Djibouti avant tout: Sustainable peace development through a civic

nationalist framework enforcing Afar-Issa rapprochement

Deek Hussain Jama

MSc Political Science: International Relations Student number: 12272337 Thesis supervisor: Dr. Michael Onyebuchi Eze Second reader: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon Date: June 2020 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude to my mother and sisters for being a huge emotional support during the difficult times throughout this course. Your encouragement is something that I treasure and I hope you know how much I would do the same for you all. I’d also like to thank my friends both in the UK and the Netherlands for being motivating throughout my studies. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my study advisors, Michael and Vivienne, for guiding me to challenge myself throughout this thesis.

I dedicate this to my grandmother, Mako Jama, who unfortunately passed away in the final weeks of my Master’s course. Her stories of Djibouti’s revolutionary moments have motivated me to research the cultural and political history of our people.

i ABSTRACT

The Afars and Issas; two ethnic groups indigenous to the Horn of Africa involved in an ongoing protraction of violence in Ethiopia. Although the population of Djibouti is majorly comprised of the two, the nation has not seen a similar level of contention since the Civil War. This thesis explores how Djiboutian civic nationalism works to reconcile the mental distances between the Afar and Issa identities caused by a historic and transnational conflict. An explanation will be presented through a case study of bureaucratic and guerrilla relations from the nation’s time as La Côte Français des Somalis to the present-day Republic. By establishing the successes and setbacks of peace development within the nation, this research will deploy a comprehensive understanding that advances knowledge of peace studies in the Djiboutian context.

Keywords: Afar, Africa, Civic nationalism, Djibouti, Ethnic conflict, Ethnic politics, Horn of Africa, Issa, Peace studies, Peace development, Political justice, Social Justice, Somali

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... I ABSTRACT ...... II ABBREVIATIONS ...... IV 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 4

CASE INTRODUCTION: DJIBOUTI’S SOCIO-POLITICAL SPHERE ...... 4 Two people, one nation ...... 4 Pre-independence conflict ...... 6 Post-independence conflict ...... 7 Present-day peace level ...... 9

LITERARY SYNOPSES: CRUX OF THE CONFLICT ...... 10

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 15

MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONFLICT ...... 15 Anatomy of violence ...... 15 Anatomy of peace ...... 16

COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES WITHIN AN ANTAGONISTIC AND HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY ...... 18

FROM ETHNIC TO CIVIC NATIONALISM: A PEACE-BUILDING FRAMEWORK ...... 19

PROPOSING A THEORETICAL MODEL ...... 21

4. METHODOLOGY ...... 21

METHODS ...... 23

ETHICS ...... 29

5. DEMONSTRATION OF AFAR-ISSA DIVERGENCE ...... 31

AN INHERITED ANTAGONISM ...... 31

ETHNIC POLITICS THROUGH THE STATE ...... 33

BEYOND THE BORDERS: A TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 35

6. COMPOSING RECONCILIATION THROUGH DJIBOUTIAN CONVERGENCE ...... 37

WHAT IT MEANS TO BE DJIBOUTIAN ...... 37

RIGHTING THE WRONGS THROUGH POLITICAL JUSTICE ...... 40

7. THREATS TO PEACE DEVELOPMENT ...... 45

IS THERE TRUE JUSTICE? ...... 45

A SPILLOVER OF REGIONAL RIVALRIES ...... 47

8. CONCLUSION ...... 49

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 54 APPENDICES ...... 66

iii ABBREVIATIONS

APP – Afar People’s Party

AROD - Action pour la Révision de l'Ordre à Djibouti

FDLD - Front Démocratique pour la Libération de Djibouti

FLCS - Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis

FRUD - Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie

IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development

MNDID – Mouvement National Djiboutien pour l'Instauration de la Démocratie

MPL - Mouvement Populaire de Libération

RADD - Rassemblement pour l'Action de Développement et la Démocratie

RDA - Regroupement Démocratique Afar

RPP - Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès

RTD - Radiodiffusion Télévision de Djibouti

SNPC - Somalia National Peace Conference

UN – United Nations

iv La défense de la Nation et de l'intégrité du territoire de la République est un devoir sacré pour tout citoyen Djiboutien. (The defence of the Nation and the integrity of the Republic’s territory is the sacred duty of every Djiboutian citizen) - La Constitution de la République de Djibouti, Titre II, Art. 6, 1992.

v CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Afar-Issa conflict has been protracted and heightened since the 16th Century (Prunier & Ficquet 2015: 34). A phenomenon so bloody and deep-rooted, it is has been baptised as the longest-running inter-ethnic dispute in the Horn of Africa (Kebbede 2016: 54). Its presence has been felt from the Awash River Valley in Ethiopia to the Obock coast in Djibouti but its magnitude is asymmetrical amongst the region. On one hand, violence remains potent in the Afar and Somali autonomous regional states of Ethiopia. As of 2019, around 124,000 Afars and Issas have been displaced, endured injuries, death, and have had scarce access to food or water (OCHCA 2020). On the other, Djibouti is currently the most peaceful in the Red Sea region (IEP 2019). Indeed, the last occurrence of profound bloodshed was the nation’s Civil War of 1991-1994. It is also one of the five fastest developing nations in the continent and this can be attributed to the relatively amicable socio-political relationship between the Afars and the Issas (IEP 2019). Through the 1994 Peace Accord between the Afar party, Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie, and the Issa party, Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès, the nation was declared as comprising of one people working for the stability of their sovereign lands, for the first time1 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994). Having said that, the two ethnic groups have never seen such unity before 1991. Embroiled in conflicts during the Middle Ages, French Colonialism and Djibouti’s independence; researchers and reporters alike would take turns speculating the potential dissolution of Djibouti’s existence as a country established on ethnic divisions (Abdi 1977; Schraeder 1993; Shilling 1973). With no constitution before 1992 and a political system that was designed to be exploited, hatred undeniably blistered and festered. In this depiction of Djibouti, we see an unexpected reconciliation of an Afar-Issa antagonism that predates the country itself. It becomes even more intriguing when we acknowledge that the Afar-Issa conflict continues across its borders in Ethiopia.

1 Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Préambule.

1 This research paper aims to figure out what has caused this sudden consolidation by exploring the paramount question: To what extent has civic nationalism facilitated Djibouti’s peace development? To construct a fully comprehensive answer, I shall provide an explanation to three sub-questions that seek to understand Djibouti’s development by examining its historical conflict and its present-day peace level:

1: How did the Afar-Issa relationship lead to the outbreak of the Djiboutian Civil War? 2: What has Djibouti done to reconcile Afar-Issa grievances after the Djiboutian Civil War? 3: What are the potential threats to Afar-Issa reconciliation in Djibouti?

This endeavour also aims to fill a knowledge gap in the understandings of the Afar-Issa conflict and the Djiboutian realm. Many theories on the Afar-Issa conflict are orientated to providing an explanation on either a regional or Ethiopian scale. They provide extensive materialist and ideological understandings of the conflict. In comparison, the literature on Djibouti remains largely historiographical. However, in select literature that do, in fact, present explanatory theories of Djiboutian domestic affairs have been focused on explaining what caused the conflict than what pacified it. These previous works have been incredibly insightful in creating a theoretical framework that understands the nature of the conflict and the national setting that I wish to evaluate yet they are entrenched in conflict studies. Although this research will explore the conflict extensively, it is categorically posited in peace studies. The significance of this research in the Political Sciences is distinct by the lack of knowledge production in the Horn of Africa in comparison to other regions of the continent. Although literature is present, as mentioned above, they are dissimilar in their accounts which leads me to believe that it remains misunderstood. Moreover, it is evident that Djibouti is one of the least studied African nations (DeLancey 1992: 209). As such, this research is not only valued because it attempts to provide an explanatory account of conflict to peace, but also the fact that it exists. Concepts that will be applied to this research will be interdisciplinary by virtue of a postcolonial ontological and epistemological position. Violence will be considered multidimensional and exemplified through Galtung’s triad of direct, structural and cultural expressions. A divergence of identities will be interpreted through concepts of victimisation, tribalism and ethnic nationalism. In addition, peace will also be established as equally complex and a convergence of identities will be examined and compared to the understandings of civic nationalism as a contemporary African reconciliatory approach.

2 These questions will be answered through a longitudinal case study encompassing six critical periods in the second independence referendum of 1967, Djibouti’s independence in 1977, the governmental transition to a one-party system in 1981, the Civil War of 1991-1994, the peace process of between 1992-2001, and the current state 2001-2020. I will employ thematic and discursive analytic approaches to evaluate Djibouti’s Journal Officiel, French newspaper of record, Le Monde, and reports from the US Department of State to compare and comprehend how the government and guerrilla groups have contributed and experienced conflict. Based on the assertions made by these analyses, I will then evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the nation’s current peace level. My research will be anchored through an inferential evaluation of my own ethics. As a British-Dutch national of Djiboutian-Somali descent, my positionality must be addressed from various standpoints. I will deconstruct any potentially biased or Eurocentric assumptions on the Afar-Issa relations and peace development by entrenching myself in relevant theories and concepts. Subsequently, my findings will be transparent, abductive and thick in description in order to provide a constructive answer.

3 CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will provide a brief historical timeline of the Afar-Issa conflict in Djibouti. In addition, it will delve into studies that have posited possible explanations and solutions for the protracted nature of the conflict. Through a critical examination of their central arguments, I will demonstrate the relevance of my research and how it is situated within current literature.

Case introduction: Djibouti’s socio-political sphere

Two people, one nation Djibouti is a small but essential state located in the Horn of Africa that emerged after gaining independence as the former Territoire français des Afars et des Issas (French Territory of the Afars and Issas) in 1977. Like many other nations in the continent, it is fairly young but its history is long-established and constitutive to the society we see today. Djibouti stands at a crossroads between the Suez Canal in the north, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the west and the heart of Africa to the south and east. According to the Global Peace Index, the nation is the most peaceful in Northeast Africa for the reason that it is surrounded by Ethiopian-Eritrean clashes, the Somali Civil War and the Yemeni Civil War (IEP 2019). Under these qualities, it is best known for being a geopolitical location of high value (IBP USA 2006a: 26). Correspondingly, Djibouti hosts military bases of incredibly powerful nations; the US, China, France, Italy and Japan. In these bases, anti-piracy ventures, counter- terrorism initiatives and intelligence surveillance have been pursued (ibid). With perpetual conflict occurring in neighbouring countries, Djibouti is in the eye of the storm and as such, has been used by foreign actors to regulate the region. However, as a consequence, the importance of its domestic stability is comparatively overlooked. Djibouti is in a unique position that needs to be explored. The current total population is around 960,000 (World Bank 2020). Approximately 95% of that number consists of the Afars and Issas (Wiafe-Amoako 2019: 208). It is important to know that these two ethnic

4 groups have been engaged in protracted violence for centuries (Michaelson 2000: 4). As a result of their size and history of contention, their relationship with each other determines how stable Djibouti is. To complicate the matter, there continues to be hostility between their kinfolk along the Afar and Somali regional states of Ethiopia because of long-term grievances and scarcity in resources (OCHA 2020). With bloodshed perpetually appearing at its doorstep and instances of occasional spillover, Djibouti’s peace is always in a state of jeopardy. Elaborating on the two ethnic groups, The Afars are a Cushitic people who are native to the Horn of Africa. As illustrated in Figure 1, their indigenous domain covers the Danakil Depression which reaches from the Awash River valley in the heart of Ethiopia across to the Obock district of Djibouti and the city of Massawa in central Eritrea. Although they contribute to 35% of Djibouti’s ethnic makeup, which amounts to around 334,000, they are more than 2.6 million strong in their greater territory (CSA 2017). They have their own Afro-Asiatic language, Afar, but huge parts of the Figure 1. Transnational map highlighting Afar-Issa ethnic borders and historical areas community in their of conflict. respective countries can speak Arabic, French and Somali. Traditionally, the Afars are nomadic pastoralists and for the most part, have largely remained a rural group of people (Hubbard 2011: 22). Nonetheless, their presence in the capital, Djibouti city, has been constant and their political presence is ever-growing. Similarly, the Issas are also a Cushitic people who are traditionally nomadic pastoralists. They reside in an adjacent yet contiguous region that consists of Northern

5 Ethiopia, Northern Somaliland/Somalia2 and Southern Djibouti. In Djibouti, they make up 65% of the population, which would amount to 640,000 (Wiafe-Amoako 2019: 208). Although present in the rural south, the majority of them are concentrated in Djibouti City (Shehim & Searing 1980: 211). The Issas are a clan of the larger Somali ethnicity that currently comprises of around 22 million people that are native to most of the Horn of Africa (UNPD 2019). In Djibouti, the Issas widely speak the Somali, which is also Afro-Asiatic, as their mother tongue but the majority of them can also speak Arabic and French; Afar is not as common. Since the Issas have been urbanised earlier and at a greater capacity, they have been more involved in the bureaucracy of the nation since the colonial era (Shehim & Searing 1980: 211).

Pre-independence conflict The Afar-Issa conflict has been the longest rivalry amongst all ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa (Kebbede 2016: 54). The exact date of when conflict erupted is hard to pinpoint due to their oral tradition of recording history but the conflict can be seen in the turn of the 16th Century (Prunier & Ficquet 2015: 34). However, conflict along the Djiboutian region can be dated back to the 18th Century after the Issa expansion from northern Somalia towards the Awash River Basin in the west and Djibouti City in the north (Lewis 1961:71). Although violence was extensive in the Ethiopian hinterlands, Djibouti was sparsely populated, so instances of violence were not constant but occasional. Tensions were heightened after the arrival of the French and an influx of populations. In 1862, the French Empire bought the rights to use the port of Obock from Afar Sultan, Dini Ahmed Aboubaker to integrate it into their international trade routes (Degefu 2003: 31). The following decades saw a French expansion to the ports of Tadjoura and Djibouti City. Then, Djibouti City quickly replaced Obock as the economic centre of the region and saw a huge rise of Arab, European and Issa merchants (ibid). Finally, the three ports were integrated into one territory in 1896 as La Côte Français des Somalis (French Somaliland). Alongside this new territory came a French and Arab ruling class with an urbanised Issa majority (Shehim & Searing 1980: 211). The changing face of Djibouti resulted in newfound Afar-Issa animosities that were manifested through political mediums. In the early 20th Century, both the Afars and Issas

2Somaliland is a disputed territory with limited international recognition. A distinction will be made in this paper when referring to its administration directly.

6 endured a political awakening but due to the latter being more urbanised, the Issas became more entrenched in the colony’s bureaucracy and thus, jurisdiction began to sway in their favour (idem: 212). Political contention between the two ethnic groups began when Somalia got its independence in 1960 from British rule and there was a rising sense of Pan-Somalism; a movement to unite all Somali-majority areas into one greater nation (idem: 210). With the indigenous Issa ruling class sympathetic to the cause, there grew an exasperation amongst the Afars who dreaded the idea of being governed by a sizable Somali state (Thibaut 1999: 316). The French had the same reservations and suppressed this prospect during the first referendum in 1958 by bolstering the value of the Afar vote but more importantly, transplanting Afar figureheads in politics as a means to skew the results (ibid). The same thing occurred for the second referendum in 1967. Subsequently, the colony remained and Issa governors were increasingly replaced by Afar counterparts in the Chamber of Deputies under the entity, Regroupement Démocratique Afar (RDA) (ibid). Consequently, the unanticipated turn in the designation of power led to many protests and conflicts. The years following the second referendum saw an emergence of stronger political polarisation as parties forged on ethnic divisions were mobilising en masse. What was thought as a colonial attempt to subdue the tensions and maintain control, actually turned out to be counterproductive as the Issas began a hostile offence against the French. The first politically charged attack on military and civil Europeans happened in 1970 as Omar Elmi Khaireh, a member of the marginalised, Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS), launched a grenade in Djibouti City’s Zinc Palm Tree Bar and Restaurant (United States, Joint Publications Research Service 1976: 24). Afterwards, attacks on the French became continuous in the 1970s, such as the kidnap of the French ambassador to Mogadishu, Jean Geury. This kidnap was notable for the fact that the FLCS unsuccessfully demanded unconditional Djiboutian independence in exchange for Geury’s return (King 1986: 174). Alongside these series of events, there was outside push from the UN and the West for France to leave its last African colony, and grant Djibouti its sovereignty (Shehim & Searing 1980: 216). Internal hostility and external pressure inevitably expelled French presence to a certain degree after independence in 1977 but this did not resolve Afar-Issa tensions. Instead, this meant that the two were now completely fixated on each other's animosity.

Post-independence conflict With the formation of the Djiboutian state, came an Issa stronghold government ready to reverse colonial bureaucracy. In 1979, two years after independence, a single-party system

7 was introduced under the first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, as a way to unify political differences (Thibaut 1999: 317). Under his party, Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP), there would be a supposed representation of all ethnic groups, thus removing the need for a variety of voices (Schraeder 1993: 207). The party’s cabinet positions were allocated based on ethnicity; one Arab, one Somali from the Gadabuursi clan, one Somali from the Isaaq clan, seven Afars and six Issas (idem: 208). These actions could have initially been perceived as sincere since Aptidon declared a desire for peace and liberation from French rule but this quickly changed as autonomous Afar legislators were rapidly dismissed and replaced (ibid). Consequently, the Afar population began to see the diversity as nothing but “window- dressing” since all members were anointed, not elected, by the Issa-founded RPP (idem: 209). Inter-ethnic animosity was also heavily exacerbated by relations with Ethiopia and Somalia. During the Ogaden War in the late 1970s. Djiboutian individuals would leave to fight with their respective kinfolk since the conflict laid on Afar-Issa ethnic borders in north- eastern Ethiopia. Proceeding the end of this war, the Ethio-Somali conflict translated directly into domestic affairs (Shehim & Searing 1980: 222). Since the Somalis lost, there came an influx of Issa refugees from other countries, which drastically aggravated an already defined ethnic cleavage (Crisp 1984: 74). Simultaneously, the Ethiopian Afars came out victorious from the conflict and began to move towards the northern Djibouti districts of Obock and Tadjoura in the pursuit of unifying an Afar nation. This led to an establishment of transnational Afar political entities such as the Ethiopian-based Mouvement Populaire de libération (MPL) (Schraeder 1993: 210). Alongside this regional pursuit, there was also Afar mobilisation in domestic affairs, such as the formation of the Front Démocratique pour la Libération de Djibouti (FDLD) (ibid). The Afars were now clear and insistent; whether Djibouti continues or an Afar nation is formed, they wanted the immediate removal of RPP and Aptidon. Aptidon’s governmental response to growing unrest amongst the Djiboutian population was to administer mass displacements of “foreign” and “domestic” actors. In the early 1980s, Issa refugees with no valid permits or residency cards were sent to camps in Dikhil and Ali Sabieh in southwest Djibouti (Crisp 1984: 76). This was a means to ease cleavages within the capital city but lead to instances of spillover conflict in the rural areas, as illustrated in Figure 1. In the early 1990s, the mobilisation of Afars in the north became so palpable that the Djiboutian government wished for France to aid them in the removal of “foreign militants” upsetting the peace of the country (Schraeder 1993: 215). However, the

8 French rejected such a notion as the insurgent entities that were being targeted were under domestic leadership and consisted of little external military personnel, as such, they announced that this was a domestic problem but would maintain their presence in the country as a precautionary measure (ibid). In lieu of this, Aptidon decided to balance this growing Afar presence by capturing notable leaders and recruiting Issa guerrilla fighters from the Ethio-Somali region (idem: 214). Over these decades, the oscillating politicisation of who was welcome and who was not induced a volatile atmosphere of uncertainty that resulted in the Civil War 1991-1994. After numerous arbitrary arrests of Afars, the marginalised political community in the north transformed into a full-scale guerrilla movement of 3,000, Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie (FRUD). Inspired by similar groups who overthrew Mengistu and Barre, dictators of Ethiopia and Somalia respectively, FRUD wished to cease long- standing maltreatment by force (Schraeder 1993: 211). Most of the conflict happened in and around Obock and Tadjoura since these were the only two state-controlled towns in the Afar- majority north. The government immediately reacted by boosting reinforcement to crackdown on dissidents. The war caused around 1,000 deaths with many more left unaccounted for (Marshall 2019). Although a number of scholars have described the conflict as “low-intensity”, this was a substantial number compared to larger countries since the country only had a total population under 630,000 at the time (World Bank n.d.). In its 14 years of existence, Djibouti descended into chaos and with conflict happening in all of its immediate neighbouring countries, there was a question as to whether this would be another endless battle.

Present-day peace level In comparison to its immediate neighbours, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen who were categorized as countries with a low or very low state of peace, Djibouti is at a medium level Peace Index and has shown significant improvement (IEP 2019). As demonstrated, Djibouti has moved on from the Civil War that ended in 1994. The beginning of this move can be seen when Aptidon expressed a compromise with the opposition group, FRUD, in the constitution of the state (IBP 2006a: 83-84). The discussion involved the integration of Afar leaders in governmental delegations and more political freedoms (ibid). Although the rest of the 1990s was a back and forth of violence and cooperation, there was minimal hostility that threatened the stability of the state as it did before. After the inauguration of the current president, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, in 1999, the Djiboutian government reached a finalisation of peace agreements

9 with FRUD in 2001. Both parties described the agreement as a pursuit to a “real devolution” in tensions (ibid). In addition, the fact that Djibouti hosts numerous military bases of powerful nations reduces the chances of domestic chaos. As mentioned before, there is a strong presence of foreign powers. Military partnerships with countries such as the US are usually compounded with humanitarian aid and assistance in security (IBP 2006a: 27). With all this in mind, peace in Djibouti is still fragile. Not only is there a spillover effect with the Afar- Issa conflict within Ethiopia but the nation has experienced piracy, terrorist attacks and constant influx of refugees from Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen (ECHO 2017). Due to being situated in a heated region, the nation is a simmering cauldron that evidently needs to continue strengthening its domestic peace status.

Literary synopses: Crux of the conflict

When exploring previous literature of the Afar-Issa relationship, most belong to the field of conflict studies. For example, there is a large discussion that their prolonged pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa is due to competition in resources and territory (Degefu 2003; Kebbede 2016; Lewis 2003). Kaplan asserts that this exactly the case in Djibouti’s barren landscape where there were resources are scarce (1978:53). Medhane suggests that this is potentially caused by cultural differences on fundamental beliefs in cohabitation. Most notably, he explains the differences in territorialism where the Issas believe that only God owns the land and as such, everyone has a right to graze and territorial rights are dependent on who is occupying the land at a given time (Medhane 2006: 14-15). This fluidity in territory directly conflicts with the Afar belief in a static Afar homeland. This can be seen in the Issa expansion from Northern Somalia to Djibouti city in the 1700s where they overtook resources and ports for their mercantile and agriculture-based economy (Stanley 2007: 133). In Yasin’s case study about Afar-Issa transboundary alliances in Ethiopia and Djibouti, he discovers that over generations, these dynamics instate stereotypes that accumulate into collective memories of ‘ancient hatred’ and ‘security dilemmas’ (2010: 21-22). Furthermore, it seeps into contemporary governance in these nations and can be seen in both groups’ competitiveness for power and ‘winner-takes-it-all’ rationale (ibid). This could be applied to the Issa-majority government in Djibouti and how they have competed with the Afar opposition around the Civil War. What is apparent in theories that have evaluated the social dimension of the inter- ethnic conflicts, is the lack of solutions that are also socially orientated. For example,

10 Oberschall suggests the everlasting peace can only be found in the separation of the two ethnic groups into exclusive territories, be it regional or national (2007:11). This does not address their animosities, rather it suggests that it is too deep-rooted to be solved. Furthermore, on a relationship suggested as a conflict of territories there is no way that you can allocate land between the Afars and Issas who have contended where their territorial borders lie. Yasin also does not provide a sufficient solution. First of all, he denies that we have truly reached peace in Djibouti (2010: 268-292). Djibouti’s current pace status may not be the most ideal but to denounce the progress it has made since the 1990s would render you unable to find out what has worked in the reconciliatory process during this period. Second of all, he finalises his findings, by demanding that the Issa government be accommodating to the Afar population and reform their corrupted political system (ibid). However, he does not explain how this can be done, especially since he declares that both the Issas and Afar inherently mistrust each other. To enact these actions that he wishes the government to do, we need to figure out a way to break the cultural institutions that have generated the inequality in the first place. Another researched facet of the Afar-Issa conflict of Djibouti is the role of French colonialism and its political legacy of tribalism. Tribalism is a colonial tool that imbalances power amongst a multicultural society (Mamdani 2001: 21-22). It politicises ethnic groups against each other within the colony’s domestic affairs as a means to maintain a Western elite class at the top of the social order (ibid). Lewis theorises that the constant switching of alliances between the French and the two indigenous groups created a new urbanised socio- political dimension to the existing animosity (Lewis 1955: 155). He states that the French incessantly retitled the colony with ethnically-charged misnomers and political officials that empowered the most compliant over the most defiant (ibid). For example, the Issas had more power during the nation’s time as La Côte Français des Somalis when the Afars rejected France’s territorial claims, and the Afars had more power on the Le territoire Français des Afars et Issas after the Issas mobilised for independence (Kadamy 1996: 512). In addition, many theorists illustrate how the Djiboutian government after independence inherited this tribalised political dynamic (Abdi 1977; Sorenson 1992). Kadamy explains that the seal of tribalisation was affixed when the repressive Issa-majority government was haphazardly created with French and Arab political and economic participation (1996: 513). In comparison, Schraeder asserts that the seal was, in fact, the enactment of the National Mobilisation Law in 1981 that banned Afar voices (1993: 207). Over the time leading up to the Civil War, a cycle was present where the heightening of repression was met with a heightening of insurgency.

11 These accounts are vital but are mainly a historiographical rendition of the Djiboutian political sphere. We can see a link between Djibouti’s political legacy and the Afar-Issa conflict but we are missing an understanding to what degree the political institutions have allowed ethnic exploitation. Moreover, there is not a comparable amount of focus on how this has affected Djibouti’s peace development. Stating that the conflict is caused by the political system implies that the political system needs to be changed to cause peace. We need to comprehend how Djibouti has done this and how effective it has been. One of the most discussed topics in the Horn of Africa is the rise of ethnic nationalism and civil conflict in the 20th century, especially amongst the Afars and Issas (Kefale 2013; Leta et al 2015; Mengisteab 2013). Firstly, it is imperative to call attention to the difference between the previously discussed topic, tribalism, and ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is an exclusive ideology that does not entertain a diverse ethnic makeup in the first place and favours a nation that is defined by the homogeneity of its people (Leoussi 2001: 62). Its contemporary form was born in Europe as a response to the Napoleonic occupation of Central and Western Europe in the early 19th Century, this ideology is treated as the foundation of the nation-state concept (Dusche 2010: 42). Under German anti-feudalist enlightenment, it centralised the worth of a state within its people and consequently defines the worth of the people within the state. In the past, this has induced a fierce loyalty that has caused atrocities such as ethnic cleansings and genocides (ibid). This paradigm was introduced to the world by European colonisers who invaded lands to extend their own nation-states (idem: 38). As a consequence, these new colonies were stripped of their own unique concepts of territory and were sorted into the social periphery of a Western world. Shehim and Searing state the ethnic nationalist awakening of the Afars and Issas was after the Egyptian revolution in 1952 and the Algerian War in 1954 (1980: 212). These were monumental events as the Eurocentric notion of the ethnic nationalism ironically emboldened the native Egyptians and Algerians to overthrow their colonisers and transform their colonies into contemporary nation-states. The leader of the Egyptian movement, Gamal Abdel Nasser, called for a rise in nationalism and anti-imperialism amongst his neighbours (ibid). The Algerian war, a mobilisation towards self-determination and independence, sent shockwaves throughout the French empire (ibid). Amidst their concurrent tension, rather than uniting the ethnic groups against imperialism, it is evident that the awakening actually incited the desire for segregated nation-states; Greater Somalia and Afar Country. Going back to Yasin’s “winner-takes-it-all” illustration, the annexation of Djibouti was equally fundamental in both Afar and Issa nationalism. Shehim and Searing round-up the circumstances by stating that

12 neither group were truly dedicated to the preservation of the state and the colony essentially existed by French demand (idem: 209). This lack of concern for state stability and a desire to seize the territory makes it ideal for a brewing conflict to explode. With these motivations to destabilise post-colonial nations in order to create ethnic nation-states, Hundie suggests bolstering an interdependence between the domestic ethnic groups and also between the post-colonial states (2010: 146). He suggests doing so by creating transboundary institutions that facilitate inter-ethnic resource sharing and a strong national and international alliances to enforce border security (ibid). This is enlightening but it is regional and economic-based. We also need to address how state stability can be strengthened through domestic and cultural institutions. It is evident that the Afar-Issa conflict has been pursued in conflict studies, however, the problem is that peace studies on this topic are comparatively so few and far in between. Alemu adopts all the discussions of ancient hatred, resource conflict and ethnic nationalism and explains that violence is multidimensional and can encompass all explanations (2018: 235-254). As such, he takes a multidimensional approach to produce peace. He rejects the reductionist approach of amounting the conflict to a disagreement of material that can be resolved through simple territorial allocation. Rather, he emphasises that the conflict has also been a psychological, emotional, historical, economic and political conflict, so he suggests a socio-political consolidation through transforming the memory of violence between the two, strengthening it through a synthesis of conflict resolution customary traditions from both cultures and Ethiopian legislation (ibid). Much of what Alemu discusses is insightful in understanding that there is not simply one explanation in the Afar-Issa conflict yet that is why his own research is not enough to apply to the Djiboutian context. His study is within the Ethiopian realm and so there are dimensions unique to Djibouti that he has not explained. For example, the role of tribalism as a result of European colonialism. The French have reordered the Afar-Issa relationship and have politicised them differently in comparison to Ethiopia who has never been colonised. Furthermore, Ethiopia is an ethnic federalist state that provides local authority to its regions, which means that both the Afars and Issas have had a much more comparable level of political power to weaponise against one another. The Djiboutian government has been a centralised authority since its colonial past where the two would take turns to wield the power and experience the political repression. Consequently, there are levels to the Djiboutian experience of the Afar-Issa conflict that needs to be evaluated in the nation’s peace development.

13 Overall, not much attention has been made to explain the core differences of the Afar- Issa conflict and peace development in the Djiboutian context. Many theorists have provided stimulating explanations, from material to ideological motivations. Yet within these understandings, even with Djibouti in mind, they have been so focused on understanding the conflict that their comprehension of peace and how it can be reached is lacking. When peace studies are mentioned, however, they remain regional or orientated to the Ethiopian state. I argue that this knowledge gap requires exhaustive attention.

14 CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

After conducting a historical overview and evaluation of relevant discussions and their applicability, I will now select, clarify and synthesise mentioned concepts to create a theoretical framework that is able to support my study. More specifically, I will further evaluate the multidimensionality of violence and peace, how identities can experience these social dynamics differently and how a civic nationalism could enforce a reconciliation through converging identities and reconciling experiences.

Multidimensional conflict

Anatomy of violence The typologies of violence and peace are broad and contrasting, however, I did find some insight from Alemu’s critical analysis of the Afar-Issa conflict in Ethiopia. More specifically, his utilisation of Galtung’s theories of multidimensional violence and peace. Although Galtung may have not theorised about violence in the African context, his concepts are indeed fascinating. Utilising Western-sourced theories in my postcolonial position is not contradictory, in fact it is vital. I must prevent my research from being “reverse-Eurocentric” where the aim amounts to rebuking the European school of thought rather than truly answering the research question (Donzé-Magnier 2017: 5-6). To commit to the latter, I must adopt concepts from various disciplines and creatively interweave them to provide a framework adept to understanding the particularised task at hand (Spivak 1988: 71-72). Accordingly, I find evaluating Galtung’s theory relevant because he presents a structure that maps out a way to understand violence and peace on a sociological level void of cultural ties. This then allows me to contextualise it to the Afar-Issa conflict and peace development in the Djiboutian context. Galtung illustrates violence with a triad scheme; cultural, structural and direct. The first concept, cultural violence, is the legitimisation of violent acts and intentions. It is the catalyst that empowers direct and structural violence, in fact, it can frame it as the right thing to do (Galtung 1990: 292). This is done so through cultural institutions that construct the

15 foundation of reality and how we interpret them; religion, language, art etc. (idem: 291). Galtung also depicts a synonymy between violence and power in their requirement for legitimation, as such the ethos of a community to validate violence is essential for the cycle of the triad to continue. The next form is structural violence; the exercise of avoidable inequality in a social structure that benefits the elite. It is the act and the execution of institutionalising the deprivation of basic human needs on the grounds of traits such as race, class and gender (Galtung 1990: 292). On a national scale, this degradation can be characterised by a lack of an ecological balance comprised of survival, well-being, freedom and basic human maintenance (ibid). Synthesising this point with, Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)’s indicators of good African governance (2019), my understanding of this can be concluded by the assertion that structural violence is the active pursuit of stripping the vital institutions; safety and security, rule of law, transparency of corruption, human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. The final component of Galtung’s triad is direct violence. It is violence in its most primitive form and entails harm inflicted unto another; murder, genocide, rape, pillaging etc. (Galtung 1990: 292). This is the action that causes physical long-lasting pain to the target. In the context of protracted conflict, direct violence is not arbitrary and is, in fact, dependent on the previous two unseen forms of violence. It is motivated by them and in turn, strengthens them back. Applying Galtung’s prism to the Afar-Issa relations, we begin to see a pattern in the anarchy. As mentioned before, Afar-Issa relations comes from a period predating the Djiboutian state and French colonialism. Conflict was incited because of territorial expansion due to a scarcity of resource, which impeded on the geographical security of the other. This would incite defence and offence; direct violence. Fast forward to the existence of Djibouti in the 20th Century and you see domestic direct violence between the government and guerrilla militia. Moreover, there is regional direct violence in the form of spillover conflict. Instances of structural violence can be examined in the governance of Djibouti and the power imbalance amongst the Afars and Issas. Finally, the cultural violence will derive from contrasting societal motivations to perpetuate the Afar-Issa antagonism.

Anatomy of peace Peace in the discussion of conflict is often defined as less complex but the concept is more than simply an absence of violence. Galtung presupposes that we should not fall into the trap

16 of a violence-peace binary that defines the latter as simply war-avoidant (1991: 293). Much rather, he illustrates peace as complex in its own right. Firstly, there are two overarching dimensions; negative and positive (Galtung 1969: 170). Negative peace is the absence of violence and positive peace is the presence of peaceful cooperation (ibid). Within this explanation, he highlights how the dimensions are insufficient without the other. For example, negative without positive is indifference and positive without negative lacks justice (idem: 294). Furthermore, the concept is transitional and one must observe the negative and positive characteristics on a past-present-future linear register (idem: 183). Peace is not static but is defined through it’s the realisation from violence to a vertical development of egalitarianism (ibid). Consequently, not only is the concept interconnected with conflict studies but also developmental studies (ibid). From this, it would be assumed that there is indeed a degree of peace in Djibouti since there has been a transition from profound violence and there has been a national effort to prevent a relapse. Yet this merely identifies that there is a presence of peace and does not provide the full scale of its nature. To do so, Galtung refers back to his triad schema to create a ‘culture of peace’ concept that identifies multidimensional mechanisms. Cultural peace is the absence of violent discourse and the presence of a peaceful dialogue of justice and poly-centrism that normalises harmonious cohabitation (Galtung 1990: 302). Interestingly, he calls cultural peace the “social glue” in this triad (ibid). Structural peace is the absence of structural exploitation and the presence of an institutionalised equitable social order (Galtung 1969: 177). If we advance this notion by referring to Mansfield’s assertions on peace and democracy, we see that Galtung’s structural peace is synonymous with a political justice that must occur to induce true harmony (2011: 231-133). Lastly, Direct peace is exemplified by the absence of direct violence (e.g. ceasefires) and a partnership in sustaining it (e.g. collaborative military intervention of threats to harmony) (Galtung 1976: 282-285). By discussing the scale of which violence and peace have been expressed within Djibouti, one can judge actions as being benefits or hindrances within the Afar-Issa reconciliatory process. From this theory of peace, we are able to find socio-political behaviour patterns that could have aided in Djibouti’s peace development. Nevertheless, Galtung’s theories are still void of context, thus we must further develop these renditions of violence and peace in order to particularise our theoretical framework to understanding the Afar-Issa conflict.

17 Collective identities within an antagonistic and heterogeneous society In my literature review, I noticed the major argument of how the contrasting identities and experiences of the Afars and Issas has caused and justified conflict. Most notably, the themes of an “ancient hatred”, tribalised political identity and ethnic nationalism are recurrent. Taking these into account, it seems as though the core of the cultural dimension of violence is that their identity and perspective of the outside world is rooted in the antagonism of the other. With Eisenstadt and Giesen’s notion of collective identity and how it constitutes an exclusive subjective reality, the conflict becomes more intelligible. Collective identities are a series of socially patterned interactions between members who are similar (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995: 74). This similarity can derive from labels of ethnicity, culture, language and initiation. These validators are a requirement to construct an internal equality on which trust and cooperation can be based on (ibid). As the group develops, the collective identity is strengthened through a commonality of experiences that characterise a concerted set of norms and ethics (ibid). I would go further and emphasise on the notion that collective identity also exists by virtue of the “other”. Collective identity has a conceptual border that limits the networks of trust and interdependence; Eisenstadt and Giesen say that it is because identities are divisive in nature; who is included and who is excluded (1995: 76). An identity is not an identity if it does not distinguish you and your group. For example, we are all human but this is not a social identity but a fact. Therefore, there can be no “us” without “them”. Following this, the exclusivity of “us” and the vilification of “them” seems to be culturally institutionalised through victimisation. Bar-Tal et al theorise that in conflict, both opponents will perceive themselves as the one who wrong has been done unto (2009: 245). This perpetuated narrative not only condemns the opponent but it also is a medium for solidarity amongst your kin (ibid). Cikara et al explain that this also works in reverse where intergroup competition of resources and power can exhibit palpable ‘schadenfreude’3 in all forms of contact (2011: 310-311). Going back to the Afars and Issas and Medhane’s explanation for their pastoralist conflict. The disagreement arrived from their opposing perspectives on territorialism and rights to resources. The conflict was experienced differently and subsequently led to the two groups to vilify each other. Furthermore, it becomes a part of their identity because it tightens

3 The feeling of pleasure as a result of someone else’s misfortune.

18 the internal bonds amongst members. After a continuation of conflict, a cycle begins to revolve where violence is thought of as a predisposed circumstance in their co-existence. Consequently, this internal allegiance on a regional scale permitted ideologies such as an ancient hatred and ethnic nationalism to grow. This sort of human interaction in Africa was then bastardised by tribalism. Eze asserts that tribalism was a colonial strategy that reforms indigenous groups into imagined politicised communities as a means to fragment masses and integrate them into a Eurocentric world (2010: 67-69). As a result, the “tribe” is already a sociological state of war. Although the French did not entirely imagine the Afar-Issa animosity, it is apparent that they did weaponise it to their advantage as the colonial rulers of Djibouti. It is within this context of a prolonged contrast of collective identities being translated on to a socio-political level that mental distances and lack of empathy become so profound and affects the nation beyond their day of Independence.

From ethnic to civic nationalism: a peace-building framework

Trying to discover an answer to ethnic cleavages in the African context, Political Science theories of civic nationalism comes to mind. According to Forrest, civic nationalism is the unity of a diverse body under a culture of inclusivity and egalitarianism on the basis of territorial separatism (2004:6). In the context of African nations, it is the adoption of state lines imposed by colonial demarcations and the emancipation of all their social caveats, such as the tribalisation of ethnic identities. Fawn asserts that there are three forces that stabilise the nation-to-state balance; civic nationalism, strong states and ethnic homogeneity (Fawn 2004: 96). Ethnic homogeneity and a strong state are inherently able to conform the masses but when the weak or moderate state is competing for legitimacy with more than one ethnic nationalism, power is negatively decentralised and there becomes a rise in national dissatisfaction (ibid). For Djibouti and many newly independent countries, dissatisfaction was unavoidable. Ekeh describes that an element to the colonial divide et impera technique was the legitimation that they received from it. After turning the people against each other, they would portray their authority as the mediating “benefactor” (Ekeh 1975: 98). As a consequence of their departure proceeding a nation’s independence, a structural void becomes apparent. Ethnic nationalism fed off this void and dissatisfaction as it promised security, equality amongst members and superiority over outsiders (Wesemüller 2014: 35). Although the new African state wishes to fill this void

19 it cannot do so without the emancipation of its inherited colonial bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is optimised by pitting ethnicities against each other, so when one ethnicity gains power, others suffer. This can be seen when the Djiboutian Issa-majority government was sympathetic to the Pan-Somalist expansion in the Horn of Africa. In doing so, the government lost legitimacy amongst the Afars who now were motivated to create their own Afar country. A competition of interests without regards to the stability of the state inevitably galvanises conflict and therefore, this competition must be neutralised. To consolidate the African nation’s lack in ethnic homogeneity, they must compensate by deepening the two factors that levels the nation-to-state balance. In the face of an ethnic ideological conflict, one must heighten the premier factor, civic nationalism, amongst its people before focusing on the other factor, state strengthening. This is because you must first legitimise and centralise the state’s power. Civic nationalism does so by addressing the people as the civic. In Adam’s research about non-racialism in South Africa after the apartheid, he describes civic nationalism as the antithesis to racialized nationalism where people are connected by ‘consent and not descent’ (1994: 17). As such, it devalues the loyalty felt by blood and values the loyalty felt by proximity and shared experiences. This goes hand in hand with Gaertner et al’s theory of reconciling two opposing identities by socially re-categorising the two camps and develop a ‘common ingroup identity’ (1993: 20-21). This is done through inclusive discourse and highlighting similarities in experiences and cultural markers (ibid). In the case of civic nationalism, it would be identifying the people under a civic label such as “Djiboutian”, connecting the people through a shared history under French colonialism as Cushitic people. Moreover, the identity must be ideationally bordered by designating all foreigners, regardless if they are members of the larger regional Afar and Issa identity, as the ‘outgroup’. What is interesting in this discussion is the comparability to Galtung’s notion of cultural peace where you work for unity. By doing so through the cultural markers, as mentioned above, you can begin to open a dialogue of cooperation. However, identitarian commonalities are not enough for civic nationalism to reconcile grievances. Greenfield explains that dignity is the essence of nationalism and this nature must be established within a polity or a society for it to function (1993:49). This is further elaborated by Adam who explains that any form of nationalism proves to be insufficient in the face of profound emotional, material and political injustices (1994: 22). To repair this, an equity amongst members must be established. In other words, a political justice felt on all social, political and economic levels. Moreover, it must continue to develop with the nation

20 and is adaptive to future obstacles that threaten the unity of the people (idem: 29). From this understanding of civic nationalism, it parallels the concepts of structural and direct peace built on cooperation. Furthermore, in the context of Djibouti, the notion of dignity explains why ethnic nationalism filled the void of French expulsion after Independence as the tribalised political system was created for injustice. Thus, to create a successful civic nationalism, it must be proactive in structural and direct peace as well as cultural. For the Afars and Issas, this would mean acknowledging grievances and candidly mending them.

Proposing a theoretical model

Figure 2. Conceptual map of how conflict is formed and how civic nationalism can mediate this relation

Advancing from my review on Djiboutian literature and theories of violence, identities and African governance, I have come to a set of conclusions that will form the theoretical foundation of my research but remains open to inferential rearrangements in the face of compelling evidence. As illustrated by Figure 2, my suggested societal sequence begins with rooting the Afar-Issa conflict in Galtung’s multidimensional triad of violence; a cycle that builds momentum due to mutually heightening dimensions. First of all, their cultural violence is embodied by an inherent ancient hatred and a tribalised political identity that is further exacerbated by their regional identity as ethnic nationalists. All these elements of cultural violence are evidently conflicting on their separate societal levels but are also interconnected.

21 Secondly, a structural violence is seen in the way that the Djiboutian political system has been constructed to present a power imbalance over politics and resources. Lastly, direct violence is demonstrated as governmental assaults towards the people but also guerrilla assaults towards the government. To reverse violence and induce a convergence between the two ethnic groups, one must balance it with a complementary triad of peace. I assume a Djiboutian civic nationalism has been used to facilitate the peace development of the nation. This is primarily done through a social recategorisation that works as a cultural peace tool. Through a collaborative common ingroup identity of ‘we’ as Djiboutians and a reorientation of the ‘other’ to foreign entities, a culture of peace is enacted that reduces the mental distances invoked by their once exclusive identities and experiences. However, as mentioned before, structural peace is also imperative. Therefore, the next element to my Djiboutian civic nationalist model is characterised by a political justice process that introduces political pluralism and is capable of reparations of oppression from the past. Furthermore, to prevent the likelihood of conflict in the future, a reformation and enactment of legislations that institutionalise equitable socio-political opportunities are introduced. Direct peace will be both the overarching transition from violence to non-violence but also proactive collaborations between the Afars and Issas to ensure state stability.

22 CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Proceeding the construction of a set of understandings specific to the Afar-Issa conflict within the Djiboutian context, this chapter will build a research design that provides a set of methods that will be used to carry out my research. Furthermore, it will pose inferential questions to evaluate trustworthiness and ethical underpinnings.

Methods

Producing a body of knowledge relative to this Afar-Issa discussion must be inductive and fixate on the plurality of human reality. A positivist perspective orbiting the universal laws of natural sciences are not suitable to measure human phenomena as it ignores the importance of the meaning behind actions (Schutz 1962: 59). We cannot make inferences on human behaviour if we do not attempt to understand the experiences and intentions behind it; in other words, we need to see things from the subject’s point of view. Grabbing the essence of the phenomenon cannot be done through quantifying measurements. Our assumptions ring truer through contextualised qualitative observations. Therefore, I will be conducting a case study that critically analyses recurring patterns of political operations and discourse within the Afar- Issa conflict. To be more specific, this case study will be longitudinal. This is done through an evaluation of data sources over a prolonged period of time (Zainal 2007: 2). What separates it from other historical analyses and case studies is that it is temporally inferential. It does not explicitly provide a chronological rendition, rather it uses time as a scale to infer on the developmental nature of cultural phenomena by locating patterns and changes (Winiarska 2017: 6-7). A common criticism is that case studies often provide little scientific generalisability (Zainal 2007: 5). However, this is not a setback because the aim of most case studies is to provide idiographic theories that value the importance of context in phenomena (Zainal 2007: 2). This research type is adequate for my task because I do not wish to generalise my theory to other societal contexts. I wish to explicitly understand the

23 reconciliatory process of the Afar-Issa conflict in Djibouti. Moreover, rather than making simple comparisons between moments of violence and peace, a longitudinal case study will allow me to understand the transition between the two concepts and how civic nationalism has facilitated this. The first step to create my research design will be to define my units, i.e. the Afars and Issas. To do so, I will take a methodological holistic approach as it is the most compatible with my topic. This approach holds importance to the social processes of institutions, structures and groups as units rather than individuals since they cannot explain large social phenomena (Halperin & Heath 2017: 37). This is especially salient in the Afar-Issa conflict for two key reasons. The first reason is that these ethnic groups have a culture deep-rooted in communitarianism (Abbink 2005: 401), thus, we cannot impose Western concepts of individualism. Secondly, all significant tensions such as conflict, education, class and social privileges within Djibouti were characterised and mobilised on ethnic lines, not individual grievances. Defining my timeline to evaluate the transition from violence to peace, my theoretical model will be evaluated on a chronology of six critical periods in Djiboutian history; the Second Independence Referendum in 1967, Djibouti’s Independence in 1977, the governmental transition to a one-party system in 1981, the Civil War of 1991-1994, the peace process of between 1992-2001, and the current state 2001-2020. The first four periods have been moments of high tension between the Afars and Issas that have shaped Djiboutian society. In comparison, the final two periods have been much more peaceful but have equally shaped the nation. To actually conduct my longitudinal case study, I will do be doing two stages of analyses. The first will be done through thematic and discourse coding schemes that will help me evaluate and contextualise the relationship between violence, peace and subjective experiences. I will collect primary data from online transcripts of the state-issued Journal

Officiel de Djibouti4 and reports from the US Department of State, to review the political operations of the nation over time. To complement this, I will use secondary data from the French newspaper of record, Le Monde, to inspect opposing guerrilla operations. Le Monde will also provide discursive data through interviews and speeches from Djiboutian, FLCS,

4 This official journal is how the government updates the public on the passing of laws.

24 RPP and FRUD political officials5. To evaluate this dataset, a thematic analysis is ideal as it will systematically identify patterns/themes across dataset (Winiarska 2017: 14). In addition, it aids in contextual evaluations as it allows the researcher to select and prioritise their own themes according to the particular research question (ibid). In my case, this will be translating my theoretical model into a research tool by treating the Afar-Issa conflict and Djiboutian civic nationalism as two overarching and separate themes6. The Afar-Issa conflict will be represented by its three variables as categories in my analysis; Cultural violence, Structural violence and Direct violence. Similarly, Djiboutian civic nationalism will also be represented by three variables; Social recategorisation (cultural peace), Political justice (structural peace) and Political justice (direct peace). All these categories will be further divided into 21 codes7 in order to break down the data collected into manageable summaries on which I can reflect on.

1. Cultural violence will be exemplified by these codes: a. Ancient hatred - This refers to a narrative of an inherited animosity that predates colonialism and alludes to their relationship being an existential foundation in their respective identities. b. Tribalised political identity- The referral of a domestic political antagonism during French colonialism and the present-day Republic. This code is characterized by an Afar-Issa grievance dimension that separates the Djiboutian context from the regional. c. Ethnic nationalist identity - Solidarity with kinfolk across national borders rather than their compatriots. A regional mindset that believes in the Greater Somali State or Afar Country and neglects Djiboutian interests. d. Territorial delegitimisation – This is a verbal assault that clearly denies the territorial rights of the opposing ethnic group. An unequal representation of territorial rights justifies an unequal distribution of power and resources.

5 FLCS, RPP and FRUD are selected as they are the biggest ethnic political parties that have greatly determined the degree of contention between Afars and Issas. Derivative and smaller entities will also be considered.

6 Refer to Appendix A to view the thematic coding agenda

7 Codes about third-parties were established during data collection as a result of the transnational nature of the Afar-Issa conflict

25 e. Third-party bias – The validation received from foreign entities that justifies the violence inflicted on either the Afars or Issas. 2. Structural violence will be exemplified by these codes: a. Political power imbalance - Political operations that assert power of one ethnic group over the other. b. Resource share imbalance - Legislation that unequally distributes resources across the nation (e.g. food, water, jobs, housing). I have also included more contemporary forms of resources and material that are present in modern states and defines whether an African Government is fair according to the indicators set by IIAG. 3. Direct violence will be exemplified by these codes: a. Government- Direct assaults enacted by the Djiboutian government. b. Guerrilla - Direct assaults enacted by political dissidents. c. Third-party - More specifically this pertains to the actions of states (France, Ethiopia, Somalia) and foreign Afars and Issas. 4. Social recategorisation (cultural peace) will be exemplified by these codes: a. Common ingroup identity - An ethnically inclusive identification of what it means to be Djiboutian. b. Common outgroup perception - The exclusion of individuals beyond national borders. More solidarity amongst compatriots. This highlights a cleavage between the Afars and Issas and their regional kinfolk. c. Dialogue of reconciliation - Acknowledgement of past grievances and the desire to resolve matters. This code will illustrate the reduction of mental distancing caused by victimisation d. Dialogue of cooperation- The discussion to work together in order to improve the development of the nation for both the Afars and Issas. It is a forward- thinking advancement after the period of reconciliation. 5. Political justice (structural peace) will be exemplified by these codes: a. Political pluralism - Legislation that emboldens the variety of political voices and expressions in governmental affairs and thus, monopoly of power is broken down and distributed amongst the Afars and Issas b. Reparations for oppression - Legislation that undoes the structural oppression caused in the past. Directly reconciling the sources of grievances.

26 c. Legislation for equality - Closing the ethnic cleavage on social, political and economic standings. This is an advancement from the previous code. It is forward-thinking and is characterised by any legislation that creates a level of equality that has not been seen before. d. Third-party structural peace – This will code any involvement of third-parties in strengthening Djibouti’s structural peace level. For example, UN and IGAD development initiatives. 6. Political justice (direct peace) will be exemplified by these codes: a. Absence of direct violence - The comparison of violence levels from the Civil War to the present day. From a basic level, one will be able to assert that there is indeed peace development in Djibouti by a transitional reduction of assault between the government and guerrilla entities. b. Domestic peace-keeping operations - Operations to maintain state stability. (e.g. border control, refugee management). This is characterised by any collaborative operations between the Afars and Issas to maintain the stability of Djibouti. c. Third-party direct peace – This code indicates any third-party involvement in reducing the chances of conflict.

This thematic analysis will be to establish monumental changes in the Afar-Issa conflict. To complement this, I will be analysing the discursive nature of political dialogues between the Afars and Issas to evaluate their experience to change. This will also use the same sources, Journal Officiel and Le Monde. Unfortunately, due to restrictions caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020, collecting a variety of data was challenging. Both the Netherlands and Djibouti went into lockdown, which meant that I was not able to visit libraries in both countries to expand my dataset. To make up for it, conducting more than one analysis on a limited set of evidence allows for a triangulation that will render my research a lot more reliable amidst these difficult circumstances (Halperin & Heath 2017: 161). Since it is apparent that the two have not seen eye to eye in the administration of Djibouti and the nature of the conflict itself, we must be able to read between the lines of texts to understand the full extent of mental distances and fortunately, analysing their discourse help. To do so, I will aim to assess Van Dijk’s four principles in discourse: accentuate the positive traits of “us”; minimise the positive traits of “them”; minimise the negative traits of “us”; accentuate the negative traits of “them” (Jahedi et al 2014: 33). There are various frameworks suggested to

27 evaluate discourse such as Fairclough’s socio-critical perspective of how discourse is related to power and can be monopolised within a society (ibid). Although thought-provoking, it is not an angle that I wish to pursue. Van Dijk’s sociocognition of conflicting discourses seems to be much more appropriate in my case of ancient hatreds, tribalism and nationalisms as it examines the victimised polarization of ingroups and outgroups (ibid). Subsequently, I will evaluate four lexical categories8 influenced by both Van Dijk and my theoretical framework; Narrative code; Identitarian label; Victimisation and Language. These will be further divided into 20 codes that will be adept to embody the subjective nature of the data collected.

1. Narrative code a. This category will be used to define the direction of violence and peace in accordance with the speaker’s rendition i. Afar → Issa ii. Afar → Third-party iii. Issa → Afar iv. Issa → Third-party v. Djibouti → Third-party vi. Third-party → Afar vii. Third-party → Issa viii. Third-party →Djibouti 2. Identitarian label a. This category codes nouns (e.g. Afar, Issa, Djiboutian) and pronouns (e.g. we, you, them). It evaluates how these labels can imply an exclusivity or inclusivity in experiences and opinions. i. Exclusive Afar ii. Exclusive Issa iii. Inclusive Djiboutian iv. Exclusive Djiboutian 3. Victimisation a. This category will complement the one above and characterise the relationship between “us” and “them” according to the speaker.

8 Refer to Appendix B for the discourse coding scheme

28 i. Victimisation ii. Vilification iii. Reconciliation 4. Language a. Djibouti is a multilingual nation and it has been suggested that language has been politically weaponised. This category will take into account any important motives to speak in a specific language. i. French ii. Afar iii. Somali iv. Arabic v. Other

The second stage of my case study was to understand current nature of peace development and Djiboutian civic nationalism. I initially want to conduct first-hand interviews for this section. The discussion would have revolved around how “Djiboutian” the people feel and if they feel society is socially and legally more harmonious now more than ever. Finding a convergence of sentiments between the Afars and Issas and their perception of a more peaceful society would serve as a direct link between civic nationalism and peacebuilding. Unfortunately, this was also affected by COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020. Due to the rapid growth in infections and deaths from the virus, there was a restriction on social interactions. I attempted to conduct interviews online but internet in Djibouti was a huge obstacle since not all citizens have access to it and the quality of connection is not ideal. As an alternative,

I shall evaluate 21st Century peace reports from IGOs and foreign ministries of Djibouti’s allies by reflecting on the assertions made from my previous thematic and discursive investigations. Data containing indicators of Afar-Issa amicability on a socio-political level will pose an isomorphic reconstruction of the subjects’ development in peace and thus, will render my finding as credible according to Bryman (2016: 391).

Ethics

My research does not cross much of the ethical boundaries set in political and social science research but my positionality must be addressed to remain impartial in my findings. Most discussions revolve around the collection of primary data such as Diener and Crandall’s

29 criteria that one must protect a participant’s safety, consent, privacy and transparency (Diener & Crandall, cited in Bryman 2016: 125). However, this does not apply to my case as I am heavily dependent on secondary data. Rather, my ethical boundaries will revolve around my positionality and values. Being aware of the potential for biases and blind spots by creating an open discussion is essential in theory building (Simmons, cited in Brown 1996: 20). This attention to my personal scope will allow me to identify potential obstacles in my analysis and proceed to overcome them in order to advance my research. Being of Djiboutian-Somali descent raises the question of whether I will hold biases in my evaluation of the Afar-Issa conflict. Being familiar with the culture of Djiboutian and Somali social norms may be advantageous when trying to represent concepts such as peace and violence in a particularised fashion, however, this trait could also be counterproductive. Could it mean that I will hold an overlooked preference to the Issas that makes me incapable of discovering vital discussions in Afar experiences? Moreover, I remain a Westerner who has never experienced conflict or peace development first-hand. What can be done to ensure that my research is insightful? To answer these questions, my intention in this study design is to consciously capture the essence of the Afar and Issa subjects impartially. Furthermore, I wish to contribute to the discussion of peace development in Djibouti by identifying successes and failures and this can only be done so through transparency and consistency of my methods. Guba and Lincoln suggest following a trustworthiness criteria to ensure that qualitative research fares well by virtue of replicability, relevance, conceivability (1985: 290-292). In order to regulate my positionality and clearly present my line of reasoning throughout this study, my use of multiple research methods over the same datasets will be incredibly helpful in triangulating evidence. Moreover, creating theoretical inferences through thick description will be crucial.

30 CHAPTER 5

DEMONSTRATION OF AFAR-ISSA DIVERGENCE

This chapter will begin to explore the peace development of Djibouti by answering the first research question: Why did the Afar-Issa relationship lead to the outbreak of the Djiboutian Civil War? The objective is to understand the circumstances that have induced the Afar-Issa conflict. This will be done by exploring how the contrasting identities of the Afars and Issas have invoked an exclusive subjectivity in experiencing and perpetrating violence. Furthermore, I will create a link between these social processes and how it has been translated into the governance of Djibouti.

An inherited antagonism

A thought that seemed to be reoccurring from both the Afars and the Issas is how the conflict was perceived as almost natural in their relationship. There is an overlap of interests in material gains instituted by a narrative that they hold exclusive right. This battle of power is further entrenched by a victimisation that depicts the sufferance of the ingroup and the vilification of the outgroup. A discourse of an exclusive inheritance towards territory can be seen in the theme of reclamation. In an anti-colonial address to the UN in 1965, FLCS states that the aim of French policy is to exterminate the Somali people and replace them with settlers so as to establish the domination of France over this territory (Le Monde 1965a). In 1992, during the Djiboutian civil war, an FRUD combatant declared that there is a war in Afar country as they wish to claim the same parts as the Issas, who control the capital (Le Monde 1992a). In both cases, with the Issas against the French and Afars against the Issas, there is an angry declaration that each group is being stripped from their homes. The exclusive nature of this narrative derives from provocative terms that do not acknowledge the territorial heritage of each other by using terms such as “settlers”9 and “Afar country”.

9 FLCS’s depiction of settlers were specifically Westerners and Afars from the Ethiopian-Eritrean Afar territories.

31 Both groups have a long history to Djibouti and as such consider it as a part of the contiguous Afar and Issa territories of the Horn of Africa. Respectively, they assume a monopoly of power within their lands, thus, the problem then arises from the fact that their territorial boundaries are marked in the middle Djibouti, which has jurisdiction over this overlapping territory. Consequently, this then induces a conflict over an indivisible good because to acquire the land your community assumes, you must have the whole country. This conflict is also characterised by a paradoxical mirroring of ingroup experiences between the Afar and Issa communities. This can be seen in the discourse of the FRUD in the 1990s and FLCS in the 1960s/70s. For example, in a statement reported by Amnesty International in 1991, an activist of a clandestine group, Action pour la Révision de l'Ordre à

Djibouti (AROD)10, states that the Afars have always been objects of all sorts of repressions, victims of torture and illegal confinement (Le Monde 1991a). Before the Civil War, Afar nationalists were captured and tortured by Aptidon’s administration since Djibouti’s independence as they were an extreme voice of a larger Afar dissatisfaction with the Issa-led government (Shehim & Searing 1980: 209). This alienated the Afar community from truly expressing themselves in the nation and evidently has caused them to feel that their sufferance is at the hands of the Issas. As a result of this ingroup experience, solidarity amongst the Afars and a vilification of the whole Issa group is emboldened. In a 1967 speech denouncing French influence in domestic politics, Mahmoud Sultan Jama, FLCS’ executive secretariat, declares, we thought that we could achieve independence by peaceful means…If the French want violence, we will respond with greater violence (Le Monde 1967a). Reading between the lines, this statement exhibits anger and frustration. Moreover, it is directly representing the Issa ingroup because of its historical context. Before the referendum, there was mass expulsion of thousands of Somalis regardless of whether they were refugees from Somalia or indigenous Issas (Nave 2005: 404). This directly influenced the polls in the referendum as the Issa population instantly decreased. The reason why it was so influential is that the Issas were the largest ethnic group and constituted most of the independence movement (Shehim & Searing 1980: 212). Contrastingly, the Afars, as a smaller group, wanted to remain as a French colony for the time being out of fear of Somali domination and the French, weaponised their votes and instated them as government officials (ibid). Jama represented an experience specific to the Issas and terms such as ‘we’ were indicators of this exclusivity.

10 A short-lived political party in 1991 that merged with other Afar parities to form FRUD.

32 French bureaucracy and Afar power in the decade before independence were evidently viewed as synonymous due to the weakening of Issa power, as such, he considers this ‘greater violence’ as culturally justified and targets not only French presence but also the Afar governance that came as a result of their victimhood. In both the Afar and Issa identity, there is a highlighted cultural violence that stipulates the prosperity of one is the demise of the other.

Ethnic politics through the state

Within the discussion of contrasting Afar and Issa identities and how they transform into conflict, the state has been used as a tool of structural and direct violence within these relations. In bureaucratic operations, there is a cultural, structural and direct violence being played by both the Afars and Issas, and the French who have done so to both. The composition of Djiboutian government officials has been continuously alternated in an abrupt manner. In the first Journal Officiel proceeding the second referendum in April 1967, the French National Assembly declared a disassembly of the former Issa majority local governance and an inauguration of an Afar majority replacement with Afar leader Ali Aref

Bourhan as the President of the Government Council for the French colony 11 (French Somaliland. Government Council 1967: 2). This pacified Issa influence and established Afar dominance in the administration (Lewis 2002: 228). Three months later, in July 1967, it is announced that the colony will be retitled from La Côte Français des Somalis to Le Territoire Français des Afars et Issas (French Territory of the Afars and Issas. Government Council 1967: 1). This was executed as a result of the French National Assembly approving the request from Aref in the month prior (Le Monde 1967b). Interestingly, in his draft request, Aref initially wanted the title, Territoire Français des Afars (ibid). He justifies this move by saying the at the Issas are disruptive and should they wish to become cooperative, the suffix, et Issas, will be added (ibid). In addition to this territorial retitling, the Issa population were also retitled. The government avoided naming them as Somali and rebranded the Somali language as a distinct Issa language although it is but a dialect (Oberlé 1971: 123). Aref’s initial request to rename the colony as Territoire Français des Afars, was as structurally violent to the Issas as was the original name, La Côte Français des Somalis, to the Afars. The name of a disputed territory bears a grave significance to the legitimation of

11 Arrêt N537, Art. 1.

33 claims as it erases the rights of the group that has not been incorporated. Furthermore, as the government is instituted to be utilised as a tool of those in power, it bears witness to the ethnic group that is in control of that period and their ability to legitimise and delegitimise their adversaries. In Aref’s request, he wields this ability by blatantly baiting the option of including, et Issas, in return for Issa compliance under Afar administration. Although the colony was retitled to include this addition in the end, there was a principle set. As the President of the Government Council, he enacted cultural violence by declaring that the Issas are disruptive in the stability of the nation and thus it is implied that any violence against them will be justified. In addition to this, there was a brazen attack on their identity. The sudden renaming of the Somali language as distinctively “Issa” in administration held no cultural validity as it was merely a dialect, thus, it is apparent that this was a politically charged move. Looking at this move in its historical context, we see that this move was done during the rise of Pan- Somalism in the Horn of Africa after the success of Somalia’s independence in 1960. For that reason, it is apparent that the motivation was to isolate and pacify the Issas in Djibouti from regional mobilisation.

A weaponising of identity markers is also present in Aptidon’s administration. On 16th November 1991, Radiodiffusion Télévision de Djibouti (RTD), a state-owned radio syndicate, made an announcement in Somali accusing the French of helping the Ethiopian militias (Le

Monde 1991b). The next day on the 17th, the National Police Force arrest more than 230 foreign guerrillas in Tadjoura, an Afar majority city in the north (ibid). It is evident that the use of indigenous languages in moments of conflict has never been a neutral move. As such, issuing official statements of a hostile nature in Somali was meant to divide. This is supported by the fact that all communication in French were considerably less partisan when discussing domestic contention (ibid). Using Somali to speak to the citizens was an exercise of Issa domination to exclude the Afars from political dialogue. Moreover, this exclusion is further established by naming Afar insurgency as “Ethiopian militias” and “foreign guerrillas”. This delegitimises their grievances, declares them morally defunct and justifies all forms of suppression. Fascinatingly, the Issa-led Aptidon administration in the 80s mirrors the Afar-led government in the 1960s/70s in more ways than one. This can also be seen in instances of political violence. In October 1981, A law on national mobilisation that stipulates the

34 government will be a one-party system is passed12 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1981). Moreover, opposing political parties are strictly prohibited and will be met with penalties for the violation of state security (ibid). Aptidon declares that his dream is to create a society free from clan differences and that this can only be done so through a one-party system with his party, RPP, at the helm because to vote for Hassan Gouled is to hope for regional peace (Le Monde 1981). In contrast, Ahmed Dini, an Afar politician who was briefly the Prime Minister for Aptidon in 1977-1978, denounced Aptidon’s move as a tribalist policy, a dictatorship and accuses France’s relations with Djibouti as being in support of the Issas (Le Monde 1981a). This polarization of opinions sheds light first and foremost in the disunity in perceiving social order between the Afars and Issas. To fathom where this chasm arises, we must evaluate the circumstances. The penalties established by law were not merely light penalties, but ranged from imprisonment to torture with the Afars, both guilty and innocent of violent insurgency, being the main targets (Amnesty International 1991:20). Consequently, Aptidon stating that these actions were taken in to unite through a centralised authority was contradictory. This repression was so forceful it compelled the Afar opposition to militarise through FRUD. This echoes the plight of FLCS who wished for political representation from the French but had to resort to militarisation as a result of colonial silencing and exile. What is seen from these analyses is how the political system has been a weapon in the Afar-Issa conflict. They have used it to attack the other by delegitimising their political voice which justified structural and direct violence on a national scale. It is clear that a similarity can be seen in the movements of the historical Afar and Issa governing bodies but more intriguingly, this process also sheds light to the striking resemblance to the Afar and Issa insurgency responses.

Beyond the borders: A transnational identity

Both the Afars and Issas have clearly stated their desire to promote sovereignty within their ethnic boundaries in the past and have used Djibouti as a tool but also as an extension of their exclusive ethnic territories. Thus, they have not been deeply committed to the preservation of the state due to their orientation of regional goals (Shehim & Searing 1980: 209). Consequently, a pursuit for peace was not a priority.

12 Loi N199 Art. 1(a).

35 This is further solidified by their relations with Ethiopia/Eritrea and Somalia respectively. Substantial Afar guerrilla groups such as FDLD and MNDID have been formed by Afars in exile within the Afar territory of Ethiopia (Ofcansky 2004: 357). FLCS itself was headquartered in Mogadishu and had its first congress in Hargeisa (Hrbek 1993: 155). This is significant information as it shows the advantages of transnational identities being able to roam within their ethnic boundaries, especially in the face of political repression. Furthermore, advancing outside of Djibouti within their ethnic group shows a more intrinsic togetherness amongst their kinfolk in comparison to their compatriots. This is made practically possible because of the fluidity of national borders in the 1960s-1980s. The borders splitting Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somali are marked on deserts that consist of rural communities. Moreover, the borders were a site for many of the wars ignited by territorial conflicts such as the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia. The principal motivation is the collective disagreement of where borders truly lie after a prolonged period of European territorial manipulation. This inevitably compels them to have no desire to cooperate with each other to maintain the stability of these colonial lines. Furthermore, they used it to their advantages. The fact that Djiboutian opposition groups were allowed to settle in foreign land shows these nations’ desire for the former to remain drastically unstable. Both Ethiopia and Somalia have expressed their wishes to annex Djibouti in the past. In 1977, Mengistu, president of Ethiopia, comments on the possibility of Djibouti’s independence during its referendum, declaring that the future of Djibouti, and especially its ports, is either a French one or an Ethiopian one (Ingiriis 2016: 141). In the same year, Siad Barre, is less aggressive and more diplomatic with his words, stating he will not take Djibouti by force but will come to the country’s aid if support is needed (Washington Post 1977). Taking into account the historical context of these speeches, Mengistu wanted access to Djibouti’s port because of its deteriorating relationship with Eritrea and also to prevent Somali annexation (United States, Joint Publications Research Service 1977: 65). This is because Barre has continuously made plans to aggressively take over Djibouti form the French to create the Greater Somali State (United States, Joint Publications Research Service 1947: 39). Taking all this into account, it is apparent that both Ethiopia and Somalia have intensified the contention between the Afars and Issas by undermining the self- determination of the Djiboutian state as a means to pursue their own goals for their own nations.

36 CHAPTER 6

COMPOSING RECONCILIATION THROUGH A DJIBOUTIAN CONVERGENCE

By establishing instances of the ethnic divergence in Djibouti and how it has contributed to strife and mismanagement of the nation, I have presented the circumstances that initiated the Civil War. I now proceed to answer my second research question: What has Djibouti done to reconcile Afar-Issa grievances after the Djiboutian Civil War? This chapter will measure the scale of Djiboutian civic nationalism throughout history by evaluating the successes and failures of social recategorisation and political justice. I will then parallel it to the nation’s peace development in order to determine its efficacy in facilitating the transition from conflict.

What it means to be Djiboutian

The Djiboutian identity is a social recategorisation through the commonality of experiences and cultural markers between the Afars and Issas. Interestingly, acknowledgement of these qualities between the groups has paralleled periods of decreased conflict. Immediately after independence, Aptidon makes his first presidential address to the Djiboutians in his Message à la Nation. This was a widely distributed pamphlet that called for the brothers and sisters of the Capital, Ali Sabieh, Tadjoura, Dikhil and Obock to unite under beliefs such as God and fraternity (Président Aptidon, 1977: 4-9). He declares that Tribalism is the enemy and how everyone must work to undo the repercussion felt socially and economically as it has brought us shame (ibid). What is evident in this address is the abundant use of an inclusive discourse. In the previous chapter, terms such as “we” and “us” have been linked to the exclusivity of Afar and Issa identities but it is evident that in this occasion, the terms are more positive. Instead of referring solely to the nation or just the capital, Aptidon also directly lists 4 of the biggest towns in Djibouti. This is critical as Tadjoura, Dikhil and Obock are predominantly Afar

37 towns and Ali Sabieh is predominately Issa13. Doing so creates a direct line of communication between a known socio-geographical divide in the country. This also sets the tone that his message is for the whole nation. Djiboutians have a unique shared experience under French colonialism and this has opened a collective understanding of struggle between the Afars and Issas. Through a declaration that tribalism is the enemy and that it has brought shame, Aptidon brandished the past in his bid for presidency. This is an influential move as the sharing of negative emotions are, in fact, strong catalysts for solidarity and bonding (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995: 74). Although both the Afars and Issas had contrasting desires with regards to the future of the nation, there was a rare unanimity in the assertion that the French were not there to help. In 1969, FLCS’ leader. Aden Robleh Awaleh, states that The French government has carried out a social policy and has set up a discriminatory legal system intended to trigger a tribal war and to divide the people into opposing groups. Jobs, education and safety are offered on the basis of tribal membership” (United States, Joint Publications Research Service 1969: 22). In 1976. During the final referendum for independence, Aref attacks France; to put a brutal stop to this rapid and favourable evolution of the people towards independence, France has pulled out the old colonial divisive manoeuvres that we all know (Le Monde 1976a). This is evident that the Afars and Issas know that the French have exacerbated their conflict and as such, they have a common enemy in France. Although the Afars may have not wanted independence as soon as the Issas, they were aware that France’s aid was self-serving. This is what inevitably made Independence possible in 1977 after multiple attempts in the past. It was a collaborative move to remove French influence in hopes of reconciling. A cultural component that has complemented anti-colonialism and an effort to move towards peace is Islam. The preamble of the 1992 constitution begins with the prayer, in the name of God Almighty, and declares that Islam is the religion of the state14(Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992). In the majority of Guelleh’s presidential speeches, especially to those made in UN General Assembly, he also begins with a prayer, praise be to God and peace and blessings to the Prophet, his family and his companions! This can be seen in the Assembly’s

74th session (UN 2019). Both the Afars and Issas are majorly Muslim and Islamic discourse

13 Refer back to Figure 1 for an illustration.

14 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Préambule.

38 is thought of in high regard15 (Müller 2010: 449). In all governmental address to unite the people, both Aptidon and Guelleh have used religion to garner attention. This strategy of intertwining religion and politics is important to acknowledge because it has been often used in the African continent to rapidly motivate people to action (Ellis & ter Haar 2013: 127). In the Djiboutian case, by using spiritual power in peace development, the government compels Afar and Issa civilians to take the divine path of unity and cooperation. It is important to note the importance of language in the discussion of Djiboutian convergence and ironically, French has been a neutral medium. In all official documents and statements, the Djiboutian government communicates in French and Arabic, with the former being widely used16 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992). French is by default a neutral language due to the weaponising of Afar and Somali in past divisive discourse and identities. As the only francophone country in the horn of Africa, French is a unique cultural marker of Djiboutians that begins to separate the Afars and Issas from their kinfolk in other nations. Conjointly, the wave of refugees throughout the 1980s/90s revealed a territorial separatist nature in the Djiboutian identity. The Afars were in a long-time conflict with Mengistu’s Marxist regime over the nationalisation of their ethnic territory in northern Ethiopia (United States. United States Department of State 1993: 22). Although the nation allowed a degree of Afar autonomy, they brutally cracked down on indications of territorial liberation, thus, leading to a displacement of thousands (ibid). In Somalia, Siad Barre’s dictatorial fight with Somaliland insurgent groups in the north contributed to many of the nation’s darkest moments, such as the Isaaq Genocide (Richards 2014: 100). Since Djibouti is a neighbouring country, thousands of refugees crossed the border to escape persecution. However, this gravely affected the already delicate balance of Afar-Issa relations that prevented it from going into a Civil War much sooner. Essentially, the foreign Afars and Somalis brought their own grievances and assumptions that exacerbated the ethnic cleavage within Djibouti (Crisp 1984: 75). Their presence also ignited an intra-ethnic divide because of the increasing cultural differences between the refugees and the citizens. Although there remained a strong sense of ethnic nationalism within the two ethnic groups that retained an exclusivity in kinship, cracks were emerging and revealing a growing civic sentiment.

15 Moreover, they both subscribe to the Sunni denomination which means that there is a consensus in teachings and opinions

16 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 1.

39 These tense circumstances resulted in a stronger political distinction of who is Djiboutian and who is not on the basis of nationality rather than ethnicity. The government repatriates 30,000 Afars and Somalis back to Ethiopia in 1983 (Gorman 1983: 16). In 1981, The government enacts the Djiboutian Nationality Law (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1981a: 1). All French citizens and minors of the former French colony will be automatically deserving of nationality17 (ibid). Nationality can only be acquired through parents, marriage, naturalisation and select declarations18 (ibid). In addition, National Identity Cards would be used to identify nationals from foreigners (Le Monde 1981a). These new policies limited who had the right to participate in domestic society and politics. By reorienting the terms that Afars and Issas have historically used against each other, such as “foreigner”, to those outside the borders, the two groups begin to align with one another under a new collaborative common ingroup identity with rights and privileges. This is imperative to create a culture of peace as it opens a dialogue between the Afars and Issas to reconcile.

Righting the wrongs through political justice

A move to socially recategorise Afars and Issas as Djiboutian is essential in bridging the mental distances between both groups but this is not sustainable without political justice. Djiboutian nationalism needs to be more than just a title in order to reconcile the centuries- long grievances that have riddled civil society. The Civil War was the pivotal event that compelled the nation to pursue true political justice. Although a sense of Djiboutian nationalism may have been present and institutionalised before then, we must remember that the nation was also a one-party system that silenced the voice of Afar voices in politics. This deficient concept of civic unity that ironically perpetuated the ethnic cleavage inevitably contributed to rapid the guerrilla militarisation of FRUD and thus, the Civil War. As such, Djibouti was forced to address its problems and reform its civic society for fear of being another black hole in the Horn of Africa. An important feature in this transition was the emergence of Afar acknowledgement in politics and a national awakening of the masses. On 24th November 1991, after months of attacks, FRUD made a unilateral decision to begin a 7-day ceasefire (Le Monde 1991c). Dr

17 Loi N 200, Art. 6.

18 Loi N 200, Art .9.

40 Abbate Ebo Adou, a spokesman for FRUD, confirmed that this was a sign of goodwill in order to give way for a political dialogue (ibid). Rather than taking up the offer, the government continues to title FRUD as foreign elements and requests the aid of France (Le Monde 1991d). Instead, Aptidon announces he will consult the Djiboutian people, by way of referendum or simple popular consultation, on the changes to be made in the political field (Le Monde 1991e). This move was unanimously criticised by both the Afars and Issas. One of Aptidon’s Afar MPs, Mohamed Ahmed Issa states, we will never accept an electoral consultation when the electoral lists are rigged (Le Monde 1991d). Also, he condemns

Aptidon directly as he continues to speak of “foreign elements” (ibid). On 2nd January 1992, 14 Afar deputies resign from the Aptidon’s RPP party because they refused to endorse a single-party regime whose leaders place the defence of their privileges before that of the interest of the Djiboutian nation (Le Monde 1992b). 28 days later, 48 Issa elders send a letter to the Aptidon administration in support of the resignation of Issa ministers (Le Monde 1992c). They denounced the government’s inability to put an end to the armed conflict and bloodshed (ibid). In response to this uproar and to avoid crumbling into multiple formations, Aptidon opens a direct negotiation with FRUD and calls on them to represent themselves in the parliamentary elections on November 20th 1992 (Le Monde 1992d). What can be seen here is the divide moving from Afar-Issa to government-public. The government did not consider FRUD as equals in the beginning and would use cease-fires as an opportunity to assert their dominance with violence (Kishi et al 2019: 206). FRUD have expressed their wish to lay their arms and discuss a solution but were compelled to defend themselves. Subsequently, this conflict resulted in an excess of collateral damage at the cost of civilians. The fact that pain was felt from both sides meant that there was a shared experience amongst the citizens regardless of the ethnic divide. Needless to say, with a risk of being overthrown and the nation at the brink of total disaster in the midst of the Civil War, Aptidon was pressured to comply and open the discussion of Djibouti’s future by recognising the voices of his citizens and FRUD who wished to end the Afar-Issa conflict. From 1992 onwards, political freedoms are instituted. Aptidon submits a redrafted constitution for a public referendum on 4th September; 98.1% of voters voted for and 1.9% against (Thibaut 1999: 323). The constitution reintroduced a multiparty system19 that would host a maximum of four parties (IBP USA 2007a: 48-49). This democratic change won

19 Loi N°1, in accordance with La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 6.

41 Aptidon the proceeding presidential elections in 1992 and 1997 and a FRUD parliamentary coalition beginning in 1995 (Awde & Hill 2003: 96). These political freedoms were further advanced under the governance of Djibouti’s

2nd president, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh who also won his seat in an RPP-FRUD coalition in 1999. In July 2002, decentralisation begins with Djibouti’s 5 regions; Arta, Ali Sabieh, Dikhil,

Obock and Tadjoura20 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2002a). They are endowed with legal personality, public law and financial autonomy within the restrictions of Djibouti’s national interests (ibid). Allowing opposers to politically express their sentiments was one of the crucial requests within the Afar community. A plurality in political legislation provides a democratic framework that is collaborative; this directly addresses the Afar request. The Peace Accord, created in 1994, was reformed on multiple occasions until it was finalised bilaterally in 2001. The first Accord begins with a mutual ceasefire that initiates a pursuit for definitive peace and reconciliation between the Djiboutians21(Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994). To do so, FRUD will adopt the Constitution, laws and regulations in force in the Republic of Djibouti22 (ibid). In return, the government will begin confidence- building measures, the elimination of factors of insecurity and the establishment of definitive security23 (ibid). However, violence began to rise in the late 1990s between the government and the extreme division of FRUD due to allegations of tampering with elections (Turner 2015: 407). In response, Guelleh declared he would improve institutional accountability should he win the upcoming presidential elections (ibid). Soon after, Guelleh does indeed win and rectifies the Peace Accord in 200024 to end violence wholly and bilaterally 25(Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2000a). The Peace accord was reformed again in 2001 and finalised after an agreement between the government and FRUD to disarm, demobilise and integrate into the body of defence and security for the nation26 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2001). This signalled a move from an intermediate implementation of peace development to full implementation. Furthermore, this mutual cessation of direct violence between the two

20 Loi N°174, Art. 2.

21 Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre I.

22 Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Tire II.

23 Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre III.

24 Accord Cadre de Réforme et de Concorde Civile 2000, Résolution N°2, Art. 6.

25 Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre I.

26 Accord de Réforme et de Concorde Civile 2001, Art. 5.

42 groups prevents the chances of mental distancing imposed by a subjective victimisation of conflict. Additionally, framing the reformed accord as a “reconciliation” between “Djiboutians” rather than “Afars and “Issas” compels both groups to see eye to eye and work together. Throughout these negotiations, there was a reversal of many manifestations of direct and structural violence, such as the institutionalisation of human rights and development. As a French colony, Djibouti introduced seven international human treaties. As a nation before the Civil War, only four more were introduced. None of these treaties were ratified except for the signing of the Convention on the Rights of Child in 1990. In comparison, the period succeeding the Civil War introduced eight more treaties and thirteen of the total amount were finally ratified (OCHR n.d.). In 1992, The constitution declared that the human is sacred, the state has an obligation to respect and protect it, and all humans are equal before the law27 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992). Moreover, a set of freedoms are established: thought, conscience, religion, worship, opinion28, privacy29, inhumanity30 and freedom of movement within the nation31 (ibid). The 1994 rendition of the Peace Accord vouched to return all that is lost by civilians as a result of the conflict by making an immediate move to provide aid and restore public infrastructures; this included administrative buildings, food dispensaries, and water points throughout the nation32 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994). These actions were vital in the reconciliation between Afars and Issas because providing basic human needs are essential in a highly tense socio-political atmosphere with an arid climate. Removing the need to resort to violence to survive, eradicates a historical dimension in the Afar-Issa conflict that was protracted on the basis of resource scarcity. Furthermore, ratifying treaties of human development, such as International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that demands the provision of fair wages, safe working conditions33, societal participation and public education34 increases accountability provides Djibouti with the conditions to not only develop peacefully but also economically (OHCHR

27 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 10.

28 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 11.

29 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 13.

30 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 16.

31 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 14.

32 Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre III(b-c).

33 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 7.

34 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 13(1).

43 1976). Eradicating the obstacles that gave way to an ethnic cleavage with a classist dimension is needed for national rehabilitation. What has become newly apparent in this analysis of political justice, is the involvement of IGOs. The United Nations was a prominent actor that demanded France to release Djibouti as a colony and denounced their interference in national referendums (Shehim & Searing 1980: 216). Since the country’s independence, the UN has also been reached out to by all opposing sides of domestic actors, throughout all periods of contracted violence. As a result, UN presence has been important with providing aid and supporting reconciliation. Another important IGO is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Headquartered in Djibouti City, it is an East African bloc that works to improve the domestic and regional development of the region. IGAD has multiple programs to maintain stability such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) that specialises in monitoring and reporting ethnic disputes within the region (OECD 2009: 117). This includes the Afar-Issa conflict in the cross-border region of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea (ibid). A conflict rooted in the identitarian existence of both the Afars and Issa, third-party intervention has been important in Djibouti’s conflict management and general development as they are entities that have not imposed grievances on either party. Due to the fact that both the government and guerrilla militias have appealed to the IGOs, shows how they are viewed as legitimate mediators that can bridge the ethnic cleavage. In short, it is evident that a move towards a political pluralism that bolsters societal equity and reconciles grievances through reparations is a vital foundation to peace in Djibouti. Furthermore, the presence of third-parties to neutralise mediums of dialogue has been incredibly advantageous in these courses of action.

44 CHAPTER 7

THREATS TO PEACE DEVELOPMENT

Although a process of reconciliation has been initiated between the Afars and Issas, we must remain realistic about the progress that the nation has actually made and the regional setting it is placed in. Illustrating the hindrances in Djibouti’s peace development is imperative to address them and maintain the ascent to sustainable state stability. Thus, this chapter will seek to answer the final research question: What are the potential threats to Afar-Issa reconciliation in Djibouti?

Is there true justice?

It has already been declared that Djibouti is much more peaceful than neighbouring countries, yet in comparison to every other country in the world, it is not so good. Although ranked as one of the five most increasingly progressive nations in Africa, on an international scale, it is still ranked 109th on the Global Peace Index (IEP 2019). Of course, the nation has seen improvements but it is evident more needs to be done to improve the quality of life for all citizens; if not, dissatisfaction may erupt into conflict again. Looking at the reformed political system, there is a disjuncture from the actual exercise of power. There are many Afar senior officials within the RPP-FRUD coalition but the Issas remain as the ruling class (United States, Department of State 2015: 23). They also dominate civil and security services; the National Police Force, the National Army and the National Gendarmerie, whose roles are to protect Djibouti from terrorism and threats to state stability (ibid). Moreover, a constitutional amendment was made35, which meant that Guelleh was able to run for a third and fourth term in 2011 and 2016, respectively (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2010). The previous conditions were set at two terms36 (Djibouti. Council of

35 Loi Constitutionnelle N°92, Titre III, Art. 23

36 La Constitution de la République De Djibouti Titre III, Art. 23

45 Ministers 2006). This shows that although the government may look representative and democratic on paper, it has been exploited for more reasons than to solely serve the people. Inevitably, with a less-than-ideal system in place, political freedoms are also compromised. On 21st December 2014, a Security Force crackdown was conducted on a gathering of opposition leaders (United States, United States Department of State 2015: 3). This led to several arrests, beat downs and hospitalisations. One of the victims was, Abdourahman Mohamed Guelleh, former Mayor of Djibouti City and Issa leader of a popular opposition party, Rassemblement pour l'Action de Développement et la Démocratie (RADD) (ibid). This sheds light to the larger practice of arbitrary arrests tortures and unfair trials against activists, civilians, journalists and political figures (idem: 6). When evaluating basic human needs, deficiencies have remained. In 2012, More than 70% of the rural community had little to no food security, with Issa-majority Ali Sabieh having the highest insecurity rate, followed by Afar-majority Tadjoura (WFP 2012). The African Development Bank Group (ADBP) reported that since 2002, a substantial number of reports have revealed that large sections of the population live in extreme poverty and are considerably unemployed (ADBP, cited in Baldry 2012: 5). In 2010, UNICEF reported that two-thirds of children were deprived of at least one of the following rights: shelter, water and sanitation, information, nutrition, education and health. What is important to remember when discussing these conditions, is the country’s challenging circumstances. More than 75% of the population live in and around Djibouti City and the other 25% are predominately rural (Erwin 2019: 106). In addition, resources are so naturally scarce due to the arid climate that 80% of the food is imported from other countries (ibid). This inevitably means that tackling food security is costly and arduous when providing for a sporadically dispersed nation. The country is still developing and so fulfilling constitutional promises such as resource distribution are, of course, ambitious. Regardless of the nation’s wealth, it is obvious that there is a continual presence of direct and structural violence. The Afars are routinely more oppressed than their Issa counterparts in these socio-political inequalities, however, there is a growing number of victims from the Issa and other ethnic groups being subject to the violence. This shows that the Afar-Issa divide remains ubiquitous and that conflict is possible but what is also present is the growing chasm between the elite and masses. What needs to be remembered is that all moments of contracted violence in the history of Djibouti has been rooted in ethnic divides, resource imbalances and political repression. These acts conducted by the government right

46 now directly inflame these sensitivities and in turn, increases the chances of another mass mobilisation.

A spillover of regional rivalries

Another threat to the peace of Djibouti is the fact that it is caught up in hostile clashes between regional actors. As there have been instances of transnational attacks within the country, Djibouti is compelled to take international measures to maintain the successes it has harvested for the last three decades or risk a complete demise in state security. Regional conflict has all too often involved Djibouti. As of 2019, roughly 124,000 humans in both the Afar and Somali administrative regions have been displaced (OCHA 2020). This is a result of both social and geographical crises. The Danakil Depression experiences flash floods and droughts which compels human movement (ibid). However, the ethnic border is lacking in road infrastructure and security and as such these human movements have overlapped conflict zones (ibid). On 14th October 2019, 16 people were killed in Afambo, a small wereda37 in the Afar region, near the Djiboutian border (Addis Standard 2019). Afar People’s Party (APP) Chairman, Kontie Moussa, alleged that this was at the hand of the Somali Region State’s Special Force but interestingly, he also accuses armed Djiboutian men 38 but this is later disputed by Colonel Tesfaye Ayalew, Head of Ethiopia’s Office of Deputy Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Defence (ibid). In addition to this, Djibouti is also subject to terrorism from the likes of Al-Shabaab. On 27th May 2014, there was an attack in Djibouti City by two suicide bombers; the first of its kind in the nation that killed one and wounded several (Reuters 2014). Al-Shabab declared that the attack was carried out against the French Crusaders for their complicity in the massacres and persecution of our Muslim brothers in the Central African Republic and for their active role in training and equipping the apostate Djiboutian troops in Somalia. (ibid). A regional setting such as this inevitably puts Djibouti’s peace in jeopardy. Moussa and Al-Shabaab’s claims depict how negative some sentiments are against the nation whether they are founded on its history or unfounded on conspiracies. Many of the violence in the Horn of Africa is perpetually intertwined with Djibouti’s violence.

37 An administrative district.

38 Allegedly Somali.

47 Djibouti has indeed attempted to remedy this regional nature by enacting initiatives with foreign actors. After the deterioration of the Ethio-Djibouti railway in the 1980s, Ethiopia has had unstable access to the sea for exportation and importation of resource, especially after the independence of Eritrea (Arnold 2000: 104). In 2002 Djibouti worked with the country to correct this by approving a 1997 posited resolution that amends the

Djibouto-Ethiopian Railway Treaty and Statute39 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2002b). With a funding of $4.2billion dollars by the Import-Export Bank of China, the project was ready in 2018 for commercial use as the first transboundary electrified railway in Africa (Sakamoto 2018: 112). In 2000, Djibouti signed a decree that initiated the Somalia National

Peace Conference (SNPC) 40 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2000b). A 16-day forum that established an internationally recognised transitional national government for Somalia; A critical moment since there was no legitimised government since the start of the Somali Civil war in 1991. Djibouti also worked with the US to conduct anti-piracy and anti-terrorism initiatives to prevent violent interferences of these conferences and the administration of the new government in Mogadishu (IBP USA 2006b: 27). In addition to these points, the nation has also long collaborated with the UN and IGAD by hosting conferences and supplying aid and refugee support. Djibouti is not an island that can incubate itself; its domestic peace and that of the Horn of Africa are clearly symbiotic. Many of the conflicts occurring in Ethiopia and Somalia are involving both the Afars and Somalis. In response to this, Djibouti has worked with its neighbouring governments to create a legislated structural and direct interdependency in state stability through aiding in infrastructure and political administration. It has worked with IGOs to reduce the spillover of immediate crises. In addition, it has capitalised on its geopolitical importance to host military bases of important countries such as the China and the US in return for rapid economic and security development to sustain direct peace. In the potential of regional conflict destabilising Djibouti, the nation has created an effective bottleneck through diplomatic border externalisation but must continue strengthening civic nationalism to prevent any risks of civil conflict.

39 Loi N°191, Art. 1.

40 Décret N° 2000-0101, Art. 1.

48 CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The Afar-Issa conflict has long been elemental to the identity and reality of both subjects since the Middle Ages. Consequently, it has been institutionalised into the socio-political fabric of Djibouti since its conception. Governed by a French colonial divide et impera strategy, the conflict metamorphosed from nomadic to highly politicised. With these conditions, it was inescapable that independence in 1977 was not a moment of reconciliation. Rather, it transformed the nation into a platform to exercise a brewing antagonism until it cataclysmically exploded into the Civil War of 1991. Falling into demise like all other nations in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti was speculated to be another void in the face of humanity (Abdi 1977; Schraeder 1993; Shilling 1973). Yet, on the contrary, the Civil War produced an antithesis to this cyclical violence and bore a collaborative interdependence that the two ethnic groups have never seen before. This is inarguably a tremendous leap but there is a gap in understanding how exactly bloodshed rapidly transformed into brotherhood. This is a crucial question as it has not been extensively explored. Nonetheless, past historiographical accounts of Djiboutian politics and regional explanations of the Afar-Issa conflict point towards the potency of ancient hatreds, tribalism and ethnic nationalism. As such, I proceeded to inquire how a civic nationalism has potentially facilitated peace. To construct an explanation that covers a wide scope of this phenomenon, I split the task into three supplementary questions. The first would be to understand the problem; Why did the Afar-Issa relationship lead to the outbreak of the Djiboutian Civil War? Secondly, we need to observe the transition to peace; What has Djibouti done to reconcile Afar-Issa grievances after the Djiboutian Civil War? And finally, an assessment of its sustainability needs to be made through exposing its strengths and weaknesses; What are the potential threats to Afar-Issa reconciliation in Djibouti? To commit to such a particularised task, I selected a postcolonial relativity approach as it is crucial in transforming my theory’s ontology and epistemology from a two- dimensional perspective in the periphery Eurocentric IR to a separated core of knowledge. There is subjectivity in the experiences of the Afars and Issas and it should be treated as so.

49 Through an interdisciplinary approach, I am able to ratify this position by creating reflexive inferences on theories from the fields of Sociology, African Studies and Political Science. Furthermore, I exercise this constellation through a research design rooted in methodological holism and hermeneutics. This is done so by conducting a longitudinal case study of Djibouti’s political institutions from its time as a French colony to this present day. To contextualise this to the societal and subjective experiences, I incorporated both thematic and discursive analytical methods to evaluate and triangulate recurring patterns within the Afar- Issa conflict. I also gauged the successes of civic nationalism as a peace development strategy by analysing peace reports from IGOs and foreign actors involved in Djibouti’s society, such as the US Department of State that conducted reports in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti City. From my research, I understand that the Afar-Issa relationship resulted in the Civil War due to their intrinsic animosity being heightened by the former Djiboutian political system and the interference of regional actors. Nonetheless, the origins of the Afar-Issa conflict derive from an inherited and mirroring rivalry over territory and limited resources as explained by past literature (Degefu 2003; Kebbede 2016; Lewis 2003). This was then passed down and mystified throughout generations to the point that their identity is constituted in the existence of the antagonistic “other” who will perpetually undermine them; a cultural violence. Evidently, Djibouti was built on this contention both geographically and politically. Established by the French in 1896, the nation’s territory overlaps the exclusive regions of both the Afars and Issas. In addition to this overriding territory, there came an overriding societal hierarchy that alternated Afar and Issa local governance to repress each other’s power in order to maintain the presence of the French elite. From the second referendum of 1967 to the Civil War in 1991, it is evident that the political institutions were intended to politically translate the ethnic cleavage and it can be seen in the way the state and its alternating Afar and Issa governing bodies have mirrored each other in their perpetuation of violence. Structural violence is present in the way that the authorities have wielded the political power to undermine the determination of the opposing ethnic group. This can be seen in the capricious retitling of the territory and the weaponising of cultural markers such as language. The devaluing of the adversary has removed their worth in domestic dialogue and culturally justified direct violences such as torture, imprisonment and exile. Moreover, it is evident that

Djibouti was a prized tool in the 20th Century in the transnational goals of the Afars and Issas. Their intentions were to merge the nation into their contiguous ethnic regions and they have been supported by their kinfolk from outside the border. Without the presence of the colonial French after Independence, there were no limits to pursue their intentions outright through

50 conflict. This perpetuated a cycle of violence between the ruling Issas and the opposing Afars that was propelled and intensified by an increasing mental distancing that exploded into the Civil War. When it comes to how Djibouti has been able to reconcile the Afars and Issas, although not discussed extensively in previous theories, my research has made it evident that a civic nationalism has been at play. As a nation, the colonial-style ruling was clearly not effective because of disunity in the ethnic groups’ self-determination as ethnic nationalists. Thus, it would be easier to rule a centralised identity. To do so, the nation has formed a common ingroup identity supported by inclusivity and egalitarianism on the basis of territorial separatism. Through inclusive discursive terms such as “brothers and sisters” and “Djiboutians” from both the Afars and Issas, a cultural peace begins. This is further strengthened by the emphasis on a set of experiences and cultural commonalities that are unique to the whole nation. Most importantly, this refers to a Francophone heritage of speaking French being under a colonial rule that has undermined their Islamic ethos. This begins to separate them from their larger ethnic group beyond Djibouti’s borders. A departure from their transnational identity is further strengthened by the institutionalisation of Djiboutian nationalism through law and the diverging experiences of Afars and Issas under Ethiopian Marxist and Somali dictatorial governance. This social process has been growing before the Civil War but the Djiboutian nationalism during this period was insufficient as it lacked the important foundation of political justice to further close the ethnic cleavage by actively addressing grievances and preventing it from reoccurring. From 1992 onwards, there has been a whirlwind of legislations that have abetted the reconciliation process, most notably the Constitution and the Peace Accord. Political freedoms were enacted to allow decentralisation of power through a multiparty system that grants a plurality in political dialogue. In addition, the authorisation of limited legal autonomy for the nation’s regions has legitimised a mutualism in territorial claims which inevitable transitions the national government from being dictatorial to a democratic framework that demands collaboration between the Afars and Issas. Moreover, economic, social and resource inequality have been addressed. The nation has ratified 13 international human rights treaties in order to authenticate the state’s obligation to respect and protect human life. This is further developed and regulated by the involvement of IGOs such as the UN and IGAD. Legislations have been enacted to commit to fair wages, public education and societal participation of all citizens. And more importantly, for an age-old conflict rooted in resource scarcity, food dispensaries and water points are made more

51 accessible in both ethnic regions of the nation. By social and politically closing the gap between the Afars and Issas is the active pursuit for true reconciliation and it is within this pursuit that we can describe a multidimensional peace the actively eradicates structural, cultural and direct violence. More importantly, we must acknowledge that peace development is far from perfect because of the threats involved. First and foremost, although inequality has been specifically addressed, there remains a substantial level between the Afars and Issas but more recently, also between classes. The political systems remain largely Issa-dominated with the RPP party still in control since the country’s independence. Moreover, the National Police Force, National Army and Security Force are also Issa-dominated. From this supremacy, there arises certain biases in the arbitrary arrests and inhumane torture that remains present in the country. However, the increasing number of Issa and Somali victims who have openly disagreed with the structural violence of the RPP bourgeoisie means that the Afar-Issa conflict is drastically reorienting to one that is about class differences or even dictatorship. In addition to political violence, you can see this growing class divide in the continuing uneven distribution of limited resources. Regardless of ethnicity, 70% of the rural community is food insecure (WFP 2012). Although the nation is poor, arid and the population is sporadically dispersed, paying attention to the imbalance in resource distribution shows a concurrent injustice. Remembering that the Afar-Issa conflict has been caused by inequality of recourses and political participation these structural deficiencies in Djiboutian governance directly inflame delicate facets of society. Another threat is that ethnic conflict continues to spill over to Djibouti’s sovereign lands but interestingly, the nation has limited its potential in upsetting domestic society. There is a protracted Afar-Issa conflict directly on the Djiboutian-Ethiopian border and Djiboutian nationals have been accused in exacerbating it (Addis Standard 2019). Additionally, ethnic terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab have directly attacked Djibouti’s peace through recent suicide bombings (Reuters 2014). To prevent the escalation of these aggressions, Djibouti has created an interdependency of state stability with Ethiopia and Somalia by aiding in the development of their institutions such as road infrastructure to assert territorial differences and installation of internationally centralised governments to control insurgencies. Furthermore, the nation hosts military bases of many powerful countries who actively counteract the rise of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. A revelatory Djiboutian renaissance has begun through the nation’s reconciliatory process but the task is not yet over. This research has been critically conducted to focus on

52 the role of identities and multidimensional violence throughout the Afar-Issa conflict and it has been revealed that a civic nationalism has allowed a culture of peace. What we can see is that the success of the nation’s peace development has largely been built on addressing this nature through civic nationalism amongst the masses. Although revolutionary, it is evident that inequality remains and the societal cleavage is shifting towards social classes. In the face of constitutional violations against the Djiboutian people, the Djiboutian government must dedicate itself to reforming the current political justice strategy by improving Afar political equity and providing more socio-economic opportunities such as education, food and shelter, to the disenfranchised poorer classes. Moreover, this must be done with haste should they wish to sustain past peace development and avoid another civil conflict.

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65 APPENDICES

Appendix A Thematic coding agenda

Theme Category Code Definition Example Coding rule

Afar-Issa Cultural Ancient hatred Being sworn enemies that are The Afars have always been conflict violence incapable of seeing eye to eye. objects of all sorts of Referring to a narrative of an repressions, victims of torture inherited animosity and illegal confinement

-AROD spokesperson (Le Monde 1991a)

Tribalised The referral of a political the aim of French policy is to References to an Afar- political antagonism during French exterminate the Somali Issa animosity on a identity colonialism and post- people and replace them with political scale. Any Independence. settlers so as to establish the conflict represented domination of France over through governance this territory

-FLCS (Le Monde 1965a)

Ethnic Solidarity with kinfolk across There is a war in Afar Indications that there is a nationalist national borders rather than their country as they wish to claim closer bond to regional identity compatriots. the same parts as the Issas, ethnic identity than who control the capital Djiboutian civic nationalism -FRUD Combatant (Le Monde 1992a).

Territorial Verbal assaults that clearly The motion presented by Mr. Territorial delegitimisation denies the territorial rights of the Ali Aref, vice-president of delegitimisation by opposing ethnic group. An the government council, domestic Afars and Issas unequal representation of proposing to call La Côte territorial rights justifies an Française des Somalis unequal distribution of power officially, Le Territoire and resources. Français des Afars. Mr. Ali Aref declared, during his speech, that if the Issas showed a willingness to participate in the work of the assembly, this designation would be supplemented later by "et Issas".

66

Ali Aref Bourhan – (Le Monde 1967b).

Third-party The validation received from [The future of Djibouti port Must be iterated by a bias foreign entities that justifies the is] either a French one or an foreign entity violence inflicted from either the Ethiopian one Afar or Issa side. -Mengistu in a dialogue to French President Charles de Gaulle (Ingiriis 2016: 141).

Structural Political power Political operations that assert La Côte Française des Afar-Issa ratio imbalance violence imbalance the political power of one ethnic Somalis officially became Le must be explicit group over the other. Territoire Français des Afars et Issas by virtue of a decree signed Wednesday by Mr. Louis Saget, High Commissioner

(Le Monde 1967c)

Resource share Legislation that unequally "We [Afars] are taken Afar-Issa ratio imbalance imbalance distributes resources across the hostage," says opponent must be explicit nation (e.g. food, water, jobs, Ahmed Dini, former prime housing). minister, stranded in Obock. "The government”, he said, “wants to starve the guerrillas by preventing supplies from the north of the country." The opposition adds that there can be no medical evacuation and that medical care is no longer provided since the aid workers were repatriated to the capital.

(Le Monde 1991c)

Direct Violence Government Direct assaults enacted by the In April 1989, several Afar All actions must be state- Djiboutian government were arrested in Tadjoura for sanctioned criticizing the authorities for allegedly diverting aid humanitarian.

67 - Mémorandum au Gouvernement de la République de Djibouti (Amnesty International 1991)

Guerilla Direct assaults enacted by After attempting to approach All action must be done Political dissidents the High Commissioner’s by known political Garden [François Saget], dissident groups where the [annual Red Cross ball] was being held, for the purpose of throwing a grenade, Omar Elmi Khaireh [FLCS] and Omar Osman Rabeh turned back to the famous Zin Palm Tree Bar and Restaurant, where the defensive device wounded 16 Europeans, including many military.

- Translations on Sub- Saharan Africa, Issues 1642- 1654. (United States, Joint Publications Research Service 1976: 24).

Third-party [The UN] Reaffirms the All involvement of inalienable right of the foreign entities in direct population of the French violence on Djiboutian Somali Coast (Djibouti) to land self-determination and independence, in accordance with resolution 1,514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.

[i.e. remove their physical imposition in Djiboutian sovereign land]

(Le Monde 1966)

Djiboutian Social Common Identifying as Djiboutian. The human is sacred, the Any discourse of civic recategorisation ingroup state has an obligation to Djiboutianness that nationalism identity respect and protect it, and all includes both Afars and Issas

68 humans are equal before the law

- La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 10. (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992

Common The exclusion of individuals Djiboutian nationality is Implications that there is outgroup beyond national borders. More granted, acquired or lost a difference between who perception solidarity amongst compatriots. according to the provisions of is Djiboutian and who is a this subject to the application foreigner based on of treaties and other territorial separatism international commitments of the Republic of Djibouti.

- Loi N200 Art. 1 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1981).

Dialogue of Acknowledgement of past Tribalism is the enemy and Dialogue between Afars reconciliation grievances and the desire to the opposite of national and Issas. Must show an resolve matters. independence and it only acceptance of benefits those who are wrongdoing, remorse, and opposed to our sovereignty a desire to change.

- Président Aptidon, H. G. (1977: 5).

Dialogue of The discussion to work together The Government must start Overall impression of cooperation in order to improve the to undertake necessary future think. Thinking of development of the nation. efforts for the resumption and how to advance the nation relaunching of development projects stopped or suspended because of the conflict, and thus, it will enter into contact with donors. New projects should be drawn up according to the new needs.

- Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre X (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

69

Political justice Political Legislation that emboldens the In order to respond to the Reforming previous (Structural pluralism variety of political pluralism in concerns of many quarters political power imbalance peace) governmental affairs. and with the supreme purpose of exploring together the way of peace, the Government engages to guarantee the FRUD combatants jobs and integration within the political, military, administrative, social and economic fields, in accordance with the stipulations and quotas fixed jointly by the two parties and recorded in the annex of the present Peace agreement.

- Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre VI (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

Reparations for Legislation that undoes the Within the framework of the Must be a direct response oppression structural oppression endured in measures of restoration of to grievances the past. trust, of the elimination of insecurity factors and the setting up of permanent security in order to promote a better circulation of people and goods, there will be a total removal of checkpoints and of the system of irregular controls - Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre III(a) (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

Legislation for Closing the ethnic cleavage on The Djiboutian people Upwards approach of equity social, political and economic solemnly proclaim their equity. Overall standings attachment to the principles impression of of Democracy and Human advancement Rights as defined by the

70 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

-La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Préambule. (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992).

Third-party Involvement of foreign entities The Amendments to the Upwards approach of structural peace to ensure structural peace within Treaty and Statute of the foreign entities aiding in Djibouti. Structural peace Djibouto-Ethiopian Railway Djiboutian structural initiatives on a regional scale as adopted by the resolutions peace either advertently should also be considered of the CDE's Extraordinary or inadvertently Administrative Council dated February 23, 1997 are approved.

-Loi N°191, Art. 1. (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2002b)

Political Justice Absence of The reduction of violence levels The combatants and exiled Resolutions on direct (Direct Peace) Direct violence from the Civil War to the present militaries of FRUD are violences from all parties day amnestied without exception involved. Impression of for acts committed before the closing the animosity. 12th of June 1994, and thus they recover, in full, their civic rights. Their security is guaranteed by the State.

-Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre VII (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

Peace-keeping Operations to maintain state FRUD undertakes the task to Collaboration between operations stability. (e.g. border control, encourage the refugees and the Afars an Issas to refugee management). Djibouti displaced persons, maintain state security finding themselves outside the national territory because of the war, to return home.

71 -Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre III(d) (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

Third-party [With regards to French Third party involvement direct peace military base of 4,000 to reduce or control personnel in the middle of the violence. Djiboutian Civil War] “In this region of Africa, we are witnessing” declared the Minister of Defense, to the French military, François Léotard, “the disintegration of certain States and the appearance of "gray areas" in which no one seems to be interested anymore and

which are gradually sinking in chaos… Djibouti can and must be a true oasis of peace and a source of stability. " " France is and will remain in Djibouti. Technical military assistance is long-term… The Republic of Djibouti knows this and asks for it”

-(Le Monde 1993)

72 Appendix B Discourse coding scheme

Example Discourse coding

The Afars have always been objects of all sorts of repressions, victims of torture and illegal confinement • Issa → Afar • Third-party → Afar • Exclusive Afar -AROD spokesperson (Le Monde 1991a) • Victimisation • French the aim of French policy is to exterminate the Somali people and replace them with settlers so as to establish the • Third-party → Issa domination of France over this territory • Exclusive Issa • Vilification • French -FLCS (Le Monde 1965a)

There is a war in Afar country as they wish to claim the same parts as the Issas, who control the capital • Issa → Afar • Exclusive Afar • Victimisation -FRUD Combatant (Le Monde 1992a). • French

The motion presented by Mr. Ali Aref, vice-president of the government council, proposing to call La Côte • Afar → Issa Française des Somalis officially, Le Territoire Français des Afars. • Inclusive Djiboutian (CONDITIONAL. AFAR- Mr. Ali Aref declared, during his speech, that if the Issas showed a willingness to participate in the work of the BIASED) assembly, this designation would be supplemented later by "et Issas". • Vilification • French

Ali Aref Bourhan – (Le Monde 1967b).

[The future of Djibouti port is] either a French one or an Ethiopian one • Third-party → Afar • Third-party → Issa -Mengistu in a dialogue to French President Charles de Gaulle (Ingiriis 2016: 141).

"We [Afars] are taken hostage," says opponent Ahmed Dini, former prime minister, stranded in Obock. "The • Issa → Afar government”, he said, “wants to starve the guerrillas by preventing supplies from the north of the country." The • Exclusive Afar • Victimisation opposition adds that there can be no medical evacuation and that medical care is no longer provided since the aid • Vilification workers were repatriated to the capital. • French

(Le Monde 1991c)

[The UN] Reaffirms the inalienable right of the population of the French Somali Coast (Djibouti) to self- • Third-party → Djibouti determination and independence, in accordance with resolution 1,514 (XV) of December 14, 1960. • French

[i.e. remove their French presence in Djiboutian sovereign land] -(Le Monde 1966)

The human is sacred, the state has an obligation to respect and protect it, and all humans are equal before the law • Afar → Issa • Issa → Afar

73 • Inclusive Djiboutian - La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Titre I, Art. 10. • Optimistic • Authoritative (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992 • Reconciliatory • Cooperation • French

Djiboutian nationality is granted, acquired or lost according to the provisions of this subject to the application of • Inclusive Djiboutian treaties and other international commitments of the Republic of Djibouti. • Exclusive Djiboutian • Authoritative • French - Loi N200 Art. 1 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1981).

Tribalism is the enemy and the opposite of national independence and it only benefits those who are opposed to our • Issa → Third-party sovereignty • Inclusive Djiboutian • Exclusive Djiboutian • Anger - Président Aptidon, H. G. (1977: 5). • Condemnation • Authoritative • Cooperation • French

The Government must start to undertake necessary efforts for the resumption and relaunching of development • Afar → Issa projects stopped or suspended because of the conflict, and thus, it will enter into contact with donors. New projects • Issa → Afar • Inclusive Djiboutian should be drawn up according to the new needs. • Optimistic • Authoritative • Reconciliatory - Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre X • Cooperation (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994). • French

In order to respond to the concerns of many quarters and with the supreme purpose of exploring together the way of • Afar → Issa peace, the Government engages to guarantee the FRUD combatants jobs and integration within the political, • Issa → Afar • Inclusive Djiboutian military, administrative, social and economic fields, in accordance with the stipulations and quotas fixed jointly by • Optimistic the two parties and recorded in the annex of the present Peace agreement. • Authoritative • Reconciliatory • Cooperation - Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre VI • French (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

Within the framework of the measures of restoration of trust, of the elimination of insecurity factors and the setting • Afar → Issa up of permanent security in order to promote a better circulation of people and goods, there will be a total removal of • Issa → Afar • Inclusive Djiboutian checkpoints and of the system of irregular controls • Optimistic - Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre III(a) • Authoritative • Reconciliatory (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994). • Cooperation • French

The Djiboutian people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the principles of Democracy and Human Rights as • Afar → Issa defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights • Issa → Afar • Inclusive Djiboutian • Optimistic -La Constitution de la République De Djibouti, Préambule. • Authoritative • Reconciliatory

74 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1992). • Cooperation • French

The Amendments to the Treaty and Statute of the Djibouto-Ethiopian Railway as adopted by the resolutions of the • Djibouti → Third-party CDE's Extraordinary Administrative Council dated February 23, 1997 are approved. • Cooperation • French

-Loi N°191, Art. 1. (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 2002b)

The combatants and exiled militaries of FRUD are amnestied without exception for acts committed before the 12th of • Issa → Afar June 1994, and thus they recover, in full, their civic rights. Their security is guaranteed by the State. • Optimistic • Authoritative • Reconciliatory -Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre VII • Cooperation • French (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

FRUD undertakes the task to encourage the refugees and Djibouti displaced persons, finding themselves outside the • Afar → Third-party national territory because of the war, to return home. • Exclusive Djiboutian • Authoritative • Cooperation -Accord de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale 1994, Titre III(d) • French (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

[With regards to French military base of 4,000 personnel in the middle of the Djiboutian Civil War] • Third-party → Djibouti “In this region of Africa, we are witnessing” declared the Minister of Defense, to the French military, François • Unsatisfied • Authoritative Léotard, “the disintegration of certain States and the appearance of "gray areas" in which no one seems to be • French interested anymore and which are gradually sinking in chaos… Djibouti can and must be a true oasis of peace and a source of stability. " " France is and will remain in Djibouti. Technical military assistance is long-term… The Republic of Djibouti knows this and asks for it”

-(Le Monde 1993)

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