Arguments for the Existence of

This reading is composed of three parts. The first is an account of the properties traditionally associated with the Judeo-Christian-Islamic conception of God. The second and third are arguments for the from the medieval philosophers, St. and St. .

Part I: The of God

The following is an excerpt from a philosophy text book titled Philosophical Issues: A Brief Introduction, by Daniel Birsch, published in 2003 by McGraw–Hill.

What is God? tries to understand God through the use of reason. For mainstream Christians, however, natural theology rarely works alone, but usually in connection with revealed theology. In revealed theology, people gain knowledge of God through revelation from God. In , the largest source of revelation is the Bible. Religious thinkers use reason to examine the ideas about God that have been revealed. Thus, the philosopher or theologian uses natural theology to examine the ideas presented in revealed theology. By about 1,000 years after Christ, the Christian theologians had developed an idea of God as an infinite, omnipotent, transcendent, omnipresent, omniscient, self-existent, eternal, personal, perfectly good, loving, spiritual, creator with thoughts, plans, emotions, and supreme intelligence. To say that God is infinite, is to say that he has no limits. This means no limits in any sense, temporal, spatial, physical, and so on. It is, of course, difficult if not impossible for finite beings to understand an infinite being. Natural theology has made some progress in this direction, however, and four characteristics related to God’s being infinite will be discussed briefly. One area related to God’s being infinite or without limits is his being all- powerful or omnipotent. According to the Christian thinker Thomas Aquinas, this claim implies that God can do anything that does not involve a contradiction in terms. For example, God cannot create a four-sided triangle because that would involve a contradiction in terms. Most theologians believe, however, that the physical laws of the universe do not bind God. For example, God can reanimate the dead, something that would seem to defy physical laws. Presumably he could also make light travel faster than 186,000 miles per second. Our physical laws would suggest that it would be impossible for light to travel at any other speed than this, but God can create new physical laws. If this is the case, we should not hope to completely understand him. Human beings could have no conception about how new physical laws could be created. The claim that God is all-powerful is a mysterious claim that we cannot really understand. We may think we understand this claim, but it is a difficult notion and has led to many problems. Another of the traditional attributes of God related to his being infinite or unlimited is that he is transcendent, or beyond the physical universe that humans experience. God is not part of the universe since he created it and is not dependent upon it. For some thinkers, God’s transcendence applies not only to space but also to time. God is outside time as well as being outside space. As well as being transcendent, God is also omnipresent, not limited to a particular spatial location, but everywhere at once. Whatever there is and wherever it is located, God is there. This might also be applied to time. In some sense, God is present in all times. We are physical beings with a definite physical and temporal location. It is, of course, difficult for us to really understand how a being could be everywhere at once.

1 One final attribute connected to God’s being infinite is that he is omniscient or all-knowing. God knows everything that it is possible to know. He knows everything that has ever happened anywhere and everything that is happening now. Some thinkers also believe that he knows everything that will happen in the future. God’s omniscience is another one of the mysteries of God. How can a being know everything, especially everything that will happen in the future? Once again it seems difficult for us to really understand this. One property that is not connected with being infinite is the idea that God is self-existent, which means that God is not dependent for his existence or characteristics on anything other than himself. No other being caused God to exist or could cause him to cease existing. He just is. When we claim that God is self-existent, we also mean that his substance is wholly his. The last part of this claim, that his substance is wholly his, means that God is not made of some other stuff, such as energy, matter, atoms, quarks, or strings. He is simply God. Another characteristic that is independent of his infinite is that God is eternal, that is, without a beginning or an ending. God exists now, and has always existed and always will exist. Many theologians have taken this to mean that God is outside all time. What exactly it means to be “outside time” is a difficult matter. We are temporal beings and it is difficult for us to understand a non-temporal being. The next attribute is that God is a personal being, one with whom it is possible to have a relationship. Christianity has made it clear that God is a “he” with a relation to human beings, rather than an “it” with no connection to people. In the Bible, God uses the personal term “father” to describe himself on many occasions. Jesus also uses the image of fatherhood as the most appropriate way to conceive of God. This use of the terms “he” and “father” has created problems for many believers, since it implies to some people that God has a gender. In the Old Testament, we see God having a personal relationship with human beings, such as Abraham. Christians believe that God can be addressed with prayer and that in one way or another God responds to the prayers of human beings. The claim that God is a personal being implies that it is possible to have a relationship or encounter with God. Christians also claim that God is perfectly good or the ultimately moral being. This is a difficult claim, which has produced a great deal of discussion about how to understand it. Does it mean that God is good in relation to some moral standard that is external to him? This would imply that on some presumably objective scale of good and evil, God is as high on the scale as it is possible to go. No being could be better than God, or higher on the scale. It also might mean that God himself is the standard of goodness. He is perfectly good because it is his nature to be perfect good-ness. Either approach produces philosophical problems connected to understanding exactly what is meant by the claim. Related to God’s perfect goodness is the idea that Christians consider God to be a loving being. God’s love for his creatures is unconditional and universal in extent. It is extended to human beings, not because they deserve it but because of the grace of God. Many Christians claim that God’s love springs from his nature, not from a person’s worthiness, and is directed toward the person’s welfare and fulfillment. God is also a spiritual being or a being whose substance is not material substance. In other words, he is spirit, whatever that is, and not matter or energy. We are material beings and cannot really understand what it would mean to be a spiritual being. This is similar to the problem we saw earlier with the nature of the soul. We did not really understand the nature of a spiritual soul, and we also cannot really understand the nature of a spiritual God. This attribute is an essential part of the mysterious nature of God. Finally in the Christian tradition, God is the creator of everything that exists other than himself. He created everything that exists out of nothing. In other words, he brought the universe into existence when there was only himself. This entails a

2 distinction between God and his creation. He is logically distinct from his creation and the creatures that he created. It also implies that the created realm is dependent upon God as its creator and the source of its continued existence. All creatures including human beings exist, not through some natural right, but by the grace of God. The Christian conception of God has been developing over the past 2,000 years. It is the product of both revealed theology and natural theology. Christians see God as the divine creator of the universe, a being perfect in every conceivable way.

Part II: St. Anselm and the

St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) was an Italian Benedictine monk, a medieval philosopher and a church official who held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109. His personal motto was “faith seeking understanding.” Considered the founder of , he is known as the originator of the ontological argument for the existence of God. The following is an excerpt from his book, , in which he presents his famous argument. (Translated by Johnathan Barnes.)

Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to faith, in so far as you know it to be beneficial, grant to me the ability to understand that you are as we believe, and that you are that which we believe. Indeed, we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be imagined. Or is there no such nature? For the fool has said in his heart: God does not exist. But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying, “something than which nothing greater can be imagined,” understands what he hears. And what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding, and another to understand that a thing exists. For example, when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his understanding what he has not yet made, but he does not yet understand that it exists. But when he has already painted it, he both has in his understanding what he has already painted and understands that it exists. Therefore even the fool is bound to agree that there is at least in the understanding something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly “that than which a greater cannot be imagined” cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater. Therefore if “that than which a greater cannot be imagined” is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be imagined, both in the understanding and in reality.

Commentary on the argument from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy As Anselm tells us in the preface to the Proslogion, he wanted to find a single argument that would by itself be enough to show that God really exists. That “single argument” is the one above. We owe the curiously unhelpful name “ontological argument” to . (The medievals simply called it “that argument of Anselm's” [argumentum Anselmi].) The proper way to understand Anselm's argument is a matter of dispute, but on the standard reading, Anselm's argument goes like this: God is “that than which nothing greater can be thought”; in other words, he is a being so great, so full of metaphysical oomph, that one cannot so much as conceive of a being who would be greater than God.

3 And yet, as we can read in the Biblical Psalms, “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to convince the fool that he is wrong? Anselm says it is. All we need is the characterization of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” The fool does at least understand that definition. But whatever is understood, exists in the understanding, just as the plan of a painting already exists in the understanding of the painter. So, “that than which nothing greater can be thought” exists in the understanding. But if it exists in the understanding, it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if “that than which nothing greater can be thought” existed only in the understanding, it would be possible to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in reality as well). It follows, then, that if “that than which nothing greater can be thought” existed only in the understanding, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought; and that, obviously, is a contradiction. So that than which nothing greater can be thought must exist in reality, not merely in the understanding. Versions of this argument have been defended and criticized by a succession of philosophers from Anselm's time through the present day. A monk named Gaunilo wrote a “Reply on Behalf of the Fool,” contending that Anselm's argument gave the fool no good reason at all to believe that “that than which nothing greater can be thought” exists in reality. Gaunilo's most famous objection proposes that we consider “that island than which no greater can be thought.” We understand what that expression means, so (following Anselm's reasoning) the greatest conceivable island exists in our understanding. But (again following Anselm's reasoning) that island must exist in reality as well; for if it did not, we could imagine a greater island—namely, one that existed in reality—and the greatest conceivable island would not be the greatest conceivable island after all. Surely, though, it is absurd to suppose that the greatest conceivable island actually exists in reality, so Gaunilo concludes that Anselm's reasoning is fallacious...

Part III: St. Thomas Aquinas and the Five Ways

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was born near Naples, Italy. His father hoped that his son would attain an ecclesiastical position, and for this reason Aquinas was placed in the Benedictine Abbey of Monte. At the age of 14 he entered the University of Naples, but while in that city he became fascinated by the monastic life of the Dominican friars and decided to enter their order. Four years later, in 1245, he entered the University of Paris, where he came under the influence of the prodigious scholar “Albert the Great.” While other theologians looked suspiciously at secular learning, Albert believed that the Christian thinker must master philosophy and science in all their forms. Albert’s particular interest was to make clearly understandable to all of Europe. Unlike Albert, whose knowledge was more encyclopedic than creative, Aquinas adapted Aristotle for his own purposes, and set out to demonstrate a harmony between Aristotle and the Christian faith. Aquinas left a huge written legacy which is all the more remarkable considering his death at the relatively young age of 49. What follows is an excerpt from the textbook, Socrates to Sartre, by Samuel Enoch Stumpf and James Feiser, published in 2007 by McGraw-Hill. (This paragraph is adapted from the same.)

Philosophy and Theology Thomas Aquinas thought and wrote as a Christian theologian. At the same time, he relied heavily upon the philosophy of Aristotle. That he brought together philosophy and theology did not mean that he confused these two disciplines. On the contrary, it was his view that philosophy and theology played complementary roles in our quest for truth. Like his teacher Albert the Great, Aquinas went to great pains to delineate the boundaries between faith and reason, indicating what philosophy and theology respectively could

4 and could not provide. The dominant religious orientation of 13th-century thought concerned the importance of our knowledge of God; Aquinas combined the insights of both philosophy and theology to address this issue. What made the correct knowledge of God so essential was that any basic errors on this subject could affect the direction of a person’s life–directing one either toward or away from God, who is our ultimate end. According to Aquinas, philosophy proceeds from principles discovered by human reason, whereas theology is the rational ordering of principles received from authoritative revelation and held as a matter of faith. Aquinas’s philosophy, then, consists for the most part in that portion of his theology that he considered rationally demonstrable–that is, “natural theology” as philosophers of later centuries used this term. Aquinas saw specific differences between philosophy and theology–between reason and faith. For one thing, philosophy begins with the immediate objects of sense experience and reasons upward to more general conceptions. Eventually, as in Aristotle’s case, we fasten upon the highest principles or first causes of being, ending in the conception of God. Theology, on the other hand, begins with a faith in God and interprets all things as creatures of God. There is here a basic difference in method, since philosophers draw their conclusions from their rational description of the of things. Theologians, by contrast, base their demonstrations upon the authority of revealed knowledge. Again, theology and philosophy do not contradict each other, but not everything that philosophy discusses is significant for a person’s religious end. Theology deals with what people need to know for their salvation, and to ensure this knowledge, it was made available through revelation. Some of the truths of revelation could never be discovered by natural reason [for instance, the details of the creation]. Other elements of revealed truth, though, could be known by reason alone but were revealed to ensure that we indeed become acquainted with such truths. For this reason, there is some overlapping between philosophy and theology. Wherever reason is capable of knowing something, faith, strictly speaking, is unnecessary, and what faith uniquely knows through revelation cannot be known by natural reason alone.

Proofs of God’s Existence Aquinas formulated five proofs or ways of demonstrating the existence of God. The proofs are deceptively short, each being only a paragraph in length. Some important assumptions, though, lay behind their brevity. Most importantly, his approach was the opposite of Anselm’s Ontological Argument. Anselm began his proof with the idea of the greatest conceivable being, from which he inferred the existence of that being. Aquinas, though, said that all knowledge must begin with our experience of sense objects. Instead of beginning with innate ideas of perfection, he rested all five of his proofs upon the ideas derived from ordinary objects that we experience with our senses. The first three of his proofs share a similar strategy, which we can see in his initial argument from motion. Everywhere we look we find things in motion, and see that things do not simply start moving by themselves. A baseball, for example, moves through the air when someone throws it. The entire world of physical motion involves similar causal connections in which one thing imparts motion to another. Thus, object A gets its motion from object B, which in turn gets its motion from object C. Aquinas then asks, how far back can we trace this motion? The Islamic philosopher, , had argued 200 years earlier that it is impossible to trace such causal connections back through time and, ultimately, we must arrive at a first cause, namely, God. Aquinas, though, sees the situation differently. Why, at least in theory, couldn’t this causal sequence trace back through time to infinity, and never have a starting point? Although this may be impossible to conceive, there is nothing logically contradictory about it. Aquinas suggests that we view the causal sequence somewhat differently. Some causal sequences do indeed take place over time, as Avicenna points out, such as when Abraham produces his son Isaac, who later produces his own son Jacob. But in addition to these time-based sequences, there are also simultaneous causal sequences, which do

5 not trace back through time. Imagine, for example, if I hold a stick in my hand and use it to move a stone. According to Aquinas, my hand, the stick, and the stone all move at the same time. Aquinas’s causal proof, then, proceeds like this. We see motion all around us, such as the motion of the winds. At the very moment that the winds are moving, there are larger physical forces at work that create this motion. In medieval science, the motion of the moon is responsible for the motion of the winds. But the moon itself moves because it too is being simultaneously moved by other celestial motions, such as the planets, the sun, and the stars. According to Aquinas, simultaneous causal sequences of motion cannot go on forever, and we must eventually find a first cause of this motion, which “everyone understands to be God.” The second argument, from efficient causes, similarly focuses on sequences of simultaneous events. We experience various kinds of effects, and in every case we assign an efficient cause to each effect. The efficient cause of the statue is the work of the sculptor. If we took away the activity of the sculptor, we would not have the effect, the statue. But there is an order of efficient causes: the hammer strikes the chisel which in turn strikes the marble. Again, we find this simultaneous sequence of efficient causes in the natural world. But it is impossible to have an infinitely long sequence of simultaneous efficient causes, and so we arrive at a first efficient cause. The third argument, from necessary being, considers the fact that all of the objects that we see around us exist only as a matter of possibility. For example, there was a time when this tree did not exist; it exists now, and finally it will go out of existence. According to Aquinas, possible objects do not contain the explanation of their existence within themselves. Instead, a possible object, such as this tree, exists because of some other thing independent of the tree itself. Thus, possible object A relies for its existence on possible object B, which in turn rests on possible object C. Once again, we cannot have a simultaneously long sequences of possible objects. There must be some necessary being–whose existence is explained by itself–which accounts for possible beings. The final two proofs rest on different strategies. Aquinas’s fourth proof is from the degrees of perfection that we see in things. In our experience we find that some things are more and some less good, true, and noble. But these and other ways of comparing things are possible only because things resemble in their different ways something that is the maximum. There must be something that is truest, noblest, and best. Similarly, we can say about things that they have more or less being, or a lower or higher form of being, as when we compare a stone with a rational creature. Thus, there must also be “something which is most being.” Aquinas then argues that the maximum in any genus is the cause of everything in that genus, as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. From this, Aquinas concludes that “there must also be some- thing which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.” Finally, Aquinas constructs a proof for God based on the order that we see in the world. We see things such as parts of the natural world or parts of the human body, which do not possess intelligence but nevertheless behave in an orderly manner. They act in special and predictable ways to achieve certain ends or functions. But things that lack intelligence, such as an ear or a lung, cannot carry out a function unless it is directed by something that does have intelligence. This is just as an arrow is directed by an archer. Aquinas concludes that “some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their ends; and this being we call God.”

Assessment of the Proofs Aquinas’s five proofs are a substantial intellectual achievement and are among the most famous arguments in Western philosophy. Nevertheless, his proofs are only as strong as the assumptions upon which they are based. The first three proofs are especially vulnerable in this regard. Today we would reject the entire notion of “simultaneous causal sequences”; to say that A causes B assumes that A occurs before B in time. Also,

6 science has come a long way since the Middle Ages and there is almost nothing in the system of medieval astronomy that we can relate to today. Thus, we must reject Aquinas’s conception of simultaneous causes tracing up through the heavens. Another problem with the first three proofs is that, even if successful, they do not lead to the idea of a God who is conscious and personal. These are, however, proofs that Aquinas considered philosophical corroborations of the religious notion of God, and we must remember that they were composed in the context of his theological task. In spite of the problems with the first three proofs, his arguments nevertheless advanced beyond Avicenna’s. Also, as philosophers in later centuries refined the causal argument for God, they relied on a modified version of Aquinas’s distinction between causal sequences. The fourth proof is also questionable because of its assumption that fire, for example, is the maximum of heat–a view initially developed by Aristotle. Science today would reject this contention. The final proof–based on natural purposes–is a different case. For centuries following Aquinas, philosophers believed that we could decisively prove God’s existence based on the appearance of natural order in the world. In point of fact, they argued, the world exhibits design, and the most reasonable explanation for this is that a cosmic designer produced the natural design around us. The greatest challenge to this argument occurred during the 19th century with the theory of evolution. Dar- win and other theorists offered an alternative and thorough explanation for the apparent design that we see in the natural world. At minimum, theologians could no longer argue that a cosmic designer was the only possible explanation of design.

The following is an excerpt from Aquinas’ . This his complete presentation of his five proofs for the existence of God, sometimes called the Five Ways. (This version was translated by the Dominican Fathers, taken from the website www.newadvent.org)

I answer that the existence of God can be proved in five ways:

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to

7 infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

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