THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL Introduction ...... 17 A Problem for All Canadians...... 18 National Water Standards ...... 19 The Judicial Inquiry ...... 22 The North Battleford Warning ...... 26 Canada’s Worst Water?...... 28 First Nations Concerns ...... 29 Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions ...... 30 THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL Introduction

August 2001. A year and a few months after to a lack of legally enforceable national the Walkerton tragedy, the commission of standards that would ensure that a fundamen- inquiry led by Mr. Justice Dennis O’Connor tal, cohesive, and effective mechanism would is listening to the final submissions from keep our public water supplies dependable witnesses and lawyers. By the end of the year and safe. the inquiry should have completed its report The lessons learned in the aftermath of the for the Government of Ontario. The tragedy tragedy tell us to heed the lesson of and subsequent public inquiry have ensured Walkerton. But what is the lesson of that Walkerton’s tainted water outbreak has Walkerton? Whom is the public to believe? become one of the highest profile public Ontario government lawyers told the inquiry health cases in the history of Canada, and it that governments can supervise and regulate, has made Canadians very aware that we but that the flawed actions of one individual probably take the safety of our drinking can always place an entire community’s water too much for granted. safety at risk. The Ontario government’s And in April 2001, Canada received severest critics contend that the current another warning. Less than a year after the E. political leadership in Ontario automatically coli outbreak in Walkerton, cryptosporidium, gives priority to “the bottom line” as opposed an intestinal parasite, invaded the municipal to public safety. Some civil servants argued water system in North Battleford, that regulatory agencies spend far more time Saskatchewan. Cryptosporidium is far less reacting to violations than to preventing them deadly than E. coli; nevertheless, it did make in the first place. And many environmental- hundreds of people very ill and forced the ists contend that we, as a society, have entire community to boil their water for three chosen to emphasize treating water sources months. as opposed to protecting them. Is the lesson Boil water orders and advisories are now to be learned a combination of all of these common in Canada. Quebec issued 542 analyses—a Gordian knot that is almost advisories in 2000. In May of 2001, 220 impossible to untie? advisories were in effect in British Columbia; The Walkerton Inquiry is considered to be Newfoundland had more than 250. In the a model of how such an investigation should summer of 2001, boil water orders were be conducted. A full spectrum of experts as issued for 35 of Ontario’s 103 campgrounds. well as the key stakeholders in the issue—the Given this statistical context, the general public and the people of Walkerton tragedy—although perhaps the Walkerton—were consulted. The inquiry’s most dramatic example of a water quality recommendations will likely influence the crisis across Canada—is a clear warning that way Canadians look at one of our most other Walkertons could indeed happen. precious and essential resources. What we Experts point to decaying and archaic infra- learn from the inquiry’s findings may help us structures for treating and delivering water in understand the tangled and tragic series of even our major cities—describing them as events and prevent similar tragedies from time bombs waiting to explode. Others point occurring elsewhere in Canada.

News in Review — 17 — September 2001 THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL A Problem for All Canadians

As the judicial inquiry into the Walkerton E. coli outbreak proceeded, many Canadians began to believe that drinking water quality was a national problem.

The Central Question As a class, discuss why drinking water is one of our fundamental resources.

Watching the Situation Closely While watching this News in Review report, jot down answers to the following questions, and discuss whether they are pivotal in terms of the inquiry. 1. In addition to the North Battleford outbreak, what other incidents during the past year drew attention to water quality problems in Canada? 2. How is it thought cryptosporidium got into the water system in North Battleford? What were the effects of this outbreak? 3. What was the sequence of events that finally led to the boil water order in North Battleford? 4. According to Stan Koebel, what was the standard approach to water treatment and testing by the Walkerton PUC? 5. How does Premier Mike Harris view the role of the Ontario government in the Walkerton outbreak? 6. What is the difference between national water guidelines, which Canada has, and national water standards recommended by the federal Progressive Conservatives? 7. According to the Ontario coroner, what is probably the most important lesson of Walkerton for all Canadians? Vigilance During the inquiry, the coroner suggested that vigilance is of the utmost importance in ensuring safe drinking water. After a second viewing of the video, discuss how the following elements of the report impact on this need. 1. In North Battleford (as in Walkerton), it was an individual doctor who called attention to the likely presence of contamination in the water supply. It took two more weeks before the boil water advisory was given to the community. 2. Workers in North Battleford knew there was a sewage problem, and it was never reported to the appropriate authorities. 3. In Walkerton, Stan Koebel, the man in charge of the water system, faked test results for years and was never called on the carpet by the utility commission, public health department, or environment ministry. 4. While national drinking water guidelines do exist, their enforcement is up to local jurisdictions and varies across the country. Follow-up Discussion What steps do you feel are needed to restore public confidence in the safety of our water system? In small groups, discuss ways in which governments can ensure that those in charge of the water supply are carrying out their duties properly. Make specific recommendations and compare yours with those of other groups.

September 2001 — 18 — News in Review THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL National Water Standards

“Canada is the only major industrial country in the world that doesn’t have legally enforceable drinking water standards.”— Dennis Bueckert, The Toronto Star, May 14, 2001

The safety of drinking water is an issue of great importance to all Canadians, no matter where they live. Media coverage of recent problems across the country has drawn attention to the inconsistencies in regulation and enforcement among the various jurisdictions—mostly provincial—responsible for guaranteeing the safety of our water. A survey in The National Post indicated that as many as 46 per cent of Canadians do not trust the water coming out of the taps in their homes.

Currently, there are only national guidelines, which are developed in meetings twice a year between federal and provincial bureaucrats. Actual regulations, however, remain a provincial responsibility. Only Alberta and Quebec have made it the law that these guidelines must be followed.

In January 2001, the environmental organization Sierra Legal published Waterproof, a report card on the drinking water situation in Canada. Sierra Legal asked each of the provinces a series of questions, and awarded a letter grade based on the responses. Questions included whether testing is required before a water source is approved, whether the province has the legal means to protect the land around water sources, what methods of water treatment were in use, and what public reporting requirements were in effect. The marks awarded were a full range: Alberta, Quebec, and Ontario (the latter after the Walkerton tragedy) received a B. (Ontario before the Walkerton tragedy would have received a D.) Nova Scotia got a B-minus; the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan got a C or C- minus; British Columbia and Newfoundland got a D; Yukon got a D-minus; and Prince Edward Island failed, with an F.

Sierra Legal’s Executive Director, Karen Wristed, joined the call for national standards for drinking water quality, and said that, at a minimum, they should be designed to protect water sources; to ensure the adequate treatment of drinking water; to staff plants with properly trained, certified operators; to guarantee strict monitoring and enforcement of regulations and standards; and to provide for the prompt publication of testing results.

Organizations such as the Federation of Canadian Municipalities have passed resolutions encouraging the development of enforceable universal standards with similar aims. Constitu- tionally, water is a provincial responsibility. But Liberal Senator Jerry Grafstein has introduced a bill to amend the Food and Drug Act to cover water, thus giving the federal government the powers to regulate it. In May, the federal Progressive Conservatives introduced a motion calling for enforceable standards across the country—a motion that passed in the House of Commons. And the federal Departments of Health and of the Environment have begun work on a national water strategy.

News in Review — 19 — September 2001 Federal politicians have said that they must proceed cautiously to avoid treading on provincial rights. Many observers, however, feel that the government is reluctant to act because with federal responsibility will come the need for massive federal funding. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities has estimated that about $16.5-billion needs to be spent on drinking water in Canada over the next 10 years. In 1996, the Canadian Water and Wastewater Asso- ciation estimated that $90-billion would need to be spent by 2002 to bring municipal water systems up to standard.

The federal budget for 2000-2001 commits $2.65-billion for all infrastructure projects over the next five years. Part of the solution to the need for increased funding will likely be a movement toward full-cost pricing for water. At present, Canadian municipal water rates are heavily subsidized, and domestic users are usually charged far less than the cost of produc- tion.

If national drinking water standards do come into effect in Canada, they will likely resemble those in effect in the United States. Legally enforceable standards in the U.S. are, for the most part, more stringent than the Canadian federal guidelines. They require all water suppliers to test regularly for a variety of contaminants, including bacteria, radioactive elements, and toxic chemicals. (Many dangerous substances that the U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act prohibits are not listed in the non-binding Canadian guidelines.) They require suppliers to immediately notify customers if a problem is found, and to recommend a method—such as boiling water— for dealing with the problem. They also require suppliers to issue annual Consumer Confi- dence reports with water bills and in newspapers, detailing the highest and lowest contaminant levels of the year. And, if the suppliers fail to meet their legal requirements, citizens have the right to sue for redress.

Even stringent regulation cannot guarantee perfection. Errors can be made, testing requirements can be ignored, and contaminants can find their way into systems. In 1998, it was estimated that as many as 20 per cent of U.S. water systems, at some point, violated testing requirements. For the most part, however, monitoring has been extremely effective, and the vast majority of systems comply faithfully with regulations.

Discussion 1. Asit Mazmunder, an aquatic ecologist at the University of Victoria, has called for a national agency to develop and enforce standards for ensuring the quality of the sources of drinking water across the country. He feels that the emphasis needs to be on protecting water at the source, before it enters the system, rather than just when it exits the tap. What kinds of regulations would be required for this approach to be effective? How would monitoring at the source differ from monitoring the treatment process?

2. For what reasons might comparing Canada and the United States, in terms of how water standards are enforced nationally, not be a valid comparison? Consider geography, political systems, and population size. Given that the worst statistic mentioned in this resource guide regarding water contamination occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, how does this affect the validity of such a comparison?

September 2001 — 20 — News in Review 3. If each jurisdiction in Canada followed the national guidelines completely, would we therefore have in essence a national water standard? Why might national guidelines as opposed to national enforceable standards be more appropriate for Canada, a country quite different from the United States? In your opinion, are national standards the answer to preventing contamination of drinking water?

4. When assessing the Walkerton legacy which approach should we take? Should we study the universal issue (the standardization of water standards) first and then the specific case studies (Walkerton, North Battleford, Saint John’s), or should we go from the specifics to the general? What are the implications and/or benefits of adopting one mode of thinking or the other?

News in Review — 21 — September 2001 THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL The Judicial Inquiry

“We can accept a tragedy that was unforeseen. I don’t think we can accept the tragedy that was predicted and even choreographed.” — Bruce Davidson, Concerned Walkerton Citizens Group The judicial inquiry that began on October 16, 2000, was divided into three parts. Part 1A, the testimony of greatest immediate interest to the people of Walkerton, was a forensic examination of what had gone wrong and had permitted the deadly strain of E. coli O157:H7 to enter the town’s water system. This breakdown of the system ultimately killed seven people and made another 2300 ill. Part 1B of the inquiry followed with an examination of broader environmental and governmental questions dealing with the quality of drinking water in Ontario. Part 2 is an investigation of solutions. Fifteen studies commissioned by a panel of experts are now being considered. Chaired by Mr. Justice Dennis O’Connor, the inquiry sought to identify responsibility without assigning blame. Witnesses who appeared had Charter of Rights protections. Police could not, generally speaking, use any of the testimony as grounds for laying criminal charges. (They perform their own separate investigations). The inquiry had a prominent media presence. Cable television broadcast the proceedings to Walkerton residents; newspapers and television provided daily coverage on a national scale. And the inquiry maintained a Web site (www.walkertoninquiry.com), where all studies and reports were published. It also made available full transcripts of all proceedings at www.tscript.com. No judicial proceedings could be more open to the public. Part 1A: A Small Town’s Revelations In the words of Kate Harries, who covered the inquiry for The Toronto Star, “ ... the first part of the inquiry ... gave small towns everywhere a bad name with its stunning revelations of local officials’ ignorance, lack of training, shoddy work practices, and wanton disregard of provincial regulations.” She based this observation on some of the following evidence. • Central to this phase of the inquiry was the testimony of Stan Koebel, manager of the Walkerton Public Utilities Commission. Koebel had joined the PUC after grade 11, learned everything he knew “hands-on” and on the job, and regularly had his qualifications automatically upgraded (grandparented), with no additional formal training needed to keep his job. Apologizing to the people of Walkerton, Koebel admitted that his lack of education should never have permitted him to be in charge of the water system. Koebel admitted to years of violation of provincial regulations. These violations included rarely keeping chlorine residual levels at those specified by the ministry (“As long as I saw the distribution system had some chlorine in it, I was content that the water was being chlorinated.”); mislabelling samples submitted for analysis; entering false chlorine readings on well operating sheets; ordering his brother Frank, the PUC foreman, to enter incorrect information on daily operating sheets; and ignoring the lab report that showed coliform and E. coli at inflated levels in the town’s water system—and later concealing this information from health authorities investigating the source of the outbreak.

September 2001 — 22 — News in Review • Frank Koebel, PUC foreman and brother of Stan, admitted to years of falsifying reports on chlorine residual levels: in his words, “guesstimating” the amount of chlorine he was adding to the water system because the scales to measure it were broken. At the same time he said that he did not really believe that additional chlorine was necessary. When the town received reports from labs indicating bacterial problems in the town water, he assumed that the problem was with the containers he used when taking his samples rather than the samples themselves. He regularly took samples from a single source—usually headquarters—rather than from several sources throughout the town, as the Environment Ministry required. On May 24, 2000 (after the outbreak was apparent), on his brother’s orders he “corrected” math errors and missing entries on water records. The inquiry was also told that neither Frank Koebel nor his brother Stan knew that E. coli could kill.

• Nor did the PUC commissioners realize the deadly effects of E. coli. Commis- sioner Richard Field testified that he saw his sole function as watching the bottom line. He admitted to never reading the Ontario Drinking Water Objectives, and claimed no knowledge of E. coli or chlorine residuals. He could not remember reading the 1998 report from the Environment Ministry detailing the severe problems with Walkerton’s water (minutes of a PUC meeting indicated that he had attended a meeting where it was discussed and Stan Koebel assured the commissioners that he was correcting the specified problems). Outgoing PUC chair Jim Kiefer shared Field’s ignorance of E. coli, chlorine residual levels, and the Ontario Drinking Water Objectives. He had never read the Ontario Public Utilities Act, which described his responsibility for supervising Stan Koebel.

• Environment Ministry officers assigned to the Walkerton area testified that they had known there was a potential E. coli problem as far back as 1995, but assumed that Koebel would correct it. Officer John Earl had seen sample contamination reports in July 1999 but did not realize that E. coli could kill and had not contacted the health unit. James Schmidt at the local health unit reported that until water testing was privatized in 1996 he had received weekly reports on water quality in Walkerton. Between September 1996 and the 2000 tragedy he had received one report on an adverse testing result.

• Murray McQuigge, the medical officer of health, testified that he issued a boil water advisory two days before contamination was confirmed, despite Stan Koebel telling him the water was okay. He praised Owen Sound pediatrician Kristen Hallett for first alerting him to the problem.

• Testimony by Andrea Ellis, an epidemiologist with Health Canada, drew attention to fundamental problems with the Walkerton water system. Water from Well 5 was so impure that the outbreak probably would have taken place even if proper chlorination procedures had been followed. But she refused to let the PUC off the hook, arguing that it was surely the PUC’s responsibility to ensure surface water runoff was not impacting on the well.

News in Review — 23 — September 2001 Part 1B: The Story of Walkertons to Come? The second phase of the inquiry (which is concluding, as this material is being written in late August of 2001, with summations by witnesses’ lawyers) explored in considerable depth the changes that had taken place in the Ontario Environment Ministry from 1995 to the Walkerton outbreak in 2000. The period in question covers the last days of the NDP government of Bob Rae and the advent of Mike Harris’s Progressive Conservatives and their “Com- mon Sense Revolution.” Principal findings were as follows: • The inquiry heard testimony that the Environment Ministry was subject to massive cuts during the period: both the NDP and the Tory governments had reduced staff, and many of those declared redundant were front-line inspectors. By the time of the Walkerton tragedy, staff had been cut by more than 50 per cent (from 1995 levels), and the department’s budget cut by 44 per cent. • Ministry employees reported a demoralized and overworked staff that was reluctant to undertake inspections because of the time involved. The ministry was devoting so much time to investigating dumping violations and chemical spills that inspections—and their follow-up reviews—were low priority. By 1997, serious consideration was being given to placing the onus for water quality inspection on the municipalities. Furthermore, there was little understanding of what kinds of violations should have inspection priority. For example, the ministry took no action when Koebel failed to keep his promises to meet regulations. • Some officers described a “cultural shift” away from imposing orders and laying charges toward seeking voluntary compliance. Phil Bye, the ministry supervisor of the area including Walkerton, had noted that the town and eight other municipalities were violating regulations and requested the ministry issue legally enforceable orders. Instead, the ministry issued warnings. In the case of Walkerton, compliance was promised but never happened. (During an inspection blitz throughout Ontario following Walkerton, 341 orders were issued.) • Meanwhile, internal departmental memos were calling attention to problems that might result from massive government cutbacks. In August 1995, for example, Assistant Deputy Minister Sheila Willis wrote that “... this scale of downsizing exposes the government to unprecedented legal and public challenges.” In 1996, The Ontario Ministry of Health warned the Environment Ministry that private labs were not reporting adverse testing results to the medical officers of health. • In 1996, the Environment Ministry developed a “Confidential Business Plan” to prepare for budget cuts; it stated that budget and staff cuts could put public safety at risk. The edited version released to the public did not include these key impacts. On the advice of some civil servants, the government deemed that the risks were manageable. No public consultations took place. • Other ministry employees reported that huge reductions were made in the amount of money spent on technical training for its officers, making it more and more difficult for them to keep up with new developments. For many, the highlights of the inquiry were the appearances by two former environment ministers, Brenda Elliott and Norm Sterling, and by Premier Mike Harris.

September 2001 — 24 — News in Review • Elliott, Environment minister in 1995 and 1996, described her role as only one member of a team that determined what cutbacks to make to the personnel and services of her department. (The other members of the team were her Cabinet colleagues, members of the civil service, and even all the MPPs who voted to pass new legislation). Drastic cuts were necessary, she said, and she was assured that any risks could be managed—although she never received an outline from her staff on how they might be accomplished. Norm Sterling, who until just before his inquiry appearance had never read the Ontario Drinking Water Objectives, took full responsibility for the outcome of any budget cuts under his stewardship. He did testify, however, that senior managers assured him that massive cuts could be managed. Sterling did not ask them how they would do that. • In his testimony, Premier Harris declared himself “accountable to all the people of Ontario.” He also insisted that the government had done nothing wrong: “At no time was any action taken by our government that I believe either jeopardized the health or safety of the people of this province or of Walkerton.” At no time was the government warned that cutbacks would increase health risks: “We weren’t given any advice that any of the reductions of the actual dollar expenditures led to any increase to the risk to health by any ministry, including the environment.” He emphasized that cuts would never have been approved without assurances that risks could be managed.

The Walkerton Inquiry is almost complete. Mr. Justice O’Connor expects to submit his report by the end of 2001. In it he will attempt to explain not only how the E. coli outbreak happened, but why, identifying not only errors of commission but also of omission. His recommendations, one can only hope, will prevent other Walkertons from happening.

Follow-up Activities and Discussion 1. As a member of the general public how would you question the key witnesses at the inquiry whose comments appear above? What questions would you put to Brenda Elliott, Norm Sterling, and Mike Harris in order to challenge their state- ments and their positions? Why is this form of questioning appropriate and necessary in a public inquiry?

2. How would key political figures prepare for an appearance before an inquiry such as this? Who would advise them? What is at stake for them in such an inquiry?

3. An editorial presents a point of view. During the Walkerton Inquiry many editorials were written following the testimonies. Find at least two editorials that, in your opinion, go beyond a factual reporting of the inquiry and give the general public a specific point of view of these events. Present the editorial to the class, define the position taken by the editorialist, and suggest how it challenges the reader and the general public.

4. In your opinion, at what point and in what way should an assessment of fault or blame be attributed following the Walkerton disaster? Who should be held accountable for the deaths and illnesses that occurred in Walkerton? How should such accountability be determined?

News in Review — 25 — September 2001 THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL The North Battleford Warning

It was less than a year after the Walkerton tragedy. On April 27, 2001, a “Precautionary Drinking Water Advisory” from the Battlefords Health District was upgraded to a boil water order for the City of North Battleford. A dangerous parasite called cryptosporidium had been found in the city’s treated water. Over 100 people had already been seen in the hospital emer- gency room for gastrointestinal complaints; many others in the community reported symptoms described as “mild to moderate,” including stomach cramps and diarrhea.

Dr. Geoff Lipsett, a family physician, was the first person to realize that cryptosporidium was the cause of an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness in the community. On April 12, when he phoned a pharmacist on behalf of one of his patients diagnosed with the parasite, he was told that everyone seemed to be buying diarrhea medications. Lipsett promptly phoned the local medical health officer with his concerns. An investigation began on April 16. By April 25 sufficient evidence of a widespread problem existed for the authorities to issue their prelimi- nary advisory.

A Dangerous Parasite The microscopic parasite cryptosporidium is found in the feces of both humans and animals. It infects humans when they ingest contaminated water or food, or touch their mouths after handling contaminated objects. The resulting disease is called cryptospoidiosis; its symptoms include diarrhea lasting one or two weeks, abdominal cramps, fatigue, nausea, mild fever, and/or vomiting. The disease was first recognized as a human disease in 1976, but rarely reported before 1982. Those most at risk are people with compromised immune systems— AIDS, cancer, or transplant patients are especially vulnerable. There is no medical cure for the infection. The best treatment for people who are otherwise healthy is to drink plenty of fluids to prevent dehydration.

Cryptosporidium poses a special problem in drinking water. It exists in most lakes, rivers, and streams. Communities that receive their drinking water supplies from such sources (surface sources) are especially vulnerable. The parasite is extremely resistant to chlorination. In fact, it lives for days in well-chlorinated swimming pools, which are regularly cited as a source of outbreaks of the disease. Special filtration is required to remove it from water supplies. If a community’s drinking water comes from a surface source and is located downstream from a sewage treatment plant or farm runoff, there is increased risk of contamination.

Cryptosporidium is believed to be responsible for more than half the outbreaks of waterborne illnesses in North America. Some of these have been staggering: 13 000 people in Carrollton, Georgia (1987); 10 000 in Kelowna, British Columbia (1996); and, the biggest of all, 400 000 ill and 100 dead in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (1993).

North Battleford takes its drinking water from a surface source, the North Saskatchewan River. The intake is only two kilometres downstream from the city’s sewage discharge system. The city’s mayor, Wayne Ray, has said that at the time of the water treatment plant’s failure, the sewage treatment plant was working over capacity.

September 2001 — 26 — News in Review The water treatment plant does not regularly test for cryptosporidium (there are no regulations requiring it to do so), but it does have facilities to remove it and other parasites from the town’s drinking water. The plant includes a solid contact unit as part of its filtration system. Here, particles like the parasite are caught and prevented from entering the water supply; instead they clump together with other particles and settle out. The unit was down for routine maintenance on March 19. When it was replaced, it failed to perform to standards, probably until as late as April 17. According to Randy Strelioff, the director of public works for North Battleford, many of the plant’s operators were aware that it could take a considerable amount of time for the unit to begin working properly after it was reinstalled—weeks, rather than hours. It was almost certainly during this period that the parasite entered the water system.

Ultimately, there were 326 confirmed cases in Saskatchewan as a result of this contamination, and another 35 reported from outside the province (victims had drunk water in North Battleford while visiting the city). No deaths are attributed to this outbreak. The boil water order was lifted on July 25.

A judicial inquiry into the North Battleford outbreak will begin in September 2001. The inquiry will look into the role of plant operators and city officials, as well as the province’s responsibility in inspecting the facilities.

Approximately 450 residents of Saskatchewan have filed a lawsuit alleging government negligence.

Discussion 1. Reflecting on the North Battleford tragedy, novelist Sharon Butala has referred to it as one more indication that “our whole idea of what constitutes a safe and adequate water supply has to be rethought.” What aspects of this outbreak, in addition to information presented on the video, would support her view?

2. Compare the apparent causes of the outbreaks of waterborne illness in Walkerton and North Battleford, and the initial responses by officials to the problems. Do they show any similarities? What are the implications of each case study for governments, regulatory bodies, and monitoring systems?

News in Review — 27 — September 2001 THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL Canada’s Worst Water?

On May 28, 2001, the Government of Newfoundland released a report on the quality of the province’s drinking water; a report that it had refused to release for five years. Among the report’s findings were the following: • Newfoundland has a rate of waterborne disease much higher than the national average. • Water quality data for the province are inadequate. • The province spends less on water treatment than any other Canadian jurisdiction. • Thirty-six communities had at least 80 times the allowable level of bacteria. • Many communities have serious problems with trihalomethane (THM), a chemical produced when disinfectant chlorine interacts with naturally occurring organic acids in the water supply. Health Canada says that THM is a contributing factor to at least 15 per cent of bladder cancer cases. • When releasing the report Premier Roger Grimes suggested that it was filled with errors. He also announced plans to invest $50-million over the next three years in water monitoring and new treatment plants. The government also made the case that Newfoundland is fortunate to have more “pristine” water supplies than most of the country, with little chemical pollution or agricultural contamination, and can spend less on protecting supplies.

Meanwhile, over 220 of Newfoundland’s 618 communities with public water supplies are required to boil their water. Newfoundland, with two per cent of Canada’s population, has one-half of the nation’s boil water advisories. There are no water disinfection systems what- ever in 87 of these communities. Many residents of the communities admit to not following the advisories.(It should be noted that many of these advisories are precautionary; only about five per cent were issued because of known contamination of the water source).

Boil water advisories are not limited to small communities. In early August 2001, thousands of residents in the capital, St. John’s, were boiling water because coliform bacteria levels 50 times higher than recommended were found in the treated water taken from one of the city’s sources. This is not the same bacterium (E. coli) that devastated Walkerton in 2000. But it can make one very sick, causing vomiting and diarrhea.

Discussion The Government of Newfoundland, until May, had consistently defended its refusal to release the drinking water quality report by insisting it was a document only for internal government use, one protected by Cabinet confidentiality rules. What role might the Walkerton and North Battleford tragedies have had in changing the government’s mind? How do you react to the statement that these are serious but isolated incidents but not cause for concern for most Canadians?

September 2001 — 28 — News in Review THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL First Nations Concerns

One of the most dramatic reports presented to the Walkerton inquiry came from the Chiefs of Ontario. Their testimony has implications for many areas of Canada.

In the 1990s, Canada assigned responsibility for drinking water quality on reserves to the band councils. This downloading came at a time when the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) determined that, in Ontario alone, 22 per cent of First Nations water treatment facilities were so substandard that they presented an immediate risk to health. Another 44 per cent failed to meet current government standards. According to the Chiefs, underfunding and the lack of regulation continue to contribute to the problems; and the strict new provincial standards do not apply on reserves.

Among the problems cited by the report are the following: • Reserves have inadequate treatment plants for both water and sewage. • Federal health officers who visit reserves can impose boil water advisories, but cannot lay charges or impose work orders. • Few reserves have plants that can kill parasites like cryptosporidium. • There is a shortage of properly trained operators. (There is only one provincially certified First Nation waterworks operator in Ontario.) • Federal funding formulas provide only half the cost of operation and maintenance of facilities.

The Chiefs’ concern was echoed by the Ontario Métis Aboriginal Association, which stated that “Ten thousand people in Northern Ontario drink water that poses a health risk.” The Association listed additional problems, such as a lack of understanding by residents of the need to protect the source of their drinking water; chronic poverty, which makes it impossible to pay for solutions; and the challenge to get water in for testing within 48 hours of a sample being taken. Dr. Hans Peterson, the Executive Director of the Safe Water Drinking Founda- tion, adds that water on reserves is often only tested for minimal requirements, and the standards are unenforceable.

This is not a situation unique to Ontario. A survey conducted in the summer of 2000 by Health Canada found that 12 per cent of Canada’s aboriginal communities “have water systems that pose a health threat.” The federal Ministry of Indian Affairs responded that it has spent more than $1-billion on water systems in aboriginal communities since 1995.

Discussion Many aboriginal leaders who were watching the public outcry following the Walkerton and North Battleford outbreaks expressed concern about their seeming inability to draw attention to their own widespread water problems. Is there any evidence to suggest that there is a heirarchy of the “needy” in Canada in terms of dealing with issues like tainted water supplies? Are aboriginal communities more at risk in this regard? Would rural or small town communities get less government attention than larger urban centres?

News in Review — 29 — September 2001 THE WALKERTON LEGACY: ONGOING VIGIL Discussion, Research, and Essay Questions

1. It is the responsibility of judicial inquiries to make recommendations to governments to deal with specific problems. The Walkerton Inquiry will make recommendations to the Ontario government to help it prevent future contamination of the province’s water supplies. The class will be divided into groups of four or five students. Each group will read the section “The Judicial Inquiry” on page 22 of this resource guide, and, using the information from it and the video, the group will create a list of two or three recommendations it feels are fundamental to ensuring public safety in drinking water. Students are reminded that a major criterion that governments will insist on before their recommendations are imple- mented is that they be cost effective. Each group will compare its list with those of other groups, and the class as a whole will determine a final “top three.” 2. Writing in Maclean’s magazine, novelist Sharon Butala considered the problem of Canada’s decaying water purification infrastructure and wrote: “I think that one answer lies in the reluctance of governments to provide money for projects that lack glamour.” Do you feel that this is a valid statement? If so, can you think of ways to make such projects appear more appealing and pertinent to the public to ensure that the necessary billions of dollars are made available? 3. The Canadian Environmental Defence Fund has recommended to the Walkerton Inquiry that provinces should force water providers to issue “Right to Know” reports to consumers, similar to the Consumer Confidence reports issued in the United States. (See “A Call for National Standards” on page 19 of this resource guide.) What role would these reports play in promoting drinking water safety, and how effective would they be? What information would need to be included to ensure the desired impact? 4. As a result of the Walkerton and North Battleford outbreaks, many people have changed their drinking water habits. Cottagers near Haliburton, Ontario, for example, no longer obtain their drinking water locally from a community spring that was in use for decades. Instead, they carry it from the city or drink bottled water. Has your family changed any of its water habits as a result of the outbreaks? Do you trust the water that comes out of your taps? 5. Not all the undesirable substances that come out of taps in homes or places of business are from the local water system. Some of these, like lead, are usually a result of problems with a building’s plumbing. Some individuals and many insti- tutions check their own water regularly. Check with the caretakers of your school. Is the water tested on a regular basis? If so, for what substances is the water tested? What kinds of reports do they need to file, and with whom? 6. E. coli O157:H7 and cryptosporidium are only two of the top bio-culprits associ- ated with major outbreaks of waterborne disease in North America. Others include Norwalk, shigella, giardia, and toxoplasma. Prepare a report on these four microscopic pests, describing their effects on human beings, and any available treat- ments.

September 2001 — 30 — News in Review

Table of Contents