Thailand's Emergency Decree
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THAILAND'S EMERGENCY DECREE: NO SOLUTION Asia Report N°105 – 18 November 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE EMERGENCY DECREE..................................................................................... 2 III. THE IMPACT OF THE DECREE............................................................................... 4 A. THE NRC..............................................................................................................................4 B. NATIONAL POLITICS .............................................................................................................5 C. THE SECURITY FORCES .........................................................................................................6 D. RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES ...............................................................................7 1. Blacklists....................................................................................................................7 2. Allegations of extra judicial killings..........................................................................8 IV. THE DEATH OF IMAM SATOPA.............................................................................. 9 A. THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLING THEORY ................................................................................9 B. THE OFFICIAL EXPLANATION................................................................................................9 C. POSSIBLE MOTIVES.............................................................................................................10 D. SIGNIFICANCE .....................................................................................................................10 V. THE FLIGHT TO MALAYSIA.................................................................................. 11 A. POSSIBLE MOTIVES.............................................................................................................11 1. Fear of extra-judicial execution in Lahan ................................................................11 2. Fear of extra-judicial execution in Sungai Kolok....................................................11 3. Fear of arbitrary arrest or extra-judicial killing in To'deng, Sungai Padi ................12 4. Unemployment in Tabing, Sai Buri.........................................................................12 B. GOVERNMENT AND MALAYSIAN RESPONSES ......................................................................13 VI. MYSTERIOUS KILLINGS IN TANYONG LIMOH............................................... 15 A. TEA SHOP SHOOTINGS ........................................................................................................15 B. HOSTAGE CRISIS AND MURDER OF MARINES.....................................................................15 C. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................................................17 1. Vigilante violence? ..................................................................................................17 2. BRN-Coordinate operation? ....................................................................................18 D. IMPLICATIONS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE .....................................................................19 E. SOFTENING THE BLOW........................................................................................................20 VII. LINKS TO TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE REGION?......................................... 21 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 22 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THAILAND .............................................................................................................23 B. MAP OF THAILAND'S THREE SOUTHERN PROVINCES ...........................................................24 C. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE EMERGENCY DECREE ........................................................25 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................30 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................31 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................34 Asia Report N°105 18 November 2005 THAILAND'S EMERGENCY DECREE: NO SOLUTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Muslim-majority region of southern Thailand is preventing any official investigation. The second continues to experience a relatively low-level insurgency involves the flight to Malaysia of 131 villagers, and the but a state of emergency imposed on three provinces is third relates to mysterious murders that led angry villagers no solution to the conflict that has claimed more than to capture and detain soldiers who were later killed by 1,000 lives since January 2004. The decree has deepened local militants. mistrust of the security forces, worsened public discontent with the government's approach to the insurgency and A by-product of the deteriorating situation has been a sharp heightened the risk of human rights abuses. Prime Minister downturn in relations between Thailand and Malaysia, Thaksin Shinawatra should take immediate steps to related to Bangkok's long-running accusation that its moderate the decree or risk plunging the area into worse neighbour turns a blind eye to Thai separatist militants violence. taking refuge in northern states and aggravated in recent months by inept handling of the "refugee" issue. The Executive Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations took effect on 19 July 2005 in Thus far, there is no evidence of outside involvement in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala and was renewed for three the violence, despite mounting speculation. However, months on 19 October. While it was designed to be a there are legitimate concerns that if the violence worsens, softer version of martial law, many see it as harsher. Far it might be exploited by jihadi groups to establish a new from helping to restore trust between the government of area for training and recruitment, as has happened in other Prime Minister Thaksin and the Malay Muslims, the conflict zones in South East Asia. decree has further eroded it. The only clear impact of the emergency decree has been The head of the government-appointed National increased alienation of Malay Muslims. Despite the Reconciliation Commission says the decree gives security absence of any demonstrable strategic gain from the forces a "licence to kill". Two provisions, one granting emergency decree, the cabinet renewed it. Unless relations law enforcement officers immunity from prosecution between the security forces and southern Muslims begin and the other suspending the jurisdiction of administrative to improve, however, and until reports of abuses and courts to prosecute officials for human rights violations, disappearances can be properly investigated, the growing leave citizens with no redress for abuses. Despite some alienation may turn into sympathy, support and even legal safeguards, the decree leaves loopholes that heighten recruits for the insurgency. the risk of arbitrary detention and mistreatment of detainees. In practice, the government's powers are the RECOMMENDATIONS same as they were under martial law, but with less accountability. To the Thai Government: One particular problem that has emerged is blacklisting, 1. Repeal Sections 16 and 17 of the decree that where police and soldiers go to villages with lists of exclude access to administrative courts and grant suspects, often based on weak intelligence and weaker enforcement officials immunity from prosecution. evidence. Those on the lists are told to surrender or face arrest or worse. While the government denies such lists are 2. Amend Sections 11 and 12 on arrest and detention being used, village headmen confirm the practice. to affirm explicitly constitutional rights such as immediate access to a lawyer of choice and to Three incidents demonstrate the depth of fear and inform family of arrest and detention. alienation in areas designated "red zones" -- those 3. Move ahead as quickly as possible with plans suspected of being insurgent strongholds. One involves to establish a centre with forensic capability to the death of an imam, where suspicion of the government investigate disappearances. Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution Crisis Group Asia Report N°105, 18 November 2005 Page ii 4. Support expansion of the joint initiative of the 7. Expand cultural awareness, and particularly National Reconciliation Commission, the Lawyers Malay language training, for officers stationed Council and the National Human Rights in the Fourth Army region. Commission to provide legal aid and human rights 8. End the blacklisting of suspects; treat suspect lists monitoring in the southern provinces. as internal documents, and make arrests only on 5. Examine, with the National Reconciliation solid evidence, not vague suspicions. Commission, mechanisms for continuing regular 9. Continue the initiative of encouraging voluntary consultations with southern community and surrenders of low-level militants but ensure that religious leaders after the Commission's mandate surrenders are genuinely voluntary and not ends, perhaps by