DOCSLIB.ORG

A New Model for Britain's Defence Forces

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A New Model for Britain's Defence Forces Defence First TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ................................................................................................................................................. 1 Acknowledgement .................................................................................................................................. 2 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 3 How did we end up in this mess? ........................................................................................................... 5 1. The inadequacy of Britain’s defence planning today .................................................................. 5 2. 2015 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) ......................................................................................... 6 3. The Breaking the Code of History (BTCH) DEFENCE Review ....................................................... 8 Section 1: Prioritising the geopolitical risks to the nation ...................................................................... 9 1.1. Predicting future geopolitical risks to Britain ......................................................................... 9 1.2. The threat from the rise of an Islamic identity ..................................................................... 10 1.3. Putin’s Russia ........................................................................................................................ 12 1.4. China ..................................................................................................................................... 14 1.4.1. The rapid rise of China .................................................................................................. 14 1.4.2. The inherent Risk of America’s debt ............................................................................. 15 1.4.3. Responding to the Chinese arms race .......................................................................... 15 1.4.4. The return to a bipolar world ........................................................................................ 16 1.4.5. Britain’s policy towards China ....................................................................................... 17 1.4.6. China’s intentions revealed ........................................................................................... 18 1.5. Timing of the next potential major war ................................................................................ 19 1.6. The nature of potential threats based on the cycles of empires .......................................... 20 Section 2: The urgent need for a new British defence policy ............................................................... 21 2.1. Third time unlucky – Britain’s failed history of preparation ................................................. 21 2.2. The forgotten value of deterrence ....................................................................................... 22 2.3. Britain’s historical defence spending .................................................................................... 24 2.4. How would anexpansive predatory nation view Britain today? ........................................... 25 2.5. The danger of Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) .......................................................... 28 2.6. The MOD and the cost of military acquisitions ..................................................................... 30 2.6.2. The size of the MoD ...................................................................................................... 32 2.6.3. Britain’s military-industrial complex (MIC) ................................................................... 33 2.6.4. The need for reform within the MOD ........................................................................... 34 2.7. The political intention required to defence the nation ........................................................ 35 2.7.1. The need for a strong defence capability ..................................................................... 35 2.7.2. The first intentional step to a solid defence ................................................................. 36 i | P a g e A New Model for Britain’s Defence Forces Defence First 2.7.3. Our approach to defence in the past decade ............................................................... 36 2.7.4. The dysfunctional use of the Armed Forces ................................................................. 37 2.7.5. The role of the National Security Council (NSC) ........................................................... 37 2.7.6. The role of pre-emption ................................................................................................ 39 2.7.7. Summary: Requirement of political intention .............................................................. 39 Section 3: National cyber security ........................................................................................................ 41 3.1. Security of information ......................................................................................................... 41 3.2. Financial integrity .................................................................................................................. 42 3.3. Network vulnerabilities ......................................................................................................... 42 3.4. Big data ................................................................................................................................. 43 3.5. Breaking of codes and integrity of communications ............................................................ 43 3.6. The grey zone and risk of distraction .................................................................................... 43 3.7. The importance of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) .................... 44 Section 4: Intelligence and Special Forces capabilities ......................................................................... 46 4.1. The Islamic threat ................................................................................................................. 46 4.2. Britain’s Special Forces.......................................................................................................... 47 4.3. Building vital intelligence capability against Russia and China ............................................. 48 Section 5: War at sea – The Royal Navy ................................................................................................ 49 5.1. The relevance of naval power today ..................................................................................... 49 5.2. The strategic nuclear deterrent ............................................................................................ 50 5.3. The future value of aircraft carriers ...................................................................................... 51 5.4. Attack submarines ................................................................................................................ 53 5.5. Amphibious landing capabilities ........................................................................................... 55 5.6. Type 45 air defence destroyers and Type 26 global combat ships (frigates) ....................... 56 5.7. The need for many Corvettes ............................................................................................... 58 5.8. Coastal patrol vessels ............................................................................................................ 60 5.9. Power projection – Replenishment at Sea (RAS) .................................................................. 61 5.10. Future naval RMAs ............................................................................................................ 61 5.10.1. A new breed of ships as revolutionary as the HMS Dreadnought ................................ 61 5.10.2. Air defence and lasers ................................................................................................... 62 5.10.3. The need for power....................................................................................................... 62 5.10.4. The concept of distributed lethality .............................................................................. 63 5.10.5. Anti-torpedo torpedoes ................................................................................................ 63 5.10.6. Drone fleets ................................................................................................................... 63 ii | P a g e A New Model for Britain’s Defence Forces Defence First 5.10.7. Standoff range of Surface to surface missiles. .............................................................. 64 5.11. Reserve Ships .................................................................................................................... 64 5.12. Summary ........................................................................................................................... 64 5.12. Key recommendations for a 100 ship Royal Navy by 2022 (excluding patrol craft) ......... 65 Section 6: War in the air and space – The RAF ..................................................................................... 67 6.1. Air defence of the UK airspace.............................................................................................. 67 6.2.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Cold War Conception of Nuclear Reality: Mobilizing the American Imagination for Nuclear War in the 1950'S
    International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, VoL 6, No. 3, 1993 The Cold War Conception of Nuclear Reality: Mobilizing the American Imagination for Nuclear War in the 1950's Guy Oakes THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR REALITY During World War II, the United States was not occupied like Europe, invaded like the Soviet Union, or bombed like Great Britain. Nor was there any plausible suggestion that the home front might be subjected to any of these acts of war. As a result, it has been said that Americans were obliged to fight the war at a distance and "on imagination alone. ''1 Within months of V-J day, civil defense strategists began to make plans to mobilize the American public for World War III. By the late 1940's, these plans included preparations for a Soviet nuclear strike against the United States. Thus Cold War civil defense planning posed the much more daunt- ing problem of fighting an imaginary war. By 1950, the American foreign policy objective of containing what was perceived to be an otherwise irresistible expansion of Soviet power was tied to the strategy of nuclear deterrence. If the Soviets threatened war, the United States would guarantee the peace, if necessary by nuclear re- taliation. As students of the early Cold War have stressed for some years, this strategy rested on domestic presuppositions. It was necessary to mo- bilize the American home front in order to sustain what President Kennedy later called "a long twilight struggle" in support of a new conception of national security. In the nuclear age, the project of securing American na- tional interests would be interminable in principle, unprecedentedly expensive, and uniquely dangerous.
    [Show full text]
  • Future Technology and International Cooperation a UK Perspective
    MAY Future Technology and International Cooperation A UK perspective In 2011, NATO’s Integrated Air Defence (NATINAD) and the supporting NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) marked 50 years of safeguarding NATO’s skies. In order to successfully reach future milestones NATO must continue (and in many cases improve) its air defence interoperability across the strategic, operational and tactical domains. In order for this to become reality a combination of exploiting synergies and acknowledging that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts1 is required at all levels. Recent improvements and a greater focus on future capability within the UK’s Joint Ground Based Air Defence (Jt GBAD) will enable the Formation to deploy its units and sub-units in order to operate the latest air defence weapon systems, within a multinational environment, against a near-peer adversary or asymmetric threat, and win. Major Charles W.I. May RA – 14 (Cole’s Kop) Battery Royal Artillery* the strategic direction of the British Armed ‘If I didn‘t have air supremacy, I wouldn‘t be here.’ Forces, and subsequently the operational level (SACEUR, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 1944) construct. As the new direction is towards Joint Force 2025 (JF2025) it is pragmatic for this paper to focus on the next 10 years. The his article will highlight the UK military’s purpose is to identify and highlight the Tstrategic situation, perception and under- pertinent capability enhancements and future standing of the air threat before explaining the vision of the UK’s Ground Based Air Defence new military structure to which the Formation Formation and its developing role within the is adapting.
    [Show full text]
  • Future War: an Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010
    Future War An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 JEFFERY R. B ARNETT Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama January 1996 Li brary of Con gress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Barnett, Jeffery R., 1950– Future war : an assess ment of aerospace campaigns in 2010 / Jeffery R. Barnett . p. cm. Includes biblio graphi cal refer ences and index . 1. Air warfare—Fore cast ing. 2. Twenty-first century—Fore casts. I. Title . UG632.B37 1996 358.4′009′0501—dc20 95-54022 CIP Dis claimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or pos ition of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy authorities and is cleared for public release. ii This project would have been impossible without the support and advice of my wife, former Captain Katherine Hoyland Barnett, USAF. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER ............................. ii FOREWORD .............................. ix ABOUT THE AUTHOR ....................... xi PREFACE ................................ xiii Notes .................................. xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................... xv INTRODUCTION . xvii 1 OVERARCHING CONCEPTS .................. 1 Information War. 2 Parallel War ............................. 8 Revolution in Military
    [Show full text]
  • Progress in Delivering the British Army's Armoured
    AVF0014 Written evidence submitted by Nicholas Drummond “Progress in Delivering the British Army’s Armoured Vehicle Capability.” Nicholas Drummond Defence Industry Consultant and Commentator Aura Consulting Ltd. ______________________________________________________________________________ _________ Contents Section 1 - Introduction Section 2 - HCDC questions 1. Does the Army have a clear understanding of how it will employ its armoured vehicles in future operations? 2. Given the delays to its programmes, will the Army be able to field the Strike Brigades and an armoured division as envisaged by the 2015 SDSR? 3. How much has the Army spent on procuring armoured vehicles over the last 20 years? How many vehicles has it procured with this funding? 4. What other capabilities has the Army sacrificed in order to fund overruns in its core armoured vehicles programmes? 5. How flexible can the Army be in adapting its current armoured vehicle plans to the results of the Integrated Review? 6. By 2025 will the Army be able to match the potential threat posed by peer adversaries? 7. Is the Army still confident that the Warrior CSP can deliver an effective vehicle capability for the foreseeable future? 8. To what extent does poor contractor performance explain the delays to the Warrior and Ajax programmes? 9. Should the UK have a land vehicles industrial strategy, and if so what benefits would this bring? 10. What sovereign capability for the design and production of armoured vehicles does the UK retain? 11. Does it make sense to upgrade the Challenger 2 when newer, more capable vehicles may be available from our NATO allies? 12. What other key gaps are emerging within the Army’s armoured vehicle capability? 13.
    [Show full text]
  • Alternative Naval Force Structure
    Alternative Naval Force Structure A compendium by CIMSEC Articles By Steve Wills · Javier Gonzalez · Tom Meyer · Bob Hein · Eric Beaty Chuck Hill · Jan Musil · Wayne P. Hughes Jr. Edited By Dmitry Filipoff · David Van Dyk · John Stryker 1 Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................ 3 The Perils of Alternative Force Structure ................................................... 4 By Steve Wills Unmanned­Centric Force Structure ............................................................... 8 By Javier Gonzalez Proposing A Modern High Speed Transport – The Long Range Patrol Vessel ................................................................................................... 11 By Tom Meyer No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire Capability Innovation in Today’s Navy ................................................................................. 15 By Bob Hein Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing Maritime Service Specialization .............................................................................................. 18 By Eric Beaty Augment Naval Force Structure By Upgunning The Coast Guard .......................................................................................................... 21 By Chuck Hill A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to be Building ..... 25 By Jan Musil Closing Remarks on Changing Naval Force Structure ....................... 31 By Wayne P. Hughes Jr. CIMSEC 22 www.cimsec.org
    [Show full text]
  • The Semaphore Circular No 659 the Beating Heart of the RNA May 2016
    The Semaphore Circular No 659 The Beating Heart of the RNA May 2016 HMS Mersey alongside in Antigua where she is currently the West Indies Guardship. The photo is courtesy of NCM 6 Shipmate Keith Ridley who was hanging around hoping for an invitation on board!!! This edition is the first on-line version of the Semaphore Circular, unless you have registered with Central Office, it will only be available on the RNA website in the ‘Members Area’ under ‘downloads’ at www.royal-naval-association.co.uk and will be emailed to the branch contact, usually the Hon Sec. 1 Daily Orders 1. April Open Day 2. New Insurance Credits 3. Blonde Joke 4. Service Deferred Pensions 5. Guess Where? 6. Donations 7. HMS Raleigh Open Day 8. Finance Corner 9. RN VC Series – T/Lt Thomas Wilkinson 10. Golf Joke 11. Book Review 12. Operation Neptune – Book Review 13. Aussie Trucker and Emu Joke 14. Legion D’Honneur 15. Covenant Fund 16. Coleman/Ansvar Insurance 17. RNPLS and Yard M/Sweepers 18. Ton Class Association Film 19. What’s the difference Joke 20. Naval Interest Groups Escorted Tours 21. RNRMC Donation 22. B of J - Paterdale 23. Smallie Joke 24. Supporting Seafarers Day Longcast “D’ye hear there” (Branch news) Crossed the Bar – Celebrating a life well lived RNA Benefits Page Shortcast Swinging the Lamp Forms Glossary of terms NCM National Council Member NC National Council AMC Association Management Committee FAC Finance Administration Committee NCh National Chairman NVCh National Vice Chairman NP National President DNP Deputy National President GS General
    [Show full text]
  • The British Commonwealth and Allied Naval Forces' Operation with the Anti
    THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND ALLIED NAVAL FORCES’ OPERATION WITH THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE KOREAN WAR: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OPERATION ON THE WEST COAST By INSEUNG KIM A dissertation submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham May 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co- operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Security & Defence European
    a 7.90 D European & Security ES & Defence 4/2016 International Security and Defence Journal Protected Logistic Vehicles ISSN 1617-7983 • www.euro-sd.com • Naval Propulsion South Africa‘s Defence Exports Navies and shipbuilders are shifting to hybrid The South African defence industry has a remarkable breadth of capa- and integrated electric concepts. bilities and an even more remarkable depth in certain technologies. August 2016 Jamie Shea: NATO‘s Warsaw Summit Politics · Armed Forces · Procurement · Technology The backbone of every strong troop. Mercedes-Benz Defence Vehicles. When your mission is clear. When there’s no road for miles around. And when you need to give all you’ve got, your equipment needs to be the best. At times like these, we’re right by your side. Mercedes-Benz Defence Vehicles: armoured, highly capable off-road and logistics vehicles with payloads ranging from 0.5 to 110 t. Mobilising safety and efficiency: www.mercedes-benz.com/defence-vehicles Editorial EU Put to the Test What had long been regarded as inconceiv- The second main argument of the Brexit able became a reality on the morning of 23 campaigners was less about a “democratic June 2016. The British voted to leave the sense of citizenship” than of material self- European Union. The majority that voted for interest. Despite all the exception rulings "Brexit", at just over 52 percent, was slim, granted, the United Kingdom is among and a great deal smaller than the 67 percent the net contribution payers in the EU. This who voted to stay in the then EEC in 1975, money, it was suggested, could be put to but ignoring the majority vote is impossible.
    [Show full text]
  • Air Defence in Northern Europe
    FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College. Editor: Kalevi Ruhala Editorial Assistant: Matti Hongisto Editorial Board: Chairman Prof. Pekka Sivonen, National Defence College Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, Ministry of Defence Col. Erkki Nordberg, Defence Staff Dr., Lt.Col. (ret.) Pekka Visuri, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Dr. Matti Vuorio, Scientific Committee for National Defence Published by NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE P.O. Box 266 FIN - 00171 Helsinki FINLAND FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 10 AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 ISBN 951-25-0873-7 ISSN 0788-5571 © Copyright 1997: National Defence College All rights reserved Oy Edita Ab Pasilan pikapaino Helsinki 1997 INTRODUCTION The historical progress of air power has shown a continuous rising trend. Military applications emerged fairly early in the infancy of aviation, in the form of first trials to establish the superiority of the third dimension over the battlefield. Well- known examples include the balloon reconnaissance efforts made in France even before the birth of the aircraft, and it was not long before the first generation of flimsy, underpowered aircraft were being tested in a military environment. The Italians used aircraft for reconnaissance missions at Tripoli in 1910-1912, and the Americans made their first attempts at taking air power to sea as early as 1910-1911.
    [Show full text]
  • Missiles OUTLOOK
    SPECIFICATIONS Missiles OUTLOOK/ GENERAL DATA AIRFRAME GUIDANCE OUTLOOK/ POWERPLANT SPECIFICATIONS MAX. MAX. SPAN, BODY LAUNCH MAX. RANGE STATUS/OUTLOOK/REMARKS DESIGNATION/NAME LENGTH WINGS OR DIAMETER WEIGHT CONTRACTOR TYPE NO. MAKE & MODEL (FT.) FINS (FT.) (FT.) (LB.) (NAUT. MI.) AIR-TO-AIR CHUNG-SHAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (CSIST), Taoyuan, Taiwan Skysword 1 (Tien Chien 1) 9.8 2.1 0.42 196.4 — IR 1 X solid propellant 9.7 In service with Taiwan air force since 1993. Skysword 2 (Tien Chien 2) 11.8 2 0.62 396.8 — Active radar 1 X solid propellant 32.4 In service with Taiwan air force since 1996. DENEL (PTY.) LTD., Pretoria, South Africa OPERATORS SATELLITE A-Darter 9.8 1.6 0.54 195.8 Denel IIR 1 X solid propellant — Fifth-generation technology demonstrator. Likely co-development with Brazil. COMMERCIAL R-Darter 11.9 2.1 0.53 264 Denel Radar 1 X solid propellant — Development completed 2000. For South African Air Force Cheetah and Gripen aircraft. U-Darter 9.6 1.67 0.42 210 Denel Two-color, IR 1 X solid propellant — First revealed in 1988; similar to Magic. Entered production in 1994. In use on South African Air Force Cheetah and Impala aircraft. DIEHL BGT DEFENSE, Uberlingen, Germany COMMERCIAL AIM-9L/I-1 Sidewinder 9.4 2.1 0.4 189 Diehl BGT Defense IR 1 X solid propellant — Upgraded and refurbished. IRIS-T 9.7 — 0.4 196 Diehl BGT Defense IIR 1 X solid propellant — In production. SATELLITE OPERATORS SATELLITE MBDA MISSILE SYSTEMS (BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica), London, UK; Vélizy, France; Rome, Italy Aspide 12.1 3.4 0.67 479 Alenia Semiactive radar, homing 1 X solid propellant 43 In service.
    [Show full text]
  • C4ISTAR TECHNOLOGIES ISSN 1478-3347 Volume Twenty Four – Issue Two September 2021
    BATTLESPACEC4ISTAR TECHNOLOGIES ISSN 1478-3347 Volume twenty four – Issue two September 2021 VEHICLES COMMUNICATIONS ARMOUR COMPUTERS SPACE Contents 8 Editor: Julian Nettlefold Advertising: Battlespace Publications Published by: BATTLESPACE Publications Old Charlock Abthorpe Road 24 Silverstone Towcester NN12 8TW United Kingdom Contacts: Julian Nettlefold Mobile: +44 (0)77689 54766 Email: j.nettlefold@ battle-technology.com All rights reserved in all countries. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted in any form 30 42 or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the Publisher. Infringements of any of the above rights will be liable to prosecution under UK, European or US civil or criminal law. Subscriptions: www.battle-technology.com Battlespace C4ISTAR Technologies (ISSN: 1478-3347) is published by Battlespace Publications. Battlespace C4ISTAR Technologies (ISSN: 1478-3347) is published by Battlespace Publications Printed by: St. Austell Printing Company St. Austell Business Park St. Austell Cornwall PL25 4FD BATTLESPACE C4ISTAR TECHNOLOGIES 3 Letter from the editor Dear Reader, Welcome to our special DSEI issue, published as the turmoil of the COVID pandemic recedes and life inches back to normal. It is a tribute to Clarion to keep the DSEI show alive and to bring us all back together again after so many months apart or on a Zoom screen. Since COVID struck the world has become a more dangerous place with hot spots springing up all over the world from Mozambique in Africa to Iranian drones in the Gulf thru to China and Afghanistan, where the situation gets worse by the day.
    [Show full text]
  • Sir Frank Cooper on Air Force Policy in the 1950S & 1960S
    The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society Copyright © Royal Air Force Historical Society, 1993 All rights reserved. 1 Copyright © 1993 by Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 1993 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Printed by Hastings Printing Company Limited Royal Air Force Historical Society 2 THE PROCEEDINGS OFTHE ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY Issue No 11 President: Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Committee Chairman: Air Marshal Sir Frederick B Sowrey KCB CBE AFC General Secretary: Group Captain J C Ainsworth CEng MRAeS Membership Secretary: Commander P O Montgomery VRD RNR Treasurer: D Goch Esq FCCA Programme Air Vice-Marshal G P Black CB OBE AFC Sub-Committee: Air Vice-Marshal F D G Clark CBE BA Air Commodore J G Greenhill FBIM T C G James CMG MA *Group Captain I Madelin Air Commodore H A Probert MBE MA Group Captain A R Thompson MBE MPhil BA FBIM MIPM Members: A S Bennell Esq MA BLitt *Dr M A Fopp MA PhD FMA FBIM A E Richardson *Group Captain N E Taylor BSc D H Wood Comp RAeS * Ex-officio The General Secretary Regrettably our General Secretary of five years standing, Mr B R Jutsum, has found it necessary to resign from the post and the committee.
    [Show full text]