Divisional Combat Engineers and the Development of Mechanized Warfare 1918 - 1942

THE DIVISIONAL COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANIZED WARFARE 1918 - 1942 / by LEE S. HARFORD, Jr. B.A., Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, 1974 A MASTER'S THESIS submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF ARTS Department of History KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 1984 Approved by: Major Profe^or A11505 b2fl1Bb ."TV; c ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The invaluable assistance of my committee members Dr. Robin Higham Dr. Donald Mrozek Dr. Alden Williams is deeply appreciated. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES Iv DEFINITION OF TERMS V PREFACE VI Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 1 Footnotes 18 II. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANIZED WARFARE IN THE ALLIED CAMP FROM 1916 TO 1938 20 Early Mechanization 20 Theories of Military Intellectuals 25 British Development of Mechanized Warfare ... 38 French Development of Mechanized Warfare ... 42 The Allied Potential for Mechanized Warfare . 44 Footnotes 54 III. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLITZKRIEG WARFARE IN THE AXIS CAMP FROM 1935 TO 1940 59 The Fascist State — The Patron of Mechanization 59 Italian Development of Strategic Mechanized Warfare — La Guerra di Rapido Corso 67 The Readiness for Mechanized Warfare of the Italian Combat Engineer 76 German Mechanization and the Development of Blitzkrieg Warfare 86 II TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Chapter Page III. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLITZKRIEG WARFARE IN THE AXIS CAMP FROM 1935 TO 1940 (Continued) Blitzkrieg Pioneers — The Part Played by the German Divisional (Stoss) Engineers in Mechanized Warfare 102 The Axis Potential for Mechanized Warfare . 119 Footnotes 120 IV. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER ON MECHANIZED WARFARE IN NORTH AFRICA FROM 1940 TO 1942 — TRIAL OF BATTLE 129 The Dialectics of Armored Warfare on the Desert 129 The First Round: The First and Second Libyan Campaigns 132 The Second Round: The Third and Fourth Libyan Campaigns 138 The Third Round: The Fifth and Sixth Libyan Campaigns 154 Footnotes 171 V. CONCLUSION 176 BIBLIOGRAPY 181 III LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1 s 2 Defensive Base from which Mobile Forces can Operate 30 3 Panzerpionier Armored and Unarraored Combat Vehicles 113 4 North-East Africa 133 5 Methods Used at the Battle of Sidi Barrani 134 6 Rommel's First Offensive — March 1941 139 7 Operation Battleaxe — June 1941 143 8 Operation Crusader — Nov. -Dec. 1941 150 9 The Battle of Gazala, Phase 1 — May 1942 156 10 Battle of Gazala, Phase 2 (the Cauldron) — June 5-6 160 11 Battle of Alam el Haifa Ridge 164 12 Operation Lightfoot Oct. 1942 165 13 Standard Mine Clearing Drill 167 IV DEFINITION OF TERMS M odern Warfare -- combat operations after the introduction of mechanization to the battlefield. Strategy — the management and maneuvering of forces up to the point of contact with the enemy. Tactics — those methods and techniques of employing forces when in contact with the enemy. Counter- M obi l ity -- to impede the enemy by reinforcing the terrain through the use of obstacles which utilize and improve on existing obstructions and natural barriers. Obstacles normally are emplaced in belts or systems which are covered by direct fire weapons to make them more effective. M obi l ity — to reduce the efforts of existing or reinforced obstacles so as to improve or make possible the maneuverability of tactical units and allow for the forward movement of essential logistics. Hasty Operations — require imagination and ingenuity in the use of available resources, and are normally conducted under enemy fire when speed is extremely important. In the advance, the combat engineers should be located with the lead elements of the maneuvering units so as to be best employed for maintaining momentum of the attack by reducing the effects of obstructions to maneuver, and mobility. Engineers also can increase flank protection by creating hasty obstacles on avenues of enemy approach to the flanks. In the defence or in blocking operations, their location is situation dependent. Field fortification and counter-mobility obstacles are accomplished when in contact or about to make contact with the enemy, and normally should consist of fox holes, open weapon emplacements, and simple obstacles as the situation permits, to increase the strength of the position and to reduce the mobility, maneuverability, and offensive advantage of the approaching enemy. Deliberate Operations — differ from hasty ones in that they are more permanent in nature and are accomplished when enemy interference during preparation is unlikely. In addition, sufficient time exists for thorough reconnaissance and careful preparation. In this case, combat engineers can be located to the rear and called forward to accomplish mossions. Field fortifications consist of elaborate trenchworks, covered emplacements, and obstacles as the situation requires. PREFACE Through my experiences as an engineer officer in the United States Army, I quickly learned that one of the greatest problems during operations on the modern battlefield lay in the cooperation between arms. This was especially so in the case of the divisional engineer who, as a participant in various field exercises, tended to follow the major combat arms across the maneuver area with no real purpose. The relative capabilities of the combat engineer were left untapped by maneuver force commanders who showed very little appreciation or interest in how these aspects could enhance the combat potential of their units. This thesis is intended to help in the resolution of this deficiency by emphasizing the incorporation of the combat engineer in battlefield operations as an essential aspect of mechanized warfare. The theme of this paper is to show historically how and why the role of the divisional engineer, through the development of mechanized warfare, evolved from an indirect support function to one of major influence over battlefield operations. This transition was contingent on the emancipation of military doctrine and planning from the constraints of traditional military elitist attitudes which, in turn, allowed for the development of the mechanized formation as a strategic weapon. Through the realization of combined-arms operations, the armored division, as an independent striking force, revolutionized warfare. The dynamics of this formation greatly depended on the mobility and counter-mobility potential of the combat engineer. Prior to and in the first three years of World War II, the VI effectiveness of armored formations differed significantly between the Allied and Axis countries. This was due, primarily, to the degree of combined-arms organization and indoctrination reached and the role played in it by the combat engineer. In the Allied nations, the conservative military elites feared the infringement of mechanization on their traditional, chivalric concepts of warfare and, consequently, established armored formations as tactical aids to infantry and cavalry based combat operations. The combat engineer remained an indirect support arm, mainly concerned with deliberate and static construction. This situation persisted despite the theories of Martel, Fuller, and Liddell Hart who, with foresight, proposed the development of mechanized formations as the basis of future warfare. The Axis nations, in contrast, had realized these concepts almost perfectly by the end of the 1930's. The corporate spirit and aggressive nationalism induced by Fascism had lifted the conceptual constraints experienced in the Allied nations and allowed for the development of the armored formation as an offensive strategic weapon. Through the application of combined- arms principles, rapid maneuverability was reintroduced to combat operations. Thus, the combat engineer, as the proponent of mobility and counter-mobility, provided greatly for the dynamics basic to mechanized warfare. The conflict in North Africa provides a vivid comparison of the opposing concepts for the employment of mechanized forces. During these campaigns, two main trends emerged. First, the decisiveness of the proper employment of the combat engineer as VII part of the mechanized combined-arms team to success on the dynamic battlefield and, second, the superiority of the strategic use of armored formations over their tactical use. Throughout most of the campaigns on the Western Desert, the Allied forces adhered to the traditional concepts of warfare and, as a result, were consistently defeated by the dynamic combined-arms team of the Axis forces. Through a slow process of trial and error, the Allies eventually adopted the methods of their opponents. The final decision at El Alamein was significantly dependent on the Allied assimilation of the combined-arms principles and the proper employment of the combat engineer into an armored dominated battlefield. This thesis will show that the success on the mechanized battlefield depends, above all else, on the application of combined-arms operations and on the mobility and counter-mobility potential of the combat engineer, who provides the dynamics on which modern warfare is based. VIII . CHAPTER I Before mechanized warfare, the combat engineers in European armies were inhibited from exercising their full potential in assisting combat operations, on both the tactical and strategical levels, due the conservative attitudes of their aristocratic leadership. During this period, cooperation of arms was actively avoided. Later, with the advent of mechanization, the deep- rootedness of this relationship retarded the incorporation

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