‘DESTRUCTIVE AND FORMIDABLE’: British infantry firepower, 1642 – 1765 David J Blackmore A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the Requirements of Nottingham Trent University For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2012 Copyright statement This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this work for private study, or personal, non-commercial research. Any re-use of the information contained within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the author, title, university, degree level and pagination. Queries or requests for any other use, or if a more substantial copy is required, should be directed to the owner of the Intellectual Property Rights. ii Abstract David J Blackmore Degree: PhD Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower, 1642 – 1765 This work is an examination of the effectiveness of British infantry firepower from 1642 to 1765, it establishes the manner in which that firepower was organised and managed and how it developed. In order to achieve this it has been necessary to develop and propose a new approach to the study of military history; practical military history, which uses a thorough understanding of the practices and procedures of the army to interpret and analyse contemporary writings on the subject. In doing so it has been possible to identify and analyse the effectiveness of the tactical doctrine and combat techniques of British infantry during the English Civil Wars and then to trace a continuous line of development of doctrine and technique from then until 1765, in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War, when this study concludes. It has also been possible to analyse the battlefield effectiveness of those techniques and to identify previously unrecognised aspects of them. It has also been possible to correct some long held misconceptions and to pinpoint times when key changes were brought about, such as the introduction of the organisation of platoons into firings. As well as identifying, for the first time, a single underlying tactical doctrine it has also been possible to clarify the manner in which the methods used to execute that iii doctrine changed. The work has identified the origins of platoon firing, its earliest form and its subsequent developments during the War of Spanish Succession, thereby correcting the long standing misidentification of the form that it first took and the idea that it remained largely unchanged from the 1680s to the 1740s. It has also identified when changes occurred and analysed the implications for the effectiveness of the firepower and, in some instances, been able to demonstrate in absolute terms, the effectiveness of that firepower. This work will enable military historians to achieve an understanding of how British infantry fought, how they achieved what they did, rather than simply what those achievements were. In using a practical military history approach it also proposes a new approach to military history that will enable an analysis of events to be given, rather than a simple narrative. iv Contents Copyright Statement ii Abstract iii Contents v Acknowledgements vi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: The Age of the Matchlock, 1642 to 1688 29 Chapter 3: The Origins of Platoon Firing and its introduction into the 68 English and Scots Armies Chapter 4: William III and The Nine Years War 94 Chapter 5: The Age of Marlborough, 1702 to 1714 119 Chapter 6: Humphrey Bland and The Duke of Cumberland,1714 to 1749 148 Chapter 7: The Seven Years War in Europe 185 Chapter 8: The French and Indian Wars 219 Chapter 9: Conclusion 252 Bibliography 1: Manuscripts 264 2: Regulations 266 3: Primary sources 267 4: Secondary sources 272 v Acknowledgements In the first place I must express my gratitude to the late Professor Richard Holmes, who encouraged me to undertake this work. The extracts from the Cumberland Papers are quoted with the permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. The staff of many archives and other institutions are due my thanks, not least; The British Library Reading Rooms at St Pancras and Boston Spa; The National Archives; The National Army Museum; Stuart Ivinson at The Royal Armouries; Micol Barengo at The Huguenot Library; The Swedish Army Museum, in particular the Director, Eva-Sofi Ernstell and her colleague Martin Markelius; The Military Archives of Sweden; The Dutch National Archive; Mary Robertson at The Huntington Library, California, Individuals who have helped along the way, sometimes with relevant material, sometimes with simple, but sound advice include; Jan Piet Puype, formerly of the Dutch Army Museum; Dave Ryan of Caliver Books; Dr Christopher Scott; Dr. Eric Gruber von Arni; Dr Lesley Prince; Dr Hannah Hunt; Dr John Houlding; Dr Olaf van Nimwegen; Dr John M Stapleton Jr; Of course, a great deal of thanks goes to my supervisory team at Nottingham Trent University; Professor Martyn Bennett, who rescued the whole thing from a premature end, Dr Kevin Gould and Dr Nicholas Morton. The greatest thanks go to Janet McKay, with whom this all started over a bottle of wine and who never, ever wants to hear about platoon firing again. vi 1: Introduction The objective of this work is to examine and analyse the use of firepower by British infantry from 1642 to 1765 in order to establish the tactical doctrine and the methods, or combat techniques, for applying that doctrine that were employed throughout that period. The year 1642 is taken as the starting point as it saw the outbreak of the English Civil War, in which conflict lie the origins of the British Army and the infantry that are the subject of this work. By 1765 and the end of the Seven Years War, British infantry had established a considerable reputation and become recognisable as the troops who would fight well, but in vain, in the American War of Independence, and most effectively against the forces of Napoleon. It is thus the formative period in the history of the British Army. This work will seek to establish if there were doctrinal changes from war to war as circumstances changed, or if there is one continuous, underlying doctrine that has underpinned the methods and combat techniques developed. It will also identify and explain the developments in the methods of delivery and organisation of firepower. Both doctrine and methods will be analysed to ascertain their effectiveness. This study is necessary because there is a consensus among modern writers of military history that the British infantry of the eighteenth century repeatedly achieved a high level of effectiveness and superiority over its enemies in firepower and relied on that firepower to win battles. Despite that consensus, however, no historian has yet traced to its beginning the development of the doctrine or the means by which that superiority was achieved and maintained over such a long period, in a variety of theatres, and against a wide variety of enemies. 1 Charles Spencer in his account of Blenheim, 1704, wrote how Anglo–Dutch firepower ‘cut down large swathes of their opponents in a moment’.1 Jeremy Black makes several similar observations about the British infantry at Dettingen in 1743, ‘French cavalry attacked British infantry only to be cut to pieces by their firepower’, at Fontenoy in 1745, ‘the British infantry displayed their discipline and fire control’ and at Minden, ‘The courage and fire discipline of the British infantry won the battle’.2 Frank McLynn has written of the British infantry at Minden in 1759, ‘A series of crashing volleys from the superbly disciplined British regiments tore the heart out of the French cavalry’.3 However, none of these writers supplies an answer to the question of how this superiority was achieved and then maintained. One possible explanation for this omission is given by the eminent military historian of the late seventeenth century John Childs. In the introduction to his book The Nine Years War and the British Army 1688-1697 he describes a ‘new military history’.4 This he describes as dealing with social, political and economic forces at the expense of traditional campaign history. His explanation for this development is the desire among ‘professional historians at universities to bring academic respectability to a branch of their discipline which has long been the poor relation of its political, religious, social and economic brothers’.5 As the self confessed author of a trilogy of new military history dealing with the British Army from 1660 to 1702, Childs also states that an army’s campaigns, actions 1 Charles Spencer, Blenheim, Battle for Europe (London, 2004), p. 255. 2 Jeremy Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1999), p. 162, p. 181 and p. 188. 3 Frank McLynn, 1759, The Year Britain Became Master of the World (London 2005), p. 276. 4 John Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army (Manchester, 1991), pp. 2-3. 5 Childs, The Nine Years War, p. 3. 2 and methods are as important as the topics of the new military history. He claims that in The Nine Years War and the British Army, 1688-1697 he will don the coat of the ‘old military historian’ and observe the British Army in action.6 To some extent Childs achieves that aim, but what emerges from the book is a limited picture of an army in action and even less of its methods. Writing about military history books dealing with the period 1689 to 1763 Brent Nosworthy wrote: ‘The so-called higher levels of warfare, generally referred to as the “operational” and “strategic” levels, are particularly well covered.’7 However, he goes on to write: ‘Though we are given general information, such as the types of formations the troops employed and some of the methods they used to fire their weapons, the picture blurs as soon as we increase the degree of magnification.’8 Elsewhere he has expressed his view more bluntly: ‘The traditional approach used to dissect and analyse battles which explains “what” occurred during a particular contest has unfortunately largely ignored the “how” and the “why”.’9 These are precisely the shortcomings of Childs in The Nine Years War.