17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

PROGRAMME 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTING

SUNDAY 24 JULY MONDAY 25 JULY

CAREFUL: TIMES ACROSS COLUMNS MAY NOT ALIGN EXACTLY CAREFUL: TIMES ACROSS COLUMNS MAY NOT ALIGN EXACTLY

09:00-10:30 EC-TUT-AGTDS: TUTORIAL ON 09:00-10:3O EC-TUT-GTSOFTWARE1: TUTORIAL 08:30-10:30 EC-AGTDS-MON830: WORKSHOP 09:00-10:3O EC-TUT-ELICML1: TUTORIAL ON ALGORITHMIC AND ON PRACTICAL GAME THEORY ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ALGO- ELICITATION AND MACHINE DATA SCIENCE (PART 1) COMPUTATION (PART 1) RITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA LEARNING (PART 1) SCIENCE (PART 3) LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 09:00 Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis 09:00 Theodore Turocy Syrgkanis Gambit and SageMath 08:30 Yongdong Liu, Denis Nekipelov and 09:00 Rafael Frongillo and Bo Waggoner Learning good mechanisms Minjung Park Foundations of elicitation Competition and Efficiency in Large 11:00-12:30 EC-TUT-AGTDS: TUTORIAL ON 11:00-12:30 EC-TUT-GTSOFTWARE1: TUTORIAL Markets for Innovation: The Case of ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND ON PRACTICAL GAME THEORY Mobile Applications on iTunes and DATA SCIENCE (PART 2) COMPUTATION (PART 2) Google Play LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 09:00 and Gali Noti An Experimental Evaluation of 11:00 Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis 11:00 Rahul Savani Regret-Based Econometrics Syrgkanis Game Theory Explorer Econometric theory 09:30 Matthew Joseph, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron Roth 11:45 Theodore Turocy Fairness in Learning: Classic and Algorithms Contextual Bandits 10:00 Xi Alice Gao, James R. Wright and Kevin 13:30-15:00 EC-AGTDS-SUN1330: WORKSHOP 13:30-15:35 EC-CLOUD-SUN1330: WORKSHOP Leyton-Brown ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ON ECONOMICS OF CLOUD Incentivizing Evaluation via Limited ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY COMPUTING (PART 1) Access to Ground Truth: Peer- AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 1) Prediction Makes Things Worse LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 11:00-12:30 SURPRISE ACT AND NOBEL SESSION 13:30 Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen and 13:30 Noam Nisan Kane Sweeney ERA: A Framework for Economic The Bidder Exclusion Effect Resource Allocation for the Cloud LOCATION > Vrijthof Theater 14:00 Jan Christoph Schlegel 14:15 Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken 14:00-15:30 EC-ADAUC-MON14: WORKSHOP 13:00-14:50 EC-TUT-ELICML2: TUTORIAL Testing Choice Theories Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market ON AD AUCTIONS (PART 1) ON ELICITATION AND MACHINE Strikes Back LEARNING (PART 2) 14:30 Jason Hartline and Samuel Taggart 14:35 Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica and LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 Non-revelation Mechanism Design Brendan Lucier On-Demand or Spot? Selling the 13:00 Rafael Frongillo and Bo Waggoner Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers Connections to machine learning 14:55 Virajith Jalaparti, Ivan Bliznets, 14:00 Various Speakers Srikanth Kandula, Brendan Lucier and Mini-talks Ishai Menache Pretium: Dynamic Pricing and Traffic 14:30 Patrick De Pas Engineering for Timely Inter- Criteo Bidding Strategy Datacenter Transfers 15:15 Felix Fischer, Ian Kash, Peter Key and Junxing Wang Approximately Efficient Cost Sharing via Double Auctions 16:00-17:30 EC-ADAUC-MON16: WORKSHOP 15:00-17:30 EC-TUT-POKER: EC-TUT-PRE- 15:30-17:10 EC-AGTDS-SUN1530: WORKSHOP 16:05-17:30 EC-CLOUD-SUN1330: WORKSHOP ON AD AUCTIONS (PART 2) TUTORIAL ON DICT: TUTORIAL ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ON ECONOMICS OF CLOUD COMPUTER ON DESIGN ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY COMPUTING (PART 2) POKER AND IMPLE- AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 2) MENTATION OF COMBINATORI- LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.23 AL PREDICTION MARKETS 15:30 Denis Nekipelov Inference and Auction Design in LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > A1.22 A1.23 Online Advertising 15:00 Sam Ganzfried Sébastien Lahaie and Marc Lanctot and Miroslav (organizers) Dudík (organizers) 16:20 , Inbal Talgam- 16:05 Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder and 16:00 Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Lemes, Cohen and Jan Vondrak Alexander Skopalik Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo When are Welfare Guarantees Congestion Games with Mixed Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms with Robust? Objectives Ex-Post IR via Bank Accounts 16:30 Pingzhong Tang and Yulong Zeng: 16:25 John Conley 16:22 Dylan Foster, Zhiyuan Li, Thodoris How to Manipulate Truthful Prior Dynamic Games for Market Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan and Éva Dependent Mechanisms Dominance in the Cloud Tardos 16:40 Harikrishna Narasimhan and David 16:45 Simon Wilkie Fast Convergence of Common C. Parkes: The Price of Privacy in the Cloud, or Learning Algorithms in Games A General Statistical Framework for The Economic Consequences of 16:45 Dominic Coey and Seungwon Jeong Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mr. Snowden Incentive Compatibility of VCG under Mechanisms Miscalibration 16:50 Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and 17:08 Mark Hou, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Peter Stone: Stier-Moses Robust Automated Mechanism Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Design Predictions in Online Markets 17:00 Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and 18:00-20:00 EC-MON18: RECEPTION AND (EC ONLY) Giuseppe Lopomo: POSTERS Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post LOCATION > Vrijthof Museum / Incentive Compatibility Grand Café Maastricht Soiron 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTING

TUESDAY 26 JULY WEDNESDAY 27 JULY

09:00-10:30 EC-1A: AUCTION THEORY 09:00-10:3O EC-1B: MATCHING 09:00-10:30 EC-4A: MODELS OF BEHAVIOR AND 09:00-10:3O EC-4B: MARKET ALGORITHMS INTERNET APPLICATIONS LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic 09:00 Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers 09:00 John Dickerson, David Manlove, Ironing in the Dark Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm 09:00 Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Manish 09:00 Vincent Cohen Addad, Alon Eden, and James Trimble Raghavan Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat Position-Indexed Formulations for Planning Problems for Sophisticated The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Kidney Exchange Agents with Present Bias Market Pricing 09:22 Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and 09:22 Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna and Denis Nekipelov Yang Li 09:22 Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan 09:22 Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal A/B Testing of Auctions The Stochastic Matching Problem Lucier and Emmanouil Pountourakis Feldman, Amos Fiat and Stefano with (Very) Few Queries Procrastination with Variable Present Leonardi Bias Lottery Pricing Equilibria 09:45 Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna Karlin 09:45 Ravi Jagadeesan and Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi- 09:45 Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian and 09:45 Nathaniel Kell and Debmalya The FedEx Problem Linear Labor Market Mohamed Mostagir Panigrahi A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding Online Budgeted Allocation with 10:08 Robert Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner and 10:08 Jan Christoph Schlegel General Budgets Glen Weyl Virtual Demand and Stable Descending Price Optimally Mechanisms 10:12 Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, 10:12 Wang Yajun and Sam Chiu-wai Wong Coordinates Search Maria Kyropoulou and Yiannis Matroid Online Bipartite Matching Tselekounis and Vertex Cover 11:00-12:30 EC-BEST: BEST PAPER AND BEST DISSERTATION AWARD PRESENTATIONS Blockchain Mining Games LOCATION > Greek Aula 11:00-12:30 EC PLENARY SESSION AND KALAI PRIZE

11:00 Piotr Dworczak LOCATION > Lecture Hall Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains 11:00 EC PLENARY TALK 11:30 Kobi Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel Procaccia and Yair Zick Keith Chen Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All? Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform

12:00 Inbal Talgam-Cohen 11:45 KALAI PRIZE TALK SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation Tim Roughgarden Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy 14:00-15:30 EC-2A: MECHANISM DESIGN AND 14:00-15:30 EC-2B: INFORMATION ELICITATION 12:30-14:00 EC BUSINESS MEETING (ALL ARE WELCOME) AUCTION THEORY LOCATION > Aula Gothic LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic 14:00-15:30 EC-5A: COMPUTATIONAL 14:00-15:30 EC-5B: ONLINE BEHAVIOR 14:00 Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer 14:00 Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour and GAME THEORY AND SYSTEMS The Revelation Principle for Yossi Azar Mechanism Design with Reporting When Should an Expert Make a LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic Costs Prediction? 14:00 Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm 14:00 Quinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen and 14:22 Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang 14:22 Rachel Cummings, David Pennock and Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Haijun Zhu Optimal Auctions for Negatively Jennifer Wortman Vaughan Bounds in Games The Seasonality Of Paid Search Correlated Items The Possibilities and Limitations of Effectiveness From A Long Running Private Prediction Markets Field Test 14:22 Yannai Gonczarowski and Moshe 14:22 Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko and Steven 14:45 Kyle Woodward 14:45 Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudik, Tennenholtz Tadelis Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Sébastien Lahaie and Sivaraman A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Returns to Consumer Search: Auctions: Equilibrium Existence Balakrishnan Resource Selection Games Evidence from eBay with Private Information Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming 14:45 Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun 14:45 Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich Ko and Chaitanya Swamy and David Rand 15:08 Marek Pycia and Kyle Woodward 15:08 Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael Hardness Results for Signaling in The Good, the Bad, and the Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods Frongillo and David Parkes Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Routing Games Decision-Making can be Predicted Peer Prediction with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types 15:50-17:40 EC-3A: MECHANISM DESIGN AND 15:50-17:40 EC-3B: COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL AUCTION THEORY CHOICE 15:08 Xu Haifeng 15:08 Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin Rao The Mysteries of Security Games and Georgios Zervas LOCATION > LOCATION > Lecture Hall Aula Gothic Understanding Emerging Threats to 15:50 Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, and 15:50 Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Online Advertising Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang Golmb 16:00-17:00 GAMES: MORGENSTERN LECTURE Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric On Voting and Facility Location Thomas Palfrey Auctions with Incomplete Information Trading Votes for Votes - A Decentralized Matching Algorithm 16:12 Itai Ashlagi, Costis Daskalakis and 16:12 Ashish Goel and Lee David LOCATION > Lecture Hall Nima Haghpanah Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Decision-Making: Small Groups and 17:20 - 18.50 EC-6A: REVENUE OPTIMIZATION 17:20 - 18.50 EC-6B: SOCIAL NETWORKS Participation Guarantees the Importance of Triads AND PRICING

16:34 Ian Kash and Rafael Frongillo 16:34 Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic Optimal Auctions with Restricted Hervé Moulin, Ariel Procaccia, Nisarg Allocations Shah and Junxing Wang 17:20 Shuchi Chawla and Benjamin Miller 17:20 Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Grant The Unreasonable Fairness of Mechanism Design for Subadditive Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu Maximum Nash Welfare Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations 16:56 Costis Daskalakis, Christos 16:56 Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas Papadimitriou and Christos Tzamos and Alexandros Voudouris 17:42 Hamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes 17:42 Mehrdad Moharrami, Vijay Does Information Revelation Improve How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh and Subramanian, Mingyan Liu and Marc Revenue? Peer Grading Be? Umar Syed Lelarge Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions Impact of Community Structure on 17:18 Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie 17:18 Antoine Desir, Vineet Goyal and From Learning Algorithms Cascades Morgenstern and Guy Reiner Danny Segev Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Assortment Optimization under a 18:05 Agrawal Shipra, Vashist Avadhanula, 18:05 , Michal Feldman, Yishay Complements Random Swap based Distribution Vineet Goyal and Assaf Zeevi Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe over Permutations Model A Near-Optimal Exploration- Tennenholtz Exploitation Approach for Assortment Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups 18:00-19:00 GAMES: VON NEUMANN LECTURE Selection Sylvain Sorin Asymptotic Value of Dynamic Games 18:28 Tim Roughgarden and Joshua Wang 18:28 Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal and Minimizing Regret with Multiple David Minarsch LOCATION > Lecture Hall Reserves Dynamic Conflict on A Network 19:30-22:30 CONFERENCE DINNER 19:00-01:00 BRIGHTLANDS PARTY - SCIENCE, FOOD, DRINKS AND CULTURE

LOCATION > “D’n Awwe Stiene” Church LOCATION > Muziekgieterij 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTING

THURSDAY 27 JULY FLOORPLANS

09:00-10:30 EC-7A: PRICING, PRIVACY 09:00-10:3O EC-7B: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND ECONOMICS OF AND EQUILIBRIUM A1.23 TS53 SECOND FLOOR INFORMATION COMPUTATION A1.22 LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic 09:00 Maxime Cohen, Georgia Perakis and 09:00 Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Robert Pindyck Seeman Pricing with Limited Knowledge of Computational Extensive-Form Demand Games 09:22 Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, 09:22 Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg and Martin Mallesh Pai and Aaron Roth Hoefer The Strange Case of Privacy in Ascending-Price Algorithms for Equilibrium Models Unknown Markets 09:45 Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, 09:45 Ozan Candogan, Markos Epitropou Vasilis Syrgkanis and Zhiwei Steven Wu and Rakesh Vohra Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Exploration in Bayesian Games Networks: A Network Flow Approach 10:08 Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe and 10:08 Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Ruixin Qiang Piliouras Persuasion with Limited Average Case Performance of Communication Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction 11:00-12:30 EC-8A: TRUST, RECOMMENDATION 11:00-12:30 EC-8B: MARKET DESIGN AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS

LOCATION > Lecture Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic

11:00 Frank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem 11:00 Thayer Morrill G1.01 G1.15A Amin and Michael Wellman Petty Envy When Assigning Objects G1.15B Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks 11:22 Grant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook and 11:22 Avinatan hassidim, Romm Assaf and Fang-Yi Yu Ran I. Shorrer TS53 FIRST FLOOR Sybil Detection Using Latent Network “Strategic” Behavior in a Strategy- Structure proof Environment 11:45 Gal Bahar, Moshe Tennenholtz and 11:45 Maximilien Burq, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Rann Smorodinsky Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi A0.23 Economic Recommendation Systems On Matching and Thickness in A0.24 Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets 12:08 Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken 12:08 Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad and Stefano Battison What Matters in School Choice Clearing Payments in Financial Tie-breakings? How Competition Networks with Credit Default Swaps Guides Design CATERING 13:30 - 14:40 EC-9A: MECHANISM DESIGN 13:30 - 14:40 EC-9B: EFFICIENCY AND PRICING AREA 1 C-1.09 LOCATION > Concert Hall LOCATION > Aula Gothic C-1.07 13:30 Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken 13:30 Richard Cole and Yixin Tao EXHIBITION AREA The Pareto Frontier for Random Large Market Games with Near C-1.05 Mechanisms Optimal Efficiency MENSA 13:52 Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos and 13:52 Jacob Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie C-1.03 Manolis Zampetakis and Matus Telgarsky Mechanism Design with Selective Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Verification Combinatorial Auctions H0.04 14:15 Joosung Lee 14:15 Yiwei Chen and Vivek Farias D0.03 Mechanisms with Referrals: On the Efficacy of Static Prices for AULA PATIO E0.04 VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Revenue Management in the Face of H0.06 Mechanisms Strategic Customers 15:00-16:10 EC-10A: DYNAMIC MECHANISM 15:00-16:10 EC-10B: RESOURCE ALLOCATION DESIGN AND POSITION AND PREFERENCE AUCTIONS REVELATION LOCATION > LOCATION > Lecture Hall Aula Gothic G0.03 15:00 Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David 15:00 Mohammad Hossein Bateni, Yiwei Parkes Chen, Dragos Ciocan and Vahab Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Mirrokni Position Auctions Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace 15:22 Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and 15:22 Nathan Kallus and Madeleine Udell Gabriel Y. Weintraub Revealed Preference at Scale: TS53 GROUND FLOOR Dynamic Mechanism Design with Learning Personalized Preferences Budget Constrained Buyers under from Assortment Choices Limited Commitment LH Lecture Hall LH 15:45 Maxime Cohen, Ilan Lobel and Renato 15:45 Vittorio Bilò and Cosimo Vinci R Registration Desk Paes Leme Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial CATERING Feature-based Dynamic Pricing Congestion Games AREA 3 P Poster Sessions KH AF Ad Fundum 16:15-17:00 EC-TESTOFTIME Craig Tovey and Michael Trick KH Kruithuis SIGecom Test of Time Award Presentation Toilets J. Bartholdi and J. Orlin, Single Transferable Vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8:341–354, 1991. Elevator J. Bartholdi, C. Tovey, M. Trick, How hard is it to control an election?, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16 (8-9), 27–40, 1992. CATERING LOCATION > Lecture Hall TS49 P AREA 2

17:00-19:00 FAREWELL BBQ (EC ONLY) 0.008 TERRACE LOCATION > Mensa 0.009 0.010 AF 0.011 0.012

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