Universiteit van Amsterdam

Lived Populism: Mainstream Social Media and the

Resurgence of the Far Right in Portugal and Spain

MA Thesis Programme: New Media and Digital Culture

Vânia Raquel Leonardo Ferreira

31 August 2020 Leonardo Ferreira 2

Contents Acknowledgements ...... 3 Abstract ...... 4 Introduction ...... 5 1. Theoretical framework ...... 7 1.1 Populism ...... 7 1.2 Social media and electoral campaigning ...... 11 1.3 Platform vernaculars ...... 13 2. Methodology ...... 15 2.1 Case studies ...... 15 2.1.1 Portugal ...... 15 2.1.2 Spain ...... 17 2.2 Digital methods ...... 19 2.3 Data ...... 21 3. Findings...... 24 3.1 Facebook ...... 24 3.1.1 CH and André Ventura ...... 24 3.1.2 VOX and Santiago Abascal ...... 40 3.2. Twitter ...... 63 3.2.1 CH and André Ventura ...... 63 3.2.2. VOX and Santiago Abascal ...... 74 3.3 Instagram ...... 99 3.3.1 CH ...... 99 3.3.2 VOX and Santiago Abascal ...... 103 3.4 YouTube ...... 113 3.4.1 CH ...... 113 3.4.2 VOX ...... 115 4. Cross-country and cross-platform analysis ...... 118 Conclusion ...... 121 References...... 123

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Acknowledgements

This thesis is the culmination of a special journey, and I want to express my gratitude to all around me who contributed to make it possible, in particular to Bernhard Rieder, for the lively and inspirational supervision of this work; and to my colleagues and friends, especially to Marta. I am most indebted to my family and to my partner, who nourished me with love and encouragement.

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Abstract

Populist right-wing political actors have been succeeding in gaining power, at various levels, in liberal democracies across Europe and beyond. Spain and Portugal stood as the ‘exception’ in Europe until recently, losing this status in 2019 when far right-wing Spanish political party VOX and Portuguese Chega entered the respective national parliaments. Considering this recent change, these cases constitute an opportunity to empirically investigate the interplay between populism and social media, responding to the need for cross-country and cross- platform research. This study investigates VOX and Chega and their leader’s use of four main social media platforms–Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube–and how they succeed, attending to the interplay between populism, as a political style, and the platforms’ vernaculars, resorting to digital methods for the data collection and analysis, within a mixed-methods analytical approach. The findings show that the political actors’ populist performances succeed within an adaptation to the platforms, as populism is lived through the platforms’ vernaculars, showing the influential role of these platforms.

Keywords Populism, social media, far right, digital methods, Portugal, Spain

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Introduction

Populist right-wing political actors have been succeeding in gaining power, at various levels, in liberal democracies across Europe and beyond, such as in Germany, Italy, or Brazil. Like with Trump, social media has been an important channel within their political communication strategy. Portugal and Spain stood as the ‘exception’ in Europe until recently, losing this status in 2019 when far right-wing Spanish political party VOX and Portuguese Chega entered the respective national parliaments. As social media has been conceived as conducive to populism (Gerbaudo), the end of the Iberian ‘exceptionalism’ constitutes an opportunity to empirically investigate the interplay between populism and social media. Although digital campaigns have been extensively studied, comparative studies taking a cross-country and multi-platform approach are still underdeveloped, to some extent owing to access limitations imposed by social media corporations, and to the growing complexity deriving from the platforms’ ever-evolving affordances, complicating the pursuit of comparative studies. However, as political actors do not operate in isolation in the current hybrid media system (Chadwick), this study responds to the need for cross-country and cross- platform research (De Vreese et al.; Engesser, Ernst, et al.; Serrano et al.). Along these lines, this paper investigates VOX and Chega and their leader’s use of four mainstream social media platforms – Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube – and how they succeed, attending to the interplay between populism and the platforms’ vernaculars. The methodological outlook is based on digital methods (Rogers, Digital Methods) following the medium for the collection and analysis of natively digital artefacts, in the case of this study each party and leader’s posts as issued from their public accounts, in the pre- and post-election periods of the latest general election. This allows to find similarities and differences and understand implications in two planes: between party and leader, as the leader is often the focus of discussion about populism, accounting for concerted campaigning endeavours; and between periods, to account for variation before and after securing electoral success. The most engaged-with posts were selected, in which case each platforms’ engagement measures were considered, as provided in the collected data. The content of the posts is analysed within a mixed-methods approach, to trace both populist and platformisation tendencies: in the first case, I take populism as a style of doing politics whose three key elements are the ‘appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’; ‘bad manners’; and crisis, breakdown or threat’ (Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 38, emphasis in original). To trace platformisation tendencies, I focus on identifying the ways in which the parties and the leaders Leonardo Ferreira 6

adapt their messages to the platforms’ vernaculars (Gibbs et al.; Meese et al.). The findings show that the political actors’ populist performances succeed within an adaptation to the platforms, as populism is lived through the platforms’ vernaculars, showing the influential role of these platforms. This paper unfolds as follows: the opening chapter provides the theoretical foundations, addressing populism, social media and electoral campaigning, and platform vernaculars. The second chapter pertains to the methodology: I contextualise the case studies, and the data collection and analysis. The third chapter encompasses the findings, followed by the fourth and last chapter, in which a cross-country and cross-platform analysis and discussion is presented.

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1. Theoretical framework

This chapter includes three sections: the first section pertains to populism and the different approaches in its study, contextualising the approach chosen in this work and previous research on populism and social media; in the second section, social media and electoral campaigning are addressed; and the third section pertains to platform vernaculars, contextualising social media platforms as sociotechnical environments.

1.1 Populism

Figure 1. Google Trends results for the term populism1

Populism has been trending in the past years, especially in relation to the 2016 presidential elections in the U.S., from which Donald Trump arose as the 45th President of the country. Although the media and academia have been increasingly devoting attention to populism, academic research on the phenomenon dates back to the late 1960s, with Ionescu and Gellner pioneering in the identification of populist manifestations across different continents (Ionescu and Gellner). Some historical examples of populism have been identified in the late nineteenth century, with the cases of the People’s Party in the U.S. defending agrarian interests; the Russian revolutionary intellectuals narodniki who, idealising the Russian peasants, advocated

1 Search results from April 27, 2020. Leonardo Ferreira 8

for a political model based on the village commune (Müller 19); or Boulangism, in France, with its nationalist call for plebiscitary republicanism as a counter to the people-estranging parliamentary regime (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 19). Appealing to ‘the people’, the virtuous or disadvantaged, and opposing the establishment were common denominators to these cases. More recent manifestations of populism include the Tea Party social movement in the U.S. (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 11); or the Italian MoVimento Cinque Stelle and the Spanish Podemos, as examples of the evolution from social movements to party politics (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley 289). Populism has been theorised from different perspectives. Weyland defines populism as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exerts power, based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of people (Weyland). Political scientist Cas Mudde conceptualises populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ for its limited range of political concepts, as such being easily combined with other thin or full ideologies such as nationalism (Mudde). Political theorist and philosopher Ernesto Laclau has defined populism as a political logic since ‘the people’ is the subject of the political, a ‘people’ that is not pre- existent but rather discursively constituted against those in power (Laclau). These three approaches to populism – strategic, ideational, and discursive-performative – acknowledge the divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, and recognise the role of the populist leader, with their differences mainly pertaining to whether populism is a binary or gradational phenomenon, and whether it is an attribute or a practice (Moffitt, Populists Without Borders). In this work, I adopt Benjamin Moffitt’s approach to populism as a political style, within the broader discursive-performative approach. In his 2016 book The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation, the author conceptualises populism as a political style, a style of doing politics, whose three key elements are the “appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’; ‘bad manners’; and ‘crisis, breakdown or threat” (Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 38, emphasis in original). Within this perspective, the populist leader appears as both ordinary and extraordinary, in the sense of being part of ‘the people’, whilst simultaneously embodying ‘the people’. In this sense, authenticity, often based on a disregard for appropriateness (‘bad manners’), is important to establish the populist leaders’ distance from the politically correct, rational elites, and thereby their legitimacy. Furthermore, the author sees the performance of crisis as intrinsic to the populist style, in which failure is elevated to crisis and based on the division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’(The Global Rise of Populism 125). Furthermore, in the performance of crisis particular ‘others’ are often targeted as enemies of ‘the people’, such as minorities, immigrants, or asylum seekers (The Leonardo Ferreira 9

Global Rise of Populism 52), beside the polarisation fostered by the dichotomy between ‘the people’ and the ‘elites’. Moffit asserts that populism can manifest across the political spectrum and present tensions between democratic tendencies, in the case of liberal-democratic societies often reacting against the liberal pillar in matters such as the protection of minorities and the safeguard of checks and balances. The author thus notes that considering populism as a political style requires embracing nuanced gradation, in the sense that variations may occur across contexts and over time, particularly along the spectrum that opposes the populist political style to the technocratic political style (The Global Rise of Populism 55). Moffitt also highlights the role of media in the creation, distribution and promotion of the populist performances, taking into account how the populist style aligns with aspects of the media logic such as polarisation, stereotypisation, emotionalisation or intensification (The Global Rise of Populism 82–83), and with social media’s immediacy, antagonistic culture and vernacular modes of expression (The Global Rise of Populism 98). The interplay between populism and media has been researched considering various channels and different approaches. Jagers and Walgrave, approaching populism as a political communication style, empirically studied six Belgian political parties and their broadcasts through a comparative discourse analysis, concluding that the extreme-right party Vlaams Blok exhibited a more populist communication style (Jagers and Walgrave). Cranmer analysed immigration-related speeches of Swiss politicians from parties across the political spectrum, finding variations in the influence of the setting on party populist communication, with right- wing Swiss People’s Party politicians employing a more populist style of communication in a televised talk show than during parliamentary sessions (Cranmer). With the increasing use of social media by politicians, scholars have also conducted empirical research to study populism and social media. Bobba analysed the Italian far right- wing party Lega Nord and its leader Matteo Salvini on Facebook, finding that populism, emotionalisation, and the role of the leader positively affect the ‘likeability’ of a message (Bobba). Larsson conducted a longitudinal study of Swedish elections on Facebook, whose findings uncovered the increasing prominence of Facebook in online political campaigning, and revealed that right-wing political parties achieved higher engagement by providing populistic content in a platform-adapted fashion (Larsson). Ernst, Engesser, and Esser studied Swiss parties on Facebook and Twitter focusing on two dimensions of populism–people- centrism and anti-elitism–finding that parties at both ends of the political spectrum have a greater tendency for populist communication, and that the left-wing parties emphasised an Leonardo Ferreira 10

advocative people-centrism, whilst the right-wing parties tendentially focused on anti-elitism in a more conflictive style (Ernst, Engesser, and Esser). Addressing the need for research adopting a cross-country and cross-platform approach in the study of populism and social media, Engesser et al. focused on five traits of populist ideology–emphasising the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elites, ostracising others, and invoking the ‘heartland’–and applied a qualitative text analysis to Facebook and Twitter posts by politicians from Austria, Switzerland, Italy and the United Kingdom (Engesser, Ernst, et al.). The findings demonstrate political actors’ freedom in articulating and spreading their populist ideology on these platforms, an ideology that nevertheless manifests in a fragmented form, with variations across the political spectrum: whilst left-wing politicians attack the economic elite, attacks to the media elite and ostracism of others are more common among right-wing political actors. Ernst et al. have detected fragmentation as well, in their cross-country and cross- platform research. The authors conducted a semi-automated content analysis of Facebook and Twitter posts by parties across the left-right spectrum from Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and France, whose results have shown that populism is mostly observed at both extremes of the political spectrum, especially on the right; by opposition parties, advocating for the people by attacking and discrediting the political elite; and mostly on Facebook rather than on Twitter, which the authors attribute to Facebook’s higher levels of proximity and reciprocity, less limitations in space for messages, and its non-elitist ethos. (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al.). Lastly, whilst Engesser, Fawzi, et al. identify the interplay between the populist communication logic and online opportunity structures across four dimensions, as shown in figure 2 (Engesser, Fawzi, et al. 1282), Baldwin-Philippi further argues that, beyond the online opportunity structures identified by Engesser, Fawzi, et al., digital media’s materiality is constitutive of populism in that the affordances and practices that exist within the platforms as well as those of the platforms extend the repertoire of practices and influence the performance of populism (Baldwin-Philippi, ‘The Technological Performance of Populism’).

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Figure 2 Interplay of populist communication logic and online opportunity structures

(Source: Engesser, Fawzi, et al. 1282)

Along these lines, in this study it is expected that the studied right-wing political actors adopt the populist style, and that social media facilitates their performance at different levels. The next section focuses on electoral campaigning on social media.

1.2 Social media and electoral campaigning

Figure 3. Number of people using social media platforms worldwide

(Source: Ortiz-Ospina) Leonardo Ferreira 12

Social media has been increasingly reinforcing its place in society. In the political sphere, social media platforms are established as a fundamental channel for political campaigning, especially in electoral moments, with Barack Obama’s 2008 U.S. presidential campaign as a paradigmatic case of successful online campaigning, capitalising on new modes of reaching citizens, attracting attention and channelling participation and support among wider and networked audiences (Baldwin-Philippi, ‘Politics 2.0’). Political actors are able to enter these platforms’ public spaces without facing barriers and at virtually no cost, where professional norms and values of traditional mass media do not apply (Engesser, Ernst, et al. 1110), thereby being able to bypass a possible cordon sanitaire. Reach and persuasion are facilitated by social media’s networked structure, immediacy, ‘closeness’ and participatory ethos, and the imbued seamlessness and intuitive use enable political actors to easily build and run campaigns. With these platforms’ ever-evolving affordances–aiming at retaining, diversifying and growing their user bases, in line with their commercial interests–political actors can benefit from mechanisms that allow for measurement of success, including paid services with more sophisticated analytics and microtargeting opportunities. On the other hand, legitimacy can be achieved through the popularity mechanisms of the ‘social media logic’ (Van Dijck and Poell), materialised in ‘likes’ and ‘views’, that take an active role in creating reality and thus are also performative (Burgess and Green 46). Within the current hybrid media system, these mechanisms are also important to attract traditional media’s attention, particularly important for newcomers who have yet to succeed in the political arena. In this hybrid media system, brought about by the evolution of communication technologies that reshaped media and politics, old and new media co-exist and intermingle, within a constellation of acting forces and shifting power relations (Chadwick). Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign exemplifies this hybridity. Alongside data-driven strategies and Facebook advertising (351), Trump’s caustic and highly engaged-with populist performance on Twitter, fitting the antagonistic culture of social media, secured traditional media’s coverage, altogether contributing to the amplification of his propaganda. Furthermore, traditional media, once the agenda-setting gatekeepers, have also adjusted to Trump’s headline- grabbing behaviour (Karpf), in line with the transformations fostered by digital media, such as the acceleration of news cycles (Chadwick 356) and the intensification of competition in securing the publics’ attention and advertising revenue (Jungherr et al.). On the other hand, Benkler et al. pointed out to a right-wing media network seeking to influence public discourse by disseminating propaganda online, anchored around Breitbart and in cooperation with Leonardo Ferreira 13

traditional media through Fox News (Benkler et al.). Wooley and Howard further address these dynamics in what they define as computational propaganda, ‘the assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data’ (Woolley and Howard 185), involving algorithms, automation and human curation, directed at disseminating deceptive content and at amplifying or repressing political messages, during the presidential election race. Along these lines, as geographies become blurred, international coordination is also facilitated, allowing for operations such as American Trump supporters assisting in amplifying French far-right politician Marine Le Pen’s messages via ‘likes’ and comments (Hendrickson and Galston). Although hybridity is not the focus of this work, it nevertheless is acknowledged that such dynamics are influential, as social media particularly constitutes an opportunity structure to populist political actors aiming at polarising and manipulating public opinion in order to achieve electoral success. In the next section, the vernaculars of these sociotechnical environments are further discussed.

1.3 Platform vernaculars

The sociotechnical and cultural dynamics of social media environments can either enable or constrain participation and visibility, thereby influencing the eb and flow of political activity. The platforms’ vernaculars encompass conventions, grammars and logics constituted by affordances and mediated performances that are co-shaped and that co-evolve through design, appropriation and use (Gibbs et al.; Meese et al.). Activity is organised and curated within a relational dynamics, in which users’ agency is also generative of the system, given the machine learning feedback-loops (Bucher and Helmond 28), thereby integrating a set of forces mutually shaping meaning and modulating behaviour (Cheney-Lippold). Accordingly, platforms ‘encourage’ users to stay (Davis and Chouinard 243, my emphasis). In this vein, part of the vernaculars is also the logic of the platforms’ business models, extending themselves into the web (Helmond) and repurposing and commodifying data, as they operate within multisided market configurations steered by network effects (Nieborg and Poell 4277–78). Along these lines, these corporations assume different roles before other media actors, users, clients, advertisers, and policymakers, shifting from populist appeals to the common citizen, to signalling their potential in connecting and targeting publics (Gillespie, ‘The Politics of “Platforms”’). In this regard, political actors will have to position themselves in face of this logic. Leonardo Ferreira 14

Moreover, platforms’ digital architectures grammatise both production, access and engagement, in that:

[n]etwork structure influences how users identify and connect with political accounts. Functionality governs the rules of media production and diffusion across a platform. Algorithmic filtering determines what content users are exposed to, and datafication provides the means for politicians to target voters outside of their existing subscribers. (Bossetta 475)

Thus, whilst Facebook affords multiple modes of engagement, such as a range of quantifiable and emotionalised buttons and ‘stickers’, Twitter encompasses a more open network structure facilitating content to surface outside one’s follower base; Instagram is tailored to photo and video-sharing; and YouTube’s algorithm filters and ranks search results and recommendation streams, involving parameters such as newness, popularity (views), uploading frequency, engagement, session time, negative feedback, metadata, and subscriber base and notifications, entailing a fine filigree of mutually constitutive agencies (Rieder et al. 65). Furthermore, platform interoperability influences the dissemination of content, and mediators such as the hashtag can be(come) relevant in advancing particular issues and improving searchability. In this sense, political actors ought to account for each platform’s mise-en-scène, particularly:

the technical resources that make it easier to circulate some kinds of content than others, the economic structures that support or restrict circulation, the attributes of a media text that might appeal to a community’s motivation for sharing material, and the social networks that link people through the exchange of meaningful bytes. (Jenkins et al. 4)

Part of the equation are then aspects such as appealing to “affective publics” (Papacharissi); memetic value; the materially productive act of pushing ‘retweet’, even if users do not necessarily share the expectations encapsulated in the post, and replicability affordances (boyd 7) enabling circulation. Moreover, the cultures within each platform invite, facilitate or exacerbate existing tendencies, of which satirical and ambivalent play (Phillips and Milner 50) is an example.

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2. Methodology

In this chapter, an initial section provides the contextualisation of the case studies, which is followed by the data collection and analysis framework. In the third section, a preliminary analysis of the collected data is presented.

2.1 Case studies

2.1.1 Portugal

Chega (henceforth CH) is a Portuguese far right-wing party, officially established in April 2019. Its leader, André Ventura, was elected to the Assembly of the Republic, the 230-member unicameral parliament, in Portugal’s most recent parliamentary election, held in October 2019. CH defines itself as a party focused in the nation, conservative, liberal and personalist (‘Manifesto’). Some of the party’s main programmatic measures pertain to the reduction of the number of members of parliament (MP), abolishment of the role of prime minister, to be accumulated by the president of the republic, and the introduction of life imprisonment for serious crimes and of chemical castration of sexual offenders. In July 2020, CH joined Identity and Democracy, the far-right political group of the European Parliament, of which Salvini’s Lega and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally are part. André Ventura, CH’s only MP, is a Doctor in Law who served as professor in Portuguese universities, worked in law firms, and in public administration as a tax inspector. Moreover, Ventura has also been a consultant with an accounting and tax firm, and a crime and football commentator on traditional media (television, newspaper). Prior to CH, Ventura had been a member of the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD) for several years, the second largest party in Portugal, which he left in 2018 to co-found CH. Ventura held functions as a PSD-elected city councillor, whose 2017 candidacy was marked by his racist discourse against the Romani. Prior to running for the 2019 Portuguese general election, Ventura had run for the 2019 European Parliament election as head of a right-wing coalition, without succeeding. In February 2020 Ventura officially announced his candidacy to the 2021 Portuguese presidential election. The current four-year legislature comprises ten parties in parliament, with the socialist António Costa as Prime Minister, who maintained incumbency, now outside a left-leaning Leonardo Ferreira 16

agreement, but also without achieving an absolute majority. CH is now one of the parties in opposition. Following the 2019 report by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in partnership with ISCTE-IUL University Institute of Lisbon (Newman et al. 102–03), based on a resident population of approximately ten million, internet penetration totalled 78% in Portugal. Television (81%) and online sources (79%, including social media) were the most used to access news, with social media alone securing 57%. In terms of social media and messaging services, the five most used for any purpose were Facebook (77%), YouTube (70%), Facebook Messenger (61%), WhatsApp (47%), and Instagram (40%). In the same year, the National Institute of Statistics reported that 76,2% of the resident population within the 16-74 age group used the internet, with four out of every five internet users participating in social media networks (Instituto Nacional de Estatística - Statistics Portugal). In the ‘Digital 2020: Portugal’ report from Datareportal.com, a website with aggregated information mostly from marketing-related sources, social media penetration was at 69% in January 2020 (Kemp, ‘Digital 2020’). On the same report, considering internet users aged 16 to 64 years old, YouTube appears as the most used (93%), followed by Facebook (86%), Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp (both with 73%), Instagram (68%), Pinterest and Twitter (both with 38%), all of them comprising the top seven sites. Moreover, internet users within the 16-64 age group spent over six hours on the internet, and a little over two hours on social media, both on a daily basis. The percentage of active social media users accessing via mobile was at 97%. Furthermore, research has shown that Portuguese parties and politicians are increasingly active on social media. Political actors tend to privilege Facebook, considering the opportunity to reach a broader electorate; Instagram is also prominent, appealing to a younger electorate; Twitter is less widespread, but is used by politicians and journalists; and WhatsApp has been gaining relevance (Expresso). Indeed, at the time of this analysis, CH had accounts on some of the most prominent platforms in the country, namely Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter, alongside with an official website and the use of messaging service WhatsApp. André Ventura had accounts on all platforms except YouTube, albeit his Instagram account having only been created in January 2020, thus falling out of the scope of this study. Although table 1 does not reflect the period of time around the 2019 general election, it nevertheless offers an overview of both the party and the leader’s (increasing) follower count per platform. Based on this overview, the Leonardo Ferreira 17

prominence of Facebook for both CH and Ventura aligns with the tendencies of the Portuguese political sphere, and with Facebook’s significant use among the citizenry.

Table 1. Follower bases as of 25 March 2020

CH André Ventura Facebook Twitter Instagram YouTube Facebook Twitter Instagram YouTube Nr. of followers/ 101,251 8,557 13,200 45,100 85,018 13,400 4,274 --- subscribers Nr. of 92,010 ------80,725 ------page likes

2.1.2 Spain

VOX was established in December 2013. Santiago Abascal, a Sociology undergraduate, who served as a People’s Party (PP) representative in the Basque regional parliament, left PP to co- found VOX. Shortly after VOX’s foundation, Abascal became the party’s president, in 2014. VOX’s ideology is grounded in nationalism, nativism, authoritarianism and conservatism (Turnbull-Dugarte), and VOX firmly rejects Spain’s current system of devolved regional powers, defending the suppression of regional autonomies and the recentralisation of the Spanish state. In 2019, political instability led to two general elections, derived from the mid-2018 no-confidence vote ousting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (PP) from office, after which Pedro Sánchez (Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE) became premier. In December 2018, VOX had secured its first electoral success at the regional level, winning 12 of the 109 seats in Andalusia’s assembly. In April 2019, VOX entered national parliament, securing 24 seats, integrating the opposition; and in November 2019 that number rose to 52 (and three senators)2, with VOX becoming the third political force, after PSOE and PP. With PSOE falling short of a majority in November 2019, a left-leaning coalition was agreed between Pedro Sánchez and Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, with Sánchez as the President of the Government.

2 The Spanish bicameral parliament, the Cortes Generales, comprises the Senate (upper house) and the Congress of Deputies (lower house, with 350 members). Leonardo Ferreira 18

According to research conducted by the University of Navarra for the aforementioned 2019 Reuters Institute report (Newman et al. 108–09), in Spain internet penetration was at 93%, considering a resident population of approximately 46 million. From the study resulted that online sources (including social media) and television were the most used to access news–80% and 72% respectively–with social media alone achieving 53%. As for social media and messaging services, the most used for any purpose were WhatsApp (78%), Facebook (73%), YouTube (68%), Instagram (38%), Twitter (29%), and Facebook Messenger (27%). The account of Datareportal.com for Spain, in ‘Digital 2020: Spain’, estimated 29 million active social media users (62%) as of January 2020 (Kemp, ‘Digital 2020’). Regarding the most used social media and messaging services for internet users of the 16-64 age group, the top six listed were YouTube (89%), WhatsApp (86%), Facebook (79%), Instagram (65%), Twitter (53%), and Facebook Messenger (46%). Furthermore, the population of internet users aged 16 to 64 spent close to six hours on the internet, and nearly two hours on social media, on a daily basis. The percentage of active social media users accessing via mobile was at 98%. Spanish politicians have been active on social media, especially on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, the latter gaining prominence in recent years among younger generations, being dominated by VOX and in which the party also finds its largest follower base, as of April 2019 (Oelsner). At the time of this analysis, VOX announced on its website to have accounts on some of the most used platforms in Spain–Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube–and also on Flickr, Gab, TikTok and Telegram. Santiago Abascal only linked to his Twitter account from his personal website, although he also has accounts on Facebook and Instagram. Despite not reflecting the situation during the studied pre- and post-electoral periods, table 2 offers an overview of the (increasing) follower bases.

Table 2. Follower bases as of 25 March 2020

VOX Santiago Abascal Facebook Twitter Instagram YouTube Facebook Twitter Instagram YouTube Nr. of followers/ 479,844 395,000 524,000 268,000 316,512 396,000 599,000 --- subscribers Nr. of 395,117 ------260,778 ------page likes

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Indeed, these cases encompass a wealth of similarities and differences that benefit a comparative study. On the one hand, considering the widespread use of social media in both countries, especially in regards to mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, the chosen platforms for this study; the countries’ transition to democracy in the mid-1970s after the end of decades-long dictatorial regimes; the ideological alignment between parties, broadly considered; and both countries’ incumbent left-wing governments at the time of the latest general election, and thereafter. On the other hand, as liberal democracies with differences in terms of systems of government: Spain as a decentralised unitary state within a constitutional monarchy, and Portugal as an unitary semi-presidential republic; and also regarding the longer existence of VOX and its more established presence on social media, as well as its earlier entry in national parliament, in April 2019. It is also worth noting both leaders’ dissidence from the respective mainstream conservative parties, which, therefore, does not position them as outsiders: even though their roles had not been at the national level, they were experienced politicians starting their own right-wing projects.

2.2 Digital methods

The methodological outlook of this paper is based on digital methods, to study society with the web with a focus on natively digital objects (Rogers, Digital Methods). Digital methods are an assemblage of research practices, techniques and tools embedded in online devices, and as such follow and evolve with the medium. In that sense, this research framework asks for the consideration of the instability of online artefacts, particularly in terms of the flow of interactions and the contingencies related to limitations imposed by the platforms in accessing their Application Programming Interface (API) (Rogers, Doing Digital Methods). In the case of social media, research does often rely on APIs, as is the case of this study, therefore this layer of contingency is inherent, as are the epistemological propositions of the software tools for data collection and analysis which build on these APIs (Rieder and Röhle 77). On the other hand, as the collection of data occurred after the periods under scrutiny in this study, the data are taken as a series of ‘snapshots’ to allow to understand these political actors’ use of the considered social media platforms and how they succeed. Several software tools were utilised for data collection and analysis. In the case of Facebook, I resorted to Facepager, an application for automated data retrieval on the web, Leonardo Ferreira 20

specifically the Facebook module via the Graph API version 3.2 (Jünger and Keyling). In regards to Twitter data, I utilised the software Twitter Capture and Analysis Toolset from the Digital Methods Initiative (DMI-TCAT), that repurposes Twitter’s REST API for research (Borra and Rieder). For Instagram, both Instaloader (Graf and Koch-Kramer) and Instagram Scraper (Digital Methods Initiative) were utilised. In regards to YouTube channels, I resorted to the software YouTube Data Tools (Rieder, YouTube Data Tools), which interfaces with YouTube API v3. As only public accounts were scraped, permission has not been formally requested to the considered political actors. The collected metadata corresponded to posts issued by the political actors on the feeds/channels of their public accounts, excluding private messages; and information about users engaging with the posts was not included. On the other hand, as screenshots of the material are provided for illustration, the privacy of citizens depicted/interacting with the posts has been accounted for, which means that some screenshots have been accordingly edited to prevent possible identification (in such occasions an indication is provided). Moreover, other software applications were utilised, when applicable, providing insight into presence and relevance of specific elements: word clouds with hashtags, through the application d3-cloud (Davies); and the software Textanalysis (Rieder, Textanalysis) for emoji, and bigrams, i.e., pairs of words co-occurring frequently. The analytical strategy is based on a mixed-methods approach to the most engaged-with posts for the selected periods: the pre-election period, considered the month leading to the election, including the day of the election itself; and the post-election period, one month after the election. With much attention currently being devoted to populist leaders, in this study both parties and leaders are considered. For the selection of these posts, each platform’s specific engagement measures were taken into account, however acknowledging, on the one hand, that the extent to which the posts have been equally visible cannot be known (Rogers, ‘Digital Methods for Cross-Platform Analysis’ 10); and, on the other hand, the imbued ambiguity in regards to participation, which, nevertheless, is productive,

[a]fter all, the more engagement a story generates, the more likely it is to live on through the circulation and transformation underscoring online interaction; content spreads memetically whether participants share something to signal support, disgust, or anything on the spectrum in between. (Phillips and Milner 54)

Therefore, in the case of Facebook, comments, shares and (aggregated) reactions were taken into account; for Twitter, the count of likes and retweets were considered; in the case of Leonardo Ferreira 21

Instagram, likes and comments were chosen; and for YouTube the count of views was selected. In the latter two cases, specific dissemination metrics (‘shares’) were not considered due to access limitations. In the Findings chapter, further details are provided in each corresponding section. Overall, this strategy allows to find similarities and differences and understand implications in two planes: between party and leader, accounting for concerted campaigning endeavours; and between periods, to account for variation before and after securing electoral success. The content of the most engaged-with posts is analysed to trace both populist and platformisation tendencies: in the first case, I take populism as a style of doing politics whose three key elements are the ‘appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’; ‘bad manners’; and crisis, breakdown or threat’ (Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 38, emphasis in original). To trace platformisation tendencies, I focus on identifying the ways in which the parties and the leaders adapt their messages to the platforms’ vernaculars (Gibbs et al.; Meese et al.). In the next section, the results of the data collection are presented, and a preliminary analysis is provided.

2.3 Data

Table 3. Total number of collected posts per actor and per platform

Actors CH André VOX Santiago Ventura Abascal Period 06/09/2019 - 06/11/2019 10/10/2019 - 10/12/2019 (dd/mm/yyyy) (general election: 6 October 2019) (general election: 10 November 2019) Facebook Nr. of 206 125 118 203 Twitter collected 152 22 1,780 851 Instagram posts 161 ---3 141 133 YouTube 13 ---4 104 ---5

3 André Ventura started posting on Instagram in late January 2020, therefore his Instagram activity has not been considered since it falls out of the timeframe set for this study. 4 At the time of the data collection, André Ventura had no YouTube channel. 5 At the time of the data collection, Santiago Abascal had no YouTube channel. Leonardo Ferreira 22

Facebook was the privileged platform in the Portuguese case, and in the Spanish case, this was the only platform where the leader surpassed the party in regards to frequency. Conversely, CH posted more than Ventura, possibly taking into account the party’s somewhat more favourable ‘traction’, considering that its accounts were created earlier. Twitter was, by far, the most used platform by VOX and Abascal. In the case of VOX, it is necessary to clarify that the collected data corresponding to the pre-election period revealed a gap of sixteen days (the earliest post dates back to 26 October 2019, not to October 10th), suggesting a block (at the occasion of data collection, it was detected that VOX’s account had already been blocked by Twitter) and/or extraordinary circumstances limiting data capture. Along these lines, and considering Ventura’s less prominent social media presence and CH’s low engagement with YouTube, the data anticipate a less consistent social media strategy than in the Spanish case. Tables 4 and 5, below, provide more details in regards to the different periods. Overall, the data anticipate a prioritisation of the pre-election period, except for Ventura’s slightly higher posting activity in the post-election period, on par with CH’s activity on YouTube.

Table 4. Number of posts per actor and per platform, before and after the election | CH and André Ventura

Actors CH André CH André Ventura Ventura Period Pre-election: 06/09/2019 - Post-election: 07/10/2019 - (dd/mm/yyyy) 06/10/2019 06/11/2019 Facebook Nr. of 155 51 51 74 Twitter collected 89 6 63 16 Instagram posts 112 --- 49 --- YouTube 1 --- 12 ---

Leonardo Ferreira 23

Table 5. Number of posts per actor and per platform, before and after the election | VOX and Santiago Abascal

Actors VOX Santiago VOX Santiago Abascal Abascal Period Pre-election: 10/10/2019 - Post-election: 11/11/2019 - (dd/mm/yyyy) 10/11/2019 10/12/2019 Facebook Nr. of 67 159 51 44 Twitter collected 931 619 849 232 Instagram posts 103 105 38 28 YouTube 85 --- 19 ---

Leonardo Ferreira 24

3. Findings

This chapter is organized in four sections addressing each platform, with subsections corresponding to each actor, in the pre- and post-election period.

3.1 Facebook

3.1.1 CH and André Ventura

3.1.1.1 CH – Pre-election

According to Facebook’s page transparency feature (as of 27 February 2020), CH created its Facebook page in October 2018, thus before it was officially established (April 2019), which suggests an effort in initiating early mobilisation of support via Facebook. Moreover, according to the information provided, this page had not run ads. In the pre-election period, CH issued five posts per day, on average. From the total 155 posts, 27 were selected, which fulfilled at least one of the following conditions (minimum): 100 comments, 150 shares, or 500 reactions. Table 6 shows that the party privileged photo- type posts in the pre-election period, and that the majority of the most engaged-with posts included videos.

Table 6. Collected posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole the selected data set posts Link 22 5 Photo 100 9 Status 2 1 Video 31 12 Grand Total 155 27

Some of the selected posts included hashtags, although these were not abundant. The hashtags referred mainly to the party’s motto/name (#CHEGA, i.e. ENOUGH; #PartidoCHEGA), although a hashtag praising Ventura was also found (#VenturaBEM), Leonardo Ferreira 25

connected to Ventura’s participation in a televised debate. Another hashtag was used to antagonise the left and their ‘gender ideology’ (#deixemascriançasempaz, i.e., leave the kids alone), accompanying a video in which a writer and grandmother endorses CH for standing against such ideology. This finding echoes Brazilian Jair Bolsonaro’s populist attacks to the left with his commitment to “combat gender ideology” (Phillips). Other attacks within the populist ‘us versus them’ performance were found, in posts targeting left-wing parties with parliamentary seat, namely PAN – People, Animals and Nature, and the Left Block. CH made use of proverbial, and emphasised their incompetence, and their ‘cuteness’ disguising ‘dangerous’ proposals favouring the criminals. One of the posts included a shared article from a partisan news website for a reputational attack, echoing the ‘network propaganda’ during Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign (Benkler et al.). A further example of hybridity is shown in figure 3, with CH sharing a piece of news to attack the leftist candidate Joacine (party Livre), reacting to her comparison between Ventura and Bolsonaro, as published in a radio news station’s website two days before the election.

Figure 3. ‘Us versus them’

Source: https://www.facebook.com/1989920374407828/posts/2564665396933320/; October 4, 2019

Caption: ‘You can yell and say what you want in these last hours of campaigning. The Portuguese people woke up and already decided to give CHEGA the strength it needs to the and the [sic] the new voice of change in the Parliament.’ / Headline: ‘Joacine Katar Moreira compares André Ventura to Bolsonaro’ Leonardo Ferreira 26

The other posts with links also related to news, serving the performance of crisis; and victory construction through polls, with CH praising the expected election of Ventura, again appealing to ‘change’, a post also found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. One of the photo-type posts (figure 4) included images related to the party’s electoral programme, each image depicting the leader and encapsulating one proposal, within a ‘proposal-in-image’ technique, inserted in an album comprising 50 of CH’s ‘70 measures to reinvigorate Portugal’. In this post’s caption there was also a link to the third-party service Linktree6, a launchpad to external online content, through which the user could get redirected to CH’s website, to a Google form as a sign-up to join the party, or to CH’s YouTube channel. This finding is suggestive of platformisation tendencies, on the one hand, for the proposal-in- image technique and its potential for dissemination, within an attempted simplification of the content of the proposals; on the other hand, in terms of cross-fertilisation, considering a possible intention in leveraging views and subscriptions on YouTube, and in prompting mobilisation. The use of Linktree was observed in a second post (figure 5), as well as among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts.

Figure 4. Electoral programme

Source: https://www.facebook.com/1989920374407828/posts/2552063354860191/; September 28, 2019

6 https://linktr.ee/s/about. Accessed on May 1, 2020. Leonardo Ferreira 27

Another finding denoting platformisation tendencies is the adoption of livestreaming. Indeed, five of the videos in this selection related to this practice. Four were amateurish mobile- broadcast livestreams: two as commemoration of the election results; and two with Ventura talking to the press whilst campaigning on the streets of downtown Lisbon. In the latter case, Ventura addressed issues of political corruption, and the insecurity of ‘the people’ due to criminality (drug- and rape-related), evoking statistical data about the Romani in jail, whilst also criticising ‘political correctness’, himself adopting an ‘unfiltered’ style and an anti-system position. This populist performance of crisis is much in line with Trump’s style, taking the example of Trump framing Obama and Clinton’s political correctness as dangerous to the safety of the ordinary Americans (Weigel). The livestreaming affordance, rolled out early in 2016, allows users to engage live with the event, reacting (e.g., clicking ‘like’, ‘love’, ‘angry’) and commenting. Cervi has studied this genre through its use by the Italian far-right politician Salvini, highlighting the importance of real-time connections for both the creators and the audience (Cervi 101). Larsson has also found this practice in his study of Swedish parties’ Facebook viral posts during elections, with parties often encouraging followers to engage (Larsson). CH did not appeal to participation in these four posts, nevertheless this finding is indicative of the synergy between the populist style and the platform’s vernaculars as the party was able to establish a direct and ‘authentic’ relationship with the followers, paramount for the populist performance. The fifth Facebook live referred to the livestream of a major televised electoral debate broadcast by the Portuguese public service RTP, including most of the 21 candidates to the general election, and in which Ventura took part. CH edited the Facebook live adding its branding and hashtags, and, in this case, did appeal to platform-based participation asking followers to share with their friends, thereby both giving a sense of proximity and attempting at driving engagement with the debate, an influential moment for voting decisions. Other calls to action were observed in this selection within different approaches. The following example reveals a different tone and format to motivate engagement: CH asked for the diffusion of the ‘truth’ about the party and Ventura in a post including an amateur video in which Ventura appeared talking in an informal setting, in the occasion of an electoral campaign activity, himself adopting a ‘mundane’ posture. In this ‘lengthy’ video (18’31’’), Ventura emphasised stigmatisation of CH; and also the failure of the system based on ‘scandalous’ taxation without return, the (moral) corruption of the political elites across the political spectrum, and crime, instilling fear, also by ostracising the Romani. The ostracism of others aligns with previous research for right-wing populists (Engesser, Ernst, et al. 1122). Leonardo Ferreira 28

Another call to action was posted on the last day of electoral campaigning, a long statement in which the party encouraged supporters to cast their ballot, and to take their family and friends, denoting populist tendencies within the division ‘us versus them’, inciting resentment focusing on the system’s support of ‘miscreants’, promotion of ‘cultural invasion’ and privilege of politicians and their families and friends, instead of ‘our own who have nothing after decades of hard work’. Moreover, the post also included an emotional appeal to ‘the people’–‘Don’t forget that we are a FAMILY!’. The appeal to the people was further observed in a different format: in a post containing a ‘Vox pop’ video with a message from an elder citizen showing support for CH. CH’s performance of crisis is well illustrated in a ‘status update’ in which the party instrumentalised an aggression to a police officer that had happened the day before, announcing the suspension of its electoral campaigning activity for that day to ‘draw attention to the escalating problem’, and the ‘shameful’ conduct of ‘the government and other political forces’, a post that was also found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. Figure 5 also illustrates the performance of crisis accompanied by a memetic image, with the party conveying a sense of material threat, framing past and present socialist leadership as responsible for economic downfall, a finding that is in line with Trump’s populist rhetoric based on emphasising grievances and on giving a prospect of future defeat (Homolar and Scholz). This post was also found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. The ballot card frame is part of the party’s style, having been found in other platforms as well. Figure 6 shows a variation of the ballot card frame, in this case referencing CH’s social media and messaging channels, in a post focusing on media censorship and media manipulation (television) by the ‘SOCIALIST STATE’, highlighting an active role of the government in exerting censorship and control via nepotism and cronyism.

Leonardo Ferreira 29

Figure 5. Performance of crisis

Source: https://www.facebook.com/1989920374407828/posts/2543882919011568/; September 24, 2019 Caption: ‘Knowing about the past is a way for us to understand the present and to prepare ourselves for the future, we don’t forget! ENOUGH! [hashtag] Check the full programme at [linktree; hashtag]’. Text in image: ‘We all know how this journey is going to end. On the 6th don’t forget about this. Vote CHEGA!’ / Mileposts: bankruptcy, recession, ‘do you understand how this is going to end?’)

Figure 6. Ballot card frame

Source: https://www.facebook.com/1989920374407828/posts/2529674640432396/; September 17, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 30

Whereas the most reacted-to post included a picture of Ventura and the team during the celebration of the election results (3,104 reactions, mainly like and love), the post that peaked in terms of comments (1,271) and shares (7,603) included a 18-second video which was an excerpt of a news piece. This video showed the Prime Minister António Costa engaging in verbal confrontation with a citizen, a situation that CH exacerbates in the post, equating the Prime Minister to ‘SOCIALIST DICTATORS’. According to a report on online disinformation by MediaLab ISCTE-IUL and Democracy Reporting International (Cardoso et al.), the false story to which this post relates first appeared in a Facebook post in October 2017, a few months after its appearance on traditional and digital news outlets. Nevertheless, the false story only became viral on Facebook in the summer of 2019, further spreading to Twitter. When in October 2019, during electoral campaigning, a citizen approached the Prime Minister making a claim based on the false story, to which the Prime Minister reacted abruptly, it made headlines, being further (re)circulated on social media. This finding thus denotes the entanglement between different forces within the hybrid media system and party propaganda, in which social media affordances play an important role. Lastly, only two posts featured other CH members, with posts focusing on Ventura being frequent. The post in figure 7, related to Ventura’s participation in a fact-checking programme on television, shows a different presentation of the leader compared to his image on the proposal-in-image material.

Figure 7. Praising the leader

Source: https://www.facebook.com/1989920374407828/posts/2544588448941015/; September 25, 2019 Caption: ‘Today it became clear that André Ventura is more than able to fill the position he proposes. / I VOTE CHEGA!’ Leonardo Ferreira 31

3.1.1.2 CH – Post-election

In the post-election period, the party decreased its posting activity by circa two thirds, posting less than two posts per day, on average, which suggests that the party privileged Facebook as an arena for electoral campaigning. For the analysis of the post-election period, 16 posts were selected out of the total 51. These fulfilled at least one of the following conditions (minimum): 200 comments, 500 shares, or 2,000 reactions. Table 7 shows that, in the post-election period, the party posted more link-type posts rather than photo-type posts. In the post-election period, hashtags were also utilised by CH, although not abundantly, all corresponding to the party’s motto/name.

Table 7. Collected post-election posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 23 7 Photo 14 2 Status 1 0 Video 13 7 Grand Total 51 16

Posts about the beginning of functions were found in this selection, for example with CH embedding a video edited from a piece from a news and opinion magazine about Ventura and his team’s first day, highlighting the support received from the Portuguese and Ventura’s commitment in ‘bringing hope and change’, but also with Ventura mentioning an ‘aura of hostility’, a post that was also found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. Indeed, posts addressing stigma and controversy emerged. CH shared a piece from an online-born news outlet reporting on a Facebook post by Ventura in which CH’s leader ‘exposed’ the newly-elected MP Joacine (Livre) for not greeting him after being together at a televised debate in the aftermath of the election. Two other posts included attacks to MP Joacine: CH shared pieces from newspapers’ websites covering a march against racism and in support of MP Joacine, which CH labelled as ‘THE MARCH OF HATE!’, ridiculing it and considering it an insult to ‘the Portuguese’, within a performance of ‘us versus them’, othering MP Joacine and her supporters, and further minorities ‘that do not abide by the Portuguese culture’, and illegal immigrants ‘financed by the Portuguese’s taxes’. Leonardo Ferreira 32

The polarising populist performance was further observed with the appeal ‘the Portuguese have already realised who is on their side’, based on stigmatisation against Ventura and the party, in this case from the right-wing People’s Party (CDS-PP) regarding the controversial attribution of a seat to Ventura at the parliament. In this post the party shared a video in which a commentator addressed the controversy during a newscast, highlighting the absence of ‘hysteria’ with the communists and neo-communists in the parliament. In this selection, shared articles from CH’s website and a video from its YouTube channel were found, revealing cross-posting activity and populist tendencies. The articles/posts related to an attack to the newly-formed government and its ‘shameful’ programme, with a chauvinist accusation to the left for wanting to ‘transform Portugal into a kind of Venezuela’; and to a policy proposal presented to the parliament to reduce the number of MPs, a central topic in more posts, one of them including a news piece covering the presentation of the proposal, to show the ‘fulfilment’ of the electoral programme. The YouTube video was related to Ventura’s parliamentary activity regarding the government’s programme, in this case ‘exposing’ the government’s hidden plans to raise taxes to sustain ‘the largest cabinet ever’, and to legalise euthanasia. One of the video-type posts reveals the adoption of a new genre applied to a pre-election issue: a montage including scenes of violence towards police officers, seemingly captured via mobile phone, suggestive of participatory/user-generated content (Baldwin-Philippi, ‘The Technological Performance of Populism’). The post, ‘signed’ by Ventura, addressed yet another aggression to a police officer, with Ventura announcing the presentation of a new proposal to the parliament to protect the ‘disenfranchised’ police force. Populist tendencies are revealed through the performance of crisis supported by audio-visual ‘flagrant proof’ with the leader ‘directly’ addressing ‘the people’, presented as ‘the one’ taking action to protect the police that ‘defend us’. Along these lines, this finding is illustrative of the constitutive role of the platform vernaculars to the populist performance. Moreover, a new practice was identified, suggestive of platformisation tendencies: sharing other users’ Facebook posts. In one case, from Ventura, with mobile phone-captured footage denouncing ‘outrageous’ offenses to the Portuguese flag alluding to a protest by Livre supporters, with Ventura assuming a posture of ‘shield’ against the ‘immoral monsters’, thereby also denoting populist tendencies. In the second case, the party shared a Facebook post by a local fire squad unit reporting on an assault allegedly perpetrated by Romani, which served the polarising performance of crisis, highlighting the state’s protection of ‘miscreants’. Posts Leonardo Ferreira 33

pivoting on both events were circulated on other platforms, including by Ventura, thus showing a concerted effort between party and leader. The post that excelled in all engagement measures relates to the assault to the fire squad unit, and is suggestive of platformisation tendencies as it includes a memetic image (figure 8), reminiscent of the tabloid genre, which is often associated with populism. CH attacks the Minister of Internal Administration, framing the minister as being involved in corruption cases, and as siding with the criminals, thereby revealing populist tendencies for the polarising performance of crisis. CH circulated this post on Twitter and Instagram, where it also emerged among the most engaged-with posts.

Figure 8. Most engaged-with post

Source: https://www.facebook.com/1989920374407828/posts/2631545923578600/; November 3, 2019 In blue and white, above: ‘Firefighters assaulted in Borba. The Minister of Internal Administration downplays the incident and assures that Portugal is a reference in security.’ Below, in red and white: ‘SHAME MR MINISTER SHAME’ Leonardo Ferreira 34

3.1.1.3 André Ventura – Pre-election

Through Facebook’s page transparency affordance (as of 27 February 2020), it was possible to realise that Ventura’s page had been created roughly one month before the short campaigning period, contrary to CH’s page which was created approximately one year before the general election. There were no data about ads having been run during the timeframe analysed in this study. However, it is relevant to note that, contrary to CH, Ventura’s page was running ads in February 2020, several months after the general election, suggesting an increased engagement with the platform’s affordances, and a strategy focused on the leader. In the pre-election period, Ventura issued 51 posts. For the selection of the most engaged-with posts the following criteria were considered (minimum): 50 comments, 50 shares, or 400 reactions. Posts matching at least one of the criteria were selected, which resulted in a total of 11 posts. In the pre-election period, Ventura’s posting activity was not very intensive: less than two post per day, on average, versus CH’s average of five daily posts in the same period. Like CH, Ventura also posted more photos in this period (table).

Table 8. Collected pre-election posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 10 2 Photo 34 7 Status 1 0 Video 6 2 Grand Total 51 11

In the pre-election period, the links in the most engaged-with posts were related to news. One of the posts, dating from the day of the election, included a piece shared from a television broadcaster’s news website covering Ventura’s presence at the ballot box, and issuing a patriotic appeal to voting. The second link-type post included a shared news piece from a digital news media outlet, and covered Ventura’s ‘fearless’ challenge to the ‘establishment’ regarding CH’s electoral proposal to fine MPs for skipping parliamentary sessions, a way to ‘moralise the shameful political system’. This finding denotes populist tendencies for the emphasis on a moralistic polarising performance of crisis, which focuses on the ‘backstage’ of politics. The Leonardo Ferreira 35

moralistic tone reflects Wiles’ assertion of populism as moralistic, valuing ‘correct attitude and spiritual make-up’ (Wiles 167). This moralising attitude was also observed among CH’s pre- election Facebook posts, and figure 9 shows a different approach, with Ventura outside a catholic church, in this case invoking the extraordinariness of the leader, and further echoing Bolsonaro’s 2018 presidential campaign, in which religion played a major role (Londoño and Darlington).

Figure 9. Emotional outburst

Source: https://www.facebook.com/101269364554956/posts/130263448322214/; September 22, 2019 Caption: ‘In order for evil to triumph, it only takes people of good to do nothing. May God always give me the strength and courage to keep fighting.’

Among Ventura’s pre-election most engaged-with posts was also a short video addressing the then salient wildfires issue, with mobile-captured footage of Ventura on the spot, aligned with a populist performance of crisis connecting the issue to terrorism. The instrumentalization of ongoing events was further observed related to the suppression of bank passbooks, with Ventura presenting CH as ‘the only voice of the people’. Furthermore, the Leonardo Ferreira 36

suspension of campaigning activity following the aggression to a police officer was also found within this selection, demonstrating the concerted effort between party and leader. However, whereas CH posted a text-based ‘official’ announcement, Ventura addressed the issue in a post with a screenshot of a news piece from a digital outlet covering this suspension, thereby denoting the varied repertoire between party and leader in exacerbating the same issue. An issue surfacing within this selection was the termination of lifetime subventions granted to politicians, also found among CH’s most engaged-with Facebook posts, thereby also showing a party-leader concerted effort in advancing an agenda. One of the posts was the most engaged-with in all three categories (102 comments, 3,730 shares, and 1,141 reactions), and included a video edited from a news broadcast, in which the ballot-card frame with CH’s social media channels was inserted. In this short video, Ventura evoked the corrupt system favouring the political elites to the detriment of ‘the ones most in need’, reporting on his immediate actions, thereby denoting populist tendencies. Figure 10 shows a photo-type post addressing this issue. Lastly, a more positive tone regarding electoral campaigning was observed in a post including a selfie ‘on the road’, in this case tapping on platform genres.

Figure 10. Electoral campaigning activity

Source: https://www.facebook.com/101269364554956/posts/126137012068191/; September 10, 2019 Caption: ‘At the door of Évora prison, demanding the corrupt to give back their lifetime subventions. And to renounce them! Be ashamed! ENOUGH’ Leonardo Ferreira 37

3.1.1.4 André Ventura – Post-election

In the post-election period, Ventura posted more frequently, in contrast to CH’s posting activity, which decreased significantly. Furthermore, Ventura’s post-election posts shifted from a majority of photo-type posts in the pre-election period, to a link-type majority (table 9), similar to CH. In this period, the selection parameters corresponded to (minimum): 150 comments; 200 shares; and 1,500 reactions. Posts matching at least one of these criteria were selected, resulting in a total of 21 posts.

Table 9. Collected posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 53 10 Photo 12 5 Status 4 2 Video 5 4 Grand Total 74 21

The posts with links referred, on the one hand, to pieces shared from media outlets; on the other hand, to videos shared from CH’s YouTube channel, namely Ventura’s first two interventions at the parliament, in this case indicating cross-posting activity between party and leader. Two of the news pieces reported on the success of the YouTube video of Ventura’s first intervention at the parliament, contrasting this achievement with the much less viewed videos of other politicians’ interventions, to which Ventura attached a performance based on demarcation from ‘the system’, highlighting virtue: hard work, ‘fearless’ confrontation of ‘difficult’ issues within ‘the system’, and ‘speaking the truth’, which captivates the ‘Noble People’–in reference to the national anthem. One of these posts was the most reacted-to: 5,863 reactions, in its vast majority ‘like’ and ‘love’. These findings are indicative of Ventura’s populist performance as part of the opposition. Ventura’s sharing of news pieces also served to report on the ‘fulfilment’ of the electoral programme (e.g. reduction of MPs) within the division ‘us versus them’; and to highlight stigma from other political and media actors, tendencies that have been observed in CH’s post-election most engaged-with posts. The issues shared by CH and Ventura were multiple and indicate a concerted effort between party and leader. The reaction to the formation of government–‘the largest cabinet’– Leonardo Ferreira 38

also surfaced in this selection. Moreover, the assault to the fire squad unit was also found within this selection, however, whilst CH’s post including a memetic image, Ventura shared a piece of news, demarcating CH from the establishment and ostracising the Romani (figure 11).Within this issue, a post including a shared piece of news reporting on Eurostat data about insecurity in Portugal also emerged, within a performance of crisis directed at discrediting the Prime Minister.

Figure 11. Fire squad issue

Source: https://www.facebook.com/101269364554956/posts/143810340300858/; November 3, 2019 Caption: ‘In Portugal, all that brings together security and gypsy ethnicity is downplayed, almost ignored. We will not do that, much less to make a fool out of the Portuguese. These are two problems that the rule of law needs to resolve. Pretending they don’t exist is not a solution!’

Moreover, highlighting stigmatisation appeared through controversies surrounding Ventura’s seat attribution in the parliament, not being welcomed to the parliament by the Prime Minister, or not being granted the turn to speak at the initiation of the legislature, blending right-wing MPs’ demarcation from Ventura with the ‘disrespectful’ seat allocation for being ‘excluded’ from the front row. These posts included shared news pieces from different outlets reporting on the controversies, and served to accuse the ‘shameful system’, with Ventura Leonardo Ferreira 39

recalling the electoral results that brought him to represent ‘the voice of the disaffected’ at the parliament, denoting populist tendencies. The controversy related to the Portuguese flag was also found in this selection, with two posts referring to this topic, one of which was the post CH had reposted from Ventura, including the video related to ‘offenses to the Portuguese flag’ targeting party Livre within the performance ‘us versus them’. In the case of Ventura, this was indeed the most commented (988) and shared (1,970) post. In the second post, Ventura othered newly-elected MP Joacine for her use of the Guinea-Bissau flag when celebrating the election results, contrasting with Ventura’s use of the Portuguese flag, a topic found among CH’s most engaged-with tweets, having also been retweeted by Ventura. This was the only post within this selection referring to the commemoration of the election results thus, in this case, celebration served a negative purpose. Othering MP Joacine was also done through ‘doxing’, with Ventura posting a screenshot of MP Joacine’s tweet about Portugal’s colonial past (figure 12); and by evoking the ‘greeting’ controversy, found among CH’s post-election most engaged-with Facebook posts. However, whereas CH’s post was a share of a piece of news reporting on the event, Ventura ‘told the story’. Thus, attacks resounding the Trumpian personalised-attacking style were frequent in this period.

Figure 12. Othering MP Joacine

Source: https://www.facebook.com/101269364554956/posts/143205220361370/; November 1, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 40

Caption: ‘CH respects the legitimacy of all parties elected to the Parliament. But one begins to run out of patience with those who are elected in Portugal to treat the Portuguese and their history as fascist, racist and colonialist. Enough already. They don’t like it being here… that’s why there are planes!’

3.1.2 VOX and Santiago Abascal

3.1.2.1 VOX – Pre-election

According to the page transparency information (as of 27 February 2020), this page ran several ads dating back to August 2018, and also during the November 2019 election. In the pre- election period, Vox’s posting average reached approximately two posts per day. For this analysis, 12 posts were analysed out of the total 67. These fulfilled at least one of the following conditions (minimum): 1,000 comments; 12,000 shares; or 15,000 reactions. Table 10 provides further details. It is worth noting that all most engaged-with posts were video-type posts, contrary to CH, whose focus was on photos.

Table 10. Collected posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 5 0 Photo 9 0 Status 1 0 Video 52 12 Grand Total 67 12

Two of the posts within this selection pertained to rallies in major cities–Madrid and Valencia–with Abascal in the spotlight; further showing an emphasis on triumph for the presence of thousands of people, and the use of belligerent language–‘we will never surrender, Spain deserves to be defended’–in this case symbolically in the capital Madrid. The latter was also found among VOX’s most engaged-with YouTube posts. On the other hand, posts of rallies served the performance of crisis pivoting on ‘dangerous others’. In a rally in Murcia, Abascal read names out of a list of alleged rent subsidy Leonardo Ferreira 41

beneficiaries, supposedly Muslim persons, inciting resentment among ‘the people’–the Spanish citizens, tax payers, allegedly excluded or not given priority–blaming the political elites for such policies, whilst siding with the Spaniards. This post was also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook posts (the most shared), however, albeit the concerted effort between party and leader, Abascal’s post did not include a the call to action for diffusion. In the Portuguese case, this type of othering was also found among CH’s Facebook posts when implicitly referring to the system’s privileging of immigrants. The narrative around ‘dangerous others’ was further found in a post apparently run as an ad (figure 13): it included a video of Abascal, at a rally, in which VOX’s leader ‘responds’ to Teresa Rodríguez (Podemos) about foreign minors arriving in Spain unaccompanied by an adult, evoking a sexual abuse case allegedly involving a Spanish girl and a foreign boy, the victim and the perpetrator, respectively. The post was shared over 16,400 times on Facebook, and was further found among VOX’s most engaged-with Twitter, Instagram and YouTube posts, as well as among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook posts. This post is illustrative of the politically incorrect populist performance, but also of the focus on a violent crime case for the performance of crisis, to activate the dichotomy ‘us versus them’: VOX, the victims, and the Spaniards facing hardship, in opposition to the system, Podemos, and violent- foreigners. This performance of crisis is reminiscent of other far-right parties’ populist crime rhetoric such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its emotionalised focus on serious crimes and generalisation of immigrants as offenders, spreading fear and emphasising “do-goodism” (Hestermann and Hoven 736). Serrano et al. further found the prevalence of an immigration- based agenda within the AfD’s social media strategy (Serrano et al.). Moreover, this post is elucidative of platformisation tendencies for the party’s engagement with the ads affordance, the use of emoji to grab attention, and the appeal to participation to drive amplification. All in all, the post shows the interplay between the populist style and the platform’s vernaculars, and how VOX combined it to set its hostile agenda.

Leonardo Ferreira 42

Figure 13. Call to action

Source: https://www.facebook.com/vox.espana/videos/479921349290733/; November 7, 2019 Caption: ‘Santiago Abascal responds to Teresa Rodríguez: ‘Unaccompanied foreign minors, who in some cases are taller than we are, should not have entered Spain. If those are your children, take them to your house! Share this video if you agree.’

Indeed, one of the aspects that most stands out between VOX and CH is VOX’s extensive use of emoji (table 11), whereas CH’s practice was more directed towards using capital letters. Emoji were included in all posts but one, denoting platformisation tendencies and further illustrating how emoji are constitutive of the populist performance. VOX resorted to emoji to attract attention, for example, to Abascal’s ‘monumental review’ to Sánchez (figure 15); to stimulate diffusion ( ); but also to emotionalise its messages more deeply (e.g., ), especially with its emoji ‘signature’ using . Hashtags and mentions were also used, although to a lesser extent than emoji. In the case of hashtags, these pertained to the party’s motto (#EspañaSiempre, i.e., Spain Always) and to Abascal’s presence on television.

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Table 11 . Emoji use

Emoji Alias Frequency flexed_biceps 5 Spain (flag)  4 loudspeaker 4 red_circle 3 clapping_hands 3 high_voltage 2 pouting_face 2 television 2 police_car_light 2 blue_circle 1 heavy_large_circle ⭕ 1 warning 1 down_arrow ⬇ 1 ant 1 Total --- 32

Bringing the leaders’ presence on television to Facebook is, indeed, a similarity between VOX and CH. Two of the most engaged-with posts within this selection related to Abascal’s participation at the televised political debate broadcast by public service RTVE, bringing together the leaders of PSOE, PP, Cs, Podemos, and VOX. The first post (figure 14), also found among VOX’s most engaged-with tweets and Instagram posts, includes a clip with Abascal summarising VOX’s programme in a one-minute-countdown pitch, as per the debate’s convention, a format that aptly meets the ‘distaste for complexity’ characteristic of the populist style (Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 83) and that is suited to secure attention on social media. These posts were issued shortly after the debate, suggesting an intention in taking advantage of the short-term opportunity window to influence the perception of the debate (Chadwick 363–64). The polarising performance of crisis is focused on VOX’s defence of freedom, unity, equality and sovereignty of Spain against the ‘progressive dictatorship’ (left- wing parties) and their ‘divisive’ policies, alluding to the controversial gender violence law (aimed at protecting women), and historical memory law, related to the Spanish civil war and the Francoist dictatorship, to which the (then ongoing) exhumation of Franco is connected. Other points conveyed by Abascal regarded the illegalisation of separatist parties and the Leonardo Ferreira 44

restauration of constitutional order, in reference to the Catalan question; decreasing political spending and a ‘historical’ lowering of taxes; ending illegal immigration that ‘brings delinquency’ and harms ‘the most modest’; and the payment of pensions. Thus, in this case, Abascal touches upon different wedge and salient issues, with the reaction to ongoing events revealing a commonality with CH, complemented by Abascal’s invocation of manipulation of VOX’s message (generic).

Figure 14 . ‘Golden minute’ post

Source: https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2191450477627028/; November 5, 2019 Caption: ‘Long Live Spain / [emoji] / Golden minute of [@] Santiago Abascal ‘We want to defend freedom in face of the progressive dictatorship that wants women to be against men, and grandchildren to deny their grandparents.’ / Good night and Long Live Spain [emoji; hashtags]’

The second video-post related to this debate referred once more the controversial historical memory law with Abascal mainly targeting Sánchez, and further associating the Catalan question (figure 15), a post that emerged among VOX’s most engaged-with Instagram and YouTube posts, and further shows the strategic use and constitutive role of emoji within the overall populist appeal. A post with a video of Abascal being interviewed on television Leonardo Ferreira 45

(newscast) showed VOX’s leader addressing the same issues, thereby revealing a diverse repertoire.

Figure 15. Televised debate

Source: https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2192699817502094/; November 5, 2019

Posts centring on the Catalan situation were also found in this selection, of which the post shown in figure 16, is an example, which also surfaced as one of VOX’s most engaged- with Instagram posts. VOX emphasised the upheaval happening at the time, following the mediatic sentencing of pro-independence Catalan leaders, a court ruling that came out in mid- October. These posts show the polarising performance of crisis with VOX emphasising chaos and violence, with moralistic (‘no forgiveness from God’) and metaphorical appeals (‘the spread of the terrorist virus’ – figure 17), focusing on casualties among the police and material loss, and framing the government as downplaying the situation, whilst siding with the ‘abandoned’. Despite the contextual differences, there are similarities between CH and VOX, namely the performance of crisis focusing on ongoing events, the symbolic reference to the police, and the governments’ downplaying of ‘critical threats’, however with VOX’s posts entailing a more visceral appeal than CH’s, taking into account VOX’s use of audio-visual material depicting violent scenes.

Leonardo Ferreira 46

Figures 16 and 17. Street violence

Sources: (left) https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2151215668317176/; October 16, 2019 / (right) https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2159397880832288/; October 19, 2019

The most engaged-with post in all categories (3,480 comments, 21,929 shares, and 44,093 reactions) included a short clip from Abascal’s participation in the popular televised talk show El Hormiguero, which also appeared among VOX’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. The posts related to violence against women, with Abascal highlighting the failure of the gender violence law, aimed at provoking a ‘war of the sexes’, a finding that denotes the varied repertoire for the polarising performance of crisis, with multiple appeals orbiting around the gender violence law, e.g., invoking fear (Islamisation) and failure (more deaths, ‘criminalisation of men’), whilst emphasising demarcation from ‘the system’ as ‘the only party’ defending life imprisonment for rapists, aspects that reveal similarities between VOX and CH. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that, like with CH, the most engaged-with posts within this selection focused on the leader.

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3.1.2.2 VOX – Post-election

Like CH, VOX also reduced its posting activity on Facebook after the election. For this period nine posts were selected from the total 51. These posts fulfilled at least one of the following criteria (minimum): 1,000 comments, 12,000 shares, or 15,000 reactions. After the election, the party continued to privilege videos (table 12); and gave continuity to the use of emoji, hashtags and mentions, in line with the pre-election period. According to the page transparency information (as of 27 February 2020), VOX did not run ads in this period.

Table 12. Collected posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 8 0 Photo 10 3 Status 0 0 Video 33 6 Grand Total 51 9

The most prevalent issues in this post-election selection referred to the formation of government; and, in a second moment, to the voting for the collegial representation in the Mesa del Congreso, the presidency of the lower house. The post that was most shared (19,123) and commented (3,987) included a video of the press conference at the congress in which Abascal reacted to the announcement of a pre- agreement between Sánchez and Iglesias to form government, accusing Sánchez of being a ‘shameless scammer’ and evoking electoral fraud. Abascal quoted Sánchez’s criticism of populism and ‘Venezuelan ration cards’, and suggested Sánchez’s resignation and abandonment of politics. This reaction was widely circulated by the party across all platforms, having also been found among Abascal’s most engaged-with posts across all platforms, although with some variations. The issue was further addressed by VOX by posting a screenshot of one of Abascal’s related tweets, thereby bringing ‘spreadable’ material from another platform, in which Abascal, assuming an intimidatory attitude, accused PSOE of collaborating with ‘communists and coup perpetrators’. Resorting to a different genre, the party shared a memetic video-montage (figure 18) that served two purposes: first, to further discredit Sánchez, including his declarations from 2014 about ‘Venezuela-like populism’; second, as a reaction to a Spanish media actor, the television channel La Sexta, accusing them of spreading Leonardo Ferreira 48

‘fake news’ about Abascal’s mention of the ration cards. The attack to the media elites aligns with previous research’s results for right-wing populists (Engesser, Ernst, et al. 1122). Once more, this post was widely circulated by VOX on all platforms, having also surfaced among Abascal’s most engaged-with posts on Facebook and Twitter, thereby demonstrating the concerted and multifaceted effort of a Trumpian performance of crisis, inciting fear, anger and disruption. Comparing with the Portuguese case, the post referring to the ‘largest cabinet in Portugal’s history’ corresponds to the populist performance reacting to the formation of government.

Figure 18. ‘Fake news’

Source: https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2210361569069252/; November 13, 2019

The beginning of functions in the new legislature surfaced in this selection, with a post related to the presentation of the 52 VOX MPs. This post included a video of Abascal at a press conference, introducing VOX’s lines of action, metaphorically framing VOX as a ‘dyke of contention’ against ‘separatism and liberticide laws’. The posts pertaining to the voting for the Mesa del Congreso included videos in which VOX members (on television, and during a press conference) attacked PP for having ‘preferred the communists over VOX’, with one of the posts including a call to action for diffusion, which was also found among VOX’s most engaged-with YouTube posts. These posts thus reveal a similarity with CH on the basis of the attack to the right, based on stigmatisation. Leonardo Ferreira 49

The focus on stigmatisation was further found on other posts: on the one hand, VOX ‘exposed’ a ‘media hunt’ towards VOX’s members and voters, again sharing a screenshot of one of Abascal’s tweets (figure 19). On the other hand, stigma was evoked involving the gender violence law, simultaneously associating Islam, connected to a female activist’s confrontation of VOX’s secretary general at a public event, with VOX comprehensively ‘debunking’ the story behind the activist to contrast the ‘failure’ of the system with VOX’s policies.

Figure 19. Cross-posting activity

Source: https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2236781463093929/; November 25, 2019

Lastly, parliamentary activity surfaced, revealing another similarity with CH and the engagement with this type of activity on Facebook on both cases. The post included a video with Abascal’s address to the president of the Mesa about VOX’s legal action towards the revocation of the MP status of elected ‘separatist’ MPs, which was the post that achieved the highest count of reactions within this selection (34,127, mostly ‘like’ and ‘love’). This post has also been found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook and Twitter posts, and VOX’s tweets, thus showing a concerted effort in pursuing this agenda, and the respective cross- platform engagement. Leonardo Ferreira 50

3.1.2.3 Santiago Abascal – Pre-election

According to Facebook’s page transparency feature (as of 27 February 2020), no ads were launched from this page, contrary to the findings for VOX, and Ventura, although in the latter case the ads were run outside the pre- and post-election periods analysed in this study. In the pre-election period, 159 posts were issued, an average close to five posts per day. For the selection of the most engaged-with posts the following criteria were considered (minimum): 1,500 comments; 3,000 shares; or 15,000 reactions. Posts matching at least one of these criteria were selected, which resulted in 40 posts. Comparing to VOX’s findings, Abascal posted mostly photo-type posts, whereas VOX posted mainly videos (table 13).

Table 13. Collected posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 12 2 Photo 82 13 Status 3 1 Video 62 24 Grand Total 159 40

Similar to VOX, and in contrast with Ventura, Abascal also made significant use of emoji (table 14), although the ‘emoji signature’ was not adopted by Abascal. The emoji served to draw attention, convey a sense of urgency, incite anger, or emphasise calls to action, overall constituting the populist performance. Moreover, Abascal also made extensive use of hashtags, which mainly referred to locations across Spain (e.g. #Guadalajara), as well as to VOX’s slogans (#EspañaSiempre, i.e., Spain Always; #AhoraVOX, i.e., now VOX), the Catalan issue, and Spain’s national day.

Leonardo Ferreira 51

Table 14. Emoji use

Emoji Alias Frequency police_car_light 7 red_circle 7 Spain (flag)  5 loudspeaker 3 down_arrow ⬇ 3 right_arrow ➡ 3 flexed_biceps 1 metro 1 thinking_face 1 pouting_face 1 Total --- 32

The bigrams7 in figure 20 show that the most frequently addressed topics within this selection were: rallies (e.g., “miles personas”, “mitin vox”, i.e., thousands of people, rally VOX), the police, the supreme court, Catalonia, and Pedro Sánchez.

Figure 20. Bigrams

7 Absolute frequency between 5 and 2. Leonardo Ferreira 52

Indeed, posts about rallies across Spain were very frequent (52,5%), which contrasts with the Portuguese case, as rallies were not found among the most engaged-with posts. Abascal’s Facebook posts pertaining to rallies included mainly short promotional videos, which contrasts with the more amateur videos posted by Ventura. These rallies took place in several locations and the findings suggest a performance adapted to what would resonate with ‘the people’ in particular regions: on the one hand, regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the pro-independence movement is strong, terrorism, abandonment, and betrayal sustained the performance of crisis. On the other hand, in other locations the emphasis was put on the appeal to ‘the people’–‘the most humble’–disenfranchised by the ‘progressives’. The rallies in Madrid were also within this selection, although none was livestreamed, as was the case of one of VOX’s most engaged-with YouTube posts. The concerted effort between VOX and Abascal to amplify certain issues was revealed with two posts about the sexual abuse case involving a foreign minor, one of which was the video with Abascal’s ‘response’ to Teresa Rodríguez, with VOX’s leader also issuing a call to action for diffusion. Abascal further addressed the issue in a post with a screenshot of a piece of news about the release of the alleged aggressor, serving the performance of crisis with Abascal invoking the ‘failure of the system’ to project his dealing at the parliament with ‘those responsible’ for the laws underlying such situations. This post was found among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets, in direct overlap. These findings suggest strategic circulation and variation in the repertoire for the construction of the crisis narrative based on ‘dangerous others’. This narrative also included associating immigration with ‘social emergency’ (e.g., unemployment and the disloyal competition from illegal immigration) and with the role of women in society, instigating Islamophobia. Islamophobic attitudes were also purveyed by pivoting on policies, particularly rent subsidy, as also found among VOX’s most engaged-with Facebook posts. The remaining ‘rally-posts’ addressed the Catalan unrest following the sentencing of pro-independence leaders. Abascal often accused Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of corruption, and ‘failure’ in dealing with the situation, resorting to memetic tropes such as ‘taliban’, ‘ghost of Moncloa’8, and ‘scavenger of Moncloa’, echoing the Trumpian populist style (e.g., Crooked Hillary). In the latter case, Abascal referred to the controversial exhumation of the Spanish dictator Franco, ongoing at the time, thus revealing a similarity with the Portuguese case, regarding posts related to ongoing events.

8 Moncloa is the official residence and workplace of the Spanish Prime Minister. Leonardo Ferreira 53

Figure 21. Rally

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1109367049266722/; October 26, 2019

Figure 22 shows a post in which VOX’s leader further used the exhumation controversy to accuse Sánchez of spreading hate with an ‘electoral manoeuvre’, alluding to the Spanish civil war, a shorter version of which was also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets. This post denotes a polarising and moralistic performance of crisis, highlighting failure of institutions, and further serving to accuse right-wing PP and Ciudadanos (Cs) of complicity. Attacks to right-wing parties were further conveyed in rallies, accusing these political actors of imitating VOX; or issuing counterattacks to their criticism regarding the use of the Spanish flag in VOX’s electoral campaigning material, an issue that surfaced on Twitter as well. The attacks to other right-wing actors reveal a similarity with the Portuguese case.

Figure 22. Exhumation controversy

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1106969932839767/; October 24, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 54

The most commented post (3,345) was also related to the Catalan unrest: a photo-type post depicting two riot police agents carrying a third agent (figure 23), with Abascal using a crafted hashtag to frame a demand for the imprisonment of the President of the Government of Catalonia, Quim Torra–#TorraAPrisión (i.e, Torra to prison). This post encompassed a performance of crisis and threat (‘they will kill’) reiterating the division ‘us versus them’: the ‘abandoned’ police and Spaniards against the coward and conforming establishment and the ‘criminal’ Catalan pro-independence collective. This post was also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets and Instagram posts. VOX also circulated a video of this situation, which surfaced among its most engaged-with Facebook and Instagram posts.

Figure 23. Most commented Facebook post

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1101296950073732/; October 18, 2019

The repertoire pivoting on the Catalan issue also pertained to announcements of immediate action, namely by the filing of an official missive addressed at the Mesa del Congreso demanding action for the reinstatement of order in Catalonia. This post was one of the most shared photo-type posts (figure 24), encompassing the performance of crisis based on a sense of failure and urgency, within the social-media-enabled ‘direct’ relationship with the followers in the communication of official matters. A second post complemented the latter in the challenge to ‘parties defending national sovereignty’ to support VOX’s initiative, Leonardo Ferreira 55

demarcating VOX’s immediacy. This post included a screenshot of a piece from a news outlet reporting on VOX’s procedures, and variants of both these posts were found among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets. Overall, these findings demonstrate Abascal’s varied repertoire pushing the Catalonia-based agenda, and the engagement therewith. In the Portuguese case, Ventura’s posts challenging other parties and reporting his immediate action denote similarities with these findings.

Figure 24. Sense of urgency

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1099041386965955/; October 16, 2019

The participation of Abascal in the talk show El Hormiguero was also found in this selection, in two posts, presenting variations regarding VOX’s findings. Firstly, Abascal posted an announcement of his participation in the show that night ‘despite pressures and boycott attempts by the bigot progressives’, consistent with the ‘progressive dictatorship’ rhetoric, herewith drawing attention to a supposed attempted suppression to foster the opposite effect and ultimately attract more attention and further dissemination. This post also featured among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets and Instagram posts.

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Figure 25. El Hormiguero

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1093850880818339/ ; October 10, 2019

The second post included a shared piece from an online newspaper reporting on the failure of the attempt to boycott Abascal’s participation in the show, allegedly organised via Twitter: the episode would have been watched by more than four million people, largely surpassing other political leaders’ participation and entering the top three most watched episodes, as stated in the article. This post follows the trend already identified in Ventura’s posts related to the amplification of popularity. However, whereas in the case of Ventura, media coverage referred to a ‘viral’ YouTube video after the election, in the case of Abascal this occurred at the key moment of the short campaigning period. A similar post was found on Twitter, showing a variation in its focus compared to Abascal’s Facebook post: linking yet to a radio station’s website reporting on the failure of the alleged Twitter-organised boycott attempt, Abascal assumed a more provocative tone than on Facebook, where the post entailed a more triumphant tone. A related post also emerged among Abascal’s most engaged-with Instagram posts, an image of Abascal at the show with the host and the show’s puppets, alluding to an ‘upper-hand’ attitude. Thus, these findings are indicative of platformisation tendencies for the adaptation to each platforms’ vernaculars, and of Abascal’s success in exploiting stigmatisation. Inciting suspicion of the media, much in line with Trump’s style, was found in this selection, with Abascal adverting followers to be careful with ‘manipulative polls’, which was also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets. Among this selection were also posts referring to Abascal’s presence at the ballot box on the day of the election, and to the celebration of the elections results. In regards to the Leonardo Ferreira 57

former, Abascal posted a series of photos, including photos taken with older and younger supporters, appealing to unity, concord, freedom, and equality among Spaniards. This was the most reacted-to post, achieving over 24,500 reactions, mainly ‘like’ and ‘love’, having been also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. This reveals a similarity with Ventura, as a post related to his presence at the ballot box also surfaced, denoting engagement with the leaders’ voting appeal. The celebration of the election results was found in a post in which Abascal announced VOX as the third force, issuing a call to action for followers to join the celebrations at VOX’s national headquarters and to spread the message, a theme not found among VOX’s most engaged-with Facebook posts. This finding shows a contrast with the Portuguese case, as the celebratory posts were found among CH’s most engaged-with Facebook posts. Lastly, posts related to the country’s symbolic national day emerged. One of the posts included a photo album of the official commemorations in which Abascal took part, within a diverse rhetorical appeal, including photos of Abascal with his wife, and of the armed forces parade, emotionally emphasising these forces’ patriotic commitment to the common good. Hashtags related to the national day and identity were used (#DíaDeLaHispanidad, i.e., the day of Spanishness). This post was also found on Instagram and on Twitter. In the second post, invoking the heartland, Abascal included a photo of the oeuvre The first tribute to Columbus (October 12, 1492)9, related to Spain’s colonial past, praising the glorious past and the ‘unmatched universal brotherhood’ brought about by the Spanish people (figure 26), framed in the metaphorical hashtag #EspañaPlusUltra (i.e., Spain further beyond), Spain’s national motto.

9 https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/the-first-tribute-to-columbus-october-12-1492-jos%C3%A9-garnelo-y- alda/VAE99Cq1orTiLw?hl=en. Accessed on March 15, 2020. Leonardo Ferreira 58

Figure 26. National day

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1095593827310711/; October 12, 2019

3.1.2.4 Santiago Abascal – Post-election

In this period, Abascal issued 44 posts, of which 18 posts were selected, having fulfilled at least one of the following criteria (minimum): 1,500 comments; shares 3,000 shares, 15,000 reactions. Contrary to Ventura but in line with VOX, Abascal decreased his activity on Facebook after the election, denoting the party and its leader’s focus on the short campaigning period. Another difference between Abascal and Ventura is Abascal’s focus on posting visual and audio-visual material, whereas Ventura mainly posted links.

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Table 15. Collected posts and respective selection per type Type Count for Count for the whole selected data set posts Link 5 0 Photo 19 9 Status 2 1 Video 18 8 Grand Total 44 18

The most commented and reacted-to post (37,295, mainly ‘like’ and ‘love’) within this selection referred to the re-emergence of celebration of the election results, a topic that was not found among VOX’s most engaged-with post-election Facebook posts. Abascal posted photos of the celebrations (figure 27), which also surfaced among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets and Instagram posts. Two other posts appeared referring to this theme, one including a clip from a video of the night of the election from VOX’s YouTube channel, the other including a video of Abascal’s visit to Murcia where the party was victorious, both having surfaced among VOX’s most engaged-with YouTube posts. The cross-posting of CH’s YouTube videos was also a practice of Ventura after the election.

Figure 27. Celebration of the election results

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1124727454397348/; November11, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 60

Issues that were indeed common to both VOX and Abascal after the election were the pre-agreement between Sánchez and Iglesias, the voting for the Mesa del Congreso; and ‘the media’s persecution’. Regarding the pre-agreement, common posts were found: the screenshot of Abascal’s own tweet; the press conference post, in this case shared from VOX’s YouTube channel; and the ‘fake news’ post. However, in this selection more posts were found addressing the issue. For example, a post including a video of Abascal’s intervention at the parliament, in July 2019. Edited with epic music, reminiscent of a battle, Abascal rejected supporting agreements with Podemos and pro-independence parties for the formation of government, thereby establishing the division between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ through symbolically contrasting his rectitude with Sánchez’s ‘treason’. This post was the most shared within this collection, with over 22,100 shares. Moreover, the hashtag #PeónSánchez was used in a post including a memetic video montage featuring Sánchez, ‘the pawn’, and the ‘communists, pro-ETA and corrupts’–Podemos and pro-independence parties–to instil an atmosphere of threat, thereby illustrating platformisation tendencies, and also populist tendencies as part of the opposition. The beginning of functions in the new legislature was addressed by both Abascal and VOX, however, whilst VOX’s post included a video with Abascal at a press conference underlining VOX’s goals, in opposition to ‘separatism and liberticide laws’, Abascal’s posts included photos of the elected MPs, showing commitment in honouring the voters. In regards to the voting for the Mesa del Congreso, only a text-based post was found, consisting of a statement exposing PP and their alignment with the political cordon sanitaire against VOX. Stigmatisation was further ‘exposed’, for example with the same screenshot of Abascal’s tweet found among VOX’s Facebook posts; via a memetic audio-visual montage with several actors issuing negative commentary about VOX; or with a post compiling ‘proof’ of an ‘anti-VOX obsession’ between media and political actors (figure 28), the latter two also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets. Thus, stigmatisation was common to both Abascal and Ventura in the post-election period.

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Figure 28. Stigmatisation

Source: https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1136866749850085/; November 22, 2019

Lastly, one issue that has not been found among VOX’s post-election Facebook posts, denoting populist and platformisation tendencies, pertained to a corruption case, namely, the sentencing of Spanish socialist politicians, a court ruling that was released that day. The post targeted the newly-formed coalition within a polarising performance of crisis, via ‘doxing’ by sharing past tweets from Sánchez and Iglesias, in the latter case simultaneously alluding to media bias. This post denotes similarities with Venture regarding the practice of ‘doxing’, and reactions to ongoing events.

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Figures 29 and 30. Performance of crisis

Sources (left): https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1133756386827788/; November 19, 2019 / (right) https://www.facebook.com/322502984619803/posts/1133790480157712/; November 19, 2019

Leonardo Ferreira 63

3.2. Twitter

3.2.1 CH and André Ventura

3.2.1.1 CH – Pre-election

CH created its Twitter account in early December 2018, a little later than it created its Facebook page, yet also before becoming an official party. In this period, the party posted 89 tweets, an average of less than three tweets per day, thus less than its daily five posts on Facebook.

Figure 31. Pre-election data set overview

As can be seen in figure 31, the party privileged original content, only retweeting tweets from Ventura. Uploading media was also privileged, mainly photos; and the hashtags corresponded almost exclusively to the party’s motto (#CHEGA, i.e. enough) and name (#partidoChega). The links in the tweets were mainly from Linktree. Moreover, the party did not run ads in the pre-election period. During the short campaigning period, engagement was low on Twitter, hence, from the 89 tweets, eight tweets were selected, based on having garnered at least 40 likes or having been retweeted at least 50 times. From this selection, only two of the tweets were retweets, from Ventura. The six remaining tweets included media: five included photos and one included a video. The tweet including the video was a direct overlap from the Facebook post about the Prime Minister’s direct verbal confrontation with a citizen. As in the case of Facebook, this tweet was the most engaged-with (both likes and retweets). Leonardo Ferreira 64

The hashtag #VenturaBEM (i.e., well done Ventura), found on one of CH’s Facebook posts, also emerged (figure 32). In this case, although this tweet also related to Ventura’s participation in a televised debate, its purpose was not to drive followers to watch the debate, but to praise Ventura by alleging bias based on nepotism, instilling suspicion of the Prime Minister and the journalist who had monitored the debate. Thus, the populist conspiratorial attack to the establishment has also been pursued on this platform. This post was further found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts, in that case including CH’s Vice-President’s signature.

Figure 32. Conspiracy

Source: https://twitter.com/PartidoCHEGA/status/1178811212097884160; October 1, 2019

Caption: ‘This was not a debate, I think it is clear that Maria Flor Pedroso was doing her cousin a favour. / On the 6th VOTE ENOUGH [X]’

Moreover, a tweet about the police force emerged, however on a different note: whilst on Facebook the emphasis was on spreading a sense of crisis pivoting on crime, on Twitter CH underlined reciprocated support to prison officers, posting a photo of Ventura with the Prison Officers’ Union leader, which was also found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. Attacks to the left persisted on Twitter, with the attack to PAN that ‘sides with the prisoners’ emerging, however in this case with CH retweeting Ventura. CH also retweeted Leonardo Ferreira 65

Ventura to attack the Left Block party, in this case differently from the Facebook post, as the focus was on ridiculing the leader of the Left Block, and the tweet did not include the link to a partisan news website. Figure 33, with the ballot card frame, illustrates the division ‘us versus them’–CH, the Portuguese in opposition to Livre/Joacine and (certain) immigrants–within a performance of crisis extrapolating to ‘an orchestrated demographic replacement in Europe’, a conspiracy theory previously circulated by other right-wing European parties on social media such as the Freedom Party of Austria or the Belgian Vlaams Belang, both on Twitter and Facebook, and VOX on Twitter (Ebner and Davey).

Figure 33. ‘Us versus them’

Source: https://twitter.com/PartidoCHEGA/status/1173560191792635907; September 16, 2019

The tendency of issuing announcements also surfaced in this selection, here as an alert to the absence of posts as no electoral campaigning is allowed on the day before the election (campaign silence), however, whereas on Facebook and Instagram the announcements were ‘signed’ by CH’s Vice President, the tweet was not. Leonardo Ferreira 66

Lastly, a topic that was not found on Facebook, but was on Instagram, related to the ‘threatened’ traditional family to centre CH as protecting the traditional family and thereby ‘the future’, however within a mixed appeal as Ventura is taking a picture with what could be interpreted as a single-parent family (figure 3410).

Figure 34. Traditional family

Source: https://twitter.com/PartidoCHEGA/status/1178716518332452865; September 30, 2019

3.2.1.2 CH – Post-election

In the post-election period CH posted 63 tweets, approximately two tweets per day, thus the party reduced its posting activity on this platform after the election as observed on Facebook. Figure 35 gives an overview of the data set.

10 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 67

Figure 35. Post-election data set overview

As in the pre-election period, CH did not privilege retweeting, with the two retweets being from Ventura. The uploaded media were, again, mainly photos; and the hashtags only pertained to the party’s motto. CH also did not run ads during this period; and the links were mainly from CH’s Facebook and YouTube posts. For the analysis of this period, 12 tweets were selected from the total 63 tweets. These tweets received at least 75 retweets or a minimum of 250 likes. In this selection, themes common to Facebook emerged, as the celebration of the election results, through a celebratory text-based tweet with an emotional thank-you note to the Portuguese for their confidence, with CH reiterating the commitment towards ‘changing Portugal’. The YouTube video from CH’s channel with Ventura’s first parliamentary intervention, found among Ventura’s most engaged-with Facebook posts, also surfaced in this selection of tweets. An attack to the newly-elected MP Joacine was found in this selection, having been the most retweeted (figure 36). This tweet referred to the election aftermath, using the same image that Ventura used in his Facebook post, however CH’s tweet is more hostile.

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Figure 36. Othering MP Joacine

Source: https://twitter.com/PartidoCHEGA/status/1181724857832235012; October 9, 2019

Caption: ‘2 MPs elected to the Portuguese Parliament: A. Ventura, after the election went to the Assembly of the Republic, where he sang the National Anthem with the Portuguese flag. Below, instead of the national flag, is a foreign flag and the discourse was of left-wing extremism’

The fire squad issue also emerged, including the attack to the Minister of Internal Administration. In a second tweet, revealing populist tendencies through the performance of crisis, CH ‘directly’ confronts the minister, claiming widespread national insecurity (figure 37). This tweet has also been found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. Moreover, CH tweeted a screenshot of the fire squad’s Facebook post, which was also found among CH’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. In this case, the failure of the system that protects ‘miscreants’ was also the party’s focus. On the other hand, CH has further shown its support towards the fire squad announcing a visit to the unit and the party’s participation in a local demonstration. This cluster of tweets thus denotes CH’s intention in amplifying the issue on Twitter and across platforms. Leonardo Ferreira 69

Figure 37. Performance of crisis

Source: https://twitter.com/PartidoCHEGA/status/1192192149888126977; November 6, 2019

Caption: ‘Mr Minister of Internal Administration, you downplay the attacks to firefighters by gypsies, you do not have personnel to patrol entire municipalities. The country is plundering thanks to you! Public Safety is at stake: resign at once! [hashtag]’ / Headline in image: ‘Tonight the Elvas unit will not be patrolling, only has 1 man on duty’

The only retweet within this selection was one of Ventura’s tweets, about the topic of the ‘largest cabinet’. The reference to proposals, particularly concerning the reduction of MPs, was also found; figure 38 shows an image adopting the tabloid genre. Moreover, a proposal- in-image surfaced, in this case about the abolition of the municipal real estate tax ‘the most ridiculous of all taxes’.

Figure 38. Parliamentary activity

Source: https://twitter.com/PartidoCHEGA/status/1191756149348950016; November 5, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 70

In the post-election period, tweets related to stigma also emerged: via a platform- specific practice, with CH linking to a pundit’s tweet to react to her attack; and via a video, as a counterattack to a Portuguese comedian, TV host and (football) commentator, who was also the target of one of Ventura’s most engaged-with Facebook posts in the post-election period, based on a football-related controversy. However, CH’s tweet served to accuse the comedian of xenophobia based on a fragment of one of his sketches in which the Romani were stereotyped. This tweet received the highest count of likes.

3.2.1.3 André Ventura – Pre-election

Ventura created his Twitter account in 19 February 2019, thus approximately six months before the general election. Clearly, Twitter was not a priority for Ventura in the short campaigning period: CH’s leader only posted six tweets. Affordances such as hashtags, mentions, and the practice of retweeting were not observed, and only two tweets included photos. Like with CH, Ventura’s tweets were not run as ads; and engagement was low: the tweets reached averages of 137 likes, and of 24 retweets. On Twitter Ventura addressed criminality outside the aggressions to police officers. First, to attack party PAN and its proposal regarding the convicted (figure 39), with Ventura taking the side of the Portuguese and the victims, similar to CH’s ‘us versus them’ populist performance on Facebook. This was the most liked and retweeted tweet, and was also retweeted by CH. Ventura’s ambiguity leaves open to discussion whether the derogatory use of ‘orangutans’ applied to PAN and/or to the imprisoned, an affordance of online environments (Phillips and Milner 51). These findings thus indicate party-leader concerted efforts.

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Figure 39. ‘Us versus them’

Source: https://twitter.com/AndreCVentura/status/1171829419528380416; September 11, 2019

Caption: ‘PAN proposes that the convicted have the length of their sentence reduced and that they be considered as especially vulnerable people. But are we fooling around with the Portuguese? Reducing the sentences even more… Those guys are orangutans!’

Secondly, Ventura posted a screenshot of a piece by the daily tabloid CM reporting on a rape crime, which served the performance of crisis, highlighting the failure of the system to present himself as the solution (figure 40). This violent crime was also emphasised by Ventura in two livestreams and one video found among CH’s most engaged-with Facebook posts. Rape is often instrumentalised by right-wing politicians in their populist performance of crisis, leveraging anti-immigration attitudes to rise as problem solvers, as the case of Trump during his 2016 candidacy (Harris) or Salvini (Stille). CH and Ventura followed this populist performance, however without an anti-immigration focus.

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Figure 40. Performance of crisis

Source: https://twitter.com/AndreCVentura/status/1171432271032643591; September 10, 2019

Caption: ‘Obviously the aggressor already had a criminal record for violent crimes and of course he had an arrest warrant pending. And of course, if I were in charge, this guy would never see daylight again. Isn't it time to say ENOUGH?’

The remaining tweets concerned the commenting or sharing of polls, a topic that did not surface among Ventura’s most engaged-with Facebook posts. On the one hand, Ventura emphasised CH’s leadership among small parties and the ‘fear and consecutive attack’ thereof, thus alluding to stigma, similar to Abascal. On the other hand, Ventura identified CH as the ‘voice of the people tired of corruption and impunity’, further presenting CH as the ‘authentic rupture with the system’ as opposed to the leftist Livre. In the case of CH, polls were found on Facebook, on a more celebratory note.

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3.2.1.4 André Ventura – Post-election

After the election, Ventura’s activity on Twitter increased, with Ventura issuing 16 tweets. These tweets were mainly text-based and hashtags were still not utilised. From these 16 tweets, four were retweeted from CH. Among Ventura’s most engaged-with Facebook posts there were no specific celebratory posts regarding the election results as was observed with CH’s tweets and, more profusely, CH’s Facebook posts. On Twitter, Ventura also did not specifically celebrate, only thanking the Portuguese and showing his commitment in ‘saving’ Portugal. The tweet that received most likes and retweets is related to stigmatisation (figure 41), which was the focus of more tweets within this selection, some including links to news, within the performance ‘us versus them’.

Figure 41. Stigmatisation

Source: https://twitter.com/AndreCVentura/status/1181562578386001920; October 8, 2019

Countering this negativity, however, was Ventura’s reply to a pseudonymous user in appreciation of their positive commentary on Ventura’s interpellations to leftist politicians; and a mention of another pseudonymous user, with Ventura sharing a favourable opinion article, which reveals more interaction with the platform’s affordances. The retweets from CH, served multiple purposes. First, to reiterate the commitment to the Portuguese against corruption and cronyism, sharing a piece of news reporting on CH’s Leonardo Ferreira 74

rejection of agreements with the right. Second, to bring up violent crime, by means of sharing a piece of news covering a case of paedophilia, to emphasise that CH takes the victims’ side. Third, to attack MP Joacine and her use of Guinea-Bissau’s flag, which was complemented by Ventura’s tweet about the ‘greeting’ controversy, as posted on Facebook. Ventura also circulated the ‘largest cabinet’ topic on Twitter (figure 42), in direct overlap with his Facebook post, a tweet that CH retweeted. Thus, these findings are indicative of populist tendencies and of cross-platform circulation of issues between party and leader.

Figure 42. Largest cabinet

Source: https://twitter.com/AndreCVentura/status/1184347931077480448; October 16, 2019

Caption: ‘Are they making fun of the Portuguese? Didn't they notice what happened on the 6th of October? Don't count on CHEGA for this!’

3.2.2. VOX and Santiago Abascal

3.2.2.1 VOX – Pre-election

As figure 43, below, shows, contrary to CH, in this period retweeting prevailed with 72% of the total 931 collected tweets corresponding to retweets, some of which also of VOX’s own tweets, besides other party members and structures, and other users. Replies were low, indicating that VOX did not privilege participating in conversations or creating threads. The Leonardo Ferreira 75

high number of mentions is connected to the remarkable prevalence of retweeting, although VOX also utilised the mention affordance in its tweets. In regards to tweets with links, these were not prominent, whereas close to one third of the tweets included media, mainly videos, but also photos. In the short campaigning period, the party also ran ads on this platform (figure 44).

Figure 43. Data set overview

Figure 44. Sources of tweets in data set

Figure 45, below, shows the hashtags in the data set, revealing its abundant and diversified utilisation. Prominent hashtags pertain to the party’s mottos (#EspañaSiempre, #EspañaViva), to the election day (#10N), and to televised political debates (#ELDebate4N, #DebateElectoral, #Debate7RTVE).

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Figure 45. Hashtags in data set11

Following this context, and considering VOX’s intensive activity12, the focus of this analysis was put on VOX’s original tweets, thus no retweets were included. In this case, from the total 931 collected tweets, 21 were selected based on having reached at least 6,000 likes. These selected tweets were retweeted 4,000 times, on average. Among the 21 selected tweets there were no replies or tweets with links but all tweets included media, mostly videos. Some of the tweets with videos are edited overlaps of VOX’s YouTube posts. Within this collection, mentions pertain almost exclusively to party members, with the exception of the mention of a televised show related to a tweet about a debate. Furthermore, nearly half of the tweets of this collection were run as ads (figure 46), launched in the last week leading to the election day.

11 Word cloud with all hashtags in data set processed by absolute frequency, with the most used appearing as the largest–e.g., #EspañaSiempre. All word clouds presented in this work have been processed according to these parameters. 12 Tweeting an average of 58 times per day in the short campaigning period–over the span of 16 days, as the data captured for VOX in the pre-election period corresponded to the timeframe 26 October-10 November 2019. Leonardo Ferreira 77

Figure 46. Sources | Pre-election selection

The majority of the tweets run as ads related to televised debates, including clips of different debates, some of which also found on Facebook, featuring Abascal and other VOX key members (thus showing more diversity than on Facebook), who confronted Sánchez and Iglesias, recalling ETA and the Spanish civil war; as well as pro-independence party leaders, qualifying them as ‘anomalies’ and haters of Spain on television. Overall, these posts related to main programmatic points such as the recentralisation of the state or the illegalisation of separatist parties. Figure 47 shows an example of one of these ads, ‘exposing’ other parties and pivoting on the role of women. Populist tendencies emerged through ‘bad manners’ and by framing the other parties as the source of the breakdown of the country.

Figure 47. Ad

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1192569736208490497; November 7, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 78

Another tweet run as an ad related to anti-immigration within a performance of threat, associating immigrants with illegality and violence, and presenting VOX as ‘the only party defending Spain’ (figure 48). The party asked for the diffusion of the attached 30-second video, which included violent images of beatings and images of people climbing a fence, with the further appeal that the video had been censored on television, herewith again drawing attention to a supposed suppression to attract attention. In the background, Abascal, at the parliament, challenged other parties over illegal immigration. This finding shows the circulation of anti- immigration-related posts within a varied repertoire.

Figure 48. Call to action

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1190973918053642240; November 3, 2019

Caption: ‘VOX is the only party that speaks loud and clear against mass immigration that devastates our neighbourhoods. / RT Spread the video that has been censored on television’

The Catalan issue surfaced in this collection as well. The hashtag #APorEllos (i.e., go get them) symbolically related to the 2017 unrest in Catalonia (Caparrós), appeared in two tweets including videos. However, these videos did not show scenes of violence as was the case with VOX’s Facebook posts, but anti-separatism ‘civilised’ marches in Catalonia, one of which is depicted in figure 49, symbolically revealing the division ‘us versus them’.

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Figure 49. ‘Us versus them’

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1188457255416586244; October 27, 2019

A specific appeal to ‘the people’ was found in a tweet, also run as an ad, with a promotional video including a collection of testimonials by VOX supporters, with the party highlighting its role as ‘the voice of the people’ against political correctness. This finding shows points in common with CH and Ventura in regards to the ‘voice of the people’, anti- political correctness claims , and to the ‘Vox pop’ video. An issue found in this collection was related to the party’s controversial electoral campaigning material. In this tweet (figure 50), VOX asked supporters to take a picture with the Spanish-flag-decorated envelope and tweet it, adding the mentioned hashtag, thereby revealing platformisation tendencies. This issue was also found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook posts, in which Abascal, at a rally, within a polarising performance, addressed the criticism of the use of the flag for electoral campaigning conveyed by a PP politician, framing PP as double-faced and imitative. Thus these findings also show party- leader concerted efforts, across platforms and within a varied repertoire.

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Figure 50. Call to action

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1189273309910831110; October 29, 2019

Caption: ‘VOX envelopes are starting to arrive at all households across Spain! / If you have also received it and you’re going to vote for VOX, tweet the photo of your envelope with the hashtag #MiSobreVOX’

On a different note, a satirical tweet including a memetic video was found in this collection. This served as a counterattack to criticism against VOX for its anti-feminism ideology, and relates to one of Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets. In his tweet, Abascal linked to a pseudonymous account that had posted a video of a young woman being interviewed for a televised talk show: when confronted about her support of VOX, considering VOX’s views against feminism, the young woman affirmed to be well aware of VOX’s stance. VOX transformed this segment of the interview into an audio-visual meme ironically resorting to the ‘thug life’ genre, to channel an esprit de corps (figure 51), which galvanised engagement, both on Twitter and on Instagram, where the post also emerged. These findings show, once more, that both the party and its leader have strategically platformised their message, capitalising on (frustrated) negative televised commentary: VOX through ‘vernacular creativity’ (Burgess), thereby engaging the ‘spreadability’ (Jenkins et al.) capital of memetic artefacts and incendiary humour; and Abascal by drawing on communities of practice through linking to a pseudonymous account, potentially within a network of pro-VOX opinion-formers. On the Leonardo Ferreira 81

other hand, these findings exemplify the productive synergy between the populist style and the platform vernaculars.

Figure 51. Meme

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1192797963388628992; November 8, 2019

Caption: ‘Nothing like closing the campaign with a good slap on a progressive’

The Trumpian discredit of the scientific community, inciting contempt and distrust, is present in a tweet attacking the scientific elite, making fun of a manifesto against VOX, allegedly subscribed by scholars. This relates to one of VOX’s most viewed YouTube videos in which Abascal, whilst giving a speech at a rally, pointed out that scholars had accused VOX of data manipulation. However, VOX’s tweet was more sardonic, with the party scorning the alleged manifesto by sharing a photo of a fabricated list of names, complemented by the ‘face with tears of joy’ emoji, . Indeed, a practice that informs both populist and platformisation tendencies in this period is the extensive use of emoji also on Twitter, contrary to CH. Emoji were utilised to attract attention, emphasising the inflammatory content of videos (e.g., ‘ Stellar intervention…’, ‘ Mega slap…’), to reinforce calls to action and as pointers to direct Leonardo Ferreira 82

attention ( , ⬇), to appeal to complicity ( , figure 50), or as an emotional nationalist ‘signature’, as was found on Facebook, with . In line with the ‘simplistic’ ethos of the populist style (Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 93), and Twitter’s 280-character limit, emoji were also used to get electoral programme points across, as with the tweet illustrated in figure 52, in which intricate matters become immediate and spreadable takeaways. This post, run as an ad in the last week of the short campaigning period, shows another version of the ‘golden minute’ Facebook post discussed before, and further shows the different approaches of VOX and CH in communicating the electoral programme.

Figures 52. Electoral programme

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1191515752974737408; November 5, 2019

Lastly, the topic of Abascal’s presence at the ballot box surfaced in this collection, as well as the celebration of the election results, the latter having been found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook and Instagram posts, and VOX’s Instagram and YouTube posts, Leonardo Ferreira 83

customised to each platform. One of these videos received the highest count of both likes and retweets– figure 53. Figure 54, however, shows an image only found on Twitter, a ‘throwback’ to Abascal’s ‘humble but resolute’ beginnings, as the ‘(extra)ordinary man’ bringing the message to ‘the people’.

Figure 53: Most engaged-with tweet

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1193647381906182145; November 10, 2019

Figure 54. Celebration of election results

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1193632501463494657; November 10, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 84

3.2.2.2 VOX – Post-election

After the election, similar to CH, the party reduced its activity, posting 849 tweets, an average of 28 tweets per day, with retweeting persisting as a prominent practice (figure 55). However, this average still exceeds that of Facebook for the same period (less than 2 posts per day). Links, mentions, and hashtags were utilised, and the vast majority of the (re)tweets with media included videos. In the post-election period, VOX still ran ads, as can be seen in figure 56 below, which differs from the party’s activity on Facebook, where VOX apparently only ran ads in the pre-election period, suggesting adapted strategies to different platforms.

Figure 55. Data set overview

Figure 56. Sources of tweets in data set

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For the analysis of this period, 21 original tweets were selected based on having reached a like count of at least 6,500, and a retweet count of at least 2,300. In this selection, seven tweets were run as ads (figure 57). Hashtags and mentions were observed and, in terms of media uploads, most tweets included videos. Following the same tendency as in the pre- election period, emoji were widely utilised, for example, instilling a sense of urgency ( ) or referring to parliamentary activity ( ). Some of the hashtags are connected to specific emoji (#DavisCupMadridFinals, #CopaDavis, and ), referring to a tweet praising Spain’s sports achievements, a nationalist appeal that has also surfaced among VOX’s most engaged- with Instagram posts. Along these lines, platformisation tendencies are prominent in the post- election period as well.

Figure 57. Sources | Post-election selection

In contrast with the selected pre-election period, within this selection some tweets included links to tweets, to VOX’s website, and to news media websites. The tweet including the link to VOX’s website, appealing to urgency, referred to the announcement of a formal request to impede a talk at the Basque University based on the participation of formerly- convicted ETA members ‘to intoxicate the young […] with radical and violent ideals’, whilst siding with the victims of terrorism, manifesting another commonality with CH in regards to the emphasis on taking the side of victims. In the case of links to news, these served several purposes. A piece about a Spanish celebrity’s intervention at a UN conference calling on leaders to demand sacrifices to the citizens regarding climate change was a source to attack the ‘progressive millionaires’ within Leonardo Ferreira 86

the ‘appeal to the people versus the elites’. This celebrity-based antagonism extended to retaliation at Twitter-based stigmatisation of VOX from another Spanish celebrity singer, thus denoting the exploitation of platform-based situations, as was seen with CH on Twitter on the same period. Moreover, the news items also served to advance the agenda against Muslim immigration: on the one hand, with a news item reporting on vandalization by Pakistani persons of the memorial to the 2017 Barcelona terrorist attack; and through a second piece reporting on the governing coalition’s initiative to remove barbed wire from the border fences in Spain’s North African autonomous cities ‘so that they can assault us more easily’. These two latter posts are indicative of the performance of crisis based on ‘dangerous others’ and on the failure of the elites, making use of media coverage. In another tweet VOX classifies the President of Mexico as ‘mediocre’ linking to a piece of news reporting on the Mexican head of state’s considerations about Spanish colonisation and the origin of corruption in Mexico, a tweet that received most likes and was the most retweeted (figure 58). By linking to one of Evo Morales’ tweets (posted shortly after Morales ceased being Bolivia’s president), in which the former president associated ‘the racist coup’ with colonial repression, VOX reacted evoking ‘anti-Spanish hatred’, accusing and ridiculing Morales. This tweet also surfaced among Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets. These cases reveal VOX’s reaction to ongoing situations in the domain of international relations, in one case exploiting media coverage, in the second case platform-specific material.

Figure 58. Most engaged-with post

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1196911204154916865; November 19, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 87

Regarding the tweets run as ads, two relate to the election aftermath: one tweet, issued as a call to action for diffusion, includes and a short clip of a longer most engaged-with YouTube video posted by VOX with Abascal giving a speech. This tweet denotes the dichotomy ‘us versus them’, as Abascal defines ‘the people’, VOX’s voters, on the one hand, as hard workers in the pursuit of a future, solidary, pacific and good; and, on the other hand, in opposition to the out-group: the ones who do not attack the constitutional order nor national unity, who do not fabricate explosives nor barricade streets. This post also emerged among VOX’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. The second ad pertaining to the election aftermath included a clip from a longer YouTube video posted by Abascal on Facebook. In this ‘one- week-milestone’ tweet (figure 59), the party affirmed itself as the leader of the opposition against the ‘progressive and communists of the government’, whilst in the video Abascal emphasised the continued political and media stigmatisation of VOX and its voters, similar to the Portuguese case.

Figure 59. One-week milestone

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1196034209372135424; November 17, 2019

Other ads coincided with circulated posts across platforms and between party and leader: the reaction to the pre-agreement between PSOE and Podemos, with the same video that Abascal posted on Facebook with his July 2019 speech at the parliament and the ‘fake news’ video; and further Abascal’s December 2019 address at the parliament demanding the Leonardo Ferreira 88

demotion of pro-independence MPs. Regarding the pre-agreement, a clip of the widely circulated press conference emerged on Twitter, although not having been run as an ad. In this case, the video corresponded to the segment in which Abascal qualifies Sánchez as a ‘shameless scammer’ and, whereas on Facebook the party posted a video of the press- conference, on Twitter VOX shared the link to the news website for the live streaming, hence denoting a repertoire adjusted to the different platforms’ affordances. Further ads referred to other circulated issues, namely immigration and gender violence, in these cases with significant variations. In the first case (figure 60), the tweet included a video of VOX’s congress spokesperson on television, who put the emphasis on the failure of political elites regarding illegal immigration.

Figure 60. Ad

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1195676702355185667; November 16, 2019

The issue of gender violence surfaced in an ad underlining generalised stigmatisation (‘progressive consensus’) against VOX’s secretary general Ortega Smith, within the ‘appeal to the people versus the elites’ (figure 61), which also surfaced among VOX’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. A second tweet mirrored the most engaged-with Facebook post related to this event, revealing adaptation to each platform’s affordances: whereas on Facebook a long post included image-based ‘proof’ ‘debunking’ the ‘background’ of the female activist that had confronted Ortega Smith, on Twitter the party created a thread, also including the ‘proof’, of which the first tweet was the most-engaged with. Leonardo Ferreira 89

Figure 61. Stigmatisation

Source: https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1198950559648235520; November 25, 2019

The tweets run as ads especially show the strategic circulation of issues as a party in opposition. Furthermore, these tweets reveal the party’s engagement with the platform’s vernaculars to achieve amplification, not only through the affordances of the platform (ads), but also through the adjustment of its repertoire to the valences of the platform (shorter videos) and the participatory appeal with the calls to action. The separatism issue also emerged. Firstly, within a performance of crisis related to the formation of the governing coalition: the tweet included a video of a road blockade in Catalonia ‘impeding a truck driver of earning his living’, to sustain an attack to Sánchez and Iglesias, framing them as being compromised not to act against the Catalan unrest for their ‘need of the separatists’ to govern. Secondly, in a post including an amateur video of a group of protesters waving the Spanish flag against a march allegedly paying tribute to ETA prisoners, with VOX praising the protesters, a post that also surfaced among VOX’s most engaged-with Instagram posts. Lastly, the ERE process also emerged, related to the sentencing of former PSOE politicians, found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook posts, although in this case implicitly and complemented by a memetic image of PSOE’s ‘Delinquency Handbook’.

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3.2.2.3 Santiago Abascal – Pre-election

In the pre-election period, Abascal posted 619 tweets, an average of approximately 19 tweets per day, much higher than his Facebook average . Figure 62 gives an overview of the data set: a focus on retweets over original tweets and replies, like VOX, with the replies being mostly part of threads created by Abascal; a significant use of hashtags (figure 63); and the prevalence of photos and videos over links. Regarding tweets with links, these were related to news pieces, and to YouTube videos outside VOX’s channel. In this period, no ads were identified, contrary to the findings for VOX. Overall, these findings are suggestive of platformisation given the intensive activity and engagement with the platform’s affordances, altogether highly contrasting with the findings for Ventura.

Figure 62. Data set overview

Figure 63. Hashtags in data set

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From the total 619 tweets, 37 were selected, which fulfilled at least one of the following conditions (minimum): 8,000 likes or 8,000 retweets. Within this selection, hashtags were observed, and the majority of the tweets included photos, videos or links (to tweets, to news media and to YouTube). Furthermore, only two tweets were retweets. However, unlike with VOX’s Twitter and Facebook posts, and Abascal’s Facebook posts, emoji were barely observed, with the ones found being almost exclusively the Spanish flag. The celebration of Spain’s national day also surfaced in this selection, with Abascal posting photos of the official commemorative events, as he had done on Facebook, where a second post was found regarding a painting alluding to Spain’s colonial past, which was not the case here. However, another patriotic post emerged, with Abascal alluding to the Spanish civil war, and with it appealing to emotion but also symbolically fostering polarisation. These findings show the tendency of emphasising particular events across platforms for the populist performance ‘us versus them’. The issue of Franco’s exhumation also surfaced in this selection, with Abascal posting the same controversial images related to the Spanish civil war, framing Sánchez as the ‘scavenger of Moncloa’ as well. Other recurrent themes were the show El Hormiguero, and rallies. In regards to the latter, the rally in Guadalajara also surfaced in this selection, with Abascal making a long thread from it about the electoral campaigning across Spain, including the short promotional videos, ending on the day of the election with Abascal casting his vote, thereby creating an electoral campaign diary. In the case of the rally in Bilbao, whereas on Facebook a post emphasising success and support followed a post reporting an alleged protest against VOX’s rally, the tweet corresponded to the latter, emphasising persecution. The trend of highlighting stigmatisation was thus also observed in this selection. Another tweet emphasised complicity between certain media and political actors causing an aggression to one of VOX’s members. Figure 64 shows a tweet in which Abascal targeted the public broadcaster RTVE, simultaneously issuing a sarcastic attack to Sánchez alluding to Franco’s exhumation.

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Figure 64. Attack to the media

Source: https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/1192933989180416002; November 8, 2019

The Catalan issue was significantly salient in this selection, showing different angles in its approach. For example, the long statement about the sentencing of pro-independence Catalan leaders from the Facebook post was transformed into a thread, emoji were removed, and instead of including photos, a link to a piece of news was shared. Whilst platformisation tendencies are observed with the adaptation to the different affordances of each platform, both the Facebook post and the tweet served the performance of crisis, including the theatre of shame approach, to question the verdict and attack PSOE, PP and Cs, thereby demarcating VOX as ‘the only party’ to defend the independence of the judiciary, the police forces and the ‘abandoned’ Catalan citizens. Moreover, the performance of crisis pivoting on the Catalan unrest also included spreading a sense of terror, emphasising the hardship faced by the police forces and the ‘failure’ of Sánchez in defending constitutional order, for example with Abascal making two threaded tweets of a longer Facebook post, including the images of the letter directed to the Mesa del Congreso posted on Facebook, reinforcing the image of VOX as the party taking ‘concrete measures’, and thereby adapting the message to Twitter’s affordances. On the other hand, Abascal appealed to a sense of chaos presenting ‘proof’, for example by sharing an amateur Leonardo Ferreira 93

video with scenes of violence, or by posting a screenshot of a piece of news of ‘the deadly repercussions’ of the Catalan unrest (figure 65).

Figure 65. Catalan issue

Source: https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/1184430109199159297; October 16, 2019

Attacks to political opponents pivoting on the Catalan issue were also found, with Abascal engaging with communities of practice (trolling) by @mentioning Gabriel Rufián, a politician of the party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, i.e., Republican Left of Catalonia), in a tweet including an amateur video which showed Rufián in the middle of a protesting crowd seemingly scorning him. The two retweets within this collection relate to the Catalan issue as well. Abascal retweeted a tweet from VOX’s Girona representative (Catalonia), including a video showing the politician in direct confrontation with the Spanish rapper Valtonyc outside the Catalan delegation in Brussels, following the court’s ruling sentencing pro-independence leaders. The second retweet was from one of VOX’s tweets, reporting on the same event, praising Paneque. This tweet included a similar video, however longer, with Paneque talking to the press after the confrontation. This finding thus shows the concerted effort in amplifying the issue, therewith advancing the anti-separatism agenda in reaction to ongoing events. Leonardo Ferreira 94

The tweet that received the highest amount of likes (14,938) and simultaneously was the most retweeted (28,397) related to the Catalan unrest and included a 5-second video depicting scenes of violence connected to the use of the Spanish flag in public, only found in this selection. Figure 66 shows a related tweet that emerged in this selection, appealing to the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy through the metaphor of the ‘Living Spain’, implicitly opposing the ‘Anti-Spain’ (Rama et al.).

Figure 66. ‘Living Spain’13

Source: https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/1184842511254200321; October 17, 2019

Caption: Whatever she votes, whatever she thinks, she is the face of the Living Spain that we will never abandon’

3.2.2.4 Santiago Abascal – Post-election

In this period the number of tweets totalled 232 which, comparing to the pre-election period, corresponds to a drop by almost two thirds. Whilst in the pre-election period Abascal issued

13 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 95

approximately nineteen tweets per day, after the election posting activity fell to less than eight tweets per day. As shown in figure 67, below, the privileging of retweeting continued in the post- election period, denoting that less than half of the tweets were original, although Abascal also frequently retweeted his tweets, a practice also observed in the pre-election period and shared by VOX. Replying was still a residual practice as in the pre-election period, similar to VOX, indicating a lack of interaction and suggesting a simplification of messages in the one-tweet format rather than threads. Media uploads (videos and photos), hashtags, and links were also observed in this period, and no ads were run.

Figure 67. Data set overview

For the analysis of the post-election period, tweets were selected based on having reached a count of (minimum) 10,000 retweets or 12,000 likes. This resulted in the selection of 27 tweets, each having fulfilled at least one of the mentioned conditions. Within this selection, most tweets included media (photos and videos), and links to tweets by news outlets and other users, including from one of VOX’s key members, and from the leader of PP. The eight retweets were circulated from VOX’s account and the remainder were retweets from Abascal’s own post-election tweets. Once more, emoji were practically inexistent, however hashtags were utilised. In this post-election selection of tweets, many reveal commonalities with previous findings. The celebration of the election results appeared, in a tweet with Abascal thanking Leonardo Ferreira 96

voters, a post that has also been found among Abascal’s most engaged-with Facebook posts, with the number of photos of the celebrations having been adjusted to Twitter’s affordances. This tweet reveals a similarity with Ventura, who also tweeted to thank the voters. Tweets related to the pre-agreement between Sánchez and Iglesias also surfaced, in multiple tweets and retweets, including the tweet whose screenshot both Abascal and VOX posted on Facebook (figure 68), which achieved the highest count of likes. The widely circulated ‘fake news’ video also emerged, having been the most retweeted (20,372). These findings reveal platformisation tendencies in terms of amplification endeavours, facilitated by the retweet affordance, and further denote the concerted effort between party and leader across platforms.

Figure 68. Most liked tweet

Source: https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/1194248689012936705; November 12, 2019

The concerted effort also included highlighting stigmatisation from the media, prominently found within this selection (tweeted and further retweeted) in multifaceted ways, for example, Abascal’s emotional outburst exposing the ‘media hunt’; and the memetic video compiling several media actors’ negative commentary (figure 69), found on Facebook, also emerged, emphasising the defence of VOX voters. These findings thus show similarities with CH and Ventura’s regarding the emphasis on stigma in the post-election period.

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Figure 69. Stigmatisation

Source: https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/1201445897529372672; December 2, 2019

The voting for the Mesa del Congreso emerged in this selection, with some variations, for example, whilst on Facebook Abascal’s post suggests an intention to exert pressure on PP to favour VOX in the voting, the tweets correspond to after-the-fact attacks with Abascal antagonising PP’s leader Pablo Casado, by framing him as ‘double-faced’, linking to a tweet by Casado as counter-propaganda at his declarations accusing VOX of lack of cooperation. The ERE process regarding the sentencing of PSOE politicians also surfaced, to attack Sánchez.

Figure 70. ERE process

Source: https://twitter.com/Santi_ABASCAL/status/1199586739863654400; November 27, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 98

Lastly, two (re)tweets revealed the polarising performance of crisis, in one case, related to separatism, emphasising the failure of the judiciary based on a court ruling over a mediatic violent crime connected to the pro-unity and pro-independence tensions. This focus on crime reveals a commonality with Ventura’s post-election approach on Twitter. The second case related the role of women to Islamophobia, emphasising ‘women’s insecurity in Europe’ to underline VOX’s countering of the implantation of ‘disrespectful cultures’.

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3.3 Instagram

3.3.1 CH14

3.3.1.1 CH – Pre-election

CH’s first post on Instagram dates from mid-August 2019, thus from shortly before the pre- election period under analysis, and one year after having created its Facebook page. In the pre- election period, the party issued 112 posts, a little under four posts per day. From these posts, the vast majority included photos. For the analysis of this period, 16 posts were selected, which received at least 140 likes15. Within this selection, several posts included hashtags, which only pertained to the party’s name and motto, in line with the findings on Facebook. Moreover, only two posts included videos, one of which was the most liked (255 likes): the video in which the Prime Minister is seen in direct verbal confrontation with a citizen. The second video pertained to a clip from the televised electoral debate in which Ventura participated. The conspiratorial tweet about the debate was also found in this selection, in this case with a longer caption referring to attempts to silence CH, and further referring to immoral behaviour within the system, projecting CH as demanding respect to the Portuguese at the parliament. The corruption of the system was the focus of more posts, to demarcate CH. Other posts also emerging in this selection included the polls; the meme referring to the socialist leadership; the post about the traditional family; the announcement of the mandatory electoral campaign silence; the post with Ventura and the Prison Officers’ Union leader; and the announcement of the suspension of the campaign due to the aggression to a police officer. A second post about the aggression to the police officer emerged (figure 71), targeting the President of the Republic, framed as the ‘the kingdom’s parrot-in-chief’, to demarcate CH as siding with ‘the ones who give their lives to protect us’.

14 Ventura’s Instagram posts have not been included in this analysis due to the fact that his account was only created after the periods under consideration in this study, as mentioned in section 2.3. 15 Comments were not considered since they were not very prominent. Leonardo Ferreira 100

Figure 71. ‘Us versus them’

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B3ArR-UH6wk; September 29, 2019

The most commented post (157 comments) related to a proposal to forbid ‘LGBTI propaganda’ at schools, within the proposal-in-image technique, and further including Linktree in the caption, which on this platform is not actionable. Other proposals following the same format were found, pertaining to the chemical castration of sexual offenders, and the termination of privileges to convicted terrorists and illegal immigrants, in this case with each proposal corresponding to one post, rather than within an album as found on Facebook. Lastly, the post about the interview to Ventura on the televised fact-checking programme also emerged, however, whereas on Facebook the post served to praise Ventura, on Instagram CH issued a call to action asking the followers’ opinion as comments to the post, revealing platformisation tendencies considering the appeal to platform-specific participation.

3.3.1.2 CH – Post-election

The party’s activity on Instagram more than halved in the post-election period, with CH issuing 49 posts, in its vast majority photos. From the total 49 posts, 15 were selected, based on having reached at least 475 likes. These posts included mainly photos; and hashtags were present in several posts, however only pertaining to the party’s motto (#CHEGA, i.e., Enough). In the post-election period, the most engaged-with posts also reveal the circulation of topics, as the celebration of the election results, in this case with a screenshot of a piece of news reporting on the election of Ventura. CH’s Facebook video-post about the beginning of functions in which Ventura mentions an ‘aura of hostility’ also surfaced in this selection, with Leonardo Ferreira 101

stigmatisation being the focus of more posts. Moreover, one of the most engaged-with posts related to othering MP Joacine, in this case with different nuances: even though the offenses to the Portuguese flag were mentioned, CH posted a screenshot of a news piece with Ventura commenting on the arrival of MP Joacine’s assistant at the parliament, as he was wearing a skirt, presenting CH as a ‘shield’ against the extreme left. The video from CH’s YouTube channel with Ventura’s first parliamentary intervention about the government’s programme also surfaced in this selection, with CH praising Ventura, who emphasises the ‘largest cabinet’ issue in his address. Moreover, the video found among Ventura’s Facebook posts about his second intervention also emerged in this selection. CH praises Ventura, who focuses on the government’s help to minorities, forgetting the police forces, and ‘distributing’ Portuguese nationality. These posts are indicative of populist tendencies regarding the polarising performance of crisis and ‘bad banners’, and are further indicative of the party-leader concerted effort in circulating this performance online. , with edited clips from the Assembly of the Republic’s broadcasts. Other attacks to the government emerged, for example figure 72 shows a post illustrating the performance of crisis based on crime, alleging the government’s manipulation, with CH including a video from its YouTube channel, a montage with the Prime Minister, at the parliament, ascertaining Portugal as one of safest countries in the world, and a piece of news about the Eurostat report that Ventura posted on Facebook, about the robbery rate in Europe according to 2017 data, and Portugal’s fifth place.

Figure 72. Performance of crisis

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4Smz9Cne2Q; October 31, 2019

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CH’s presentation of the proposal regarding the reduction of MPs also surfaced, receiving the highest count of likes (930). The issue related to the fire squad also surfaced in this selection. Besides the screenshot of the fire squad’s Facebook post, and the posts directly attacking the Minister of Internal Administration circulated on other platforms, another post emerged in this selection (figure 73), within the dichotomy ‘us versus them’.

Figure 73. ‘Us versus them’

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4Xx-xrnMI4/; November 2, 2019

Caption: “Yesterday in Santarém, on a visit from the CHEGA Party to the National Gastronomy Festival, there was still no anticipation of the attack of elements of gypsy ethnicity to the Volunteer Firefighters of Borba and naturally André Ventura was already posing with the usual ... The Good! Those beside whom we will always be!”

Lastly, post-election poll results surfaced in this selection (figure), with CH publicising its increasing success.

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Figure 74. Polls

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4cUUhYHtlJ/; November 4, 2019 Caption: “In an Intercampus Survey for CM and CMTV, despite the fieldwork being carried out before the Government Programme Debate - which we are certain will have boosted the number of voters CHEGA - this is a clear path of no return! We'll see more Polls soon ... Nobody stops #CHEGA”

3.3.2 VOX and Santiago Abascal

3.3.2.1 VOX – Pre-election

In the short campaigning period, VOX issued 103 posts (60 videos and 43 photos), around three posts per day, on average. Although the number of posts in the short campaigning period does not differ much between VOX and CH, the difference in the ratio videos-photos is very significant, with VOX prioritising audio-visual material, whilst CH scarcely posted videos. In the pre-election period, 17 posts were selected, based on having reached at least 60,000 likes and/or 3,100 comments. Within this selection, 13 posts included videos, and four included photos. In these posts, VOX made use of tags, mentions, and video collections, as well of hashtags, which were abundant, in line with the platform’s culture. VOX also made extensive use of emoji on Instagram, to frame the content of the post and appeal to diffusion. Thus, the findings show a greater engagement with the platform’s vernaculars compared to CH. Among this selection was also the post with Abascal addressing the sexual abuse case involving a foreign minor; and the video of Abascal’s participation in the talk show El Hormiguero, referring to the controversial gender violence law and invoking Islamophobia. However, in regards to the show, a second video-post appeared in this selection, as counter- Leonardo Ferreira 104

propaganda to present VOX as more concerned with ‘social emergency’ rather than with abortion and euthanasia. Spain’s national day, an event about which Abascal posted across platforms, surfaces for the first time among VOX’s posts. However, whereas Abascal’s focus was on the colonial past and on the official commemorations, VOX’s post has a different focus–challenging the pro-independence movement in Catalonia: the party posted a video of young people apparently marching in Barcelona, enthusiastically carrying the Spanish flag, where a dummy of Torra also appears (figure 75), thereby symbolically approaching the division ‘us versus them’, whilst particularly appealing to young followers. This post includes several crafted hashtags, in line with the platform’s vernaculars, relating to the country’s national day and identity (e.g., #DíaDeLaHispanidad), but also to Catalonia–#CataluñaEsEspaña (i.e., Catalonia is Spain) or #GolpistasAPrisión (coup perpetrators to prison). All in all, this post shows different approaches between party and leader and the reception thereof, with Abascal’s post being more individualised, institutionalised and nostalgic, and VOX’s propaganda showing the attention given to the appeal to young people.

Figure 75. Spain’s national day16

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B3hEk9FId6G; October 12, 2019

Other posts related to the Catalan issue also emerged, some of which already found on other platforms, such as VOX’s Facebook video-posts showing containers in flames on the streets and the riot police agent being carried by colleagues. The video the confrontation between VOX’s Girona representative Alberto Paneque and the Spanish rapper Valtonyc also emerged, with the longer version having been adapted into a threefold video-collection (figure

16 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 105

76). This was the most liked, and commented (10,772) post within this selection, with VOX emphasising braveness in defending Spain, the flag, and ‘the people’.

Figure 76. Catalan issue

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B3m7_M5otgu; October 14, 2019

However, new posts related to the Catalan issue emerge in this selection. In one post, VOX includes a photo of a citizen standing alone holding the Spanish flag, facing a crowd protesting the court ruling, a representation of the ‘us-them’ opposition, with VOX showing encouragement and support of those ‘in Catalonia defending Spain and freedom’. Furthermore, VOX posted a video edited from a televised show, in which a citizen based in Barcelona gives her unapologetic testimony about the destruction that resulted from the protests. The citizen was interviewed on the street, and images of vandalised buildings are shown. This post denotes populist tendencies in the sense that the performance of crisis is conveyed from the standpoint of ‘the people’, with the citizen becoming the representation of ‘the muzzled’. Vandalism was further evoked in a post with a memetic ‘story of a hero’ in Barcelona, ‘the super grandpa’, defending the neighbourhood from the separatists. Televised debates also surfaced among this selection of most engaged-with posts, namely the ‘golden minute’ post, and the post with Abascal confronting Sánchez, alluding to the historical memory law. However, figure 77 shows a new approach in regards to televised debates: a meme announcing Abascal’s participation in the televised debate. Drawing on vernacular, VOX anticipates Abascal’s ‘bad manners’, caricaturising the leader as a ‘slap courier’, and including the (in)famous Pepe The Frog, associated with the alt-right meme war of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The meme in figure 78 represents the polarisation conveyed by VOX, shared from an unofficial account supportive of the party (tagged)–two voting options: voting for Spain who loves herself, represented by Abascal; or voting for hate, Leonardo Ferreira 106

represented by Sánchez and Torra. Both posts represent the constitutive role of the platform vernaculars to the populist performance.

Figures 77 and 78. Memes17

Source: (left) https://www.instagram.com/p/B4dpRG-o5i8; November 5, 2019 / (right) https://www.instagram.com/p/B3rcJJpIksU; October 16, 2019

Lastly, the celebrations of the election results appeared in this selection as well, in two posts containing videos showing Abascal and other VOX key members celebrating at VOX’s headquarters, in the presence of a crowd.

3.3.2.2 VOX – Post-election

After the election, the party reduced its posting activity from 103 posts, to only 38, in line with the findings for Facebook and Twitter. For this period, the criteria for the selection of posts corresponded to (minimum) 50,000 likes and/or 2,000 comments. This resulted in the selection of ten posts, eight of which included videos. Both hashtags and emoji were abundant among these posts, and tags were utilised, in line with the pre-election period. In the post-election period, many of the most engaged-with posts have already been commented throughout this work, as Abascal’s speech in the election aftermath press- conference, constituting ‘the people’, which also included a similar call to action for diffusion. This post was complemented by post in figure 79, within the same performance, with an image showing the election results between richer (above) and poorer (below) municipalities.

17 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 107

Figure 79. ‘The people’

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4wyWHwoSDY; November 12, 2019

Other circulated posts included the celebration of sports achievements; the post about stigma against Ortega Smith related to the gender violence law, here framed with multiple hashtags; and the protest against a pro-ETA march. Posts related to the coalition between Sánchez and Iglesias also emerged, within the same populist performance, and some adapted to the platform: Abascal’s July 2019 speech at the parliament; the shorter version of Abascal’s press conference speech, however with VOX driving users to the ‘link in bio’ feature for the complete version; and the related ‘fake news’ post. A fourth post complemented the latter three, including footage of an interview to Sánchez with the quote: ‘‘I would not sleep well’ with Podemos in government’ (figure 80), including distinct hashtags.

Figure 80. Reaction to coalition government

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4xuEC2ooEU; November 12, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 108

Lastly, a post about VOX’s MPs also emerged (figure 81), framed in a humorous manner, and including the accompanying hashtags and emoji ‘signature’.

Figure 81. New legislature team18

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B5AmxA1Ingu; November 18, 2019

3.3.2.3 Santiago Abascal – Pre-election

In this period Abascal issued 105 posts (66 photos and 39 videos), from which 15 were selected, based on having garnered at least 60,000 likes and/or 1,200 comments. These posts show a consistent engagement with the platform vernaculars: emoji were used in several posts, most often the Spanish flag; hashtags were common and diverse; and Abascal also made use of tags, mentions, and photo collections. Furthermore, the majority of posts included photos. Similar to Facebook and Twitter, posts about the talk show El Hormiguero, the celebration of Spain’s national day, the Catalan unrest, the rally in Madrid, and the day of the election emerged. Abascal’s participation in the annual high profile event Premios Princesa de Asturias also surfaced in this selection, and exemplifies adaptation to the different platforms: whereas Abascal’s Facebook post served the performance of crisis related to the Catalan unrest, on Instagram the post fits the ‘celebrity’ performance (figure 82), as Abascal emphasised having felt welcomed, posting photos with his wife and with supporters, including selfies.

18 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 109

Figure 82. Event Premios Princesa de Asturias19

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B3yrLdII28_; October 19, 2019

Also suggestive of platformisation is the symbolic electoral campaign closing rally in Madrid: on Instagram Abascal used a photo album within a message of hope for change, the ‘España Viva’ (Living Spain), including ‘backstage’ photos. The televised debate broadcast by RTVE with the five leaders of the main political forces also emerged, however within a less hostile approach: VOX’s leader put the focus on his good feelings in the aftermath of the ‘dialectical combat’ and on the messages of support he had received, posting several photos, including among his adversaries (figure 83), and his team. Other two posts related to this debate: one indirectly announcing the debate, building rapport with the followers; and the other thanking the debate’s organising entity, promoting a celebrity status, and an image of a focused and confident person. The only post including a video, within this selection, referred to the memetic 2-second ‘Good night and Long Live Spain’, extracted from this debate, posted on the day before the election, a post that was also found Abascal’s most engaged-with tweets for this period.

Figure 83. Televised debate20

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4fCb7CotGB November 5, 2019

19 Edited for privacy protection purposes. 20 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 110

Posts symbolically blending the private sphere with the political agenda included selfies at the gym ‘between rallies’, promoting the national military police force; at the barber, a ‘clear- sighted’, ‘trustworthy’ Cuban; or a ‘brief visit’ to the office with his children on the day before the election, ‘the day of reflection’, i.e. the day of campaign silence. Lastly, the most liked and commented post includes a joke combining a Spanish tradition with an attack to Pedro Sánchez (figure 84), alluding to Franco’s exhumation, a topic also widely circulated.

Figure 84. Most engaged-with post21

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4jvNpyoW5I; November 7, 2019

Caption: ‘I handle the bulls like Sánchez does politics, only daring with the dead.’

3.3.2.4 Santiago Abascal – Post-election

In this period Abascal’s posting activity dropped drastically, from 105 to 28 posts, from which 11 posts were selected, based on having garnered at least 65,000 likes and/or 2,000 comments. Emoji continued to be frequently utilised, as well as hashtags; and tags, mentions, and photo collections were also observed. In this selection, all posts included photos. Within this selection, two posts related to the celebration of the election results, with Abascal posting photos of the celebrations and thanking the voters, similar to what has been found among Abascal’s Facebook and Twitter most engaged-with posts. The beginning of the new legislature was also brought to Instagram, with two posts surfacing, in line with Abascal’s Facebook post by showing appreciation and commitment to the voters, also making use of crafted hashtags.

21 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 111

The widely circulated reaction to the coalition pre-agreement also surfaced, in a post with photos of the press conference (figure 85), in which Abascal also refers to Sánchez as a ‘shameless scammer’. In this case, Abascal frames the reaction with the hashtag #StopFrentePopular (i.e., Stop Popular Front), alluding to the civil war past, as a comparison to the left-leaning coalition involved in the war. Moreover, a link is shared to the video of the press conference from VOX’s YouTube channel in which electoral fraud is emphasised.

Figure 85. Press conference

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B4zphyhISfb; November 13, 2019

Caption: ‘BREAKING / At the Congress following the agreement between Sánchez and Pablo Iglesias. / ‘Sánchez has neither word, nor shame, nor scruples, nor principles. He has acted as a professional scammer before public opinion’.’

Figure 86 shows a second post related to the coalition, in which Abascal shared a link to an interview, evoking the new government’s intention in undermining constitutional order, and framing VOX as a barrier against socialism, communism and separatism, thus in line with the polarising and emotionalised populist performance observed in other platforms. Therefore, both populist and platformisation tendencies permeate these two posts.

Figure 86. Interview

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B5NZtSdojZP ; November 23, 2019 Leonardo Ferreira 112

The remaining posts relate to a more personal side of Abascal: on the one hand, intimist posts with photos of Abascal with his wife, and his children; on the other hand, more focused on lifestyle (figure 87) and relating to celebrity status (figure 88), altogether contributing to (af)firming his persona, especially in regards to values, attitudes and place in life, important to strengthen his role as leader and in opposition.

Figure 87. Most-liked post22

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B47Q0WloxmZ; November 16, 2019

Figure 88. 500,000 followers milestone23

Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/B5GV1fbIHI8; November 20, 2019

22 Edited for privacy protection purposes. 23 Edited for privacy protection purposes. Leonardo Ferreira 113

3.4 YouTube

3.4.1 CH

3.4.1.1 CH – Pre-election

CH created its YouTube channel, CHEGA TV, on 27 January 2019, having posted its first video on the same day. CH’s creation of a YouTube channel follows the trend of its Facebook page, as it was also created before the party was officially established. However, only one video was posted in the short campaigning period: a video of Ventura’s ‘electoral pitch’, which related to a web series of ‘electoral pitches’ by a Portuguese news and opinion magazine, reaching 18,534 views. Ventura approached issues of immigration, and ethnic minorities, including attacks to the political elites (the system), within the performance of crisis by emphasising murder, illegality, political corruption, and the ‘subsidised’ Romani. In terms of affordances, CH did not make use of video description, hashtags or emoji, and comments were disabled.

3.4.1.2 CH – Post-election

In the post-election period, the party posted 12 videos. The posts show that the party linked once to its website, made occasional use of hashtags (#CHEGA, i.e., Enough), added descriptions to all videos, and opened the comment box to all videos but two. After the election, the party continued to put the spotlight on Ventura, reverberating the attention given to Ventura by the media: posting a video with fragments from his speech in the aftermath of the election; a ‘lengthy’ interview to the leader by a radio station, without footage (still image); and a clip of his participation in a debate on a well-known programme on television. Again, a video by the aforementioned magazine was posted, reporting on the beginning of functions at the parliament, with Ventura mentioning an ‘aura of hostility’, a video that was found among CH’s most engaged-with Facebook and Instagram posts. Below (figure 89) is a screenshot of a video also found among CH and Ventura’s most engaged-with Facebook posts related to the ‘fulfilment’ of the electoral programme, regarding the presentation of the proposal to reduce the number of MPs.

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Figure 89. Cross-posted video

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxHQ3E0RDzw; November 6, 2019

The crime-based performance of crisis was conveyed through the assault to the fire squad unit, with CH posting a clip of news with the Minister of Internal Administration commenting the situation. On the other hand, the video found on Instagram in which the Prime Minister ascertains Portugal as one of the safest countries also surfaced, with CH also accusing the government of manipulation. However, from these videos, only the interview to Ventura on the radio, and the clip of his participation in the televised debate achieved high engagement on YouTube. The three interventions of Ventura at the parliament, circulated on the other platforms and denoting populist tendencies, did indeed reach high engagement, with the most viewed video from these five most engaged-with posts being Ventura’s first intervention at the parliament, whose YouTube success was covered by the media, as found among Ventura’s Facebook posts. These five most engaged-with videos achieved at least 110,000 views.

Leonardo Ferreira 115

3.4.2 VOX

3.4.2.1 VOX – Pre-election

In the pre-election period, VOX posted 85 videos, slightly below three per day. All these videos contained descriptions, comments were enabled, and hashtags and emoji were frequently utilised. These findings thus differ from CH’s approach to YouTube in the pre-election period. For the analysis of this period 16 videos were selected, based on having reached at least 100,000 views. These videos pertained mainly to rallies and televised debates, and most have been found among VOX and Abascal’s most engaged-with posts on other platforms. In regards to the televised debates, these featured Abascal attacking Iglesias and Sánchez, evoking ETA and the historical memory law; and VOX’s congress spokesperson giving an ‘economy lesson’ regarding VOX’s programme (figure), following the same style in regards to the use of emoji.

Figure 90. Televised debate

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NThIsEZATZE; November 2, 2019

Rallies pivoting on the performance of crisis based on immigration emerged, namely those about the rent subsidy policy, and the sexual abuse case involving a foreign minor, the latter achieving the third highest count of views (over 510,000). The rallies in the province of Barcelona and in Madrid also surfaced, within the betrayal- and belligerent-based polarising performance, in the latter case mentioning political, Leonardo Ferreira 116

media and scientific elites’ stigmatisation of VOX, and attacking parties across the political spectrum. The rally in Guadalajara also emerged, with VOX highlighting to have received immense support and thanking for it, in the title and description. In the video Abascal rejects ‘labels’, and appeals to a ‘back to the basics’–love of the country, identity and tradition, no outside interference and freedom from the progressive dictatorship. This post reveals populist tendencies for the emotional and simplistic appeal to the people whilst situating the ‘others’. In terms of specificities within this selection, a rally in Valladolid emerged, indeed as a promotional video, and following the populist style for the emphasis on political elites’ lack of consultation with the people. On the other hand, the rally closing the campaign, in Madrid, was livestreamed from YouTube, a practice also adopted by CH, although on Facebook. Moreover, VOX posted a video compiling the interventions of various VOX key members at a rally, with the party’s main messages, simultaneously praising the leader, and including a call to action for diffusion (figure 91).

Figure 91. Rally

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_Lck24ut6Q; October 16, 2019

The Catalan question also surfaced, related to the court ruling, with a video of Abascal talking to the press, announcing an upcoming appeal; the confrontation between VOX Girona representative and the Spanish rapper, which was the most viewed (over 680,000 views); and a unique post to this selection, with a ‘best moments’ video featuring VOX’s secretary general commenting the sentence on television. Leonardo Ferreira 117

Lastly, the longer version of the celebration of the election results surfaced, with Abascal appealing to the ‘patriotic alternative’ in opposition to the ‘progressive dictatorship’, reiterating the issues of Catalonia, immigration, and political and media stigmatisation.

3.4.2.2 VOX – Post-election

After the election, VOX significantly decreased its activity on YouTube, contrary to CH, posting only 19 videos, of which ten were selected based on having achieved a count of at least 100,000 views. Nevertheless, VOX continued to make use of emoji and hashtags, the comment box was open, and descriptions were added to the videos. As in the pre-election period, in this selection videos that have been found on other platforms have surfaced, as the longer version of Abascal’s speech in the election-aftermath press conference, constituting the people, further addressing the unrest in Catalonia, attacking other parties across the political spectrum and framing VOX as ‘the contention dyke’ against coup perpetrators and their accomplices, and further mentioning stigmatisation of VOX from the media and on social media. Moreover, reactions to the pre-agreement between Sánchez and Iglesias also surfaced: the press conference, which was the most viewed video (over 840,000 views); as well as the ‘fake news’ video. Abascal’s visit to Murcia also emerged, and further also Abascal’s address to the president of the Mesa del Congreso about taking action to demote elected ‘separatist’ MPs, the second most viewed (over 569,000 views). In regards to the voting for the formation of the Mesa, the video of VOX’s secretary general attacking PP emerged, also including a call to action for diffusion. Stigmatisation was further emphasised in a one-minute video to reassure VOX’s ‘fearless’ representation of their voters, a unique post to this selection. Other unique posts pertained to videos featuring other VOX MPs participating in televised debates alongside with representatives of other parties, one ‘defending VOX voters’ and demarcating VOX from the others’ ‘unified agenda’; the second with a ‘review’ to the progressives highlighting VOX’s difference in regards to the gender violence law. Lastly, the Catalan issue surfaced, with a video of Abascal talking to the press at a demonstration in Barcelona, for the defence of the Constitution, also including the ‘dyke of contention’ reference against coup perpetrators and their accomplices. Leonardo Ferreira 118

4. Cross-country and cross-platform analysis

In the pre-election period, the populist style was a constant across platforms in Portuguese case, with instances of the appeal to the ‘us versus them’, the performance of crisis and ‘bad manners’ emerging. The adoption of the livestreaming affordance on Facebook, constitutive of the populist performance, and the use of memetic visual and audio-visual material in parallel with messages triggering attention and emotional reactions suggest that high engagement is reached through a platform-adapted populist performance, which aligns with previous research on Facebook (Larsson). Indeed, Facebook was the platform where CH and Ventura were able to fare better in regards to reciprocity, which seems to result from a confluence of factors: Facebook’s broad set of options in regards to engagement (reactions, comments, and shares); its anti-elitist ethos (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al.), and prominence in Portugal; Facebook’s affordances in terms of a wide range of posting possibilities (e.g., long videos); and the party’s earlier presence and more intensive posting activity on this platform, where the leader was also most active, enhancing their concerted efforts in antagonising certain political and media actors, ostracising specific groups, and instrumentalising and exacerbating local issues du jour. Altogether, the affordances ‘imagined’ (Bucher and Helmond 22) by the party and its leader regarding Facebook may have contributed to their retention on this platform, considering the lower activity and engagement on the other platforms where, albeit the populist performance, the platform vernaculars have had a constraining influence, which is reinforced by the findings regarding VOX and Abascal. In the Spanish case, the studied social media have had a central role in their strategy with the findings for the pre-election period indicating that both the party and the leader pushed the agenda in a concerted and multiplex manner across platforms by focusing on crisis, ostracism and antagonism to appeal to ‘the people’, making repeated use of tropes (e.g., progressive dictatorship) and sound bites (e.g., war of sexes); and by engaging with the platforms’ vernaculars, such as the platform-specific calls to action on Twitter, activating the lever of participation of socially active and networked audiences (Jenkins et al. 45), drawing on participatory/user generated content on Instagram, or the engaging with affordances of the platform (ads), all constitutive of the populist performance (Baldwin-Philippi, ‘The Technological Performance of Populism’). These findings thus indicate that high engagement was achieved through the adoption of the populist style in parallel with an adaptation to the different platform vernaculars, contributing to the dissemination of their message, in which the Leonardo Ferreira 119

exploitation of fracturing issues and ongoing events, such as the Catalan crisis and Franco’s exhumation, played an important role. Indeed, the ‘imagined’ affordances of each platform seem to have influenced VOX and Abascal’s approach, of which the findings related to Twitter are particularly suggestive, considering their pre-election intensive activity, which seems to account for the platform’s more open network structure, and for the presence of journalists, opinion formers, and politicians as active users, alongside with a culture of (automated) fake accounts. Taking the short campaigning period as a time in which more actors are more active, campaigning, monitoring, or issuing information and commentary around the event of the election, VOX and Abascal’s intensive activity suggests an adaptation to the platform’s vernaculars to enhance the chances of VOX(-related) content to surface in users’ timelines, and to possibly attract professional media’s attention. All the more, considering political contenders’ stronger presence on Twitter in the previous election (Oelsner); VOX’s previous links to particular networks with ‘abnormal high-activity users’ (Applebaum); and taking into account the findings related to the alleged Twitter-driven attempt to boycott Abascal’s participation in the show El Hormiguero. Despite not being photo- or video-based platforms, visual and audio-visual material was predominant on Facebook and Twitter, especially in the case of VOX, aligning with the ‘visual turn’, diffusing electoral debates. Emoji constituted the populist performance and captured attention, and thereby engagement. Hashtag use, relevant in regards to visibility, especially on Twitter and Instagram, was also part of the repertoire, through several crafted hashtags. As a video-sharing platform, YouTube affords longer videos, which were among the most engaged-with posts, thereby prolonging stay, especially the live stream, mutually beneficial (to the platform, and to ingrain the party’s message); however short videos were also found, facilitating cross-posting. The findings for the video- and photo-sharing Instagram reveal the party’s appeal to the young, a growing community in the Spanish Instagram. On the other hand, the findings for Abascal show that, whereas on Facebook the prevalent promotional videos of rallies centred the grandness of the leader and an esprit de corps, on Instagram the leader’s charisma was centred in the flow between ordinariness and extraordinariness, meshing a more intimist side with a public image tending to celebrity (Sampietro and Sánchez-Castillo 171), thereby conveying both ‘influence’ and ‘authenticity’, paramount for legitimacy, in which the posts related to the private sphere show the subtlety in pushing the political agenda. Furthermore, on Twitter Abascal’s alignment with the platform’s culture is well illustrated by Leonardo Ferreira 120

the practice of trolling, via mentioning an adversary, which also constitutes the populist performance, and centres the leader in a different way than on Instagram. Along these lines, the findings suggest that a weaker alignment with the platforms’ vernaculars and low traction have contributed to the low levels of engagement observed in the Portuguese case, albeit the populist performance with influences from the (social media-based) populist performance of other international political actors, such as spreading conspiracy. Therefore, the studied social media channels do not seem to have been central to electoral mobilisation, although less public spheres such as WhatsApp groups may have been important channels, of which the party’s publicity to WhatsApp is suggestive, a messaging service that played a role in favouring Bolsonaro in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election (Belli). CH and Ventura seem to have been at an early stage of social media-based mobilisation, indicated by the adherence to Facebook’s advertising services at a later stage, which can be related to a prioritisation of offline activities, important in the Portuguese electoral context, and to Ventura’s visibility as football and crime commentator. In this sense, these findings also show how political actors are conditioned by the platforms. The lack of ‘intensity’ in the Portuguese case and, conversely, the Spaniards’ ‘calibration’ show that populism is lived through the platforms’ vernaculars, constituted by (non)human agency and unpredictability, representing new forms of mobilisation shaped by these platforms. On the other hand, the findings for the post-election period revealed populist tendencies for both parties and leaders, aligned with an opposition role (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al.), allowing to problematise the propagation of the adoption of the populist style adapted to the platforms to reach high engagement (Larsson). Therefore, these findings situate social media’s role in the global rise of populism, in general, and of the far right in liberal democracies in particular, adding urgency to the debate about the platform’s ideological influence and control, as they contribute to and benefit from the proliferation of bigotry and manipulation. As Gillespie argues, platforms ‘produce specific kinds of public discourse in specific ways’, thus they can invite, facilitate and exacerbate existing tendencies towards

weaponized and coordinated harassment; misrepresentation and propaganda buoyed by its quantified popularity; polarization as a side effect of algorithmic personalization; bots speaking as humans, humans speaking as bots; public participation emphatically figured as individual self-promotion; the tactical gaming of algorithms in order to simulate genuine cultural value. (Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet 206) Leonardo Ferreira 121

Conclusion

Social media plays an increasingly influential role within the parties’ communication and mobilisation strategies in liberal democracies. Considering the widespread use of social media and the global rise of populism, with scholarship postulating social media as conducive to populism (Gerbaudo), this study has sought to study the interplay between populism and social media taking the cases of VOX and CH and their leaders and four major social media platforms. As this study methodological approach is anchored on digital methods, the instability of the medium is inherent, as well as access limitations are, thus this study includes the volatility of engagement and a perspective that leaves out affordances such as Instagram stories and others, as platforms increasingly expand their services to appeal to and retain different audiences. Moreover, establishing comparisons is in itself a challenge in face of the specificities of diverse phenomena, particularly in regards to the digital public sphere, and its complex and evolving sociotechnical and cultural dynamics, thereby constituting a methodological and analytical challenge (Burgess and Matamoros-Fernández). Nevertheless, this work demonstrates that success in reception emerges at the nexus of the populist style and the alignment with the platforms’ vernaculars. As citizens’ attention is highly disputed in these social media environments and within the broader media ecosystem, the populist style and its polarising appeal to ‘the people’, antagonising ‘others’ and focusing on crisis, permeated by emotionalization, simplification and ‘bad manners’, is a way of doing politics with attention-grabbing potential, and that can benefit from social media’s vernaculars, among which the imbued ambivalence or the affordances with the potential to exacerbate the populist performance. As such, these findings can help explain the rise of populism as social media use is increasingly widespread, further considering the constitutive role of the platforms’ vernaculars to the populist performance. As the political actors’ populist performances succeed within an adaptation to the platforms’ vernaculars, social media exert influence in online campaigning success, especially in regards to their demand of intensity and calibration, suiting the platforms’ commercial imperatives and, thereby, reinforcing their attractiveness before clients, investors and users such as political parties, given the opportunity to manage their campaigns with access to a wealth of resources, as the ever-evolving affordances of the platforms continue to offer practical solutions and freshness. Along these lines, regarding Moffit’s assertion of populism as gradational, the findings have shown that, on social media, gradation becomes lived populism through each platform’s vernaculars considering the ways in which populism can be enacted and shaped. Moreover, in Leonardo Ferreira 122

regards to the author’s question of whether there are types of democratic regimes more susceptible to populism than others (Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism 162), although the findings show that Spain’s system of government has played a role in VOX campaigning, catering on the Catalan issue, the question can be directed at problematising the role of social media, as a product of liberal democracies, in the advancement of the far right that caters on bigotry, resentment, discord, and manipulation, with the platforms’ indirect and direct profiting. Future research would aim at understanding CH and VOX and other Portuguese and Spanish parties’ presence on social media after VOX and CH’s electoral successes, to investigate normalisation of far right ideology and proliferation in the adoption of the populist style. As instances of hybridity emerged, falling out of the scope of this study, hybridity continues to constitute an important dimension for investigation. This is not to disregard the remarkably low turnout in the last Portuguese general election, in which 51,4% of the citizens did not cast their ballot, nor Spain’s crisis in regard to Catalonia, nor to decline the citizens’ voting on these actors, but indeed to shed light on the message of populism and social media concerning the health of liberal democracies, an effort that begs the involvement of the citizens.

Leonardo Ferreira 123

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