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Iran in Deir Ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion, and Opportunities

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Iran in Deir Ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion, and Opportunities Iran in Deir ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion, and Opportunities Ziad Awad Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS) Research Project Report 21 October 2019 2019/13 © European University Institute 2019 Content and individual chapters © Ziad Awad, 2019 This work has been published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the authors. If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the year and the publisher. Requests should be addressed to [email protected]. Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the European University Institute. Middle East Directions Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Project Report RSCAS/Middle East Directions 2019/13 21 October 2019 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ cadmus.eui.eu Iran in Deir ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion, and Opportunities Ziad Awad* * Ziad Awad is a Syrian journalist and researcher who works under the aegis of the ‘Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria’ research project in the Middle East Directions Programme supervised by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University in Florence. His work focuses on the eastern regions of Syria, and especially on the dynamics of local conflict in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. This research paper was written in September 2019 and was published in Arabic on 7 October 2019 by Middle East Directions (http://medirections.com/index.php/2019-05-07-15-50-27/wartime/2019-10-07-07-56-40). It was translated into English by Alex Rowell and Moayad Hokan. Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 1. The Iranian Presence in Deir ez-Zor 3 1.1. IRGC Militias: Yesterday’s Newcomers are Tomorrow’s Settlers 4 1.2. Iran’s ‘Soft’ Hands 7 2. Powerful Iranian Influence in a Weak Country 10 2.1. Easy Expansion to Local Authorities and Communities 10 Relationships with Local Authorities and their Senior Representatives 10 Relations with Local Communities Through New and Old Actors 11 2.2. Comfortable Work in a Near-Empty Space 14 3. Obstacles to Iranian Policy in Deir ez-Zor 17 3.1. Iranians are Persian Shia Amid Sunni Arabs 17 3.2. Other Actors in the Arena 19 3.3. Iran’s Lack of Adequate Financial Resources 21 Conclusion 22 Executive Summary Since late 2017, militias affiliated to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been deployed in areas west of the Euphrates River, and parts of the region to its east in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor, which was previously under Islamic State (IS) control. Within two years of their being there, these militias from various backgrounds – foreign, Syrian and local – have succeeded in recruiting thousands of local youths into their ranks, thus providing the IRGC with important contact with the local communities. Iran is attempting to get closer to the local population and gain legitimacy with it through its civil, charitable and humanitarian activities, for which it has mainly relied on the Iranian Cultural Centre and the Jihad al-Binaa organisation. At the same time, Iran has succeeded in building important relationships and friendships with the governor of Deir ez-Zor, leaders of the regime’s intelligence services and other influential officials in the higher circles of local government. It has also succeeded, especially through the Iranian Cultural Centre, in bringing local figures from the economic, social and professional elite and official religious institutions into the diverse networks it is currently forming, which extend from Deir ez-Zor to the capital Damascus, where other Iranian institutions are active. The weakness, disintegration and exhaustion of the local communities resulting from the prolonged war in the governorate have enabled Iran to infiltrate the fabric of these communities, which have lost their ability to oppose Iranian influence, even if Iran raises sensitivities, particularly religious ones. Despite the strength and opportunities available to Iran in Deir ez-Zor, major obstacles still stand in its way. The most important of these is the sectarian disparity, given the overwhelming Sunni majority, which wishes to preserve its faith and is influenced by the prevailing Sunni view of Shiism as a deviation from original Islam. This view owes much to the Salafi-jihadism embodied by IS, which has survived as both a set of rejectionist ideas and a physical militant group still capable of launching attacks from its pocket of influence in the Syrian desert (Badia). Escalating Israeli airstrikes on IRGC positions in the governorate and the presence of US forces east of the Euphrates are other threats to Iranian influence there. Moreover, another primary challenge to Iran in the region is the strict economic sanctions imposed by the United States, which have hindered recruitment and led to the salaries of local militiamen in Deir ez-Zor being lowered. 1 Introduction Following the victory of the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979, Iran, which then named itself the Islamic Republic of Iran, launched Shia conversion campaigns in Syria. This represented a broad resumption of the Shia activism which had initially been limited in the mid-1970s, being concentrated in the then-remote area of Sayyidah Zaynab south of Damascus.1 As in other Syrian regions, Iran’s first contact with Deir ez-Zor began following the launch of Shia proselytism there in the early 1980s. These campaigns particularly focused on the town of Hatla, and by 2011 had managed to convert nearly 4,000 of the town’s approximately 22,000 residents, along with hundreds of others from nearby villages. In the summer of 2017, the Assad regime and its Iranian and Russian allies launched a joint military operation against IS in the governorate, breaking the siege imposed by the group since 2015 on the regime-controlled pocket in the city of Deir ez-Zor.2 The final outcome was a takeover by the regime and its allies of more than half of the governorate’s administrative area, with the remainder falling under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their American ally following a separate military operation which began at about the same time and concluded in March 2019. Nearly two years on from the military defeat of IS in the Deir ez-Zor governorate, the IRGC has maintained its militia presence in the province, and this has become the broader front of the Iranian- American cold war being waged in Syria. The issue of the Iranian presence has become a subject of broad debate with various opinions as to its reality and implications, and only a few field studies have been conducted on the matter. This begs questions as to the reasons for the Iranians’ success and their influence in this region, together with the factors that could potentially limit or hinder this success in the medium and long terms. This paper first examines the forms of Iran’s presence, and its military and civilian activities in the regime-controlled parts of Deir ez-Zor. It then analyses the factors contributing to Iran’s power at the levels of local authorities and society, and the challenges faced by Iran, the most notable of which are sectarian differences, the presence of other active forces in the governorate and Iran’s diminishing financial resources due to tightened US sanctions. The researcher has drawn on more than fifty meetings conducted with the help of six assistants residing in the governorates of Deir ez-Zor and Damascus. These meetings between February and September 2019, some of which involved several encounters, were held with people familiar with developments in Deir ez-Zor who either reside in the governorate or have been displaced from it. Other interviewees included members of IRGC-affiliated militias, other Shia figures and members of the regime’s army and its affiliated militias. For security reasons, the identities of most of the interviewees and their specific places of residence are omitted. The researcher has also undertaken lengthy monitoring and tracking of published content relevant to the subject through open-access sources on the websites of research centres, media outlets, social media sites, forums and personal blogs. 1 Abdulrahman al-Hajj, Shiite Baath in Syria 2007-2019 (in Arabic), (Beirut: Jusoor for Translation and Publishing, 2017). 2 Ziad Awad, “The Rebuilding of Syrian Regime Networks in the City of Deir ez-Zor: Identifying Key Local Players,” research project report, (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, March 2019), https://bit.ly/33jVu4s 2 1. The Iranian Presence in Deir ez-Zor The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps3 commands a variety of militias in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor working to achieve its military objective of protecting its sphere of influence. By recruiting local young men in the ranks of these militias, the IRGC meets its need for greater numbers of fighters, producing affiliates that can be integrated into larger more consolidated local formations in the future serving as alternatives to other foreign militias and thus entrenching Iranian influence in Deir ez-Zor. Furthermore, the civil activities of the Iranian Cultural Centre, and the Jihad al-Binaa organisation in particular, provide a ‘friendly’ image of Iran among local communities, through which Iran attempts to gain legitimacy and acceptance of its various roles. Map 1. Military Control and Influence in Deir ez-Zor Governorate Source: the author. Graphic designer: Laura Pigneri, 20 September 2019 3 Strictly speaking, the IRGC’s external arm is known as the Quds Force, but here it is referred to as the IRGC for the sake of simplicity.
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