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A Bibliography of the Publications of Daniel C. Dennett

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A Bibliography of the Publications of Daniel C. Dennett 1 September 08, 2021 A Bibliography of the Publications of Daniel C. Dennett Books Content and Consciousness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, and Humanities Press, New York, 1969 (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method). (Paperback edition, 1986; Italian edition, 1992; Spanish edition, 1994). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Bradford Books, 1978. (Italian edition, 1991; Swedish edition, 1992; Portuguese edition, 2000); "Where am I?" translated into Estonian, Akadeemia 7, 2013, pp. 1155-1324; translated into Hebrew, Alaxon, August 25th, 2016; Chinese translation of Chapter 7, "Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology," by Justin Zou, 2020. The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul, Co-edited with Douglas Hofstadter, Basic Books, 1981. (Japanese edition, 1984; Spanish and Italian editions, 1985; German and Dutch editions 1986; French and Chinese editions, 1987; Greek edition, 1993). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, 1984. (German edition, 1986; Spanish edition, 1992, 2018). Audio edition, MIT Press, 2016; Croatian edition, 2019. The Intentional Stance, MIT Press/A Bradford Book, 1987 (French edition, 1990; Spanish edition, 1991; Italian edition, 1993; Japanese edition, 1995). Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown, 1991, Penguin, 1992 (Dutch, Italian, French, German, Spanish and Korean editions). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Simon & Schuster, 1995 (Dutch, German, Japanese, Hungarian, French, Portugese, Spanish, Estonian, Chinese, 2 Bulgarian, Croatian and Italian editions); translated into Turkish, ALFA 2011; translated into Russian, 2021. Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, Basic Books, 1996. Part of the Science Masters Series (also editions in French, Italian, Spanish, Portugese, German, Dutch, Finnish, Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian, Hebrew, Turkish, Japanese, Korean, Chinese). Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds, MIT Press and Penguin, 1998. AZ Intencionalitas Filozofiaja, Philosophy of Intentionality, Selected Papers, Osiris Kiado publishers, Budapest, a collection of essays, translated by Csaba Pleh into Hungarian, 1998. Freedom Evolves, Allen Lane Publishers, an imprint of Penguin Books, 2003; excerpt from “A Hearing for Libertarianism: Kane’s Model of Indeterministic Decision- making,” reprinted in Free Will, Critical Concepts in Philosophy, Vol III, Free Will: Liberatarianism, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, ed. J.M. Fischer, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, June 2005, pp. 109-37; translated in Italian and published by Raffaello Cortina Editore (2004); translated in Dutch and published by Uitgeverij Contact, Amsterdam, 2004; translated in Japanese and published by Yamagata Hiroo, 2005; translated in Korean and published by Dongnyok Publishers, 2009. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness, MIT Press, 2005; translated in Italian and published by Raffaello Cortina Editore (2006); translated in Spanish and published by Katz, Buenos Aires, 2006; translated in Polish and published by Prószyński i S-ka, 2007; translated in German and published by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 2007; translated in Japanese and published by NTT, Japan, 2009. Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Viking Press, 2006; translated in Dutch and published by Uitgeverij Contact, Amsterdam, 2006; translated in Finnish and published by Terra Cognita, Helsinki, 2006; translated in Italian and published by Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, 2007; translated in Portugese and published by 3 Editora Globo, 2006; translated in Spanish and published by Katz Editores, Madrid, 2007; translated in Greek, 2007; translated in Polish and published by Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsawa 2008; Persian translation by Amir Maniee 2019. Dove nascono le idée, translated by Francesca Garofoli, Di Renzo Editore, Roma, 2006. Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? Point/Counterpoint Series with Alvin Plantinga; James P. Sterba, Series Editor, Oxford University Press, 2011; translated into Italian by Edizione ETS, Pisa, 2011; translated into Polish, Nauka i religia: Czy mozna je pogodzic, by Copernicus Center Press, 2014; translated into Romanian, Ratio et Revelatio publishers, 2014. Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind, Matthew Hurley, Daniel C. Dennett and Reginald B. Adams, Jr., MIT Press, 2011; translated into Japanese, Kataoka Hirohito, 2015; translated into Arabic, Dar Stoor House, forthcoming in 2021. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, W.W. Norton & Co., NY, 2013; and Penguin Books, UK, 2013; translated into Dutch by Uitgeverij Atlas Contact, Amsterdam, 2014; translated into Italian, Rafaello Cortina Editore, 2014; Polish translation, Copernicus Press, 2020. Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind, with Linda LaScola, Amazon.com 2013. From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds, W.W. Norton & Co., 2017; Italian translation 2018; Chapter 15, "The Age of post-intelligent design," reprinted in The Age of Artificial Intelligence, Steven S. Gouveia, ed., Vernon Press, pp. 27-62, 2020; Portugese translation, Grupo Almedina, 2020; Persian translation by Amir Maniee, 2020. The Four Horsemen: The Discussion That Sparked An Atheist Revolution, with Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens, Penguin Random House, 2019. Just Deserts: Debating Free Will, with Gregg Caruso, Polity, 2021. Articles and Reviews 4 1. "Machine Traces and Protocol Statements," Behavioral Science, 13, 155-61, March 1968. 2. "Geach on Intentional Identity," Journal of Philosophy, LXV, 335-41, May 31, 1968. 3. "Features of Intentional Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIX, 232-44, December 1968. 4. "Intentional Systems," Journal of Philosophy, LXVIII, 87-106, February 25, 1971. German translation, "Intentionale Systeme," in P. Bieri, ed., Analytische Philosophie des Geistes, Heidelberg: Anton Hain 1981. French translation (with a new postscript), "Systemes intentionnels," Philosophie, 1, 55-80, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1984. Spanish translation, "Sistemas intencionales," Cuadernos de Crítica, #40, Department of Philosophy, University of Mexico, 1985. Reprinted in J. Haugeland, ed., Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology Artificial Intelligence, MIT Press, 1981, William Lyons, ed., Modern Philosophy of Mind, Everyman, London, 1995, pp. 191-213, R. Hoy and N. L. Oaklander, eds., Metaphysics: Classic and Contemporary Readings Wadsworth, 1991. 5. "Review of C. O. Evans, The Subject of Consciousness," Philosophical Quarterly, 21, 180-1, April 1971. 6. "Review of J. R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will,"Journal of Philosophy, LXIX, 527-31, September 21, 1972; to be reprinted in Minds, Brains & Computers, R. Cummins & D.D. Cummins, Blackwell Publishers, March 1999. 7. "Mechanism and Responsibility," in T. Honderich, ed., Essays on Freedom of Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973. Spanish translation, "Mecanicismo y responsabilidad," Cuadernos de Crítica, #42, Department of Philosophy, University of Mexico, 1985. Reprinted in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, OUP, 1982; reprinted in B. Wilson, Simply Philosophy, Guided Readings, Edinburgh University Press, 2003, pp. 55-57. 5 8. "Comment on Wilfrid Sellars," Synthese, 27, 439-44, July/August 1974. 9. "Why the Law of Effect Will not Go Away," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 5, 169-87, October 1975. Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, MIT Press, 1990. 10. "Brain Writing and Mind Reading," in K. Gunderson, (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, University of Minnesota Press 1975, pp. 403-416. Reprinted, with postscript in D. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind, Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. 11. "Review of G. Warnock and B. F. Skinner, Behavior Control: Freedom and Morality" (an Open University film), Teaching Philosophy, 1, 175-7, 1975; reprinted on Open University Digital Archive, forthcoming in 2021. 12. "Are Dreams Experiences?" Philosophical Review, LXXXV, 151-71, April 1976. Spanish translation, "Son experiencias los sueños?" Cuadernos de Crítica, #33, Department of Philosophy, University of Mexico, 1984. Reprinted in Charles Dunlop, ed., Philosophical Essays on Dreaming, 1977, Cornell Univ. Press. 13. "Conditions of Personhood," in A. Rorty, (ed.), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press 1976. German translation, "Bedingungen der Personalität," in P. Bieri, (ed.), Analytische Philosophie des Geistes, Heidelberg: Anton Hain 1981, and in L. Siep, ed., Identität der Person, Basel, Stuttgart: Schwabe 1983. Reprinted in M. F. Goodman, ed., What is a Person? Humana, 1988; reprinted in History of Philosophy (Yearbook), transl. by Yulina N.S., Moscow, Russia, 1999, N. 5, pp. 199-223; translated into Russian by N.S.Yulina and reprinted in ГOЛOBOЛOMKИ ПPOБЛЕМЬI COЗНАНИЯ: КОНЦеПЦИЯ ДЭНИеЛа ДЭНИеТа (The “Brainstorms” in Philosophy of Mind: Daniel Dennett and his Critics), Moscow: KAHOH, pp. 447-77. 14. "Critical Notice of J. Fodor, The Language of Thought," (reprinted in Brainstorms as "A Cure for the Common Code"), Mind, LXXXVI, 265-80, April 1977. Reprinted in Ned Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, 2, Harvard Univ. Press, 1981. Reprinted in Problems in Mind: 6 Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, J.S. Crumley II, ed., Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000. 15. "Review of W. Matson, Sentience,"
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