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Programme 17Th Acm Conference on Economics and Computing 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation PROGRAMME 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTING SUNDAY 24 JULY MONDAY 25 JULY CAREFUL: TIMES ACROSS COLUMNS MAY NOT ALIGN EXACTLY CAREFUL: TIMES ACROSS COLUMNS MAY NOT ALIGN EXACTLY 09:00-10:30 EC-TUT-AGTDS: TUTORIAL ON 09:00-10:3O EC-TUT-GTSOFTWARE1: TUTORIAL 08:30-10:30 EC-AGTDS-MON830: WORKSHOP 09:00-10:3O EC-TUT-ELICML1: TUTORIAL ON ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND ON PRACTICAL GAME THEORY ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ALGO- ELICITATION AND MACHINE DATA SCIENCE (PART 1) COMPUTATION (PART 1) RITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA LEARNING (PART 1) SCIENCE (PART 3) LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 09:00 Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis 09:00 Theodore Turocy Syrgkanis Gambit and SageMath 08:30 Yongdong Liu, Denis Nekipelov and 09:00 Rafael Frongillo and Bo Waggoner Learning good mechanisms Minjung Park Foundations of elicitation Competition and Efficiency in Large 11:00-12:30 EC-TUT-AGTDS: TUTORIAL ON 11:00-12:30 EC-TUT-GTSOFTWARE1: TUTORIAL Markets for Innovation: The Case of ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND ON PRACTICAL GAME THEORY Mobile Applications on iTunes and DATA SCIENCE (PART 2) COMPUTATION (PART 2) Google Play LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 09:00 Noam Nisan and Gali Noti An Experimental Evaluation of 11:00 Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis 11:00 Rahul Savani Regret-Based Econometrics Syrgkanis Game Theory Explorer Econometric theory 09:30 Matthew Joseph, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron Roth 11:45 Theodore Turocy Fairness in Learning: Classic and Algorithms Contextual Bandits 10:00 Xi Alice Gao, James R. Wright and Kevin 13:30-15:00 EC-AGTDS-SUN1330: WORKSHOP 13:30-15:35 EC-CLOUD-SUN1330: WORKSHOP Leyton-Brown ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ON ECONOMICS OF CLOUD Incentivizing Evaluation via Limited ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY COMPUTING (PART 1) Access to Ground Truth: Peer- AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 1) Prediction Makes Things Worse LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 11:00-12:30 SURPRISE ACT AND NOBEL SESSION 13:30 Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen and 13:30 Noam Nisan Kane Sweeney ERA: A Framework for Economic The Bidder Exclusion Effect Resource Allocation for the Cloud LOCATION > Vrijthof Theater 14:00 Jan Christoph Schlegel 14:15 Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken 14:00-15:30 EC-ADAUC-MON14: WORKSHOP 13:00-14:50 EC-TUT-ELICML2: TUTORIAL Testing Choice Theories Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market ON AD AUCTIONS (PART 1) ON ELICITATION AND MACHINE Strikes Back LEARNING (PART 2) 14:30 Jason Hartline and Samuel Taggart 14:35 Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica and LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 Non-revelation Mechanism Design Brendan Lucier On-Demand or Spot? Selling the 13:00 Rafael Frongillo and Bo Waggoner Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers Connections to machine learning 14:55 Virajith Jalaparti, Ivan Bliznets, 14:00 Various Speakers Srikanth Kandula, Brendan Lucier and Mini-talks Ishai Menache Pretium: Dynamic Pricing and Traffic 14:30 Patrick De Pas Engineering for Timely Inter- Criteo Bidding Strategy Datacenter Transfers 15:15 Felix Fischer, Ian Kash, Peter Key and Junxing Wang Approximately Efficient Cost Sharing via Double Auctions 16:00-17:30 EC-ADAUC-MON16: WORKSHOP 15:00-17:30 EC-TUT-POKER: EC-TUT-PRE- 15:30-17:10 EC-AGTDS-SUN1530: WORKSHOP 16:05-17:30 EC-CLOUD-SUN1330: WORKSHOP ON AD AUCTIONS (PART 2) TUTORIAL ON DICT: TUTORIAL ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ON ECONOMICS OF CLOUD COMPUTER ON DESIGN ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY COMPUTING (PART 2) POKER AND IMPLE- AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 2) MENTATION OF COMBINATORI- LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 AL PREDICTION MARKETS 15:30 Denis Nekipelov Inference and Auction Design in LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.22 A1.23 Online Advertising 15:00 Sam Ganzfried Sébastien Lahaie and Marc Lanctot and Miroslav (organizers) Dudík (organizers) 16:20 Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam- 16:05 Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder and 16:00 Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Lemes, Cohen and Jan Vondrak Alexander Skopalik Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo When are Welfare Guarantees Congestion Games with Mixed Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms with Robust? Objectives Ex-Post IR via Bank Accounts 16:30 Pingzhong Tang and Yulong Zeng: 16:25 John Conley 16:22 Dylan Foster, Zhiyuan Li, Thodoris How to Manipulate Truthful Prior Dynamic Games for Market Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan and Éva Dependent Mechanisms Dominance in the Cloud Tardos 16:40 Harikrishna Narasimhan and David 16:45 Simon Wilkie Fast Convergence of Common C. Parkes: The Price of Privacy in the Cloud, or Learning Algorithms in Games A General Statistical Framework for The Economic Consequences of 16:45 Dominic Coey and Seungwon Jeong Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mr. Snowden Incentive Compatibility of VCG under Mechanisms Miscalibration 16:50 Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and 17:08 Mark Hou, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Peter Stone: Stier-Moses Robust Automated Mechanism Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Design Predictions in Online Markets 17:00 Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and 18:00-20:00 EC-MON18: RECEPTION AND (EC ONLY) Giuseppe Lopomo: POSTERS Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post LOCATION > Vrijthof Museum / Incentive Compatibility Grand Café Maastricht Soiron 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTING TUESDAY 26 JULY WEDNESDAY 27 JULY 09:00-10:30 EC-1A: AUCTION THEORY 09:00-10:3O EC-1B: MATCHING 09:00-10:30 EC-4A: MODELS OF BEHAVIOR AND 09:00-10:3O EC-4B: MARKET ALGORITHMS INTERNET APPLICATIONS LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic 09:00 Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers 09:00 John Dickerson, David Manlove, Ironing in the Dark Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm 09:00 Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Manish 09:00 Vincent Cohen Addad, Alon Eden, and James Trimble Raghavan Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat Position-Indexed Formulations for Planning Problems for Sophisticated The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Kidney Exchange Agents with Present Bias Market Pricing 09:22 Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and 09:22 Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna and Denis Nekipelov Yang Li 09:22 Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan 09:22 Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal A/B Testing of Auctions The Stochastic Matching Problem Lucier and Emmanouil Pountourakis Feldman, Amos Fiat and Stefano with (Very) Few Queries Procrastination with Variable Present Leonardi Bias Lottery Pricing Equilibria 09:45 Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna Karlin 09:45 Ravi Jagadeesan and Elias Koutsoupias Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi- 09:45 Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian and 09:45 Nathaniel Kell and Debmalya The FedEx Problem Linear Labor Market Mohamed Mostagir Panigrahi A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding Online Budgeted Allocation with 10:08 Robert Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner and 10:08 Jan Christoph Schlegel General Budgets Glen Weyl Virtual Demand and Stable Descending Price Optimally Mechanisms 10:12 Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, 10:12 Wang Yajun and Sam Chiu-wai Wong Coordinates Search Maria Kyropoulou and Yiannis Matroid Online Bipartite Matching Tselekounis and Vertex Cover 11:00-12:30 EC-BEST: BEST PAPER AND BEST DISSERTATION AWARD PRESENTATIONS Blockchain Mining Games LOCATION > Greek Aula 11:00-12:30 EC PLENARY SESSION AND KALAI PRIZE 11:00 Piotr Dworczak LOCATION > Lecture Hall Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains 11:00 EC PLENARY TALK 11:30 Kobi Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel Procaccia and Yair Zick Keith Chen Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All? Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform 12:00 Inbal Talgam-Cohen 11:45 KALAI PRIZE TALK SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation Tim Roughgarden Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy 14:00-15:30 EC-2A: MECHANISM DESIGN AND 14:00-15:30 EC-2B: INFORMATION ELICITATION 12:30-14:00 EC BUSINESS MEETING (ALL ARE WELCOME) AUCTION THEORY LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic 14:00-15:30 EC-5A: COMPUTATIONAL 14:00-15:30 EC-5B: ONLINE BEHAVIOR 14:00 Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer 14:00 Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour and GAME THEORY AND SYSTEMS The Revelation Principle for Yossi Azar Mechanism Design with Reporting When Should an Expert Make a LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic Costs Prediction? 14:00 Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm 14:00 Quinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen and 14:22 Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang 14:22 Rachel Cummings, David Pennock and Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Haijun Zhu Optimal Auctions for Negatively Jennifer Wortman Vaughan Bounds in Games The Seasonality Of Paid Search Correlated Items The Possibilities and Limitations of Effectiveness From A Long Running Private Prediction Markets Field Test 14:22 Yannai Gonczarowski and Moshe 14:22 Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko and Steven 14:45 Kyle Woodward 14:45 Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudik, Tennenholtz Tadelis Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Sébastien Lahaie and Sivaraman A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Returns to Consumer Search: Auctions: Equilibrium Existence Balakrishnan Resource Selection Games Evidence from eBay with Private Information Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming 14:45 Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun 14:45 Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich Ko and Chaitanya Swamy and David Rand 15:08 Marek Pycia and Kyle Woodward 15:08 Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael Hardness Results for Signaling in The Good, the Bad, and the Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods Frongillo and David Parkes Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Informed Truthfulness
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