All Along the Watchtower: Linear Defenses and the Introduction of Serfdom in Russia Preliminary and Incomplete Andrea Matranga∗ New Economic School May 15, 2017 Abstract Why did Russia enserf its previously free peasants, just as Western Europe was un- dergoing the opposite transition? Domar argued that Russia's low population density would have resulted in a high equilibrium wage, and therefore created the incentives for the nobility to restrict labor mobility, so as to appropriate the agricultural serfdom. However, while this explains the cross-sectional pattern, it cannot explain why serfdom was not reintroduced in the west after the Black Death. In this paper I propose a new theory, that argues that serfdom was necessary to ensure that the defense cordon against the Tatar slave raids from the south could be effectively manned. In support of my the- ory I demonstrate a geographic association between serfdom and the sequence of linear defenses employed. I also deploy spatial methods to calculate the optimal invasion routes for Tatars, as well as the optimal defense lines to block the raids. I find that modern patterns of development are significantly correlated with calculated defense lines towards the South, where nomadic raids made the cordon defense necessary, but not towards the West, where invaders had extensive logistical tails and could be effectively parried by blocking only the major roads. ∗email: [email protected]. 1 1 Introduction Until approximately 1550, the Russian lands were overwhelmingly farmed by free tenant labor. The Russian peasant did owe rent to his landlord, but he was free to move at any time, and as a result his rent was determined largely by market forces. These freedoms were gradually removed over the course of the following century, so that by 1650 the peasant was bonded to his landowner, and essentially at his complete mercy (Khodarkovsky 2004). This tragic loss of freedom is all the more puzzling given that most of Europe was experiencing the opposite trend, abolishing the worst strictures of feudal societies, and letting the peasants relocate at will. The traditional explanation for the enserfment of the Russian peasant was provided by Domar (1970), who argued that since land was abundant in Russia, free agricultural labor would have resulted in very high equilibrium wages. Landowners therefore had very strong incentives to collude and keep the labor force enserfed. In the West on the other hand, population density was much higher, so that wages were in any case reasonably close to the subsistence limit. Under these conditions, it made no sense to spend a lot of time and effort controlling peasants and restricting their movement, and it was easier and cheaper to simply pay them the fair market wage. The problem with this theory (as Domar himself pointed out), was that it would predict a return to serfdom in Western Europe after the Black Death essentially halved its population, while instead the process of serf enfranchisement continued, indeed in many cases accelerated. Domar therefore proposed that the effect of population density on the conditions of the farming population was fundamentally ambiguous: on the one hand, a lower population density increases the equilibrium wage that agricultural labor would receive if it were free, but on the other it also increased the incentives of the landed class to dramatically restrict their freedom. I propose a new theory which generates unambiguous predictions on which types of societies should adopt serfdom, and which should allow agricultural labor to move as they please. Central to my theory is the fact that the decision of labor to locate in different areas can impose important defense externalities on their fellow citizens. In the Russian case, the primary threat came from Tatar raiders to the south, who would regularly scour the countryside in cavalry raids up to 80,000 men strong (Khodarkovsky 2004). Their primary objective was capturing slaves, which were then mainly sold onwards to 2 the Ottoman empire. Since the raiders had superior mobility and no logistical tail, it was impossible to block these raids by building fortresses on the main lines of communication { the raiders would simply bypass such point defenses. An efficient way to defend against such raids was by adopting a cordon defense (Clausewitz 1873, book 6 chapter 22), which in the Russian case meant building { and manning { a continuous series of ramparts and palisades stretching over 1000 km. The fundamental theory advanced by this paper is that while this system could po- tentially secure an enormous area, it was unfortunately incompatible with the free move- ment of labor. Crucial to the security of this system was its spatial continuity: the Tatars would certainly find any gaps and exploit them, putting in jeopardy the entire population of the state. Inevitably, parts of the defense line would need to cross areas that were less fertile than others, where the marginal productivity at any given popu- lation density would necessarily be lower. If peasants decided to leave for more fertile areas { which paid higher wages { the allocative efficiency of the economy would increase, but a dangerous gap would have been opened in the defenses. For the labor of those peasant was necessary to ensure that the local land owners/soldiers had the means to afford horses and arms, as well as report for duty on the wall for months at a time. A theoretical alternative would have been to let peasants reallocate as they pleased, and then tax them (or the landowners), so as to pay salaries to a dedicated military class. Indeed this was the system towards which nearly every Czar from Peter I onwards tried to laboriously maneuver Russia. But in the 16th century, no European country had the state capacity to efficiently tax a country as agrarian and dispersed as Russia. To support my theory, I first analyze the Russian defense system, and show how the military and productive spheres interacted within the region. Then I draw on records of serfdom from the 19th century to show that the regions with the highest prevalence of serfdom were those that had to support fortification lines. Specifically, areas that were part of the active defense line in the 16th century { when the army was organized along strictly feudal lines { maintained the highest percentage of private serfdom, while areas that were part of the 17th century defense lines { when the army was undergoing a series of centralizing reforms { maintained a very high percentage of state serfs (a more liberal land tenure regime). The possibility exists that the correlation between serfdom and the defense lines may 3 be due to some other underlying variable, which has a causal effect on both. For example, certain areas might be more fertile, making both their defense important, and the use of serfs profitable. To avoid possible endogeneity concerns, I construct a novel measure for the suitability for fortifications, which combines the direction of the main nomadic threat, their most frequent target, and the network of rivers which determined both the best axis of attack, and the cheapest fortification construction costs. I then show that areas that were more suitable for fortifications still have more night lights today. This is because the defense line was punctuated by fortified towns, which then persisted becoming the cities of today. This finding highlights the extent to which the Czar was willing to compromise the economic efficiency { in this case, the placement of towns { to achieve defense goals, and that this particular compromise was only enacted on the southern front, the direction of the nomadic threat. This research improves on the existing literature along several axis. First of all, I introduce a new theory for the introduction of serfdom, that differs from the existing the- ories by assuming that { aside from distributional considerations between social classes { rulers had strong preferences over the actual geographic location of their agricultural labor force, and that these preferences were related to the need to efficiently defend the borders. Essentially, I argue that whenever the free movement of labor would result in a geographic distribution of the population which severely complicates the defense of the state, rulers will have a powerful incentive to limit the mobility of the population, poten- tially by enacting serfdom. Another way of viewing this is by saying that in deciding to move away from low-wage (but strategically important) districts, workers are neglecting the negative security externality that they are imposing on the rest of the population. In this interpretation, accepting a ruler which imposes serfdom is a crude coordination device in the face of an enemy more fearsome than indentured work. I also show how this theory can help understand the differential impact of the intro- duction of gunpowder on serfdom between Eastern and Western Europe. In the West, medieval warfare was cavalry based. While the topography did not require continuous lines of fortifications, defending effectively against such a threat still required some sol- diers, and their retainers and support population, to live in some areas where it was not economically efficient to do so. When artillery was introduced, cavalry armies were robbed of their operational mobility advantage, and in particular reduced their ability 4 to move cross country. Thus, strong fortifications along the main roads were sufficient to create impermeable frontiers, even though the space in between was technically passable. As a result, Western European states concentrated resources in improving their urban centers, and could afford to let the rural population allocate according to productive efficiency. Along Russia's southern border however, the lack of natural obstacles and the proximity of the steppe meant that cavalry remained competitive long after the intro- duction of gunpowder, and the Russian state had to control the disposition of peasants to insure the lines of defense could be manned and supplied.