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THE MANAGEMENT of the UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME Volume II - Report of Investigation Programme Background

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THE MANAGEMENT of the UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME Volume II - Report of Investigation Programme Background THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME Volume II - Report of Investigation Programme Background Investigation Preface Programme Background and Manipulation by Iraq Negotiation and Establishment of the Oil-for-Food Programme The Security Council - Response to Surcharges and Kickbacks Smuggling Paul A. Volcker, Chairman Richard J. Goldstone, Member Mark Pieth, Member September 7, 2005 www.iic-offp.org INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME VOLUME II - TABLE OF CONTENTS INVESTIGATION PREFACE........................................................................................ 1 I. THE COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION ........................................................... 1 A. MANDATE ............................................................................................................. 1 B. INVESTIGATIVE APPROACH AND STAFF ................................................................ 2 C. INFORMATION COLLECTED ................................................................................... 3 D. COOPERATION FROM THE UNITED NATIONS AND MEMBER STATES...................... 4 II. REPORT REFERENCES....................................................................................... 8 A. WITNESSES ........................................................................................................... 8 B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ................................................................................... 9 III. ADVERSE NOTICE PROCEDURES................................................................. 10 CHAPTER 1 – PROGRAMME BACKGROUND AND MANIPULATION BY IRAQ...........................................................................................................................11 I. ESTABLISHMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAMME ............... 11 II. THE KEY INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS ............................................................ 16 A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS 661 COMMITTEE............................................. 16 B. THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT.................................................................. 21 C. THE UN-RELATED AGENCIES ............................................................................. 25 III. RULES FOR THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF PROGRAMME CONTRACTS ........................................................................................................ 27 A. OIL SALES........................................................................................................... 27 B. GOODS PURCHASES ............................................................................................ 28 IV. IRAQ’S MANIPULATION OF TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE PROGRAMME...................................................................................................... 29 A. OIL SURCHARGES ............................................................................................... 32 B. HUMANITARIAN CONTRACT KICKBACKS............................................................ 35 CHAPTER 2 – NEGOTIATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME.................................................................................39 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.................................................................. 39 II. EARLY EFFORTS, FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE IRAQ-UN MOU ..................................................................................................... 42 A. UNSCOM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF SANCTIONS .............................................. 42 B. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 706 AND 712................................................ 43 i INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME VOLUME II - TABLE OF CONTENTS C. EARLY ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN 1992 AND 1993 ....................................... 45 D. UNSCOM AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ....................................................... 49 E. PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SANCTIONS FRONT IN 1995 ....................... 50 F. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 986 ................................................................ 51 G. IRAQ’S REJECTION OF RESOLUTION 986 ............................................................. 55 H. THE DEFECTION OF GENERAL HUSSEIN KAMEL ................................................. 58 I. IRAQ RECONSIDERS NEGOTIATIONS UNDER RESOLUTION 986 ........................... 60 J. FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS—A FLEXIBLE APPROACH............................................ 65 K. REACHING A FINAL AGREEMENT ........................................................................ 70 III. BACKCHANNEL DISCUSSIONS...................................................................... 72 A. THE BACKCHANNEL—SAMIR VINCENT AND TONGSUN PARK ............................ 72 B. IRAQ’S PLAN TO BRIBE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL............................................ 82 IV. PAYMENTS FROM IRAQ TO TONGSUN PARK IN 1997 AND THE CONNECTION TO MAURICE STRONG......................................................... 97 A. MAURICE STRONG’S BACKGROUND AND HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS................................................................................................ 98 B. MR. PARK AND MR. STRONG .............................................................................. 99 C. MR. PARK’S DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ AND THE CONNECTION TO MR. STRONG ................................................................................................ 102 D. MR. PARK’S TRAVELS TO IRAQ AND THE PAYMENTS TO MR. STRONG ............. 103 V. ANNEX: CORRESPONDENCE FROM BOUTROS BOUTROS- GHALI AND MAURICE STRONG .................................................................. 113 CHAPTER 3 – THE SECURITY COUNCIL - RESPONSE TO SURCHARGES AND KICKBACKS .......................................................................................................117 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY................................................................ 117 II. RESPONSE TO OIL SURCHARGES............................................................... 121 A. THE EARLY PROBLEMS AND WARNINGS........................................................... 121 B. THE 661 COMMITTEE’S INITIAL DISCOVERY OF AND RESPONSE TO IRAQ’S SURCHARGE POLICY ......................................................................................... 134 C. FAILED EFFORTS TO ADDRESS OIL SURCHARGES ............................................. 140 D. THE ADVENT OF RETROACTIVE PRICING .......................................................... 146 E. THE END OF OIL SURCHARGES ......................................................................... 150 III. RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CONTRACT KICKBACKS ................ 152 A. CONTRACT REVIEW PROCESSES........................................................................ 152 B. RESPONSE TO EARLY ALLEGATIONS OF KICKBACKS ........................................ 157 ii INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME VOLUME II - TABLE OF CONTENTS C. EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO ADDRESS KICKBACKS....................................................................................................... 164 D. HIGH-PRICED CONTRACTS REPORTED BY OIP TO THE 661 COMMITTEE........... 168 E. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE 661 COMMITTEE’S INACTION..................................... 175 F. RECALIBRATION OF CONTRACTS AT THE PROGRAMME’S END.......................... 183 CHAPTER 4 – SMUGGLING......................................................................................185 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY................................................................ 185 II. JORDAN............................................................................................................... 190 A. INITIAL REQUEST FOR RELIEF FROM SANCTIONS .............................................. 190 B. THE 661 COMMITTEE “TAKES NOTE” OF JORDAN’S OIL IMPORTS .................... 194 C. CONTINUED TRADE WITH IRAQ FROM 1991 TO 1994 ........................................ 196 D. REPORTS TO THE 661 COMMITTEE FROM 1991 TO 1994.................................... 198 E. ILLICIT TRADE WITH IRAQ DURING THE PROGRAMME ...................................... 202 F. IMPORTS THROUGH AQABA .............................................................................. 204 G. JORDAN’S LAPSE IN REPORTING AND THE ABSENCE OF RESPONSE BY THE 661 COMMITTEE ................................................................................... 207 H. THE UNCERTAIN LEGAL STATUS OF IRAQ-JORDAN TRADE............................... 211 I. SMUGGLING FROM KHOR AL-AMAYA IN EARLY 2003 ...................................... 213 J. RESPONSE OF JORDAN AND THE UNITED STATES .............................................. 226 III. TURKEY .............................................................................................................. 227 A. REQUEST FOR ARTICLE 50 RELIEF .................................................................... 229 B. CONTINUED TRADE IN 1997 AND 1998 ............................................................. 231 C. RENEWED REQUEST FOR ARTICLE 50 RELIEF ................................................... 232 D. THE FAILED EFFORT TO BRING TRADE BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY UNDER THE PROGRAMME .................................................................................. 233 E. THE ADVENT OF A FORMAL IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER TRADE PROTOCOL........... 235 F. STATEMENTS
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