PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES

Number 53

The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right

Tom Flanagan

Contents Introduction ...... 3 Why are we talking about uniting the right? ...... 4 The concept of opposition ...... 7 Patterns of opposition ...... 8 Does opposition matter? ...... 11 How can this be true? ...... 15 The bottom line: application to Canada ...... 18 Bibliography ...... 22 Acknowledgements ...... 23 About the author ...... 23

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Printed and bound in Canada. ISSN 1206-6257 Introduction The Fraser Institute in early 2000 that I write a lit- tle book to be called Getting Together: How Political ver since the beginning of the United Alter- Parties Cooperate, with the intention of bringing Enative project in May 1998, conservative pol- together material I have been collecting for sev- itics in Canada have revolved around the quest to eral years on party coalitions and mergers in Can- “unite the right.” The formation of the Canadian ada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Alliance consumed 1998 and 1999; then, after that Zealand. The Institute agreed to consider pub- party did not do as well as its founders hoped in lishing this book, and I still hope to write it when I the 2000 election, a new round of efforts com- get the chance; acquaintance with the history of menced to bring the Alliance together with the cooperation between parties would prove useful Progressive Conservatives. Peter White and to anyone trying to undertake it today. Adam Daifallah expressed the motivation for this initiative concisely: “Canada can have no strong But a funny thing happened on the way to the and united opposition to the Liberals until the Ca- book. I started to think seriously about the under- nadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative lying premise, and the more I thought and read party find some way to come together again as about it, the more it seemed open to question. As I one” (White and Daifallah, 2001, p. 52). explain at greater length in this Public Policy Source, I have concluded that democracy can The underlying premise of such attempts at unit- work well with each of several models of opposi- ing the right is a belief in the superiority of the tion, as long as the fundamentals of two-party alternative-government model of op- constitutionalism, rule of law, respect for prop- position. Hugh Segal, the president of the Insti- erty rights and markets, free discussion of public tute for Research on Public Policy, put it this way affairs, and a widely distributed franchise are re- in a proposal for bringing the parties together: spected. “Canadians and their democracy are well-served when voters have at least two choices at election The two-party alternative-government configu- time—an incumbent government seeking re-elec- ration is one of several workable possibilities; it is tion and an alternative government that offers not a universally valid model that Canada must different priorities and policy choices from which rush to adopt, and dire consequences will not voters can choose” (Segal, 2001). Likewise Cana- necessarily follow if this configuration is not em- dian democracy is poorly served when voters do braced. In short, political science provides no cat- not have such a choice. As Joe Clark and Chuck egorical imperative to “unite the right.” While I Strahl put it: “The inability of any one opposition am not against unification as such, I would place party to garner the electoral support necessary to a higher priority on maintaining one or more par- contend for the governing role has seriously ties whose policies are compatible with the focus harmed the democratic system” (Clark and of The Fraser Institute on directing “public atten- Strahl, 2001). tion to the role of competitive markets in provid- ing for the well-being of Canadians.” Personally, I Initially, I also accepted this premise as self-evi- would not find it worthwhile to support a party dent; indeed, I probably contributed to its accep- not committed to competitive markets, even if it tance through some of my own writing on the were in a position to “unite the right” and seemed subject (Harper and Flanagan, 1997; Flanagan poised to win the next election. and Harper, 1998; Flanagan, 1999, 2001b). In addi- tion, however, I felt it was time to apply some This Public Policy Source is addressed in the first scholarly effort to the issues and so suggested to instance to libertarians—those who want free

The Fraser Institute 3 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 markets and individual choice to be the main de- 52 seats, all but one in the West. The New terminant of public policy—as well as to conser- Democrats fell to seven seats and lost official vatives—those who like free markets but are also party status. The only element of continuity with concerned about the maintenance of traditional the past was that the Liberals, in opposition for morality (Boaz, 1997, pp. 291-294). Even though the previous nine years, returned to the position they have some important disagreements with of government, which they have occupied for each other, libertarians and conservatives make about 70 percent of the twentieth century. up “the right” in Canada and so are directly in- volved in attempts to “unite the right.” I hope this These results shattered the conventional under- essay will help clarify their thinking about what standing that Canada was a so-called they have to gain or lose in such efforts. “two-party-plus” system, in which the Liberals and Conservatives would alternate in office while In a broader sense, it is also addressed to Canadi- smaller parties might intermittently elect a few ans of all political persuasions. Commentators of members. Suddenly Canada looked much more many points of view have entered the debate like a “one-party-plus” system, in which only the about uniting the right, often in the belief that the Liberals had broad enough support to elect a gov- two-party alternative-government model of op- ernment, while other parties might represent par- position is essential to the health of democracy. ticular regional or demographic slices of public Even if they do not support it or want to be part of opinion (Flanagan and Harper, 1998, p. 170). it, they may think a united party of the right would be beneficial to Canada. Thus, anyone con- Although this seemed at the time to be a novelty cerned with the functioning of Canadian democ- in Canadian politics, it was in fact the culmination racy should be interested in the line of argument of an old trend. The 1993 election gave Canada a developed here. “Uniting the right” happens to five-party configuration; but ever since 1921, be the topic of the day, but at another time it could when the Progressives broke the Liberal-Conser- just as well be “uniting the left,” or “uniting Ca- vative duopoly that had controlled Parliament nadian nationalists,” or “uniting environmental- since Confederation, there had been at least three, ists.” There is nothing intrinsically conservative and more often four, parties represented in the or libertarian about the challenges facing the Ca- House of Commons. Throughout the twentieth nadian right today; they are issues of political century, the Conservatives were not really a party competition and institutional structure, not full-fledged opposition party able to present an of ideology per se. alternative government. They governed in only 31 years since Wilfrid Laurier’s critical Liberal Why are we talking about victory in 1896. Moreover, each time they won a uniting the right? majority of seats, it was in special circumstances that could not last: A recent book on Canadian political parties calls the 1993 federal election “one of the greatest dem- • In 1911, Robert Borden won a majority with ocratic electoral earthquakes ever recorded” the support of Henri Bourassa’s Nationalists (Carty, Cross, and Young, 2000, p. 12). The Pro- inside Quebec and dissident Liberal protec- gressive Conservatives, who had run a majority tionists outside Quebec. He was re-elected in government from 1984 to 1993, were reduced to 1917 in a wartime coalition with part of the two seats. One new party, the Bloc Qu–b–cois, Liberals. Once the war was over, the coalition won 54 seats and became the Official Opposition, collapsed and the Conservatives came third while another newcomer, the Reform Party, won in the 1921 election (Beck, 1968).

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• In 1930, R.B. Bennett won a majority as the limited to win even a plurality of seats, let alone a Depression settled in, but it proved to be a majority. Thus, political activists of conservative Pyrrhic victory. Unable to restore prosperity, sympathies, seeing Reform’s limitations, quickly Bennett was resoundingly defeated in 1935, started to talk about “uniting the right.” In May and the Conservatives remained out of power 1996, the author David Frum, assisted by the until 1967 (Beck, 1968, pp. 191-205). young lawyer Ezra Levant, organized the Winds of Change conference in Calgary to discuss unifi- • In 1958, John Diefenbaker won a huge major- cation. Chaired by Stockwell Day, it was attended ity when Maurice Duplessis’s Union by more than a hundred writers, researchers, and Nationale machine delivered 50 seats in Que- political activists. Federal Tories stayed away, but bec. But by 1962 Duplessis was dead, the UN there was a large contingent of provincial Conser- was out of power, and Diefenbaker lost his vative organizers from Ontario. Preston Manning majority in that year’s election (Beck, 1968, was not there, but he was represented by Rick pp. 311-328; Flanagan, 1998, pp. 84-85). Anderson and Cliff Fryers, his chief lieutenants. • In 1984, Brian Mulroney won another huge majority by recruiting Quebec separatists and Winds of Change recommended a strategy of coop- nationalists into the party and promising to eration at the riding level between Reform and re-open the constitutional file. He won an- the Progressive Conservatives, including joint other majority in 1988 by supporting free nomination of candidates; but Tory leader Jean trade with the United States, perhaps the only Charest rejected all such proposals. Reform issue on which the Quebec and Western ele- leader Preston Manning was not so dismissive, ments of his caucus could unite. But his over- but he continued to insist that Reform could win extended coalition fell apart when he could an election on its own. However, after Reform not deliver the constitutional changes that his won only 60 seats in 1997, all of them in the West, Quebec followers demanded, and the Tories Mr. Manning made a further move towards coop- were reduced to two seats in 1993 (Flanagan, eration. At the May 1998 Reform Assembly in 1998, pp. 86-88). London, Ontario, he admitted that Reform was unlikely ever to win by itself and unveiled a plan The weight of historical evidence therefore sug- for transforming the party. gests that Canada has a long-term tendency to- ward one-party-plus politics, with a weak Mr. Manning’s plan, known as the United Alter- opposition able only occasionally and for short native, was not exactly a proposal to “unite the periods of time to offer an alternative government right.” It was rather an invitation to people from (Johnston, 2001). all quarters of the political compass to form a principled coalition based on points of agree- After the 1993 election, the Bloc Quebecois consti- ment. Mr. Manning envisioned bringing together tuted the Official Opposition in Parliament; but not only social and economic conservatives, but having no plans to run candidates outside Que- also democratic reformers and decentralists bec, and being dedicated to taking Quebec out of (Simpson, 2001, p. 108). But it turned out that Canada, it was obviously not an alternative gov- most of the people interested in working with Re- ernment. The Reform Party, which went on to be- form were the so-called “Blue Tories,” i.e., federal come the Official Opposition after the 1997 Progressive Conservatives who thought their election, presented itself as capable of forming a own party was not conservative enough, particu- future government; but its support base was too larly after Joe Clark had been elected leader. The regionally concentrated and demographically Blue Tories were not numerous, but they in-

The Fraser Institute 5 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 cluded some prominent organizers and Preston Manning started a campaign to bring fundraisers, such as Tom Long, chief organizer about a quick merger with the Tories. In March for Ontario premier Mike Harris, and Peter 2001, Mr. Manning published an important col- White, former principal secretary to Brian umn in the National Post, arguing that a “strategic Mulroney. Thus, in practice the United Alterna- alliance” with the Conservatives had to be tive turned into an approximation of uniting the reached quickly and without the “exhausting right, even if that had not been Mr. Manning’s schedule” of grassroots discussion or the use of original intention. approval mechanisms that had been part of the United Alternative (Manning, 2001). In the spring of 2000, after two national assem- blies and two internal referendums, the Reform In spring 2001, a dozen Alliance MPs were sus- Party transformed itself into the Canadian Alli- pended from caucus for calling for Mr. Day’s im- ance, with prominent positions reserved for the mediate resignation. Forming themselves into a Blue Tories. A hotly contested leadership race un- new “Democratic Representative Caucus” expectedly replaced Preston Manning with (DRC), they pressed for close cooperation with Stockwell Day as leader of the new party the Progressive Conservatives. As Mr. Day came (Flanagan, 2001a, pp. 288-290). Expectations for under attack from this internal opposition, he and the coming federal election ran high. Even his leading supporters, such as the new House though the Progressive Conservatives were still Leader John Reynolds, also emphasized the im- in the field, many thought that the Alliance portance of coming to a quick deal with the To- would be strong enough to reduce the Liberals to ries. In June, Mr. Day announced that he would a minority government. In what now seems like a ask the National Council to hold an internal party euphoric haze of misjudgment, I wrote early in referendum on the subject—later downgraded to the 2000 election campaign that “an approxima- a consultative poll to be carried out in fall 2001. tion of two-party politics seems to be just over the When the results were reported in late October, horizon” (Flanagan, 2000). almost 60 percent of respondents said they would like to see an agreement with the Tories to run a In the event, the Alliance did better in the 2000 single candidate in all ridings in the next election, election than Reform had ever done—25.5 per- subject to such agreement being approved by Al- cent of the popular vote, and 66 seats—but it fell liance members in an internal referendum well below expectations. In particular, it failed to (Alberts, 2001). displace the Progressive Conservatives. Joe Clark got elected in Calgary Centre and his party, al- The Tories held talks both with Canadian Alli- though it gathered only 12 percent of the popular ance and the DRC. After a highly publicized vote, won 12 seats, enough to be recognized as a meeting at Mont-Tremblant, Quebec, in August party in the House of Commons. 2001, they announced a coalition with the DRC, portraying it as the first step towards creating a In the wake of these disappointing results, the Na- broader political movement. Four members of the tional Post, widely read among Canadians of con- DRC subsequently returned to the Alliance cau- servative views, began calling for the departure cus in early September 2001, but the remaining of both Stockwell Day and Joe Clark from their eight decided to persist with their project of coop- leadership positions and quick merger of the par- eration with Mr. Clark’s party. At a meeting in ties to present one unified right-wing option to Edmonton held on 12 September, 2001, the 12 PCs voters in the next election. Also, a group of highly and eight DRC members formed themselves into placed Alliance members who had been close to a combined caucus of 20, with officers drawn

The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right 6 The Fraser Institute PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 from both groups. The Speaker subsequently rec- balance each other. The only great writer of the ognized the PCDRC coalition as a functioning en- eighteenth century to take a more positive view of tity for some, though not all, purposes in the faction was Edmund Burke, who in 1770 formu- House of Commons. lated his classical definition of a political party as “a body of men united for promoting by their Overall, the conventional wisdom in conserva- joint endeavours the national interest upon some tive circles in 2001 was that the highest priority particular principle in which they are all agreed” was to defeat the Liberals and get control of the (quoted in Hofstadter, 1969, p. 32). federal government, and that this would require bringing the Canadian Alliance and the Progres- The practice of parliamentary opposition, in sive Conservatives together as soon as possi- which an organized party criticized the govern- ble—preferably in a merger, but at least in some ment of the day and stood ready to form an alter- form of electoral coalition. An opposition that native government, grew up slowly in tandem could not win an election, it was widely argued, with the practice of responsible government, that was worthless. is, of the Crown appointing only ministers who could keep the confidence of the House of Com- The concept of opposition mons. In April 1783, King George III dismissed his Tory ministers and appointed a coalition min- Until the late eighteenth century, the British Par- istry composed of followers of Lord North and liament, especially the House of Commons, was Charles James Fox, two men who bitterly op- understood as an adviser and counterbalance to posed one another. The ministry lasted only until the executive power of the Crown. It was ex- December of that year and gave the very word pected to deliberate and arrive at a univocal posi- “coalition” a bad name in English politics. In the tion, to be conveyed to the King by a single early decades of the nineteenth century, party “Speaker of the House.” In such a tableau, there lines were fluid and there were numerous hybrid was room for disagreement and debate among in- ministries (Butler, 1978, ch. 1). The phrase “His dividuals MPs, but not for a “formed opposi- Majesty’s Opposition” was introduced in 1826 as tion,” that is, for an organized faction pursuing a jest, not a serious term of political analysis. As goals as a group. Because the House of Commons late as 1867, John Stuart Mill could publish his as a whole was effectively a loyal opposition to magisterial Considerations on Representative Gov- the executive power, there was no need for an in- ernment without including any discussion what- ternal opposition within the House. soever of organized opposition.

Eighteenth-century statesmen and political phi- Perhaps the first well-known writer to try to take losophers almost unanimously condemned par- adequate account of opposition was Sidney Low, ties and factions (Hofstadter, 1969, pp. 10-13). in The Governance of England (1904). His descrip- Some, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Alex- tion of the role of opposition as an alternative ander Hamilton, thought that factions were in- government in a two-party configuration has en- trinsically evil and should be suppressed. Others, tered the folklore of parliamentary wisdom: “The such as David Hume and James Madison, saw check on the Government in office is the existence factions as dangerous but inevitable expressions of an alternative Government out of office, ready of human self-interest. The challenge for states- and able to take its place at any moment; and such men, according to Madison’s famous Federalist 10, an opposition government in posse is impossible was to construct an “extensive republic” with a without the two great well-balanced forces, al- representative system in which factions could ways mobilized and on the war footing” (quoted

The Fraser Institute 7 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 in Barker, 1971, p. 18). Only in the 1960s did the alternative government ready to take office on founding of the journal Government and Opposi- short notice. Being only one step removed from tion (1965) and publication of a spate of books the exercise of power, it should be brought into (Dahl, 1966; Ionescu and Madariaga, 1968; the system so that it will be prepared to exercise Hofstadter, 1969; Barker, 1971) create the study of power responsibly when the occasion arises. This opposition as a subspecialty in political science. line of thought has led to labeling as failures those opposition parties that seem unable to win a na- Opposition started to receive institutional en- tional election and thereby form a government. In trenchment early in the twentieth century. Can- the case of contemporary Canadian politics, as in- ada led the way in 1905 by beginning to pay an dicated above, this argument has led to the drive extra salary to the leader of the largest opposition to “unite the right” in the name of producing a vi- party. Australia followed in 1920, Great Britain in able and credible alternative government. Yet 1937, and New Zealand in 1951 (McHenry, 1954). there are many difficulties with this conception. Canada also designated Stornoway as the official Even the most cursory survey of real-world poli- residence of the Leader of the Opposition in 1950, tics shows that the alternative-government a move that has not been imitated in other parlia- model is honoured more in the breach than the mentary democracies. Nonetheless, all parlia- observance. mentary governments now officially recognize opposition in formal ways going well beyond Patterns of opposition paying the leader. These include paying hono- raria to other caucus officers, appropriating Several patterns of opposition can be identified as money for extra staff, guaranteeing time to speak ideal types. Like all ideal types, the lines between in floor debates and committee proceedings, and them are often fuzzy in the real word, but they offering the leader confidential briefings and spe- can be useful as a way of describing recurrent sit- cial access to foreign dignitaries. uations. Below is my own classification. Other typologies using other terminology exist (e.g., see There is a double rationale to these institutional Sartori, 1976), but none is universally accepted. developments. The first is that parliamentary crit- The terms I am proposing are italicized when icism is intrinsically beneficial and results in they first appear in the following discussion. better government. This position is a logical suc- cessor to the older view that Parliament as a The model advocated by partisans of uniting the whole acts as a check upon the executive govern- right I call two-party alternative government. The ment. Now that the practice of responsible gov- paradigm of two big parties alternating as gov- ernment has virtually fused the executive with ernment and opposition is conventionally associ- the legislature, Parliament as a whole cannot criti- ated with the British parliamentary system, but in cize the executive because the executive requires fact it has been the norm in Britain only since the the confidence of the Commons and exercises end of World War II (Butler, 1978, pp. 112-113). party discipline to ensure that it remains in power. From 1900 until 1945, the three major par- Hence it is logical for one part of the House, the ties—Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour—par- opposition, to take over the function of criticism; ticipated in a long series of coalition and minority human fallibility requires opportunities for criti- governments, at times also involving smaller par- cism to be built into the political system. ties such as the Liberal Unionists and the Irish Na- tionalists. Most, but by no means all, of these were The second rationale for giving institutional rec- so-called “National governments,” designed to ognition to the opposition is that it constitutes an meet the emergencies of war and depression.

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Since 1945, Conservatives and Labour have taken jority in both houses of Congress (sometimes it turns governing by themselves, though Labour has a majority in neither, as occurred in Bill ran some minority governments in the 1970s. Clinton’s second term); and even when the presi- dent does have a majority, the absence of party Elsewhere, the two-party paradigm emerged in discipline means he cannot count on automatic New Zealand in 1936, when a merger of the Re- support. In reality, almost all American legisla- form and United Parties produced the National tion is written, passed, and amended by biparti- Party. Prior to that, there had been 25 years of co- san coalitions. Rather than government and alition and minority governments involving opposition, American politics is better described three main parties plus independents (Bassett, as an elaborate system of power-sharing, in which 1982). In 1996, the introduction of proportional the two main parties exercise influence roughly representation caused the two-party system to proportional to the results of the most recent disintegrate, and all governments since then have election. been coalitions. Beyond the two-party, alternative government In one obvious sense, Canada has also followed model lies the alternative coalition model, in which the two-party model since Confederation: only politics is dominated by two more or less stable the Liberals and Conservatives have ever formed coalitions of parties, usually described as lying on federal governments, and they have always done the left and on the right. Whichever coalition gets so as single parties, except for the National Gov- more seats in the election will proceed to form a ernment associated with World War I. Also, prior government from among its partners. In practice, to 1993, only the Liberals and Conservatives had however, there are many variations. ever been the Official Opposition (the Progres- sives won more seats than the Conservatives in Australia is closest to the pure two-party model 1921 and could have become the Official Opposi- in that the left is represented by only one tion if they had wished). But since 1993, three dif- party—Labor—and the right consists of a coali- ferent parties have been the Official tion between the Liberal and National Parties that Opposition—the BQ, Reform, and the Canadian has endured with few breakdowns since forma- Alliance; and, as noted earlier, Canada seems to tion of the modern Liberal Party in 1944 (Costar, have entered a one-party-plus phase, in which only 1994). Since 1996, New Zealand seems to be mov- the Liberals have enough support to govern and ing in the direction of competing coalitions, with none of the opposition parties is a credible alter- Labour and Alliance on the left and the National native government. Party and the Association of Consumers and Tax- payers, the ACT, on the right; but the Greens and The United States, of course, also has a two-party New Zealand First refuse to align themselves in system. Since the Civil War, only Republicans this way and at the present time hold the balance and Democrats have occupied the White House, of power over a minority Labour-Alliance coali- and those two parties have consistently won al- tion government. The French Fifth Republic has most all the seats in Congress. But in the Ameri- seen an alternation in power of left and right co- can model of separation of powers, government alitions, though the timing of elections means that and opposition do not exist in the same sense as in the president is sometimes from a different side a parliamentary system. The president and cabi- than the majority in the National Assembly. net cannot “fall” before the next election, and Post-war Germany offers another variation on there is no alternative government in waiting. the theme of alternating coalition governments. The president’s party often does not have a ma- The dominant party of the right, the Christian

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Democrats, is a permanent coalition of the Chris- others may leave, and still others may enter. With tian Democratic Union (CDU) with the Christian or without a change in the participating parties, Social Union, which exists only in Bavaria. The the complexion of the coalition may also change Christian Democrats have occasionally formed a as a result of the reassignment of portfolios and majority government on their own, but more fre- the entry of new ministers, even of a new prime quently in coalition with the Free Democrats. minister. Following Arend Lijphart (1994), I will Once there was even a so-called “grand coalition” call this pattern of change without alternation with the Social Democrats (SPD). The latter are by consensus government. far the largest party on the left, but have always had to govern in coalition with the Free Demo- The Swiss have taken consensus government to crats or, more recently, the Greens. The overall its highest development with a seven-member picture is one of alternating CDU and SPD gov- collective executive in which the seats are distrib- ernments, but almost always moderated by the uted 2-2-2-1 among the four largest parties. All need for coalition partners to establish a majority the main parties participate in the government in the Bundestag. executive, and there is no alternative govern- ment, nor even an opposition in the usual sense. It Within the category of alternating coalitions, is a perfected system of permanent power-shar- then, the main variation is the degree to which the ing, in which a frequent resort to referenda and coalitions are identified before the voters go to the citizens’ initiatives provide a check on the discre- polls. In Australia and the French Fifth Republic, tion of the political cartel in power. for example, the coalitions are always in place be- fore the decisive vote. In the most recent New In some countries, the consensus model has led to Zealand election, Labour and the Alliance an- long one-party-plus periods in which a single nounced their coalition ahead of time, but no co- party rules with little effective opposition. One alitions were announced in the 1996 election and case is Japan, in which the Liberal Democratic the government was put together afterwards Party governed continuously without coalition through negotiations between party leaders. In partners from 1955 to 1993 (Johnson, 2000). An- Germany, it is clear that the CDU and CSU will al- other is Sweden, in which the Social Democratic ways be together and that the Greens might join Party, either alone or as the senior coalition part- in government with the SPD but not with the ner, has been in power since 1932, except for the Christian Democrats. The position of the Free interludes of 1976-1982 and 1991-1994, when vari- Democrats, however, is less predictable because ous non-socialist coalitions governed. Still an- they have formed coalitions with both the Chris- other case was post-War Italy, in which the tian Democrats and Social Democrats. Christian Democrats were the senior partner in all coalition governments until 1993, when the electoral system was changed and many of the If alliances are unpredictable most of the time and old parties were reorganized. Ionescu and are firmed up only after the election, one can no Madariaga (1968, p. 88) describe this sort of situa- longer speak of alternating coalitions. This is, in tion as follows: fact, a very common situation. The general pic- ture in Europe, Japan, and Israel is that of a multi- In such cases, even though the political party system, supported by one of the many mechanism functions normally and freely, forms of proportional representation, in which al- and the conditions for a peaceful change of ternation in government is rare. Change in gov- government are fully assured, the opposi- ernment usually means recomposing the ruling tion is unable for long—sometimes very coalition. Some parties will stay in government, long—periods to win an election. It is of-

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ten assumed that if opposition parties fail model of opposition. The two most common ar- ever to come to power, there must some guments run approximately as follows: deficiency in the institutional mechanism. But this is not necessarily so. The institu- 1. The two-party alternative-government tions may be there, and function quite satisfactorily, and nevertheless the oppo- model gives voters a meaningful choice of sition party or parties fail to secure the req- ideology at elections. It is taken for granted uisite number of votes, and are thus that the parties espouse different philoso- transformed into a permanent minority. phies of government, between which voters can choose on election day. Canada may have entered a similar phase of pro- longed one-party dominance in 1993, though no 2. The two-party alternative-government one can say in advance how long it will last. The model encourages more honest, efficient, province of Alberta has experienced and accountable government. The politi- one-party-dominant government, with very cians in power know that another crew is weak opposition, for almost a century. In Alberta ready and willing to replace them in sailing no provincial government, once having been de- the ship of state. Those in power, therefore, feated, has ever gone into opposition and then have incentives to govern honestly, so that returned to power. In fact, no traditional oppo- the opposition cannot discredit them; to sition party has ever won an election. Each of govern efficiently, so that voters will feel the three times that a government in the prov- they are getting their money’s worth; and ince has been defeated, it was by a recently to govern in accord with people’s wishes, founded (United Farmers of Alberta, 1920; So- so that voters will feel that they are getting cial Credit, 1935) or revitalized (Progressive what they want. Conservative, 1971) party. There can be change without alternation. Such arguments seem convincing when stated abstractly but are open to serious objection on In sum, there are five main patterns of opposition both theoretical and empirical grounds. among stable democracies in the modern world: two-party alternative government, alternative co- As long ago as 1957, Anthony Downs showed alitions, consensus government, one-party-plus, that under certain conditions, including high bar- and power-sharing. Although consensus govern- riers to new-party entry and a unidimensional ment is numerically the most common, each spectrum of issues, both parties in a two-party model exists in at least two countries where it system tend to converge on the ideological posi- seems to have been reasonably successful for a tion of the median voter. This was a theoretical ar- period of several decades or longer. A political gument, not an empirical observation. It is now scientist recently arrived from Mars would see no widely realized that other factors can affect prima facie evidence that two-party alternating Downs’ theoretical prediction of convergence government is the normal or preferred model of (Donleavy, 1991, pp. 112-135). But though Downs opposition. may not have said the last word, even the most casual empiricism shows that he was on to some- thing. Does opposition matter? Generally speaking, post-War politics in the An- It is not hard to produce persuasive arguments in glo-American democracies with two-party sys- favour of the two-party, alternative-government tems were marked by Downsian convergence of

The Fraser Institute 11 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 the two major parties, one nominally of the left, native government model produces honesty, effi- the other of the right. Labour and Conservatives ciency, and accountability—remains attractive. It in Britain; Liberals and Progressive Conserva- is consistent with economic arguments about the tives in Canada; Democrats and Republicans in value of competition, as well as with John Stuart the United States; Labour and National in New Mill’s famous theory of the importance of open Zealand—all accepted the fundamentals of the debate in a world of limited human knowledge mixed economy, the welfare state, and opposition and understanding, where no one can ever be to Soviet expansionism. The parties had more ex- sure beyond doubt about being right. But in the treme wings, espousing socialism and unilateral empirical study of politics, plausibility is not the disarmament on the left and resolute free enter- same as proof; actual evidence is required before prise on the right; but the controlling elements of reaching conclusions. the parties were very close to each other. Richard Nixon’s famous statement, “We are all Keynes- It is important that the evidence be systematic, ians now,” epitomizes this era. not impressionistic. It is easy, as White and Daifallah do, to catalogue the sins of omission The post-War convergence lasted until the rise of and commission of the Liberal government, at- Margaret Thatcher in Britain (1979) and Ronald tribute them to lack of an effective opposition, Reagan in the United States (1980); in New Zea- and predict that a new government would do land until the Labour Party’s unexpected lurch better (White and Daifallah, 2001, pp. 37-51). But back towards capitalism (1984); and in Canada one could have compiled a similar list when the until the foundation of the Reform Party (1987). PCs were in power under Brian Mulroney. In- Throughout these years, the two-party system deed, the Liberals did so; it was called the Red gave voters more of an echo than a choice. Barry Book, and it was their campaign platform in 1993. Goldwater discovered this to his dismay in 1964, At any point in time, there is always much that when he promised American voters “A Choice, any government is neglecting or doing badly, and not an Echo,” and went down to resounding de- no shortage of claims that another party could do feat. Of course, politics were often bitterly parti- better. What is needed, however, is hard evidence san, as illustrated by the rivalries between Nixon that this political strife makes much difference in and Kennedy, Pearson and Diefenbaker, Trudeau the long run. Do jurisdictions with the two-party and Clark; but these partisan differences repre- alternative-government model of opposition ac- sented the competition of political teams, not of tually fare better over a long period of time than world views. other jurisdictions?

Such evidence shows that the two-party, alterna- Below are a number of bodies of evidence drawn tive government model of opposition produces a from sophisticated rankings compiled by impar- choice of governing teams for voters, but not nec- tial experts. None of these rankings is definitive essarily an ideological choice or even a choice of and all are open to criticism, but together they alternative policies. Those who want to vote for a suggest that no strong empirical case can be made party espousing a specific and clearly defined in favour of any particular model of opposition. world view or philosophy of government will of- All seem to be capable of working well according ten feel that the system gives them only echoes, to the judgments of well-informed observers. not choices. First is the intriguing case of Alberta. As men- But even if ideological choice is not guaranteed, tioned previously, Alberta has had a the second argument—that the two-party alter- one-party-plus configuration with weak, frag-

The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right 12 The Fraser Institute PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 mented opposition for the past 80 years, yet it Another challenge comes from the Fraser Insti- consistently places at the top of Fraser Institute tute’s annual Economic Freedom of the World sur- rankings of public policy environments in the Ca- vey. Table 1 lists the top 10 countries for 1999 as nadian provinces. For example, it was judged to ranked on the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) have the best investment climate in 2001, and the (Gwartney and Lawson, 2001, p. 9), together with best spending and taxation policies in 1997 (Fra- my assessment of the role of opposition in their ser Institute media releases, June 26, 2001, and political systems: March 6, 1997). Table 1: Economic Freedom Index It should be noted that support for the Liberal op- Ranking, 1999 position soared in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Country Score Opposition when Don Getty’s Conservative government pur- sued high-tax, high-spending, high-debt policies. Hong Kong 9.4 Colonial management, first by the UK, then by China. The Liberals, led by former Edmonton mayor Opposition unimportant. Laurence Decore, threatened to outflank the Con- Singapore 9.3 “Guided democracy.” servatives on the right and succeeded in getting Opposition unimportant. 40 percent of the vote in the 1993 provincial elec- New Zealand 8.9 Two-party alternative- tion. The new PC leader, Ralph Klein, narrowly government until 1996. Now beat the Liberals, but only by repudiating the pol- competing coalitions. icies of his predecessor and making a sharp turn United 8.8 Two-party alternative- towards fiscal conservatism. Kingdom government. United States 8.7 Two-party power-sharing. Yet this one episode of two-party competition, Australia 8.5 Competing coalitions. important as it was, cannot explain all of Al- Ireland 8.5 Competing coalitions berta’s success. Since the end of World War II, un- with some flexibility. der both Social Credit and PC governments, the Switzerland 8.5 Power-sharing model. province has generally adhered to the economic Luxembourg 8.4 Consensus model. fundamentals of private property rights, free Netherlands 8.4 Consensus model. markets, balanced budgets, and low taxes; and this happened for decades when opposition was so fragmented and weak that there was never any These rankings suggest that the form of opposi- doubt about the re-election of the governing tion in itself cannot be a critical variable in pro- party. Indeed, during this whole period, the only ducing policies conducive to economic freedom. change of party government came in 1971, when The top two countries are not even democracies, the PCs replaced Social Credit after Ernest while the others in the top ten include examples Manning retired. At least for those who think that of the alternative-government, competing-coali- economic freedom is an essential aspect of good tion, consensus, and power-sharing models. government, the Alberta experience challenges Also, cultural milieu must be important because beliefs about the necessity of adhering to the the top seven countries are all English-speaking two-party alternative-government model. and were at one time part of the British Empire.1

1 A recent statistical study of 102 nonsocialist nations (Mahoney, 2001) shows that common-law countries enjoyed an average 1 of 3 faster growth in the years 1960 to 1992 than that enjoyed by civil-law countries. The British cultural and legal heritage may convey economic benefits that have nothing to do with the internal organization of the legislature.

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For a longer-term view, consider the six countries Table 3: The Economist’s that were identified as having achieved consis- Prospective Business tently high rankings in the period 1975-1995 Environment Rankings, 2001-2005 (Gwartney, Lawson, and Block, 1996, p. 67): Country Rank (for Opposition 2001-2005) Table 2: Countries Consistently Netherlands 1 Consensus model Ranked High on the Economic Freedom Index, 1975-1995 United States 2 Two-party power-sharing.

Country Score Opposition United 3 Two-party alternative- Kingdom government. (1995) Canada 4 One-party-plus. Hong Kong 9.1 Colonial management by the UK. Opposition Switzerland 5 Multi-party power-sharing. unimportant. Ireland 6 Competing coalitions with Switzerland 7.5 Power-sharing model. some flexibility.

Singapore 8.2 “Guided democracy.” Finland 7 Consensus model. Opposition unimpor- Singapore 8 Guided democracy. tant. Sweden 9 Consensus model, tending United States 7.7 Two-party power- towards one-party-plus. sharing. Hong Kong 10 Colonial management by Canada 6.9 Weak version of China. two-party alternative- government model

Germany 6.4 Competing coalitions with some flexibility.

Seven of the 10 countries in table 3 were also in the Economic Freedom Index top 10 for 1999, al- This picture is broadly similar to that for the EFI though the order of ranking is somewhat differ- top 10 in 1999: a variety of models of opposition, ent. Again there is the same representation of all together with an overrepresentation of Eng- models of opposition. lish-speaking countries. Of course, economic freedom and a favourable Finally, for a more future-oriented economic per- environment for business investment represent spective, table 3 uses the prospective business en- only one dimension of good government. Let us vironment rankings published annually by the look, therefore, at the United Nations Human De- Economist magazine. Because the differences be- velopment Index (HDI), which includes gross do- tween the top 10 were said to be “wafer-thin” mestic product per capita but places more weight (Leger, 2001), these can all be considered exam- on life expectancy, adult literacy, and school en- ples of successful countries as seen from the van- rolment. Table 4 lists the top 10 countries for 1999 tage of investment prospects: (see www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0778562.html).

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Admittedly, this evidence does not show that pat- Table 4: United Nations Human terns of opposition are unimportant. A properly Development Index Ranking, 1999 designed multivariate study might demonstrate Country Rank Opposition statistical correlations between patterns of oppo- sition and policy outcomes.2 My conclusion is Canada 1 Weak version of alternative- simpler but also more relevant to contemporary government model until Canadian politics: according to available empiri- 1993, one-party-plus there- after. cal evidence, no model of opposition is demon- strably best or worst. All models can be found Norway 2 Consensus model. among the countries achieving the world’s most United States 3 Two-party power-sharing. enviable economic and social outcomes. There is

Australia 4 Competing coalitions. no overriding necessity to “unite the right” in or- der to imitate a two-party alternative-govern- Iceland 5 Consensus model. ment model that, on the evidence, is only one of Sweden 6 Consensus model, tending several workable possibilities. towards one-party-plus.

Belgium 7 Consensus model. A wider conclusion, also supported by the same evidence, is that many different forms of democ- Netherlands 8 Consensus model. racy can work well. Democracy can succeed with Japan 9 One-party-plus. a written or unwritten constitution; with or with-

United 10 Two-party alternative- out an entrenched bill of rights; with a presiden- Kingdom government. tial or parliamentary system of government; with first-past-the-post voting, the alternative ballot, and various forms of proportional representa- This listing is somewhat different in character tion. Given the demonstrated success of all these from those based on the Economic Freedom In- institutional alternatives, the underlying funda- dex. Only four of the top 10 countries on the HDI mentals must be the crucial factors: the rule of index are English-speaking, versus seven of 10 on law; an independent, politically neutral judiciary; the EFI for 1999; and four or five (depending on respect for property rights and free markets; a how one evaluates Sweden) of the top 10 HDI widely distributed right to vote; freedom of dis- countries have the consensus model of opposi- cussion and political opposition (but not any par- tion, versus two of the top 10 on the EFI ranking. ticular form of opposition). But the overall picture is still one of diversity with respect to models of opposition. The HDI top 10 How can this be true? include examples of all democratic patterns of opposition: alternative government, competing These conclusions may seem counterintuitive. coalitions, power-sharing, consensus, and one- Anyone brought up in the alternative-govern- party-plus. ment tradition of opposition, which has long

2 Credible studies exist showing a statistical relationship between proportional representation and various outcomes that many observers, especially on the left, find desirable: higher turnout in elections, greater representation of women in parlia- ment, and greater equality in the distribution of income. See Milner, 1999 and 2001. There is also a parallel line of research on the alleged virtues of consensus government. See Lijphart, 1994 and Crepaz, 1996. But all of these findings depend heavily on what time period is studied, what variables are selected, and how the analyst values political outcomes, as shown by the different conclusions in Basham, Clemens, and Roque (2000).

The Fraser Institute 15 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 passed for conventional wisdom in the Eng- vacation or do business elsewhere. For shorter lish-speaking world, is likely to be persuaded by trips, air travel has to compete with railway, bus, the words of the distinguished NDP Parliamen- and passenger car alternatives, again putting lim- tarian Stanley Knowles: “…the opposition should its on Air Canada’s ability to extract monopoly so conduct itself in Parliament as to persuade the prices from the market. Finally, the owners and people of the country that it could be an improve- managers of monopolistic companies know that, ment on the government of the day. No one will if they perform inefficiently, their company deny [my emphasis] that our system works best might be taken over through merger or acquisi- when there is a change of government at reason- tion. Competitive forces would be even stronger able intervals” (quoted in Schmitz, 1988, p. 4). Yet if government policy did not prohibit for- the evidence suggests that non-alternating forms eign-owned airlines from flying domestic routes of opposition, including even one-party domi- (cabotage); but even in the absence of cabotage, nance and power-sharing, can work as well as al- Air Canada is pressed from many sides. Al- ternation in power. An analogy between though the theoretical model of perfect competi- economic and political competition may help to tion is not attained, the market can still function explain the situation (Ware, 1979). with reasonable efficiency.

In economics, the theoretical ideal is known as Economic competition is different in important perfect competition. It would exist if a number of ways from political competition in a democracy. conditions were met: such a large number of sell- Economic agents typically sell a limited number ers and buyers that no one can set a price; perfect of products to buyers who make voluntary deci- information; and an undifferentiated, divisible, sions whether or not to purchase. Political deci- and transferable product. Given these conditions, sion-makers, in contrast, impose a bundle of economists can show that perfect competition involuntary outcomes upon all those residing leads to market-clearing prices and the efficient within their jurisdiction. But the basic point of the allocation of resources. The conditions, however, comparison I wish to make here is still valid: po- are hardly ever met. Markets exist in a real world litical competition, like economic competition, of imperfect information and differentiated prod- can be effective in the real world under a wide va- ucts. Moreover, most markets are dominated by riety of conditions, even if it does not live up to a only a few, sometimes very few, buyers or sellers. theoretical ideal. Air Canada, for example, is the only large airline left in Canada; and before its acquisition of Cana- Assume for the sake of argument that the dian Airlines, there were only two large air- two-party alternative-government model is the lines—still far from the theoretical ideal of perfect theoretical ideal because it lets the voters periodi- competition. cally select which team of politicians they want to manage the affairs of state. Of course, the alterna- Competitive forces exist, however, even in a de tive-government model may not be so theoreti- facto duopoly or monopoly. Small airlines, such cally perfect if we take into account Downs’ as WestJet, can compete successfully with Air argument about convergence. Moreover, even in Canada in specific or niche markets, thus nibbling cases where the competitors are genuinely differ- away at the larger firm’s overall profitability. In- ent ideologically, the two-party alternative-gov- ternational travel is highly competitive, so Cana- ernment model has been criticized for producing dians can choose among airlines if they wish to “discontinuity,” i.e., stop-start disruptions in leave the country. The more expensive domestic public policy (Finer, 1975, pp. 13-14). As an exam- travel becomes, the more travelers may choose to ple of this line of thought, consider the installa-

The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right 16 The Fraser Institute PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 tion of the National Energy Program by the the grizzly hunt. This process is similar to the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau in 1981 dynamic that prevails in the world of busi- and its repeal by the Conservative government of ness. Air Canada cannot afford to ignore Brian Mulroney in 1986. A consensus or WestJet and Canada 3000 simply because the power-sharing model that included a substantial latter are much smaller companies; rather, Air element from the West, for example, might never Canada tries to beat them back by offering have passed the NEP in the first place. similar products.

However, assume for the sake of argument that • New parties. The possibility of new-party en- the ideal would be to have two parties, each capa- try into political competition is the equivalent ble of winning an election and governing, and of contestability in economic markets. As long each presenting a distinctly different philosophy as there are no legal barriers to entry, a gov- of government to the voters at each election. (It erning party cannot afford to become compla- would presumably be even better to present the cent even if there seems to be no viable voters with more than two options, but then it opponent at the moment. With modern tech- would be unlikely that all such parties would niques of communication, organization, and have enough support to be able to form a govern- fundraising, a political entrepreneur can ment.) Even if this traditional British model of quickly fill a competitive void by founding a government and opposition exists in only a small new party. The possibilities are multiplied in number of cases, the competing-coalition model a federal system such as Canada’s, where a is not too dissimilar. But what keeps govern- party competing at one level may decide to ments reasonably honest, efficient, and account- enter the other level as well. Ever since the able when there is only one viable governing founding of the Reform Party in 1987, politi- party, or when change means only a slight adjust- cians in the western provinces have had to ment in the composition of the governing coali- reckon with the possibility that Reform might tion, or when government is dominated enter provincial politics. Therein lies part of Swiss-style by a permanent cartel? Below are the explanation for the adoption in the early some possible answers to that question. 1990s of the citizens’ initiative in Saskatche- wan, and the initiative and recall in British • Small parties. A governing party cannot com- Columbia. Reform had “road tested” these pletely ignore small opponents, even if they policies and shown their popularity with seem unlikely to prevail in the next election. western voters. It seems plausible, though it Small parties can become big parties. To pre- cannot be proven definitively, that the move- serve its hegemony, a governing party will of- ment of Premiers Klein of Alberta and Filmon ten appropriate policy ideas from smaller of Manitoba toward balanced budgets was opponents, as the Liberals did during the last partially motivated by the same factors. They decade with respect to balanced budgets, tax must have considered that, if they did not rep- cuts, and firmer resistance to Quebec separat- resent the desire of their conservative sup- ism. Another example comes from the behav- porters for balanced budgets, the federal iour of the NDP government of British Reform Party, or some breakaway element Columbia in the run up to the 2001 campaign. within it, might move in on their base, as the Knowing from polls how the Greens were Reform Party of British Columbia actually did cutting into their traditional base of support, try to do. the NDP tried to fend them off with a series of environmental measures, such as prohibiting • Takeovers. Just as corporations can be taken over and given a new direction, so can politi-

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cal parties. A striking example from the recent have to pay attention to what other gov- past is Ralph Klein’s victorious race in 1992 erning parties are doing. Such pressures against Nancy Betkowski to replace Don also extend from one level to another in a Getty as leader of the Progressive Conserva- federal system. The decision made by the tive Party and premier of Alberta. Mr. Klein’s federal Liberals in 2000 to offer tax cuts victory meant a new team at the top and a came after most provinces had already strikingly different policy direction. It was al- demonstrated the political popularity of most equivalent to a change in governing lower taxes. party (Cooper and Kanji, 2000). Such evidence does not prove that the two-party • Jurisdictional competition. Globalization means alternative-government model of opposition is that governments today are increasingly con- unimportant or undesirable. It does, however, strained by the decisions of other govern- suggest that the absence of the alternative gov- ments, as well as by impersonal economic ernment model of opposition is not a catastrophe, forces. Some examples: because other competitive forces continue to con- ♦ The consequences of decades of protec- strain and guide governing parties as long as the tionism and interventionism in New Zea- democratic process is open. A principle of antici- land forced the Labour government into a pated reaction leads governing parties to operate, radical departure in economic policy in at least to a degree, as if they faced an opposition 1984. Labour and National governments party or a coalition that could displace them in continued with subsequent waves of re- the next election. They know that, if they do not form through the mid-1990s as necessity take the possibility of opposition seriously, that proved more important than party labels possibility could become a reality. (Russell, 1996). The bottom line: application ♦ Reckless accumulation of public debt to Canada would eventually have led to financial cri- sis in Canada. Finance minister Paul Mar- According both to political theory and to empiri- tin finally took decisive action to balance cal evidence, the two-party alternative-govern- the budget when he came to realize this in ment model is not the only acceptable form of 1995 after the Mexican peso crisis opposition; other configurations have worked (Greenspon and Wilson-Smith, 1996, p. well at various times in many jurisdictions. That 236). finding, however, does not really settle the con- ♦ For decades in the United States, people temporary Canadian debate. Even if everything and capital left the high-tax states of the can work somewhere, sometime, the two-party northeast for the low-tax states of the south alternative government model might be better for and west (Frum, 2000, p. 325). Massachu- Canada here and now. setts eventually had to legislate deep tax cuts in order to escape its nickname, I would be the first to support a merger of the Ca- “Taxachusetts.” In Canada, tax cuts in On- nadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative tario and Alberta set up pressures for simi- parties if I thought it would produce not only a lar cuts in other provinces. Critics on the party that could win an election fairly soon, but left might decry this as a “race to the bot- also a party that was consistently conservative in tom”; but whether one approves or disap- the sense of respect for principles of individual proves, it is clear that governing parties property rights, competitive markets, smaller

The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right 18 The Fraser Institute PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 government, and traditional morality. The evi- For these and many other reasons, every empiri- dence, however, suggests that such a party, even cal study conducted by political scientists has if it could be constructed, would probably fail to shown that there is greater distance between Tory meet both criteria. and Alliance members and supporters than there is between either and the Liberals. In fact, the Lib- To date, the two major attempts at fusion have erals are the most common second choice among produced more heat than light. The founders of partisans of both parties. On several dimensions the Canadian Alliance succeeded in detaching a of political choice, the Tories are now perceived group of so-called Blue Tories from the Progres- as lying to the left of the Liberals (Flanagan and sive Conservative party, but they did not deliver Harper, 1998, pp. 177-185; Nevitte et al., 2000, pp. a death blow to the PCs. After the Mont-Trem- 98-101; Johnston, 2001, pp. 11-12). This gap be- blant meeting in August 2001, the PCs announced tween the members and supporters of the two the formation of a loose coalition with the Demo- parties will make it difficult to engineer a peace- cratic Representative Caucus; but the latter are in ful unification, no matter who the leaders hap- reality only a breakaway group from the Alliance, pen to be. Even if merger is attained, so many thus repeating the previous pattern by which an supporters might be lost in the process that the element of one party went over to the other. In final whole would be less than the sum of the both cases, the desire of a minority to work with original parts. the other party has seemingly stiffened the re- solve of the remaining majority to keep its party Beyond the ideological cleavages loom problems alive and steer its own course. of party democracy. The Alliance membership list is said to have reached 270,000 names in the According to the National Post as well as to White course of the recent leadership race and federal and Daifallah (2001), the difficulty in bringing the election. Although many of those were tempo- parties together is mainly a problem of leader- rary members brought in by the excitement of a ship. In their view, if only Joe Clark and Stockwell leadership race and federal election, the party’s Day would get out of the way, merger would pro- membership is still large by Canadian standards. ceed without impediment. But they are insuffi- The internal political culture of the Alliance, ciently attentive to real and profound ideological moreover, emphasizes majority rule and calls for differences between members of the two parties. direct membership participation in selecting the While the parties share common ground on some leader and deciding major issues of party policy. (not all) fiscal and economic matters, they are far The PCs, on the other hand, have a much smaller apart on other important issues. For example, membership (said to have reached about 90,000 in while Joe Clark opposed the Liberal govern- their last leadership race) and a less populist in- ment’s Clarity Act, and the PC party still offi- ternal culture. Mr. Clark was chosen leader by a cially endorses Quebec’s right of self-determina- direct ballot of members, but the operating rule tion, the Alliance supported the Clarity Act and was not one member, one (equal) vote. Rather, generally takes a tough line against Quebec sep- each constituency association was weighted aratism. On the aboriginal front, the Tories sup- equally, no matter how large or small its member- port the “inherent right of aboriginal self-gov- ship. The party never did release figures on how ernment,” while the Alliance wants self-govern- many members actually voted for Mr. Clark. ment to be equivalent to municipal government and has called provocatively for private prop- Merging these two parties, with their different erty rights and an end to tax exemptions on re- cultures and unequally sized memberships, will serves. not be easy. In a purely democratic scenario (ma-

The Fraser Institute 19 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 jority rule; one member, one vote), the Tories will ties. We share a belief in tolerance, a need fear being swamped by the greater number of Al- to hear the majority wherever possible, liance members. But if the Tories get special pro- but to protect minorities whenever neces- tection or privileges because of their smaller sary. Whether you call these principles right, centrist, or leftist, they will influence numbers, the Alliance members, particularly the positions we take… those who used to be Reformers, will perceive the arrangement as a throwback to the undemocratic Mushy prose like this doesn’t offer much reassur- manipulation that caused them to leave other ance that the cooperative movement which parties in the first place. It is hard to see a solution Messrs. Clark and Strahl claim to be building will to this conundrum unless one of the parties col- be conservative in any serious sense. In fact, they lapses so completely that it is just a matter of pick- explicitly deny that it will be conservative: ing up the shattered pieces—but that would be more of an acquisition than a merger. …most voters don’t consider themselves “right wing,” and curiously those that do, Assume for the moment that all of these difficul- vote Liberal more than anything else. The ties could be overcome, that it would be possible lack of a self-styled right-wing party does- to effect a happy merger in spite of differences in n’t make people vote Liberal. Offering ideology, internal culture, and membership base. them such an option wouldn’t make them The new party might constitute an alternative abandon the Liberal party. And more im- governing team, but would it present an alterna- portantly, it wouldn’t reflect the interests of the vast majority of Canadians. tive philosophy of government? The views of Joe Clark and Chuck Strahl, as presented shortly after The columnist George Jonas quickly lampooned negotiating their coalition at Mont-Tremblant, the ideas set forth by Clark and Strahl: “Dear vot- portend otherwise. Here are some excerpts from ers! You might say that if you like Liberal ideas, or their essay (Clark and Strahl, 2001): if you like the way the Liberals govern Canada, you should vote Liberal. We say you’re mistaken. One of the reasons to believe our working If you like the way the Liberals govern, you coalition will, in fact, work in Parliament should vote Clark & Strahl” (Jonas, 2001). The ap- and may well lead to broader co-opera- proach adopted at Mont-Tremblant and articu- tion, is because we accept and embrace [em- phasis added] the fact voters have lated by Messrs. Clark and Strahl is essentially to occasionally contradictory values. In Can- offer voters a choice of governing teams without a ada, tolerance is twinned with a desire to choice of governing philosophies. From the per- preserve a traditional set of values. In Can- spective of political science, it is a return to ada, taxes can feel too high, but spending Downsian convergence. cuts can feel too harsh. In Canada, free trade can be embraced, but laissez-faire The history of convergent two-party politics in economics rejected. Canada, as well as in other countries, suggests that, while competition may be keen, even bitter, ...We share a view that less government is the chief result of victory at the polls is to deter- generally better, that governments must mine which team of party loyalists will receive limit their costs and pay off their debts, that free market economies work better patronage appointments and contracts from the than planned ones. We share a commit- public purse. In other respects the parties tend to ment that issues of environmental safety, mirror each other. During the 1980s, for example, and of personal health and security cannot the Mulroney government continued and even take a back seat to purely economic priori- extended policies earlier introduced by Liberal

The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right 20 The Fraser Institute PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53 governments: deficit spending, public health in- Let me conclude this discussion with several surance, pay and employment equity, regional propositions: economic development, generous unemploy- ment insurance, aboriginal self-government, offi- 1. The empirical evidence from other democ- cial bilingualism, and multiculturalism racies shows no obvious superiority of the (Flanagan, 1995, pp. 40-41). During the 1990s, the two-party alternative-government model Liberals left in place and even extended the inno- of opposition. Jurisdictions with several vations the Mulroney Tories had made: tighter different forms of opposition routinely ob- money, lower marginal rates of income tax, the tain top scores on a number of economic GST, and NAFTA, although they opposed those and social ranking systems. measures at the time they were enacted. Of course, one can find policy differences between 2. Political theory suggests a strong, albeit not the Mulroney and Trudeau governments (e.g., invariable, tendency for the main contend- the Mulroney government repealed the National ers in a two-party system to converge on Energy Program), as well as between those of the position of the median voter, thereby of- Diefenbaker and Pearson, or Bennett and King; fering voters a choice of governing teams but such differences tend to reflect circumstances but not of policies. rather than consistent philosophical orientations (by 1986 falling energy prices had made the Na- 3. Canadian history in the twentieth century tional Energy Program pointless). largely conforms to the pattern of two-party convergence. During the twentieth century, genuine policy change in Canada has come not so much from the (infrequent) alternation of the two big brokerage 4. Policy innovation in Canada has come parties as from the efforts of smaller parties with a mainly from smaller parties espousing a clear ideological outlook. From the 1940s through consistent philosophy, even if they have the 1980s, the CCF/NDP proposed and the Lib- not been able to win elections and form a erals disposed: unemployment insurance, old age government. pensions, national health insurance, and other as- pects of the welfare state. During the 1990s, it was If these four propositions are true, a fifth proposi- a similar story, with the Liberals still disposing tion follows, which can serve as the last word of but Reform and the Alliance proposing: balanced this essay: budgets, downsizing government, decentraliza- tion, and tax cuts. Advocates of uniting the right Conservatives and libertarians who see have often belittled such accomplishments, say- politics as a means of effecting change in ing they want to govern, not just to be “the NDP public policy are more likely to achieve of the right.” But for philosophical conservatives their goals by supporting parties with a and libertarians for whom changing public policy consistent free-market outlook than by sub- is the main purpose of engaging in politics, the merging themselves in “big tent” parties NDP is an attractive role model. that may sometimes win elections but have no clear agenda for changing public policy.

The Fraser Institute 21 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES, NUMBER 53

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Tom Flanagan is a professor of political science at the University of Calgary, a senior fellow of The Fraser Institute, and a fellow of the Royal Society Acknowledgments of Canada. He has written extensively on Cana- dian politics and history. His most recent book, I would like to thank Preston Manning and First Nations? Second Thoughts (2000), won the Gordon Gibson for their kindness in reading a Donner Prize for the best book on public policy draft of this paper and making several helpful and the Donald Smiley Prize for the best book on suggestions. Neither, however, fully supports the Canadian government and politics in the year of conclusions I have reached. publication.

The Fraser Institute 23 The Uneasy Case for Uniting the Right