical to seek to cover all of the details of the Agincourt campaign here, however, certain episodes are very revealing for the purposes of this thesis. In 1413, Henry was crowned King of England and France, and Lord of Ireland. The Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti clearly portrays him as a man of peace, but peace of course, was simply a state of affairs where no legal claims were outstanding (see Chapter Two). Peace required justice and this in turn implied the restitution of his rights and the inheritance of France.56 As a piece of propaganda probably written by a royal chaplain in 1418 to portray him in a good light and justify both the Agincourt campaign and the follow up operation in 1417, the Gesta, could be expected to take such a line.57 The second chapter of the Gesta portrays the new king attempting to secure a lasting

52 Chandos Herald, Black Prince, 1.2480. Being caught through an act of treason would presumably have absol ved the victim of the charge of incompetence at being taken through surprise. 53 Grandes Chroniques de France ou de St Denis, Alexis Paulin Paris (Ed.), 8 vols. (paris: 1836-40), VI, p.245. 54 Sumption, Trial by Fire, p.549. 55 Ibid. 56 For example: 'Rex noster, qui non bellum set pacem quesivit' (Our king, who sought not ~ar but peace), and; 'qui non bellum sed pacem quesivimus' (who have sought not war but peace): Fro~: Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti, trans. Frank Taylor & John S. Roskell (Eds.) (London: Oxford Umverslty Press, 1975), p.34 & p.66. . 57 Anne Curry, 'Henry V: A Life and Reign', Agincourt 1415: Henry V, Sir Thomas Erpmgham and the Triumph of the English Archers (Ed.) Anne Curry (Stroud: Tempus, 2000), p.10.

230 peace or pacem perpetuam between England and France through noble concessions. These proving unsuccessful, his just cause was assured:

Aliud non videns remedium seu At length, not perceiving any other medium per quod as ius suum remedy or means by which he venire posset, ad supremi iudicis might attain his right, he hastened convolavit sentenciam, censiens to seek a ruling from the Supreme sub ipsius auxilio sui iusti Judge, deciding to wield, with His mucronis vibrare potenciam, et help, the power of his just sword inculpati gladii execucione and by us of this blameless sword expetere quod Francorum to exact what the French, by their culpabilis et iniusta violencia, tam blameworthy and unjust violence, longo tractu temporis, usurpare et have for so long a period of time 58 detinere contendit. striven to usurp and withhold.

His fleet was assembled and it is here that the fIrst case of the use of surprise can be found. Just as with the Crecy campaign 80 years before, at the highest strategic political level, the French were hardly going to be surprised by an English attack given that this was an ongoing conflict, and unsuccessful peace negotiations had just concluded. However, according to the Gesta, surprise may still have been attempted at a high level. Henry concealed the destination of his fleet to all but his very closest of advisors:

celato pene omnibus preterquam Having concealed from all save his strictissimo suo consilio quorsum closest councillors the destination proras verteret, transfretare of the ships, he prepared to cross to disposuit in Normanniam.59 Normandy.

Evidence supporting the attempts to achieve surprise is provided by the monastic chronicler Thomas Walsingham recorded the arrest of some French Ambassadors who had seen Henry's invasion preparations near Southampton and apparently hoped to warn their king of his intent. Henry was probably already suspicious of the last minute embassy having already reduced the period of the ambassadors' safe conducts which he regarded as excessive for the duties to be performed.6o It can hardly be a coincidence that the ambassadors were detained at precisely this moment in time. Apart from being in a

58 Gesta Henrici, p.14. I have employed the translations from the Taylor & Roskill edition. 59 Gesta Henrici, p.16. 60 Alban & Allmand, Spies and Spying, p.78. See N. H. Nicolas, History of the Battle of Agincourt (2nd Edn. London: 1832), Appendix 1 ,p.3. for details of the Ambassadors' arrest.

231 position to warn of the impending departure of large numbers of troops, they might also have gained vital information regarding the destination of the ships due to their level of access. If Henry was not concerned about broadcasting his actions, why would he keep his destination secret from all but his most trusted advisors? Anne Curry discovered that on the indentures issued to the English captains on th 29 April 1415, both the English territory of Gascony and French occupied Normandy are named (this was important for the captains as campaigns in French territory paid a higher rate). When the indentures came to be paid on 6th June (or possibly even as early as 14th May), they were actually paid at the French rate rather than the Gascony rate. 61 This raises many questions about whether or not Henry really was attempting to surprise the French. How many people would have been 'in the know' is impossible to say. Presumably it would have been known amongst his troops that they were going to France when the indentures were paid although significantly more research is needed to determine at what point different people would have actually received full payment due to the structure of the indenture system. It is not inconceivable that the actual number who would have been privy to this knowledge would still have been relatively small. Other factors to take into account were that the king could still have ordered the ships to Gascony (the higher pay rate just kept his options open) and, perhaps more importantly, the news that French territory was to be attacked did not mean that the actual destination could be worked out anyway. Even if it had been narrowed down to Normandy, the coast was still enormous and quite impossible to defend in its entirety. Another explanation is that, rather than wishing to keep his destination secret, Henry may simply not have known his destination for sure in April. More importantly for this thesis, it does not actually matter if he knew where he was going all along or even if he did want to achieve surprise at this level. The Gesta portrays the English king in a favourable light throughout and it appears most strange that it would state categorically in its opening chapters that Henry deliberately sought to keep his destination secret if there was any chance that this would not be viewed favourably by his contemporaries.

61 Anne Curry, 'Is there Anything New to Know About Agincouft?'. Lecture given at the Medieval and Early Modern Warfare Seminar Series, King's College London 27/01199.

232 Henry had arrived in France with a force that was at least two thirds mounted. This indicates that some type of chevauchee was planned, possibly to Bordeaux via Paris, as indicated by the two destinations given on the indentures above. By June of 1415, Henry had decided to take the key Norman port of Harfleur.62 The Gesta is keen to demonstrate that this was done in the correct manner:

Rex noster, qui non bellum set Our king, who sought not war but pacem quesivit, ut causam sui peace, in order to arm with the incepti operis maioris armaret shield of innocence the just cause of innocencie clipeo, iuxta the great enterprise upon which he ffiO Deutronomium legis xx , had embarked, offered, in proposuit pacem obsessis si sibi accordance with the twentieth aperirent ianuas et villam illam, chapter of the Deuteronomic law, nobilem porcionem peace to the besieged if, freely and hereditariam corone sue Anglie without coercion, they would open et ducatus sui Normannie, their gates to him and, as was their redderent, ut deberent, libere et duty, restore that town, which was a 63 sine vi. noble and hereditary portion of his crown of England and of his duchy of Normandy.

Again Henry is portrayed as referring to the correct legal procedures before embarking on a course of action. Indeed, the king is supposed to have written all the laws contained in Deuteronomy in his very heart when he took the throne of England so that he may 'Fear the Lord his God and keep the precepts and ceremonies inscribed in that law' - 'timere dominum deum suum et custodire precepta et cerimonias que in lege scripta sunt' .64 In a letter written by Henry to Charles VI in late July or early August of 1415, Henry makes a reference to the laws of war as set out in Deuteronomy:

L' auctori te escripte en Livre The authority of the scripture Deuteronomme enseigne que, a Deuteronomy teaches that, when quelque cite que I' omme viendra thou comest nigh unto a city to pour icelle impugner et combatre, il fight against it, then proclaim peace

62 Nicholas Hooper & Matthew Bennett, Warfare in the Middle Ages 768-1487 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.128. 63 Gesta Henrici, pp.34f. 64 Gesta Henrici, pp.154ff. 65 Monstrelet, La Chronique D'Enguerran De Monstrelet: en deux livres avec piecesjustificatives 1400- 1444, L. Douet-d' Arcq, 6 vols (Societe de l'Histoire de France, 1859), III p.79. Deuteronomy 20.11

233 65 lui offre paix. unto it.

This is perhaps done as a warning to Charles who would have been perfectly aware of the implications of this passage, and the price to be paid for resistance:

And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it: And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword: But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, thou shalt take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God has given thee.66

During the siege later in the year, the Gesta portrays the defenders of the walls of Harfleur suddenly attempting to negotiate once the barbican had fallen, both because they realised that further attacks were imminent and because they feared the punishment of the law of Deuteronomy.67 It is clear that the Gesta is keen to demonstrate the underlying justice of Henry's actions.

Hundreds of siege specialists and military craftsmen had been brought over the Channel to conduct the siege but, at five weeks, the investment still took significantly longer than anticipated. Apart from time, it also cost Henry men, many succumbing to dysentery probably thanks to the appalling hygiene associated with the collection of the shellfish in the estuary below the siege lines. Rather than risking the long journey across France, but mindful of saving face despite the advice of his nobles, Henry opted for a 120 mile chevauchee to Calais with only eight days of food. A challenge to single combat had 68 already been sent by Henry to the Dauphin. Rather than the type of chevauchee that involved devastation, burning, extortion and plundering en route, Henry ordered that his force should take only what they needed for the march, treating the land as friendly rather than hostile territory. 69 With the French forcing a long detour by blocking crossings across the Somme, it was a tired and hungry force that met the superior numbers of French deployed across their route at Agincourt. The French intention to decide the issue continues 'if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee.' 66 Deuteronomy 20. 12-14. 67 Gesta Henrici, pp.48f. 68 Rymer, Foedera, IX. p.313. 69 Gesta Henrici, pp.60f.

234 by battle was made clear when heralds were sent by the Dukes of Orleans and Bourbon and the Constable of France. They asked if Henry 'wished to appoint a day and place to fight against them ... The details should be decided upon by the representatives of both sides and should not give unfair advantage to one side or the other'. This is clearly seeking to agree on a judicial arena. In return, Henry stated to the heralds that: 'since he had left the town of Harfleur he had sought and was still seeking to return to his kingdom of England, and had not stayed in any fortified town or fortress. Thus, if the three princes of France wanted to fight with him there was no need to appoint a time or place because

they could find him any day they liked in open country and without hindrance.' 70 Although a time and place had not been agreed, the legal situation would have been clearly understood by both sides. The subtleties may be a bit harder for us to draw out today. For example, once the two groups were in sight of each other, did banners have to be unfurled before the legal situation would have changed officially from feud to trial by combat? Such subtleties aside, it is clear that a judicial combat was expected by both sides at some point in the immediate future. Once the French force was sighted, Henry became concerned the French might attempt an assault from an unexpected quarter:

Et coniectans Rex noster eos And our king, on the assumption that sic vel circuire silvam ut per by so doing [withdrawing to a field] illam viam venirent super they would either circle round the eum, vel alias per vicina wood, in order that way to make a remociora nemora circuire et surprise attack upon him, or else nos circumcingere ex omni would circle round the somewhat latere, removit statim agmina more distant woodlands in the sua et ea semper constituit in neighbourhood and so surround us on . 71 ad versum elS. every side, immediately moved his lines again, always positioning them so that they faced the enemy.

70 Le Fevre was 19 at the time of the battle and was with the English although he spent the battle with the heralds and used Monstrelet for many for the details. Waurin was 15 and also relied upon Monstrelet for many details, writing his account in the mid fifteenth ce~tury. Jean Le. Fevre & Jean de Waurin, in Anne Curry, The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and InterpretatlOns (Woodbn?ge: Boydell, 2000), p.149. The. Gesta simply has the heralds saying that the French would do battle WIth Henry before he reached CalaIS. Gesta Henrici, pp.74f. 71 Gesta Henrici, pp.78f.

235 It would be easy for the Gesta to make some kind of moral judgement on the expected behaviour of the French but it does not happen. Henry simply expected that the French might try and attack the rear of his force and acted so as to avoid this. As we have seen in earlier chapters, diligence was considered very important and it was up to a good knight not to allow himself to be surprised by an opponent. We know Henry V was considered to be just such a knight thanks to people like Jean de Waurin who stated that Henry V

'kept well the discipline of chivalry, as did the Romans formally' .72 Night fell with no engagement although the French placed heavily manned watches to prevent any English attempt at withdrawal. The French battle plan has only recently come to light. Devised by the experienced Boucicaut and d' Albret, it involved clearing away the archers using heavy cavalry. Unfortunately for the French, the additional numbers of French that collected between the plan being formulated and the actual battle meant that the French were overconfident. The Gesta portrays the French playing dice for the prisoners that they would surely take on the day of the battle. This attitude combined with the funnelling affect of the terrain caused by the woods of Agincourt and -Tramecourt on either side meant that the well-thought out plan was barely implemented at all.73 It would have been no surprise to Henry or his army as the English were discussing just such a rumour as they attempted to find a crossing place on the Somme.74 Another part of the original plan involved sending a small group of men-at­ arms under the command of Louis de Bosredon to attack the rear of the English line and their baggage train. This was exactly the type of thing that Henry was concerned about. On the actual day of the battle, an attack on the baggage train was indeed made as the stratagem was put into effect by Robinet de Bournonville, Riffert de Clamace and Yzambert d'Azincourt.75 It was the emergence of this sudden threat combined with the continued presence of the French rear guard, reforming, still outnumbering the English and still displaying their banners, that persuaded the English king that it was necessary to begin executing his prisoners. Rather than the killing of the prisoners being criticised by

72 Jean de Waurin, Chroniques, W. Hardy & E. Hardy (Eds) (Rolls Series: 1864-91), II p.429. 73 Christopher Phillpotts, 'The French Plan of Battle During the Agincourt Campaign' , English Historical Review, vo1.99 (1984), pp.59ff. French confidence in their superior numbers also meant that the French failed to employ their crossbows. 74 Gesta Henrici, pp.68f. 75 Phillpotts, Plan of Battle, p.63.

236 commentators and contemporary historians, it is the attack on the rear itself that receives the harsh judgement. Different accounts denounce the dishonourable action of the plunderers although exact details are far from clear.76 The Gesta states that French pillagers had been observing the baggage and waiting for their chance when the attention of the English was distracted by the battle.77 It appears that the attack receives criticism, not necessarily because it was carried out on the rear of the English line, but because the battle had already been lost. The French were acting unchivalrously because they should have known the trial was a lost cause by this point. The possible presence of English archers concealed in the trees on either side of the battlefield is another interesting episode:

Ie roy Anglais envoya environ deux The king of England sent about cens archers par derriere son ost, 200 archers behind his army so affin qu' ilz ne feussent apperceuz that they would not be spotted by desdiz Fran~ois. Et entrerent the French. They secretly entered secretement a Tramecourt, dedens a meadow near Tramcourt, quite ung pre, assez pres de I' avantgarde close to the [vanguard] of the d' iceulx Fran~ois, et la tindrent tout French, and held themselves there coiement jusques ace qu'il fut secretly until it was time to shoot. temps de traire, et tous les autres All the other English stayed with Anlois demourerent avecques leur their king.79 roy.78

Monstrelet states that the group of English archers were sent to ambush the van of the French position by slipping into a field on their flank the night before the battle. A few things need to be borne in mind about these claims though. Firstly, Monstrelet was writing about thirty years after the event. Apart from the amount of time that had passed, political or national bias is important to bear in mind here. Monstrelet was a Burgundian and wrote his chronicle while in Cambrai, receiving 50 ecus upon presenting it to Philip the Good in 1447. He could simply be attempting to counter negative comments about

76 Le Fevre, Chronique de Jean Ie Fevre, Seigneur de Saint Remy, F. Morand (Ed.) (paris: Societe de l'histoire de France, 1876-81), I pp.257f. 77 Gesta Henrici, pp.82ff. See also: Monstre1et, Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet: en deux livres avec pieces justificatives 1400-1444. L. Douet-d' Arcq (Ed.) 6 Vols (Paris: Societe de l'his~oire de Fr~ce, 1857- 62), iii p.l09; M.L. Bellaguet (Ed.), Chronique du Religieux de St Denys, 6 Vols (Pans: C?llectlOn des documents inedits sur l'histoire de France, 1839-52), V p.564; Edmond de Dynter, Chromque des Dues de Brabant, P.F.X. de Ram (Ed.) 3 Vols (Brussels: Commission Royale d'Histoire, 1857), iii pp.750f. 78 Monstrelet, Chronique, pp.l05.

237 the Burgundians, by downplaying the significance of their absence at the battle by h'f' 80 S 1 hng some of the blame onto the sneaky English. Monstrelet is not the only source to mention this action and variations of this episode are reported in other sources too. Jean de Waurin states:

Aulcuns de la part es Francois Some on the French side say that ont voulu dire que Ie roy the king of England sent 200 d' Angleterre envoia secretement archers towards the French and par derriere son ost deux cens behind their army, secretly, so that archiers, adfin quilz ne feussent they could not be seen, towards aparcheus vers Tramecourt Tramecourt to a meadow close to parmy ung pret a lendroit de where the vanguard of the French lavangarde des Francois, adfin were positioned. The purpose of que au marchier que feroient this was that when the French lesdis Francois, ces deux cens marched forward, the 200 Anglois les berseroient a ce Englishmen could [shoot] on them coste; mais jay oy certiffier pour from the side. But I have heard said verite par homme dhonneur qui a and certified as true by a man of ceste heure estoit en lost honour who was there on that day 81 dAngleterre quil nen fut riens. in the company of the king of England that nothing like this happened. 82

Le Fevre also details and then refutes the Tramecourt ambush story.83 However, it is important to consider that both chroniclers were writing long after the event and were not even present during the battle. They both used Monstrelet for many of the details that they could not otherwise know and may simply be mentioning the archers' story because it was stated in the manuscript they were using to fill in the gaps in their own accounts. They both choose to then dismiss the claims by referring to a superior authority - a man of honour. It is always difficult to determine how far one can assume that agreement amongst different texts demonstrates increased proof of the event actually taking place, and how far this simply means that one account has been used as the basis for others. While it is the attitude of the commentators that we are interested in here rather than an exact representation of what actually happened in October of 1415 it may simply

79 Translation from Curry, Sources and Interpretations, p.158. I have changed rearguard to vanguard. 80 See Curry, Sources and Interpretations, p.137. 81 Jean de Waurin, Chroniques, W. Hardy & E. Hardy (Eds) (London: Rolls Series, 1868), IT pp.208f. 82 Translation from Curry, Agincourt 1415, p.24 (my slight correction - one does not fire a bow).

238 have been that the presence of the English archers in the trees was due to the orders gi ven to advance. This could have funnelled the English force making its flanks press into the 84 wood on either side. This is suggested by the account in the Gesta which, whilst not mentioning anything at all about archers being sent off the night before, recounts how the advance by both the English and French lines left the people on the far flanks in the trees due to the narrowing of the field:

Cum accessum prope mutuum When the men-at-arms had from utrimque fecissent armati, latera each side advanced towards one utriusque aciei, nostre videlicet et another over roughly the same adversarie, se imergebant distance, the flanks of both battle nemoribus que erant ad utrumque lines, ours, that is, and the enemy's, 85 latus excercituum. extended into the woodlands which were on both sides of the armies.

As far as the Gesta is concerned, there was no ambush, or if there was one, it was not worth mentioning and the only reason there might have been anyone in the trees is because of the nature of the terrain through which they were moving. The archers that were in the trees would have been offered a certain degree of protection, particularly from any mounted attack, while the archers elsewhere in the line were protected to some degree by their stakes hammered into the ground. 86 The fact that the other sources, sympathetic to the English, choose to mention but then deny the ambush story indicates that they are keen not to take anything away from the victory. The main source that claims it is true has a vested interest in showing that the English had some sort of unfair advantage that would not have been countered by the presence of the Burgundians. It is treated more as a factor rather than anything decisive though as I believe that if Monstrelet had felt that more capital could be made of this, then it surely would have been stressed further. Even the alleged presence of the archers at all, particularly placed where they were, might well have been considered to be unacceptable or at least

83 Curry, Agincourt 1415, p.25. . 84 This might also explain the mounted men along with the archers that one source claImed wer~ concealed in the trees although the accuracy of this account has been questioned. See Jean Juvenal des Ursms, Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France, in Curry, Sources and Interpretations, p.l33. 85 Gesta Henrici, pp.86ff. 86 Gesta Henrici, pp.86f. The archers had been ordered to carry these after the rumours of an impending cavalry attack had spread through the host. See Gesta Henrici, pp.68ff.

239 unpalatable by some due to the nature of the confrontation. Challenges had been issued and effectively accepted even if the exact location was not specified as Henry had replied that he had no intention of avoiding the French. With the French army placed squarely across his path, he was obliged to engage them even without the additional practical problems of lack of supplies etc. also forcing him to. The archers, whilst an important part of the English war machine, could have been perceived by some of the more conservatively-minded as interfering somehow in this process, particularly if they were separated from the main English force, where they could have been considered hors de combat and not an integral part of the contest or duel. Even if the archers had been deliberately placed in ambush, this would not have affected the clear judgement of the battle. If their presence could have done then far more of this would have been made by the partisan sources. However, mentioning of the archers and their concealment could perhaps just have taken a little away from the English by tarnishing their victory a little, therefore finding its way into the sources sympathetic to the French cause and being explained away or dismissed by those sympathetic to the English. It may also be why Shakespeare writing nearly two hundred years later, chose to ignore the archers completely in Henry V, not just from the battle of Agincourt itself, but from the entire

campaIgn.• 87

Conclusion Although the case studies cover nearly 70 years of the Hundred Years War, contextually, the three examples have many similarities. The use of surprise and deception and the attitudes displayed by the sources towards such usage can be compared across the different legal levels of analysis. All three examples involve the feud of kings and have major political actors present in the prosecution of their feuds. Each of the case studies took place within a clearly defined legal process, where a recognised state of war existed and the process and implications of the feud were expected and understood. Surprise or deception at this political/legal level would be counterproductive as it would prevent the feud from being recognised as a specific legal process and the resulting acts would

87 Christopher Smith, 'Shakespeare's Agincourt: Sir Thomas Erpingham and the Missing Archers', in Curry, Agincourt 1415, p.148.

240 simply be regarded as criminal- the point was not simply to win, but to do so within a specific and recognised legal environment where the results would have specific legally recognised consequences. The argument could not begin without the starting position being set out through the formal declaration that began the feud. Once that had been given, surprise and deception had legitimate roles to play within the process. At the grand tactical or operational level of the feud itself, the planning of both the CnScy and the Agincourt campaigns attempted to preserve the element of surprise in where and when the process of the feud would begin. This was prudent and there is no criticism of this, nor could there be as long as the correct declarations had been made to confirm the legal standing of any such actions. Once the feud was actually underway, the process itself can be seen as a kind of ongoing negotiation procedure, with individual events being the building blocks of the argument. Whether those events involved burning and laying waste to the countryside or simply being in a deliberately provocative place unopposed, the process was an attempt to bring about compromise or the acceptance of a legal right by the other side. The process of the feud could and did involve the use of both surprise and deception. The examples of both sides on the Najera campaign attempting surprise night attacks and killing many men still asleep in their beds is recorded by the chronicles without criticism or outrage. While on the march before the Battle of Agincourt, Henry fully expected a surprise French attack and this concern is recorded in the most matter of fact way with no moral indignation. No charges of treason or unfair play are raised over such episodes. The objections only come about when the legal situation is perceived as having changed

In some way. While acceptable within the legal context of the feud, surprise and deception could not be employed once the legal context had become one of judicial ordeal. Either side could attempt to resolve the dispute through offering the judicial procedure of ordeal by combat. This specific legal situation could not come about by accident as both sides had to submit to such a process. An acceptance of an offer of trial by battle effectively suspended the feud for arbitration through a formal contest of arms. This could of course be precisely what both parties were seeking. Once the judicial procedure of a trial by battle had been accepted by both sides and was actually underway, the tools of surprise

241 and deception could once more be considered legitimate (for example, a sudden attack from a concealed position or feigned retreat etc), but to offer or imply a change of legal context away from the feud to an ordeal and then return to the methods of the feud without also making clear the change of legal context could be seen as dishonourable and against the laws of war. Although the idea that Edward challenged the bourgeois of Caen to battle once they had refused his terms is far fetched, this is the context that would have allowed the charge of treachery to be levelled at the king when he did not go through with the contest in the proscribed way but instead arrived at the town early and attacked it anyway. Whether or not it actually happened, the charges of treachery made against Edward by the Grandes Chroniques on two occasions only make sense because the account also asserts that a trial by battle had been offered and accepted at a particular time and place. For the English to then use that time to do something else and effectively wrong foot the French could be portrayed as perfidious and therefore treacherous in some way. Because both sides of the dispute had to accept the terms of the judicial ordeal before a legally recognised trial by battle could take place, they were understandably rare occurrences. The requirement for mutual consent meant that it was highly unlikely to take place if one side had a distinct advantage. This can help explain why Henry the Bastard felt the need to leave his advantageous position at Najera and came down to fight the English 'on a fair and beauteous plain'. It was Henry who needed to prove his moral and legal position the most and the Black Prince would have been foolhardy to attack a superior position. Similar language to the 'fair and beauteous plain' crops up again and again, from the accounts of Crecy to Mauron and beyond, and it can be no accident that similar language is used to describe a place designated for a trial by combat in Nicholas Upton's De Studio Militari: 'when the day apoynetyd to fyght ys come A great wyde & playne place schall be provydyd for them' .88 At Najera, until the playing field was levelled, the contest was simply not going to take place. It is this idea of a level playing field that allows chroniclers such as Monstrelet to claim that the English at Agincourt were not playing fair somehow by using archers concealed in the trees even if the charge

88 Nicholas Upton, The Essential Portions of Nicholas Upton's De Studio Militari, trans. John Blount, Francis Pierrepont Barnard (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), pp.13f.

242 was far too insufficient to challenge such an overwhelming victory. The attempt to tarnish the clear judicial verdict is done by questioning the presence of the archers, not because they were necessarily concealed, but because, as archers, they did not really belong there in the first place as part of such a procedure. Their presence in the trees meant that they would have been considered by some as separated from the main English force and therefore properly hors de combat. If the verdict itself was beyond question, the only thing left was to seek to cast doubts on the process itself. Of course, it was far easier to admit to being caught out or fooled by the use of surprise or deception in some way if it could also be claimed that one's opponent was breaking the rules in some way. Thus King Charles of Navarre attempted to claim he had been captured through treasonous means to absolve him of the lack of duty implicit in being caught by surprise. The same sentiment is clearly evident in the account of the Crecy campaign in the Grandes Chroniques when it records that the people could not understand how their king could have been consistently wrong footed by the English unless some treason was being employed by the perfidious English. In short, these three case studies demonstrate the different legal levels that the feud and the arbitration provided by trial by battle involved and illustrate that it is the legal (and therefore implicitly the moral) environment that determines the legitimacy of the tools of surprise and deception. These examples demonstrate clearly that it is the context rather than the act that provides the normative framework for the use of surprise and deception.

243 Chapter Eight

Conclusion

The traditional view of warfare in the Middle Ages saw knights as the single most important actor, and glorious battle as the only element worthy of real attention. The other more mundane activities could be dismissed as being irrelevant, merely plundering expeditions aimed at self-aggrandisement and with no strategic function whatsoever. Ruse, surprise, deception, tactical or strategic ingenuity simply did not fit into the picture of medieval warfare that influential authors such as Charles Oman and Hans Delbriick painted. As Bennett eloquently states, chivalry was erroneously seen as 'empty-headed bravery and foolish courtesy to the enemy, completely undermining the necessary cunning of the art of war'. 1 A growing understanding and appreciation of the complexities of the period gradually challenged this view. Beginning in the 1950s with pathfinders such as J.P. Verbruggen and R.C. Smail, historians began the long process of convincing a sceptical audience that organisational, tactical and strategic sophistication in the Middle Ages was actually very high. For example, the vital role played by infantry could now be acknowledged and the chevauchees of the Hundred Years War could now be seen as having some kind of strategic purpose, rather than being dismissed as mere mounted plundering expeditions. As the appreciation of the medieval art of war grew, the professional nature of its protagonists came to be recognised. With this recognition came a revaluation of the idea of a code of chivalry that had captured imaginations for so long. The code of chivalric warfare came to be seen as something akin to a business relationship, a limited partnership where one's maximum losses could be minimised rather than an honourable code, limiting the behaviour of the bon chevaliers. If these professional warriors really were proficient, how could they not utilise all the tools at their disposal? Previously overlooked examples from chronicles and histories confirmed that sometimes they did indeed employ such useful tools as surprise and deception in their pursuit of military victory. However, while this view of chivalric warfare became popular, there were still many inconsistencies in the accounts of medieval warfare that could not be adequately

1 Matthew Bennett, 'The Knight Unmasked', Military History Quarterly, Vol. 7 No.4 (Summer 1995), p.16. 244 explained. Medieval sources indicate that it was apparently acceptable to employ stratagems in one situation but not in another. Blatantly lying about one's identity and even nationality in order to ambush a group of knights was considered to be a fairly normal event by Froissart, the Chronicler of Chivalry, while King Edward was roundly criticised by the Grandes Chroniques for his manoeuvrings before the battle of Crecy as they were perceived to have been over subtle and treacherous. Why was it acceptable to employ stratagems in one situation but not in another? To give another example; if the point was simply to defeat one's opponent, and given the time required to assemble a medieval host, why was it so common to announce a time and a place for an engagement instead of simply catching one's enemy unawares? Time and time again the practitioners of medieval warfare appeared to undermine their own chances of success through abandoning advantages in this way. This thesis has demonstrated that rather than there being inconsistencies in the medieval attitude to surprise and deception, what has been missed by a modem audience is the context of the actions themselves. Richard Kaeuper noted that it is to be regretted that no one ever travelled around 'from one castle, tourney field, court, siege camp, battle line, or raiding party to another, observing and interviewing knights of all particular

social claims to record their commonplace attitudes and beliefs' .2 It is precisely those commonplace attitudes and beliefs that this thesis has tried to distil from the sources that we have handed down to us. Recognising that the subject of medieval warfare is enormous, the thesis employed a methodology utilisation of the twin concepts of surprise and deception to explore the larger topic. This has provided a powerful and original insight into medieval attitudes and beliefs about warfare. The way that the use of surprise and deception was perceived and portrayed in the medieval sources provide proof that warfare was understood in a fundamentally different way in the Middle Ages. From the perspective of the early Twenty-first Century our understanding and attitudes towards conflict have been shaped by the experiences of the great and devastating clashes of the Twentieth Century. In the nuclear age, it is often war itself which is seen as the enemy. However, in the Middle Ages war was seen as a manifestation of the Divine Will, a way of shaping society when things were not as they should be. Metaphysically, war was seen as an essential mechanism of the medieval

245 constitutional structure. Honore Bouvet explained at great length that it could not be that war itself was a bad thing as its aim was to 'wrest peace, tranquillity and reasonableness, from him who refuses to acknowledge his wrongdoing,.3 How could war itself be a bad thing when the very first war took place in Heaven when Lucifer and his followers were cast out? Clearly, it was not that war itself was a bad thing, but it was essential that it was conducted for the right reasons. In this spirit, Augustine reconciled the pacifistic doctrine of the New Testament with the reality of his environment by agreeing with Aristotle that the goal of ajust war was peace but adding that it should be motivated by love. War itself was only evil when it was carried out because of a desire for violence, greed or lust for power. If it was motivated by charity and the desire to prevent injustice, then it was done in the name of God and could not be evil - 'the intention rather than the hostile act was normative' .4 It was in this context that the code of what became know as Just War, and in particular, jus ad bellum, the justification for going to war, became particularly important. Inextricably linked with these ideas, the thesis demonstrated that an understanding of the role of law within the medieval world was absolutely central to any real understanding of warfare in this period. It was clearly understood in the Middle Ages that all law came from God and that applied to both the conduct of war and the very nature of war itself. War was demonstrated to be more than merely governed by laws; it was itself actually a legal process. The complicated legal background and influences provided by Roman, Frankish, Canon and Civil Law based on custom was explored and it was demonstrated that the laws governing medieval warfare were informed by all of these, but especially feudal law, developed from Germanic tradition. From the earliest of times it was known that killing brought vengeance, whether that was brought in person or, if necessary, by kinsmen. Some of the earliest laws were about regulating this process to prevent it escalating beyond control by prescribing levels of compensation according to the level of wrong committed. Revenge was not seen as a negative thing but as a moral duty. Peace was simply the state where no rights were being challenged or asserted.

2 Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.34. 3 Honore Bouvet, The Tree of Battles, trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), p.125. 4 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.17. 246 Peace could not exist until vengeance had been achieved or a compromise accepted and therefore a feud or state of war would exist.

The principle of self-help was at the heart of this tradition and it is not surprising that the centralisation of state power and authority was linked very closely with the decline in the use of the feud as a legitimate source of justice. Although the nobility resisted it, notions of legitimate authority changed over time as the sovereign took over judicial functions, making the feud and principle of self-help redundant in most circumstances. For example, in England, by the time of Henry V, redress had to be sought from someone with authority over the defendant. Only once the legal process had been conducted and resisted could a letter of Marque be awarded allowing the challenger to restore his right or recover losses. Only once the state itself was in a position to take over this function in its entirety, was the feud truly obsolete, with the language of the feud passing into the courtroom, fought with words and argument rather than weapons. However, the thesis also demonstrated that kings, princes or other sovereigns had no superior authority to administer justice on their behalf, so their feuds continued in the form of war. War was the feud of kings. The Hundred Years War was itself a grand feud, governed by the same rules. It began with a perceived injury and defiance being sent setting out the injury and what was required for the feud to cease. Authority was determined by the breaking of bonds between the parties and then the process began with each side attempting to force the other side to accept the justice of their cause. The chevauchees of various English kings, designed to undermine the strength and prosperity of regions of France and show the impotence of the French monarchy, make perfect sense when seen in this light. The goal of the feud was to get the other party to accept the challenger's view of what was right thus restoring the peaceful state. This could be achieved through what in peace time would be regarded as criminal acts such as forced contributions, arson, plunder, injuries, destruction of property, ransom, or in the most serious cases, manslaughter. The legal context of the feud meant that as long as the correct rules were adhered to, these acts were regarded as legitimate due to the ends they were being employed towards. The feud might involve small scale fighting, sieges or skirmishes, or even larger impromptu engagements.

247 The most common form of result for a feud was a compromise, eventually reached privately when one or both sides had simply had enough, or through submitting to the arbitration of a third party. Far less commonly, the feud could be decided through a judicial ordeal. Traditionally this was the process employed when no other form of evidence or proof was available, for example charges of stealth murder, poisoning, heresy or perjury. The ordeal could be by fire, oaths, water, hot iron, or, as preferred by the nobility, trial by combat or battle. Trial by battle involved set rules, a set time and a place agreed in advance. The outcome was accepted as God's judgement and battle was therefore something taken extremely seriously. Of course, as with all types of armed encounter, there was also the risk of death or capture and imprisonment. However, if the engagement was recognised as a trial by battle, defeat meant loss of the argument and lands or titles, loss of followers and the undermining of one's moral and legal authority, as one was clearly not favoured by God. It is hardly surprising that battles were rare in the Middle Ages when one considers the stakes. It was far more than simply a case of fighting to see who was the strongest or who was the better general on the day. It was clearly a moral and legal contest. Battle was certainly not the logical or necessary conclusion to the feud in the way that it was conducted for the vast majority of the Middle Ages. The feud was an attempt to force an agreement, while a true battle was a way of actually reaching a decision through an ordeal and the judgement by God. War was the feud of kings but trial by battle was not actually war at all. Whether the trial was between two men fighting over a case of alleged adultery or between two kings fighting for a kingdom, technically trial by battle was actually the suspension of war for arbitration. In this case, that arbitration just happened to be armed. Surprise and deception were both employed in medieval warfare. However, their use was not acceptable in every instance. This thesis has demonstrated that the rules were applied differently depending upon the legal and moral context of the situation. Geoffrey de Charny makes clear that the different types of engagement had different rights, duties and therefore consequences. He sets out rencontre or encounter, besoigne or work and batille or battle as three distinct conditions, asking the noble knights of King John's Order of the Star technical questions in an attempt to clarify the differences between and the implications of the different contexts. Just as with Froissart's account of the knight at a deed of arms in Vannes disabling his opponent by striking the wrong part of his body,

248 the protagonists of medieval war were bound to accomplish victory within the terms of the challenge. To question the professionalism of those who conducted war in the Middle Ages for their failure to employ all the tools at their disposal in every case is to miss the purpose of the exercise. They understood perfectly that the point was not simply to win, but to reach a decision that would be accepted by both sides. That meant operating within the mutually accepted rules that the specific situation demanded. Chivalry was the framework or system of rules that made this possible. Setting fire to somebody's property was clearly a criminal act, but if it was conducted during a legally recognised feud then it became legitimate. In the same way, surprise and deception (excluding perfidy) could be employed as long as the context allowed it. In the normal process of the feud, it was up to a knight not to be caught by surprise - the onus was on the knight to be diligent rather than for a knight to avoid employing surprise against his adversary. Having a just intent was vital but that did not mean that one had to avoid employing deception in pursuance of one's cause. It was up to the other party to avoid being deceived. However, that did not mean that surprise and deception could be employed in every situation. One could not begin a legitimate feud until the correct legal procedure had been followed. That required the sending of a defiance effectively ruling out surprise at this level. Once that defiance had been sent and received then surprise was perfectly acceptable. That was why there was no inconsistency in Sir Walter Manny's expedition to surprise and capture the town of Mortaigne. The King of France had received his challenge and therefore a new legal situation existed regardless of whether the inhabitants of the town were aware of it. Understanding the context of the action is vital to understanding what is actually happening in the Middle Ages: even within a properly conducted feud, one could not use deception to bring about a trial by combat. Although the complaint is made by a hostile source, there is a very important point being made by the Grandes Chroniques during the CnScy campaign. Edward III was criticised precisely because his actions before the battle of CnScy were perceived to have crossed the line between legitimate deception during the process of a feud, and negotiations to proceed with a judicial combat. The serious nature of the charge that the Grandes Chroniques levels at him is only ameliorated by his categorical victory in just such a trial by battle shortly afterwards. A feud could involve a large engagement and this might well have very important implications. However, while trial by battle might look the same as another large-scale engagement, it was qualitatively

249 different to an armed clash that might come about during the normal process of the feud. A judicial combat could not happen by accident or be brought about through the use of surprise or deception because on a very important level, both parties needed to give their consent to the process. Only then could both sides accept the outcome as a legitimate judgement of their respective causes. This thesis has added to the understanding of the professional nature of the practitioners of warfare in the Middle Ages. Examples such as that of giving notice of one's intentions or abandoning an advantageous tactical position prior to a battle, can now be better understood. Rather than undermining the medieval practitioner's professionalism, these examples can instead be seen for what they are, as illustrations of the professional warriors' understanding of both implicit and explicit legal and moral contexts. It was this context for their actions that gave the results themselves meaning and it would have been up to those responsible for the management of war to be aware of these issues. Hence Charny's questions being asked of the highest ranking knights of the realm and the future king of France being the intended audience for Christine de Pisan' s work. It would have been part of their training and certainly part of their duty to understand and recognise the subtleties of the legal, moral and strategic environment and this is indeed what they managed to do. The implications of this thesis go to the heart of the very nature of war itself. It makes clear that victory is not something that is taken from a defeated opponent; it is something that is given by the defeated party. Victory in a meaningful sense cannot simply be coerced from an opponent. That recognition of a moral defeat as well as a physical and legal one is vital for a conflict to be satisfactorily resolved and this requires a mutually accepted framework of rules. An acceptance and adherence to those rules is absolutely vital for victory to be achieved. Therefore, rules are not something external to war, they are not merely 'bolted on' in an effort to restrain it somehow; rules and the law are absolutely central to the whole idea of medieval warfare itself.

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